The European Union and aid conditionality between effective multilateralism and a ‘European vision’ for international development

Abstract

This study analyses the application of aid conditionality within the EU’s supranational development
cooperation policy managed by the European Commission. It asks why the EU as a
donor in its own right seems so ambiguous in pursuing globally advocated policy prescription
on aid conditionality. The Commission has sought to implement some, e.g. resultsorientedness
and the concentration on joint conditionality assessment frameworks, seems to
ignore others, e.g. rigid country selectivity, and fails to pursue featured prescriptions as envisaged,
e.g. conditionality on a holistic understanding of governance. It is argued that this
ambiguity is the result of a dilemma-like trade-off within the Commission’s ambition to justify
the existence of a separate EU level development policy. The Commission struggles to
reconcile its ambition to pursue a normatively distinctive approach to development (‘European
vision’), if necessary unilaterally, with supporting effective multilateral cooperation
within the existing global discourse, especially around the World Bank (‘effective multilateralism’),
which often contradicts the Commission’s views on development cooperation. This
undermines the Commission’s attempt to justify its role as a separate donor in international
development as long as it remains outside its capacity to consistently influence the content
of the global aid agenda.