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*'WE DON'T WANT TO SPEAK WITH
TECHNOCRATS BECAUSE THE SOLUTIONS ARE
POLITICAL': THE STRATEGIES OF THE CHILEAN
STUDENT PROTESTS IN 2006 AND 2011*

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation identifies and describes the strategies used by the Chilean student movement in its 2006 and 2011 protests. It analyses the development of the strategies and observes that a traditional repertoire of action was complemented by important democratising organisational changes that changed both the strategising and collective identity of the student movement. In addition to this, the collective action frame evolved make substantial links between material demands and structural features of neoliberalism. This latter strategy was articulated through political discourse, which directly contested the technocratic discourse of neoliberalism and contributed towards a wider process of re-politicisation of Chilean society that continues to be linked to the leaders and demands of the 2011 movement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS	3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5
DECLARATION	6
INTRODUCTION	7
I. CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY: THE COUP AND THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP	8
II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHILE AFTER RE-DEMOCRATISATION	11
III. CONCLUSION	13
CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW	14
I. NEOLIBERALISM AND DEPOLITICISATION	14
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CHILE AND LATIN AMERICA	16
III. THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IN 2006 AND 2011	17
IV. CONCLUSION	18
CHAPTER 2 STRATEGIES OF THE PENGUIN PROTESTS	20
I. ORGANISATION	21
II. COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME	23
III. REPERTOIRE OF ACTION	24
IV. AUTONOMY	26
V. CONCLUSION	26

CHAPTER 3 THE STRATEGIES OF THE 2011 PROTESTS	28
I. ORGANISATION	29
II. COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME	31
III. REPERTOIRE OF ACTION	34
IV. AUTONOMY	37
V. CONCLUSION	38
CHAPTER 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIES.....	39
I. THE MAIN STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011	39
II. ARTICULATING RE-POLITICISATION	41
III. TRADITIONAL OR NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT	43
IV. CONCLUSION.....	44
CONCLUSION	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	48

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DECLARATION

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature:

Printed Name:

INTRODUCTION

“When students in Latin America break into international headlines, it is usually as the result of some mass demonstration or riot” (Bonilla, 1960: 311)

Chile is no exception to the long tradition of student protest in Latin America. Dating back to the founding of the *Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile* (FECH) in 1906, student organisations have been a steady force for change within universities and occasionally beyond (Bonilla, 1960). However, when the current wave of the Chilean student movement first emerged in 2006, it did so in inauspicious circumstances. Indeed, the arrival of the Penguin movement, named after the black and white uniforms of the marching secondary school students, “took the country by surprise” (Donoso, 2013: 2). The student movement then not only re-emerged in 2011 but brought about the biggest street protest since the 1989 pro-democratisation movement, breaking once again into international headlines (Figueroa, 2012; Segovia and Gamboa, 2012). Now, as a new generation of high school students march through Santiago's streets, the leaders from the 2011 are spearheading a campaign to bring about a plebiscite and change former dictator Augusto Pinochet's constitution while former president Michele Bachelet, now the current favourite to win the presidential election this November, is campaigning on a set of proposals that mirror the student demands.

That these developments were a cause for surprise was rooted in the widespread assumption that Chilean civil society was, to all intents and purposes, dormant (Silva, 2004). Though the country's 17-year dictatorship had ended in 1990, the quality of democracy was being seriously questioned, particularly in terms of the inheritance of Pinochet's 1980 Constitution and neoliberal programme (Barrera, 1999; Garretón, 2003; Tedesco and Barton, 2004). One of the acute symptoms of this was seen to be the depoliticisation of Chilean life at both the level of formal

politics and civil society, which had its roots in the dictatorship but did not improve with democratisation (Oxhorn, 1994; Barrera, 1999; Silva, 2004). Citizens increasingly neither sought political expression through formal political parties (Olavarría, 2003) nor grassroots movements despite growing dissent with the status quo (Garretón, 1994). Indeed, the mere possibility of political discourse had been neutralised by the neoliberal re-packaging of political issues as economic policies (Garretón, 1994), which included education policy since the Higher Education Reform Decree of 1980 initiated the systematic decentralisation and privatisation of schools and universities.

Yet the protests not only emerged but grew in substance and size. This dissertation will attempt to explain how the movement achieved this, by focussing on the following research questions: What were the strategies of the Chilean student movement in 2006 and 2011? How did they develop? These questions will be directly addressed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Firstly, it is necessary to give an account of the social and political context that demonstrates why the emergence of a significant social movement appeared unlikely in the 2000s, while providing evidence for how Chilean social movements have learned to expand and contract with political space available since Pinochet's dictatorship began in 1973.

I. CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY: THE COUP AND THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Chile had enjoyed one of the longest established democracies in the world when the military coup of 1973 removed Socialist president Salvador Allende from power. It was a dramatic end to an administration fraught with political polarisation and financial instability. Allende had begun his administration with a limited authority after the close-run 1970 election led to his appointment by Congress on the condition that he had no control over the military or judiciary. He planned a peaceful transition to Socialism, initiated with a programme of land reforms and popular policies, which was legal but, crucially, perceived as illegitimate as it departed from established elite bargaining procedures between

political parties across the spectrum (Garretón, 2003; Navia, 2010). However, the shadow of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 loomed large. The USA and Latin America had watched closely as Fidel Castro establish a communist state, with support from the Soviet Union, and the dual response within Chile reflected that across the continent: those on the left demanded revolution, while alarm bells rang for the country's conservative, land-owning classes. The latter had the support of the USA, which had already invested in a Christian Democrat candidate in the 1964 election to avoid a socialist victory. In 1972, it doubled military aid to Chile and on 11th of September the following year the armed forces stormed the presidential palace to remove Allende (Hellinger, 2011).

Pinochet soon emerged as leader among the military generals and his dictatorship began with a systematic attempt to eliminate those on the left of the political spectrum. The first few years of his rule saw more than 3000 people executed or disappeared (Collins, 2010), with thousands of others tortured. Many more went into exile. The systematic repression of the population was amplified by Pinochet's invocation of the threat of Communism, and the conflation of this with any form of left-wing politics. Once the left of the spectrum was deemed to be under control, Pinochet began to radically restructure Chile's economic and social policy and thereby reconfigure the relationship between state and society. The introduction of a severe form of neoliberalism with the economic reforms of 1975-85 and 1986 committed the country to a programme of increasing exports and exploiting natural resources and labour, while either ending or curtailing existing social programmes in order to reformulate them in neoliberal terms (Taylor, 2003). Citizens became consumers of private social services and political issues became economic calculations, in direct opposition to the collectivism nurtured under Allende (Oxhorn, 1994; Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 2003).

Education was privatised and decentralised, with management of primary and secondary schools being delegated to municipalities. By 1990, 45 private universities had opened, most offering mainly technical-professional courses, and fees rose. Combined, the changes reinforced traditional class divisions and were the undoing of years of popular struggle for equal access to education as well as having "among its consequences the dismantling of one of the more

productive and democratic higher education systems of the Americas" (Austin, 1997: p.26).

Meanwhile, the new constitution of 1980 contained a series of articles designed to consolidate Pinochet's regime and inhibit the return to democracy; these articles required an unachievable vote threshold in order to be amended. Among other features, it gave the military the majority of seats on a new National Security Council (NSC), whose remit included civil policy matters; Article 8 guaranteed sanctions against individuals or groups supporting positions against the family or in support of violence or political views deemed Marxist; and it removed immunity from members of Congress so that they could be dismissed for any objection to the regime (Oppenheim, 1993).

Nevertheless, while the regime eliminated opportunities for formal political representation, it did not "absorb society" (Garretón, 2003: 119) and grassroots social movements began to emerge from various sectors, chiefly women's groups and the *pobladores*, or poor, urban population, spurred by previous organising during democracy and the alternative, autonomous space created by the regime's removal of traditional means of political expression (Oxhorn, 1995; Taylor, 1998; Navia, 2010). Given that political parties were banned and communist parties would be made illegal, people had to organise outwith official politics and institutions, while membership of these emerging social movement cut across party political boundaries (Taylor, 1998). Protests tended to be localised, small-scale, brief and based upon self-expression about a specific cause or issue rather than an expectation of fundamental political change, and many took place in association with and therefore under the protection of the Catholic church (Garretón, 1988).

Combined, these small, informal protests produced an "emergent intermediate political class" (Garretón, 1988: 11) which contributed to the massive "National Protest" on May Day, 1983. This was initiated by copper miners during an economic crisis and set in motion a wave of popular protest, in which communists and women played significant organising roles (Hellinger, 2011). By this stage, the pro-democracy movement was supported by the working and

middle classes, young and old, as well as the union for copper workers - the biggest in the country - and was not initially diminished by Pinochet's clampdowns. However, the violence of a 1986 mass protest, in which two young protesters were burned by military forces, marked a turning point in tactics and the opposition began to seek more peaceful, formal means of ending the dictatorship, which would not risk compromising the support of the middle classes that had benefited from its neoliberal policies (Oxhorn, 1994).

At the time, the pro-democracy movement was divided over how big an impact mobilisation could have upon the dictatorship and it's a question still debated by scholars. The 1988 plebiscite, as planned by Pinochet in his Constitution, gave the Chilean people the opportunity to simply vote for or against the dictator continuing in office for a further eight years - 56% voted no. For some, this marked the culmination of a process of elite bargaining, a style of politics honed during the previous democracy until Allende's turn to a more participatory style, and retained in the new, which defines Chile's transition as being "from above". However, others emphasise that negotiations between the Pinochet regime and opposition politicians were initiated after the first National Protest (Hellinger, 2011).

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHILE AFTER RE-DEMOCRATISATION

The 1990 election was won by a coalition of parties known as the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*, led by Patricio Aylwin. The *Concertación* had to make significant concessions, such as retaining a constitution that would severely limit the degree of democratisation achieved during transition, and explicitly pursued a pragmatic approach to justice for human rights violations "en la medida de lo posible"; or "in the realm of the possible"; this meant, it transpired, a truth commission with limited remit and an abandoned plan to repeal the 1978 amnesty law. It was a cautious first democratic administration; necessarily so, given its inherited constitution and the continued presence of the military both in government and wider institutions, including universities. At the same time, neoliberal policies brought in during the dictatorship would continue

to form the heart of the country's economy and a binomial voting system negotiated during the transition would effectively guarantee the right an equal number of seats in the Congress even if they were minority candidates. Combined, these inherited structural features would continue to exert influence on the nature and extent of democratisation. The plebiscite itself initiated an emphasis on procedural democracy, while "*la democracia de los acuerdos*" or "democracy of agreements" (Barrera, 1999), as well as echoes of the political polarisation that had contributed to the coup, set a deliberative tone of consensus over dispute.

Though social movements had surged in the campaign for democratisation, certain features of both the movements themselves and the changing political circumstances resulted in a severe contraction in their activities. Groups that had defined themselves by what they were *against* - i.e. Pinochet - began to falter when their impetus for action and source of mobilisation left office (though his influence continued in his chosen roles of senator-for-life and commander of the armed forces). The informal, reactive networks of various political and civil society groups lost their mechanism for mobilisation in the same way. Furthermore, democratisation brought new rules of engagement: protests that would have been considered legitimate by the public-at-large under dictatorship could no longer be considered justified in a democracy, where citizens in principle had the opportunity to express dissent through the formal channels of lobbying and voting (Taylor, 1998).

While the neoliberal model was consolidated during democratisation, its effect on the public sphere was keenly felt in the country's one-dimensional media, the plurality of which had been depleted by the *Concertación's* decision to cut off funding to independent publications on the basis of its pursuit of political stability and adherence to the neoliberal media model (Bresnahan, 2003). As a chief conduit for information, representation and expression, a democratised media has been recognised as an essential part of democratisation (O'Neil, 1998). Instead, the media monopoly in the early years of the return to democracy continued to promote a pro-Pinochet perspective. It has since continued to demonstrate this effect of neoliberal media democratisation

through its exclusive dialogue between newspaper editors and an increasingly media-obsessed government, thereby severely limiting the diversity of public information and debate by its exclusion and biased reporting on social actors (Bresnahan, 2003; León-Dermota, 2003).

III. CONCLUSION

The foregoing history has highlighted the challenges faced by social movements in Chile since Pinochet's dictatorship and during democratisation - some of these as a direct result of the dictatorship and some, such as elite bargaining, having already featured in the political culture pre-1973. Combined, these factors have limited the political space available for actors in civil society, particular in formal political channels. However, social movements have been able to carve out space for protest. The last significant instance of this were the democratisation protests of the late 1980s, though this political space could not be sustained through the first years of the *Concertación*, which continued in government for twenty years until 2010. The student movement emerged at the end of the presidency of Richard Lagos (2000-2006), persisted during that of Michele Bachelet (2006-2010) and continues during the administration of Sebastián Piñera (the next presidential election will be held on 11th of November 2013). It has grown in defiance of all diagnoses of the de-politicisation of Chilean society and is now in the position of being courted rather than excluded by the political elite, while former leaders are establishing alternative political parties and mainstream campaigns to overhaul Pinochet's constitution.

The following chapters will, firstly, examine the strategies used by the movement in 2006 and 2011 and, secondly, identify key developments in the strategies. Overall, it will argue that the student protests contributed to a wider re-politicisation of Chilean society by politicising the discourse on social issues, which directly confronted the technocratic discourse of the government and ultimately revealed the political content of neoliberalism. Lastly, the position of the student movement in terms of traditional and "new" social movements in Latin America will be discussed.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the years following the military coup of 1973, rich scholarship emerged on Chile on topics including the dictatorship, social movements, neoliberalism, and later on democratisation. This literature review will focus on three areas of research that directly inform and therefore may assist in answering the research questions of the dissertation: (I) depoliticisation in relation to neoliberalism; (II) social movements in Latin America; and (III) the Chilean student movements themselves. The first of these areas is fundamental to understanding the meaning and manifestation of depoliticisation in Chile and how this was related to the neoliberal project; the second puts the student movement in a broader regional and theoretical context; and the third deals specifically with the events and domestic context around the student protests. They will now be considered in turn.

I. NEOLIBERALISM AND DEPOLITICISATION

Depoliticisation can be defined as the removal of any political dimension from matters that have generally been considered political, such as policy-making, the formation of constitutions, and the configuration of state-civil society relations. It is an important concept for this dissertation because it can explain both the social landscape into which the student movement emerged as well as indicate the obstacles to its success. There is consensus in the literature that systematic depoliticisation is not only an effect of neoliberalism but forms the basis of its theoretical underpinnings, which are rooted in the idea that social processes can be governed by market principles (Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 2006). This severe contraction of the definition of the political sphere makes way for

decision-making by economic experts, or technocrats, free from the influence of social actors, which requires the inhibition of collective identity and action and so was an overt aim of the neoliberal programme introduced by Pinochet (Barrera, 1999; Taylor, 2006) and this continued during democratisation and the *Concertación* era through the same non-participatory, elite-based approach to politics (Taylor, 1998; Garretón, 2003; Silva, 2004; Taylor, 2006). This continuity establishes a logical link between the authoritarian political system and the neoliberal programme that continued to replicate its configuration of state-civil society relations and reveals neoliberalism as a political project in itself, rather than a set of technocratic practices, that is logically incompatible with democracy (Paley, 2001; Taylor, 2006).

At the level of civil society, the inequalities created and exacerbated by neoliberalism themselves inhibit civil society in addition to the obstruction or suppression of collective organising at the grassroots level (see next section), while the economic, supposedly ideology-free explanation of policy-making enable the characterisation of opposing political demands as divisive in a way that invokes the political crisis in Chile during the early 1970s for which neoliberalism was seen as the solution (Taylor, 2006). While the political demands of social actors could have been channelled through the return of electoral politics, a combination of the binomial electoral system, which over-represents the right-wing parties that were seen to be key to the maintenance of neoliberalism, and the exclusion of citizens from the policy-making process resulted in a rejection of the procedures of democracy (Olavarría, 2003). While depoliticisation is generally characterised as a passive state of apathy or indifference (Garretón, 1994; Silva, 2004) this conception is challenged by research which suggests that recent non-voting among the younger generation can itself be interpreted as a political decision, in the sense of an objection to the formality of voting as a method of political expression when other forms are limited and policy decisions exclude citizens (Olavarría, 2003).

II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CHILE AND LATIN AMERICA

Research on social movements in Latin America expanded greatly with the pro-democratisation movements of the 1980s and anti-neoliberal and indigenous rights protests in the 1990s. Chile was no exception and this section will focus on the literature on the changing strategies of social movements, defined as “organized collective actors who engage in sustained political or cultural contestation through recourse to institutional and extra-institutional forms of action” (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 321), then go on to consider the wider literature on Latin America.

Several key features of the strategies of social movements in Chile emerge from the literature. Firstly, there is consensus that even in the midst of repression social movements were able to organise (Garretón, 1988; Oxnorn, 1995; Taylor, 1998) which is explained by reference to experience of democratic organisation pre-1973 (Taylor, 1998), the strength of community bonds as much as practical demands (Oxnorn, 1995) and ongoing symbiotic links with political parties (Schneider, 1991). This is further explained either by the Pinochet regime’s inability to repress (Garretón, 1988) or tolerance of (Oxnorn, 1995) collective organisation. Despite this resilience, social movements drastically declined with the introduction of formal democracy and its redefinitions of the political and democratic expression (Garretón 1988; Taylor, 1998; Paley, 2001). That is, social movements have demonstrated an ability to create political space where there is apparently none; but not where there is actually existing democracy.

The degree of autonomy from political parties is also identified as representing a critical strategic decision in order to, first, avoid social, economic and political demands being subsumed to or co-opted within the compromise-led approach of elite politics since 1990 and, second, avoid the divisive effect that party allegiance can have within social movements, thereby inhibiting collective identity (Garretón, 1994; Taylor, 1998; Paley 2001). Social movements have historically been linked very closely to political parties in Chile and are more likely to emerge in areas with strong historical links to particular parties (Schneider, 1991), however the detachment of *Concertación* parties from their

grassroots bases, particularly among the working classes, has damaged all sectors (Olavarría, 2003). The key issue here is that social movements have an antagonistic relationship with political parties in Chile - they may depend upon them to organise in the first place but at the cost of a broad collective identity and are unlikely to be involved in any elite negotiations. As there is far more empirical research on the changing experiences of community movements and the urban working classes (Oxhorn, 1995; Paley, 2001), this dynamic may not apply to movements emerging from other sectors.

Of the wider and more recent scholarship on social movements in Latin America, an emerging category of "new social movements" has been widely acknowledged (Robinson, 2007; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker, 2007; Vanden, 2007). These are characterised by "horizontality", "autonomy" and "solidarity", in addition to tending to make use of technology to enhance their commitment to mass mobilisation, sometimes across national and international borders and frequently in contestation of neoliberal policies (Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker, 2007). This type of movement ostensibly has more in common with the identity-orientated theories of social movements than strategy-orientated.

III. THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IN 2006 AND 2011

As the student movement is a recent phenomenon, serious academic research on the topic is only beginning to emerge; naturally, the 2006 protests have received greater attention in published work. This section will consider work on the 2006 and 2011 protests separately, particularly highlighting what it has so far suggested about the strategies of the movements.

The most comprehensive work on the 2006 Penguin movement focuses on the organisational, strategic and tactical factors that enabled the Penguin movement to create political space, as identified through in-depth interviews with leaders of the movement (Donoso, 2013). It highlights key organisation features including horizontality and participation movement and frames them in terms of theoretical touchstones such as collective action frames, while emphasis on how the movement consciously staggered its demands while

responding to external events, particularly encounters with the media and government.

A further attempt to begin to theorising the movement raises some potent ideas regarding the gestation of the movement using the concept of inter-generational learning, however it limits its analysis to women in the movement when the broader application of this framework could yield a powerful explanation for the apparently spontaneous protest (Chovanec and Benitez, 2008). A further paper highlights a vital moment for the 2006 protest: how street demonstrations were abandoned in favour of school occupations after accusations of violence threatened the legitimacy of the movement (Alarcón Ferrari, 2007).

An analysis of the 2011 protests proposes to question whether they represent a traditional or “Occupy-type” movement and concludes that they are too entrenched in domestic political factors and centrally organised through the institutions and networks of long-established student organisations to warrant comparison with the the latter (Guzman-Concha, 2012). While this conclusion is sound, it does highlight the need for in-depth empirical research to properly explain the organisational features indicated, whether these influenced the strategies available to the movement and, if so, how. Elsewhere, the strategic preference for mobilisation over immediate resolution of demands and non-party allegiance are stressed (Jara Reyes, 2012), as well as the ability of the movement to highlight the shortcomings of the *Concertación* and Piñera's subsequent administration as a way of gaining support and broad-based legitimacy among the middle sectors (Ruiz, 2012).

IV. CONCLUSION

This literature review has assessed the existing scholarship on three areas relevant to the topic of this dissertation. The scholarship on depoliticisation provides a rich account of how the authoritarian repression of civil society through systematic depoliticisation has been maintained by the mechanisms of neoliberalism throughout the period of democratisation.

One of the most informative aspects of this for this dissertation is the way in which neoliberalism, in purporting to be apolitical, significantly altered the discourse available to citizens to make sense of and contest their circumstances, which has made the definition of grievances in political terms and negotiations with politicians who use technocratic language virtually impossible. It is less clear whether neoliberalism can tolerate a greater degree of politicisation or if it is fundamentally incompatible with democratic processes.

The research on social movements in Chile is valuable in establishing the context in which the student movement arose and identifies key obstacles to its success, particularly the continued exclusion from elite decision-making and traditional ties to political parties inhibiting the formation of a broad base. However, its explanatory power is limited by its focus upon traditional social movements at the working class level. In particular, the student movement is not well represented from the beginning of the dictatorship up until the current wave of protest, which is important as Bonilla's research suggests that student movements have historically operated by a different logic to other movements and this resonates with key features of the current wave.

Finally, emerging work on the student movement itself is increasingly enriched by its empirical approach, which is increasingly framed in terms of social movement theory and historical dynamics. This is necessary in order to place it within the literature on Latin American social movements, which is instructive in highlighting key characteristics of recent social movements in the region as well as acknowledging that its distinction between traditional and new movements raises as many questions as it purports to answer. For instance, it is clear that technology has been important to the student movement, but, for instance, how does it operate as part of a dynamic with more traditional mobilisations?

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIES OF THE PENGUIN PROTESTS

The first significant wave of education protests began in earnest on the 10th of May 2006, when students from publically-funded secondary schools declared a national strike and took to the streets of Santiago after several weeks of smaller-scale, localised protests across the country. The first domino had fallen in April, when the roof of a school in a town in Southern Chile collapsed after heavy rainfall and prompted protest against the lack of investment in infrastructure. This nascent discontent quickly spread northwards and grew into a catalogue of complaints regarding the state of secondary schools in the country. On the 27th of April, the *Asamblea de Estudiantes Secundarios de Santiago* (AES) held a march of 4000 protesters. The burgeoning movement soon became known as the penguin protests, in reference to the black and white school uniforms of the protesters.

The Penguins began their march at a time when Chile was garnering international goodwill for its economic performance following the neoliberal reforms of the preceding decades. The *Concertación* was just over halfway through its twenty-year administration, with the socialist Ricardo Lagos having been superceded by fellow socialist Michelle Bachelet on the 6th of March 2006. Both administrations attempted to offset the harshest repercussions of the continuing commitment to Pinochet's neoliberalism by incorporating social demands into their policy programmes, while Bachelet had pledged to introduce a more participatory form of politics. As established in the preceding chapters, this moderate turn to the left during a time of transition was not the democratic catalyst it was expected to be and the period was marked by the depoliticisation of civil society, which included a considerable decline of social movements. It was into this arena that a group of uniformed secondary school students

emerged, with little prior experience of large-scale organising and even less of elite politics.

This chapter will identify and describe the particular strategies of the Penguin movement in this context, considering in turn: (I) organisation; (II) collective action frame; (III) repertoire of action; and (IV) autonomy. It emphasises the way in which previous experiences in 2001 and 2005 influenced the strategies of the Penguin movement, and suggests that the two most significant strategic developments brought about by the Penguin movement were, first, the re-organisation of the student body to improve mobilisation, which also constituted a significant shift in the collective identity of the movement, and the shift from material demands to the identification of a structural issue.

I. ORGANISATION

An organisational basis is plainly a ready source of mobilisation for social movements and is usually associated with trade unions and other professional bodies; however, the precise relevance of the organisation of a social movement to its strategy represents a grey area in social movement theory. As Foweraker points out, it is “never imagined as a purposive and deliberate process” by leading identity-orientated theorists (1995: 15), while the strategy-orientated perspective, not traditionally applied to Latin American movements, acknowledges that “organization and leadership are necessary precisely because the movement is goal-orientated and must make the strategic choices that may achieve those goals” (1995: 16).

Against this background, the school and university student organisations in Chile during the 2000s are on ambiguous ground. Like any organisation, they offer a source of ready mobilisation; unlike other organisations, student organisations have a distinct cyclical nature, owing to the fact that their protests tend to be renewed each academic year and their members are similarly subject to this process; joining, moving up or leaving the organisation depending on their school year. This internal mechanism appears to lend itself to focussing on short-term material demands that are relevant to the current student population and can

be resolved before the end of the academic year, and the history of the student movement overall in Chile appears to confirm this (Bonilla, 1960). Furthermore, as the introduction pointed out, student organisations have traditionally been hierarchical and elite, rooted in the so-called emblematic schools and universities.

Yet this significantly changed just before the beginning of the academic year of 2006 and therefore directly before the new protest cycle that became the Penguin Revolution. At the end of 2005, the secondary student organisations *Asamblea de Centros de Alumnos de Santiago* (ACAS) and the *Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios* (ACES) came together to form the AES. This instantly diluted the political mix and tone of the student body. The ACES had objected to the authoritarian origins of ACAS and in forming the new body dispensed with them while simultaneously prompting a shift to the ACES's more progressive horizontal and participatory structure, with spokespersons appointed rather than leaders. The AES represented a degree of plurality of political parties, from the left to the right, as well as students not affiliated to parties.

On one hand, this "pre-movement" event can be interpreted as a purely strategic move because previous experiences showed that it would have a positive effect on mobilisation and therefore support the achievement of the movement's goals. The ACES had itself been founded only in 2000, when several other student organisations came together with a new ethos of horizontality and participation that welcomed for the first time representatives from informal student groups as well as those from student councils. This step towards greater inclusion resulted in more students joining the ACES (Donoso, 2013: 7) and indeed the same effect was observed after the changes in 2005. On the other hand, it can also be seen as a precursor to the structural changes that the movement would come to demand of the government - inclusive and democratic decision-making, and the shedding of Pinochet's legacy - and thereby established continuity between their material demands and growing ideological position. That is, the re-organisation was a political act related to the changing goals and identity of the movement. Consequently, it can be interpreted as an early renewal of collective identity that went on to influence the strategies of

the Penguin movement considered below. That is, the transformation enabled the movement to begin to escape the default collective identity acquired through the long tradition of largely left-wing student protest and emerge as a progressive organisation, still orientated to the left but inclusive, deliberative and democratic in style and disposed of the final traces of Pinochet.

II. COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME

The collective action frame of a social movement can be characterised as its cognitive strategy and may be made up of various distinct or overlapping frames. It has been defined as an “interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). This process of forming a collective action frame is vital for the identity and mobilisation potential of the movement. As previously outlined, the Penguin movement emerged out of a series of smaller protests based on a combination of local and national material demands, with its first phase dominated by calls for free transport passes and an end to the fees charged for taking a university entrance exam. At this point, the protests had organisational unity as they were supported by the AES, but the variety of demands meant that the movement lacked coherence and a single message that communicated their importance beyond those immediately affected by the problems they described.

However, this quickly shifted focus to the overall quality and inequality of neoliberal education policies and in particular the *Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Educación* (LOCE) (Burton, 2012; Cabalin, 2012). This constituted a highly significant development for the “diagnostic” frame of the movement and marked a shift from technical and practical matters to political issues. The incorporation of the LOCE also marked a degree of maturation in the movement itself, as the *Mochilazo* protesters of 2001 had also cited the law as a grievance, but it was not embedded within the same ideological framework. As one *Mochilazo* participant said: “We criticised the LOCE for its authoritarian origin;

not because we knew which aspects were contributing to inequality" (Donoso, 2013: 7). Five years later, the AES had developed this into a protest against the LOCE itself with slogans including "*Yo solo sé, no LOCE*" or "I only know, no LOCE", thereby constituting a stronger diagnostic collective action frame.

However, it was not yet a prognostic frame, as positive discussions regarding an alternative to the LOCE were deliberately avoided by the movement on the basis that "ultimately, while material demands are transversal, political demands always divide" (student leader quoted in Donoso, 2013: 12). Nevertheless, the mere inclusion of the LOCE and criticism of neoliberalism in the collective action frame had considerable domestic resonance as it represented an absence in the debate of the time. It made explicit the connection between material circumstances and the wider political system that "revealed the gap between the real Chile and the topics discussed in the public sphere, showing that the latter had become a reverential dialogue between politics and the media" (Ruiz, 2012: 76). The students were able to invoke principles of equality and equity that, although directly related to their particular demands, spoke to other groups in society as "it was not only the poorest who had been excluded from economic growth: full-time workers and large sectors of the middle class were also on the margins" (Ruiz, 2012: 76). That is, the connection began to prick the protective bubble of neoliberalism.

III. REPERTOIRE OF ACTION

The repertoire of action of a social movement typically comprises forms of protests that have been "developed over long periods, and have been changed and adapted to suit the respective setting" (Haunss, 2007: 164). Such adaptations may include responses to the political structure of the time, the organisational structure of the movement, political parties and cultural references. As we have seen, protest in Chile has historically been highly adaptable, with the pro-democracy movement creating space for resistance under dictatorship; however, the decline in social movements following the return to democracy in 1990 effectively created a significant fracture in the

continuity of protest. The early experiences of the penguin movement suggested that the mobilisation of 10th of May acted as a litmus test for how any form of large-scale protest would be responded to by the political elite.

Secondary students had opted for traditional street mobilisations several times in 2006 before the penguin movement called the general protest on 10th of May. As well as being a traditional form of protest in the country and within the history of the movement itself, it was a particularly appropriate choice for the student protesters before they became more unified in 2005 - physical unity creates the illusion of organisational unity, as was seen during the pro-democracy protests. However, 10th of May saw violent confrontations between protesters and the police, with 930 arrests made (Donoso, 2013). The leading national newspaper, *El Mercurio*, ran an editorial piece stating that "it is inevitable to presume that, eventually, a strategy of ... anti-systemic agitation such as the one observed in the 1960s and 1970s might be brewing or even being applied within the extreme Left" (quoted in Donoso, 2013: 11).

This association of the movement with violence and historical prejudices regarding the left, particularly a vestigial reflex at any suggestion of Communism, and the movement's inability to re-direct this, prompted a change in strategy to school occupations or *tomas*, also a traditional form of student protest. By 29th of May, 130,000 students were occupying schools across the country, bringing the academic year to a standstill. While this achieved the desired effect, in the sense that the movement was taken seriously by the government and negotiations over its material demands were initiated, the nature of sit-ins meant that fatigue became an issue. Sit-ins are high-cost in terms of missed school and detachment from normal life and the effect of this may have led to dwindling energy reserves that made the movement less resistant to co-optation. In addition, sit-ins lack the expressive, high-impact nature of ongoing street demonstrations.

IV. AUTONOMY

For social movements, autonomy has been described as being “at the heart of the articulation of strategies” (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 321), however the domestic political context must determine from what the social movement must be autonomous. In Chile, with its history of strong political parties, autonomy means that a social movement defines itself and operates independently of political parties. Furthermore, resistance to co-optation is a valuable strategy given the strong tendency towards co-optation of social movements by governments in Chile (Paley, 2001; Greaves, 2012). These principles were distilled in the experience of student leaders at a platform for negotiation in 2005, after a proposal developed during series of meetings hosted in the Ministry of Education was disregarded as soon as the Bachelet administration began (Donoso, 2013). Nevertheless, in 2006 the students joined a presidential advisory commission for education comprising social actors such as themselves and technocrats, only to find their contribution sidelined and the movement effectively co-opted. That is, they were met with “the solid institutional frame of the Chilean state, which inhibits the entry of new actors to the political game” (Jara Reyes, 2011: 99). However, though they had been lured by Bachelet’s discourse about a “government of citizens”, the movement showed signs of developing its own distinctive political discourse that itself became an emerging strategy of resistance: “We don’t want to speak with technocrats, because the solutions are political” (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008:108, quoted in Donoso, 2013: 11). Combined these experiences reaffirmed the importance of autonomy while giving the movement access to the nature of elite discussions. The students heard technocratic discourse first-hand and refused to engage in a dialogue with it.

V. CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to give an account of the main strategies of the Penguin movement of 2006. Though the protests took the country unawares, their extensive school occupations did bring about negotiations with the

Bachelet administration, though these effectively ended with the co-optation of the movement and decisions were reached by politicians and experts. Though the Penguin protests are generally viewed as having been unsuccessful, two important strategic developments can be noted. First, it is argued here that the organisational changes initiated before the protests represent a political act that both expressed and operationalised a commitment to democratic values, thereby redefining the collective identity of the movement while simultaneously constituting a strategy for mobilisation. Second, that the connection of material grievances to their structural causes marked the beginning of a shift in strategy that barely had the opportunity to develop beyond sloganeering before the movement came to an end.

CHAPTER 3

THE STRATEGIES OF THE 2011 PROTESTS

Five years after the Penguin Revolution, the streets of Santiago were again filled with protesting students - this time older, wiser and more indignant. The national student representative body, the *Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile* (CONFECH), announced a national day of protest on 12th of May 2011 to precede the annual presidential address nine days later. Between 15,000-30,000 students - the number varies from report to report - turned out protest against high tuition fees and the associated high-interest debt incurred by students and their families in order to pay them, which was directly linked to neoliberal education policies that encouraged private universities to be run as businesses. Marches continued and expanded, with the turnout building to 120,000 months later - the highest number since the pro-democracy protests before the plebiscite of 1989 - and university occupations and strikes ran concurrently.

Just over a year earlier, the 20-year run of the centre-left Concertación had given way to the right-wing administration of Sebastian Piñera, a billionaire businessman and economist. Piñera appointed Joaquín Lavín as his Minister for Education, who as one of the "Chicago Boys" had been an architect of Chile's neoliberal programme and by then owned one of the country's private universities. The demands of the students and the position of the government could barely have been more opposed. Furthermore, the students were not the only source of discontent at the time, with two other local protests being staged in the first half of 2011; one against petrol prices in the Magallanes region and the other against the massive HidroAysén dam project in the Aysén region (Segovia and Gamboa, 2012). Before the end of the academic year, the student protests had garnered coverage in the New York Times, dominated public life in Chile and brought the government into crisis.

Following the form of the preceding chapter, this chapter will identify and describe the main strategies of the 2011 protests, considering in turn: (I) organisation; (II) collective action frame; (III) repertoire of action; and (IV) autonomy. It will emphasise the significance of the strategic move towards transversality, which began at the level of the university federations, and changed the collective identity of the movement. In addition, it will highlight the way in which the collective action frame of the movement was substantially expanded to critique the structural causes of grievances with the educational system and the use of political discourse as part of this development in cognitive strategy.

I. ORGANISATION

University students in Chile are represented by their individual university federations, while CONFECH represents the traditional universities at the national level. Both levels of student representation have historically been hierarchical and elite, with the biggest federations representing the traditional universities in the country: the *Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile* (FECH) and the *Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica* (FEUC). The individual and national federations constitute a solid source of collective identity and resources for mobilisation, which through CONFECH can be realised on a national scale by either acting independently or forming associations with non-member universities. However, in the early 2000s this had been compromised by two factors. First, like other social movements, the federations had been left “relatively weak organizationally because of the legacy of military repression” (Burton, 2012: 47) and, second, the rapid growth of the private sector under neoliberalism meant that the traditional federations were no longer representative of the student body.

Two significant changes that took place in the structure and practices of CONFECH in the period leading up to the 2011 protests must be viewed in this context and therefore, it is suggested, as part of a process of post-dictatorship

re-configuration of collective identity and strategy. First, of the two main university federations stated above, only FECH had a recent history of joining national student protests. However, discussions beginning in 2009 brought the federations closer together under the CONFECH umbrella, which saw two thousand students represented by FEUC marching on 12th of May 2011, twenty times more than had previously participated (Jackson, 2012: 67). The participation of FUEC was important because it is the elite, right-wing university that counts many right-wing politicians among its alumni. While the integration of FUEC was significant, that of the new, private universities was even more so. Indeed, it constituted “the key to the breadth and depth of political impact” (Figueroa, 2012: 49, this quote and subsequent quotes are my own translations) because doing so would solve a problem of representation in the movement by bringing in grievances that were “more representative of real Chilean society” (Figueroa, 2012: 49). Bringing in the private universities meant that Chile’s large middle class was represented, which comprised those most affected by the problems of student debt brought about by the neoliberal education policies identified by the movement. This emerging commitment to transversality in organisation and collective identity was further developed in the collective action frame of the movement.

The second organisational change was a shift to direct and participative democracy within CONFECH, in addition to its pre-existing system of representation (Figueroa, 2012: 101). This was important for the collective identity of the movement as it signalled a commitment to an alternative style of politics that could be directly contrasted with the historically elite, non-participatory style of Chilean politics. That is, the style of politics that had prevailed over the post-dictatorship period of depoliticisation and that had excluded the penguin movement in 2006. It would also go on to determine how strategies were formed, as everything became a matter of horizontal discussion and decision-making within a, by then, more transversal social movement. The repercussions of this will be dealt with in the following sections.

Overall, these changes in the student movement demonstrate again a fundamental role of organisational structure in the intertwined formation of

strategy and collective identity. The shift within CONFECH towards a broader base signalled an early commitment to the strategy of transversality, while the commitment to more participative and direct democratic style defined the movement against the elite style of Chilean politics and fed into a collective identity of inclusivity and strong democratic principles.

II. COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME

The collective action frame, or cognitive strategy, of the 2011 protests was centred on the idea of education as a right that ought to be free, quality and accessible to all. The diagnostic frame clarified the nature of the student grievances and linked these to the neoliberal education policy installed in the constitution by Pinochet in 1990, as summed up by the slogan '*Educar, no Lucrar*', or 'Educate, don't Profiteer'. The prognostic frame pointed towards the structural proposals of the student movement. These two levels, it is suggested here, operated in a dynamic to reinforce how the lived reality of students was a direct consequence of neoliberalism, thereby establishing a coherent collective action frame.

The diagnostic frame was rooted in the financial grievances of students, including issues of student debt, tuition fees, university entrance fees and dropout rates of students from poorer background, set against the profiteering and corruption of universities. Each of these elements demonstrated how the neoliberal education policy was manifested in the real world and therefore imparted particular meaning to the demands of the movement. However, achieving this connection in the minds of the people required strategic communication of the diagnostic frame. First, given the individualism inherent in the neoliberal project, which had for two decades treated Chilean citizens as consumers, it was recognised that "we had to talk about the debt of each; it was not ideology, it was pure unionism" (Jackson, 2012: 64, this quote and subsequent quotes are my own translations). Second, given the historical prejudice against left-wing ideology and recent distortion of the movement's message by the government and media, it was important to anchor the

diagnostic frame in objective information regarding both education and wider inequality. The strategy was “to try to disarm them, to show the lies in those statements that seemed so real” and thereby reveal the government's criticisms as stemming from a neoliberal ideology (Jackson's prologue to Atria, 2012: xvi). Lastly, the student leaders were aware that material demands provoke mobilisation more readily than structural demands and that, consequently, a strong diagnostic frame could be used as part of a dynamic with a longer-term prognostic frame.

In addition to this, the challenge of ensuring the diagnostic frame had this mobilising effect across different groups in society was responded to with a communications campaign that had two objectives. First, “to seek to awaken a sense of responsibility, even culpability and shame, in those who are the privileged in the higher education system” and second, “to awaken a sense of collective action and resistance in those who study even with huge economic difficulties” (Jackson, 2012: 63). In this way, the movement continued its transversal strategy of including, representing and mobilising students at both private and public universities.

The prognostic frame offered a more complex set of challenges. The material demands of the movement were logically tied to the structural demands, which included changing Pinochet's constitution through holding a plebiscite and substantially increasing the state's role in education, but there was a significant obstacle to discussing these. As Jackson observed, there was consensus within the movement that the political system would need to be changed in order to resolve the grievances of the movement but also that there was “no space” in political discourse for proposing such a reform (2012: 62). This effectively meant that however successful the diagnostic frame was in giving the movement a substantial presence on the street, the prognostic frame necessitated a significant discursive turn in a country where government and the media have historically had the monopoly on public discourse. The prognostic frame also had to be constructed in a way that sidestepped ideological prejudices related to the left, thereby preserving the transversal basis of the movement and avoiding distortion by the right-wing media and government.

In keeping with its strategy of transversality, the movement presented the prognostic frame as a “common ideological battle” (Jackson, 2012: 63), which meant avoiding the use of particular words because they would be sure to “revive prejudices: they are the same left as always” (Jackson, 2012: 63). This careful navigation of the historical political landscape of Chile extended to the distribution of tasks among leaders. At meetings with government ministers, Camila Vallejo and Camilo Ballesteros, members of the young Communists, would be given the role of setting out the diagnostic frame in factual terms, while Jackson, seen to represent the middle-ground of disillusioned *Concertación* supporters and the social and intellectual elite, made the case for deep structural changes. The public communication of the prognostic frame was also approached with caution, by increasing the emphasis on the structural argument incrementally in line with the scale of mobilisation.

Social media was also used to clarify the collective action frame as well as correct the perceived distortion of it by the mainstream media. A film posted online prior to the first protest on 12th of May received forty thousand views in the first two days after being posted and contained factual information on student debt and corruption at universities. As Jackson has commented: “Many students were excited to see unity, diagnosis and proposals, together with a simple and direct graphic” (2012: 63). Having suffered at the hands of mainstream media during the penguin protests, social media gave the movement the opportunity to crystallise its collective action frame and in particular make the logical link between diagnostic and prognostic frames that in the more highly ideologised mainstream media may have been characterised as more of a logical leap. This, Jackson states, was valuable as the movement “had the capacity to bring the issue to the whole of society and put out a message over which we had total control” (2012: 22).

However, the new collective action frame, particularly the prognostic frame, had not been formed entirely within the student movement. Between 25th of June and 6th of August 2011, the Chilean law academic Fernando Atria published a series of columns titled “10 false platitudes CIPER about Chilean education (and a proposal to make it less segregated)” in CIPER, an online centre for

independent investigative journalism based in Santiago and funded in part by COPESA, one of the main media companies in the country, as well as international non-government organisations including the Open Society Foundation and the Ford Foundation. These false platitudes included “Private is better than public”, “Reform is impossible” and “Freedom of choice”, effectively addressing key tenets of the neoliberal project and the reasons given for its maintenance. These columns were published in 2012 as the book *La Mala Educación: las Ideas que Inspiraron al Movimiento Estudiantil en Chile*, for which Giorgio Jackson wrote the prologue and confessed that during the protests he always carried a copy of Atria's columns and that, along with fellow leaders Francisco Figueroa and Camila Vallejo, he referred to Atria's arguments during meetings with government officials. In addition to Atria, Figueroa cites Chilean sociologist Tomas Moulian's *Chile Actual: Anatomía de un Mito*, which was published in 1997 and deconstructs the promises of democracy and neoliberalism. By the end of 2011, though the demonstrations had grown smaller, the diagnostic frame of the problem and the solutions had been consolidated in a coherent discourse that was circulating in the public sphere and in direct contention with that of the government.

III. REPERTOIRE OF ACTION

The overall repertoire of action of the 2011 protests was continuous with both that of the Penguins and the traditional template for protest in Chile - a combination of marches and occupations. The protests were sustained for seven months and generally increased in momentum, while new media and social networks were used to mediate their representation by the government and media. This section will show how the initial strategy of the 2011 movement was to increase the scale and duration of the protests beyond the level achieved in 2006. Additionally, that the creative forms of action that have come to characterise the protests, including the kiss-ins and Thriller dance, were not part of the strategy but rather can be seen as a spontaneous consequence of the movement's organisational changes.

From the beginning of the 2011 protests, a clear emphasis was placed on the need for mobilisation on a bigger scale than had been seen in recent years and, in order to do so, it was recognised that “we had to get people to accumulate information, rage, shame, for what was happening...” (Jackson, 2012: 62). Prior to the day of protest, the movement initiated an awareness campaign based around the collective action frame detailed above, with the aim of bringing 20,000 students to march both to create impact on the day and ensure sufficient momentum to follow the first march with many more. The date of the first march was delayed until it was felt that a large number of students had been mobilised and, when the day finally came, the first march drew between 15,000 to 30,000 protesters to the streets of Santiago. By 30th of June, this number increased to between 100,000-200,000 in Santiago and 40,000 in the rest of the country and a high turnout was sustained until the end of the academic year, with the momentum increasingly being provided by the government response to the protests - some of the largest protests followed rejections of government proposals.

While marches were a traditional repertoire of action, they were also traditionally confrontational and the experience in 2011 was no exception, with violent encounters between protesters and the police being captured in front-page photographs. Tear gas and water cannons were used on the protesters, while there were 900 arrests at protests in early August alone, which displayed a certain continuity in how demonstrations were dealt with during the dictatorship and under democracy. Yet there was no fear of severe violence. As one of the leaders, Camila Vallejo, was quoted in newspaper coverage: “For many years our parents’ generation was afraid to demonstrate, to complain, thinking it was better to conform to what was going on. Students are setting an example without the fear our parents had” (Barrionuevo, 2011).

In addition to marches, school and university occupations began at between 100-200 institutions across the country. Again, this was achieved on a bigger scale than in 2006 as well as being more “inclusive” as families joined their children (Jackson, 2012: 80). As well as functioning as permanent protests that brought the education of many to a standstill, sit-ins effectively became think tanks for

the movement, with the suspension of the academic year and groups of students sharing the same space 24-hours a day enabling intense discussion and strategising (Figueroa, 2012).

Whereas the street demonstrations of the Penguins had been curtailed by negative media coverage, the 2011 protesters used social media to directly confront media reports and government comments that they considered to have distorted either their identity, message or any events that occurred during the protests. As well as performing this corrective role, the use of social media also made the point that the government and media “do not have the monopoly on representations of reality” (Figueroa, 2012: 85). Footage, photos and written accounts of protests were also posted online, particularly through Facebook and Twitter, which served to catalyse further protest and establish connections between protests across the country.

In addition to these traditional forms of collective action, the movement also became known for a series of spontaneous, creative protests. These included a running relay around *La Moneda*, a kissing protest and performances of the dance routine to Michael Jackson's *Thriller* in front of *La Moneda*. These generated some of the most significant media coverage for the movement, drawing the attention of the *New York Times* and *The Guardian*. However, Figueroa states that these were not part of the strategy for action - rather, they were organised by peripheral groups of students, which points towards the benefits of a degree of fragmentation within a social movement that could be encouraged by a horizontal, participatory organisational style and “prove highly effective from a strategic point of view” (Alvarez and Escobar, 1992: 323).

This transpired to be the case, as after the media coverage in the USA and UK, the CONFECH leaders visited the Office for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union, among other organisations. On the other hand, the organisational style may also have led to considerable indecision around the deployment of the agreed traditional repertoire of action, with “tensions” and extensive discussions regarding “if we go to classes or we go to

march, if there is a march or we declare a strike, if we hold a strike or sit-in on campus" (Figueroa, 2012: 87).

IV. AUTONOMY

CONFECH has historically been politically plural, with members aligned to university political parties which have traditionally operated autonomously from the political party proper. The leaders of the 2011 movement included members of the Communist Youth Party and the youth contingent of the *Concertación*, as well as other student political organisations not represented by national political parties, however the horizontal, participatory organisational structure as well as a small but vocal number of autonomous students guarded against particular parties exerting much influence. In terms of its resistance to co-optation, the experience of the Penguin movement was instructive: "The Penguins generated tremendous distrust towards the political system. This destruction of trust - that was consolidated in 2008 with the promulgation of the Ley General de Educación (LGE)- gave students great awareness and resistance when the conflict began in 2011" (Jackson, 2012: 61). This distrust had been formed against the *Concertación*, with which many student leaders felt a degree of political affinity, so when Piñera's administration began this was considerably amplified. The movement's instinctive mistrust of Piñera, soon validated by his administration's explicit intention to deepen privatisation, "generated a unity rarely seen in Confech" (Jackson, 2012: 62), while the policies of the right-wing government itself "accelerated this divorce between civil society and state", further encouraging autonomy (Jara Reyes, 2012: 106).

In practice, this was manifested in the movement's encounters with government officials. Though the student leaders would attend negotiations, they would repeatedly object to the terminology used by the government and consistently rejected the proposals of the Piñera administration - timing marches to correspond with this and thereby demonstrating their oppositional power. For its part, the government would frequently try to characterise the movement as "ultras", thereby invoking old associations between the left-wing and aspirations

of violent revolution. Indeed, this mutually antagonistic dynamic had an amplifying effect on the content of the demands of the movement, with government backtracks, distortions and proposals that fell short of student demands “radicalising” (Jackson, 2012: 86) the movement further and creating even greater distance between them and having a consolidating effect on the autonomy of the movement.

V. CONCLUSION

This chapter has elucidated the key strategies of the 2011 protests, which were largely viewed as successful due to their sustained protest and autonomy, creating great pressure upon the government and severely affecting the approval ratings of Piñera, which fell to 26% in August 2011 (Cabalin, 2011). It has highlighted the importance of several strategies in achieving this. Firstly, organisational changes broadened the representative base of CONFECH, which went on to form associations with private universities and other social organisations, and introduced participatory, horizontal practices. Together, these constituted, it is argued, a combined statement of collective identity of commitment to democratic values as well as an early move in applying the strategy of transversality.

Secondly, it emphasised the importance of maximising mobilisation at an early stage in the academic year, which was achieved through a collective action frame that was rooted in communicating the diagnostic frame in an ideology-free manner that would resonate with individuals, couched in an increasingly sophisticated prognostic frame that clearly linked these individual grievances with the neoliberal paradigm. While this prognostic frame marked a significant departure for the student movement, its repertoire for action was largely reassuringly familiar, though the movement was able to augment and amplify the media coverage of this through its own use of social media.

CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIES

The preceding chapters have established the key elements of the strategies of the 2006 and 2011 student protests in Chile. This chapter will draw upon these to address the question of how these developed. In doing so, it will make two arguments. The first is that the increasing focus on the structural demands of the movement and broad mobilisation was accompanied by a shift in strategy that subverted the achievement of the movement's particular goals to the wider re-politicisation of Chilean society, to which its chief contribution was the popularising of democratic and critical political discourse. The second is that the sum of this analysis supports the conclusion that the Chilean student protests can be categorised as a “hybrid” movement, on the spectrum of traditional to “new” social movements in Latin America.

I. THE MAIN STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011

While the 2006 and 2011 protests had significantly different outcomes, they share key strategic similarities and developments that require them to be viewed as a continuum. That this should be the case is not surprising, since the traditional institutional base of the university federations, in particular, virtually guarantees the endurance of collective identity over time, while the cyclical nature of student protest facilitates learning from experience and adapting strategies accordingly. It is argued that the collective identity of both school and university student bodies underwent significant development due to organisational changes accompanying both waves of protest. These, it has been argued, constituted a combined articulation of strategy and collective identity

that together established the student movement as committed to democratic principles and practice. This would become manifested in strategies that emphasised the democratic values of availability of information, transversal representation and participation that, crucially, stood in stark contrast to the approach of elite negotiation of the Piñera administration.

While there can be observed to be continuity in the collective action frames, or cognitive strategies, of the protests, by far the most significant development between the movements was the way in which the 2011 movement managed to define and communicate the connection between the material demands relating to education provision in Chile and structural features of neoliberalism that not only explain them but also other inequalities and which condition the interaction of citizen and social movements with the state, thereby affecting the quality of democracy. As outlined earlier, this was assisted by the work of Chilean intellectuals including Atria and Moulán and led the movement towards a set of proposals that would have repercussions far beyond the educational sphere. Other adjustments to the collective action frame can be attributed to a process of learning from the Penguin protests. For instance, the early approach to the diagnostic action frame could be described as “facts before ideology”, in direct response to historical prejudices against movements from the left in Chile which the Penguin movement experienced immediately after its first street protest. In addition, the leaders strategised mobilisation to ensure a massive turnout on the first official protest by prioritising awareness of the “diagnostic” frame, with distinct communication strategies to engage both the rich and poor, and went on to link the level of mobilisation to the force of their “prognostic” frame - the scale of mobilisation, then, determined how far the movement advanced from protest to proposal. Lastly, the 2011 movement was able to exploit social media to reinforce its diagnostic and prognostic collective action frames against perceived distortions by the government and media, which had stifled the 2006 protests and historically the student movement in general (Bonilla, 1960).

The repertoires for action largely remained the same, but emphasised scale, which catalysed the advance to “proposal” and created greater pressure on the government at an early stage in the academic year. It has already been argued

that the “creative” protests of 2011 that attracted much media attention was more a consequence of having a horizontal, participatory organisation than a concerted attempt to subvert the traditional identity of left-wing movements in Chile, though that was nevertheless one of their effects. However, they also enabled the movement to inadvertently acquire a master frame of being a southern outpost of the global pro-democracy protests when foreign media coverage dubbed the protests 'The Chilean Winter' and thereby associated them with the Arab Spring. This demonstrates a certain degree of fluidity between the repertoire for action and collective action frames as well as the role of fragmented human agency in collective action. Finally, the movement's strategy of autonomy was fully realised in 2011, in part bolstered by traditionally heterogeneous nature of university organisations, the rapid and large mobilisation of students, which would later include other social groups and wider society, unified in opposition to the right-wing Piñera and disillusionment with the *Concertación*. This gave the movement the confidence to reject proposal upon proposal, which would be followed by a protest in a general expression of opposition.

II. ARTICULATING RE-POLITICISATION

Giorgio Jackson, in his book about the 2011 protests, continually refers to the movement as a “snowball” (2012: p.81), to convey that it took on its own momentum, and Figueroa states that those in the movement were continually surprised by how much support they achieved. While the movement did prioritise transversality among its strategies, this alone could not account for its rapid expansion. There had been public signs of re-politicisation with the system for years. It was in the publication of Moulian's deconstruction of the “myth” of neoliberalism, which stayed on the best-seller list in Chile for a year after its publication in 1997 (Sisto, 2001), which perhaps suggested that some quarters of Chilean society had never been successfully depoliticised in the first place. If we accept Olavarría's definition of abstention from voting as a positive act, it was in the absence of younger voters at polling stations during the *Concertación* era. It was also in the HidroAysén and petrol price protests that preceded the Penguin

protests. The problem was that there had been no far-reaching rekindling of the democratic instincts that the Chilean population had so strongly demonstrated in the late 1980s.

That the 2011 movement managed to harness this discontent and mobilise broad sectors of society must be attributed to the fact that its powerful collective action frame united particular education-based goals - education being a universal issue - with a substantial critique of neoliberalism resonated with school students, teachers' unions and workers' unions, as well as the Moulian's, the non-voters, the environment protesters. That is to say, the large swathe of mainly *Concertación* supporters who were dissatisfied by the Lagos and Bachelet administrations and feared the worst with Piñera.

Yet until the 2011 protests, the full-blooded political discourse required to describe the source of this discontent did not have popular legitimacy; anything stronger than the anaemic language of technocracy was dismissed as ideological. At the beginning of the protests, the movement had been careful to use the factual language of the prevailing technocratic discourse in order to avoid the stigma of being called ideological. However, its slogans, social media content and the public statements of its leaders rapidly became defiantly political, in part emboldened by the publication of Atría's series of columns that student leaders have credited with enabling them to contextualise their grievances within a larger political framework.

The strategy that acted as the shot in the arm for re-politicisation was the way in which the movement reclaimed the space for an alternative discourse - whether that be on social media, on permanent banners outside schools during occupations, on placards during marches or during television interviews that would be repeatedly viewed on YouTube - and set about politicising it. As the support for the movement grew, the traditional media was forced to reassess its traditional disinterest in student protests (Bonilla, 1960) and so the discourse of the movement was propagated more widely. Of course, the significance of the popularisation of this discourse in the public sphere is that its absence was one of the invisible supports of the idea that neoliberalism was based on an

apolitical set of economic principles; that if something is not called political, it is not political. The popularisation of simply calling things political was one of the most important steps towards re-politicisation initiated by the 2011 movement.

While broad re-politicisation was not a stated goal of the movement, it can be argued that increasing the quality of democracy was and that this partly explains why it opted to continue to seek greater mobilisation rather than seek the short-term resolution of its demands (Jara Reyes, 2012). While the student protests were undoubtedly rooted in educational grievances, their strategies as a whole constituted a comprehensive shift towards fundamentally democratic practices. These included organisational changes that embodied principles of representation, participation and direct democracy. The diagnostic frame was rooted in objective information that directly challenged the distortions of the government and media discourse. The strategic emphasis on mobilisation aimed to re-awaken a sense of citizenship and collective action over consumerism and individualism.

Once the movement gained broad support and began to dominate the public agenda, it effectively embodied an autonomous, alternative vision of democracy, co-existing alongside and, in the manner of an alternative opposition party, relentlessly antagonising a democratically-elected government that displayed an ongoing commitment to technocratic political processes that perpetuated the very sources of depoliticisation. The continuous extra-institutional performance of participatory, representative democracy demanded that neoliberalism be seen as incompatible with democracy.

III. TRADITIONAL OR NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Finally, the question of how we can classify the protests of 2006 and 2011 in the typology of Latin American social movements will first require a definition of the broad categories of "traditional" and "new" social movements. Traditional social movements are associated with organising around trade unions, political parties and communities in order influence the state and other political institutions and

obtain material goals. New social movements, on the other hand, usually exist autonomously of political institutions, organise in a horizontal and participatory manner and pursue identity-based values such as feminism, gay rights and environmental issues (Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker, 2007: 7). The latter is also associated with a repertoire of action that includes social media.

On this schema, the Chilean student movement has a blend of characteristics that suggest it is a hybrid of these types. Firstly, although an organisational or institutional base typically signifies a traditional movement, it has been argued throughout this dissertation that organisational changes within school and university bodies constituted a shift towards a collective identity strongly associated with democratic values and practices. That is, the organisation defined itself by values that transcended its material demands. Similarly, while the protests were based around key material demands, from the cost of transport passes of the Penguins to the interest rates of student loans of the 2011 wave, and therefore engaged with “distributional” demands related to “access to wealth and resources” (Guzman-Concha, 2012: 411) that are characteristic of traditional movements, the political context required that these were situated within a far wider frame of contention that included a rejection of neoliberalism and technocratic politics. This rejection of the prevailing political paradigm was reinforced by the strong democratic collective identity and strategies of the movement.

This growing rejection of neoliberalism coupled with previous experience of co-optation and exclusion from elite decision-making also became a key source of autonomy, a further characteristic usually associated with new movements. In addition, while the 2011 wave utilised social media, it primarily did so to counteract government and media distortion and sharing evidence and therefore was also rooted in how the movement articulated itself against the state.

IV. CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to unite the strategies of the 2006 and 2011 protests in order to highlight key developments and place it on the spectrum of

traditional and new social movements. It has argued that the most important developments were, first, in organisational changes that facilitated the broadening of the membership of the traditional school and university associations and the connections they would go on to form with other universities, especially those with right-wing associations and from the private sector. These represented an important strategic move towards transversality. Second, that the identification of the structural causes of educational inequalities during the Penguin movement were developed into a highly sophisticated collective action frame that contested neoliberalism.

The latter development gave rise to what this thesis holds to be the most significant strategy of the student movement: the use of a highly-politicised, oppositional discourse to communicate its collective action frame. This had a significant re-politicising effect in the country as apparently apolitical, technocratic language had previously been the only legitimate kind of discourse in the media and among politicians, while “political” language was associated with old biases regarding left-wing radicalism, Communism and violent revolutionaries. In demanding that its grievances be identified as political, the movement undermined the myth that neoliberalism is a matter of mere economic calculation and not politics. This re-politicising effect was one outcome of the movement's commitment to democratic values, which it is argued resulted in its preference for continued mobilisation over satisfaction of its demands. Finally, the chapter concluded with the assessment of the movement as a hybrid type, featuring features of both traditional and new movements.

CONCLUSION

“...students come to the foreground in abnormal times, when the usual machinery of national decision-making is weakened or monopolised by a single group...” (Bonilla, 1960: 334)

This dissertation began by noting that the student protests of 2006 were greeted by a sense of surprise in Chile. The country had broadly been diagnosed as depoliticised by the dual forces of dictatorship and neoliberalism during the 70s and 80s and the maintenance of Pinochet's neoliberal model and Constitution during democratisation. The space between the state and civil society was wrenched open by elite decision-making and the semantic rebirth of formerly political, divisive issues as value-free economic calculations. The effect of this was a sharp decline in the activity of social movements and participation in elections. Then 2006 and 2011 saw the biggest protests in Chile since those for democratisation in the late 80s. This dissertation sought to find out how they achieved this by asking what their strategies were and how they developed.

The overarching conclusion of the project is that the most important strategic achievement of the movement was one that developed over the course of the protests. In 2006, the Penguin movement publicly defined its grievances as products of the neoliberal education policy. Five years later, the 2011 protests embedded this in their collective action frame, supported by the work of intellectuals including Fernando Atría and Tomás Moulian, and effectively brought about a seismic shift in the public discourse from the language of technocrats to the language of politics. By using this language of rights, social justice, equality, access, opportunity, freedom of expression, democracy and participation, the movement re-defined the social world as political and, so, revealed the political content of supposedly apolitical neoliberal policies. Though Moulian had diagnosed this 14 years earlier, the protective semantic bubble was finally burst by students.

On this note, this dissertation will end by suggesting that in light of the qualities of the student movement that have been observed through its strategising - its adaptability, resilience, heterogeneity, creativity, ambition, fearlessness in the face of authority and sense of entitlement - perhaps there is something in the particular logic of student movements that meant that it was no surprise at all that it was students who played such a significant role in the growing re-politicisation of Chile.

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