Why NATO Endures: Debunking the NATO-in-Crisis Claims

2043548R

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MSc European Politics

Department of Politics

University of Glasgow

September 2013

Word Count (excluding title page, acknowledgements, abstract, and table of contents): 14,802

Abstract

Over the last sixty years, NATO has endured numerous internal and external challenges and has constantly striven to reform itself in order to be a stronger and more unified alliance. Three particular moments of crisis: the 1966 French withdrawal from NATO's military structure, the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991, and the debate over the 2003 invasion of Iraq, have demonstrated NATO's resilience to adversity and internal strife. In all three instances, the Transatlantic Alliance was able to transform moments of crisis and uncertainty into opportunities for developing and strengthening the internal structure of and the purpose of the Alliance. NATO's evolution and particularly its endurance have long been a topic of debate amongst international relations scholars.

This project aims to establish how NATO has endured for sixty years through various internal and external crises. Furthermore, this project seeks to address and critically assess the theoretical explanations and debates that have been offered concerning NATO's endurance. Throughout NATO's history, skeptics, particularly within the neorealist camp, have predicted the Alliance's demise. Using the three case studies mentioned above, this paper examines the factors that led NATO pessimists to predict its dissolution and assesses why these predictions were wrong. Did the NATO-in-crisis commentators overlook key factors that explain the Alliance's endurance, or did they over-exaggerate the negative effects of each crisis on NATO and prematurely announce its death? This project determines that the key to NATO's sixty-year existence lies in the Alliance's responses to moments of crisis and that NATO skeptics overlooked the factors that explain NATO's resilience, including the ability of institutions to mitigate the conflictive effects of anarchy and the tendency of states with similar interests and shared norms to prefer a system of cooperation and consultation.

Acknowledgements

I would like to first thank my supervisor, Dr. Cian O'Driscoll, whose continual guidance has been invaluable throughout this project. He constantly pushed me to dig deeper and think harder, and for that I am extremely grateful. It has been an absolute privilege working with him on this project.

In addition, I owe my thanks to Eliot Boden for his assistance as a peer reviewer and editor and for constantly cheering me on throughout this year. His love and support have been a great source of motivation.

And finally, I owe a deep amount of gratitude to my loving father, Arthur Rohloff, and to my incredible family who have supported me relentlessly throughout this journey. My dad has been a tremendous source of inspiration and I appreciate him always listening to my mutterings and offering an endless supply of sage advice. This project is dedicated to him.

Why NATO Endures: Debunking the NATO-in-Crisis Claims

Table of Contents

Introduction

For nearly forty years the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was clearly defined and its capabilities as a security and defense organization were rarely questioned. Ratified in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II by the United States and the countries of Western Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty created an alliance based on shared values and the common threat of the Soviet Union. The rise of the Soviet Union as a military power and ideological opponent to the democratic states of the West prompted the US and its European allies to create an organization that would serve as a deterrent to the power of the Eastern bloc. For approximately forty years, this is exactly what NATO accomplished, serving as a deterrent against the spread of communism and the escalation of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Transatlantic Alliance created a guarantee between the US and its European allies that an attack against one would be perceived as an attack against all, a guarantee that reassured Europe as it attempted to reconstruct its war-ravaged society.

In 1989, as the Soviet Union began to collapse and the Cold War came to an end, the role and purpose of NATO suddenly came into doubt. Commentators pondered the question: would NATO survive the end of the Cold War? Once the Cold War ended and the bipolar international system was replaced by the unrivalled hegemony of the US, the transatlantic organization suddenly seemed superfluous. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, what purpose could NATO serve in the twenty-first century? Could it be adapted to new global security challenges? Could the Alliance continue to promote political and military relations between the US and Europe? NATO's unique history and its sometimes surprising ability to endure and adapt to both internal and external crises warrants the question: why and how does NATO endure? NATO has faced numerous challenges in its sixty-year existence, yet the defense organization has always found a way to recover from crises and remain a viable alliance structure. Considering NATO's resilience, were these 'crises' sounding the death knell of NATO or were they opportunities in disguise? Commentators throughout NATO's history have extensively discussed the Alliance's strengths and weaknesses and the explanations for NATO's failings and endurance

are numerous. In lieu of the extensive debate over NATO's durability and the numerous challenges the Alliance has confronted, what factors explain NATO's sixty-year resilience?

Particularly since the end of the Cold War, political theorists have attempted to answer the questions of how and why NATO endures, producing a vast literature on the topic of NATO-in-crisis and the Alliance's durability. Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, and alliance theorists, such as Stephen Walt, have generally taken a more pessimistic view in regards to NATO's long-term resilience. At the end of the Cold War they argued that without the common threat of the Soviet Union, the transatlantic allies would have little incentive to maintain their defensive coalition. As Waltz predicted at the time, NATO's years were numbered because the Alliance had lost its *raison d'être*. While realists were wrong in their prediction that NATO would disband, their important failure was neglecting the possibility that NATO would or could evolve. Realists have generally struggled to offer a viable explanation for NATO's evolution, including its adoption of new roles and its expansion to include new members. This difficulty stems from realism's state-centric level of analysis and its assumption that cooperation cannot mitigate the effects of anarchy.

In contrast to neorealism's pessimistic view of NATO's future, liberal theories of international relations present a more optimistic perspective in which alliances are characterized by cooperation and common norms that work to bind nations to one another. According to neoliberal institutionalism, "as the norms of underlying international institutions are internalized, they affect the order and intensity of actor preferences, in the process developing a self-perpetuating dynamic. Therefore, international institutions evolve rather than die" (Hellman and Wolf 1993: 15). Unlike neorealism, liberal theories, particularly neoliberal institutionalism, are more adequately equipped to explain NATO's durability because these theoretical approaches utilize both the individual and institutional levels of analysis and because they argue that cooperation has mitigating effects on international anarchy. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism is able to account for the effect that individual decisions and institutional developments within NATO have had on its evolution and ultimately its endurance.

Using these two contrasting theoretical explanations for NATO's endurance and the overarching literature on international cooperation as a framework, the purpose of this paper is to address the primary question, 'why does NATO endure?' Throughout its history, the Alliance has faced challenges, several of which have raised doubts about NATO's future durability. Yet in spite of moments of crisis and the frequent criticisms from commentators, NATO has passed its sixtieth anniversary, demonstrating that the Transatlantic Alliance has a capacity to endure. I argue that NATO's durability can be explained by the initiative taken by NATO's member states and individuals who transformed moments of crisis into opportunities for reform, as well as the propensity for cooperation within NATO. Moreover, while neorealist explanations for NATO's continued presence do have merit, NATO's existence more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War seriously refutes the neorealist prediction that NATO would dissolve. Influenced by social constructivism, neoliberal institutionalism better encapsulates which factors have contributed to NATO's long-term durability.

In order to explain NATO's endurance, this retrospective study will examine three moments of crisis in NATO's history, beginning with the 1966 French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure. This first case will examine the policy and strategy disagreements leading up to France's dissociation, a decision that shook the foundation of the young defense organization and led to speculations about further fragmentation. This first major internal crisis of the alliance is particularly significant because it demonstrates the strength of the bonds between the allied members and their willingness to reform NATO in order to meet the challenges and consequences of France's withdrawal. Finally, an assessment of the debates and divergence of opinions of the 1960s, in addition to the effects of France's withdrawal, can "help 'explain why NATO did not suddenly collapse after 1989-1991 and why the alliance continued to develop from an integrated defense pact into an organization that can deal with the broader management of security'" (Wenger 2004: 74).

The second case study, which is perhaps the most significant turning point for NATO, focuses on the effects of the end of the Cold War on the Alliance. Contrary to popular belief at the time, NATO did not dissolve after the collapse of the Soviet Union but instead the commitment of the member states to continued alliance secured NATO's endurance into the twenty-first century. The 1990s presented NATO with a

unique opportunity to redefine its *raison d'être* and it was NATO's response to this opportunity that influenced its future development. Finally, this case will also assess the theoretical predictions and explanations that were offered at the end of the Cold War concerning NATO's future and will evaluate how NATO's perseverance either supports or refutes those assumptions.

The third and final case study concerns the debate and serious internal division surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In spite of NATO's immediate support and invocation of Article 5 in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, US foreign policy took a unilateralist turn that complicated its relations with international organizations and its allies within NATO. More significantly, 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq revealed a growing divergence between America's and Europe's threat perceptions. While the 2003 war in Iraq accentuated the differences between the US and Europe regarding twenty-first century security challenges and the means to address them, NATO survived what many thought were its death knells and it once again demonstrated that fundamental ideological similarities have contributed to the Alliance's endurance. The key question that remains is: what are these ideological similarities and will they be enough to ensure NATO's future longevity?

Throughout NATO's history, the defense organization has been confronted with internal and external crises that have often tested the solidarity of the Alliance, yet in spite of the many challenges, NATO continues to endure. By using these case studies that represent three moments of crisis from NATO's history, this paper argues that NATO's more than sixty years of endurance can be explained by assessing how the Alliance responded to moments of crisis and how those particular responses shaped the Alliance's development and future. Furthermore, in utilizing these three case studies, this paper addresses the strengths and weaknesses that both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have in explaining NATO's endurance. The goal is not to determine if there is one theory that is best suited to explaining NATO's unique history, but rather the aim is to critically assess both theories and explain that, when combined, they are able to account for NATO's sixty-year persistence.

Trouble in Paradise: The 1966 French Crisis

After nearly fifteen successful years of deterrence and cooperation, NATO ran into its first major road block in 1966. As the Cold War evolved, and even thawed in some respects, differences of opinion and policy positions became more apparent within NATO. With his own agenda for restoring France to its former position in the international system, President Charles de Gaulle criticized and challenged the structure and policies of NATO and the other allied states, thus building an internal pressure. Throughout the 1960s tensions heightened, particularly between the US and France, and the result was France's withdrawal in 1966 from NATO's integrated military structure. France's decision left NATO in a difficult position, and many commentators of the time viewed the situation as a crisis of NATO's legitimacy and credibility. Yet NATO successfully survived France's challenge and maintained its relevancy as a defense organization throughout the rest of the Cold War.

This chapter addresses two principal questions: why was France's withdrawal in 1966 considered such a serious crisis for NATO and since NATO endured, why was the crisis not in fact the final moment for NATO? Those who questioned whether NATO would survive France's withdrawal, argued that a serious lack of consultation within the Alliance and a divergence over security policies were the causes of NATO's weakness during the 1960s and the potential culprits for its undoing. However, since NATO endured, this chapter employs the case of France's withdrawal to assess why the commentators were wrong and to examine what factors contributed to NATO's resilience. By utilizing both secondary and primary sources, this chapter aims to address these questions in order to assess to what extent NATO was in crisis and what factors explain its endurance.[1]

NATO-in-Crisis, 1958-1966

There were two primary factors that contributed to the speculations during the 1960s that NATO may not celebrate its twentieth anniversary in 1969. The first concerned the credibility of NATO as a defensive organization responsible for the protection of Europe against the threat of the neighboring Soviet Union. During the

---

[1] It must be noted that some of the primary documents I am utilizing are originally in French. The in-text English citations will be my own translations and the original French will be included in the footnotes for purposes of comparison.

early 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle advocated for a French nuclear capability. However, de Gaulle was quickly met with resistance from American officials, particularly Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who argued that "no other NATO member should find it necessary to have nuclear weaponry; the U.S. nuclear arsenal was more than sufficient to serve all the others" (Kaplan 2004: 31). While the US was mainly concerned about the potential difficulties from competing independent nuclear forces, France viewed America's resistance as a blatant attempt to undermine French authority in Europe and to maintain American hegemony within NATO. France's push for a nuclear capability also revealed a more fundamental policy divide within NATO, a growing rift that significantly contributed to France's decision to withdraw in 1966. It was at this same time, during the early 1960s, that the United States' position on Soviet relations began to change. After nearly twenty years of a firm stance against the Soviets, by the 1960s the US was increasingly moving towards a policy of 'flexible response,' which promoted the use of conventional forces over nuclear weapons. Although the French generally agreed that the Soviet Union posed less of an aggressive threat by the 1960s than at the start of the Cold War, de Gaulle and his supporters viewed détente, and especially the policy of 'flexible response,' as no less than a betrayal of Europe. De Gaulle used the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union as an example of the "United States going over the heads of the allies to reduce nuclear arms, and in doing so reduce as well the deterrent function of the nuclear weapon" (Kaplan 2004: 32).

In addition to the question of NATO's credibility as a defensive organization, de Gaulle's criticisms also raised awareness of a legitimacy crisis within the Alliance. As one of the global superpowers after WWII, the US naturally assumed a leadership role when NATO was established. However, international events in the late 1950s and early 1960s revealed serious problems with NATO's decision-making and consensus-building procedures. In both the 1958 and 1961 Berlin crises, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev issued nearly identical ultimatums offering the Western allies a "six month interim for negotiation of a peace treaty between the two German states; otherwise Moscow would conclude a separate Soviet-East German treaty and thus end Western rights in Berlin" (Nuenlist 2007: 76). After criticism over Eisenhower's shift towards unilateral negotiations during the 1958 crisis, the 1961 Berlin crisis was a crucial test of the extent to which the Kennedy administration would encourage political consultation within NATO in order to resolve the situation.

There was a general understanding among Kennedy's administration and among the allied states that a unified alliance was crucial to deterring the Soviet threat and preventing an irreparable division of Germany. While the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was involved in several of the discussions concerning NATO's strategy in the 1961 Berlin crisis, the ambassadors to some of the smaller member states were not consulted; when they asked to be included in the discussions, they were reprimanded by Dean Rusk, Kennedy's Secretary of State (Nuenlist 2007: 77). The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back came on July 25, 1961 when Kennedy gave a speech announcing the US policy on Berlin without first consulting NATO. In spite of criticism about lack of consultation, Kennedy continued to pursue a unilateral approach towards the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. The result of this approach was that by NATO's fifteenth anniversary in 1964, "there was widespread pessimism as to whether NATO would still be there to celebrate its twentieth anniversary in 1969" (Nuenlist 2007: 83).

In March 1966, France formally withdrew from NATO's military organization, and the concerns about a legitimacy and credibility crisis became a reality. First, France's decision raised fears that other member states might question the purpose of the Alliance and take advantage of Article 13 in the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that "After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given" (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 13). According to Brigadier K. Hunt, a researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies during the 1960s, there was the "danger that she [France] may, by her example and by her unsettling effect on her allies, have started a process within the Alliance akin to unwinding a ball of wool" (Hunt 1966: 2). In particular, during the 1960s there was considerable discussion regarding the possibility of German reunification and whether NATO or France was best suited to helping the Federal Republic of Germany in achieving its goal of reunification. However, in a December 1966 discussion between John J. McCloy, the US High Commissioner to Germany, and Kurt Kiesinger, Chancellor of West Germany, Kiesinger "reassured McCloy that West Germany would not 'withdraw from NATO in order to advance reunification'" (Wenger 2004: 54).

Additionally, de Gaulle's harsh criticism of NATO's credibility as a defense organization loyal to the protection of Europe and its legitimacy as a political

institution raised doubts about the alliance's ability to fulfill its treaty obligations. In the aftermath of France's withdrawal, the remaining allies were left to address two key questions that would influence the future of NATO. The first question concerned "whether NATO could still be seen as militarily relevant 'as long as conditions of military stability prevail and the threat of direct aggression seems remote'" (Bozo 1998: 346-347). If de Gaulle was correct in his assessment that the direct threat of the Soviet Union had diminished, then did that also imply that NATO's role as a military and defense tool had diminished? As the Cold War developed and relations with the Soviet Union evolved, NATO had to adjust its policies to meet the new security and political demands otherwise it would have found itself becoming a superfluous defense organization. The second question that the allies had to address was "whether NATO could be kept politically cohesive in an era of relaxed East-West relations" (Bozo 1998: 347). During the 1960s, détente was fast becoming the major policy influencing relations with the Soviet bloc but these relaxing tensions challenged the basic premises on which NATO was founded and risked the creation of bilateral agreements between NATO's member states and the Soviet Union.

Out of the Fire: NATO's Survival Post-1966

According to many commentators at the time, NATO's prospects looked bleak after France's withdrawal in March 1966 left NATO frantically mending a fragmented alliance with a weakened military structure. However, NATO survived the challenges posed by de Gaulle and transformed itself into a stronger and more unified alliance that would successfully endure through the end of the Cold War. NATO's resilience in 1966 begs the question: why did NATO survive? Did those who doubted NATO's future in the 1960s exaggerate the severity of France's withdrawal or did those pessimists overlook several crucial factors that explain NATO's endurance? Based on the reaction of the remaining fourteen allied states to France's decision, it is apparent that the NATO pessimists underestimated the bonds of solidarity within the Alliance and the influence of individuals to foster cooperation.

While the concerns about NATO's legitimacy and credibility issues made 1966 a particularly challenging year, several key decisions made by individuals influenced the development of the crisis and ultimately NATO's ability to endure this

first shockwave. The first crucial decision came from President Johnson's administration shortly after de Gaulle's announcement of France's withdrawal. Contrary to the recommendation of several of his advisors, Johnson chose not to confront de Gaulle and instead decided that the US should focus its attentions on restoring the cohesion of NATO and reforming US-NATO policy. Thus, beginning with its own policies, the US began to adapt its East-West strategy with the aim of making its positions more compatible with the policy of détente. According to Walt Rostow, Johnson's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the US and other allies "ought to accompany the NATO reorganisation with as many forward looking measures as possible, including 'more East-West bridge-building by Atlantic nations'" (Bozo 1998: 348). Additionally, leaders such as Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO between 1964 and 1971, and Dean Rusk, pushed for NATO to develop its political cohesion and to make itself a "vigorous organ for political consultation among allies both in East-West relations in Europe and out of area" (Bozo 1998: 347). As France prepared for talks with the Soviet Union in June 1966, Johnson recognized that it was crucial for NATO to strengthen its ties with the USSR in order to demonstrate that NATO was capable of promoting European détente. Thus, by the fall of 1966, the US was fully committed to a policy of détente and to the cohesion of NATO.

In December 1966, Pierre Harmel, Belgium's foreign minister, proposed that NATO conduct a study to determine the effects of France's withdrawal and to assess the future tasks of the Alliance. In his initial proposal to the NAC, Harmel suggested that the report study the past and present state of the Alliance, "examine the ways of perfecting the Atlantic dialogue," and finally "to study the problems linked to European security and to the reunification of Germany" (Harmel Report 1966: Vol. 1).[2] On December 15, 1966, the NAC accepted Harmel's proposal and in the following months set up the necessary sub-groups to study and analyze the following subject areas: East-West relations including the evolving relations with the Soviet Union; inter-allied relations, concerning changes in transatlantic relations and the issue of consultation within NATO; the future security policy of NATO, including

---

[2] Original French text : « 1) d'étudier l'état de l'Alliance et de déterminer dans quelle mesure elles sont susceptibles d'influencer les objectifs et les méthodes présents ; 2) d'examiner les moyens de perfectionner le dialogue atlantique, notamment du côté européen ; 3) d'étudier les problèmes liés à la sécurité européenne et à la réunification de l'Allemagne, ainsi que les moyens d'améliorer les relations Est-Ouest. »

world collective security, the role of regional treaties, and the European security capability gap; and finally developments in regions outside the NATO area, including general changes in the international system and issues concerning the underdeveloped Third World (Harmel Report 1966: Vol. 1).

Between October and December 1967 the four sub-groups completed their studies and reported their findings to NATO's Ministerial Council. The general consensus among the final reports was that "the most important understanding is that all the members of the alliance believe that it should continue. The majority of [the member states], if not all, affirm that the alliance will continue after 1969" (Harmel Report 1967: Vol. 5).[3] In addition to reaffirming the member states' commitment to NATO, the final draft of the Harmel report also stated that détente was a crucial part of NATO policy and that NATO should play a greater role in developing peace in Europe. Thus, a two-pillar security strategy was created in which "military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary," making NATO better suited to addressing the evolving challenges of the Cold War (Kaplan 2004: 43). The development of this two-pillar security strategy was a major victory for NATO's smaller states, who had been promoting the adaptation of NATO to the changes in the Cold War and to the shifting relations with the Soviet Union. By affirming the new authority of the smaller states and improving political consultation, NATO ended the legitimacy crisis brought on by de Gaulle's criticisms.

In addition to the influence of individuals, such as President Johnson and Pierre Harmel, on NATO's adaptation and subsequent survival of the 1966 crisis, the solidarity of the remaining allied states also explains NATO's endurance. In spite of the difficulties posed by France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure, the remaining fourteen states quickly coordinated their efforts to reorganize NATO's military structures, which included abolishing the Standing Group, reorganizing the International Planning Staff, developing the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) into a permanent body, and establishing the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) (Wenger 2004: 40). Furthermore, NATO demonstrated its commitment to unified

---

[3] Original French text: « …la constatation la plus importante est que tous les membres de l'Alliance estiment que celle-ci doit continuer. La plupart d'entre eux, sinon tous, affirment qu'elle doit continuer après 1969. »

security when, on March 18, 1966, in response to bilateral memoranda issued by France, the remaining fourteen allies issued a joint declaration stating:

> The Atlantic Alliance has insured its efficacy as an instrument of defence and deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military organization in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.
> (Hunt 1966: 4)

Thus, the remaining allied states recognized the benefits of maintaining an integrated defense system and chose to reorganize the military structure to better meet the security needs of the member states as well as the needs of an evolving alliance. Contrary to the NATO-in-crisis pessimists, who doubted whether the Alliance could overcome the consultation issues of the early 1960s, the reforms made by the Harmel report and the reorganization of the military structure demonstrate the allied states' commitment to NATO's preservation and the willingness to adapt national policies to satisfy the purposes of NATO.

Theoretical Analysis: Anarchy vs. Cooperation

While the decisions made by national and NATO officials after France's withdrawal and the effects of the Harmel report played a significant role in securing NATO's post-1966 survival, the nature of the Alliance itself may also have been a contributing factor to its endurance. According to most traditional alliance theorists, as well as structural realists, an alliance "associates like minded actors in the hope of overcoming their rivals" (Thies 2009: 287). This definition certainly applies to a 1949 NATO that was founded in order to restrict the advance of the Soviet Union. However, does this definition apply to the Alliance circa 1969? While NATO was founded *against* a common threat, it was also created *for* a shared purpose. This alternative purpose is evidenced by the language of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly Articles 2 and 3 which establish "provisions for cooperation in nonmilitary endeavors" and a commitment to "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" (Thies 2009: 288). In addition, contrary to most pre-WWII alliances, the members of NATO share common values, such as democracy and liberalism, common interests, particularly eventual peace and stability in Europe, and a common heritage. These 'self-healing tendencies,' as Thies describes them, became an integral

part of NATO's identity via the language of the Washington Treaty and through the cooperation of its members and are part of what bound the Alliance together even when the common threat of the Soviet Union began to wane and France challenged NATO's *raison d'être*.

It is this particular understanding of the effects of cooperation that enables neoliberal institutionalism to account for NATO's endurance after the difficulties during the 1960s. Unlike NATO pessimists, particularly neorealists, neoliberal institutionalism takes a much more optimistic view of the international system and argues that institutions can alleviate the unilateral behavior produced by the anarchic international system. Institutions reduce transaction costs, foster communication, and can ultimately reduce the incentive of states to defect from their agreements. According to Robert Keohane, "institutions alter the payoff structures facing actors and they may lengthen the shadow of the future" thus creating incentives for states to continue cooperating with one another (Axelrod and Keohane 1993: 98). Although the threat of the Soviet Union may be sufficient to account for NATO's durability through the difficulties of the 1960s, it does not quite explain why NATO underwent so many transformations. Neoliberal theory argues that "the most direct way to encourage cooperation is to make the relationship more durable" (Grieco 1988: 818). When cooperation was faltering during the 1960s, the NAC, and especially its individual members such as Pierre Harmel and President Johnson, worked to reform the structure of the Alliance in order to make it more resilient and subsequently, to further bind the allied states closer to one another.

One of the key limitations of neorealism, in terms of explaining NATO's durability, is its perception of anarchy and how anarchy shapes the international system. According to realists, "international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests" and furthermore, "international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on inter-state cooperation" (Grieco 1988: 805). The neoclassical realist Luca Ratti argues that "despite the 'glue' constituted by shared norms, perceptions and values, institutions are never fully binding" because the inherently conflictive nature of anarchy prevents states from maintaining long-term cooperative relationships (Ratti 2006: 103). Realist theories assume this fact because they perceive states to be rational unitary actors that are always seeking to maximize

their own personal gains. Thus, cooperation is only likely to be a short-term solution because the zero-sum-game nature of the international system prevents states from sacrificing their maximum relative gains in favor of more equitable absolute gains. This appeared to be the case in 1966 when France broke away from NATO's military structure and raised doubts about NATO's cohesion and durability. However, the combined efforts of the fourteen allied states after France's withdrawal to overcome NATO's credibility and legitimacy crisis demonstrate a commitment to cooperation and to the long-term endurance of NATO.

Conclusion

According to many NATO-in-crisis scholars, the "Gaullist challenge to the raison d'être of the alliance amounted to the most serious crisis of NATO since its founding in 1949" (Wenger 2004: 22). However, what began as a crisis in 1966 quickly turned into an occasion for reflection and development. Because of key decisions that were made by individuals and by the NAC, NATO was able to transform the French challenge into an opportunity for reform that cemented its endurance. President Johnson's push for a realignment of US policy with NATO positions, and Harmel's proposal to examine the purpose and potential roles of NATO created an initiative for internal reform. Moreover, France's withdrawal and the subsequent studies of the Harmel report influenced NATO's long-term strategic thinking, a development that would affect the conduct of the rest of the Cold War and contribute to the rapprochement of East-West relations and the expansion of peace in Europe. France's withdrawal did challenge NATO and may have threatened the future existence of the Alliance if it had not been for the solidarity of the remaining fourteen members. The motivation of NATO's individual members and allied states to transform challenges into opportunities for reassessment and improvement is a recurring characteristic throughout the Alliance's history and one that helps to explain NATO's endurance.

End of the Cold War: Demise or Revitalization of NATO's *Raison d'Être*?

After forty years of deterrence, of stand-offs between East and West, of uncertainty and fear of nuclear war, the Cold War finally ended between 1989 and 1991. Turning the international system on its head, the end came as a surprise to many as an era of relatively stable bipolarity suddenly drew to a close and an age of American hegemony emerged. While the end of the Cold War had consequences for the structure of the international system and the global balance of power, it also had a considerable impact on the alliance that had stood against the threats of the Soviet Union for forty years.

Without the common threat of the Soviet Union, many commentators believed that NATO was suddenly without a *raison d'être,* and thus would naturally disband as the new international system took hold. The changes of the early 1990s raised numerous uncertainties and questions: If NATO endured the end of the Cold War, what would its new role be? And could NATO sustain close security ties between the US and Europe? Many realist scholars and NATO pessimists expected the Alliance to eventually disband as a result of diverging interests between member states and a lack of a common security threat. These critics anticipated the years following the collapse of Soviet Union to be the end for NATO because the international balance of power was shifting and thus allegiances between states would also shift. In spite of the traditional alliance theory assumptions that alliances disband once 'victory' is achieved, NATO endured through the end of the Cold War and redefined its *raison d'être* to meet the security threats of the twenty-first century. This chapter aims to determine why neorealists and NATO pessimists were wrong in their prediction that NATO would disband at the end of the Cold War. Did these commentators overblow the effects of the changing international system on NATO or did they underestimate the member states' commitment to and desire for cooperation within NATO? Additionally, this chapter will evaluate the decisions made by NATO in the 1990s and assess how those decisions proved the skeptics wrong and contributed to the Alliance's transformation and continued endurance.

Predicting NATO's Demise

The end of the Cold War was a significant moment for international relations theories and for NATO as the international balance of power shifted. Traditional military alliance theory assumes that "winning alliances dissolve in the wake of their 'victory' – when the need to balance against power or threats has disappeared" (Ciuta 2002: 39). Alliance theory also assumes that "military alliances are always 'against,' never 'for' something, and what they are against is an enemy to be opposed through the aggregation of military capabilities of the member states" (Ciuta 2002: 39). In relation to the Cold War, NATO was the 'victorious' alliance and a coalition of states *against* the political and ideological threat of communism and the Soviet Union. Following this assumption that alliances naturally disband once the common threat has disappeared, neorealists offered their own predictions concerning NATO's future. Neorealists assumed that NATO would dissolve because the members would cut military expenditures substantially, they would "engage in more disputes over common alliance policy as they take more independent directions in their foreign and defense policies," and that the allied states would turn to other forms of international cooperation (McCalla 1996: 454).

Although NATO did not dissolve immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many NATO skeptics and neorealists viewed NATO's involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s as a gradual weakening of the Alliance. After having adopted the new roles of peacekeeper and conflict manager, the first opportunity for NATO to demonstrate its new identity came in July 1991, when the Yugoslav federation began to break apart as both Slovenia and Croatia vied for independence. While both the NAC and the George H.W. Bush administration viewed the Yugoslavian civil war as "the hour of Europe" in which the European institutions should take responsibility for security in their region, NATO was willing to offer military support in order to maintain peace in Europe (Medcalf 2005: 27). Working in support of the United Nations (UN), NATO's involvement in resolving the civil war demonstrated the Alliance's acceptance of its new role as crisis manager and peacekeeper. Yet, in spite of NATO's assistance in resolving the conflict, the Alliance's "confused and belated response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia

raised questions about its post-cold war value" and revealed leadership problems within the Alliance as the Europeans failed to manage a security threat in their own backyard (McCalla 1996: 446).

The subsequent crises in the Balkans, particularly the 1993 Bosnian conflict, exposed basic weaknesses in NATO's ability to carry out its new roles as well as serious rifts in transatlantic relations. As NATO transitioned into the post-Cold War era, the conflicts in the Balkans were "an opportunity for NATO to give meaning to its crisis management intentions" (Kaplan 2004: 116). But it became increasingly difficult for NATO to prove itself as a crisis manager and peacekeeper as internal weaknesses became more apparent. The 1990s Balkans crises revealed the growing gap in the strategic priorities of the member states. Particularly with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the European states, using the structure and resources of the European Community institutions, were expected to spearhead the peacekeeping operation since conflicts in the Balkans posed a more direct threat to European security. The general debacle in the Balkans during the 1990s exposed the fact that

> …there was no longer a guarantee of American underwriting of and intervention in European security but also that the main reason for this was that, post-Cold War, European security problems no longer affected the North American Allies in the same way nor to the same extent as the remaining European Allies.
>
> (Medcalf 205: 41)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US began to lessen its involvement in European security matters and both the US and NATO encouraged the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO's framework. The concern of the US was that its European allies would rely on America's military strength and ultimately drain US economic and military resources. While the US wished that Europe would develop its military capabilities and become a key actor in maintaining peace and stability on the continent, Europe viewed America's distance and apparent disinterest in the Balkans crises as abandonment. America's reluctance to intervene in former Yugoslavia certainly demonstrated a weakening of the US commitment to European security, but did it also signify the undermining of common interests within the Alliance? According to neorealists, the distancing of the US from Europe did indicate the weakening of NATO and thus neorealists anticipated that NATO's years were numbered.

Redefining NATO's Raison d'être, 1991-1995

While NATO's involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s did reveal some underlying weaknesses in NATO's purpose, the Alliance has overcome those weaknesses and endured well into the twenty-first century. In the absence of the Soviet Union – the supposed glue that held the allies together – NATO had to reflect inward and find answers to two crucial questions: "could the Alliance continue to be a provider of security (however broadly defined) in a dramatically altered Europe? And could the US-European security partnership be sustained?" (Cornish 1997: 5). During the next decade, NATO sought to answer these questions and worked to transform the Cold War alliance into an institution that would continue to meet the security needs of its members and maintain the consultative transatlantic relationship. NATO's first redefine its *raison d'être* came on July 5 and 6, 1990, when the NAC issued the Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, also known as the London Declaration, which emphasized the Alliance's need to adapt to the changes, particularly in Europe, brought about by the end of the Cold War. In addition to outlining how NATO should expand its membership and develop a European security identity, the London Declaration identified NATO's principal goals as follows:

> Our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty. (London Declaration 1990: Para. 2)

Article 2 stipulates that the members of the alliance will "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" (North Atlantic Treaty 1949: Article 2). Although forty years had transpired since NATO's creation, its fundamental goals remained much the same, even in spite of internal crises and substantial changes to the international system.

NATO continued its transformative efforts with the 1991 Rome Summit which produced the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, an essential step in the process of

evolving NATO's *raison d'être*. First, the document outlined the post-Cold War strategic environment, identifying the significant changes that occurred in Eastern and Central Europe and the necessity of NATO to develop a stronger European security and defense identity. Second, the Strategic Concept specified the new security challenges, including the possible threat from weak and unstable states in Central and Eastern Europe and the proliferation of WMDs and acts of global terrorism. Finally, it detailed the purpose of the Alliance and its fundamental tasks in relation to these new security threats and challenges. In a transition away from its Cold War identity, the member states and NATO officials recognized that:

> With the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before … Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.
> (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991: Para. 24)

Although the changes brought on by the end of the Cold War created new challenges for NATO, the Alliance maintained its commitment to inter-allied communication and coordination, in addition to emphasizing the importance of cooperating with former Warsaw Pact states. In a series of speeches given at the Rome Summit, NATO and member state officials emphasized that "if NATO was needed less for short-term protection, it was needed more for long-term stability. Recognizing the uncertainties ahead as Europe was transformed, no one wanted to see a severing of the links between Europe and the United States and Canada" (Hartmann and Wendzel 1994: 320). After forty years of cooperation and a commitment to mutual defense, the member states continued to see the advantage of maintaining NATO but revitalizing its mandate to fit the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Thus, in addition to reemphasizing NATO's commitment to cooperation, the 1990 London Summit and 1991 New Strategic Concept established as NATO's new "primary purposes crisis management and promoting international stability, as seen in its shift from threat assessment to risk assessment" (McCalla 1996: 449).

In order to achieve these new tasks and to improve East-West relations, the 1991 Rome Summit proposed the establishment of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Formally endorsed at the 1994 Brussels Summit, the CJTF illustrates NATO's attempts in the early 1990s to transition from its Cold War mission to a role

more appropriately suited to the new security challenges identified in the Strategic Concept. The purpose of the CJTF was to "provide the flexibility that would be required to allow NATO and non-NATO forces to act together in peacekeeping and other contingency operations" (Wörner 1994: 4). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of a new security outlook in Europe, NATO officials realized that in order for NATO to continue playing a role in preserving European security, the ability to conduct 'out-of-area' operations would be essential. Hence the CJTF was established to provide Europe with a 'separate, but not separate' military capability to contribute to the management of crisis situations and assist in maintaining the overall peace and stability of Europe. Moreover, the steps taken at the Rome and Brussels Summits to transform the purpose of the Alliance and strengthen its ability to address new security challenges demonstrated that "NATO is not a relic of a time gone by but rather an adaptable tool through which member states continue to express and protect their common interests" (Wörner 1994: 3).

The push for a revision of NATO's security strategy culminated in the April 1999 Washington Summit's New Strategic Concept. Nearly ten years after the creation of the 1991 New Strategic Concept and as a result of the conflicts in the Balkans, as well as the growing threat of terrorism and WMDs, the Alliance recognized the necessity of updating its security strategy to better meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Expressing the need for reform in a 1998 Brussels press conference, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright stated:

> It is clear from our discussions that we all understand that the world has changed. Collective defense remains NATO's core purpose. But we need, and are achieving, a balance between missions old and new. Missile technologies have made our borders vulnerable to threats originating well beyond those borders. And instability that is dangerous and contagious is best stopped before it reaches NATO's borders.
> (Statement to the Press: 8 December 1988)

Besides reaffirming the Alliance's commitment to collective defense and reiterating the importance of the transatlantic link, the 1999 Strategic Concept expanded NATO's security role by establishing out-of-area missions as a central component of NATO's new role. Using the language of the North Atlantic Treaty to justify its decision, the NAC expanded the 'North Atlantic area', stipulating that:

> Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by

crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region. (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1999: Para. 6)

While NATO officials emphasized that their goal was not to create a new 'global NATO,' the 1999 Strategic Concept illustrated the member states' understanding that security threats were increasingly emerging beyond NATO's borders and therefore the Alliance must be capable of addressing these new out-of-area challenges. NATO's transformation during the 1990s and its willingness to adapt to new challenges are demonstrative of the Alliance's ability to redefine its purpose, an action that considerably contributed to NATO's post-Cold War endurance.

Miscalculating NATO's Death

While neorealists' predictions concerning the future of NATO after the Cold War did not necessarily come to fruition, neorealists were not entirely unjustified in assuming that NATO would eventually dissolve. As a state-centric theory, it was natural for neorealists to assume that a defensive alliance would disband unless the member states found it in their national self-interest to maintain the cooperative structure of the alliance. According to neorealists such as Waltz, alliances are simply treaties composed by states and thus the states determine the fate of the alliance once victory has been achieved (Waltz 2000: 20). Previous alliances illustrated the tendency to dissolve once the purpose, chiefly military in nature, of the alliance was achieved and thus neorealists had an abundance of historical examples to support their prediction of NATO's death. In spite of historical precedence, NATO has proven itself to be in many ways a *sui generis* alliance that has endured well beyond its anticipated expiration date. Contrary to neorealist assumptions, NATO was not just an alliance formed to balance against the threat of the Soviet Union; it was also established *for* the purpose of preserving stability and promoting peace within the North Atlantic area. As the preamble to the Washington Treaty declares, the allied states created a coalition "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (North Atlantic Treaty 1949: Preamble). Furthermore, there is no mention of the Soviet Union nor is there specific mention of any threat in the Washington Treaty, indicating that even at its creation, the allied members

believed that a partnership between states could be established on the basis of common values and goals.

What neorealists failed to predict at the end of the Cold War was that the allied states could cut their military expenditures, could disagree over NATO policies, and even turn to other international organizations and yet still maintain the strength and solidarity of the Alliance. For instance, the member states did reduce their force levels but instead, and "in accordance with the decision of NATO to establish an allied rapid reaction corps, many member states are setting up intervention forces for deployment to distant regions" (Hellman and Wolf 1993: 22). Furthermore, even though NATO suffered serious internal policy disagreements during the 1990s, the Alliance found ways to resolve those disagreements and retain its relevancy. And finally, even though the European states began to turn increasingly to the UN and European Union, NATO was never abandoned, partly because:

> International institutions are easier to maintain than they are to create because they are so difficult to construct that, once created, 'it may be rational to obey their rules if the alternative is their breakdown, since even an imperfect (institution) may be superior to any politically feasible replacement.' (Hellmann and Wolf 1993: 14-15)

NATO's continued existence after the Cold War can also be explained by the fact that "as the norms underlying international institutions are internalized, they affect the order and intensity of actor preferences, in the process developing a self-perpetuating dynamic. Therefore, international institutions evolve rather than die" (Hellmann and Wolf 1993: 15).

This evolutionary tendency of institutions is evidenced by the London, Rome, and Brussels Summits and the two New Strategic Concepts that redefined NATO's *raison d'être* and reinvigorated the Alliance to tackle new security challenges. By taking the initiative to extend NATO's role to peacekeeping and conflict management, NATO officials secured the Alliance's continued relevance in an international system with increasingly globalized security threats. Even though interests began to diverge between the US and Europe during the 1990s, NATO officials remained committed to the institution's survival and thus transformed NATO in order to realign the interests of its member states. In general, neorealism's greatest shortcoming in terms of explaining NATO's endurance has been its inability to explain the Alliance's evolution. Neorealists and NATO pessimists only anticipated NATO to survive the

end of the Cold War if it continued to satisfy the interests of its member states but they did not predict the Alliance's perseverance due to a redefining and evolution of its *raison d'être*.

Where neorealism falls short, institutionalist theories, particularly neoliberal institutionalism, offer more viable and complete explanations for NATO's endurance. According to institutionalist logic, institutions such as NATO "continue to persist because they are part of the system of mutual commitments and reassurances whose logic predated and was at least partially independent of the Cold War" (Ikenberry 2001: 6). Institutionalist theory posits that when the allied states established NATO they 'institutionalized' their power, turning NATO into something more than a simple defensive alliance. Neorealism's central fault is its underestimation of the power and influence of institutions and the fact that institutions can be "employed as strategies to mitigate a range of opportunistic incentives that states will otherwise respond to under conditions of anarchy" (Ikenberry 2001: 15). Institutions reduce the fear of cheating, mitigate concerns over relative and absolute gains, and enhance the opportunities for cooperation and communication between states. In the neorealist anarchic perception of the world, there is a great deal of incentive for states to balance against one another, and as the balance of power shifts, coalitions of allied states will also shift. However, a coalitional shift did not occur among the Western powers at the end of the Cold War. Due to NATO's highly institutionalized nature, and the construction of shared values and norms between its member states, the Alliance not only endured the end of the Cold War but continued to institutionalize itself through the adoption of new roles and the enlargement to new members.

Conclusion

Rather than accepting its predicted fate of eventual dissolution, the Transatlantic Alliance responded to the challenges of the post-Cold War era by developing methods to transform the defense organization in order to meet the new security needs of its member states. Through summit meetings and two New Strategic Concepts, NATO successfully transitioned from its Cold War role of defensive alliance to a twenty-first century institution capable of managing conflicts in the greater Euro-Atlantic area. Contrary to neorealism's assumptions, NATO

endured beyond the end of the Cold War and revitalized its *raison d'être* and has subsequently remained a relevant security and defense organization. Because neorealism is state-centric and assumed that NATO would only survive the end of the Cold War if its endurance coincided with the interests of its member states, particularly the hegemonic US, it overlooked the possibility that NATO would evolve. Institutionalist and constructivist theories, on the other hand, recognize the institutionalized quality of NATO and argue that, "NATO did not collapse when the threat disappeared, because kinship – shared ideas, values and experiences – helped to sustain it" (Cornish 1997: 4). By going beyond the state-centric level and accounting for the influence of individuals, institutions, and even norms, institutionalist theories have offered more accurate and comprehensive explanations for NATO's endurance and evolution.

Between Iraq and a Hard Place: NATO's 2003 Crisis

On September 12, 2001, for the first time in NATO's fifty-year history, the allied powers invoked Article 5, the collective defense clause. The 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in a new era of global security concerns and again tested the solidarity and effectiveness of the Transatlantic Alliance. While NATO's response to 9/11 demonstrated unanimous support for the US, the effects of the terrorist attacks, both on the US and on NATO, gradually weakened that initial unity and produced internal tensions that culminated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The shift within the US administration to a neoconservative foreign policy and the increasing divergence of strategic interests between the US and Europe exacerbated the situation created by 9/11 and produced an internal crisis that questioned the solidarity and future of NATO. For many neorealists who had predicted NATO's dissolution after the end of the Cold War, the "Iraq issue conceivably could have been the rock on which the Atlantic alliance might split in two, or collapse altogether" (Kaplan 2004: 143). And yet ten years after the invasion of Iraq, NATO still endures and continues to play an active role in international affairs, once again raising the question: why does NATO endure?

The purpose of this final case study is to examine the most contemporary crisis within NATO and once again assess why the NATO pessimists' gloom and doom predictions concerning NATO's future were wrong. What factors led the neorealists and NATO skeptics to argue that 2003 may be the end for the Alliance and did these factors justify the NATO-in-crisis claims or did the pessimists overblow the situation and sound the death knells too soon? Additionally, since the NATO skeptics' predictions of NATO's death were wrong, what factors explain the Alliance's continued endurance? Are the NATO pessimists overeager in their NATO-in-crisis claims or are they overlooking other crucial factors that account for NATO's sixty-year endurance?

9/11, Iraq, and NATO's Internal Conflict

With the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, the world suddenly realized that the US, one of the global superpowers, was not immune to an attack on American soil. This realization shook the US as well as NATO, which depended greatly on American strength and power, because for the first time in NATO's history the US was vulnerable to Soviet attack. A similar shock occurred on September 11, 2001 when the terrorist organization al Qaeda carried out attacks against the US. In an era of new and often indeterminate security threats, 9/11 revealed not only the global scale of terrorism, but once again demonstrated the vulnerability of all nations, including the most powerful. The sudden awareness of this exposure had a significant impact on NATO policy. Throughout the 1990s there was a lack of consensus within NATO concerning security policies towards WMDs and terrorism. Prior to 9/11, the US perceived WMDs and terrorism as primary security threats to NATO and its member states; however, many of the European allies "did not view tackling WMD as NATO's strategic priority even though they agreed that they were a threat" (Medcalf 2005: 113). As a result of this disagreement, these security challenges were not incorporated into NATO's post-Cold War reform. It was not until the 9/11 attacks that WMDs and global terrorism became top priorities on NATO's agenda, and the nexus between WMDs and terrorism became a central concern of the Alliance (Medcalf 2005: 114). However, some of the allies, particularly France, remained defiant, arguing that there was little need for NATO to further develop its counter-terrorism role. This transatlantic divergence over NATO's role in addressing these security threats would continue to divide the allies during the 2003 debate over Iraq.

After the initial post-9/11 solidarity, consensus within NATO began to weaken and international support began to wane as the US increasingly shifted towards a more unilateral and aggressive foreign policy. The first signs of tension between members emerged when President George W. Bush implored the European allies to substantially increase their defense expenditures and to promise their "support if the war against terrorism should spread to other rogue nations," alluding to the Bush administration's desire to confront Iraq (Kaplan 2004: 136). While some of the initial European hesitations concerning the war in Afghanistan did create tensions within

NATO, it was the United States' 180-degree foreign policy turn and the shift to unilateralism that cemented the rift within the Alliance. For instance, when French and German officials offered to provide military support to help combat Taliban forces in Afghanistan, the US was reluctant to accept this form of assistance from Europe. The Bush administration recalled command and control problems from previous crises, such as the war in Kosovo, and thus the US "feared that anything more than a token contribution from the European allies would lead to interference with the American conduct of war" (Kaplan 2004: 136).

Relations between the US and Europe continued to decline and many commentators argued that "the year 2002 saw a dramatic change in the transatlantic climate" (Toje 2008: 121). This change became more prominent after President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, in which he claimed that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea composed an 'Axis of Evil' and that these supposed rogue states should be met with strength and resistance. What most concerned the Europeans was that Bush's speech seemed to "revive a unilateral approach to the world based on a superpower's prerogative" (Kaplan 2004: 139). Reminiscent of the conflicts within the Alliance over the lack of consultation during the 1960s, the Bush administration's shift to unilateralism raised concerns among the Europeans that major decisions were being made that would affect all members of NATO without consultation. In response to Bush's aggressive foreign policy towards Iraq, in August 2002, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder warned that "it would be a mistake to intervene militarily in Iraq" and announced that Germany would not contribute forces, regardless of whether an invasion was mandated by the UN (Gardner 2004: 283). NATO reiterated this sentiment at the 2002 Prague Summit where NATO officials released a statement concerning Iraq declaring:

> We, the 19 Heads of State and Government of NATO, meeting in Prague, have expressed our serious concern about terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Concerning Iraq, we pledge our full support for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and call on Iraq to comply fully and immediately with this and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
> (Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, 21 November 2002)

It is important to note that NATO was created in 1949 as a *defensive* alliance and therefore, it is not within the Alliance's mandate to preemptively strike a potential security threat. Therefore, following the mandate laid out in the North Atlantic

Treaty, NATO announced its support of the UN Security Council's resolutions to inspect Iraqi facilities for WMDs; however, this decision further alienated the US from NATO.

After NATO's statement at the 2002 Prague Summit transatlantic relations continued to deteriorate. In February 2003, NATO was confronted with another challenge when Turkey invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened" (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4, 4 April 1949). While the NAC complied with Turkey's invocation of Article 4 and began consultations regarding the defense of Turkey in the event of an attack, the larger issue raised by Turkey's request was whether or not it was within NATO's mandate to provide defensive tools if the threat to Turkey's territorial and political integrity was not immediately threatened. The doubt concerning NATO's obligation to defend Turkey brought the US and several European states head-to-head and exposed a deep-seated problem within NATO. In spite of the Alliance's efforts to develop a global mandate, there had been "no discussion let alone a clear policy statement that provides a coherent rationale or set of guidelines to establish when and where NATO is justified in acting" (Terriff 2004: 431). France, Germany, and Belgium perceived Turkey's request for defensive aid as a "thinly veiled attempt at gaining NATO approval for the war" and thus all three states blocked the necessary unanimous vote in the NAC to grant defensive capabilities to Turkey (Toje 2008: 125). The inter-allied crisis escalated when the US issued a "series of official and unofficial statements stating that if Turkey did not receive a statement of solidarity, the US would review its commitment to the Alliance" (Toje 2008: 125). Suddenly, the question of whether NATO was entitled to grant defensive aid to Turkey under such questionable circumstances transformed into a question of whether NATO would even survive this crisis.

Is This the End? NATO Skeptics' Arguments

As the situation in Iraq developed and as US-European tensions escalated, NATO pessimists increasingly anticipated the gloom and doom predictions of the end of the Cold War to finally come to fruition. Neorealists and NATO skeptics pointed

to the deep schism within NATO over security strategies and policies as evidence of the gradual crumbling of NATO's foundations. Although there was wide-spread support for the US immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent war on terror revealed a strong divergence between the US and Europe over NATO's responsibility to address the threats from WMDs and global terrorism. The reluctance among many Europeans to incorporate counter-terrorism policies in NATO's agenda indicated to many neorealists the development of an irreparable division between US and European security interests. According to neorealists, states are unitary, rational actors that pursue their own self-interests and the war on terror and the 2003 invasion of Iraq revealed the United States' unyielding willingness to defend its national territory and if necessary, unilaterally pursue its interests abroad. As a result of the US shift to neo-conservatism and unilateralism it was natural for neorealists to perceive NATO's 2003 crisis as its possible finale.

Moreover, what the debate over Iraq and the defense of Turkey revealed were divergences over the cornerstones of the Alliance. With the rise of neo-conservatism in the US, the Bush administration pushed for a preemptive approach to the situation in Iraq, a policy and strategy that conflicted with much of Europe's preference for defensive action. Although American and European threat perceptions had begun diverging after the Cold War, the crisis in Iraq caused a schism within the Alliance. The US viewed rogue states – namely Iraq, Iran and North Korea – terrorism, and WMDs as matters vital to national interest, whereas the Europeans found these same threats less pressing because they were less directly affected. Additionally, there was also a divide between the US and Europe over the best means of addressing the threats from rogue states, terrorism, and WMDs. As many neoconservatives argued during the time, "U.S. military power begets an ideological tendency to use it" while "Europeans prefer to deal with problems through economic integration, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions" (Moravcsik 2003: 76). Such drastically different approaches to security threats produced tensions between the allies and raised the question of whether NATO's twenty-first century role should be chiefly defensive or offensive. Neorealists and NATO pessimists focused in on these factors and argued that such a severe deviation of interests within NATO, particularly over security issues, could only spell misfortune for the Alliance.

Proving the Critics Wrong: Explaining NATO's Resilience

While the US-European tensions of the early 2000s seemed to indicate a weakening of NATO, neorealists and other critics underestimated the Alliance's ability to foster cooperation even when interests diverge. Although the reasons for and the means of invading Iraq were hotly disputed within NATO, the Alliance began to alleviate tensions when it pledged support for building democracy in post-Saddam Iraq. In 2004, NATO issued a statement concerning Iraq that included NATO's offer of full cooperation with the Iraqi Interim Government, calls for the end of terrorist attacks in Iraq, and, most significantly, NATO's offer of assistance, in coordination with the UN, to help train Iraqi security forces (NATO Statement on Iraq, 28 June 2004). Additionally, in the statement NATO declared that:

> We, the 26 Heads of State and Government of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, meeting in Istanbul, declare our full support for the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and for the strengthening of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law and security for all the Iraqi people.
> (NATO Statement on Iraq, 28 June, 2004)

NATO's willingness and ability to fulfill its mandate and twenty-first century role of maintaining peace and stability in 'out-of-area' states helped to ease tensions between the allied states. Although the Alliance was unable to support the Bush administration's decision to preemptively invade Iraq due to the stipulations of the Washington Treaty and the institution's principles, NATO demonstrated its ability to be a key player in the process of building peace and stability, a necessary role for the pursuit of security in the greater Euro-Atlantic area.

In spite of the serious internal divisions created by the 2003 Iraq crisis, NATO endured, and as it has done throughout its history, the Alliance reformed itself, having learned from the lessons of 9/11 and 2003. Besides NATO's attempts to rebuild its internal solidarity, individual member states also took various steps to reconfirm their faith in the Transatlantic Alliance. To begin with, in 2006, the US reaffirmed NATO's relevance in the twenty-first century with the US National Security Strategy stating that:

> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a vital pillar of US foreign policy. The Alliance has been strengthened by expanding its membership and now acts beyond its borders as an instrument for peace and stability in many parts of the world.
> (Lindley-French 2007: 106)

After the Bush administration's drastic foreign policy turn, by 2006 the US had returned to its policy of cooperation and consultation with its allies. In May 2006, Daniel Fried, the US Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasian Affairs, noted that, "Unilateralism is out. Effective multilateralism is in. We are working to make NATO the centerpiece alliance through which the transatlantic democratic security community deals with security challenges around the world" (Hendrickson 2007: 110). Despite the disagreements between the US, Europe, and NATO over the motivation and means for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US continues to value the Transatlantic Alliance and the forum for consultation and cooperation that it provides.

In 2009, six years after the Iraq crisis, the twenty eight members of NATO gathered in Strasbourg and Kehl to continue NATO's tradition of reforming itself in the aftermath of a crisis. Meeting on April 4, 2009, the allied members celebrated NATO's sixtieth anniversary – a significant accomplishment for an originally defensive alliance – and issued the Declaration on Alliance Security. First and foremost, the allied members stated in the Declaration that:

> We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the US and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN.
> (Declaration on Alliance Security, 4 April 2009)

The Declaration also reaffirmed NATO's commitment to a Europe whole and free, particularly through the process of enlargement, it set out the goals of improving the Alliance's ability to meet new security challenges and strengthening cooperation among allies and with other international actors, especially the UN and EU, and the Declaration also reiterated NATO's mission of renovating itself to address current threats and to anticipate future challenges. Finally, at the summit the allied members agreed that "NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance" (Declaration on Alliance Security, 4 April 2009).

In spite of the various internal and external difficulties the Alliance has faced throughout its existence, NATO has always preserved its fundamental mission: collective defense based on allied solidarity. In addition to NATO's ability and

willingness to adapt itself in response to challenges, perhaps it is the consistency of NATO's mandate that has ensured the Alliance's endurance for the past sixty years. Even after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has remained committed to the defense and security of its member states, as was illustrated by its involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s and its immediate and unified response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The institutionalization of collective defense has worked to bind the allied states together and mitigate the security dilemma which would normally compel states to distrust and compete with one another. While the transatlantic partners often disagree on what types of power ought to be used to resolve a crisis and how that power should be utilized, there is a deep-rooted solidarity within NATO based on shared values and interests, as well as an understanding that cooperation is necessary to tackle twenty-first century security challenges. For neorealists and even traditional liberals, the ability of institutions to bind states to one another in order to create a more stable and peaceful order is generally inexplicable. Institutionalists and constructivists, on the other hand, view institutions as at least semi-autonomous actors with the capability of shaping the behavior of individuals and states by lowering transaction costs, increasing communication, and thus reducing uncertainty. According to these theoretical schools, "institutions are seen as overarching patterns of relations that define and reproduce the interests and actions of individuals and groups" (Ikenberry 2001: 15). Through continual interaction, particularly over a longer period of time, institutions embody the principles and values of the states that created them and in turn, the institutions influence state interests and behavior, a process seriously overlooked by NATO pessimists.

Realist explanations of NATO's endurance are limited by the assumption that international cooperation between states is extremely difficult because states are untrustworthy and are too concerned about relative gains. Within the tenets of realism, states are unitary actors that are "sensitive to costs" and furthermore, "international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests" (Grieco 1988: 805). In taking a zero-sum game approach, realists tend to underestimate the ability of institutions to mediate between states and to encourage the exchange of information

which ultimately leads to increased cooperation. In the aftermath of the tensions in 2003 over Iraq, Kaplan argued that:

> The partnership with the allies has been vital if not always respected for the services they have provided in the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as for the support the United States seeks from Europe in a reconstructed Iraq. Granted the ongoing frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a mutual dependence that has kept the alliance together in the past and should continue to do so in the future.
>
> (Kaplan 2004: 149)

Moreover, according to neoliberal institutionalists, cooperation becomes more likely after repeated experiences because "states that interact repeatedly in either a mutually beneficial or harmful manner are likely to find that mutual cooperation is their best long-term strategy" (Grieco 1988: 811). As Kaplan's argument above suggests, NATO has provided a forum for consultation and cooperation for sixty years and even as security threats move beyond the original North Atlantic area, the Alliance has shaped and continues to influence its member states' behavior so that it is in the allies' best interest to maintain NATO and the level of cooperation that has developed over the past six decades.

Conclusion

In many ways the internal debate over the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the most severe crisis that NATO has endured throughout its sixty year history. While the 1966 withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure raised issues about consultation and the shift in the international balance of power, and the end of the Cold War brought up questions about NATO's future in a world without the threat from the Soviet Union, neither of these crises tested the cornerstones of the Alliance. Although the US and the European states have shown differing views on what constitutes a security threat and what means should be utilized to address that threat, these differences were never a serious issue until the post-9/11 era. Not only was the US suddenly vulnerable again, but there was a strict divergence between the global hegemon and the European states concerning how the rising threat of global terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs should be addressed, particularly by NATO. According to Kaplan, "The shifting emphasis from al Qaeda to Iraq in the war on terrorism opened a schism in the alliance that worsened when the United States

prepared for war with a coalition of the willing, or alone if necessary" (Kaplan 2004: 141). The shift within the US to a foreign policy based on neo-conservatism and unilateralism drove a wedge between the transatlantic partners and questioned the relevancy of NATO in tackling these new global security threats.

In spite of the tensions between the allied states, NATO was able to uphold its mandate and eventually ameliorate the tensions between the member states. Once again, NATO's ability to evolve from moments of crisis attests to the Alliance's enduring quality. Particularly after the difficulties and tensions caused by 9/11 and the Iraq crisis, the Alliance's persistence may be a testament to the necessity of American-European cooperation. In spite of the differences of opinion concerning principal security threats and the best methods to address such threats, it is evident that both the US and Europe continue to find the Transatlantic Alliance useful and that the allies benefit from the forum for cooperation that NATO has created.

Conclusion

What this paper has sought to accomplish is to offer a more comprehensive explanation for why NATO has endured well beyond its anticipated expiration date. To do this, three case studies have been used: the 1966 withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure, the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991, and the 2003 debate over the invasion of Iraq, to demonstrate how NATO's commitment to cooperation and the motivation of NATO's member states to transform crises into opportunities for reform and development explain its endurance. In all three instances, NATO was faced with challenges that threatened its stability and even future; yet in all three cases NATO responded to these moments of crisis by assessing its purpose and devising ways to strengthen NATO's solidarity and reaffirm its relevance within the international system. "NATO's ability to successfully address transatlantic discord suggests a pattern of dispute resolution and effective adaptation" and it is this pattern of adaptation that best accounts for NATO's persistence throughout the years. Finally, this paper has attempted to illustrate that neorealists and NATO skeptics overlooked several key factors, including the ability of institutions to foster cooperation and the motivation of individuals to keep NATO alive, when they predicted NATO's demise on all three occasions.

Both the 1966 crisis and the end of the Cold War demonstrated the prominent role of individuals in the transformation and maintenance of NATO. Because realist theories assume a state-centric level of analysis they underestimate the significant influence of individuals on NATO's decisions and actions and overlook the importance of the institutional framework of NATO and how its components and committees have shaped the Alliance's development. By examining the individual level of analysis, theoretical approaches such as neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism are able to explain how NATO overcame the challenges of the 1960s. It was Belgium's foreign minister, Pierre Harmel, who proposed significant reforms to NATO's organizational and decision-making framework in order to strengthen the solidarity and improve the efficiency of the Alliance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991, individuals played a significant role in maintaining

NATO and transforming the Alliance's *raison d'être* to ensure its relevancy in the twenty-first century.

Utilizing an individual level of analysis, the bureaucratic nature of NATO can debunk neorealism's predictions of NATO's death and can shed some light not just on how NATO endured but also on how it evolved. Bureaucracies such as NATO are composed of thousands of individuals who strive to preserve the institution. When the survival of the institution is questioned, these individuals will seek ways to ensure the durability of the institution to preserve their source of employment. Realism's state-centric level of analysis overlooks this simple yet vital component of all institutions and assumes that states are the only entities whose interests determine the fate of the organization. While NATO's initial survival after the end of the Cold War could be attributed to state interests, the Alliance's dramatic transformation during the 1990s and its endurance into the twenty-first century cannot be explained just by the allied members' pursuit of their own national interests. Hendrickson argues that "much of the responsibility for NATO's survival in the first decade after the Cold War rests with the Clinton administration, who aggressively pushed for NATO's transformation" (Hendrickson 2007: 109). For instance, rather than disengaging the US from its European allies, the Clinton administration worked to develop a 'New Transatlantic Agenda' that would provide "a new framework for a partnership of global significance, designed to lend a new quality to the transatlantic relationship, moving it from one of consultation to one of joint action" (Toje 2008: 35).

The third and final case, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, exposed the weakness in neorealism's assumption that institutions cannot mitigate the effects of anarchy and the claim that states prefer relative gains over absolute gains, particularly when their interests do not align. The animosity between the US and Europe concerning NATO's security policies and the debate over its involvement in the war on terror and in Iraq produced a severe fracture within the Alliance that many commentators thought foreshadowed the end of NATO. In spite of the disagreements over security issues, NATO skeptics and neorealists underestimated the inter-allied bonds of cooperation and the member state's inherent commitment to NATO's endurance. Neorealists and NATO pessimists assume that the ties between states can easily be broken when interests no longer align and the common purpose weakens. However, what these commentators overlooked in the case of the 2003 crisis was that the

member states could have diverging pursuits and concerns and yet still maintain an invested interest in the resilience of NATO. For sixty years NATO has provided for the collective defense and security of its members and these states have come to value the forum for cooperation and consultation that NATO has created.

The three case studies reveal that there is a tendency among states to cooperate, especially when they share common values, interests, and heritage. Moreover, in fostering cooperation, institutions do have a mitigating effect on international anarchy. As NATO's endurance through the end of the Cold War illustrated, institutions and even defensive alliances like NATO can evolve beyond their original mandate and remain relevant organizations throughout changes in the international balance of power. Although historical precedence warranted NATO skeptics' assumptions that a shift in the balance of power also produces a shift in alliances as states begin the rebalancing process, these NATO pessimists underestimated the influence institutions can have on state interests. In all three cases, the evolution of NATO to respond to new internal challenges and to external security threats maintained the Alliance's relevance and guaranteed the continued support of its member states. If NATO officials and other individuals had not taken the initiative to continuously reform and transform NATO, then it is likely that the NATO-in-crisis predictions would have come to fruition. However, NATO has endured well beyond its anticipated expiration date because of these efforts and because of the Alliance's willingness to evolve, all of which are factors that the NATO-in-crisis commentators overlooked in their predictions.

In terms of the broader question about international cooperation, NATO has demonstrated that institutions and even defensive alliances have an important role to play in the development of state interests and the conduct of international relations. One of the primary limiting factors of realist theories is their assumptions about alliances. Most realists, but especially those within the neorealist camp, argue that states form alliances *against* a threat but once that threat is gone, there is little incentive for the states to maintain the alliance. This dissolution is exactly what most neorealists expected to happen to NATO in the years following the end of the Cold War. Yet it has been over twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and not only does NATO still exist, but it has transformed itself and expanded its mandate to a global level. Institutionalist theory, however, recognizes that alliances and coalitions

of states can become institutionalized, thus binding states together on the basis of common objectives and principles, rather than simply on the basis of a shared threat. According to institutionalist theory, "Alliances are institutions to the extent that states engage in a formal and contractual obligation to co-operate on security matters, and they may choose to create a formal organization to facilitate the pursuit of their collective objectives" (Rafferty 2003: 344). It is the process of creating a formal organization with means of cooperation and consultation that can contribute to the persistence and evolution of an alliance over time. Part of what realists overlook is that "when states share constitutive norms, they are committed to the alliance not only for the functions it performs, but also for what it represents. Norms generate a form of 'loyalty' to the institution" (Rafferty 2003: 345). When addressing the creation, evolution, survival, and dissolution of an alliance, especially one as unique as NATO, it is necessary to consider the role of states' interests and their cost-benefit analyses; however, it is also crucial to examine institutions from the individual level to comprehend how norms are adopted and proliferated and also how those norms influence the behavior and interests of the institution as a whole. Through the processes of institutionalization and socialization of norms, international institutions are shaping state interests and fostering an environment for cooperation and consultation. Based on the past sixty years, it seems plausible that NATO will continue to endure and that international institutions will continue to shape and construct the international system and mitigate the conflictive effects of anarchy.

Works Cited

Asmus, Ronald D. (2003). "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, 82/20, pp. 20-31.

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane (1993). "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" in David A. Baldwin (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 85-115.

Barany, Zoltan and Robert Rauchhaus (2011). "Explaining NATO's Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32/2, pp. 286-307.

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Bozo, Frédéric (1998). "Détente versus Alliance: France, the US and the politics of the Harmel report (1964-1968)", *Contemporary European History*, 7/3, pp. 343-360.

Clark, Ian (2001). *The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Ciuta, Felix (2002). "The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action, and Narrative Transformation", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 23/1, pp. 35-62.

Cornish, Paul (1997). *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Flockhart, Trine (2012). "Constructivism and Foreign Policy", in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (eds.) *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 78-92.

Gardner, Hall (2004). "Preclusive War with Iraq: Regional and Global Ramifications" in Hall Gardner (ed.) *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 278-316.

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism" in Andrew Linklater (ed.) *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume 2* (London: Routledge), pp. 805-829.

Haglund, David G. (1995). "Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and Policy Dilemmas", *International Journal*, 50/4, pp. 651-674.

Hartmann, Frederick H. and Robert L. Wendzel (1994). *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Harper Collins).

Hellmann, Gunther and Reinhard Wolf (1993). "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO", *Security Studies*, 3/1, pp. 3-43.

Hendrickson, Ryan C. (2007). "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death", *Parameters*, 37/7, pp. 98-114.

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh (2005). *Atlanticism for a New Century: Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.).

Hunt, Brigadier K. (1966). "NATO without France: The military implications", *The Adolphi Papers*, 6/32, pp. 1-21.

Ikenberry, John G. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Jervis, Robert (1999). "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate", *International Security*, 24/1, pp. 42-63.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. (2004). *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (London: Praeger).

Lindley-French, Julian (2007). *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance* (London: Routledge).

Locher, Anna (2007). "A crisis foretold: NATO and France, 1963-66" in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (eds.) *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s* (London: Routledge), pp. 107-127.

Mahncke, Dieter, Wyn Rees, and Wayne C. Thompson (2004). *Redefining transatlantic security relations: The challenge of change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

McCalla, Robert B. (1996). "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, 50/3, pp. 445-475.

Medcalf, Jennifer (2005). *NATO: A Beginner's Guide* (Oxford: Oneworld Publishing).

Moens, Alexander, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens (eds.) (2003). *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism* (London: Praeger).

Moravcsik, Andrew (2003). "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, 82, pp. 74-89.

NATO, *Declaration on Alliance Security*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl, 4 April 2009.

NATO, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Berlin, 3 June 1996.

NATO, *London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, 10-11 January 1990.

NATO, *North Atlantic Treaty*, 4 April 1949.

NATO, *Statement to the Press,* by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Brussels, 8 December 1998.

NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7-8
November 1991.

NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999.

NATO, *The Future Tasks of the Alliance (The Harmel Report)*, 13 December 1967.

Nuenlist, Christian (2007). "Into the 1960s: NATO's role in East-West relations,
1958-63" in Wenger, Nuenlist, and Locher (eds.) *Transforming NATO in the
Cold War* (London: Routledge), pp. 67-88.

Peterson, John and Mark A. Pollack (2003). *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic
relations in the twenty-first century* (London: Routledge).

Rafferty, Kirsten (2003). "An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance
Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory", *Canadian Journal of Political
Science*, 36/2, pp. 341-362.

Ratti, Luca (2006). "Post-Cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The
Case for Neo-Classical Realism", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4/1, pp.
81-110.

Risse-Kappan, Thomas (1996). "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community:
The Case of NATO" in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia
University Press), pp. 357-399.

Sloan, Stanley R. (2003). *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community*
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.).

Steel, Ronald (1990). "Europe after the Superpowers" in Nicholas X. Rizopoulos
(ed.) *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed* (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press), pp. 7-21.

Stein, Arthur (1993). "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in David A. Baldwin (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 29-59.

Suri, Jeremi (2007). "The normative resilience of NATO: a community of shared values amid public discord" in Wenger, Nuenlist, and Locher (eds.) *Transforming NATO in the Cold War* (London: Routledge), pp. 15-30.

Terriff, Terry (2004). "Fear and Loathing in NATO: The Atlantic Alliance after the Crisis over Iraq", *Perspectives on European Politics and Security*, 5/3, pp. 419-446.

Thies, Wallace J. (2009). *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Toje, Asle (2008). *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the transatlantic bargain* (London: Routledge).

Trachtenberg, Mark (2012). *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Walt, Stephen (1987). *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell: Cornell University Press).

Waltz, Kenneth (2000). "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, 25/1, pp. 5-41.

Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Wenger, Andreas (2004). "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966-1968," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6/1, pp. 22-74.

Wörner, Manfred (1994). "Shaping the Alliance for the Future", *NATO Review*, 42/1, pp. 3-6.