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Rebels with a Cause: Self-determination Groups' Uses

of Indiscriminate Political Violence, 1970-2005.

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'Hate begets hate; violence begets violence […] adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that.'

-Martin Luther King Jr.

This paper is the final piece of work I will write as a student at the University of Glasgow. I have been at the University for six years, and in that time have developed deep and sustained interests in international relations and political violence, and an abiding belief that the most valuable scholarship is that which not only describes our world, but also seeks to change it. I do not believe that writing about political violence will end it, but I do believe that as we develop a better and better understanding of it we gain greater and greater insight into how to mitigate its prevalence. This paper is intended to be a small, but I hope substantive contribution to that endeavour.

1

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

GTD – Global Terrorism Database

IRA – Irish Republican Army

LTTE – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 'Tamil Tigers'

pIRA – Provisional Irish Republican Army

TELO – Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation

Figures

Abstract

In this paper I explore self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate violence against the state and coethnics. I argue that such behaviour is deeply paradoxical, ineffective, and counterproductive: indiscriminate political violence against the state provokes a backlash against oneself and one's people, its use against coethnics is delegitimising and self-defeating, and in any case indiscriminate violence is by nature incapable of producing compliance with one's goals. Despite this, self-determination groups across the world have engaged in lengthy and intense campaign of indiscriminate political violence. Using a newly compiled and coded dataset, I develop and test several potential explanations for this phenomenon using logistic regressions. I argue that the relatively large cost of selective violence, extensive state repression, internal competition between factions, and the institutionalisation of indiscriminate political violence as a standard operating procedure increase the likelihood of its use against the state. Internal competition between factions for hegemony over the self-determination group, and the institutionalisation of the behaviour, lead to greater likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics. I provide an initial set of insights into self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate political violence, and suggest new directions for future research.

Introduction

The study of rebellion, civil war, and the uses of political violence in such contexts is a now rich and fascinating field of inquiry across many disciplines in the social sciences. As the number of intrastate conflicts continues to grow, and as the number of people caught up in such conflicts – losing livelihoods, homes, friends, family, and often their lives – increases in tandem, the study of the uses of intrastate political violence becomes ever more important. To address violence in these contexts, we first must understand it. In this thesis I seek to contribute to this growing literature by exploring a particularly puzzling use of political violence within the state: that of indiscriminate political violence used by self-determination groups. I conceptualise indiscriminate political violence as instrumental violence designed to coerce, in which targets are selected on the basis of information about a group they belong to and/or in which the perpetrator utilises a method of violence which is incapable of discriminating between targets and others. As Kalyvas (2006) argues, the use of indiscriminate violence to obtain compliance from others is paradoxical in any case: its indiscriminate nature makes compliance no more or less safe than non-compliance, meaning that there are no actual incentives to comply (p. 171). The use of indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups is particularly self-defeating: the use of indiscriminate political violence against the state will lead to retaliation against one's own people, and the use of indiscriminate political violence against one's coethnics will lead to defection and the erosion of one's base of support, and yet we still see self-determination groups engaging in this behaviour.

Between 1970 and 2005 there were 142 self-determination groups active across 76 states, which provide 4328 dyad-years in which there either was or was not incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state or against coethnics; of those dyad-years, indiscriminate political violence against the state occurred in 608 (14.05% of total) and against coethnics in 203 (4.69% of total). Indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups is not especially common, but it does occur. Indeed, 66 self-determination groups engaged in indiscriminate political violence against their host state at least once between 1970 and 2005 (46.48% of groups) and 39 engaged in indiscriminate political violence against coethnics civilians or factions over the same period (27.46% of groups). So almost half of self-determination groups have engaged in indiscriminate political

violence against their host state, and more than one in four have done so against coethnics. Clearly, despite the ineffectiveness and counter-productiveness of indiscriminate political violence, self-determination groups' use of it is not an insignificant phenomenon, yet it is a phenomenon which remains unexplored and unexplained.

I have constructed a new dataset for this thesis which provides dyad-year data for self-determination groups from 1970-2005, constructed primarily using Kathleen Cunningham's (2014) dataset of self-determination groups and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START, 2016) data on instances of terrorism. The dataset contributes new measures of self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate violence: one of the incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state and another of the incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, as well as measures of previous use of indiscriminate political violence. I carry out logistic regressions to model the effects of different explanatory variables on the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence being used in a given dyad-year. This method is used to test several hypotheses about self-determination groups' uses of political violence.

I find that self-determination groups are more likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence against the state when they are fragmented, when the state is engaged in extensive repression of the population, and when the state has a large military capacity, and that the tactic often becomes institutionalised and utilised over a long period of time. I also find that self-determination groups are more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence against coethnics when the group is highly fragmented, as different factions attempt to establish hegemony over the group, and that this too becomes an institutionalised behaviour. Self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate political violence are substantially affected by the costliness of violence, by the internal politics of the group, the actions of the state, and the extent to which the behaviour becomes institutionalised. However, this explanation does not cover all instances of indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups: I also argue that there is substantial space and practical, methodological, and theoretical justifications for further research to disaggregate indiscriminate political violence by intensity, duration, and lethality. I cannot, and do not seek to, offer a comprehensive explanation here as to why and when self-determination groups engage in indiscriminate

violence against the state and coethnics, but I do offer an initial survey of the phenomenon, and theoretical and empirical support for specific mechanisms which appear to make the use of indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups more likely.

Literature Review

The Politics of Self-determination

Rebel groups are goal-seeking[1] political units which compete with the state, and other non-state actors, for control over a territory and its population. They are not perennially in violent conflict with their competitors, but such conflict is common. In order to engage the state a rebel group must command sufficient support amongst the local population (Tilly, 1978: 135) to mobilise the force required to establish a monopoly on legitimate violence within the territory they seek to control. The fundamental driver behind rebel groups' interactions with local populations stem from the strategic challenges they face: in the case of those which seek to viably compete with the state and other rebel groups for sovereign control of territory, they must control the material means and political support to do so. In doing so, rebel groups pursue different ideal-typical strategies: predation, the coercive extraction of resources from the population, or rebel governance in which resources are provided in exchange for services.

I am primarily concerned with self-determination groups as a class of rebel group. Self-determination groups by definition constitute, effectively, rebel groups as defined above: whilst not all self-determination groups find themselves in *violent* conflict with the state, they compete directly with the state (and other groups) for control over a territory and its population. Their strategic goal – greater self-governance for their politico-ethnic group (Cunningham, 2014: 32) – is ideological and inextricably linked to identity, meaning that as much as they seek to govern the local population, they arise *from* that population and are defined by their claim to represent it. As Weinstein (2007) argues, a rebel group will share power with the local population when they require financial and material support from it and when they have long-term strategic goals, especially when those goals are ideological (p. 160); self-determination groups require the financial and material support of their politico-ethnic group to achieve an ideological long-term strategic goal, defined in terms greater self-governance for that population. Accordingly, they ought to pursue a governance strategy to maintain their legitimacy and that population's loyalty to them and to their cause.

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[1] This paper assumes rational, goal-seeking behaviour, which is not to suggest that rebel groups are perfectly rational actors with perfect information – quite the opposite, in fact, as the puzzle addressed here demonstrates – rather, they are seen as being boundedly-rational actors with imperfect information, actors seeking to achieve goals as best they can.

Legitimacy is – in the positive rather than normative sense – the acceptance of a system of government by the governed. From a Weberian perspective, legitimacy is a social construct built on the intersubjective understanding that a political authority is legitimate (Weber, 1968: 213). Maintaining this understanding requires that the governing actor actively engenders and maintains the belief of the governed that its rule is appropriate (Lipset, 1983: 64). For competing governing actors this involves engagement in the iterative justification of one's own existing or proposed social contract between themselves and the population, alongside the iterative undermining of the others' justificatory discourse. Justification requires establishing that a governing actor and social contract are both rationally and morally acceptable (Simmons, 2001: 123). This is a defensive exercise, pre-empting or countering objections to whatever needs justifying. These objections can either be comparative or noncomparative: the former are presented in the form 'alternative *x* is preferable to your position *y*', the latter as 'your position *y* is unacceptable/wrong' in an absolute sense (Simmons, 2001: 124). Self-determination groups pursuing a governance strategy propound both types of objection against the state and other groups, whilst guarding their own position and pre-empting such objections against it.

What does this position look like? Necessarily it involves an intersubjective understanding with the local population which designates the group as morally and rationally acceptable as a governing actor: a social contract. This social contract between the rebel group and the population is a form of moral contractarianism, which we can see clearly in the logic for such arrangements: they create a structure within which the group can extract resources from a willing local population (a right), in exchange for certain obligations which we see carried out in the form of service provision, for example the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) provision of services such as policing and – interestingly enough, in conjunction with the state – education in Tamil area of Sri Lanka (Mampilly, 2011: 112). In other words, such social contracts ground moral rights and obligations in the self-interests of the relevant parties, who adopt behavioural constraints in order to maximise the benefits of their relationship (Boucher & Kelly, 1994: 3). The success of the group pursuing a governance strategy depends entirely on the maintenance of this Gauthian social contract: a noncomparative objection to the rebel group's rule will fall flat if the group sticks to the

contract, as the moral rules which the group needs to follow are defined in the terms of the contract itself; a comparative objection may still gain traction, but only if the group is fulfilling its side of the bargain poorly relative to another group. Thus it is in the group's interests to adhere to the contract in all its endeavours to the greatest extent possible, including by upholding the social norms of their politico-ethnic group, and avoiding actions which run counter to their collective wellbeing. As a result, the social contract places behavioural restrictions on the self-determination group (Gauthier, 1986: 2-3).

Choosing Violence

Arguably, the greatest obligation a self-determination group will have to the local protection will be the obligation to preserve the peoples' lives. This necessarily creates an incentive to avoid violent conflict, yet violent conflict does occur between self-determination groups and their host states. In the period covered in this thesis there are 640 dyad-years of civil war[2] (14.8% of total), consisting of 87 separate civil wars. This provokes the question: why do some self-determination groups engage in political violence, and why do others not?

Kathleen Cunningham's (2014) study of self-determination groups' interactions with their host states reveals a great deal about such incidences of civil war, or alternatively accommodation arrangements. She finds that the potentials for accommodation or civil war onset are significantly impacted by the fragmentation of self-determination groups and the structure of coalition building within the state (p. 99). Moderately divided states which have enough veto points to make credible commitments (as the accommodation arrangement will prove difficult for future governments to ditch) but not so many as to create deadlock are most likely to make concessions to self-determination groups (pp. 82-83). Self-determination groups which have more factions are more likely to see the state attempt to co-opt and strengthen moderate factions through concessions in order to ultimately establish an accommodation arrangement with those moderates which resolves the conflict (pp. 82-84). At the same time, highly fragmented self-determination groups can create confusion as to what concessions the state should make and can struggle to make credible commitments, heightening the likelihood of civil war (p. 110). Extremely divided states are also less capable

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[2] An intrastate conflict with more than 25 battle deaths in that dyad-year.

of making credible commitments, or even settling on a policy towards the self-determination group, and are much more likely to see civil war onset than other states (p. 109). Accommodation is most likely when the state as a moderate number of veto points, enough to make commitments which are credible, and when the self-determination group is fragmented enough for the state to exploit factionalisation; civil war is most likely then the self-determination group is fragmented and the state cannot exploit that fact, and when the two sides are not capable of making credible commitments. These are typical concerns in bargaining situations (see both Fearon, 1995, and Putnam, 1988) and are likely worsened by issue indivisibility. Symbolically important territory may have a particular meaning for a group which makes compromise over it untenable, as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict (Toft, 2003), but the key problem is that even when accommodation is reached it is in the context of a zero-sum game: the transfer of decision-making competences (as in devolved settlements in the United Kingdom), or even just the state adopting particular policies, necessitates at least the ceding of some power from the centre to the self-determination group periphery. Either the state cedes that power, or it doesn't. Some groups, like the Bodo in India, will agree to concessions like the Bodo Autonomous Council, the decisions of which could be easily overturned by Assam state (Cunningham, 2014: 97); that does not change the zero-sum nature of the bargaining situation, only that the state has not ceded power (it ultimately did, in the Bodo case, in 2003).

Cunningham's model of conflict onset is basically a bargaining failure model. She provides a good argument that the internal politics of the state and self-determination group are important factors in determining whether accommodation will be reach or whether civil war will break out. However, she does not concern herself with the uses of political violence as such: the operationalisation she adopts of 'civil war' is the same as the definition I adopted above, an intrastate conflict with at least 25 battle deaths in that dyad-year. Civil war incidence is a good heuristic for the use of political violence by self-determination groups if those groups' uses of political violence are restricted to civil wars. On the contrary, at least in the case of *indiscriminate* political violence, between 1970 and 2005 only 316 of the 608 dyad-years which saw incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state also saw incidence of civil war, or 51.97%, meaning that 48.03% of dyad-years which saw incidences of indiscriminate political violence against the state did not occur in the context of civil war. That figure drops to 33% of dyad-years with incidence of indiscriminate political violence

against coethnics occurring outside of a civil war context. Empirically, it is fairly clear that civil war is not a good heuristic for incidence of indiscriminate political violence, and so we need to look elsewhere for an explanation of why self-determination groups choose indiscriminate political violence as a tactic.

Political Violence

Violence, generally, can be instrumental or expressive. Seneca is often quoted as arguing that violence is underpinned by reason, that 'no one proceeds to shed human blood for its own sake', however he attaches to this statement a caveat: '…or at any rate only a few do so' (quoted in Grotius, 1925: 547), recognising that violence can at times be used with no instrumental purpose in mind. Rule (1988) suggests that the 'inherent satisfactions' of violence, of inflicting pain on one's enemies, might be enough motive (p. 190). Yet an individual can commit a violent act to some end, with the added motivation of enjoying the violence itself – motives can be mixed. Moreover, there is something about *political* violence which is particularly instrumental.

Kalyvas (2006) offers over twenty political uses for violence, from intimidation of another group to the improvement of in-group morale (p. 23), and convincingly argues that in many acts of violence dismissed as irrational one can see an instrumental logic at work (p. 25). In particular, it appears that the use of violence to inspire fear is often written off as random or senseless when, by its nature, it is the exact opposite: premeditated and purposeful. Moreover, those involved in producing political violence tend to lack the personality features associated with purely expressive violence (2006: 25). Kalyvas argues that expressive accounts of political violence tend to claim to address the motivations of a group when they actually address the acts of individuals (2006: 25), and that there is a difference between the reasons why a group engages in political violence and the specific reasons why individual members implement such policies in particular ways (p. 26). The key to overcoming the conceptual and empirical challenge posed by instrumental and expressive violence then is the mapping, as Kalyvas describes, of instrumental action over expressive action, attributing the causal, instrumental behaviour to group leaders and the expressive action to group members: the 'premium' placed on organisation in political violence reinforces interpretations of its

instrumentality (2004: 26). For the purposes of this paper, which is foremost concerned with group-level decision making, political violence is assumed to be instrumental. This is to say that I set aside Seneca's caveat, and consider instead that political violence is used for some reason: self-determination groups, like other political actors, do not shed human blood for its own sake. We can potentially explain the use of political violence by self-determination groups pursuing governance strategies in terms of bargaining failure, without violating the argument that their behaviour should adhere with the terms of a Gauthian social contract, as violence is not always construed as unjust. However, there is an aspect of their use of political violence which *does* seem to violate this rationale: *indiscriminate* political violence.

Indiscriminate Political Violence

Within the category of political violence, indiscriminate political violence occupies a particular place which scholars have struggled to precisely outline, conceptually or operationally. Kalyvas (2004) for example seems to define indiscriminate political violence against selective violence, the key difference being the method of target selection (p. 101). In cases of selective violence, individuals are targeted on the basis of 'personalised information' about their actions and beliefs; they are identified as people who have acted against and/or continue to act against the goals of the group, or who have committed violent acts against group members, and are harmed – perhaps killed – in order to both stop them from taking further action, and in order to make an example of them and coerce others. In contrast, indiscriminate political violence is perpetrated against individuals not because of personalised information about their actions or beliefs, but because of *generalised information* about a group to which they belong. The key difference is that in cases of selective violence victims are selected based on fine-grained, individual-specific information; in cases of indiscriminate political violence selection occurs on the basis of abstract, group-level information. In the former case one may be targeted despite being a member of the same group as the perpetrators of the violence, in the latter case this would not happen; in the former, individuals who are members of an opposing ethnicity, for example, but who are personally sympathetic to the groups' goals and beliefs will not be targeted, in the latter case that would simply not matter. In an ideal-typical sense, the two are relatively easy to separate out as involving decision-making based on two different levels of information. However, this

distinction does not necessarily capture the more complex nature of the decision-making underpinning the use of political violence, which involves not just intent but also method.

Consider the Brighton Hotel Bombing in 1984. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, and her Cabinet along with several other Conservative Party Members of Parliament were staying in the hotel during the Conservative Party conference in October that year; Patrick Magee, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (pIRA) – an armed component of the Irish Republican self-determination movement and offshoot of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – who had stayed at the hotel under a pseudonym, had planted an explosive in his hotel room fitted with a long-delay timer in mid-September with the intention of killing Prime Minister Thatcher and her cabinet during the conference (Parry, 1986). When it detonated, the bomb killed five and injured 34 people. No members of the Cabinet were killed, and only one Member of Parliament – Sir Anthony Berry, a government whip – died. The other deaths were two wives of senior Conservative Party officials, the wife of the Conservative Chief Whip, and a senior regional party official (Hughes, 2009). In seeking to determine whether or not this was an act of selective or indiscriminate political violence, we can look to the intended targets, the actual victims, and the method used to get an impression of the thinking which lay behind the attack. Firstly, the intended victims were the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Cabinet, in other words members of the British Government, which had been pursuing a campaign of suppression against the pIRA and other Irish Republican groups for decades, and which was – and is – stringently opposed to the Irish Republican goal of Irish Unification. Initially this seems like targeting based on group-level information, but the convention of Cabinet collective responsibility (Gay & Powell, 2004: 10-11) ensures that all members of the Cabinet accept moral responsibility for the actions of the Government: the act of accepting a Cabinet level appointment involved at the time the acceptance and support of the UK Government's campaign against Irish Republicanism. In this sense, each targeted individual could be identified as an enemy by the pIRA at the individual level. However, those actually killed by the bombing were not Cabinet members: most were not Parliamentarians, and some were not politicians at all. This aspect of the attack ties in with the method used: the bomb was planted in the room which Magee happened to be put in by the hotel, roughly a month before it was meant to go off. The pIRA had no idea who would be occupying the room, never mind who would be in adjacent rooms. They could not have known in advance the political views or activities of every potential

victim of the blast. This says something about relying purely on target selection to define indiscriminate vs. selective violence: the choice of method and the calculation made regarding whose deaths were *acceptable* are also key parts of the decision-making process. If the pIRA wanted only to eliminate Margaret Thatcher or members of the Cabinet, they would have chosen a more discriminatory method. I suggest therefore using two criteria to discriminate between indiscriminate and selective political violence, on the basis of that understanding that selective targeting involves both selection of targets based on personalised information *and* limiting the scope of an attack to those targets:

1. Basis of Target Selection: Are individuals selected using personalised information or generalised information?
2. Method of Violence: Are the methods of violence concomitant with restricting casualties to individuals targeted using personalised information?

This creates a two-dimensional typology which we can use to distinguish between selective and indiscriminate political violence:

Table 1: Typology of political violence – indiscriminate v. selective violence

		Method of Violence	
		Limited	Non-limited
Basis of Target Selection	Personalised Information	Selective Violence	Indiscriminate Violence
	Generalised Information	Indiscriminate Violence	Indiscriminate Violence

This typology places greater conceptual restrictions on what we might consider selective violence than perhaps some scholars might be comfortable with. However, whilst it does tighten the definition of selective violence, and therefore widens the definition of indiscriminate political violence which we are operating with, it does so within the already tightened definition of indiscriminate political violence offered in Kalyvas' (2006) discussion on the topic (pp. 146-148) and does so in a way that clarifies that target selection and intent are not the only aspects of decision-making in political violence. To be clear, the second criterion does not seek to infer from outcomes the motives of those perpetrating the act of violence, but does assert that the choice of weapon and the extent to which it can be

15

considered indiscriminate (a hundred kilograms of explosives being far more so than a knife) matters.

Indiscriminate political violence is political violence which is instrumental in nature, aimed at coercing another group or actor into accepting the goals of the perpetrator, in which the perpetrator targets individuals on the basis of generalised, group level information, or makes no attempt to restrict the victims of their violence to those being targeted.

Indiscriminate Political Violence Against the State

There are numerous reasons why self-determination groups should outright avoid the use of indiscriminate political violence, against their host state or against coethnics. The first of these is broadly applicable to any number of groups, and is unpacked and discussed by Kalyvas (2006), who argues that the problem with using indiscriminate violence to achieve compliance with one's goals is that its indiscriminate nature makes compliance no more or less safe than non-compliance: the 'innocent' members of the target group are no safer and the 'guilty' no more threatened (p. 171). This is a fairly straightforward strategic problem with indiscriminate political violence, in that simply is not – by its nature – capable of helping a goal-seeking actor achieve compliance with their goal. Whilst Kalyvas focuses on state/occupier use of indiscriminate political violence, the same logic holds true for all indiscriminate political violence: it does not create incentives for compliance, nor does it deter non-compliance. Self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate political violence create two further strategic problems. Which of the two applies depends on the target: the state or coethnics. In addition to the fact that indiscriminate political violence is incapable of helping self-determination groups achieve their goals, its use against the state risks provoking a catastrophic reaction. Abrahms and Conrad (forthcoming) convincingly argue that the reason that the majority of terrorist attacks recorded in the Global Terrorism Database go unclaimed is that groups want to avoid organisational responsibility for the deaths of, primarily, civilians. We can extend their argument to non-military or 'soft' state targets, such as police, diplomats, and other civil servants. These attacks provoke retaliation by the state. Why should we consider this a serious problem for self-determination groups?

Firstly, retaliatory strikes by the state will be hugely damaging, costing the group lives and materiel. Beyond this, however, the use of indiscriminate violence by the group will create the discursive space the state needs to justify an indiscriminate response which targets the self-determination group's ethno-political community. The state may step up repressive measures like the use of torture, lessen its respect for the physical integrity rights of members of the ethno-political community, and carry out campaigns of outright indiscriminate killing in order to eradicate the self-determination group, as the Sri Lankan government did in the late 2000s to eliminate the LTTE. This response, or at least the potential for it, should be sufficient to deter the use of indiscriminate political violence against the state, especially considering that using indiscriminate political violence *will not work*. Furthermore, being seen to *provoke* a violent response by the state may put the group in the position of having its legitimacy challenged on the grounds that it recklessly endangered the community it is supposed to represent, eroding the base of its political and financial support; this will not necessarily occur, of course, but taking the risk when indiscriminate political violence is ineffective anyway is nonsensical.

That said, we might suggest a set of explanations as to why self-determination groups engage in indiscriminate political violence against the state despite its ineffectiveness and the potential for blowback. The first of these is a policy alternatives approach.

A Policy Alternatives Explanation

Selective violence is costly. Selecting targets on the basis of personalised information requires gathering that information, which takes time and may take significant manpower. Planning an attack to minimise non-target casualties also takes time and requires the use of less destructive methods, which also means that a larger number of attacks may be required to achieve the same level of impact. Risks are greater, as 'legitimate' targets such as soldiers, intelligence officers, and politicians are more likely to be armed or heavily guarded than civilian targets. When selective violence is significantly costly, indiscriminate political violence might serve as an apparently useful substitute (Kalyvas, 2004: 165).

In particular, the more capable the state is of defending itself and its agents, the costlier (and the less likely to succeed) selective violence will be. State military capacity is the most

appropriate concept for capturing this. As Hendrix and Young (2014) argue, general state capacity is a multifaceted concept (p. 333). They find that states with large bureaucratic capacity, with the ability to understand and respond to dissent, are less likely to experience 'terrorism' whereas those with large military capacity are more likely to (2014: 359). Their argument is that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, but only if the state is incapable of finding political solutions to conflict. Accordingly, we should expect self-determination groups facing a state with a great deal of military capacity to be more likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence than otherwise, unless that state also displays a capacity to identify and quell conflicts arising from the politics of self-determination and address self-determination group concerns.

> H_1: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely in dyad-years in which with high state military capacity.

> H_2: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely in dyad-years with less state bureaucratic capacity.

The state's actual use of violence might also matter: when states mobilise their military capacity against a population, groups claiming to represent that population are pushed into a position of having to defend the population, or at least show they are capable of carrying out retribution for violence, or risk the loss of the support of, and potentially the defection of, the local population (Kalyvas, 2006: 166-167). This kind of mobilisation by the state is best captured by the concept of state repression, defined by Davenport (2007) as the state's violation of 'First Amendment-type rights', due process, and 'personal integrity or security' (p. 2). We would expect that where there are high levels of state repression we will see self-determination groups retaliate for those violations, and do so 'in kind'. In cases where the state is actively repressing the group's local population, we ought to expect that the group will be able to use this repression to justify more indiscriminate forms of retaliation in the form of: 'group *x* did this to us (the collective) indiscriminately, and so we are justified in retaliating in kind'. We may also expect that individual agents of the group might seek to utilise more indiscriminate methods of violence as emotionally driven revenge.

> H_3: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely in dyad-years featuring high levels of state repression.

Learning versus Habit

Another approach is to consider that the strategic problems with indiscriminate political violence are not initially evident to the perpetrator, reflecting a social learning process[3] through which experience sharpens tactics. Kalyvas (2004) argues that a lack of strategic experience with indiscriminate political violence may lead to the tactic appearing a better option than it actually is: following the use of indiscriminate political violence the group should learn that it is a counterproductive tactic and will be less likely to use it in future (pp. 162-165), as the relatively lower material costs of indiscriminate political violence will be readily apparent in the planning phase of attacks, whereas its counter-productivity will only become apparent in the wake of attacks.

> H_4: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is less likely in dyad-years following the prior use of indiscriminate political violence against the state.

Yet we see that many self-determination groups which engage in indiscriminate political violence against the state do so again, often for a prolonged period over many years: looking at the IRA (and its splinter groups) and the LTTE provides prominent examples of prolonged and sustained campaigns of indiscriminate political violence against the state. Why might this be the case? Graham Allison (1969) argued that inherent to all bureaucratic organisations are behavioural and interactional guidelines and rules: 'standard operating procedures' (p. 698). Like all other organisations, self-determination group factions are bureaucratic and consist of individuals, each of whom have personal and political ambitions as well as the ambition of greater self-governance for their group. The systems to manage the interactions between these individuals, within-faction groupings, and between factions allow the group to function coherently – they are an accepted way of doing things, tendencies at the least. When a mode of operation becomes accepted by the group, the behaviours involved become institutionalised and difficult to change. This may lead to the use of indiscriminate political violence over a long period of time once it has become accepted. The IRA are a good example of this: their uses of booby-trap bombs in Catholic areas lead to a great many coethnic deaths over several years, yet the method persisted because it had become institutionalised.

> H_5: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely following prior instances of indiscriminate political violence against the state.

An Internal Political Explanation

A number of authors have rightly pointed out that systemic explanations for self-determination group behaviour assume a simplistic, unitary group which is not particularly reflective of the realities of the internal politics of non-state actors. Introducing a special

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[3] Most significantly, the failure of indiscriminate violence to coerce and its erosion of the group's legitimacy constitutes a form of vicarious reinforcement, that is learning through the observation of a behaviour's outcome the value of that behaviour (see Bandura, 1977)

volume on group fragmentation, Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) characterise the groups involved in recent civil conflicts as 'shifting coalitions' with 'malleable allegiances and at times divergent interests' (p. 4). The costs and opportunities used to explain decisions are not '*solely* a product of the interaction between the non-state actor and its external environment' (2012: 7, italics added). The internal politics of the actor matters also, and in particular the literature in this area has focused on the extent to which a group is fragmented. In addition to considering how the interaction between group and environment can lead to the decision to perpetrate acts of indiscriminate political violence, we must also consider how group fragmentation could lead to the same outcome.

Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2012) find that fragmentation within self-determination groups specifically leads to greater violence against the state as a spoiling tactic, as one faction might attempt to spoil an accommodation arrangement which will mainly, or solely, benefit another faction (p. 73). Factions might also engage in more indiscriminate political violence against the state if they believe that doing so will swell their own material and political support amongst the politico-ethnic group at the expense of other factions, an outbidding strategy. While Findley and Young (2012) find little evidence that there is more incidence of terrorism on the whole in contexts of greater competition between non-state combatant groups, Conrad and Greene (2015) find that outbidding and differentiation strategies do lead to non-state combatant groups engaging in deadlier and more severe violence: we might argue that self-determination group factions might be more likely to engage in *indiscriminate* rather than selective violence under conditions of fragmentation as a method of differentiation to outcompete other factions. On the whole, self-determination groups will be more likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence against the state when fragmented as the different factions jostle to establish hegemony over the group.

> H_6: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely in dyad-years with a larger number of self-determination group factions.

To distinguish between spoiler and outbidding mechanisms, we can include a further hypothesis which states:

> H_7: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state is more likely when the state makes concessions to the self-determination group.

Indiscriminate Political Violence Against Coethnics

The second problem with the use of indiscriminate political violence, specific to self-determination groups, concerns its use against coethnic civilians and factions. Indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups against their politico-ethnic group undermines two core aspects of the Gauthian social contract which binds the group to the population. In the first instance, it violates the wellbeing of the local population through killing and maiming, but it more specifically does so in a way which violates the established moral norms of the local population: the requirement that the behaviour of the group must be seen as just. The perpetrators target an individual, or individuals on the basis of generalised information, or if they do so on the basis of personalised information they fail to make reasonable provision to restrict casualties to actual targets. This either directly or indirectly results in the killing of coethnics perceived as innocent by the population. Whilst the self-determination group might get away with political violence against targets selected on the basis of their own actions, say informants working against the group, there is inevitably a moral norm against killing innocent human beings. That norm may look different across societies, and indeed not all societies operate this norm on the basis of Western concepts of innocence, but there is nevertheless a universal category of norms against *indiscriminate* killing without consequences (Browning, 2006: 67-68). As Weinstein (2007) notes, abuse of the population inevitably leads to escalating civilian resistance to the group (p. 11); it will also lead to defection[4] from the group (Kalyvas, 2006: 166-167).

Staniland's (2012) analysis of what he calls 'insurgent fratricide' and the resulting 'fratricidal flipping', or ethnic defection, suggests that despite the threat of defection which arises from the use of violence against co-ethnics many factions will nevertheless pursue such strategies in order to achieve hegemony over the rebel movement as a whole. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE committed insurgent fratricide several times, most strikingly in the mortaring of strongholds belonging to the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) in April 1986, effectively wiping that co-ethnic faction out. This kind of behaviour ought not to happen, given the way

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[4] One might assume that this would be less the case in ethnic civil wars, or civil wars fought over self-determination, as the literature on ethnic civil wars for the most part assumes that ethnic identity predicts for support of ethnic rebel groups (Kalyvas, 2008: 1044). However, as Kalyvas demonstrates this assumption both violates the theoretical insights of constructivism (basically, that socially constructed identities are malleable and thus the assumption that behaviour can be predicted using a generalised understanding of an ethnic identity, rather than the specific and often diverse inter*subjective* understandings, is flawed) and is contradicted by the phenomena of identity shift (literal changes in identity) and ethnic defection (2008: 1045).

it would undermine the group, however the LTTE attempted to define the TELO out of the Tamil community, characterising them and other co-ethnic rivals as 'traitors and opportunists' (Tamilīḻa Viṭutalaippulikaḷ, 1984: 12). This suggests that as a part of the struggle to achieve hegemony over a rebel group or movement, factions engage in a discursive strategy to complement their use of violence, attempting to portray their victims as justly killed and thus avoid the appearance of violating the social contract.

Factions might also engage in internecine violence where they have significant disagreements over policy. A great deal of the coethnic violence in the Palestinian self-determination movement before the First Intifada was committed by the Abu Nidal Organisation, a splinter of the Fatah faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1974, and which targeted PLO diplomats and members in both Europe and the Middle East. The faction originated in the Rejectionist Front, a set of Palestinian factions opposed to the PLO's decision to adopt the Ten Point Plan at the Twelfth Palestinian National Congress, a plan which laid the groundwork to make bargaining concessions to Israel following the Yom Kippur War (Chakhtoura, 2005: 136). Between tussles for hegemony and ideological infighting, it seems that many self-determination group factions will find a way to rationalise pursuing factional goals over the broader goal of the group as a whole – in other words, under conditions of fragmentation many factions will pursue their own vision of self-governance, to the exclusion of self-governance on the terms of another faction, allowing them to overcome (in their own internal logic) the obvious setbacks of using indiscriminate political violence.

> H_8: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics will be more likely in dyad-years with more self-determination group factions.

Similarly, we might argue that such indiscriminate political violence against coethnics will be more likely when one faction has extracted concessions from the state; as a reaction to that faction 'selling out' the movement its members may be targeted as signalling. There may also be an incentive to engage in indiscriminate political violence against coethnics where a faction may be strengthened by such concessions, as a part of the struggle for hegemony over the movement. Examples of such incidence of indiscriminate political violence can be found in post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland and the campaigns carried out by groups like the Real Irish Republican Army and the Continuity Irish Republican Army, against both the state and IRA members and members of Irish Republican political party Sinn Fein.

H_9: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics will be more likely where one faction extracts concessions from the state.

We might also extend to the use of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics the social learning logic elaborated above: it will take time for factions to see that their use of indiscriminate political violence is having negative effects on their position in the self-determination group, and on the self-determination group's success broadly. Note that factions ought to be capable of learning from the actions of other factions within the same milieu; vicarious reinforcement does not require that the observed outcomes of actions be the outcomes of the 'learner's' actions.

H_{10}: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics will be less likely in dyad-years following prior incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics.

In the same way, we can also extend the bureaucratic politics logic and suggest that following the use of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, the behaviour can become an accepted practice within the faction and become institutionalised as a standard operating procedure, resistant to change. During the First Palestinian Intifada, Hamas engaged not only in extensive indiscriminate political violence against the state but also against coethnics, most prominently against Fatah supporters, initially as a signalling mechanism to intimidate or push Fatah supporters to defect, but it later became an entrenched behaviour which led to years of internecine fratricide between the two factions.

H_{11}: Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics will be more likely in dyad-years following prior incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics.

Research Strategy

The SD-IPV Dataset

I will now carry out large-n statistical testing of those hypotheses. I am concerned with self-determination groups as a class of actor, and so large-*n*, cross-case analysis is necessary to generate results applicable across the whole class of actor. As the dependent variables are binary, categorical variables I use logistic regression to model the effects of the explanatory variables. Of course, statistical testing has the drawback of black-boxing causal mechanisms in a way we might want to avoid, as a more complete answer to our question resides in explicating potential causal mechanisms. Above, I have suggested a set of not-mutually-exclusive explanations for the use of indiscriminate political violence despite its ostensible irrationality. Unpacking these explanations and proposing specific hypotheses on the basis of their mechanisms helps to overcome the black-boxing of those mechanisms to an extent, though I recognise than in some cases I have proposed more than one mechanism leading to the same hypothesis.

I have constructed a new dataset for testing these hypotheses. The Self-determination Group Indiscriminate Political Violence (SD-IPV) dataset contains 4328 dyad-year observations organised by self-determination group and host state, between 1970 and 2005. The time range for the dataset was defined by the availability of data from Kathleen Cunningham's (2014) dataset of self-determination movements, which runs from 1960-2005, and the GTD (START, 2016) which runs from 1970-2014. The dyad-years are data drawn from Cunningham's dataset, as are data on the number of factions in a self-determination group, civil war incidence, onset, and termination, as well as the number of self-determination groups in a state. To these data I have added new variables and some drawn from other datasets.

Coding Indiscriminate Political Violence

I have coded two dependent variables for the SD-IPV dataset: incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state (*IPVState*), and against coethnics (*IPVCoethnic*). Both are binary variables, measuring whether or not indiscriminate political violence occurred against the respective target groups in that dyad year. They were coded using the GTD, by identifying events which constituted an act of indiscriminate political violence by a self-

determination group faction, and then by identifying whether or not the act was against a coethnic or the state (or a state affiliated target).

An event was coded as political violence by a self-determination group if it appears in the GTD as an act of terrorism, and if it fulfils the three GTD criteria:

1. It had a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
2. It was intended to coerce, intimidate, or publicise to a larger audience.
3. It occurred outside of the context of legitimate warfare.

Events further had to be claimed by the self-determination group. As I mentioned above, most events in the GTD are unclaimed in order for the perpetrators to avoid organisational responsibility, however groups are unlikely to manage to coerce compliance with their goals if nobody knows that they carried out the attack, and as such I consider such events as irrelevant for the purposes of this paper.

Instances of political violence by self-determination groups are considered indiscriminate political violence if the target was clearly selected on the basis of generalised information, for example the IRA's targeting of Ulster Protestants in Northern Ireland, or the Hizbul Mujahideen's targeting of Hindu temples in Kashmir. Events were further coded as indiscriminate political violence if the weapon used was indiscriminate in nature, for example the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland, which utilised a car bomb and killed 29 people. Events in which the target was selected carefully, on the basis of personalised information, but in which the method was indiscriminate and resulted in indiscriminate killing, are also coded as indiscriminate political violence: a good example is the LTTE's failed attempt to assassinate Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga at a pre-election rally in 1999, in which a Tamil suicide bomber killed 14 people and injured 110, but failed to kill the President (she lost vision in her right eye to permanent optic damage, but went on to win re-election three days later). Once an event was coded as indiscriminate political violence, the target group was then used to code whether it was indiscriminate political violence against the state or coethnics: the event was indiscriminate political violence against the state if the targets were state agents, members of an ethnic group loyal to the state, tourists, foreign firms, foreign dignitaries, or members of any other group associated with the state. The event

was indiscriminate political violence against coethnics if the targets were coethnic civilians or members of a coethnic faction. These data were then used to code *IPVState* and *IPVCoethnic*: if an instance of indiscriminate political violence against the relevant group had occurred in that dyad-year, it was coded as such, otherwise incidence of indiscriminate political violence against that group was coded as absent.

Operationalising and Coding Independent Variables

State capacity is a complex and multifaceted concept which has in the past been measured in a variety of different manners. I expect state military capacity and state bureaucratic capacity to have different effects on the likelihood of the use of indiscriminate political violence against the state, and so I disaggregate them. Military capacity can be measured in several ways. The Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset (v 4.0) (1972) contains the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) which is produced based on measuring potential power under conditions of total war (Hendrix & Young, 2014: 462), conditions which do not hold in the overwhelming majority of dyad-years. Moreover, CINC includes resources potentially controlled by the self-determination group and not the state. Hendrix (2010) recommends using the log of military expenditure per capita, as it better reflects the sophistication of the state's military and surveillance capabilities (p. 283). Military expenditure alone, whilst it does not capture the quality of the state's military capabilities, certainly captures the resources the state has available to it in that dyad-year. We might further use military personnel per capita to measure mobilisation. These measures are all expressions of the same underlying concept of military capacity, a latent variable which we can approximate the value of by using factor analysis which incorporates different measures of the concept: Hendrix & Young (2014) use a factor-derived latent variable based on military expenditure, military personnel, and military expenditure per head of personnel. I use their factor variable for the analysis in this paper, terming it *factor military capacity*.

There are similarly several ways to measure state bureaucratic capacity. Hendrix (2010) explores the different measures which have been, and can be, used to measure bureaucratic capacity, producing a factor analysis for the underlying latent variables presumed to underpin measures like tax extractive capacity (pp. 280-283). He finds three underlying factors which underpin state capacity (pp. 281-282), on the basis of sets of highly collinear variables (p. 238). His recommendation is to take a multivariate approach to measuring state capacity, but

in particular recommends the ratio of tax to gross domestic product – the tax/GDP ratio and a measure of the state's extractive capacity – alongside a qualitatively determined measure termed bureaucratic quality, which measures the quality of state institutions on the basis of expert opinion. Hendrix and Young (2014) use these two recommended measures to produce a measure of the underlying state bureaucratic capacity, another latent variable, using factor analysis. This is the variable I use in this analysis, terming it *factor bureaucratic capacity*. Both variables are included in the model, but as one is dependent on the other (military capacity is largely dependent on state bureaucratic capacity, especially insofar as military capacity will increase as the state's extractive capacity – the tax/GDP ratio – and bureaucratic quality – ability to channel resources effectively being affected by this – increase) I also include the interaction term *state capacity* (*factor military capacity* x *factor bureaucratic capacity*) to measure their combined effect on the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state.

Repression is operationalised using the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 2014). I have taken the Physical Integrity Rights Index, which is a composite indicator constructed using their measures of extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment, and inverted it such that the higher the score, the greater the extent of repression. I have chosen to limit the operationalisation of *repression* to physical integrity rights as it is these most fundamental rights which self-determination groups are most likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence to protect – there is no reason to think that they would react to violation of freedom of speech, for example through censorship, with car bombs in crowded marketplaces, whereas there is a specific mechanism constructed to link torture or indiscriminate killing to the use of indiscriminate political violence.

Prior IPV could be operationalised in a number of ways. I operationalise it as incidence of indiscriminate political violence within the past three years. This avoids two problems: firstly, by blanket coding every dyad-year after one incidence of indiscriminate political violence as positive for *prior IPV*, one would be suggesting that a single instance of indiscriminate political violence in 1970 might make another instance 35 years later more or less likely, which is self-evidently absurd; secondly, coding for indiscriminate political

violence the previous year, or within the past two years, might miss the link between past and current use of indiscriminate political violence due to a temporary cessation of violence, after which the self-determination group returns to indiscriminate political violence as an institutionalised behaviour. One could argue for use four or five years as the cut-off, potentially, and I recognise that in that sense picking three years is somewhat arbitrary, but I see it as a reasonable cut-off after which we can consider that indiscriminate violence is not an institutionalised behaviour of the group.

SD-group factions, a measure of fragmentation, is coded using Kathleen Cunningham's (2014) data, in which she provides data on the number of factions in a self-determination group for each dyad-year. I also code *(log) SD-group factions* to reflect the difference between the increase from one faction to two faction (doubling) and the increase from 30 to 31 (an increase of 3.33%). The reasoning behind this is that the more fragmented the self-determination group is, the less impact an additional faction is likely to have on the extent of internecine violence. *Concessions* is coded two different ways, one of which codes for concessions in that dyad-year, and another – *concessions (previous year)* – which codes for concessions from the state in the previous dyad-year. This double coding captures that the effect of concessions – hypothesised to be greater likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state as a result of spoiling strategies, and greater likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics to prevent the faction receiving concessions from establishing more power over the self-determination group – may occur both in the dyad-year in which concessions are granted and in the following year[5]. The *concessions* variable is drawn from Cunningham's (2014) data, and was used to code *concessions (previous year)* as a lag variable.

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[5] Not to mention that concessions negotiated and granted over the winter months are likely to provoke responses well into the following year.

Findings and Discussion

The binomial distributions for the two dependent variables, *IPVState* and *IPVCoethnic*, can be seen in table 2. 14% of the 4328 dyad-years had incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state, and 4.7% had incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics. These are the base probabilities of indiscriminate political violence occurring in a randomly selected dyad-year. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables.

Table 2: Binomial distributions of indiscriminate political violence against the state and coethnics

Incidence of indiscriminate political violence	Frequency
Incidence against the state	608 (14%)
No incidence against the state	3720 (86%)
Incidence against coethnics	203 (4.7%)
No incidence against coethnics	4125 (95.3%)

Note: Number of observations in each category, with proportion of the sample in parentheses.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for independent variables

Variable	Measure of Dispersion						Frequency
	Mean	Median	Mode	S. Dev.	Max.	Min.	
Factor Military Capacity	-0.759	-0.167	1.388	0.841	1.388	-1.876	
Factor Bureaucratic Capacity	0.504	0.556	0.573	0.91	2.934	-5.244	
SD-group Factions	2.47	1	1	3.247	39	0	
(log) SD-group Factions	0.716	0.693	0	0.777	0	3.66	
Concessions							178
Concessions (previous year)							168
Prior IPVState							851
Prior IPVCoethnic							291
Repression (1)							259
Repression (2)							291
Repression (3)							230
Repression (4)							306
Repression (5)							388
Repression (6)							332
Repression (7)							386
Repression (8)							352
Repression (9)							365

Modelling Indiscriminate Political Violence Against the State

Table 4 provides the logistic coefficients and odds ratios of a logistic regression model predicting indiscriminate political violence against the state ($M_{IPVSTATE}$). We can see that *state capacity* has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state. The relationship is not, however, as I hypothesised: the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state increases with both *factor military capacity* and *factor bureaucratic capacity*, meaning that there is no moderating effect of bureaucratic capacity in states with high military capacity. The relationship is simpler: as state capacity increases, self-determination groups become more likely to utilise indiscriminate political violence against the state. This supports the theory that the costliness of selective violence leads to self-determination groups resorting to indiscriminate political violence as a cheaper alternative. Considering why bureaucratic capacity has no moderating effect, we should pay attention to the nature of self-determination group demands. Many groups demand nothing less than total independence from the state, as was true in the cases of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the IRA in the United Kingdom, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain and France, and many other cases of prolonged campaigns of indiscriminate political violence against the state; in such cases the state cannot concede to the self-determination group without completely ceding sovereignty. The lack of a moderating effect of bureaucratic capacity on the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state in high military capacity states is likely because of issue indivisibility. There is also a statistically significant relationship between self-determination group fragmentation and the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state. Specifically, as *SD-group factions* is not significant but *(log) SD-group factions* is, the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state does not increase with each added faction but with the proportional fragmentation of the group. There is also a statistically significant relationship between state concessions to the self-determination group and the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state, in a contrary direction to that hypothesised: following concessions, the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state *decreases*. This suggests that the mechanism leading from greater fragmentation to a higher likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state is outbidding, rather than spoiling. As the self-determination group fragments, the factions compete with each other for resources and political support from the group's ethno-political group by carrying out competing campaigns of indiscriminate political violence against the state.

Table 4: Modelling indiscriminate political violence against the state (1)

	β (S. E.)	95% Confidence Intervals for β(Exp.)		
		Lower Bound	β(Exp.)	Upper Bound
Constant	-4.954 (0.402)***		0.007	
Factor Military Capacity	0.123 (0.167)	0.816	1.131	1.567
Factor Bureaucratic Capacity	-0.005 (0.122)	0.784	0.995	1.264
State Capacity	0.39 (0.128)***	1.149	1.477	1.899
SD-group Factions	0.04 (0.045)	0.953	1.041	1.138
(log) SD-group Factions	0.514 (0.221)**	1.084	1.672	2.577
Prior IPVState	3.332 (0.163)***	20.358	28.003	38.519
Concessions	-0.176 (0.326)	0.443	0.839	1.588
Concessions (previous year)	-0.627 (0.35)*	0.269	0.534	1.06
Repression (1)	***			
Repression (2)	-0.287 (0.417)	0.331	0.75	1.7
Repression (3)	0.132 (0.437)	0.485	1.141	2.685
Repression (4)	0.863 (0.419)**	1.043	2.37	5.382
Repression (5)	1.102 (0.432)**	1.29	3.01	7.023
Repression (6)	1.385 (0.44)***	1.688	3.996	9.461
Repression (7)	1.491 (0.424)***	1.934	4.44	10.196
Repression (8)	1.303 (0.438)***	1.56	3.681	6.688
Repression (9)	1.203 (0.419)***	1.466	3.331	7.567

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *Repression* base value is 1.
$N^2{}_R$=0.566
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Repression is also statistically significantly related to the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state. In $M_{IPVSTATE}$, absolute state respect for physical integrity rights is the base value against which other levels of state respect for physical integrity rights are assessed. The results suggest that those states with relatively higher levels of respect for physical integrity rights see less incidence of indiscriminate political violence than those with little respect for such rights. In other words, states which engage in greater levels extrajudicial killing, torture, abduction and political imprisonment are more likely to experience indiscriminate political violence than those which do not. This supports the argument that self-determination groups will respond in kind to illegitimate state violence in order to protect their kin and prevent defection – effectively to prove that they can stand up to the state and provide security. Interestingly, the effect size of *repression* is lower for the most extreme cases of state disrespect for physical integrity rights than it is for states which show little respect for such rights but do not qualify as extreme cases. One might argue that this is

because in extreme cases of extrajudicial killing, torture, abduction and political imprisonment the self-determination group is unable to respond in kind, or is unwilling to – its members may be cowed, or its leaders killed or imprisoned – but this is worth further investigation. By far the variable with the greatest effect size is *prior IPVState*, which is statistically significantly related to the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against the state. In dyad-years with incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state in the past three years, self-determination groups are enormously more likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence against the state again. Table 5 is a contingency table mapping the correlation between prior and current incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state. The majority of dyad-years with prior incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state see indiscriminate political violence against the state in that year also, and the majority of dyad-years with incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state have seen the use of indiscriminate political violence against the state within the previous three years. This finding supports the argument that the use of indiscriminate political violence becomes an institutionalised part of a self-determination group's repertoire of tactics once the group has made a decision to utilise it.

Table 5: Prior and current incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state.

Prior incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state	Incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state	
	Incidence against the state	No incidence against the state
Prior incidence against the state	498	337
No prior incidence against the state	110	3383

Table 6 shows $M_{IPVSTATE}$ with the insignificant variables – *SD-group factions* and *concessions* – removed. Removing these produces a model with better fit, but unfortunately, $M_{IPVSTATE}$ produces a set of large standardised residuals. The standardised residuals for 2.15% of cases are greater than 3.29. These cases are outliers, but they are important and share a key feature: they all contain incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state without prior incidence in the past three years. They are typically one offs, or at most

the first year of incidence in a relatively short succession of years with indiscriminate political violence against the state, for which the model predicts that there should not be such. $M_{IPVSTATE}$ is prone to making type II errors – false negatives – when cases are not a part of a longer or more sustained campaign of indiscriminate political violence against the state. In other words, the model can explain the indiscriminate political violence against the state of the IRA, LTTE, Hamas, and other such militant groups, but is not as accurate when it comes to explaining the indiscriminate political violence of the Tuareg people in Niger, which was not as intense, lethal, or sustained. This suggests that going forward we may need to disaggregate high intensity indiscriminate political violence from low intensity indiscriminate political violence, and high lethality indiscriminate political violence from low lethality indiscriminate political violence.

Table 6: Modelling indiscriminate political violence against the state (2)

	β (S. E.)	95% Confidence Intervals for β(Exp.)		
		Lower Bound	β(Exp.)	Upper Bound
Constant	-5.029 (0.395)***		0.007	
Factor Military Capacity	0.124 (0.167)	0.816	1.131	1.569
Factor Bureaucratic Capacity	0.002 (0.122)	0.789	1.002	1.272
State Capacity	0.399 (0.128)***	1.159	1.49	1.915
(log) SD-group Factions	0.687 (0.104)***	1.621	1.989	2.439
Prior IPVState	3.327 (0.162)***	20.267	27.863	38.305
Concessions (previous year)	-0.642 (0.348)*	0.266	0.526	1.041
Repression (1)	***			
Repression (2)	-0.292 (0.417)	0.33	0.747	1.69
Repression (3)	0.135 (0.436)	0.487	1.145	2.69
Repression (4)	0.898 (0.416)**	1.087	2.454	5.544
Repression (5)	1.124 (0.43)***	1.326	3.078	7.146
Repression (6)	1.423 (0.437)***	1.761	4.15	9.779
Repression (7)	1.519 (0.422)***	1.998	4.566	10.436
Repression (8)	1.322 (0.437)***	1.595	3.752	8.829
Repression (9)	1.252 (0.414)***	1.552	3.497	7.878

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *Repression* base value is 1.
N^2_R=0.564
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Modelling Indiscriminate Political Violence Against Coethnics

Table 7 provides the logistic coefficients and odds ratios of a logistic regression model predicting indiscriminate political violence against coethnics ($M_{IPVCOETHNIC}$). There is a statistically significant relationship between *SD-group factions* and the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, and a statistically significant relationship between *(log) SD-group factions* and the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics. The former relationship is negative, which is surprising, but the effect size is small, especially in comparison to the latter relationship which has a large effect size. Taken together they suggest that when there are very few factions, further fragmentation increases the likelihood of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, and when there are already many factions then proportionally small increases in fragmentation will not have a great deal of impact. Taken together with the insignificant results for *concessions* and *concessions (previous year)*, there is support for the argument that self-determination group factions compete with each other for hegemony over their movement, and that they use indiscriminate political violence as a tactic in that struggle, but that they will rarely use indiscriminate political violence against coethnics in response to one faction obtaining concessions from the state. Again, prior use of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics within the last three years is statistically significantly related to *IPVCoethnic*: when indiscriminate political violence has been used against coethnics in the previous three years, self-determination group factions are significantly more likely to use it again. This provides support for the argument that the use of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics becomes an institutionalised behaviour for self-determination group factions, and that they continue to use it as much out of habit as rational calculation.

Table 7: Modelling indiscriminate political violence against coethnics (1)

	β (S. E.)	95% Confidence Intervals for β(Exp.)		
		Lower Bound	β(Exp.)	Upper Bound
Constant	-5.497 (0.242)***		0.004	
SD-group Factions	-0.09 (0.025)***	0.87	0.913	0.959
(log) SD-group Factions	1.524 (0.2)***	3.101	4.591	6.798
Concessions	0.437 (0.361)	0.791	1.604	3.254
Concessions (previous year)	-0.218 (0.402)	0.365	0.804	1.769
Prior IPVCoethnic	3.426 (0.196)***	20.933	30.755	45.185

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *Repression* base value is 1.

N^2_R=0.487
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 8 provides statistics for $M_{IPVCOETHNIC}$ with the insignificant variables – *concessions* and *concessions (previous year)* – removed. Model fit is almost identical to the $M_{IPVCOETHNIC}$ with the insignificant variables included. As with $M_{IPVSTATE}$, there are some outliers: 1.3% of cases have a standardised residual over 3.29. These cases all have incidence of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics without such incidence in the past three years, and they are not part of long periods of indiscriminate political violence use against coethnics. $M_{IPVCOETHNIC}$ is good as explaining institutionalised use of indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, for example that of the IRA against Catholic policemen, or that of the Abu Nidal Organisation against the PLO, but not that of Basque separatists in France which was not as sustained. This provides further reason to think that we should disaggregate indiscriminate political violence further.

Table 8: Modelling indiscriminate political violence against coethnics (2)

		95% Confidence Intervals for β(Exp.)		
	β (S. E.)	Lower Bound	β(Exp.)	Upper Bound
Constant	-5.475 (0.239)***		0.004	
SD-group Factions	-0.091 (0.025)***	0.869	0.913	0.959
(log) SD-group Factions	1.529 (0.199)***	3.12	4.613	6.82
Prior IPVCoethnic	3.41 (0.196)***	20.637	30.279	44.426

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *Repression* base value is 1.
N^2_R=0.486
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Self-determination Groups and the Uses of Indiscriminate Political Violence

The logistic regressions presented above grant us significant insight into the indiscriminate political violence of self-determination groups. Firstly, they are more likely to engage in indiscriminate political violence against states with greater military capacity and states which engage in systemic violation of physical integrity rights. They are pushed towards the use of indiscriminate political violence by the relative costliness of selective violence, and by the impetus to protect their politico-ethnic group from the violence of the state. They are also more likely to do so when they are fragmented, as factions attempt to outbid each other for political and material support by demonstrating strength against the state. Most significantly,

the use of indiscriminate political violence becomes institutionalised: having already engaged in indiscriminate political violence, the tactic becomes a standard operating procedure which is difficult to change. Conversely, there is no support for the argument that states with a large bureaucratic capacity are necessarily better at securing accommodation arrangements and avoiding incidence of indiscriminate political violence, nor for the argument that self-determination groups learn from experience that indiscriminate political violence is counterproductive and therefore will stop engaging in it. There is support for the argument that fragmented self-determination groups will see factions engaging in indiscriminate political violence against coethnics more often than unified groups, as they struggle for hegemony over the group, and that this behaviour also becomes institutionalised. The institutionalisation of indiscriminate political violence as a tactic is the most significant factor in self-determination groups' further uses of indiscriminate political violence, closely followed by fragmentation and internal competition. Both mechanisms are internal to the self-determination group, and so this analysis also supports the assertions of scholars who argue that the internal politics of non-state actors are key to understanding their behaviours.

The mechanisms supported in this analysis do not, however, explain all self-determination group use of indiscriminate political violence. Where indiscriminate political violence occurs but not at a highly intense or lethal level, these models perform poorly at predicting it. This suggests that there is a need to disaggregate indiscriminate political violence further, and distinguish between intense, longer term campaigns of indiscriminate political violence and single instances, on the one hand, and between highly lethal indiscriminate political violence and less lethal indiscriminate political violence on the other. There are also methodological and theoretical arguments for this. Methodologically, incidence of indiscriminate political violence as a binary measure of its occurrence treats a dyad-year in which dozens of discrete events of indiscriminate political violence occur as being the same as one in which there is only one occurrence: there is a significant difference between the indiscriminate political violence of the IRA at the height of The Troubles, during which the IRA detonated hundreds of explosives and killed and injured thousands, and that of the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front – a Somalian faction in Ethiopia – when they targeted members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front in 1991, the only such instance of indiscriminate political violence perpetrated by a Somalian self-determination group faction. Theoretically, questions over the intensity, duration and lethality of campaigns of indiscriminate political

violence are interesting in and of themselves. I have not addressed here why groups stop using indiscriminate political violence, nor why some groups seek to maximise casualties and others do not, nor why indiscriminate political violence is a more or less dominant tactic in some groups than others. The analysis in this paper grants an initial insight into self-determination groups' uses of indiscriminate political violence, but far from answers every question there is to ask about the phenomenon.

Conclusion and Future Directions

In this paper I have offered an initial theoretical and empirical survey of the phenomenon of indiscriminate political violence perpetrated by self-determination groups. Arguing that such behaviour is paradoxical, ineffective, and counterproductive, I have identified that the costliness of selective violence, factional outbidding strategies, extensive state repression, and the institutionalisation of the behaviour over the longer term, are all significant factors which influence the incidence of indiscriminate political violence against the state. For indiscriminate political violence against coethnics, I have argued that factional conflict for hegemony over the group often leads to indiscriminate political violence against coethnics (including civilians) linked to other factions, and that this too becomes an institutionalised behaviour.

There is still a great deal to explain. There are several outliers which the logistic regression models I have developed do not accurately predict, and they tend to be qualitatively different from the high intensity, high lethality violence of the groups used to develop hypotheses in this paper. This provides ample justification for further disaggregating indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups and analysing the intensity, duration, and lethality of such violence. Such fine-grained measures will allow for a more detailed picture of indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups to emerge, and they can be constructed using the data available in the Global Terrorism Database: over 12000 events in the Database are incidences of violence by self-determination groups which fulfil all three criteria for illegitimate political violence – or terrorism. Coding events as indiscriminate political violence against the state and coethnics would allow for the creation of both an events level dataset, and a more detailed dyad-year level dataset. There are further questions which could be explored using such datasets, including why some groups favour different methods, or target certain types of groups, as well as whether the use of indiscriminate political violence varies due to contextual factors. Further qualitative research is also required to better explicate how the causal mechanisms specified in this paper operate: how does indiscriminate political violence become institutionalised, for instance? The use of indiscriminate political violence by self-determination groups remains a fascinating and challenging phenomenon which is fertile ground for future research.

Appendix

Cases with Standardised Residuals Above 3.29 – M$_{IPVSTATE}$

Dyad-year	Host State	Self-determination Group	Residual
1992	India	Tripuras	3.43310
1995	Iraq	Kurds	3.44885
2004	Pakistan	Baluchis	3.47238
1995	Russia	Chechens	3.47853
1999	Nigeria	Ijaw	3.52647
1992	India	Nagas	3.65513
2000	Indonesia	Acehnese	3.73618
2002	United Kingdom	Scots	3.76969
1996	Iran	Kurds	3.81444
1989	India	Bodos	3.86819
1988	India	Assamese	3.87163
2000	Nigeria	Yoruba	3.89977
1988	France	Bretons	3.90709
1984	India	Nagas	4.12915
1984	India	Tripuras	4.12915
2005	China	Uighurs	4.16285
1988	India	Nagas	4.18027
1997	Ecuador	Lowland Indigenous Peoples	4.34577
1988	Myanmar	Karens	4.36459
1988	Myanmar	Mons	4.36459
1988	Thailand	Malay-Muslims	4.38160
1998	France	Bretons	4.39173
1995	Indonesia	Acehnese	4.46849
1996	Brazil	Indigenous Peoples	4.60330
2001	Yugoslavia	Albanians	4.68653
1992	Indonesia	East Timorese	4.74177
1991	Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	4.78390
1988	Myanmar	Shan	4.81824
2003	Myanmar	Shan	4.91889
1999	Angola	Cabindans	5.00337
1992	Brazil	Indigenous Peoples	5.11676
1988	Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pathans)	5.34138
1989	Ethiopia	Oromos	5.50603
1992	Myanmar	Kachins	5.53879
2002	India	Mizos	5.55207
1990	Angola	Cabindans	5.57580
1994	India	Mizos	5.67654

Dyad-year	Host State	Self-determination Group	Residual
1991	Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pathans)	5.84372
1990	Yugoslavia	Kosovar Albanians	6.33719
1990	Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans	6.37009
1988	Italy	South Tyrolians	6.47435
1986	Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Peoples	6.49489
1988	Senegal	Casamacias	6.68469
1992	Nicaragua	Indigenous Peoples and Creoles	7.25561
1984	Turkey	Kurds2	7.40811
1984	Indonesia	Papuans	8.73744
2002	Italy	Sardinians	8.75109
1991	Niger	Tuaregs1	14.32433

Cases with Standardised Residuals Above 3.29 – M$_{\text{IPVCOETHNIC}}$

Dyad-year	Host State	Self-determination Group	Residual
1979	Spain	Catalans	3.49006
2004	Israel	Palestinians	3.84879
1988	Israel	Palestinians	3.85934
1995	India	Sikhs	3.99257
2002	India	Tripuras	4.07717
1998	United States	Puerto Ricans	4.07717
1989	India	Kashmiri Muslims	4.07717
1982	United States	Puerto Ricans	4.19006
1983	India	Sikhs	4.19006
1984	Sri Lanka	Tamils	4.19006
1999	France	Corsicans	4.19006
1994	South Africa	Afrikaners	4.19006
1978	Israel	Palestinians	4.33928
1987	Spain	Catalans	4.33928
2002	United Kingdom	Catholics	4.33928
1998	United Kingdom	Catholics	4.33928
1990	United States	Puerto Ricans	4.53670
1997	Yugoslavia	Kosovar Albanians	4.53670
1997	India	Bodos	4.53670
1994	Iraq	Kurds1	4.80054
2005	Pakistan	Baluchis	4.80054
1998	Russia	Chechens	4.80054

Dyad-year	Host State	Self-determination Group	Residual
1999	Nigeria	Ijaw	4.80054
2005	India	Kashmiri Muslims	4.90527
1999	India	Assamese	5.66803
2001	Senegal	Casamacias	5.66803
1995	Indonesia	East Timorese	5.66803
1992	India	Nagas	5.66803
1970	Canada	Quebecois	6.42290
1975	United Kingdom	Scots	6.42290
1990	Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	6.42290
1997	Turkey	Kurds	6.42290
1989	Thailand	Malay-Muslims	6.42290
1992	Myanmar	Karens	6.42290
1990	India	Assamese	6.42290
2001	Indonesia	Acehnese	6.42290
1991	France	Corsicans	6.42290
1973	Spain	Basques	6.66986
1970	United Kingdom	Catholics	6.66986
1997	Senegal	Casamacias	7.64637
1985	India	Tripuras	7.64637
1987	Philippines	Moros	7.64637
1988	Myanmar	Shan	7.64637
1979	Philippines	Moros	9.96051
1996	Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pathans)	9.96051
1985	France	Bretons	9.96051
1984	South Africa	Khoisan	9.96051
1984	South Africa	Zulus	9.96051
1991	South Africa	Khoisan	9.96051
1988	Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Peoples	9.96051
1989	Ethiopia	Eritreans	9.96051
1977	Yugoslavia	Croats	15.44656
1973	United States	Indigenous Peoples	15.44656
1975	United States	Indigenous Peoples	15.44656
2005	France	Basques	16.16633
1989	Turkey	Kurds	16.16633
1984	France	Basques	16.16633

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