![University of Glasgow]

Casey, Ryan (2016) *Securing the quay: criminological perspective on the lived experience of port security* [MSc.]

ABSTRACT

Sea ports are a key transit point in the supply chain of international trade, which brings them under the domain of international security and regulation. As a consequence of late modernity, ports have become a secured and governed space of hybridity: both public and private actors, both federal and commercial contracts, both independent and vested interest stakeholders, and under the jurisdiction of multiple security-enforcement agencies. However, at the same time, sea ports interface with vast spaces of unregulated waters. From a criminological perspective, port security is an underdeveloped research area. Security, as it moves away from the monopoly of the state, manifests as a networked effort made up of actors and agencies from various sectors. Therefore, it is the aim of this research to gain an understanding of the lived experience of port security through the interpretations of operational and administrative actors in the extensive port security network. The interactions that occur on a daily basis at the port, situated in its local context, are what come to define port security and how it is maintained. Taking into consideration the governance of port security, the post-9/11 security landscape, interagency cooperation efforts, and the occupational culture of port security actors, it is hoped that a more nuanced understanding of the port security network and its compliance to and enforcement of security can be understood.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Sea ports play a vital role in the global economy and supply chain of international trade and, in effect, are an important site of international security and regulation (Demirbas *et al*., 2014; Sanchez *et al*., 2003; Feng *et al*., 2012; Eski, 2011). Their ability to handle large volumes of cargo at comparably low costs attracts approximately 90% of all transported world cargo (Feng *et al*., 2012; Nordstrom, 2007; Eski, 2016). Furthermore, ports are included in the larger post-9/11 security agenda of surveillance, heightened measures, and counterterrorism protocols (Shaw, 2001; Eski, 2011). As a transit point, it is important to understand that ports are not just the time or distance between supply and demand, but a universe of processes and meanings unto themselves (Nordstrom, 2007). This realm of complex interactions, meanings, interpretations, and activities is what Eski (2016) refers to as the 'port securityscape'. The interactions and interpretations that occur on a daily basis at the port, situated in its local context, are what comes to define port security and how it is maintained. Therefore, this research project is guided by the following research question(s):

As a vital transit point for international trade, how is security maintained and complied with at sea ports while situated in a local, national, and international security context? Who is responsible for its enforcement and how is it experienced?

To answer these questions, multi-sited ethnographic research was conducted at two European ports in order to understand the lived experience of port security. In order to research and collect data on the lived experience of port security, I situated myself within the environment and culture of those responsible for creating, supporting, or enforcing it. Qualitative data was collected through interviews, observation, and participation during the daily occupational responsibilities of port security network actors. This research study will begin by reviewing existing literature on criminological perspectives on security, globalised security, the port security environment, and transnational crimes dependent on trade. In addition, port studies, as a niche area of transportation and economic studies, is reviewed to supplement an understanding of the global supply chain. A multidisciplinary approach to this subject area will provide a sound theoretical foundation of knowledge which should create a framework and path for meaningful and significant research findings. While it is important to point out that there was a considerable body of existing research in the respective subject areas, there appeared to be a noticeable gap in the literature regarding diversity of fieldwork sites: the existing literature tends to focus on the Port of Rotterdam. This research

moves beyond the well-explored sites in the existing research base by focusing upon two ports that have not been explored in academic research to date.

The focus of the ethnographic fieldwork was to capture the creation and construction of port security, its interconnections with local and global phenomena, it manifestations, perceptions of it, and the diverse narratives woven into the 'securityscape' (Eski, 2016). Furthermore, port security actors were understood as a broad network that extended into structural and commercial aspects of ports, as relevant nodes of security. The findings of this research are divided into two themes: (1) accountability and (2) occupational culture; both of which are based on the data collected and the interpretations of the participants, which in turn, are influenced by my own interpretations. The section on accountability concerns the governance of the ports and interagency cooperation amongst port security actors. The following section on occupational culture covers image management and the ways port security actors situate themselves in a local and global context. After a discussion of the research findings, there is an additional synthesis of the data collected which seeks to reflexively analyse the participants' interpretations of port security and tie them into larger concepts for critical thought and engagement.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) is a complex network of actors that play a vital role in the security of global economy and supply chain of international trade, as well as the protection and enforcement of the local port site (Demirbas *et al*., 2014; Sanchez *et al*., 2003; Feng *et al*., 2012; Eski, 2011). In fact, the broad security of the trade often manifests itself exclusively in the physical port space. However, this has not been explicitly evidenced by previous research in terms of the 'localness' of international security and how it is experienced. Criminological research (see Eski, 2011; 2016; Zaitch, 2002; Nordstrom, 2007) suggests that a port's interpretation and enforcement of security (or lack thereof) can leave it vulnerable to the manipulation of transnational criminal activity, such as smuggling or trafficking, which would not only impact the local community of the port, but contribute to the harm of the global economy among other consequences.

The principal aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of how security is maintained and complied with at sea ports through minor interactions while situated in a local, national, and international security context. The key objectives of this project are: to interpret the lived experience of port security and capture the complexity of context as a local and international hub of activity.

With that in mind, this research seeks to maintain the concept of 'the local' at its centre while exploring the existing body of knowledge and previous studies in this field, in addition to considering a multidisciplinary approach. Two main topic areas have been determined in order to critically explore the existing literature while demonstrating that a gap in the literature exists as far as capturing the humanistic daily experience of port security and how it interprets the influences of 'glocalisation' (Robertson, 1995). The first section concerns security in the context of late modernity, in order to critically understand contemporary conceptualizations of globalization, security, and their interrelated processes. This is followed by an evaluation of recent studies and publications that situate port security in the context of globalization by highlighting recent publications on the topic of port security, as well as transport studies as a complimentary discipline, and assessing recent criminological literature at the international level that directly or indirectly relates to port security. Given the quantity of academic work on or related to port security it is not possible to review it in its entirety. This literature review is

therefore deliberately planned to be critical and theoretical. A degree of convergence is expected of this review with certain reference to: contextualization, transnationality, and interpretation. This critical review is being conducted in order to establish an informed, relevant and thorough beginning for this study, related fieldwork and beyond.

Security in the context of late modernity

The language of late modernity reflects a changing socio-political and economic system that is attempting to grasp the complex and interconnected processes of globalization. These processes permeate society at every level: micro, meso, and macro. As such, the implications of this dynamic phenomenon have altered the security landscape and interpretations of what security means. The emphasis on the local stems from the contradictory notion that despite a connection to and awareness of global happenings, people still live within a local context, not an international one (Chan, 2000). However, this complicates expectations and conceptualizations of modern security.

Processes of globalization

Globalization has been defined by Giddens (1990: 64) as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. It is not just the homogenous swallowing-up of the local by the global, but the situating of both within a singular space; a nexus (Brewer, 2002: 179). Often referred to as 'glocalisation', this more nuanced socio-spatial conceptualization of globalization visualizes the complex process as a two-way unfolding of interaction between the universal and the local; international processes must manifest in the local space (Robertson, 1995; Chan, 2000). This complex relationship has been written about extensively, theoretically, as a major consequence of late modernity (*inter alia* Robertson, 1995; Giddens, 1990, 1996; Sklair, 1999; Held et al., 1999; Chan, 2000; Aas, 2007, 2010). However, there has been less empirical research done to capture this abstract concept and phenomenon. There are a limited number of notable examples which see to capture the local-global nexus (see McCrone, 1998; Miller, 1997; Brewer *et a*l., 1997), however none exclusively on port security.

In criminology, amongst other social sciences, the rhetoric of late modernity is sometimes criticized for its tendency to distract the researcher in postmodern abstractions which deter

quality research into transnational issues (Burowoy, 2000). For some researchers, such as anthropologist Scheper-Hughes (2004), it is dismissed as a stylistic choice; she claimed her findings were not well-received because she did not conform to the style of language that she felt was being (aggressively) encouraged. However, as evidenced in the emphasis on the importance of the local in Scheper-Hughes' (2004) study, it is to be kept in mind that the spirit of the research is more important than the language of it. The rhetoric of late modernity is not inherently a stylistic choice, but a way of recognizing and expressing a changing economic, political, and social system. It has implications at the international, national, and local level of governance, crime and justice, and for the purpose of this study, security.

Criminologically conceptualizing security

The term 'security' is an interdisciplinary word and concept whose contested definition is often adapted to accommodate the relevant discipline using it (Buzan, 1991; Gariup, 2009; Zedner, 2009). Valverde (2011: 5) argues security can only be understood in terms of 'what people do in it name' rather than as a thing. Though it has been comprehensively studied and discussed in many disciplines, there is a clear and seemingly intentional omission amongst disciplines to create a working definition for the term. The closest and most relevant attempt at a definition defines security as 'the objective state of being without, or protected from, threat; […] the subjective condition of freedom from anxiety; […] also the means or pursuit of these two ends" (Zedner, 2003: 158). However, Zedner's (2003) definition of security does not encapsulate what security is, but rather, how it is subjectively interpreted and felt by those providing and receiving it. According to Eski (2016: 44), 'it [is] pretentious to conceptualize security' because of the varying constructions of its use and its frequent re-interpretations'. However, this absence of a theoretical definition and academic hesitancy indicates a need for further empirical research on security, which could then enlighten its theoretical conceptualization.

Criminology, for the most part, has only recently begun contributing towards the larger body of knowledge on security (*inter alia*: Zedner, 2010; Loader & Walker, 2007a, 2007b; Shearing, 2005; Schuilenburg *et al*., 2014; Schuilenburg, 2015; Löfstrand *et al*., 2016). However, often entangled within Young's (2011) concept of the 'criminological imagination' (see Eski, 2016), criminology's attempt to explore security does not expand much beyond the reiteration of its heterogeneous nature (Foucault, 1984) and reliance upon 'sensitizing concepts' (Blumer, 1954) to skirt around the definition of security. This leads to an issue when studying post-9/11

security and its changing landscape as well as priorities. Theoretical literature exists on topics such as: understandings of provision, risks, threats, surveillance, reconstruction of the 'national' as 'international', and the moving from reactionary to preventative (*inter alia*: Shaw, 2001; Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Shearing, 2001; Zedner, 2000, 2003; Loader & Sparks, 2002; Sheptycki, 1998, 2007), yet there is little empirical research in these areas. There is a tendency in criminological literature to draw attention to the changes and developments in the realm of security, often with transforming, dramatic, or even negative connotations (Schuilenburg et al., 2014: 10); comparisons between how it was before 9/11 and how it has changed. Eski's (2016) conceptualization of it as part of Young's (2011) historically-embedded and dynamic 'criminological imagination' subscribes to this trend as well; security is a constantly changing social phenomenon. However, such comparisons between the past and present of the realm of security cannot be drawn without an implicit foundational definition; there must be a universal interpretation of security if these post-9/11 and globalized changes are universally observed. Unfortunately, there is not much in the way of existing literature that offers a universal understanding of security, or even the existence of an implicit one.

Situating port security in the context of globalization

Sea ports are in a taken-for-granted interdependent relationship with governments and a global trading system which makes them a target and tool for criminal acts. Due to the processes of globalization, port security has become an all-encompassing phenomenon that affects the port, the surrounding community, international relations, and the global economy. This section of the review evaluates the quality and range of research related to ports, port security, and an overview of crimes that could potentially threaten ports.

The port security environment

The port exists as a local space dealing with local and international problems. As such, between its complex security measures being maintained, its vital relationship to international trade, and the amalgamated cooperative of agencies that secure the site, ports make for an attractive and enriching research setting. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were the catalyst for what has become a complete transformation of worldwide security awareness, including in the maritime industry (Eski, 2016: 47). The most tangible change here has been the implementation

of legislation known as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, following the events of 9/11 (Chalk, 2008). Policy-based studies have been conducted on the compliance of security to the ISPS Code (see Bichou, 2004) as well as the effect of subsequent security intervention into the global trade (see Urciuoli et al., 2010); however, no existing studies are from a criminological perspective.

Social science studies exist which descriptively capture the experience of global trade, security at ports, and its criminological implications such as Nordstrom's (2007) ethnographic study. However, the Nordstrom study is broad in its coverage as it is not strictly limited to sea ports, nor is it inherently focused on security or criminology. Eski's (2016) more recent ethnographic account of port security of Rotterdam and Hamburg is more attuned to criminological research; however, the findings are grounded in conflict theory and power differentials. It is also worth noting that most social science-oriented research studies into port security use the same site for data collection, namely, the Port of Rotterdam (see Hoekema, 1973 cited in Eski, 2016; Zaitch, 2002; Van Os, 2003; Nordstrom, 2007; Hoogenboom, 2010 cited in Eski, 2016; Eski, 2016). The Port of Rotterdam is universally known as a large port, in the sense that it deals with a high volume of cargo and general activity. It is one of the world's largest container ports and has the highest ranking by the World Shipping Council (2014) out of any other European port. However, the continued use of the same research site amongst a number of projects and scholars does nothing for the diversification of the topic, nor does it allow for fair generalizations to be made and applied to other studies when the data is so specific to a single site. While it makes for an enriching study to use a port with seemingly infinite resources and experienced in accommodating academic researchers, Rotterdam is not representative of the majority of ports in Europe in size, scale, capabilities, or volume. These measurements need to be considered for future research, as it helps to understand ports in relation to their performance as well as capabilities.

The port as a supply-chain (SC) interface

Port studies is a growing sub-discipline within the larger discourse of transportation studies and economics. Through the use of calculable and descriptive methodologies, port study researchers attempt to measure various aspects of the port in order to develop an understanding of its economics, policies, and management (Pallis *et al*., 2011). Much of the current research in this area involves port-related themes such as: policy and regulation (see Notteboom, 2002;

Haralambides *et al*., 2001); ports in transport and in supply chains (see McCalla, 1999; Slack & Frémont, 2005) and port governance (see Baird, 2000; Juhel, 2001). Unlike the existing research on ports from security and criminological perspectives, this body of research contextualizes the port in its local site, its place within a surrounding community, the structure from which it is governed, and recognizes its intermodal role within the larger system of international trade. This makes a valuable contribution to situating and understanding ports in contemporary societies.

Supply-chain (SC) studies account for a number of aspects often overlooked by criminological research on ports such as the port-city relationship. The environmental impact (see Wu and Dun, 1995), indirect quay-side employment and revenue (see Guoqiang *et al*., 2005), and risk absorption and analysis (see Handley-Schachler & Navare, 2010) are all aspects of the port with criminological implications, particularly as port-city relationship reinforces the localness of the port security phenomenon. Port governance studies also account for structural-regulatory aspects to the port, which could directly or indirectly influence port security, such as: public-private sector involvement (see Baird, 2000; Juhel, 2001) and the regulation of stevedore earnings and unions (see Talley, 2002, 2004). However, a major omission in the body of literature on port studies is the explicit appreciative mention of port security, as a group and concept excluded from the general port labour population and the laws and policies which regulate the port. In conducting this literature review, one recent study of port performance was found that actually uses the concept of 'security' as an obstacle to be mitigated in order to overcome for improved performance (see Urciuoli *et al*., 2010). Furthermore, transportation study research into ports lacks the human and qualitative element of the social sciences. For instance, Bichou's (2004) SC-based study of port security is limited to logistical compliance with the ISPS Code, rather than socially-interpreted compliance. By dealing in that which is only quantitative and survey-friendly, port and transportation studies lack a nuanced understanding of the humanistic 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016).

Ports in relation to transnational crime

Ports facilitate the largely uninterrupted flow of trade between bordered jurisdictions and across large expanses of unregulated water (Eski, 2011; Nordstrom, 2007). These interfaces and ties to unregulated space leave ports vulnerable to being used and exploited by criminal networks for shipping and advancing their criminal opportunities (see Zaitch, 2002; Nordstrom, 2007). Twenty-foot equivalent units (aka containers) are the archetypal 20x8x8 foot storage units that

define modern shipping (Nordstrom, 2007: 117). When a ship is carrying several thousands of these containers they become an ideal vessel for smuggling, because so few are checked by Customs agencies (*ibid.*). According to Nordstrom (2007: 118), the usual offences caught by Customs agencies include: under-declaring the value of cargo; wrongly declaring the nature of the cargo; bad paperwork; or smuggling. Studies (*ibid.*: 119) have captured the pressure felt by Harbour Boards to allow containers through the ports without inspection, in order to avoid delaying or upsetting their customers. However, this can eventually lead to corruption of officials (Kostakos & Antonopoulos, 2010). Unfortunately, this leads to transnational smuggling organizations utilising legitimate commercial maritime routes in order to integrate and launder their smuggled goods (McNicholas, 2008: 192; Eski, 2011: 418).

Ports are vulnerable to a number of crimes and threats. Previous studies have recorded incidences of: drug trafficking (Zaitch, 2002); human trafficking (Degeneste & Sullivan, 1996); arms and weapons trafficking (Kostakos & Antonopoulos, 2010); corruption of law enforcement officers (ibid.); cultural property trafficking (St. Hilaire, 2012); piracy (Liss, 2011); and even terrorism (Chalk, 2008; Christopher, 2009; Woodward, 2009). That does not even include minor occurrences of theft (Degeneste & Sullivan, 1996), natural disasters or damage (Chowdhury, 2015) or suspicious activity (Atkinson & Culliton, 2015). These studies into specific crimes or criminal networks operating at the port help to depict the larger context in which the port is situated, as well as the importance of why ports ought to be secured. However, it has been argued that the focus of research on security at sea ports needs to be readjusted from specific crimes occurring at the port towards the perspective of security (Van Os, 2003). Several recent studies have attempted to capture this perspective, such as Malcolm's (2011) study of UK policy, which was limited to a discourse analysis with sparse interviews which did not compare to the robust fieldwork of crime-oriented research on port security. Brewer's (2014) comparative study on the ports of Los Angeles and Melbourne also embodies a security-oriented perspective, however, its top-down approach lacks an operational understanding of how security is experienced.

Conclusion

Despite the abundance of multidisciplinary research on port security, very few studies have explored neither a site for fieldwork that has never been studied before without acknowledging its grandeur, nor a bottom-up experience of port security situated in a local and international context. This literature review has attempted to collate research surrounding:

security, port security, port-transportation studies, and transnational crime, in order to create a basic knowledge foundation to give theoretical and practical background to the findings that this project will generate. Though this project is limited by time and resources, this literature review helps to mitigate such limitations in its attempt to critically assess a number of interrelated discipline areas in a focused manner. It has outlined the narrative course of research on port security by exploring emerging key themes, concepts, complementary disciplines, and settings as they relate to the research questions of this project. Though the selectiveness of this review may have limited its broadness, King and Wincup (2008: 18) argue it is the better strategy for the sake of comprehension and purposefulness.

It is evident there are gaps in the literature of port security; these are opportunities for future development of research in the field. This literature review sought to present findings from studies which would be able to create a multi-situated contextual understanding of issues surrounding port security, as a network created through lived interactions and interpretations. It is hoped that this research will add to existing knowledge by addressing the evident gap in literature that the research questions seek to uncover.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Methodological framework

Epistemology and ontology

In order to answer the original research question(s) and gain insight into the 'lived experience' of port security, a qualitative approach was employed in order to 'appreciate' and give meaning to the social world of the research participants, specifically from their point of view (Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 13). Rather than seeking an explanation for how ports operate and perform quantitatively via key performance indicators or units of measurement (see Feng *et al*., 2011; Demirbas *et al*., 2013), I sought an analysis of the human element of the 'port securityscape' to determine how successfully a port operates (Eski, 2016). Therefore, it is important to note that this research is founded in an interpretivist epistemology. The aim was to understand and explain how various individuals with vested interests in port security interpret, assign meaning, and socially construct their identity and surroundings within a plurality of social, political, and economic contexts. Ontologically, this project assumes a constructionist consideration in order meet the needs of the experiential research question; security is socially-constructed and only given meaning by social actors. Furthermore, construction of theory within this study was approached inductively, meaning: the theory functions more as a conclusion; it is built after an understanding of the specific social situation and after an interpretation of cultural meanings has been established (Bottoms, 2008). Drawing from symbolic interactionism, I also kept in mind the importance of human agency and the blurred lines between the norms and values associated with 'normal' and 'deviant' behaviour (Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 7). The nature of my research is occupation-driven and the identities of my participants are defined (but not limited) by this, not by a status of inherent criminality or deviancy. Therefore, as will be evident throughout this study, I suspend all distinctions between 'normal' and 'deviant' behaviours as categories, as these are not attributions my participants would give to themselves in their occupational roles.

Methods choice

The ethnographic approach to this research study is its most significant attribute. Criminological ethnography is an active-subject socially oriented research method that supports an interpretivist approach to research (Bottoms, 2008). In order to research and collect data on the

lived experience of port security, I situated myself within the environment and culture of those responsible for creating, supporting, or enforcing it. According to Hammersley & Atkinson's (1995) definition of traditional ethnographic research, this would have meant participating in the daily life of port security work for an extended period of time. However, my ethnography was not traditional; the circumstances of my situation, being limited in time and resources, called for a more flexible understanding of the ethnographic method. I approached my ethnography as a study of the participants in their occupational setting which involved my presence for 'extended periods of time in order to collect data systematically about their daily activities and the meanings they attach to them' (Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 93). Furthermore, my ethnographic approach was reflexive: I remained critically aware of the port as a local site; its existential meaning and role in global trade; conflicts between my anticipated assumptions versus the research process; and self-interpreted constructions versus those of my participants (Wender, 2004; Finlay, 2002; Meuser & Löschper, 2002). Embracing these conflictual agendas and perspectives allowed me to extract empirical evidence from the narratives of my participants. Originally, I intended to carry out my ethnography through a mixture of only two key specific methods: unstructured interview and recorded observation. However, the fluid and ad hoc nature of my fieldwork led to my active participation as well, which positively enriched the ethnographic experience. Pawson & Tilley (1997) emphasise the role of participant-observation as vital to the ethnographic method because it allows for the researcher to understand a social reality not just by hearsay, but by bearing witness and participating in a group's decision-making process.

Methodological appropriateness

This project is rooted in the notion that research is more than a practice, but also a process; it often lacks discrete and mutually exclusive steps (i.e. planning, access, data collection, analysis, etc.) in favour of a more fluid and whole event (Brewer, 2002: 5). Therefore, I determined an ethnographic approach to my research question(s) to be the most appropriate methodological choice to carry out this research. The focus of my ethnographic fieldwork was the creation and construction of port security, its interconnections with local and global phenomena, how it manifests, perceptions of it, and the capturing of diverse narratives woven into security. Therefore, I pre-emptively acknowledged that any research method that took my participants out of the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) environment, would lessen the quality of data; I had to enter their world and way of thinking. Moreover, I knew it was unrealistic to take my participants

aside during a work shift in order to conduct a formal or structured interview which is why I accepted an unstructured format which would accommodate them, particularly on a busy work day. By shadowing my participants, participating in their occupational duties, taking lunch breaks together, and ending shifts together, I experienced a day in their lives while building a camaraderie with them.

Research design

Gatekeepers and access

The reality of the post-9/11 sea port, regardless of scale or capabilities, is that it is a 'private space' (D'Eramo, 2015: 98) where an outsider such as myself needs permission to penetrate its boundaries – both physical and social – in order to conduct research on the community living within. I began negotiating site access by approaching regional sea ports and contacting their administrative staff by email or phone. This initial correspondence involved introducing myself and the general nature of the research I wanted to conduct. Of all of the ports (N=18) initially contacted in this manner, I found I had a response rate of 55.5% (see Appendix A), which is higher than I had expected based on previous studies of a similar nature (see Eski, 2016). Of those ports which responded to my request: one port granted access unconditionally; one port granted access on the basis I proved I was insured and supervised the majority of the time; one port requested further documentation and verification of my student status and a copy of my written paper prior to submission; and one port expressed interest in wanting to help but never explicitly granted access (*ibid*.) The rest of the responses I received consisted of polite request denials. Hereafter, the two ports which granted access for my research and to which I conducted fieldwork will be referred to as Port A (or City A) and Port B (or City B). Due to the varying and complex nature of sea ports and their structural organisation and ownership, the gatekeepers for each respective site held different positions within different departments. At Port A, my gatekeeper was a Security Manager named Callum while at Port B, my gatekeeper was a commercial Operations Director named David. Their names as well as the names of all particpants are pseudonyms. Both gatekeepers served to help recruit participants as well as participate themselves in this research.

Recruiting participants

Of the total number of participants (N=9) in this research project, seven of the participants were from Port A and only two were from Port B (see Appendix B). This is attributed to the occupational nature of the research and the conditions under which each site operates and staffs itself. It should be noted that I attempted to address this issue during the fieldwork by dedicating more time to the two participants from Port B in order to make up for the imbalance. These participants were recruited in part by the gatekeepers of each site in addition to my own pre-arranged initiatives. At Port A, a Security Supervisor named Jack shadowed me throughout my time at the site and assisted in recruiting more participants from the security team on behalf of Callum. Jack's method of recruiting involved a brief but thorough tour of the entire port and the stations at which the security team has responsibility. At each station, he would yield authority to the relevant subordinate so I could conduct an interview with that person in their role. Most of these participants were recruited ad hoc, as the activities of the business site required. Furthermore, Jack's company throughout the day granted me access to participants and areas of the port that required a security clearance I would not have had without him.

Port B operated quite differently from Port A in that it was more business oriented and privatised, and therefore, my point of contact at the site was in a very different position and a different sort of professional from my participants at Port A. Unlike Jack in Port A, David did not have a diverse team of subordinates spread throughout the site. Anyone on the site was likely contracted by a number of different private businesses. Expecting this before I arrived to City B, I pre-emptively contacted the City B Harbour Board the day before I was to begin my fieldwork and received an immediate reply from the Harbourmaster of the port, Bradley, who agreed to an interview as well. However, like David, he could offer no further points of contact.

Research settings

Ports embody a contradictory characterisation, as it is a loud, busy, and crowded site of business and trade, but it is also where ship crews can disembark and rest after a long journey at sea (Rickman, 1988; Eski, 2016). The locations of my fieldwork necessitated pre-arranged travel and accommodation, which meant the time I spent at each site was structured and fixed. Therefore, the average period of time spent at each site was approximately nine hours and completed within a single day. One site was on the outskirts of a major city within a quiet and

private compound, while another was less than a five-minute walk from the city centre. At one site, the research settings followed the business activity; a cruise-liner had docked early in the morning and I spent time with various participants in their work settings. This included many car rides, petrol station coffee breaks, sitting within gated checkpoint booths, and amongst a sixteen-monitor operations control room. When my participants were too busy working to speak with me, I was told to wear a reflective jacket with 'Security' labelled on the back and assist the participants in directing traffic and tourists. Other times, interviews were conducted in business conference rooms and corner offices. The opportunity-based and random nature of this research project and its settings had to be embraced if I were to gather meaningful data.

Limitations

As in any research study, I encountered and overcame a number of limitations throughout this research project. The most important of which was developing my identity and rapport within the ethnographic process. Limited by time and resources, I acknowledge that the time spent immersed in the field is less than the average ethnographic study. This meant I had to rely on my social skills to quickly build a degree of trust and rapport with my participants, which is a vital part of the ethnographic method. According to Davies (2002: 419), it is the contextualisation and long-term relationships built through extended participation and immersion that defines and distinguishes quality ethnographic research. To ensure my ethnographic research was of good quality, this limitation was addressed by being friendly, sociable, agreeable, and placating the participants throughout the project to make them feel at ease with me. I recognised the attitudes and responses of my participants change and relax after spending considerable time with me, which indicated rapport-building. Regardless, I acknowledge that I was the outsider in this research project and had my fieldwork extended for a time longer, it would have served to benefit my collected data.

Another limitation to this study was the lack of privacy. As mentioned, I was only granted access to Port A under the condition that Jack or another managerial officer supervised my presence at the port. While this was helpful in obtaining access to secured areas, it impacted the data collected from other participants. I took this into account during fieldwork at Port B when I decided to not recruit anyone else from David's office. My reasoning was a response to the fact that the office was an open-floor plan and that it would be impossible for any conversation or interview with any member of staff to be considered private; I observed David's co-workers

eavesdropping during his interview and acknowledged that they might not be comfortable discussing such matters in the presence of their boss if David chose to eavesdrop as well.

Lastly, as a study that used two sites to conduct fieldwork, it would have followed naturally to transform this project into a comparative study. Considering the local-global nexus, which is a crux of this project, the dialectic between the universal and culturally-relative aspects of such a comparative study of security would have been enriching and useful (Zedner, 2003; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009; Howard *et al.*, 2000). However, a comparative study would require a more scientific and repeatable method of data collection at each site than what this project offers. The ad hoc nature, snowball-recruitment, differences in gatekeepers, and opportunity-based decisions during the respective fieldwork make it impossible to justifiably compare the ports against one another. Throughout this project, it will be evident that certain comparisons and contrasts are recognised between the two ports; however, it must be reiterated that due to limitations, the comparative element is not the definitive methodological choice.

Ethical considerations

Full ethical approval was granted to this research project by the University of Glasgow College of Social Science Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects (see Appendix C). Based on the guidelines provided by the University, this project was low risk to both the researcher and participants. Before any interviews or observations took place, I acted upon my 'duty of confidentiality' (Corti *et al.*, 2000) by informing all participants of the nature of the research project, the type of information I was to collect, their participation was voluntary and could be discontinued at any time for any reason, and contact information for my dissertation supervisor if they felt I misrepresented the University. Prior to commencing interviews or audio-recording, all participants were issued an information sheet (see Appendix D) which has details about the research project and how their information would be used. I also took it upon myself to explain the sheet verbally. Consent forms (see Appendix E) were also distributed that asked the participant if they were willing to participate and separately, if they were willing and comfortable with being recorded. I read over every consent sheet before commencing an interview and audio-recorded my participants (after they consented) in an overt fashion to passively confirm their continued knowledge of what was going on. This project required a great deal of travel, and with that, a number of associated risks. However, this was

mitigated by extensive pre-planning, general safety measures, and assigning a contact with whom I would regularly communicate to ensure I was safe.

Data analysis

Data storage and security

In order to ensure safety and security for both my participants and myself, all of the research participants were informed of all of the measures taken to ensure their anonymity and that of anyone or anywhere they mentioned or alluded to throughout the course of the interviews. This was done so during the transcription process, in order to avoid the use of real names. Furthermore, a 'resource-intensive process' of proof-reading the transcripts was undertaken to ensure subtle indicators of identities and specific locations were not revealed (Corti *et al*., 2000). In terms of practical security measures, all written data was stored in a locked cabinet in a private facility, in a room which is locked and only accessible by the researcher. Typed computer files and audio-recordings were stored on a locked computer in a password-protected file and backed up on an encrypted and password-protected external hard drive. All participants are identified only by pseudonym on transcript and written documents. Other than the researcher, no one has had or will have access to the raw data. Two years after the expiry of the project (i.e. September 2018), the raw data will be destroyed in accordance with the policies of the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee. Two years' retention has been selected to accommodate the possibility of later publications related to the data.

Transcribing

In the pursuit of accuracy and only with the consent of each participant, audio from the interviews were digitally recorded. Over a period of two weeks, a total of 15 audio files lasting a total of 2 hours and 55 minutes were transcribed using a computer program that converted the digitally-recorded audio into computer-friendly MP3s. Only the researcher has access to the audio-recordings and transcribed the recordings in a private space with the use of headphones. The style of the transcriptions denotes the speakers (both researcher and participant) by name and in the case of multiple participants being present or interruptions, distinguishes who a comment was directed towards. Handwritten notes and observations were taken during fieldwork to

complement the recorded interviews, which have also been collated and word-processed immediately after each day of fieldwork.

Analysis technique

I applied a qualitative, two-staged, thematic approach to my analysis technique. I began by analysing the transcriptions as well observation notes, which include reflexive pre and post-fieldwork notes. From these, approximately six themes emerged that were used to code and annotate the transcripts manually. After coding and annotating, I acknowledged a number of patterns (as well as dead-ends) that emerged after reorganising the data. The coded data was once again collated, guided by the patterns developing and reorganised in a way that naturally followed the narrative I saw unfolding. After this process, I determined several working themes as well as sub-themes to be discussed later in my findings and then integrated into a general analysis. This grounded and inductive approach to identifying themes from the data not only organises and unifies the participants as a communal group for ethnographic study, but does so using only the information they voluntarily provided and in their own collective voice.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Findings

The aim of this research was to gain an understanding of the lived experience of port security, in order to analyse how security is carried out and enforced in the local as well as international setting. The following section seeks to address these questions through a critical integrated discussion and analysis of the key thematic research findings, their theoretical importance, and their impact to knowledge on this broad topic. To reiterate the highlights of the literature review, there is a gap in research surrounding: criminological port security studies that use new sites for fieldwork; port studies that account for humanistic data; and, studies that weigh and compare the capability differences from one port to another. The following discussion of findings seeks to address these areas. Two major themes have been identified from the data collected: (1) accountability and (2) occupational culture. Each of them give way to a number of sub-themes and discussion of relevant theory. After a discussion of these points, their meanings and consequences will be combined in a progressive and thoughtful analysis of port security as a whole.

Accountability

The first thematic research finding has been included to contextualise the sites in regard to their accountability, which analyses the governance, resources, heterogeneity, and outside pressures that affect and influence the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016). This is crucial to understanding the capabilities of both individual Ports A and B and their institutional make-up. For the purpose of constant comparison, accountability becomes a qualitative unit of measurement that serves as a vantage point for discussion and dialogue between sites.

This finding is divided amongst a number sub-themes that will consider how the port is accounted for, how security is governed, and how it is bureaucratically interpreted by the participants. First will be a discussion of (1) governance, which explores the complex structural organisation and funding methods of the ports; then (2) degree of interagency cooperation, which explores the different priorities of each agency involved in security of the port and how they often fail to share information and cooperate with one another at the expense of progressiveness and efficiency.

Governance

Governance plays a vital role in the formation of security. The governance of the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) is like a conceptual microcosm of late modernity, in that it is a space of hybridity: both public and private actors, both federal and commercial contracts, both independent and vested interest stakeholders, and under the jurisdiction of multiple security-enforcement agencies. Security, as it moves away from the monopoly of the state, manifests as a networked effort made up of various actors from every sector (Chan, 2000; Sheptycki, 2007). In order to understand the formation of these networks, the (1) structural organisation and (2) funding mechanisms of Ports A and B will be comparatively analysed as separate regimes, yet sharing numerous qualities.

Structural organisation

The port is structurally organised by its administrative operations, which then trickles down to affect how security operates on the ground. During fieldwork, it was quickly observed that ownership was a major factor in a port's organisation. For instance, Port A is a semi-state owned port. It was observed and noted at the time of fieldwork as a quite isolated and monitored large industrial compound (650 acres) on the outskirts of a major city; through participation in traffic-control during the docking of a cruise liner, it was learned that from the berth to the city centre of City A was a 45-minute walk. Participants, such as the following security officer, explained how the state controlled port activities:

> **HARRY**: *[I] started here back when it was federal. Federal went bust and they got bought out by Tressell so we worked for Tressell then. Then we went to KRF. They lost the contract to KRF. So now we work them for them, just continually being taken over.*
>
> […]
>
> **HARRY**: *We go on the ISPS levels. […] As for a major incident, it goes down to the powers that be that decides what happens here. […] If you are moving up a level from Level 1 to Level 2, you have to get authorisation from the Department of Transport. It's governed by them. Everything is governed by them […] ISPS levels, they're all governed by the Department of Transport. They tell us whether they want us to go to it, or we have to ask them or approach them if we feel that we need to go to it. Can't just do it off our own backs. We can't just raise it to a 2.*

Harry's account demonstrated the confusing nature of semi-state owned ports, where security is contracted out privately and commercially, yet still governed by the national Department of Transport which holds a major role in the port company and determines broad security protocols from a different location. In this structural organisation, governance consequently limited the power of operational security through means of hierarchal bureaucracy. Therefore, the Department of Transport served as the central actor in the security network of Port A, as the security team reports to the port company which reports to the Department (Whelan, 2015). Additionally, another participant at Port A pointed out that the monitoring alert system used at the port is shared with a nearby international airport. This is important for visualising the extent of the entire security network.

Unlike Port A, Port B is a trust port. It is run by an independent Harbour Board council; the port's answer to an unbiased republic, called upon to make decisions for the port and given full power of governance by Parliamentary decree, though it also answered to the Department of Transport. It is centrally-located in City B, less than a five-minute walk from the city centre, and inserted amongst various commercial businesses as well as housing accommodations; less than 100 feet away from the new Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) tower, behind an ISPS-secured gate, was a chip shop which formally served as a Custom house. Participants stated that a trust port council was broadly comprised as such:

> **DAVID**: *There's a board of directors at the trust port here. I think the council is made up of certain sectors of businesses near the port in the city that have to be represented. There will be members of the council that will be legal people, guys who are involved in the oil industry, and more of that side, somebody more involved in the commercial aspect of shipping; a variety. Some real academics as well. Quite a real broad spectrum. But again, there is a guideline as to the type of people that should be on the council. So the logic works, though it has been abused.*

David was an operations director at a private business that supplied equipment and stevedores for incoming and outgoing cargo. As a businessman with biased interests and priorities in the port, he was not a member of the trust port's Harbour Board, and was critical of the so-called 'independent' judgement of those in the administration. In regard to the provision of security, the Board was responsible for securing contracts. However, beyond that, as a 'left hand of the state' (Wacquant, 2016: 116), the Board was not operational and often limited to 'steering' rather than 'rowing'

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(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Meaning, its actual ability to act was limited. This was confirmed during an interview with Bradley, the Harbourmaster and Operations Director of the Harbour Board, who saw the function of the trust port as setting long-term goals and ensuring longevity for everyone's interests. David, on the other hand, interpreted the Board's governing powers as such:

> **DAVID**: *The Harbour are completely custodians; landlords, and nothing more. So a number of companies do what we do and that's it. We're not policed, really, by the Harbour. We pay them on behalf of the vessels that we represent and that's really it. There are speed limits and stuff imposed by the Harbour that we have to adhere to. And we consult with the Harbour on a daily basis with regards to berth allocation and anything and everything else that you need to speak to about ships, but that's really it. So that's what they do. They sit back and take the money… In the nicest possible way.*

David understood that the Harbour, as the governing body, did not play a significant role at Port B at the operational level. Though they may have been in charge of developing projects and land, their influence on ground-level security practices was 'hands-off' according to Bradley. Furthermore, a contradiction was noted about the Harbour Board, which was supposed to be an independent council with no vested interests; a CEO was on the Board, representing an exception to that rule. That called into question the logic and legitimacy of the structural organisation of Port B. Another interesting note regarding the governance of both Ports A and B was the reference to the ISPS Code and European Union (EU) Directive, not just as forms of written regulation, but as forms of security governance themselves. The emphasis both ports placed on the ISPS code in determining security protocols and routine tasks will later be explored as an issue of the security agenda (Shaw, 2001).

Funding

The funding and marketing mechanisms of a port are a vital part of its ability to enforce security. This has become a bigger topic of discussion in recent literature due to the privatisation of security (Loader, 1999; Zedner, 2000, 2002). Being partially owned by the state, Port A received public funds for its projects and security contracts. A common topic for discussion amongst Port A participants was the 'facelift' the Port was undergoing in order to cope with larger trends in international trade:

> **HARRY**: *All these different things that have started, the whole 50-year plan that's started –*
> **ME**: *It's a 50-year plan??*
> **HARRY**: *Yeah. Master Plan. I won't be here 50 years so I won't see it either. But that's the start of it now. A lot of changes.*

Like many of his fellow officers, Harry expressed slight sarcasm towards the long-term improvement project going on at the site, mostly due to the half-a-century timeline it had been given. This exposed a major downside of public funding; the slow-moving bureaucratic process of approval, money allocation, and resource collecting. The vague and lengthy 'Master Plan' was confusing to participants and encouraged rumours and uncertainty as well. Still, however, the funding process of Port A, as a consequence of being semi-state, was characteristically singular and homogeneous; there was only one avenue of funding and resources. As mentioned before, security for Port A was contracted out to private security companies. While the contracts themselves went through rapid change-overs, the men behind the contracts seemed static, as expressed by Harry's experience of being bought-out and sold from company to company but remaining in the port.

Port B differed insofar as contracts and personnel were both constantly in flux. This was evidenced by David's interactions with checkpoint officers throughout the site during a drive around the port; he was stopped three times by personnel who would ask him who he was and for identification, and as noted in fieldwork notes, he was unrecognised each time despite having worked at the site since 1988. He later attributed it to a change of contracts for security officers. Port B was further disenfranchised through the separate security regime of the oil sector of the port known as Point York. Neither David (business sector) nor Bradley (administrative sector) had access to this area. However, Bradley informed me that local oil and fuel companies were dissatisfied with Port B's security of Point York and formed their own cooperative to pay for supplementary security measures and personnel. Subsequently, this limited the Harbour Board's access to Point York which effectively made it more secure and sensitive than any of the designated ISPS-secured areas.

Degree of interagency cooperation

This section seeks to identify the various players within the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) and how different agencies worked together and shared information. As mentioned above, the port was a site of multiagency overlap: different actors provide security services in different capacities,

with security either being all-encompassing or deconstructed into menial tasks which collectively made up security. Both Port A and Port B employed operational security officers contracted by private companies to carry out specific tasks. Experienced via observation and participation, security officers were tasked with: monitoring CCTVs and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems, patrolling terminals by vehicle or foot, boarding ships, inspecting passenger vehicles on ferries, guarding checkpoints, controlling traffic, or responding to minor emergencies (e.g. oil spills, calling ambulances, confronting suspicious persons). Their presence at the port was constant and in routine shifts. However, Bradley from Port B confessed the essential job of an operational security officer was to simply ensure nothing was tampered with for other inspection and monitoring-oriented agencies such as: Customs, Port Security Authority, Harbour/Maritime Police, and the Maritime Guard. From fieldwork participation in the activities of operational security officers, it was evident that Bradley underestimated their responsibilities. However, he set the tone for what was a shared estimation of the lowest-rung actor in the port security regime. In what ought to be an environment of shared intelligence in a post-9/11 security landscape (Sheptycki, 2007; Eski, 2016), there was little communication between different agencies in the port environment, especially for security officers on the receiving end. This subsection regards the lack of interagency cooperation within port security.

Of the other agencies that more frequently occupied port space, Customs was a common topic of discussion amongst participants. In some instances, the lack of cooperation and communication between Customs and other agencies was attributed by participants to petty causes such as diverging priorities in the case of inspecting cruise passengers where Customs no longer sent drug-sniffing canines on a regular basis. However, for Port B, distance was described as a major reason for lack of cooperation:

DAVID: *Customs, well that's changed dramatically over the years. I mean, at one time, Customs used to be next door. At one time. You used to have to go and submit paper and deal with that mess but then they moved up the street and now, to get any sense out of anybody, you have to speak to people at the airport. I think at Emerald House, in the city, you might get some interaction there, in the main, physical presence – yeah, it's a phone call to somebody at the airport. Where the old Customs guys were part of the Board, now everything else is done by fax still.*

ME: *Fax?*

DAVID: *Fax. Still haven't got their act together. And now we can do email as well, but they'll still send it back by fax.*

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Unlike other sectors, commercial businesses had to constantly send communications to Customs regarding cargo in addition to crew information to satisfy Immigration services. Somehow, despite the advanced technology a Customs house at an international airport may have been equipped with, outdated protocols required communications to be by fax machine rather than more efficient means. In the instance of an arriving crew member being a non-EU national, David had to have them driven to the airport and processed by Immigration, which according to him, was approximately a 45-minute journey without traffic. While David's experience with Customs demonstrated evidence of cooperation, it was clearly an inconvenient version of it that could be improved or housed closer to the port.

At Port A, participants often described zero cooperation between themselves and Customs officers, even in the case of major interceptions of trafficked or smuggled goods:

> **JACK**: *They'll close an area off.*
>
> **WILL**: *They'll set up the truck and scan the containers. And they get a lot of stuff, so. Cartons of cigarettes. Drugs.*
>
> **JACK**: *We don't even hear about it. We see it on the news.*
>
> **WILL**: *It's completely separate from us. They are their own organisation.*
>
> **JACK**: *They don't need – if they need us, they'll call us to do traffic or close off an area or whatever. Very rarely they'd call us.*

These officers of the operational security team had little to no communication with Customs, despite both pursuing port security. For Jack, the supervisor of the security team, to not be made aware of incidents such as the interception of trafficked goods, reflected a poor communication and cooperation system at the port, possibly stemming from constructed security hierarchies, with contracted security officers representing 'low policing' (Whelan, 2015: 2) compared to other agencies. This was supported by David's perspective of the security team at Port B, who - after having to explain who he was to checkpoints guards in front of me several times during fieldwork - angrily referred to the contracted guards as 'monkeys' and later insinuated that they had no real power or authority to interfere in his business or to bother his stevedores in the event of suspicious activity. In all, at Port B, not a single participant mentioned involving security officers when asked who they would contact in the event of an emergency response on the site.

It was evident that there was minimal communication between the various security actors at either port sites. From data collected during fieldwork, it was established that the security team and

Customs did not share information or cooperate well. One participant relayed an anecdote that happened to involve the presence of a single policeman, but this was the only other instance of plural security; information about any sort of relationship with any other agency could not even be collected because there was no such relationship to speak of. This lack of multiagency cooperation could possibly mitigate effective security responses in the future. Previous studies have linked poor relationships between security and police agencies to their conflictual occupational cultures, as culture is a known interpersonal property of a network (Brodeur, 2007; Zegart, 2007; Whelan, 2015). Therefore, it follows that occupational culture is interrelated with accountability and security networks.

Occupational culture

The second major thematic finding of this project serves to contextualise the participants, as port security actors, in regard to their occupational culture, which analyses how they situate themselves in their environment, portray themselves, and tell their stories. This is crucial to understanding the communication of their identity and image as well as their relationship to local and global phenomena. This section is based on shared patterns across fieldwork sites in an attempt to generalise about the 'port securityscape' in a productive and progressive manner (Eski, 2016). It is divided amongst two sub-themes that will consider how port security actors construct their own image, prioritise values, exert control, and interpret the meaning of their own work. First will be a discussion of (1) image management, which explores the performance of professionalism and interpreted sensationalism of identity; and then (2) tunnel vision, which explores how the stories and captured experiences of the participants are so locked in the immediate local setting, at the expense of global interconnectedness.

Image management

Image management is an important and informative aspect of occupational culture, in that it characterises the projected identity of the port security network. As described by Goffman (1959: 203), it is the '[successful] staging of a character' performed as a team effort. The port security network, as a group projecting the image of power, uses various defensive and offensive techniques to maintain its performance (*ibid.*). In order to understand the communication and

management of this occupational image, examples of (1) professionalism and (2) sensationalism will be analysed as performances of identity.

Professionalism

Policing and security organisations are stereotypically known for behaving secretively and suspiciously when approached by those outside the network (Reiner 2010). This behaviour, though it is a generalisation, was found to be true for this research project. It reveals a 'defensive measure' (Goffman, 1959: 207) taken by port security actors to ensure the maintenance of their occupational image through the insistence of professionalism throughout fieldwork. It was quickly observed that a majority of my time immersed in the environment at either site was monitored by participants, who often intervened or sought to control the direction of conversation I had with them. Bradley, the Harbourmaster of Port B, only agreed to participate in the project on the condition that I excluded a number of conversation topics from the interview that he deemed either sensitive or unprofessional. His interpretations of port security, which he did not consent to have recorded, were cautious, polished, and carefully worded in order to maintain his image of professionalism.

Professional-driven control was also exerted by participants in the form of confirmation bias. This was most often evidenced by the presence of a managerial security participant in the room during interviews with subordinate security officers, which often obstructed the desired informal flow of conversation:

> **RYAN**: *So how many cars do you get in here per day?*
> **DYLAN**: *It's mental here. Maybe about 1500 a week.*
> **JACK**: *That can't be right. Earlier I told her it was 500 a day. Don't make me look stupid now, Dylan. Haha!*

In this instance, Dylan's interpretation of events was disrupted by Jack, in an effort to exert control and protect the group's image of professionalism. Though the true figure did not matter, Jack saw the discrepancy between his reply and Dylan's as a sign of unprofessionalism and attempted to take control of the incident overtly and with jest. This supports Goffman's (1959: 210-11) concept of 'dramaturgical discipline' regarding the maintenance of the performance; when threatened with disruption, a disciplined member of the team will reduce the disruption with a joke to remove the significance (*ibid*.) At the beginning of the fieldwork day during a coffee break between Jack, Will,

and myself, a similar instance of confirmation bias had happened, except Will refused to offer any new information or opinions without first deferring to Jack. In doing so, Will's interpretations were biased and went through a filter of confirmation from his superior.

However, the researcher is not the only audience for the security network's performance of professionalism and power; other outsiders that interact within the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) also find themselves subjected to the projected image of the security identity. Some participants gave accounts of exerting control over territorial jurisdiction:

> **HARRY**: *There aren't enough taxi drivers, as usual […]. They don't like the rule system in here because they have to queue up out here and when we're ready to take them, we accept them in there and we release them. They could be sitting out here for ages and their argument is that if they're out here, passengers can't see them […]. We have to be able to control the flow. They don't like it.*

Harry's account of checkpoint work, which involves controlling gate access between a public road and an ISPS-secured area, demonstrated a professional and controlling persona, as an exhibition of power. He recounted a story about a taxi-driver who had been banned from the port in the past for disrespectful behavior; however, when the taxi-driver attempted to sneak back into the port in disguise, it was Harry who took a stance against the driver by not allowing him past the gate and reigning authority over him. This sort of control manifested itself in professional jurisdiction as well:

> **DAVID**: *I mean, as a stevedore, all my guys are qualified and all my lifting gear is certified so you would never get someone to ask and check on those credentials. […] We're bona fide.*

From David's account, he exerts control into the oversight of his business and crew; his professionalism is self-interpreted as a reason for his credentials to go unquestioned. In terms of 'the art of image management', this assumption David made was based on his belief that his audience, an oversight agency, practices 'tactful tendencies' and buys into the performance in order to save the show (Goffman, 1959: 222-23). These examples of control and confirmation bias towards outsiders demonstrate the various ways in which the port security network communicates a professional identity and maintains a powerful image.

Sensationalism

Whereas the maintenance of professionalism signifies a defensive technique, the sensationalism of identity is an offensive and promotional technique that serves to further manage the security image (Goffman, 1959: 222). During fieldwork, it was evident that certain participants wished to exaggerate or sensationalise the extent of their relationship and cooperation with multi-agency partners such as operational harbour police or Customs officers. In fact, this amplification of 'presented similarity and near-equality' (Eski, 2016: 113) between port security officers and other law enforcement agents has been found in similar studies (see *ibid*.; Löfstrand *et al*., 2016). For this project, such sensationalisms often manifested as participants imaginatively including themselves in the subcultures and efforts of Customs:

RYAN: *Did [the container of illegally smuggled cigarettes] bounce around?*

HARRY: *Yeah, before they came here. So they went to that one, and they went to that one, and then that one, and then they came here. To try to throw them off the scent. But that just makes Customs go 'hang on, they went to that port and that port and that port and this one.' Why would they do that, you know? I imagine they were a little bit wary and that's how they found it. They were here for days taking them out in loads. That's how many cigarettes there were.*

In this instance, Harry scripted what he imagined to be the thought-process of the on-site Customs agency as they uncovered what turned out to be a large cargo of smuggled cigarettes. However, it was already understood from the interpretations of other participants that security officers were often excluded from events of this nature. This act of relational sensationalism was subtle in that it sought to convince the audience that the performer shared a special experience and relationship with a group he considered superior to his own. However, it was also observed during fieldwork that the media played a role in exaggerating the relational aspects of the port security network. A television show about security and seizures was filming an episode at Port A, which interchangeably filmed the activities of port security officers and Customs officers as a homogenous effort. Not only did this confirm the sensationalised image of the network for the performers, but it projected the exaggeration to a wider broadcasted audience.

Moreover, the sensationalism of the group's identity went beyond relational exaggeration. Many participants told stories of heroic proportions, romanticised their years on the sea, or highlighted their expertise in instinct-driven tasks. However, other instances of sensationalism

had more to do with the participants wanting recognition for their contributions to security work that relied on their intuition and instincts:

> **HARRY**: *So when you're talking to [passengers], you can kind of get a feeling from them of whether they're telling the truth or trying to hide something. We'll just go: 'Sorry, can you just take that bag out?' And they'll be confused like: 'Um, which bag?' And we'll point to it and they'll try to avoid us searching a certain bag and ask why we asked for that one in particular. Sometimes they'll just have something embarrassing that they don't want me to see but eventually, we get to the bottom of it.*

Harry very often spoke of profiling and how he has learned from experience that it was an important skill to develop when doing security work. While technology was heavily relied on for surveillance security, many participants spoke of the importance of humanistic skills such as profiling, which they interpreted as a distinguishing contribution that set them apart from the likes of CCTV systems or scanners. Unlike the other mentioned manifestations of sensationalism, this element of the communicated identity was less imaginative and, rather, an overemphasis of a real aspect of their daily work that they felt needed to be performed through story and at the forefront of their occupational identity. Overall, findings suggested participants performed 'the art of image management' during fieldwork in order to communicate their interpreted occupational identity and manage that identity through demonstrations of professionalism and sensationalism (Goffman, 1959).

Tunnel vision

This sub-theme addresses the complicated relationship between the local and the global which both theoretically manifest themselves in the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016). However, as evidenced by the data, it was clear that the port security network was so exclusively focused on the local and immediate setting that global phenomena and recognition of the port as an interface in the global supply chain were not notions that factored into the everyday enforcement of security. This was demonstrated by participants' anecdotes which revolved around local or insignificant subject matters, reduced global phenomena to two-dimensional anecdotes, and the overall limited knowledge of broad port processes.

One of the clearest demonstrations of this tunnel vision perspective was the specificity of the stories shared by participants; they were so often limited to the immediate setting and their narrative progression was so modestly incremental. However, these narratives were descriptive and indicated that the participants were very knowledgeable of minor details within the port site. Many stories simply involved the gradual clearing of yards and terminals, movement of fences, or the progression of construction, in such a way that it seemed the participants were attempting, perhaps unsuccessfully, to contribute to a larger narrative:

> **HARRY**: *The port has changed so much even over the last 10-15 years. But this is a major, major change now. Major overhaul.*
> **RYAN**: *What do you mean by the more recent changes?*
> **HARRY**: *Before, you used to be able to come in this road. That's now only an emergency gate. It's closed off.*

During this interview with Harry, I recorded in fieldwork notes the sense of underwhelming climax during this point in conversation; he seemed to hint at observing bigger-picture phenomena or at something outside the scope of his daily tasks, but then related his understandings to a very specific and local example. This would occur throughout the fieldwork process; a participant beginning to discuss globalisation or international trade, and then relating it to the installation of a new fire hose. From these experiences, it should be understood that the participants were not unable to make such broad connections between their jobs to larger phenomena, but rather, they saw no reason to do so. However, this tunnel vision approach to security, in some instances, led to an oversimplification or insensitive attitude towards systemic and complex issues:

> **WILL**: *There's more exciting parts in the port. When the Eclipse comes in from City K, because there are the refugee camps in City K, obviously they're all trying to get on the boats. So you get down here and you have five refugees coming and jumping off – Jack actually caught some of them out there recently, so that was cool. Obviously, it's a terrible human story. But work-wise, that's one of the more interesting things you'll come across here.*

In this instance, Will reduced his witnessing of caught asylum-seekers to that of an 'interesting work day'. This participant's recognition of the refugee crisis was evidently limited

to its direct relevance to his occupational role, rather than as a global phenomenon. Furthermore, it demonstrates the shortcomings and lack of depth the tunnel vision perspective causes port security at the expense of sensitivity to global interconnectedness and overall awareness. While there is no direct career incentive to be knowledgeable of 'the global', the clear sensationalism of duty, relationships to transnational security agencies, and general importance, indirectly indicates that their performed image is, in fact, attuned to more global phenomena. Lastly, this narrow interpretation of occupation manifested itself in the general lack of knowledge most participants had about port activities outside their specific domain. Based on the imaginative responses received when the participants sought to sensationalise or impress, it was evident that their knowledge of port activities was selective based on preference when the topic of conversation was less relevant to their projected image:

> **DAVID**: *The port security officers, I can't be completely sure, but I think they're mostly new. It's not my side of things so I'm not 100% sure.*

> **WILL**: *I don't know what [the asylum procedure] is. Immigration guards will be able to tell you it. I'm not so sure.*

These accounts of David and Will demonstrated the disinclination of port security network actors to seek to understand the general activities ongoing at the port. They were evidently lacking knowledge or interest in specific areas of port security that did not immediately involve them. However, their performance of identity and sensationalism of importance, indicated a more advanced and all-encompassing knowledge of security than what was demonstrated. It is important to note that this point is not grounded in their actual responsibilities, but rather, their communicated image. This selectivity facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the priorities and values of the occupational culture of the port security network, in conjunction with the management of their projected occupational image.

Analysis

The aim of this research was to capture the lived experience of port security, in order to analyse how it is enforced and complied with in a local and international context. After a thorough discussion of the findings of the research, this section seeks to synthesise those findings

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through integration; to critically extrapolate intelligence from the findings so that this project can potentially have impact for further research and in the daily experience of the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016). This analysis is divided into three discussions: (1) the prevalence of operational silos amongst network actors; (2) the complex relationship between security officers and technology, resulting in inertia; and (3) the contradictions of the goal-oriented port security network.

Silo mentality

Operational disjunctures throughout the port were the consequence of lack of shared information and cooperation between port security agencies - both horizontally and vertically - which created isolated silos in which each group of actors operated. This was evidenced by the contradictions in port governance, the lack of interagency cooperation, and the unwillingness of port security actors to reflect on the overall port and trade network. According to Sheptycki (2007: 73), 'information silos' is an organisational pathology resulting from the tension between network-style thinking and hierarchical models of organisation. During a discussion of interagency cooperation, it was evident that the flows of information in the ports were one-way, which supports the idea that a hierarchy of groups exist that limit the dissemination of information amongst the entire network. As information moves from operational actors up the chain towards administration, it is obstructed by bureaucratic processes and the disjunctures between what are supposed to be cooperative nodes of the security network (*ibid.*). Therefore each agency tends to operate in its own silo, which consequently leads to miscommunications throughout the port security environment. At Port A, there were instances where this led to infrastructural issues:

> **DYLAN**: *[The imported cars] come up there over the bridge, see it?*
> **RYAN**: *Yeah, that skinny roller-coaster-type bridge?*
> **DYLAN**: *Yeah the skinny thing. Jack designed that. Right, Jack?*
> **JACK**: *Haha! Oh, yeah. No, come on Dylan, you know if we designed that it'd be a double lane.*
> **DYLAN**: *It's only been two years. Two years since September that we'd built that. It should be a two-way lane.*

At Port A, the state had recently invested in a new bridge to simplify the movement of vehicles into the car terminal, which had previously involved crossing a busy commuter road. However, the governance of the port and the planning of its operations was so far removed from operations that it did not adequately consult the car terminal and security personnel to realise designing a single-lane bridge with low weight-bearing capacity would prove counterproductive for a high-volume car terminal. This demonstrated a lack of communication and cooperation between governance and operational actors, poor allocation of funding money, and reflected a clear reluctance on the part of the centralised administration to understand the general needs and activities of the rest of the nodal network.

The detrimental consequences of the ports' silo mentalities manifested in other ways as well. As discussed in the findings, Point York was a secured area of Port B that was controlled by a different private security company than the rest of the port and received funding from a separate provider. Regarding access and jurisdiction, this caused confusion amongst all participants which meant no one knew who was granted access to the area or it was governed. David claimed it was the Harbour Board's territory, yet the Harbourmaster confessed Point York was not his business to meddle in, as the oil companies housed there provided the funding and therefore had sovereignty. The overlap of agencies and contract-holders at Port B created information and security gaps which weakened oversight and homogenous security enforcement of the site. It was evident at the time of fieldwork that such operational disjunctures hindered effective and productive security enforcement.

Technologic inertia

In the age of late modernity, security is defined by its reliance upon technology. Contemporary strategies are multidimensional and involve both direct and indirect methods of control and enforcement, the most pervasive of which is surveillance (Sheptycki, 2007). However, data from this project suggests that when a port security network is impeded by operational silos among other dysfunctions, a state of inertia is established; where technologic security was poorly implemented or maintained by disconnected administrations, security personnel had to supplement or take its place. Unlike other security regimes where personnel are often replaced by technology, the ISPS code which regulates and governs port security mandates an extensive and constant team of security officers on site to supplement the technologic infrastructure as well as satisfy insurance requirements (Eski, 2016: 137). However, it was evident at Port A that the security team and the humanistic security skills it offered far surpassed the existing technology in effectiveness and

efficiency. This often manifested itself as a security officer having to supervise and do the job of a piece of equipment that either failed to work or was poorly implemented:

> **HARRY**: *There's a barrier here [at the checkpoint] that goes down on each side of the traffic and one on this side as well. They're not working 100% at the moment so rather than put them down and having to try to get someone out to try and fix it – if we need to put them down we will. But they're not going back up properly, so you're holding the traffic up. And if it's so busy, like today, between the rain and cement and traffic, if you put that down, you'd be holding up so much traffic.*

At Port A, Harry kept the ISPS checkpoint gate barriers fixed in the air so that any vehicle could pass through once Harry informally waived them on from a seat behind the glass window. This demonstrated the frequent occurrence of security officers replacing technologic security. Another instance involved the above mentioned bridge connecting the main port to the car terminal at Port A; the traffic lights which were installed to amend the poorly-designed single lane did not work and required two personnel to guard either side of the bridge and direct traffic via radio. Port B experienced similar examples of technologic inertia. During a tour with Bradley of the relatively new VTS tower which controls ship traffic, I was shown the Automatic Identification System (AIS) room which monitored the entire port by satellite and radar. However, at the time, the AIS radar was not working properly (the displayed images were skewed) which meant extra security personnel had to attend to the work the AIS could not complete.

It was evident during fieldwork that security officers were a necessary and more productive security measure than most of the technology at the port, especially when most of the equipment was designed by non-operational actors who did not understand the demands of operational security. Furthermore, the ability for personnel to learn and adapt gives officers an advantage over a software system or surveillance camera; when those trying to avoid detection are able to learn and adapt techniques, security must be capable of being just as flexible.

The 'port securityscape' as a goal-oriented network

Viewing the actors and agencies involved in the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016) as a network is productive for mapping and analysing patterns of inter-organisational and interpersonal

relationships (or lack thereof) (Whelan, 2015: 4). Security networks are structurally organised to foster cooperation and the achievement of individual goals as well as a collective network goal (*ibid*.: 2). Regarding the port security network, this would involve the priorities of each security-enforcement agency such as private security companies, Customs agencies, or Harbour police, in addition to what ought to a a determined collective goal of the network. However, the tensions that existed within the hierarchical levels of Port A and the fragmented, commercialist council regime of Port B, damaged the relational properties of the security networks at both sites, which hindered inter-organisational cooperation and collective goal-setting; the collective goal theoretically being making the port a safe, secure, and crime-free environment.

A vital aim of this project, initially, was to define security. However, after fieldwork, it was realised that port security was only defined by the regulation driving and governing it; namely, the ISPS Code. It then followed that the collective goal of the port security network was essentially compliance to the Code. Subsequently, what must be considered is a question of who or what regulation-driven security benefits. From David's interpretations of his business and the lack of oversight his business and stevedores received, it was clear the ISPS Code reprioritised what was to be considered a security concern, which left commercial businesses responsible for self-regulation. However, 'to focus locally on the "safe environment" […] is exactly what "market forces" […] want the nation-state governments to do' (Bauman, 1998: 120). Most participants shared the sentiment that the ISPS Code was an Americanised, post-9/11 regulation that mostly concerned security protocols designed for counter-terrorism measures. When high security concerns such as terrorism at the ports were brought up in conversation with participants, they often laughed at the notion:

> **DAVID:** *In City X and City Z, it's more central and populated. Here, you live a couple of miles from any other place. Nobody's after you. Haha! […] Like any self-respecting terrorist is going to come [here]! […] It's really amazing, isn't it? Police don't come here much.*

This attitude was common amongst most of the participants, which highlighted a discrepancy in the governance of port security; governance was aimed at global threats, while security network actors were fixated on the local. Furthermore, the discrepancies of this issue was subjected to the poor relational properties of the network, which disrupted the flow of information from the operational level to the administrative. During fieldwork, I observed that

this issue often manifested itself as yet another image performance, with security sensationalised to appear more intense than it actually was:

> **DAVID**: *You know, you can say whatever and they would probably let you [into one of the secured areas].*
> **RYAN**: *Visually, there's a lot of fences and fortifications though. From what I can see.*
> **DAVID**: *There is, from what you can see. When we go around, you'll see. Part of the port is and part isn't. But I'm led to believe that it satisfies the requirements imposed on the port by the government. And they've got CCTV, etc. I suppose that's how they get away with it.*

Certain participants were privy to the 'backstage' (Goffman, 1959) of the security performance, which informed them that the intimidating-looking security measures and the presence of surveillance technology did not directly correlate to security being more severe; rather, it was only projected to appear that way. This demonstrates the impracticality and perfunctory nature of directive-led security, especially when mandated and enforced by a disconnected and dysfunctional security network.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Port security is an all-encompassing effort on the part of a large network of actors, connected by relational and structural nodes, working within the 'port securityscape' (Eski, 2016; Whelan, 2015). The first major theme of this research dealt with the accountability and governance of the ports, which was found to heavily influence the enforcement and capabilities of port security at an operational level. Furthermore, it analysed the relational aspects of the security network, which speaks to a larger discussion of information sharing in contemporary security regimes; an ongoing topic of study in criminological and security studies (Sheptycki, 2007). The second major theme of this research concerned occupational culture, which manifested itself as the identity projected by the port security network and their collective perspective on the local and global nature of the port and their role in it. Together, these two themes revealed three major points that address the original research question(s) of this project, which is about the maintenance and compliance of security at sea ports, exploring who enforces it, how it is experienced, and how it is situated in a local as well as global context.

This research project sought to uniquely explore and interpret the lived experience of security compliance at sea ports through a multi-sited, ethnographic study of port security. It began by reviewing the literature on port security from a criminological perspective, but also welcoming insight from other disciplines such as economic-oriented transportation studies. In critically assessing the larger body of knowledge on the topic, gaps in the literature were identified in order to situate this project amongst previous significant studies. Subsequently, I outlined the methodological framework of this study by critically discussing method choice, appropriateness, and acknowledgement of the limitations to this study. After critically analysing all of the data collected during fieldwork, two major themes, accountability and occupational culture, were distinguished and explored in detail using data, theory, and linkages to previous studies as evidence. However, an additional cumulative analysis of the findings was included in order to critically and reflexively discuss and balance the relationships between the tangible port and its existential meaning; my self-interpreted constructions and those of my participants; and the conceptualisation of dialogue between sites while uniting them through shared generalisations.

Recognising what is now known, there are several aspects to the project I would recommend have been done differently. First, I would have sought a funding body in order to extend the time I

was able to spend immersed in the field in order to strengthen the ethnographic data. Second, I would have negotiated more firmly the conditions of site-access so that I did not have to be supervised during fieldwork at the expense of privacy with participants. Third, I would have included a site outside of the socially-constructed Global North, which would have further diversified the data for this project and not fallen into the trap of exclusively studying European phenomena as universal truths. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I would have pursued a clearly evident gender dimension to this project as all of the research participants were male, which heavily influenced their occupational culture. However, related to the first recommendation, I was too limited in time and resources.

Despite these reflective after-thoughts, the ethnographic method used for this project allowed me to understand and immerse myself in the daily lives of the participants. This experience permitted an insightful and meaningful interpretation of the lived experience of port security. From the data collected, I have proposed three issues that build upon each other and are inductively constructed from the interpretations of the participants. The port security network tends to operate in information silos which obstruct the flow of information throughout the nodes of the network. A true networked form of governance should balance hierarchical structures with the flexibility of independent trust councils, however, the fieldwork sites seemed to represent opposing ends of the spectrum (O'Toole, 1997; Whelan, 2015). Furthermore, the disjunctures between port administration and operational security, due to lack of information sharing, led to a state of technologic inertia at the port; surveillance and monitoring technology, which should enhance the enforcement of security, was often made redundant by personnel who had to work around poorly-implemented equipment. Lastly, the security agenda of the 'port securityscape' network (Eski, 2016) had increasingly become a compliance to the ISPS Code, almost exclusively, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, the interpretations of the majority of participants was that terrorism was not realistic threat; their individual priorities concerned more local phenomena, almost to a fault. Therefore, the heightened operational counter-terrorism measures in place at the ports were often superficial and perfunctory in order to appease a distant administration.

Attending to the gap in the literature on port security, it is evident much more attention and research is needed on this topic. Considering the dysfunctions identified in this small-scale project, there is promising potential for a larger project on port security to produce high-quality and informative research to contribute to academia. Furthermore, such research could serve to improve the efficiency and future developments of security networks and transport supply chains.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A:

Master's Dissertation

ervised at all times and
bring proof of indemnity.

City W

APPENDIX B:

NAME	PORT	ROLE
Callum	A	Security Manager
Jack	A	Security Supervisor
Will	A	Search Team
Harry	A	Security Officer
George	A	Country Ferry Security Officer
Dylan	A	Car Terminal Assistant Manager
Connor	A	Oil Warden
David	B	Operations Director
Bradley	B	Harbour Master

APPENDIX C:

University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects

NOTIFICATION OF ETHICS APPLICATION OUTCOME – UG and PGT Applications

Application Type: New   **Date Application Reviewed:**   June 13th 2016

Application Number: SPS/2016/668/SOCIAL SCIENCE
Applicant's Name: Ryan Casey
Project Title: The Lived Experience of Security Compliance at Commercial Sea Ports

APPLICATION OUTCOME

(A)   **Fully Approved**   ☐ *Start Date of Approval:*   *End Date of Approval:*

(*B*)   **Approved subject to amendments**
If the applicant has been given approval subject to amendments this means they can proceed with their data collection with effect from the date of approval, however they should note the following applies to their application:

Approved Subject to Amendments without the need to submit amendments to the Supervisor	☐
Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the applicant's Supervisor	☒

The College Ethics Committee expects the applicant to act responsibly in addressing the recommended amendments.

(C)   **Application is Not Approved at this Time**

Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the School Ethics Forum (SEF)	☐

Complete resubmission required. Discuss the application with supervisor before resubmitting. ☐

Please note the comments in the section below and provide further information where requested.

If you have been asked to resubmit your application in full, send it to your supervisor who will forward it to your local School Ethics Forum admin support staff.

Where resubmissions only need to be submitted to an applicant's supervisor.
This will apply to essential items that an applicant must address prior to ethics approval being granted. As the associated research ethics risks are considered to be low, the applicant's response need only be reviewed and cleared by the applicant's supervisor before the research can properly begin. For any application processed under this outcome, it is the Supervisor's responsibility to email socpol-pgt-ethics@glagow.ac.uk with confirmation of their approval of the re-submitted application.

APPLICATION COMMENTS

Major Recommendations:

There appears to be an intention to carry out interviews with staff and observations at two sites. However the permission email attached to the application appears to be relevant only to one site, and does not refer explicitly to the proposed research activities.

Before proceeding, the supervisor should assure himself that the email from Aberdeen does indeed provide permission to carry out all the planned activities (scheduled and impromptu interviews, and observation).

The researcher should also obtain written permission in relation to the Dublin research, and the supervisor should lodge this with the ethics committee, before fieldwork commences there.

Minor Recommendations:

While recognising that the research fieldwork is low risk, it is recommended that a third party (e.g. family member, friend) holds details of the researcher's appointments (where, when, with whom), and that the researcher checks in with the third party at then end of each day's fieldwork.

Please note that the relevant ethics committee for the particpant information sheet is the School of Social and Polical Sciences ethics forum, the convenor of which is Keith Kintrea.

Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact your School Ethics forum admin support staff.

University of Glasgow

School of Social & Political Sciences

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Study title and researcher details

The title of this research study is 'The Lived Experience of Security at Commercial Seaports.' The researcher is Miss Ryan Casey, who is a postgraduate student at the University of Glasgow studying Transnational Security. She can be contacted by email at 2216976c@student.gla.ac.uk.

Purpose of research?

The purpose of the study is to understand security procedures at commercial seaports through the views of port staff.

Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen because of your knowledge of the port, your experience in this line of work, and your willingness to take part in the research study.

Do I have to take part?

This research project is completely voluntary. This means you only take part in it if you want to. You don't have to answer any questions you don't want to answer.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you volunteer, the researcher will interview you for approximately 30 minutes. The questions will be related to the work you do at the port. Your answers will be audio-recorded with your permission.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

As a participant, your personal details will be kept confidential. Your identity will be anonymized along with the name of the port. The researcher will be aware of your name, but will create a pseudonym and to the best of her ability make your participation in the research unidentifiable. Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of wrongdoing or potential harm is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to contact relevant statutory bodies/agencies.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The information you provide during the interview will be used by the researcher for her master's dissertation on port security. It will be stored on a password-protected laptop in a secure room. After submission of the dissertation, the interviews will be erased.

Who has reviewed this study?

This project has been considered and approved by the College Research Ethics Committee at the University of Glasgow. But for further information and where to pursue any complaint, please

contact the College of Social and Political Sciences Ethics Officer, **Prof Keith Kintrea, email: keith.kintrea@glasgow.ac.uk**.

APPENDIX E:

School of Social & Political Sciences   Consent Form

Title of Project: The Lived Experience of Security at Commercial Seaports

Name of Researcher: Ryan Casey

I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

Please tick one of the following:

☐ I consent to interviews being audio-recorded.

☐ I do not consent to interviews being audio-recorded.

I acknowledge that participants will be referred to by pseudonym.

I understand the researcher may use direct quotes from me in publications, which will be attributed to my pseudonym.

I understand that the data collected from this research will be stored securely with my personal details removed and agree for it to be held as set out in the Participant Information Sheet.

Please tick one of the following:

I agree to take part in this research study   ☐

I do not agree to take part in this research study   ☐

Name of Participant …………………………………………….. Signature
……………………………………………………..

Date …………………………………

Name of Researcher …………………………………………………….. Signature

…………………………………………………….

Date …………………………………

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