



University
of Glasgow

Boyle, Roderick Iain (2015) *Can religion be inherently undemocratic? An analysis of Islam and democracy.*

[Undergraduate degree]

Copyright © 2015 The Author

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, institution and date must be given

<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/13/>

Deposited on: 7 September 2015

Matriculation Number:

1107447

Dissertation Title:

Can religion be inherently undemocratic? An analysis of Islam and Democracy

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of:

Economic & Social History & Politics

University of Glasgow

March 2015

Civilizational scholars, most notably Samuel P. Huntington (1991, 1996), argue that Islam is inherently undemocratic, due to the writings of the Qur'an, and

consequently contend that the followers of Islam are unable to take part in democracies. This study wishes to highlight the misplaced groundings for such an argument through historical and empirical analysis. Questioning the compatibility of different religions with regards to democracy is not a recent phenomenon, as religions such as Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Confucianism have faced similar scrutiny. Islam has become one of the largest world religions in today's world and current arguments of its undemocratic nature have attracted the attention of this study. The discussion surrounding Islam and democracy is of the utmost importance, as the extension of liberal democracy is thought to provide a more stable and peaceful international sphere. Oneal (et al. 1996: 11) supports such a claim by revealing that Immanuel Kant was correct when he argued that international conflict is minimised when "external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution". However, the post-9/11 controversies against Western Democracies, the outspoken rejection of democratic practices by Islamic fundamentalists and the lack of democracy in Muslim-dominated countries have unfortunately led many to question Islam's compatibility with democratic thought. Therefore, this study will determine whether Islam is truly incompatible.

The spread of democracy has so far been limited to certain regions. Western Europe, North America, Latin America and Australasia have strong ties to democracy, while Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East show very weak associations with democracy. Samuel Huntington (1984, 1993, 1996) and Francis Fukuyama (1992, 2001) view this disproportionate spread of democracy as an indication that certain civilizations are incompatible with democracy. Moreover, Huntington (1996: 70) asserts "Western Christianity...is historically the single most important characteristic of Western civilisation", as its key characteristic was the separation of church and state. This feature, Huntington (1996) argues, is lacking from the world's other major religious systems, namely, Confucianism, Orthodoxy and Islam, which explains why these civilizations have not progressed towards greater democratic tendencies. For many secularists the aphoristic equation 'no secularism; no democracy' is one they hold in high regard. Keane (2000: 6) agrees, as he stresses that the decline of religiosity actually strengthens citizens' capacities to live freer, less biased and more rationally fulfilling lives. Furthermore, secularism has been shown to

promote open-minded thinking, which is an essential ingredient to the functioning of a pluralist democracy (Keane, 200: 7). Others argue secularism should not be seen as a vital component of a functioning democracy. Stepan (2000) reveals that as of 1990 five of the fifteen EU member states had an established church. Stepan’s (2000) study therefore reveals that there are “democracies with established churches and even democracies with unfriendly separation of church and state”. This categorization of an unfriendly separation between church and state denotes an anti-religious tone from the ruling elite, which emphasises the power of secularization over that of religion (Haynes, 2010: 710). Therefore, Islamic countries could theoretically transition towards democracy without a separation of church and state, and which thus casts doubt upon the assertion that only secular countries are compatible with democracy.




Figure 1. The Distribution of Governance Regimes in the Global System, mid 2014 (Marshall & Cole, 2014: 23)

Fukuyama (1992; 1995: 9) also argues that Islam is inherently undemocratic, as he claims Islam is staunchly against modernity. For Fukuyama (The Guardian, 11/10/2001), modernity is characterized by liberal democracy and capitalism, whereas Islam “is the only cultural system that regularly produce people like Osama bin Laden and the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel”. Although, some would

argue that this is more representative of Islamic fundamentalism rather than Islam itself, for Huntington (1996: 217), “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam”. This argument draws on his findings of “civilizational fault-line conflicts”, which he argues lead to wars being waged in the name of Islam, rather than in the name of states. Therefore, Huntington (1993, 1996) claims that the growing importance of kin cultures and civilizational fault-line conflicts are proof that the “world’s religious civilizations are increasingly unitary and change-resistant” (Stepan, 2000: 38). These arguments suggest that the Islamic world will not adopt Western liberal democracy, as the values that are present within the Western World are not found in the majority of Islamic followers. However, this study shall indicate that Islam has been anything but resistant to modernity, as Muslims around the world have shown their thirst for democracy.

Moreover, democratic principles such as the equality of all citizens and the existence of a legislative body are argued as impossibilities within an Islamic state, because these principles are deemed to conflict teachings of the Qur’an. For instance, Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri, a leading Kurdish politician during the debates over the formation of the Iranian constitution, argued that the equality of all citizens was impossible within an Islamic state and thus conceded the hopelessness of democratization (Donohue & Esposito, 1982). The topic of inequality within Islamic states is well documented, as divisions are drawn between “believers and non-believers, the rich and poor, husband and wife, the healthy and the ill, and the learned jurist and his followers” (Esposito & Piscatori, 1991: 435). Thus, the strong association between Islam and inequality is one factor that force scholar’s to question Islam’s compatibility. Moreover, Sayyid Qutb, a leading theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood, strongly argued against popular sovereignty, as he stressed the un-Islamic nature of subsuming one individual to the will of other individuals (Esposito & Piscatori, 1991: 435). Therefore, popular sovereignty is regarded un-Islamic because sovereignty is reserved for God alone, and therefore signifying a major obstacle to the creation of a fully functioning democratic society. However, it will become apparent that there are principles within Islam that still condone democracy, namely, the practice of social contracts, and the Islamic institutions of Shura (consultation), Ijma (consensus) and Ijtihad (informed, independent judgement).

This study shall thus tackle the question of Islam's democratic incompatibility through four main chapters. Firstly, this paper shall define democracy and will indicate processes of democratization. This will provide an understanding of important terms and shall indicate reasons why states democratise. Secondly, an evaluation of Protestantism and Catholicism will indicate what religious factors can encourage democracy and the time in which it takes to progress towards democratic compatibility. Thirdly, an examination of Islam will specify the aspects of Islam that contradict democracy and the elements that adhere to principles of democracy. And finally, empirical data will also be used to clearly emphasize the positive associations between Islam and democracy, which ultimately suggests the start of an Islamic democratic progression. Therefore, through an in-depth historical, theoretical and empirical analysis, this study finds that Islam and democracy are undoubtedly compatible.

Democracy and Democratization

In today's global modern society, democratic ideals are becoming more universally accepted, which has led many to hold optimistic views of democracy's future. Defining democracy is our first focus here, and two definitions of democracy shall be identified. In its minimal sense, many scholars and international organizations have identified the presence of an electoral democracy as a sufficient criterion for

defining the transitional process towards democracy. Schumpeter (1943) was the first to establish such a minimal definition, which identifies the need to allow ‘free competition for a free vote’ that provide citizens with the ability to decide who governs. This minimal definition is widely accepted and has also been very effective in differentiating between authoritarian and democratic regimes during the 20th Century. Furthermore, the minimal definition also allows scholars to identify nations that are in a transitional phase, which may eventually progress towards consolidating democracy. However, some have argued that the definition of an electoral democracy is too narrow and limited, as they simply require that the “election of the ruling elite be based on the formal, universal rights to vote, such that elections are general free and regular” (Merkel, 2007: 34). Therefore, using this minimal definition of democracy risks the categorization of authoritarian states as democracies. Finally, simplifying the definition of democracy to that of an electoral democracy also results in a number of other vital elements of democracy, such as the rule of law and political participation, being omitted from the explanation.

As previously mentioned, the minimalist definition of democracy arguably conceals the functioning of competitive authoritarian regimes that are neither completely democratic nor authoritarian in nature. More importantly, these competitive authoritarian regimes are clearly not making any attempt to transition towards greater democratic practices. This is undoubtedly highlighted by the fact that said regimes will allow competitive elections but will violate a number of democratic criterions to create an uneven environment between the government and opposition parties. Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) concur by emphasizing that competitive authoritarian regimes, such as Russia under Vladimir Putin, have routinely abused state resources, denied opposition parties adequate media coverage, have harassed opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulated electoral results. This ultimately results in a system dominated by one ruling party. Singapore, for example, is a competitive authoritarian regime that functions on a clear one party dominated system, as Diamond (2002: 32) indicates that Singapore has repeatedly re-elected the ruling party with over 95 per cent of parliamentary seats. This clearly reveals that competitive authoritarian regimes are not on a path of democratization, as the government violate basic principles of democracy and use these to produce a one party dominated parliamentary system to secure the undemocratic status quo.

On the other hand, comprehensive definitions of democracy seek to highlight the importance of other elements, such as the rule of law and political participation, to establish a more complete and thorough definition. The rule of law is highlighted as a necessary component because it ensures that governments are held accountable through free and fair elections, and that the ruling party abide by laws or norms that have been put in place. The rule of law thus minimalizes government attempts to ‘manage’ elections through the banning of opposition parties, harassing critics, intimidating electors and falsifying the count of votes, which would deem elections unfair and unfree (Maravall & Przeworski, 2003). Furthermore, the rule of law is also in place to protect opposition parties once a government is formed, as losing parties in authoritarian regimes often face prosecution. It is therefore clear that the rule of law is necessary to limit the powers of the government and allow a degree of predictability when assessing the behaviour of the ruling party (Maravall & Przeworski, 2003). In addition to the rule of law, political participation is another component that is emphasised within scholarly literature. Verba (1967) indicates that it is important that all adult citizens are free to join political groups, engage in discussions about how the country ought to be governed and allowed the right to protest through written letters or public demonstrations. Subsequently, this aspect ensures the basic democratic rights of people and clearly determines whether a state is democratic or not. Thus, a government within a representative democracy is held fully responsible to adhere to the demands of the ruled and a number of legal frameworks ensure that the government is held accountable for their actions in the public realm (Przeworski et al, 1999). Ultimately, it is evident that the rule of law and political participation are vital in any strong democratic state.

Therefore, this study shall adopt a more comprehensive definition of democracy, as minimalist approaches provide very narrow definitions that conceal the inner workings of hybrid regimes. Therefore, O’Donnell’s description of democracy shall be highlighted to reaffirm the position of this study. O’Donnell (2004: 14) argues that a democratic regime will frequently hold free, inclusive, egalitarian and decisive elections that are upheld by a system of law, and which stress the political rights of their citizens, namely, the right to protest government actions and participate in the functioning of government.

The theory behind democratization

Identifying the reasons why states democratize is another vital component when attempting to understand why some states have or have not embarked upon a path to democracy. Structural pressures, such as socio-economic growth, have been identified by academics as forces that can encourage the development of democracy within a nation. With regards to socio-economic factors, “theorists have argued that a country is more likely to develop democracy when it passes certain economic development thresholds, achieving a particular level of per capita gross national product (GNP) or a particular literacy rate” (Huntington, 1991: 31). Modernization theory therefore argues that states that are undergoing economic modernization are likely to progress towards democracy because of growing socio-economic pressures. Two prime examples of where modernization is most likely to have affected the spread of democratic thought is in South Korea and Taiwan, as they both indicate a strong correlation between economic growth and democracy. Cotton (1989: 246) indicates that demands of greater political participation in South Korea largely stemmed from the process of socioeconomic modernization, which has been accepted by the ruling elite to bolster their rule in current times. Perhaps, further developments in socio-economic factors are needed within the Islamic World to aid democratic progression.

Socio-economic modernization can clearly produce forces strong enough to encourage democratic transitions; however, modernization theory does not guarantee a transitional phase towards democracy. Therefore, the scholarly community have also examined the forces of culture in an attempt to explain why authoritarian states are often politically unstable. The congruence thesis argues that the pattern of authority within the political system “must be consistent with other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part” (Eckstein, 1966: 234, cited in Castles, 1974: 291). The congruence thesis thus posits that if there is a stronger sense of emancipative values within a state with a lower corresponding level of democracy, then political instability will be unavoidable, and may result in the toppling of the ruling elite. Welzel and Inglehart (2006: 91) reveal that emancipative values, which predominantly emerge in response to socioeconomic modernization, do have a positive effect on democratic institutions and that this effect is independent from the

influence of prior democratic experiences. Therefore, the congruence thesis provides measurable grounds to indicate that democratic transition, which transcends cultural boundaries, can be achieved.

Again, much like the modernization theory, the congruence thesis does not ensure a process of democratization, and so other factors must work in accordance with both modernization and congruence theories to initiate democratization. Particular elements such as the role of political actors can have an immensely positive association with the rise of democracy. It is therefore evident from an examination of European democratic transitions that structural pressures can also emerge through socio-political changes that may take place years before any transition is set into motion. Bregolat (1999) reveals that in the case of Spain, it was socio-political changes made by Francisco Franco that aided the creation of an educated middle class, and which later encouraged democratic growth. Furthermore, the removal or death of an authoritarian leader may also provide the necessary internal pressures to overthrow a repressive regime. This was true again for Spain's democratic transition, as it did not fully take effect until Franco's death in 1975 and the arrival of his democratic supporting successor, King Juan Carlos (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Spain's democratic transition is thus a clear example of the forces of agency in full effect, as it reveals that growing economic and social pressures to democratize were answered by the ruling elite, who sanctioned a period of democratic transition.

Moreover, an empirical examination of Spain's democratization uncovers the presence of a political phenomenon whereby states progress towards democracy in waves, with one state's democratization creating greater pressures to democratize in nearby countries. Huntington (1991: 100) argues that the successful transition of one state can encourage other neighbouring states to embark upon their own democratic transition, "either because they seem to face similar problems, or because successful democratization elsewhere suggests that democratization might be a cure for their problems whatever those problems are, or because the country that has democratized is powerful and or is viewed as a political and cultural model". This argument presented by Huntington does have historical groundings to base itself upon, as the demonstration effect has successfully and unsuccessfully swept through Southern Europe and more recently through North Africa and the Middle East. Linz and Stepan

(1996: 236) also reveal that a domino effect, also known as the demonstration effect, was evident in the democratic transitions of the post-communist nations in the years preceding the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and which ultimately allowed said nations to democratize at such a rapid pace. Again both structural and agency related processes allowed democratization to swing into full force, and those nations that had experienced democracy in the past were better equipped to consolidate their democratic transitions.

External pressures are also useful to explain the reasons why a state would embark on a democratic transition. International organisations, and in particular regional organisations, are argued to produce an indirect effect upon a state to democratize. Pevehouse (2002: 542) also argues that International Organisations (IO) can affect the dynamics of political liberalization by swaying the behaviours of political elites by “assuaging fears of national elites or by socializing a group of national elites”. Therefore, one would claim that International Organisations, such as the United Nations and in particular regional institutions such as the European Union, indirectly help states to change the political behaviour of their political elites to encourage democratic transition. Moreover, since Huntington’s identification of a third wave of democratization, the role of external actors has had a very profound effect upon the encouragement of global democratic transitions. This is highlighted by the impact that changes in the Catholic Church have made in Latin America, as the national churches moved from supporting the status quo to opposing authoritarian rule (Huntington, 1991: 13). Finally, the term ‘external actors’ also include states, of which changes in the policies of the European Community, the United States and the Soviet Union have paved the way for the further spread of democratic ideals. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 allowed Eastern European countries to move along a political path of their own, and this was coupled with democratic promotion policies from the European Community and the United States, which aided the development of democratic transitions throughout Europe and further (Bregolat, 1999).

Chapter 1: The historical link between democratization and religion

Theorists have argued that factors such as culture and religion can either advance or hinder a country's prospects for democratic change, and within this argument Christianity, more specifically Protestantism, has consistently shown a positive association with the emergence and consolidation of democracy. This point is highlighted in a plethora of scholarly literature, which indicate Protestantism's positive links with political democracy, political rights, civil liberties and economic development that may have facilitated the growth of liberal democracy (Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Anderson, 2007; Grier, 1997). This is an interesting discovery by the scholarly community, and is one that this chapter wishes to expand upon further in a bid to identify which elements of Protestantism may aid democratic development in other world religions. Moreover, this chapter also seeks to analyse the Catholic faith, as it has become apparent, within Huntington's third wave of democratization, that

the Catholic Church is no longer against democracy. This is highlighted by the fact that “roughly two-thirds of the 30-some countries that have undergone successful transitions to democracy since the mid-1970s were Catholic” (Casanova, 2001: 1041). Therefore, it is in our interest to decipher the reasons behind Catholicism’s shift from incompatibility to compatibility, as it may suggest ways in which the Islamic faith may transition towards greater associations with democracy.

There are many paths towards democracy, and even within the analysis of Protestantism there seem to have been a number of factors that combined to hasten democratic transitions. Tusalem (2009) has indicated that there are several factors that arose from the Protestant Reformation that encouraged democratic transition, namely, the strengthening of individualism, factionalism, egalitarianism and economic development. With regards to individualism, Bruce (2007: 7) indicates that the Reformation bolstered the idea of the individual by ending the possibility of transferring religious merit from the more to the less Godly, and therefore stressing the fact that each person stood at equidistance from God. This was a huge step towards eventual democratization, as individual conscience stressed that people could appropriate God’s word personally, without the mediation of priests (Woodberry & Shah, 2004: 48). This is an important point, as it also reveals that Protestantism promoted a break away from the ancient church structures and traditions, and therefore illustrating an important shift from an authoritarian and hierarchical epistemology to one that was essentially democratic in practice (Bruce, 2003: 248). By removing the clergy as intermediaries and by moving away from an authoritarian epistemology, Protestantism was promoting more of an individual approach to Christianity, which demanded literate followers to read the Bible.

Mass education thus became a vital characteristic of Protestantism, which ultimately has clear associations with the promotion of democracy, as modernization theorists highlight links between education, wealth and democracy (Lipset, 1959). By stressing the importance of individualism, Protestantism began a programme of mass education to equip people with the skills necessary to read the word of God. Both within Europe and abroad “Protestants started Sunday schools for the poor, founded Bible and tract societies, and pressed governments to fund mass education” (Woodberry and Shah, 2004: 53). Consequently, the Protestant movement encouraged

the development of an educated and economically prosperous middle class that would spread democratic ideals further. Moreover, egalitarianism was also evident in such programmes, as they “often provided the only formal education open to women and marginalized groups such as slaves, blacks in South Africa, or members of ‘untouchable’ castes in India” (Woodberry and Shah, 2004:53). Protestantism’s emphasis on individualism and education may thus explain why scholars, most notably Weber (1992) have found that Protestant nations have been able to establish market economies that are able to produce some of the highest economic growth rates.

In addition, Protestantism’s focus upon the individual also had other consequences that aided developments towards democratic consolidation. Martin (2011: 197) indicates that the Protestant focus on individualism promoted greater toleration and democracy through the emphasis on individual interpretations of scripture, which resulted in the factionalism of Protestantism. It was through Protestant factionalism that a number of Protestant sects later accepted their minority status within the community, which inadvertently encouraged greater toleration between the sects and prompted a progression towards state neutrality on matters of religion (Bruce, 2007: 10). Moreover, factional competition also saw greater involvement in the public sphere, as sects established voluntary organisations to interact with the surrounding communities. Protestant voluntary organisations therefore left a lasting pro-democratic affect that strengthened the civil society, as Protestant individualism had a tendency of supporting self-organization through a plethora of voluntary associations and communities, which ultimately left a lasting organizational template (Fukuyama, 1997: 5). Religious diversity and tolerance, which emerged through Protestant factionalism, also aided the emergence of working-class politics and thus strengthened transitional factors. However, unlike Protestant nations, Catholic countries maintained close ties between the church and the state, and thus radical movements that rejected the feudal order were also rejecting the church (Bruce, 2007). As a result, the political dissent in France “became anti-clerical while in Britain it often led to religious innovation” (Bruce, 2007: 14). Clearly, Protestantism led the way in democratic thought when compared to other Christian sects.

Finally, the most obvious connection between Protestantism and democracy is the presence of secularization in Western, largely Protestant democracies. The separation of church-state relations has been identified as an area that promoted religious toleration, and therefore facilitated the growth of democracy. Bruce (2003: 253) reveals that during the Western phase of modernity, the state gave up on attempting to coerce religious conformity, as this was no longer acceptable due to the rise of egalitarian impulses and the threat it posed to encouraging social conflict. Secularization may have therefore encouraged greater toleration and aided the consolidation of democracy in the West, particularly in the United States of America. Secularization, however, is not a necessary condition of democracy. Stepan (2000) reveals that secularization is not inherently democratic and thus not a condition to democracy, as many European states that are associated with modern consolidated democracy are not secular states, namely, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland and Norway. Therefore, it is acceptable to argue that states can transition towards democracy without adopting full secularization, as communist states have indicated that staunchly secular regimes do not necessarily equate to democracy.

The point behind analysing Protestantism's transition towards democracy is to highlight that there were a number of factors that inadvertently changed Protestantism's compatibility with democracy. Bruce (2003: 245) argues that most religions are incompatible with liberal democracy because they "cannot treat all opinions as equally valid and they cannot treat all people as equal irrespective of their religion". This was initially true of Protestantism, but within the centuries preceding the Reformation, Protestantism adopted changes, either directly associated or inadvertently associated with promoting democracy. Bruce (2003) reveals that "the new importance of individualism and a general increase in egalitarianism, were accidental by-products" of the Reformation that ultimately fostered the gradual demise of religion and encouraged the rise of democracy. Moreover, many have highlighted the role that capitalism played in ushering in democratic pressures. Robertson, however, reveals that capitalism existed before the Reformation and ultimately "changed the Protestant ethic to accommodate a more thrifty, hard working people". This clearly indicates that outside variables, including the use of the printing press, aided the development of democracy in Protestant nations (Grier, 1997: 49). Indeed it is known that influential Protestant reformers did not condone the rise of

democracy. Figures such as “Martin Luther and John Calvin favoured authoritarian politics as a means of defending or extending the purity of Reformed doctrines and practices”, and therefore internal pressure, which was largely inadvertently created, promoted the rise of democracy (Woodberry & Shah, 2004: 48). Therefore, this analysis clearly suggests that Protestantism was incompatible with democracy until the necessary social and economic conditions, arguably in the form of modernization, changed the dynamic of the religion.

Catholicism and the pursuit of democratic compatibility

This evaluation of Protestantism now steers the study towards the analysis of Catholicism and the process it underwent to achieve democratic compatibility. A historical examination of the relationship between Catholicism and democracy illustrates the Church’s stern opposition to democracy. Weigel (2010) reveals that in the years preceding 1965 the Catholic Church strongly opposed the idea of the secular state and liberal democracy, and this was largely due to the Church’s assertion that ‘God is sovereign over states and individuals’ and the Vatican’s fear of religious persecution. As a result, the Vatican supported, through a number of concordats, fascist and totalitarian regimes, such as the Third Reich, Fascist Italy, the U.S.S.R and Latin American dictatorships (Philpott, 2004: 34). However, there were a number of developments within the international environment and within the Catholic Church that brought about positive change. The largest and arguably the most important development was the meeting of the Second Vatican Council (1963-1965). Under the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church changed its political theology to adhere to the idea of human rights and democracy, thereby encouraging the spread of emancipative values in predominantly Catholic nations (Minkenbergh, 2007: 894). This was an important development, which arose largely in response to rising internal pressures.

Catholicism’s path towards democratic compatibility was a slow process, which required the joint efforts of several papacies. Under the papacy of Pope Pius XI (1922-1939), the Vatican placed a new emphasis upon the principle of subsidiarity, which kick-started the democratic wheels of change. The work of Kenneth L. Grasso (et al, 1995: 31) indicates that the six principles of subsidiarity were developed to set

clear boundaries to state power and to emphasize the responsibilities of the individual, which were later officially implemented into the Second Vatican Council's verdict. Differentiation between the Protestant definition of the individual and the Catholic definition is important to note, as it indicates that different religions will have different conceptions of the "individual". Catholicism thus identified the individual through the Christian belief that "every man is destined for eternal life or damnation on his individual merits or demerits", and thus the state must act as a "moral force based on freedom and a sense of responsibility" to allow the individual to pursue the good life (Grasso, et al, 1995: 17, 32). The Vatican's re-positioning of the individual and the Vatican's assertion of state functioning guidelines, clearly denoted a change, as the Catholic Church transitioned from once supporting authoritarian governments to nurturing the further rise of democracy.

The reasons behind Catholicism's change in democratic compatibility stem from two main international developments, namely, the functioning of the US secular and liberal democracy, and the immoral functioning of totalitarian regimes in both Europe and Latin America. With regards to the functioning of the U.S state, Weigel (2010) highlights that the Catholic Church learnt first to tolerate the U.S model of democracy and later preferred this method of state governing. The reason for this stemmed largely from the absence of state sponsored religious persecutions and the ascribed freedoms and limits that closely adhered to the Vatican's understanding of the individual and the state (Casanova, 1996). This is an important point, as it illustrates that Catholic academics altered the view of the Catholic Church through a deeper, fuller and modern understanding of biblical scripture, which matched the views predominately held by Catholic followers in Western democracies. Moreover, the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe and Latin America, which were initially condoned by the Church through their belief that "temporal authorities ought to promote the Church's prerogatives and permit dissenters no rights", eventually began losing Vatican's support (Philpott, 2004: 34). This shift in support from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments largely stemmed from the Church's opposition to violent, racist and damaging actions of authoritarian regimes that did not adhere to the principles of subsidiarity or the developments from the Second Vatican Council. Philpott (2007: 511) stressed such a point as he reveals that Catholicism's democratic encouraging developments and Pope John Paul II's stern opposition to

authoritarianism, which originated from his experience as Archbishop of Warsaw during the Cold War, aided the emergence of a Catholic wave of democratization.

In conclusion, Islam is no more different than Protestantism or Catholicism with regards to the initial questioning of democratic compatibility. This section has uncovered that both Protestantism and Catholicism were at one point viewed as incompatible with democracy. However, through an eventual emphasis on the individual and rationalism, the religions altered their compatibility, which is what Fatima Mernissi has sternly argued is needed within Islam in order to foster democratic growth (cited in Hugh Goddard, 2002: 8). Moreover, culturalist theorists, namely Fukuyama (1992, 2001, 2006) and Huntington (1993, 1996) imply that certain religions, namely Islam, are monolithic, which is a dangerous path to follow. The dangers of such a claim are highlighted by Casanova (2001: 1075), as he indicates that “Every incrimination of Islam as a fundamentalist, antimodern and anti-Western religion could have been directed even more justifiably against Catholicism not so long ago”. This point highlights the fact that religions need time to eventually change their attitudes to democracy, as it is evidently clear that Catholicism took several hundred years to finally condone democracy. This may suggest that democratic preconditions, such as economic modernity, education, industrialization and others are needed throughout a region to encourage a growth in democratic norms and change religious understandings. Finally, Muslims can be found in both democratic and nondemocratic nations, and as such those living in the former can encourage the spread of democracy abroad. Philpot (2007) reveals that Catholic followers in the U.S have had a large part to play in encouraging the Vatican to change their views on democracy. Again this is an important historical development, as it may suggest that Islam, with an estimated 600 million followers living in democracies, near democracies, or intermittent democracies, may soon face internal pressures to democratize (Stepan, 2000: 48).

Chapter 2: Islamic multi-vocality

It is clear through the analysis of Catholicism that there is nothing deterministic about a religion's relationship to democracy, and therefore through an analysis of Islam, one could argue that there is nothing deterministic about the future of Islam. Currently, Islam has been unfairly banished to the category of democratic incompatibility due to rash and short-sighted arguments, which claim that Muslims are intolerant, univocal and violent (Huntington, 1991, 1996; Fukuyama, 1992, 2001, 2006; Fickenscher, 2008). This unjustly describes a small proportion of Muslims who are often very conservative and bitter at the vehement historical contestation between Christianity and Islam, which now consequently categorizes Islamic cultures as backwards and violent (Lewis, 1990). The arguments that regard Islam as undemocratic largely stem from three political and cultural factors, namely, "the war on terror, religious integration of Islam in secular spaces, and the Salafization of Islamic thinking" (Cesari, 2013: 139). Ultimately, these factors can be linked to the rise of the Salafism, which through its strict practice of Orthopraxy is sternly against the idea of democracy (Ruthven, 1997: 4).¹ This chapter shall therefore primarily focus upon the topic of Salafism, the rise of militant jihad and Shari'a law to indicate why arguments surrounding Islam's incompatibility with democracy have surfaced. Furthermore, this chapter will later highlight the presence of an Islamic reformation and will also indicate the political integration of Muslims in Western democracies.

Fundamentalism is a term that is being used with growing frequency, and it is paramount that it be defined since its meaning is often controversial. In a Western sense, the term fundamentalism arose to describe the “literal, yet creative, interpretation of the Bible” and was later used to describe “Muslim individuals or groups who have been involved in Islamic revivalism”, which currently have been associated with anti-democratic regimes (Khatab, 2011:11, 12). This definition may resonate with many in the West who consider Islam and modernisation as inherently opposed, yet it only describes the relatively small segment of Muslims who wish to adopt or enforce strict interpretations of Islam. Cesari (2004:54) reveals that there are four main fundamental sects, which have shown little or no interest in participating in Western civilizations, despite their Western presence, namely Salafi, Wahhabism, Barelvi and Tabligh. Admittedly, these fundamental sects hold a number of beliefs and traditions that are ultimately hindering their integration into Western society, such as their withdrawal from political participation and their religiously motivated rejection of democracy (Amghar, 2007). But these sects only represent a small percentage of Muslim sects, most of which do not hold such staunchly anti-democratic beliefs. Thus, conflating the characteristics of fundamentalism with those of Islam allow certain academics to wildly claim that Islam, as a whole, is incompatible with democracy. Yet the absence of democratic principles held by fundamentalists is obviously a worrying sign for the West, especially as the European Salafist population increases. The rise of Salafism in Europe has been “described as the fastest-growing Islamic movement in Europe”, and this has been confirmed within Germany, as they report that “Salafists have grown from 3,800 to 6,300 in three years” (The Week, 19/01/2015). Therefore, the absence of democratic tendencies within Salafism and its rise in Europe has led many to fear the current and future links between Islam and democracy.

Claims of Islam’s incompatibility have been accentuated further through anti-democratic remarks and actions from religious leaders and radical Islamic groups. The lack of a sole authoritative figure in Islam, such as that of the Pope in Catholicism, allows radical leaders in the fringe to claim authority and to promote their particular strand of Islam (Cesari, 2004:154). This is nowhere more evident than within Islamic extremist groups, which have taken it upon themselves to vocalise their

anti-western and anti-democratic tendencies, and are consequently misconstrued by many in the West as a sound representation of Islam and the majority of Muslims. The rise of militant Salafists, and past atrocities such as 9/11, the 7/7 bombings, the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and many others, have led national governments around the world to perceive such groups as one of the greatest challenges facing today's world (Harrigan & El-Said, 2010: 199). As a result, Islamist groups, such as Al Qaeda and other affiliated groups, emphasize claims of democratic incompatibility, as they assert their aim of establishing a Caliphate far removed from democratic values. Hence, the presences of extremist violent attacks rightly play into Huntington's (1996) argument that there are civilizational fault line conflicts, which ultimately suggest Islamic resistance to modernity, democracy and the West.

Furthermore, radical proponents of Shari'a law have also thwarted people's views of the association between democracy and Islam, as the strict implementation of Shari'a law does not adhere to democratic principles. Hefner (2011: 3) indicates that in its extreme forms, Shari'a law "calls for the mandatory veiling of women (and even the closing of girls schools), the Maiming of thieves, the stoning of adulterers, and the execution of apostates". What this seems to suggest is the existence of a legal system based on religious intolerance, gender inequality and religiously condoned death penalties, which obviously do not adhere to democratic values. Moreover, radical interpretations of Shari'a law by Islamic extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda, are used to justify their acts of terrorism through Islamic legal doctrines, which consequently invokes fear in those worrying of indiscriminate acts of violence (Emon, et al, 2012: 15). Clearly, extreme implementations of Shari'a law suggest to many that Islam is incompatible with democracy, as large Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, still frequently uphold their right to practice the sometimes violent legal doctrine (BBC, 9/01/2015). However, some also argue that Shari'a law does not have to be static in its apparent rejection of democracy and legislation, as modernist thinkers have argued that "God left the shari'a politically unspecific so that believers would engage in itihad (Ar., literally "effort," more generally, reinterpretation of the sources of the law to develop new rules) to make the general principles of God's law relevant for each age" (Hefner, 2011:7). This may thus suggest that within modern Islamic thought, Islam and Shari'a law may transition towards greater democratic compatibility.

Therefore, categorizing a religion as inherently undemocratic or democratic can be a wild assertion. Huntington's (1996: 217) work asserts that undemocratic factors are inherent within Islam itself, not merely in the practices and beliefs of fundamental Islamic groups. However, Huntington (1996) also reveals that some Christian Orthodox nations indicate poor associations with democracy and yet, generally, Christianity is portrayed as intrinsically democratic. Such arguments are usually supported by empirical findings that suggest democracy is not as widely dispersed throughout the Christian world, as many would believe. These empirical findings emphasize the lack of democracy and the comparatively weaker demands for democracy in Christian Orthodox dominated nations, most notably Belarus and Russia (Freedom House, 2014; Polity IVa, 2015, World Values Survey, 2015). Therefore, perhaps it is orthodox or orthoprax practices that explain why some nations or cultures are slower to adopt a form of democracy.

Signs of Islamic compatibility with democracy

Despite the uncovering of democratic incompatibilities within some aspects of Islam, radical interpretations of the Qur'an are not the sole representation of global Muslim interpretations, as Islam, like other major world religions, is a formation of a number of different sects, namely, Sunni, Shia, Sufi and many other smaller Islamic sects. Within these religious groupings, the Islamic world has witnessed the rise of Islamic scholars who stress the need to reform Islamic interpretations and a need to emphasize its democratic elements. Keddie (1983) argues that from as far back as late 19th century, Islamic scholars such as Sayyid Jamāl ad-Din "al-Afghāni" and many others have demanded freer interpretations of the Qur'an that would allow the Islamic world to 'catch up' with the west in terms of technological, scientific and philosophical terms. Moreover, freer interpretations may also allow the Islamic world to move towards greater democratic compatibility, as noted by Muhammed Abduh, and may even condone secularisation, as argued by Lufti al-Sayyid (Salem, 1994: 94). These assertions by past Islamic scholars seem to suggest the need for a reformation, perhaps one similar to that of the Protestant Reformation, to visibly assert Islam's compatibility with democracy. This section will therefore expand upon modernist Islamic thinking to indicate Islam's compatibility with democracy. In addition, this

section will also highlight the democratic participation of Muslims within the Western world to emphasize the existence of democratically involved Islamic followers.

Firstly, Islam has been portrayed as religiously intolerant and resistant to re-defining and re-interpreting Islam in new contexts. However the history behind al-Andalus provides impetus to question such a view. The establishment of an Arab-Islamic society in modern day Spain between 711-1492, indicated the presence of religious diversity within an Islamic state (Marin, 1998). Muslims, Jews and Christians inhabited a common region for nearly eight centuries, and though some conflicts arose, a legal and social framework was devised that allowed religious diversity within an Islamic state to flourish. Safran (2013) indicates that a social contract was created to protect the religious freedom of Christians and Jews within the Islamic state, and as result, the *dhimmi* (“protected persons”- Jews and Christians) were not officially subjected to all Islamic laws. Therefore, the presence of an officially known demarcation within the legal boundaries of Muslim jurisdiction indicated the Islamic State’s tolerance of other religious practices. Such tolerance was the result of defining Islam in their new social context, which was characterized by religious and ethnic diversity, and demonstrates Islam’s ability to re-define itself within new ages. Thus, history provides a rebuttal to those who argue that Islam is intolerant and backwards.

Moreover, demands for the re-interpretation of Islam in new social contexts are by no means forgotten developments, as Islamic academics based in Europe and abroad have stressed, and still do stress, Islam’s democratic potential. Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad emphasized Islam’s democratic potential by demonstrating that the Islamic community can, as part of the third foundation of Islamic law, make legally binding laws, and additionally indicates that social contracts were often a necessary condition within the Islamic Caliphate (Goddard, 2002: 7). Both of these elements have links to democracy that demonstrate the democratic potential of Muslim dominated cultures. Moreover, some scholars have linked the institutions of Shura (consultation), ijma (consensus) and ijihad (informed, independent judgement) to an early form of Islamic democracy, which may act as a sacred precedent for democracy in the Islamic world (Esposito and Voll 1996). There are thus elements within Islam that clearly suggest that democratic progression is possible, and this too is asserted by Islamic

academics. Iranian Islamic reformist Abdul Karim Soroush is widely known for his assertion that “Islam and democracy are not only compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect” (Soroush, cited within Abootalebi, 1999: 19). This is a vital point, as this clearly agrees with this studies findings thus far, namely, that democracy compatibility is a process that religious cultures must work towards. This was certainly the case within Protestant and Catholic cultures, which thus begs the question ‘why not Islam?’

Finally, arguments stressing Islam’s compatibility with democracy only need look at the democratic participation and representation of Muslims in the Western world, as this clearly highlights the ability of Islamic followers to participate in a democratic system. With regards to democratically elected Muslim representatives, the European Union stands as a prime example, as Muslim MEP (Members of the European Parliament) representatives include Rachita Datia, Karima Delli, Syed Kamall, Saïd el Khadraoui, Emine Bozkuryt and many others elected during the 2009 European Elections (Euro-Islam.info, 2015). Clearly this illustrates the level of Muslim representation within Western democracies, and also suggests the presence of a Western Muslim electorate. There are thus many studies that emphasise the presence of a Western Muslim electorate, albeit with differing levels of Muslim participation. Cesari (2013: 65) indicates, within her Berlin survey, that 44.7% of Muslim participants voted in past local elections, but generally indicates comparatively low voter turnout of Muslim citizens. Moreover, Ayers and Hofsetter (2008) and Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) also reveal the existence of a Muslim electorate in America and Britain, respectively. Admittedly, these numbers do not represent a clear majority, however the findings do show that Muslims are participating to some degree in Western democratic systems. Hence, the presence of a EU Muslim electorate and the existence of democratically elected Muslim representatives demonstrate that Islamic followers do participate within European democracies.

There is abundant evidence suggesting that Islam and democracy are compatible, and a plethora of scholars have drawn similarities between the practice of Islam and democratic values (Hoffman, 2004; Keddie, 1983; Esposito and Piscatori, 1991; Stepan 2000; Minkenberg, 2007). Moreover, modern calls within the Islamic

community have also emphasized the importance of Western Muslims and their responsibility to signify Islam's compatibility with democracy. Tariq Ramadan (1999, 2004) is one such notable figure, as he asserts the similarities between democracy and Islam and thereby stresses the benefits of electoral structures and freedoms granted within democracies over the unjustifiable theocracies or autocracies currently present in the Islamic world. These arguments are thus expressed by a number of Muslims who see the democratic potential of Islam. One notable figure that has transitioned from one extreme to another is Maajid Nawaz, who in the past was a very vocal member of the extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir and now co-founder of British based counter-extremist think tank, the Quilliam foundation (Nawaz, 2012). Finally, the examples presented within this analysis clearly indicate that deeming Islam as inherently undemocratic is absurd, as Islam is undoubtedly a multi-vocal religion that has shown clear signs of democratic compatibility, either through Islamic academic re-interpretations or through analyses of Muslim participation within democratic systems.

Chapter 3: Democracy and emancipative values in Islamic nations

Islamic-dominated nations are not solely run as strict undemocratic Islamic states, and thus different levels of democratic principles can be found within such states. As previously discussed, this study shall adopt a more comprehensive definition of democracy, which adheres closely to that provided by the 2010 Polity IV data series. An analysis of democracy in Muslim-dominated nations demonstrates that there are nations that are clearly undemocratic, and nations that seem to be progressing towards greater democratic compatibility. Therefore, in a bid to highlight the presence of democracy in the Islamic world, this study shall primarily focus upon the nation of Indonesia, and mention in less detail other Muslim nations that show signs of democratic compatibility. Hence, an analysis of empirical data will clearly indicate that some Islamic states seem to be progressing or have progressed towards democracy, a finding that undermines the assertion that Islam is inherently undemocratic.

It is first paramount to explain the workings of the Polity IV data series, as to provide a thorough understanding of the index scale. Polity IV Country Reports provide a table and graph that map an independent nation's 'polity score' annually, which is calculated through an evaluation of state political systems on a 20-point scale that runs from -10 to +10, and which denotes a nation's political classification through their accumulated 'polity score'. Ultimately, the 'polity score' is used to determine a state's categorization, which is sub-divided into three main categories, namely authoritarian states (corresponding to scores of -6 to -10), anocracies, which signifies a hybrid regime (ranging from -5 to +5), and democracies (scoring anything between +6 to +10) (Polity IV, 2015b). Furthermore, additional democracy measuring variables are included to provide a deeper understanding, namely, of a state's

electoral openness and competitiveness, of its level of executive constraints, and of the nature of its political participation. Such variables provide information on the level of democracy (labelled ‘Democ’ within the data series) or autocracy (labelled ‘Autoc’), which contribute to the final ‘polity score’. Once evaluation is complete, the ‘polity score’ is used to visually track nations on their 20-point graph. Consequently, Polity IV has been able to design a data series that closely adheres to this study’s definition of a democracy, as it includes evaluations on election competitiveness, ruling accountability, and political participation.

Polity IV Country Report 2010: Indonesia

Score:	2009	2010	Change			
Polity:	8	8	0			
Democ:	8	8	0			
Autoc:	0	0	0			
Durable:		11				
Tentative:		No				
SCODE	INS	CCODE	850	Date of Report	1 June 2011	
Polity IV Component Variables						
XRREG	XRCOMP	XROPEN	XCONST	PARREG	PARCOMP	
3	3	4	6	2	4	

Figure 2. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Indonesia, (Polity IV a, 2015)

Polity IV currently considers Indonesia, home to the largest Muslim population in the world, a democratic state. This is indicated by Indonesia’s current Polity ranking of 8, which clearly deems Indonesia a democratic state (Polity IV, 2015a). Within their report, Polity IV evaluate three main areas, namely executive recruitment, executive constraints and political participation to decipher a state’s political regime. With regards to an evaluation of executive recruitment, Indonesia has been measured on three indices that determine the level of democracy, namely XRREG, which measures the level of regulation, XRCOMP, which measures the competitiveness of executive recruitment, and XROPEN, which determines the level of openness within executive recruitment (Marshall, et al, 2013). Indonesia has been deemed regulated, competitive and open with regards to executive recruitment, which

strongly denotes the presence of democratic tendencies (Polity IV, 2015a). Such a claim is shared by Lussier and Fish (2012: 71), as they indicate that competitive and open elections have been practiced since 2004, and which thus clearly confirms that predominantly Islamic countries can provide the necessary conditions for democracy to flourish.

Furthermore, Polity IV also includes additional variables to measure democracy levels within Indonesia, which also confirm the claim that Indonesia is democratic. When analysing the level of executive constraints, the data series uses the variable XCONST, which “refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives” (Marshall, et al, 2013: 24). Thus, Indonesia scores a constructive seven out of a potential eight within the XCONST indicia, and which ultimately identifies Indonesia has more than “substantial limitations on executive authority” (Marshall, et al, 2013: 25). Polity IV (2015a: 3) identifies this through highlighting Indonesia’s constitutional reform, which “weakened and reformed the legislative branch into a bicameral system, provided for direct elections to the presidency, and established a constitutional court with the power of judicial review”. The implementation of constitutional reforms has aided the level of political accountability within Indonesia, however a large application of the rule of law is needed, as argued by Hamid (2012).

Finally, Polity IV conduct a last evaluation to determine the level of democracy, and this area concerns the level of political competitiveness. The variables used within this political competitiveness are PARREG and PARCOMP, which measure the level of regulation within political participation, and the competitiveness of participation (Marshall, et al, 2013: 25-26). Measuring such factors are vital when deciphering a nation’s level of democracy, as PARREG determines if groups are competing non-violently for political influence while PARCOMP evaluates “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena” (Marshall, et al, 2013: 26). Therefore, Indonesia has obtained PARREG categorization of ‘multiple identity’, which states: “There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level-parties, regional groups or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few, recognised overlapping (common)

interests” (Marshall, et al, 2013: 26). This is positive, as it reveals that Indonesia has a system in place, which treats political groups quite democratically, rather than implementing either an unregulated, sectarian, or restricted system. Moreover, Indonesia’s PARCOMP classification has also shown positive signs, as their political system is recognised as being in a state of transition to fully competitive patterns (Polity IV, 2015a; Marshall, et al, 2013: 27). Therefore, Indonesia’s cumulative total is nine out of a potential 10, which therefore classifies the state as a state undergoing electoral transition with limited conflict or coercion (Polity IV, 2015a; Marshall, et al, 2013: 28). Such a positive rating signifies the health level of democracy present within Indonesia.

Polity IV Country Report 2010: Turkey




Figure 3. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Turkey (Polity IV, 2015a)

Indonesia stands as a prime example of an Islamic country demonstrating positive associations with a healthy level of democracy. However, Indonesia is not the only case of an Islamic country that encourages the growth of democracy, as another promising democracy is Turkey. This claim is also emphasized by Polity IV (2015a), which categorises the large Muslim-ruled state as democratic with a ‘polity score’ of 7. Moreover, other predominantly Muslim societies have also shown positive, albeit rocky, associations with democracy, the nations of Mali, Pakistan and Niger (Polity IV, 2015a). The data series results for Mali, Pakistan and Niger reveal that democracy can appear within Islamic states. Therefore, it is clear

through an analysis of the Polity IV data series that Muslim nations have shown positive associations with democracy, despite claims that Islam is inherently undemocratic. Clearly, this casts considerable doubt on Huntington (1993, 1996) and Fukuyama's (1992, 2001, 2006) theories.

Evaluation of the within Islamic nations

The claim that Islam is inherently undemocratic regrettably categorises one of the largest world religions as firmly against the notion of democracy. However, we can test such a claim through the use of the World Values Survey (WVS). The Stockholm-based association tracks changes in internationally-held values and beliefs, which is very important when attempting to uncover the degree to which democratic principles exist in undemocratic Islamic nations. The WVS has devised an international questionnaire that is answered on a 10-point scale running from disagreement (1) to agreement (10). As a result of the ranking system, an analyst can sub-divide the series into smaller categories. Thus, within this study: one shall represent strongly disagree, between two and four will represent disagree, numbers five and six will signify neither agree nor disagree, seven to nine shall indicate agree, and 10 will denote strongly agree. This section focuses on two democracy-measuring variables within the nations of Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar and Egypt in a bid to uncover whether emancipative values exist in undemocratic Islamic states. The nations of Jordan, Morocco, Qatar and Egypt shall be analysed due to their undemocratic categorization with the Polity IV Country Reports (2015). Moreover, Malaysia, which since 2009 has been awarded a polity score of 6 and thus classified as democratic in the Polity IV reports, shall also be evaluated. Therefore, the two variables being used will test the level of importance democracy is ascribed within the Islamic World, and the second shall test views associated with a minimalist definition of democracy.

The WVS variable V140 identifies the importance people assign to democracy between 2010-2014. From evaluating the data, the V140 variable indicates that Muslims within Islamic countries do largely hold pro-democratic values, which suggests compatibility between Islam and democracy. This is represented by the

nations mean scores, which are 8.29 in Jordan, 8.61 in Malaysia, 8.49 in Morocco, 8.34 in Qatar, and 8.95 in Egypt (World Values Survey, 2015). These results indicate that democracy is held with a high level of importance in these Muslim-dominated states. However, the data collected also indicate that each studied nation has a high standard of deviation (SD), which unfortunately range from 1.63 to 2.49. The high rates of SD in the nations of Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco and Qatar risk a demotion to the rank of 6, which denotes neither agree nor disagree. Although, data previously collected from WVS between 2005-2009 also strongly reiterates the importance ascribed to democracy in Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco and Egypt. This is indicated in the data series, as Jordan gained a mean score of 9.43 with a standard deviation (SD) of 1.42, Malaysia with a mean of 7.89 and a SD of 1.67, Morocco at 8.93 and a SD of 1.86, and finally Egypt with a mean score of 9.19 and a SD of 1.58. These results reveal that Jordan, Morocco and Egypt obtained a categorization of ‘important’ with regards to democracy’s position in society, while Malaysia indicated an improvement in the 2010-2014 data series when comparing her 2005-2009 results. Clearly these results from 2005-2014 indicate that the Islamic World have continuously obtained scores that suggest a high approval of democracy.

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Jordan	Malaysia	Morocco	Qatar	Egypt
Not at all important	1.5%	1.3%	0.2%	0.9%	4.9%	0.7%
2	0.4%	0.9%	0.1%	0.1%	0.7%	0.4%
3	0.5%	1.3%	0.2%	0.2%	1.0%	0.2%
4	1.0%	1.1%	0.8%	1.3%	1.3%	0.6%
5	5.6%	6.7%	3.6%	11.2%	6.6%	1.4%
6	5.7%	6.2%	8.6%	5.4%	5.6%	3.1%
7	7.6%	11.3%	8.8%	5.0%	5.5%	7.0%
8	12.8%	14.6%	19.8%	7.8%	9.2%	11.8%
9	14.2%	12.3%	12.2%	7.2%	10.1%	25.9%
Absolutely important	48.2%	43.2%	45.8%	49.8%	54.1%	48.9%
No answer	1.1%	-	-	5.1%	1.0%	-
Don't know	1.3%	1.0%	-	5.8%	-	-
(N)	(6,283)	(1,200)	(1,300)	(1,200)	(1,060)	(1,523)
Mean	8.57	8.29	8.61	8.49	8.34	8.95
Standard Deviation	1.96	2.07	1.63	2.09	2.49	1.51
Base mean	(6,129)	(1,188)	(1,300)	(1,069)	(1,049)	(1,523)

Selected samples: Egypt 2012, Jordan 2014, Malaysia 2011, Morocco 2011, Qatar 2010

Table 1. World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014, V140: The importance of Democracy in Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar and Egypt (World Values Survey, 2015)

When measuring variable V140, it is unclear how democracy is defined. Therefore, to provide a deeper understanding of the definition of democracy, the variable V133 will be used. The V133 variable asks participants how essential the characteristic of free elections is within the definition of democracy, and which is shown within table 2 below. The data series indicates relatively poor results, but these scores still largely indicate that free elections are an ‘important’ element within democracy. The nations of Jordan with a mean score of 7.14, Malaysia with 7.87, Morocco at a score of 8.49, and Egypt with 8.79 assert the importance ascribed to free elections. On the other hand, Qatar, a large gas-producing country in the heart of the oil-rich Middle East, has indicated a poor mean score of 6.87, and which ultimately classifies free elections as neither relevant nor irrelevant within Qatar’s definition of democracy. Moreover, relatively high standard of deviation results weaken the data further, as Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco could have their classification demoted to the category of neither agree nor disagree, while Qatar could potentially be classed as not deeming free elections as an important element of democracy. These results are mixed, as they indicate that Muslims in Islamic states do not ascribe free elections as an essential element of democracy. This is worrying as free elections are a minimal characteristic of democracies.

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Jordan	Malaysia	Morocco	Qatar	Egypt
Not an essential characteristic of democracy	4.4%	4.6%	3.1%	1.7%	14.8%	0.2%
2	1.6%	2.5%	2.4%	0.4%	2.3%	0.9%
3	1.9%	3.8%	2.5%	0.6%	1.9%	0.9%
4	2.1%	3.8%	2.4%	1.7%	2.4%	0.8%
5	7.2%	10.0%	7.1%	9.2%	9.3%	2.0%
6	5.5%	8.8%	5.8%	2.8%	7.7%	3.2%
7	8.5%	11.9%	9.2%	7.0%	8.3%	6.7%
8	13.6%	16.8%	14.8%	8.0%	8.9%	17.9%
9	14.4%	13.4%	18.8%	6.8%	7.7%	22.1%
An essential characteristic of democracy	37.6%	21.7%	33.9%	50.1%	34.7%	45.4%
No answer	1.4%	-	-	5.2%	2.2%	-
Don't know	1.8%	2.8%	-	6.5%	-	-
(N)	(6,283)	(1,200)	(1,300)	(1,200)	(1,060)	(1,523)
Mean	7.90	7.14	7.87	8.49	6.87	8.79
Standard Deviation	2.52	2.56	2.42	2.20	3.26	1.60
Base mean	(6,086)	(1,167)	(1,300)	(1,059)	(1,037)	(1,523)

Selected samples: Egypt 2012, Jordan 2014, Malaysia 2011, Morocco 2011, Qatar 2010

Table 2. World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014, V133: Democracy: People chose their leaders in free elections in Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar, Egypt, (World Values Survey, 2015)

Ultimately, an analysis of the World Values Survey (2015) has indicated mixed results, as the five Islamic states have shown relatively weak results once the standard deviation is factored in. With regards to the first variable, which measured the importance of democracy, this study finds initial optimism because all five Islamic states obtain a satisfactory score of between seven and nine, or the categorization of ‘important’, as it is also known within this study. These results suggest that the notion of democracy is held with high esteem within predominantly Muslim countries, and thus providing a valid basis to doubt claims of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy. However, further analysis uncovers limitations within the region, as variable V133 indicates that the minimalist definition of democracy is not held with high importance. Unfortunately, this result was a consequence of a large standard of deviation, which demoted four of the five Islamic states to categorizations below ‘important’. Therefore, the WVS data analyses demonstrate mixed results, as some Islamic states were deemed to have had acceptable and consistent emancipative values while others were not. This however, should not be deemed a failure, as a study of the WVS has indicated that there are positive signs that democracy is beginning to progress in the Islamic World.

Conclusion

Huntington (1984: 208; 1993, 1996) Fukuyama (1992, 2001, 2006), and Lewis (1990) have all argued, in some way or another, that democracy and Islam are incompatible. Huntington (1984, 1993, 1996) and Fukuyama (1992, 2001) argue that Islam is resistant to liberal democracy, while Lewis (1990) claims that Islam is inherently violent, intolerant and anti-western. Assertions that Islam is intrinsically undemocratic ultimately deem Muslims as inherently undemocratic; however, such an argument is contested within this study, as Islam is by all means a multi-vocal religion.

With regards to the historical relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism, an evaluation has indicated that religions are not inherently democratic; rather they progress towards democratic compatibility. This claim is asserted by Bruce (2004, 2007), who indicates that most religions are incompatible with liberal democracy because they “cannot treat all opinions as equally valid and they cannot treat all people as equal irrespective of their religion”. This was initially true of both Protestantism and Catholicism; yet historical changes encouraged the Christian faiths to create, sometimes inadvertently, the necessary democratic pre-conditions for democracy (Bruce, 2004, 2007; Woodberry & Shah, 2004). This is evident within the changing emphasis upon individualism and egalitarianism, which promoted religious toleration, and aided democratic growth within Protestant and Catholic states (Lipset, 1959, Bruce, 2004, Woodberry & Shah, 2004; Weigel, 2010; Grasso, et al, 1995; Casanova, 1996). Moreover, transitioning from democratic incompatibility to compatibility can be a lengthy process, as Catholicism took some 200 years after the French Revolution to finally adhere to democratic principles (Minkenbergh, 2007: 984). This again stresses the fact that religions progress towards democracy by accentuating pro-democratic principles, namely, a greater emphasis on individualism, egalitarianism, and economic and social modernization. These elements are undoubtedly present within Islam, and through a historical, theoretical and empirical analysis it is clear that Islam has democratic potential.

Islam, both historically and theoretically, has shown positive associations with democracy. Safran (2013) highlights this through an evaluation of the European Islamic Caliphate of Al-Andalus, which through a social contract encouraged and protected religious differences for nearly eight centuries. Unlike Christian religions, Islam promoted religious toleration through the teachings of the Qur'an, as "there is no compulsion in religion" (Qur'an 2:256) and verses ordering Christians and Jews to live by their faith: "So let the people of the Gospel judge by that which Allah has revealed therein, for he who judges not by that which Allah has revealed is a sinner" (Qur'an 5:47). This may clearly indicate the promotion of religious toleration within Islam, and thus suggests that Islam has some degree of democratic compatibility. Additionally, the Islamic institutions of Shura (consultation), Ijma (consensus) and Ijtihad (informed, independent judgement) may also denote the foundations to which democracy can later emerge, as these institutions have incorporated clear democratic principles that merely need greater emphasis (Voll & Esposito, 1994). If Islam is the obstructing democratic transition through inherently undemocratic values, than why are there clear indications of Islamic democratic compatibility?

Furthermore, Islam has shown empirically that it is compatible with democracy in three main areas, namely, Western Muslim political participation and representation, democracy growth within the Islamic World, and examinations of emancipative values. With regards to Western Muslim political participation and representation, this study has indicated that American, Canadian, and European Muslims are participating politically through electoral participation and political representation (Cesari, 2013; Euro-Islam.info, 2015; Ayers & Hofsetter, 2008; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Karim in Haddad ed, 2002). This thereby reveals that Muslims, although 'inherently undemocratic', can and do participate within Western democratic systems. Moreover, democracy has shown encouraging signs within the Islamic World, as an evaluation of the Polity IV (2015) data series indicates the growth of democracy in Indonesia, Turkey, Senegal, Niger and arguably Pakistan. However, this study's focus upon Indonesia has indicated the strength to which democracy is present within the Islamic World, which again stresses the poor validity of Huntington (1984, 1993, 1996) and Fukuyama's (1992, 2001, 2006) arguments. Finally, the World Values Survey (WVS, 2015) has indicated the universality of the notion of democracy, as the predominantly Muslim nations of Jordan, Malaysia,

Morocco, Qatar and Egypt have all categorised living within a democracy as ‘important’, yet they have shown comparatively weaker associations with the minimalist definition of democracy, namely, the importance of free elections. Therefore, if Islam is essentially undemocratic and all Muslims are anti-democracy, than why does Muslim political participation and representation exist within the Islamic and Western Worlds, and why would Muslims stress the importance of emancipative values? Perhaps what this study has uncovered is that Islam is beginning its transition towards democratic compatibility, as the notion and implementation of democracy in the Islamic World is undoubtedly improving.

Finally, the 2011 Arab Spring, which witnessed pro-democratic demonstrations across North Africa and the Middle East, may denote an important chapter within Islam’s relationship with democracy. This assertion may have empirical groundings, as for all its failures the Arab-Spring did successfully replaced authoritarian leaders in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt with transitional authorities that “have all explicitly advocated electoral democracy in their country” (Volpi, 2013: 790). However, it’s general failure in encouraging and sustaining greater democratic changes within the region, particularly within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), may suggest that the democratic preconditions of social and economic modernization have not been developed far enough. The agreement that these Islamic states have not progressed socially or economically far enough is emphasised by those that study the relationship between natural resources and democracy. Rose (2001) and Herb (2002) have indicated that rentier states, those that produce oil and gas, have avoided democratic change, as these nations function on a ‘no taxation and no representation policy’, which is enforced through supressing opponents and subsidising living conditions and costs, as to legitimise the regime. This argument may thus suggest that despite high levels of emancipative values and Islam’s democratic potential, rentier states have been able to prevent the emergence of democracy.

To conclude, this essay has found substantial evidence to argue against claims that Islam is inherently undemocratic. However, much more could have been researched and evaluated to provide a greater understanding of the relationship between Islam and democracy. The limitations of this paper therefore include: a weak evaluation of the link between the Islamic World and capitalism, an almost absent

analysis of the Arab-Spring and the consequences of rentierism, a narrow historical comparison between Christianity and Islam, and a minimal understanding of the link between colonialism and anti-western and anti-democratic values. Ultimately, future studies should delve further into an analysis of the relationship between Islam and democracy, as to uncover the extent of Islam's democratic potential.

Appendix

1. See Malise Ruthven (1997), 'Islam: A short introduction', *Oxford University Press*, p. 4. Ruthven asserts: "the focus for those seeking to defend Islam against what they see as the corrupting efforts of modern secularism and the 'West' is *action* rather than *belief*. This agenda, however novel its methods of application (including the adoption of terrorist methods), generally accords with long-established historical patterns. Throughout history Islamic rectitude has tended to be defined in relation to practice rather than doctrine. Muslims who dissent from the majority on issues of leadership or theology were usually tolerated provided their social behaviour conformed to generally accepted standards. It is in enforcing behavioural conformity (orthopraxy) rather than doctrinal conformity (orthodoxy) that Muslim radicals or activists look to a 'restoration' of Islamic law backed by the power of the state."

- Abootalebi, Ali R. (1999), 'Islam, Islamists, and Democracy', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1
- Alvarez, Mike, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski (1996) 'Classifying Political Regimes', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 3-36
- Amghar, Samir (2007), 'Chapter 3: Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims', *European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, Centre for European Policy Studies: Brussels
- Anderson, John (2007), 'Does God Matter, and if so whose God? Religion and democratization', *Democratization*, 11:4, 192-217
- Ayers and Hofstetter (2008), 'American Muslim Political Participation Following 9/11: Religious Belief, Political Resources, Social Structures, and Political Awareness', *Religion and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 3-26
- BBC News (09/01/2015), 'Saudi blogger Badawi 'flogged for Islam insult'', <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30744693>
- Bollen and Jackman (1985), 'Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 438-457
- Bregolat, Eugenio (1999) 'Spain's Transition to Democracy', *The John Hopkins University Press, SAIS Review*, Vol. 19.2, 149-155
- Bruce, Steve (2007) 'Did Protestantism Create Democracy?', *Democratization*, 11:4, 3-20
- Bruce, Steve (2003) *Politics and Religion*, Polity Press (Blackwell Publishing)
- Castles, Francis G. (1974) 'Political Stability and the Dominant Image of Society', *Political Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 289-298
- Casanova, José (2001) 'Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam', *Social Research*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 1041-1080
- Casanova, José (1996) 'Global Catholicism and the Politics of Civil Society', *Sociological Inquiry*, 66, 356-373
- Cesari, Jocelyne (2004), *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*, Palgrave Macmillan

- Cesari, Jocelyne (2013), *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*, Palgrave Macmillan
- Cotton, James (1989) 'From Authoritarian to Democracy in South Korea', *Political Studies*, Vol. 37, Issue No. 2: 244-259
- Diamond, Larry (2002), 'Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 21-35
- Donohue, J.J. & Esposito, J.L. (1982) *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University Press
- Emon, A. M, Ellis, M. S, Glahn, B. (2012), *Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law*, Oxford University Press
- Esposito, John L. & James P. Piscatori (1991), Democratization and Islam, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 3; 427-440
- Esposito, John L. & Voll, John O. (1996), *Islam and Democracy*, Oxford University Press
- Euro-Islam.info: Muslim's in European Politics, www.euro-islam.info/key-issues/political-representation/ 09/02/2015
- Fieldhouse, Edward & David Cutts (2008), 'Mobilisation or Marginalisation? Neighbourhood Effects on Muslim Electoral Registration in Britain in 2001', *Political Studies*, Vol. 56, 333-354
- Fikentscher, Wolfgang (2008), 'Chapter 5: Theories of Culture and Cultures', *Law and Anthropology: Outlines, Issues, Suggestions*, Munich: Bayerische Akademie Der Wissenschaften, C. H Beck in Kommission
- Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2014' http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VDKqmNPF_38 05/10/2014
- Fukuyama, Francis (2006) 'Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 5-20
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, NY: Avon Books
- Fukuyama, Francis (1997) 'The Great Disruption', *Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University*: 1-29
- Fukuyama, Francis (1995) 'The Primacy of Culture', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 7-14

- Fukuyama, Francis (2001) 'The West has won', *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30> (accessed 13/02/2015)
- Goddard, Hugh (2002), 'Islam and Democracy', *The Political Quarterly*, Blackwell Publishers, 3-9
- Grasso, Kenneth, Gerard V. Bradley and Robert P. Hunt (1995), *Catholicism, Liberalism, & Communitarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundations of Democracy*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
- Grier, Robin (1997), 'The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross National Study of 63 Former Colonies', *Kyklos*, 50: 47-62
- Hamid, Sandra (2012) 'Indonesian politic in 2012: coalitions, accountability and the future of democracy', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 48:3, 325-345
- Harrigan, Jane and Hamed El-Said (2010), *Globalisation, Democratisation and Radicalisation in the Arab World*, [Online] Available at: <http://www.palgraveconnect.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/pc/doi/10.1057/9780230307001>. (Accessed: 18 February 2015)
- Herb, M. (2002) 'Does Rentierism Prevent Democracy?', *American Political Science Association*
- Hefner, Robert W. (2011), *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World*, Indiana University Press
- Hoffman, Steven R. (2004), 'Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 6
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) 'Democracy's Third Wave', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 12-34
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 22-49
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1984) 'Will More Countries Become Democratic?', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, 193-218

- Haynes, Jeff (2010) 'Religion, secularisation and politics: A postmodern conspectus', *Third World Quarterly*, 18:4, 709-728
- Karim H. Karim (2002) 'Crescent Dawn in the Great White North: Muslim Participation in the Canadian Public Sphere' in Yvonne Y. Haddad (ed) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, Oxford University Press
- Keane, J. (2000), 'Secularism?', *The political Quarterly*, 71, 5-19
- Keddie, Nikki R. (1983), *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Din "al-Afghāni"*, University of California Press
- Khatab, Sayed (2011) *Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Theological and Ideological Basis of al-Qa'ida's Political Tactics*, The American University in Cairo Press
- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way (2002), 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.13, No. 2, 51-65
- Lewis, Bernard (1990), 'The Roots of Muslim rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified', *The Atlantic*, Vol 266, No. 3, 47-60
- Lipset, S. M. (1959) 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Association*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 69-105
- Linz, Juan J & Alfred Stepan (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press
- Lussier D. N & M. S. Fish (2012), 'Indonesia: The Benefits of Civic Engagement', *Journal of Democracy*, Vo. 23, No. 1, 70-84
- Maravall, José & Adam Przeworski (2003), *Democracy and the Rule of Law*, Cambridge University Press
- Marin, Manuela, (1998), *The Formation of the Classical Islamic World: The formation of al-Andalus: Part 1. History and Society*, Ashgate publishing limited
- Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole (2014), 'Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility', *Polity IV: Center For Systemic Peace*

- Marshall, Monty G, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jagers (2013), 'Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012: dataset Users' Manual, *Center for Systemic Peace*
- Martin, David (2011), *The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization*, Ashgate Publishing
- Merkel, Wolfgang (2007) 'Embedded and defective democracies', *Democratization*, 11:5, 35-58
- Minkenberg, Michael (2007), 'Democracy and Religion: Theoretical and Empirical Observations on the Relationship between Christianity, Islam and Liberal Democracy', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33:6, 887-909
- Nawaz, Maajid (2012), *Radical: My Journey from Islamist Extremism to a Democratic Awakening*, WH Allen: Ebury Publishing
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, Jorge Vargas Cullell and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta (2004), *The Quality of Democracy*, University of Notre Dame Press
- Oneal, John R., Frances H Oneal, Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett (1996) 'The liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 1: 11-28
- Pevehouse, Jon C. (2002) 'Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization', *International Organization*, 56: 515-549
- Philpott, Daniel (2004), 'The Catholic Wave', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 32-46
- Philpott, Daniel (2007), 'Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 505-525
- Polity IV a, Polity IV Country Reports 2010: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/p4creports.html> 04/02/2015
- Polity IV b, Polity IV Country Reports 2010 Series: Explanatory notes, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/keynew.htm> 08/02/2015
- Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin (1999), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge University Press
- Ramadan, Tariq (1999), *To Be an European Muslim*, Leicester: Islamic Foundation
- Ramadan, Tariq (2004), *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Oxford University press

- Ross, M. (2001) 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', *World Politics*, 53 (3), 325-361
- Ruthven, Malise (1997), *Islam: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press
- Safran, Janina M (2013), *Defining Boundaries in Al-Andalus: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Islamic Iberia*, Cornell University Press
- Salem, Paul (1994), *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World*, Syracuse University Press
- Schumpeter, Joseph A (1994) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Routledge Ltd
- Stepan, Alfred C. (2000) 'Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations"', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 37-57
- The Week, (19/01/2015), 'What is Salafism and should we be worried by it?' (Accessed on 07/02/2015), <http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/6073/what-is-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried-by-it>
- Tusalem, Rollin F. (2009), 'The Role of Protestantism in Democratic Consolidation Among Transitional States', *Comparative Political Studies*, 1-34
- Verba, Sidney, (1967) 'Democratic Participation', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 373, 53-78
- Voll John O. & John L. Esposito (1994) 'Islam's Democratic Essence', *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 3
- Weber, Max (1930) *The protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London: George Allen and Unwin
- Weigel, George (2010) 'Catholicism and Democracy: The Other Twentieth-Century Revolution', *The Washington Quarterly*, 12:4, 3-26
- Welzel, C., Inglehart, R (2006) 'Emancipative Values and Democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 74-94
- Woodberry, Robert Dudley & Timothy S. Shah (2004), 'The Pioneering Protestants', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 2: 47-61

- World Values Survey (Accessed 19/02/2015a), 'World values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: V140.- Importance of democracy', Analysis of Russia and Belarus, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>