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Drivers of Support for European Integration during Economic Crisis: The Greek Case

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Abstract

As public support for European integration becomes increasingly vital to the longevity and legitimacy of the EU, the driving forces behind such support remain ambiguous. Using the critical case of Greece, I quantitatively demonstrate the elements influencing Greek attitudes towards integration during a tumultuous time of economic crisis and public alertness. A comprehensive literature examination and reduction of variables through principal component analysis revealed six possible predictors to test as drivers of public attitudes: sociotropic and egocentric economics, blame, trust, identity, and politics. The resulting, variable-specific regression models reveal associations in nearly every category. However, the final comprehensive model quantitatively shows that overall, attributions of blame and individuals' trust at the EU level are the only significant predictors of their likelihood to support European integration. Such results are fresh contributions to the EI field, validating the previous literature's shift from assessing output-based attitudes to ideational. Furthermore, the practical implications of these results suggest that while the economic crisis may not directly create an equally-strong crisis of diffuse support, policy and democratic reform must be addressed to stop the slow decline of broad support for European integration.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The longevity and legitimacy of the EU project is increasingly held in the hands of the public. Not only are citizens' "constraining dissensus" stalling the progression of European integration (EI), but the increasing involvement of direct democracy has given direct power to the people. Over the past 45 years, at least 45 referendums associated with European Integration have taken place (Hobolt 2009:7). The recent "Brexit", a shock to EU elites and the UK public themselves that solidified the first state withdrawal from the EU, is an appropriate example of the disintegration threat facing both the UK and EU. This paper analyses the root drivers of public attitudes towards European integration, which are both timely and critical to the progression of European integration. Based on post-functionalist assumptions and David Easton's theory on types of support, this paper uses statistical analysis to magnify both material and ideational variables found in previous literature that may influence the Greek public's attitudes towards EI during economic crisis.

By incorporating fundamental drivers found in past research and carefully selecting the type of EI support to measure, statistical analysis finds which drivers negatively and positively affect an individual person's attitude toward the broader goal, or continual process, of EI. Because robust data is collected during pronounced economic crises, analysis is also used to compare the strength of drivers, in particular testing to what extent economic conditions influence individuals' attitudes when compared to more abstract influences such as identity and institutional trust or blame. Finally this paper uses information to engage the growing "Euroscepticisms", multiple opposing arguments towards the EU that are often amplified by marginal but embedded political parties, to halt the gradual erosion of diffuse support for EI (Usherwood 2013).

The paper begins by investigating the Greek context and public perception of the EU during the onset of the Eurocrisis. Using self-

analysed Eurobarometer data[1] and historical context, the first section empirically reinforces the current, prevalent negative attitudes in Greece towards the EU and state membership. The next section engages a theoretical overview of a multitude literature and quantitative analysis regarding public support of EI, which provides potential answers to the drivers behind the "constraining public". A methodological section details the type of analysis used, along with operationalising variables for practical testing of hypotheses. The seven resulting regression models reveal the main drivers of EI attitudes, and a return to theoretical discussion over the observed substantive significance between variables suggests the implications of this paper to the wider field of European integration.

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[1] Eurobarometers were selected based on question availability and timing; data ranges from just before the onset of the global crisis to the most recent data, 2007-2015

Chapter 2: Shifting Greek Attitudes

2.1 Introduction

Greece has a strong history of supporting European integration, first applying for accession into the European Economic Community in 1959. Yet its tumultuous political past has consistently contributed to preventing EU membership (Hellenic Republic: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [HRMFA] 2016). After a seven-year dictatorship, Greece again applied for accession in 1975 (HRMFA 2016). Greek politicians saw the EU as offering, foremost, a source of renewed political stability, economic development, and simultaneous independence with regional support and beneficial world-power positioning (HRMFA 2016). Even with these strategic benefits, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) adds, "Greece wanted, as a European country, to be present in, and have an impact on the process of European integration as well as the configuration of the European model." Thus, normative motives and a self-alignment with European culture played a part alongside clear political objectives. And despite several setbacks, full membership was granted in 1981. For almost 30 years, the state and its residents have supported integration, which is exemplified through Greece's support of a common currency, joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001, and allowance for free cross-national movement of people within the Schengen region since 2000 (EU 2016).

The formal integration of Greece into the EU has historically been driven by and often researched through the actions of political elites (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993:507-509; McLaren 2006:8). However, the 21st century came with an increasingly-aware public, a more elusive force behind the European project, and the populace's demand commands a prominent research focus in the direction of EI. This is because, in part, the EU's legitimacy is heavily based on collective consent (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008:4). EI issues have become more transparent to the public eye, and the project

evolution that initially was allowed through the peoples' "permissive consensus" is now limited by their increasing awareness and "constraining dissensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2008). This is reflected in academic research by an increasing number of articles focusing on Euroscepticism rather than support (Boomgaarden et al. 2011:242). As Loveless and Rohrschneider (2008:4) put, "…the EU itself has come to recognise its reliance on [the public] for continued legitimacy. For the EU exists on little more than the collective agreement among Europeans, making this 'agreement' important to understand." Therefore, explaining Greek public attitudes towards the EU is essential to understand what drives individuals' support, or lack thereof, of EI, and in turn, determine what direction the European project will take.

2.2 Perceptions of the EU

Eurobarometer surveys, conducted biannually through the European Commission (EC), provide a plethora of data for researchers to catch the pulse of the European public. For instance, Figure 1 depicts the aforementioned strong Greek support for the EU in the early 21st century. Positive perceptions of the EU were 14% above the EU average in 2003 and continued to stay high through 2009, though a significant (16%) drop in 2008 turned much of the public's EU perception neutral.

Figure 1: Public perception of the EU

Positive Perceptions of the EU

Source: (EC 2003-2015); self-compiled and analysed Eurobarometer surveys
Notes: Question: "In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a
very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative
image?"

This sudden decrease coincides with a year of increased interest rates
followed by financial shock from the global crisis, which had
previously been downplayed as an American issue by Greek and
European leaders (Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2015:36-37). More
importantly, Figure 1 also displays a blatant and drastic drop in
Greeks' positive images, as well as increase in negative perceptions of
the EU, by 2010.

Even with the 2009 exposure of Greece's hidden sovereign
debt and subsequent realisation of the severity of this financial
concern, not until 2010 did Greek public opinion of the EU (at 29%)
plummet below EU averages and corresponding negative attitudes
begin to take the majority (32%). Tsarouhas (2015:187) provides a
concise explanation for the late-onset of public negativity, including
initial reluctance of the PASOK government to instigate robust

reforms. One of the first major pension reforms and austerity measures took place in 2010, and meanwhile, "…an attempt was made to exogenise blame and appear as the victim of forces beyond the government's control" (Tsarouhas 2015:187). Simultaneously, the EU downplayed structural flaws of the EMU, labelling Greece's predicament an exceptional circumstance due to the country's poor domestic policies, corruption, and financial mismanagement (Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2015:38). Thus, a period of blame and austerity in and between Greece and the EU ensued. The average EU members' positive images reached their lowest in 2012; Greek citizens reported their most negative perceptions of the EU in 2013. Now, though the economic crisis is far from over, shifts in the negative perception appear to be receding along with neutral and positive images increasing. Nonetheless, this data shows a clear connection between Greeks' dwindling perceptions of the EU and the onset of economic crisis.

2.3 Perceptions of State Membership

The extent of public influence on EI was made most apparent in Greece when a possible "Grexit" from the EMU threatened to backtrack previous integration progress, specifically after the 2015 referendum ended in a vote against continuing the EU-imposed austerity programs. In general, the multi-faceted global crisis that hit Europe in 2008 would "…produce the greatest challenge the European integration project had faced since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty" (Karyotis and Gerodimos 2015:2). Greece was hit hardest by the crisis, a struggle well-felt at the individual level with unemployment in 2015 still hovering at 25 percent (EC 2016) and austerity policies burdening residents with significant tax additions and increases[2]. As Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively show, Greeks'

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[2] Recent changes include: VAT tax increase up to 24% (Georgiopoulos 2016); up to 75% of income taxes required in advance for particular sectors (Nikas

perceptions of their state's benefit as part of the EU and positive association with state membership had dropped significantly by 2011. Figure 2 shows a 10% drop in perceived state benefits in 2008, though this is still well above the EU public's average. By 2010 however the public is at a near-even split on whether the Greece benefits as part of the EU, and continues to drop below EU averages by 2011.

Figure 2: Public perception of EU membership benefits

2015); various capital controls and continued national bank shut-downs (Hewitt 2015); various wage and pension freezing and cuts; changes in property, income, and solidarity taxes

Source: (EC 2003-2015); self-compiled and analysed Eurobarometer surveys
Note: Question not available past 2011
Question: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Greece has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?"

Figure 3: Public perception of state membership to the EU

Source: (EC 2003-2015); self-compiled and analysed Eurobarometer surveys
Note: Question not available past 2011
Question: "Generally speaking, do you think that Greece's membership of the European Union is... a good thing, neither good nor bad, a bad thing?"

Figure 2 shows a similar, but reverse view of Figure 1: the negative side of attitudes towards the EU. Likewise, it displays a

temporary and slight rise in negative attitudes in 2008 and 2009; Greeks largely became less positive and more neutral when considering Greece's membership to the EU. However by 2011, Greeks viewing their states membership to the EU as a "bad thing" jumped from 10% to 38%. And for the first year shown, Greek negative attitudes again escalated above average EU rates of disapproval.

2.5 Conclusion

The figures in this section have given a brief indication of the Greeks' changing attitudes towards the EU over 8 years and how these changes coincide with the Eurozone crisis. However, Ioannou et al. (2015:167) notes the majority of literature agrees there has been a practical increase in support for EI in recent years even though the economic crisis is still prevalent in individual life. Thus, dissatisfaction toward the EU and membership within it may not directly equate with attitudes towards integration. Furthermore, accountability for economic concerns, or evaluating EU membership largely on out-put and effectiveness, addresses specific concerns rather than attitudes toward the long-term legitimacy of EI. As Majone (2012:6) concisely states "effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative", and I argue the graphs are primarily a measure of the former. Thus the next sections note the importance in differentiating between types of support for the EU and EI. The paper then takes a comprehensive theoretical look at possible drivers, both economic and ideational, of public attitudes towards European integration.

Chapter 3: Driving Support for EI

3.1 Introduction

This section provides a theoretical overview, laying the foundation for further research analysis through several well-supported hypotheses. First, European integration and the type of support endorsing such a concept are defined; these are broad terms, and narrowing their meanings is essential to understand exactly what later research is measuring and deciphering the implications for any results found. Then, a literature overview reveals six key areas that drive public attitudes towards EI, including perceptions of individual and national economic conditions, attributions of blame and trust on different institutional levels, politics, and identity. Finally, this paper puts forward a hypothesis for each category to use in upcoming analyses.

3.2 Defining European Integration

European integration is, overall, a fluid term, dependent on context, timing, and subjective constructs. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006:7) openly states "there is no consensus definition of 'regional integration'… people mean different things when they use the concept." This applies to individuals, who when asked about their attitudes towards the EU or EI may conjure different ideas according to personal experience. The relative, individual association with EI is part of the specific drivers, such as egocentric economic concerns, this study seeks to validate. However, an academic issue also arises. European integration has many meanings and attributes, such as whether it is a perpetual process or has an end result. Haas (1971:18) argued that collecting knowledge on such a fluid dependent variable, bearing in mind the process and goals of EI have changed over time, presents issues determining which independent variables should be explored. Even after years of research in the EI field, Hooghe and

Marks (2005:426) reiterate this point stating, "…the European Union is a moving target." In following post-functionalist theory, this paper then assumes EI is a process with a trajectory still being defined, largely by public support or dissent in pursing the developing project.

3.3 Defining Support

Before offering what drives support for European integration, it is crucial to define what type of support is being assessed. David Easton's 1975 article is the backbone for describing two key, distinct dimensions of support: diffuse and specific. Easton (1975:436) first describes support as "an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively." Specific support is then "object-specific", primarily in that "it is a response to the authorities… only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or political community" (Easton 1975:437). In essence, individuals perceive a causative connection between their needs and an incumbent authority and determine their level of specific support either by general performance or, more often, calculated comparison between personal demands and outputs of the system (Easton 1975:438-439). In this way, specific support is more volatile, short-term, and based in individual cost-benefit calculations. Comparatively, diffuse support is aptly named as a broader base of support and as such, is more difficult to both build and erode (Magalhẫes 2014:79). Easton (1975:445) describes diffuse support as ideological and of theoretical significance, living beyond individuals and their current performance in the system: "attachment to political objects for their own sake, will not be easily dislodged because of current dissatisfaction with what the government does." Therefore, diffuse support is held despite unfavourable conditions due to ideological and culture alignments (Armingeon and Ceka 2013:3). Easton (1975:447-453) goes on to describe trust and legitimacy as key expressions of this support. Bearing this classification in mind, this

paper tests and compares drivers of Greek individuals' broad support for European integration. Considering Greeks' pre-crisis attitudes towards the EU and historical alignment with the EU project, erosion in specific support would account for the attitudes depicted in Chapter 2.

It is important to note that the type of support and how it is being measured should not be taken lightly. Empirically distinguishing between specific and diffuse support is imperative for accurate measurements and assessment. Multiple authors briefly touch on this subject. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996:189) note, "…the evaluation of membership in the EU is thus much more subject to fluctuations in economic performance than support for the project in general." Likewise, Leconte (2010:164) displays sizeable differences and a consistently higher response to positive attitudes towards "unification" than positive attitudes towards EU membership over an extended period of time. She claims, "EC membership was more volatile than affective support for unification" (Leconte 2010:165). Others have then sought to correct this by dividing attitudes into different dimensions (i.e. Boomgaarden et al. 2011) or combining several variables for a closer indication of overall EI support (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Gabel 1998a; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Garry and Tilley 2009; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014).

Yet many studies use Eurobarometer data due to availability, consistency and validity, and equate citizens' attitudes towards their state's EU membership as support for EI. Though McLaren (2006:21-27) shows a high correlation between attitudes towards membership and desire for EU unification, interchanging the two leaves room for both theoretical and statistical error. For instance, these studies often run the risk of measuring specific support. As Easton (1975:450) explains, even survey allusions to political communities or authorities often invoke an individual to conjure an image and answer according to specific circumstance. And although continual negative specific support suggests a decrease in diffuse support over time (Serricchio et

al. 2013:52), this research purposefully connects micro-level driving variables with diffuse support to explore the factors directly influencing individuals' long-term support for EI, rather than their immediate thoughts on the EU.

3.4 Drivers of Public Support

Researchers in EI have made significant progress in discovering and assessing the drivers of public attitudes over the last 20 years. Sorting through a multitude of variables, their combinations and varying proxies, makes choosing which elements to include a challenging task. For clarity, I have separated each into one of six broad categories: egocentric economics, sociotropic economics, attributions of blame, institutional trust, political ideology and interest, and identity. I then derive a hypothesis from each variable to use in empirical analysis.

3.4.1 Sociotropic Economics

Early EI models analysed sociotropic variables, macroeconomic and high-level descriptive factors, to determine what drove public attitudes. In these theories, individuals identify or evaluate the benefits of EU membership by objective nation-level data such as unemployment, GDP, and inflation. Researchers hypothesized that higher GDP, lower inflation, and lower unemployment rates are correlated with higher levels of EI support among the public. Yet this has increasingly led to few consistently significant results (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Serricchio et al. 2012; Armingeon and Ceka 2013). Other sociotropic variables include intra-EU trade and fiscal transfers (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Garry and Tilley 2009 specify strength when combined with national identity variables) and duration of a state's membership to the EU (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Armingeon and Ceka 2013), which

is also used as an analytical tool to compare original and later member states (such as Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2002). The former variables are important to acknowledge as the foundation for refining variable selection, and the latter are more appropriate for multinational analyses.

Addressing the national-level, sociotropic variables used more recently, Braun and Tausendpfund (2014:231) show that "… in times of the crisis economic factors again play a major role in the explanation of support for the EU." Serricchio et al. (2013:58, 59) also find that since the Eurozone crisis, negative perceptions of European membership were closely tied with similar perceptions of the domestic economy. By demonstrating that individuals' subjective perceptions of the job market and national economy change public support levels for EI, the authors show the public's sociotropic economic evaluations are an important factor to consider, even more so during the Eurozone crisis than the global crisis (Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). Several other studies have verified these results (i.e. Tanasoiu and Colonescu 2008) and suggest public evaluations can be based on retrospective scrutiny - individuals' evaluations of past economic conditions (Garry and Tilley 2009) or projected prospective expectations - individuals' anticipations for future national conditions (i.e. Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Serricchio et al. 2012). Notably, Tilley et al. (2008:680) find the subjective rather than objective economic performance, in both sociotropic and egocentric evaluations, has greater effect on voters: "…the subjective economy is the important economy for political actors, both mass and elite." In accordance with the previous findings, the following hypothesis can then be made regarding the Greek public's perception of the national economy and its effect on support of EI.

> H1a: Individuals with positive retrospective evaluations of the
> national economy will have greater support for EI.

H1b: Individuals with positive prospective evaluations of the national economy will have greater support for EI.

Logically, economic factors are important, especially during financial crisis, but it is important to note several studies find issue with macro-level variables. Overall, many sociotropic drivers are tied to individual-level predictors; the public's perception of the national economy is tied to the socioeconomics of their personal lives, typically working class, income, and education. If not controlled for, this analysis can generate imprecise results. In addition, these personal details, such as difficulty of financial situation, make up the daily realities through which individuals determine their support - even if it is stemmed by a national-level economic crisis. Therefore, the next section looks at the possibility of egocentric economic drivers of public attitudes towards EI.

3.4.2 Egocentric Economics

Researchers turned to individual-level cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate the coherence of individuals' opinions on international affairs. They theorized that a citizen's societal and economic placement drove their opinions at the supranational level just as it did on the domestic level (Gabel 1998b:950). Models using egocentric variables test the relationship between an individual's perceived or objective place in society, the costs and benefits they determine are brought through EI, and the change in support that arises accordingly from it. In particular, this deals with economic perceptions or placement, labour-related assessments, and levels of education.

Loveless and Rohrschneider (2008:9) concisely cover the socioeconomic, or utilitarian, approach in stating, "The utilitarian cost-benefit approach states that as material gains within a country increase – particularly through the liberalization of trade within the EU – support for the EU will increase." Ample studies on EI include socioeconomic variables as potential egocentric drivers of public

attitudes. For instance in an early study, Gabel (1998b) used Heckscher-Olin international economy theory to demonstrate that relative competitiveness of occupational skills in the liberal market determines individual support. Other research confirms the negative connection between manual or unemployed workers and support for EI while executive or professional workers have higher levels of support for EI (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Armingeon and Ceka 2013). Several studies attest to the utilitarian model in the sense that perception of personal economic situation (Anderson 1998; Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014), income levels, and labour sector (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Gabel 1998b; Garry and Tilley 2009) are egocentric drivers of EI: the more an individual benefits (whether real or perceived) through increased income or job security, the greater their support for EI. Due to the need for consistency in comparing sociotropic economic variables and findings in the aforementioned studies, availability of data, and this paper's overall focus on micro-level attitudes during crisis, the following hypotheses are made to test how Greek egocentric perceptions of economic conditions drive their support for EI.

> *H2a: Individuals with positive retrospective evaluations of their personal economic situation will have greater support for EI.*
> *H2b: Individuals with positive prospective evaluations of their personal economic situation will have greater support for EI.*

Yet, as Loveless and Rohrschneider (2008:10) comment, "…the utilitarian approach is limited to the output-based conception of representation". As such, limiting statistical analysis to dealing with economic calculations rather than the many abstract ideas and feelings that influence individuals' choices would provide inadequate explanations for the broad and complex nature of EI support.

Recent EI models (i.e. Serricchio et al. 2013) have then suggested the importance of abstract, ideational variables over rational, economic-based drivers. As stated earlier, Braun and Tausendpfund (2014) demonstrate a strong relationship between the Eurozone crisis and decline of EU support. They also claim: "…our findings are in contrast to the literature inspired by post-functionalist perspectives, whereby economic considerations lose their explanatory power of EU support." Yet, post-functionalists do not deny the correlation of economic variables with EI but put forth the argument that identity variables have greater explanatory power over periods of time (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Furthermore, economic drivers are rooted in national contexts and party cues. Armingeon and Ceka (2013) and Braun Tausendpfund (2014) agree, to an extent, and also acknowledge that the effect of each of these drivers on support depends on context. For instance, Hooghe and Marks (2005:437) note that "Economic interests and communal identities do not speak with a single voice across the European Union, but interact with national institutions and elites." In essence, national identity is engaged when national elites are most divided (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Recent literature also suggests that partisanship is a conditioning element for individuals' evaluations of economic outputs and attributions of blame (Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Thus, the next theoretical sections consider ideational drivers as possible predictors of support for EI: politics, institutional trust, attributions of blame, and national identity.

3.4.3 Blame Attribution

The bulk of research relating individual citizens' attribution of responsibility - or in its negative form, blame - on institutions has been centred around electoral politics and voting behaviour[3]. Yet, the active blame component during the onset of economic crisis in Greece, as

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[3] For a literature overview and post-austerity analysis on Greece, see Karyotis and Rüdig (2013)

described in Chapter 2, provides an opportunity for exploring this variable further in regards to its relationship with attitudes towards the EI. While voter response and reward-punishment models are more closely related to specific support, blame attribution as it affects broader support for EI is a fresh topic for investigation.

Public opinion and direct attributions of blame in multilevel systems of governance, particularly between national governments and the EU, is a relatively new field for research. For instance, Anderson (1998:591) put forth the system proxy theory and empirically showed "because citizens lack crucial information about the integration process, they resort to proxies derived from domestic political reality to comprehend and form opinions about it." Many researchers have since found that individuals evaluate and adjust their level of support for EI as a by-product of domestic politics (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Serricchio et al. 2012; Armingeon and Ceka 2013). Attribution of blame, then, directly to the EU is difficult. As Majone (2012:5) points out:

> *EU policies were too remote from the daily problems of the people to seriously concern public opinion. Moreover, it was difficult for ordinary citizens, and sometimes even for the experts, to allocate responsibility for unsatisfactory outcomes as between "Brussels" and the national governments.*

Yet Majone (2012:5) goes on to state the Eurozone crisis is crucial because it allowed EU policy transparency to the public, who can now directly evaluate the EU.

Recent quantitative research supports Majone's theory on direct evaluations. Despite the complex system that is the EU, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) find individuals are capable of differing between levels of government. More recently, Wilson and Hobolt (2015) find increased salience and knowledge of issues, comparable in this case to the highly politicised issue of the Eurozone crisis, results in

individuals' ability to more accurately attribute blame. As a result, Greek citizens' attributions of blame based on the economic crisis offer an original variable to test in relation to EI support.

For the scope of this paper, I then look at attribution of blame once solidified in individuals' minds, regardless of the nature of its framing and construction. That is, regardless of the way individuals are persuaded into shifting placement of blame, this paper's goal is to assess the relationship between existing attributions of blame for the economic crisis and their effect on support for EI. In this regard, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) also note that individuals in Eurozone member states are more likely to place higher levels of responsibility for monetary policy on the EU. Therefore, I hypothesise two scenarios, EU and national, for attributions of blame as predictors of EI attitudes:

H3a: Individuals who attribute blame to the EU for poor economic conditions will not support EI.
H3b: Individuals who attribute blame to the Greek government for poor economic conditions will support EI.

3.4.4 Institutional Trust

On the flipside of placing institutional blame, an individual's level of trust or confidence at the national or EU level interacts to drive public support. Institutional trust is a vital part of ensuring the longevity of EI. As Arnold et al. (2012:3) state, trust "…is a prerequisite for increasing the legitimacy of the European Union". Furthermore, Hobolt and Tilley (2014:7) point to changing levels of trust as a the primary outlet for public disappointment with EU policy, since it currently lacks the influential mechanisms, as national governments have in voting systems, for individuals' discontent. As Verney (2015:286, 290) shows, Greek citizens in post-Eurozone crisis showed a strikingly rapid decline in both national and EU levels of trust. This drastic change is a chance to test one step further: how

multi-level trust, in turn, predicts and interacts with the Greek support for EI.

Several studies have used quantitative analyses to test the relationship between trust and public support for EI. The more confidence an individual has in their national government, or the less corruptness they perceive, the more supportive they are of EI (Serricchio et al. 2012). Armingeon and Ceka (2013) also show that greater trust for national government leads to greater trust for the EU, and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) finds trust in the EU is a strong driver of positive support for EI. In general then, Anderson's (1998) system proxy hypothesis, and later McLaren (2007), suggest institutional (dis)trust on the national-level is reflected on the EU level.

However, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) also posits the interdependency between trust in national and supranational institutions can have inverse relationships. Tanasoi and Colonescu (2008) confirm this in the Bulgarian case, wherein citizen's lack of confidence in the national government drives greater trust in the EU. However in the Greek case, Verney (2015) comments on the separation of blame between levels of government for the crisis, which resulted in a parallel downward trend in Greek trust of both the EU and the domestic government. Thus, it would seem trust in the EU would imitate trust in the national government, specifically since Greece is already an entity working within the EU. This paper uses the next hypotheses to test how trust drives individual attitudes on both a national and supranational level:

> *H4a: Individuals who trust the EU will support EI.*
> *H4b: Individuals who trust the Greek government will support EI.*

3.4.5 Political Ideology and Interest

Moving from material, economic factors, past abstract institutional attributes, politics and partisanship has long been an

element involved in EI research, and of course, is related to many aspects concerning the EU. Specifically, The Maastricht Treaty was a defining event turning the EU project from economic to political (Serricchio et al. 2012:53).

One political element often investigated is the greater the amount of real or perceived political knowledge an individual has, the more supportive of EI (Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). However, measuring an individual's political knowledge is problematic and often oversimplified in surveys to asking a limited number of specific questions (Armingeon and Ceka 2013).

Political knowledge is also associated with cognitive mobilization- "a high level of political awareness and well-developed skills in political communication, [which] enables citizens to identify with a supranational political community" (Gabel 1999a). When this theory is tested in multiple regression analyses, often as an indication of individual political interest or more political discussion, its impact on support for EI has generally had weak explanatory power (Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2002; Boomgaarden et al. 2011) or been insignificant (Gabel 1998b; alternatively see Carey 2002).

Personal political leanings and ideological preferences have also been heavily assessed on driving individual attitudes towards EI. Initially defined between the bourgeois (right) and proletariat (left), several researchers (Franklin et al. 1994; Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2002; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Armingeon and Ceka 2013) have confirmed that left parties are less likely to support EU membership, theoretically due to the uneven distributional consequences of increased free-market, global trade. Other studies, such as Hooghe and Marks (2005) find no significant relationship between right-left ideologies. However the authors (along with Brinegar and Jolly 2005) discover that party cues, through individuals following the stance put forth by their chosen political party, correlate with support for EI, particularly when domestic parties are divided on an issue. Lastly, Eichenberg and

Dalton (2007) show that "dramatic political events", such as wars, referenda, and new treaties, creates spikes in support for EI. Based on this summary of past research and availability of data, the following hypotheses are made:

> *H5a: Individual alignment with the political left drives positive support for EI.*
> *H5b: Individuals with high political cognitive mobility have greater support for EI.*

3.4.6 Identity

Lastly, the limited ability of economic variables to determine attitudes towards EI has increasingly shifted researchers' focus on national and EU levels of identity. As Malik (2015) points out, the modern-day focus on defining the conceptually separating the communities that exist in EU society, rather than focusing on what type of community they desire to create, means that "politics of ideology have given way to the politics of identity". Yet note, previous literature as well as the empirical research in this paper, often uses proxies to measure such a fluid and abstract concept. While this variable is difficult to concretise, Greece during the Eurozone crisis still provides a critical case to test driving identity associations with changes in support for EI.

Because territorial laws change more quickly than social identities, the long-standing pro-integration Greece- though in direct conflict to its current economic self-interest - indicates circumstances invoking identity mobilization (Risse 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2008:12, 2). The conflict of the EMU crisis, such as politically-constructed and mobilized national identities along with increased public saliency of EI, have ripened conditions for "tension between rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable identities" (Hooghe And Marks 2008:13). Particularly for Greece then, its geographical location as a border member state heightens awareness of EU

enlargement, and the Syrian refugee crisis has made the EU's lack of proper immigration policy, both outside and within the EU, a daily reality.

Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of social identity in determining attitudes towards EI. Several studies test positive and inclusive identity associations with greater support for EI; specifically, positive attachment to the EU (Carey 2002) and multiculturalism (Hooghe and Marks 2005) have been associated with higher levels of support for EI among individuals. More commonly, exclusionary identity variables are used to test how individuals perceive EU enlargement as a threat to culture and national identity (McLaren 2002; Lubbers 2008; Brinegar and Jolly 2005) feelings of exclusive national identity and attachment (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Serricchio et al. 2012), or even loss of language (Carey 2002) generate less EI support or negative attitudes toward the EU.

Specifically, anti-immigration attitudes have been linked to the preservation of domestic identity. Given the recent levels of awareness and concern over immigration within and into the EU, this variable is particularly interesting in the case of Greece. Boomgaarden et al. (2011) find anti-immigration attitudes in the Netherlands are a strong indicator of individuals lacking support for all five of their separate dimensions on EU attitudes[4]. In addition, Garry and Tilley (2009) add an economic component and demonstrate a citizen's concern over abuse of social benefits is an indicator of "economic xenophobic" individuals. It is notable that identity can be seen as both a driver affecting attitudes towards enlargement, as the EU extends to include more countries, but also deepening integration since EU states now include free mobility of peoples, to varying extents. Thus as Hymans (2002:15) says, "[social identity theory] researchers have found that intergroup contact can be unsettling and lead to a stronger motive for

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[4] Performance, identity, (negative) affection, utilitarianism and strengthening

boundary definition and hence discrimination under many circumstances".

In culmination, and as a way to link several explanatory variables, Tillman (2013) notes the commonality between the exclusionary proxies of social identity – such as national identity, anti-immigration and cultural threats – and statistically establishes authoritarianism as their "casual thread". Tillman (2013:570-572) fittingly defines authoritarian individuals as those with a predisposition to "identify strongly with established in-groups to which they belong and their values while simultaneously expressing distrust or hostility towards members of out-groups or anything else that would threaten the cohesion…". His findings demonstrate that authoritarianism has a direct negative effect on EU support but also is an indirect predictor and promoter of separate identity variables that independently drive lower levels of support for EI (Tillman 2013).

Given the theoretical background and empirical findings on identity, hypotheses for Greek identity drivers of EI support are given:

> *H6a: Individuals with a positive perception of immigrants will be more likely to support EI.*
> *H6b: Individuals with an authoritarian disposition are less likely to support EI.*

3.5 Conclusion

The wide-ranging list of predictor variables explained in this section, along with foundational definitions of diffuse support for European integration, provide a solid theoretical basis for further statistical analysis. Testing of the generated hypotheses will provide explanation for current Greek attitudes while contributing to EI research as a whole by strengthening academic understanding on motivations behind the EI-constraining public. Chapter 4 continues this

project by justifying Greece as ideal for a single-case consideration and detailing the data used in later analysis.

Chapter 4: Methodology and Measurements

4.1 Introduction

To test the aforementioned theories, this paper used a single-case, quantitative analysis with valid and reliable large-sample data. By specifically observing attitudes in Greece and using robust, privately-collected data of random Greek individuals in 2015, the quantitative analysis to follow differs from similar research in its depth. A series of regression models cover each hypothesis made, both independently and collectively. To ensure assumptions are met, each model is tested and evaluated for goodness of fit and independence of observations.

Statistical analysis not only contributes to the variety of research previously written, it attempts to concretely prove or disprove both new and continuing theories presented in the previous chapters. The following sections justify Greece and the specific survey used as an optimal single-case study and details the variables, including their manipulation and application, used for a transparent and systematic research design.

4.2 Single-case Considerations

The scope of this analysis is limited to Greek public opinions, rather than using cross-national survey data, and offers a chance to search in depth and context for independent variables driving attitudes towards EI. Given EU enlargement since the project first began, the 'EU public' covers diverse states, and their drivers operate within a wide range of varying cultural norms and economic backgrounds. Thus this analysis was not subject to the oversimplification needed to condense multistate and cross-temporal analyses. That is, focusing on Greece in 2015 created space for further discussion and consideration of the complex contextual factors that contribute to changes in Greek support for EI.

Furthermore, because this research covers a contemporary issue in which the independent variables cannot be systematically manipulated for observation, a case study research design is ideal for addressing the larger questions of why the public maintains support for EI and how independent variables, both individually and relative to one another, affect levels of support (Yin 1994:4-9). And Greece, compared to other EU member states, was the optimal case for an extensive look at contemporary EI attitudes during economic crisis. According to Yin's (1994:38) definitions on appropriate circumstances for single-case studies, Greece and its citizens are under conditions that make it an appropriate "critical" case for evaluating changes or consistencies in the driving of public attitudes. As discussed earlier, individuals in Greece have felt economic crisis individually and nationally on a more extensive level relative to all other EU member states. In addition, Greece's case presents a clash between pre-crisis pro-integration attitudes and the present-day negativity directed towards the EU. The dramatic changes allowed for testing interactions of several important EI-support theories, including the relevance of economic, identity, and institutional concepts.

The timing of the survey chosen was also an important consideration. As a survey from February 2015, its timeliness ensured Greeks' understanding of the severity and longevity of the economic crisis, while the initial dust from the politics of blame and transparency issues from several years prior had settled, at least partially. This early survey was also chosen over one more recently given, in December, due to exceptional domestic events in Greece. For instance, the spring survey takes place several months before the Greek referendum, and as Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) have found, key events, namely referendums and contentious elections, spike change in public opinion towards EI. While this is an interesting context to investigate in further research, this paper did not seek to consider specific political events but rather, the overall public opinion towards EI after half a decade of economic crisis.

4.3 Data and Sampling

The public's attitudes used in this research were derived from a dataset with 1,019 valid responses, compiled from an extensive questionnaire that was aimed to cover a large, representative sample of the adult Greek population. Surveys were conducted via telephone in February 2015 by Kapa Research in Athens. The method of household selection was collected through a stratified quota sample, conducting one interview per household. Quotas were defined according to census data for gender, age, and regional distribution. Telephone codes were purposefully selected for each region in relation to its population size, and computer software aided in randomly generating the remaining dialling digits. With a survey of over 60 multifaceted questions, the data collected also allowed for an optimal selection of variables and proxies that would best test each hypothesis.

4.4 Variables and Proxies

One major benefit of using independent surveys, rather than the Eurobarometers often used in past, was the ample and unambiguous questions available for incorporating into each model. As this section details, most explanatory variables, as well as the crucial measure of support for EI acting as the dependent variable, were capable of being directly interpreted into their relative theory. Therefore, the variables described here[5] are used in Chapter 5 to generate seven regression models and clearly interpret and discuss their results.

The dependent variable used throughout this analysis was based on a survey question asking whether European *unification* should progress, and thereby is a strong measure for diffuse support for

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[5] Appendix B contains a thorough table listing each survey question and data transformation used in connection with applied variables

European integration rather than specific, temporal attitudes towards the EU. Responses ranged on a 0-10 point scale; 0 indicated that European unification should be pushed back, 10 indicated unification should be pushed further, and 11 was added as an "I don't know" option. The unification variable had 989 valid responses, and 2.9% were missing or "I don't know" responses.

With an ordered categorical dependent variable, linear models are not appropriate, mainly because the distance between each number, or category, is not identical. While an ordered logistic regression would be ideal, several preliminary attempts demonstrated the parallel lines assumption would be consistently violated. Thus, I further condensed the dependent variable into binary, nominal categories for a binary logistic regression. Negative attitudes towards unification, 0-4, were grouped and recoded as 0 (31.2% of valid responses). Neutral attitudes were considered to be the individual's desire to maintain the current unification and are thus combined with positive attitudes, meaning a desire to progress further. This grouping was coded as 1 (68.8% of valid responses). Accordingly, the resulting binary dependent variable on attitudes towards unification is hereby referred to, and interpreted as, desire for European integration.

Next, relevant survey questions asked the respondent's subjective evaluation of their economic situation on personal and national levels. Each of these were recorded on an incremental scale of 1-5, wherein 1 represented the economic situation would be "much worse" and 5 indicated it would be "much better". The variables under *Egocentric* cover personal evaluations in both retrospect, looking back one year, and prospect, an individual's perceived economic outlook in one year's time. Neutral attitudes, respondents who scored a 3, were used as the reference category, recoded as 0. Respondents who scored 1 or 2 and negatively viewed past or future economic situations were coded as 1, and labelled *Retrospective- Worse* and *Prospective- Worse*. Individuals who had positive evaluations of the past and future, 3 and 4, were coded as 2 and labelled *Retrospective- Better* and *Prospective-*

Better. Likewise, national economic questions asked for an individuals' retrospective and prospective view on and for Greece's domestic economy, respectively *Sociotropic Retrospective* and *Sociotropic Prospective*. Coding and grouping of scores is identical to those in the egocentric category.

Two variables were chosen and refined to test the hypotheses on left-right political alignment and interests. First, a question asks for respondents' self-placement on a 0-10 scale of corresponding left-right political ideology. This piece is recoded into 3 categories: 0-4 as left (37.8%), 5 as center (33.3%), and 6-10 (29%) as right political alignment, resulting in roughly even number of cases in each category. Centre views were coded as 0 and used as a reference category. Respondents who did not know their political identification, scores of 11, were again recorded as missing values. The theoretical section also explained that prior research on cognitive mobility was a political component that affects levels of support for EI. This is measured by the individuals' self-placed level of interest in politics on a scale of 1-4 from "very interested" to "not at all interested". The data was recoded into a binary variable and flipped for consistency in interpretation; scores 3-4 were coded as 0 and not interested, while interest in politics was recoded as 1 and consists of scores of 1-2.

The more elusive concept of identity required proxies for quantitative analysis. Due to limited availability of direct questions covering exclusive identity, two proxy variables were chosen to test whether identity-related predictors drove attitudes for EI. First, for consistency and comparison with aforementioned literature, anti-immigration attitudes were a proxy for individuals with exclusive national identity; they were thus used in this model as a test of economic xenophobia. This binary variable is derived from a question asking whether immigrants are good for the economy, scored on a scale of 1-5. Respondents who agreed or were neutral, scoring 3-5, were recoded as the reference category of 0. Scores of 1-2, strongly to moderately disagreeing that immigrants are good for economy, were

recoded as 1. In addition, Tillman's (2013) authoritarianism theory was tested under this category through a scalar question on how individuals' feel about challenging authority. Authoritarianism was transformed in an identical manner to the previous identity variable, wherein 0 is neutral to less authoritarian and 1 reflects an individual who is more authoritarian. Separating each of these binary, identity variables in such a way allocated roughly half of the responses in each category.

Demographic variables were also included as the main, consistent controls used throughout the regression analyses. Age is a scale variable that indicated the respondent's age; Male is a binary variable made to indicate gender; Manual and Professional indicate skill level of employment; University refers to individuals with graduate and post graduate education levels. These control variables were used to remain consistent with previous studies' controls and demonstrated effects on similar dependent variables. However, they were also important to control the effects independent variables may have on one another, such as links between education, employment, and cognitive mobilization or political ideology. In this light, *Interpersonal Trust* is a specific control included in the trust regression and final model, which accounts for an individual's general ability to trust. The final two variables included in this analysis deal with blame and trust, and required preliminary statistical analysis that is described in the next section.

4.5 Factor Analysis

The Greek publics' blame attributions and levels of trust were surveyed by asking individuals to score 20 different entities across both categories. Factor analysis then provided an opportunity for data reduction, while also reducing the risk of multicollinearity issues between similar variables, by extrapolating a new, smaller set of composite variables, or factors, based on greatest common variance

(Walker and Madden 2009:326). In essence, variables within their respective categories of blame and trust were combined based on common underlying dimensions and used to generate more concise factors for later use as independent scale variables in regression models. Due to the primary purpose of reduction, principal component analysis (PCA) is used rather than other factor extraction methods. For greater statistical parsimony, orthogonal rotation is also used to precisely define each factor by comparing rotated loading values, shown in the next sections' results. The PCA conducted with the blame and trust variables demonstrates the strong relationship between variables in blame, which after interpreting each factor structure, I define as *EU*, *National*, and *Societal* blame. Likewise, two factors can be derived from eight trust variables: *EU* and *National* trust.

4.5.1 Blame Attribution

In questions concerning blame, respondents were asked to separately attribute blame of the economic crisis to 12 different entities, ranking each between 1 (not at all responsible) and 5 (extremely responsible). PCA revealed 3 factors with eigenvalues above 1. Figure 4 shows the 3 defined factors, relevant variables within each, and their rotated factor loadings, which quantify how closely each variable is associated to each factor.

Overall, the three factors account for 55.1% of all variance. Factor 1, *The EU*, has the greatest factor strength with an eigenvalue of 4.1 compared to values of 1.4 and 1.1 for factors 1 and 2, respectively, and 34% of variance. As Figure 4's bold factor loadings indicate, Factor 1 mainly comprises blame towards "Germany" with 43% of valid respondents finding Germany "extremely responsible" for the economic crisis, but also external elements such as "The EU" and "Globalisation" as weighty variables contributing to this factor. Due to Germany's power position within the EU, along with part of the Greek public's mentality issuing the EU as a 'puppet government' for Germany (Exadaktylos 2015), and the EU's institutional nature as a

progressive leader in globalisation, I combine these for conciseness under *The EU*.

Figure 4: Primary factor components of Greek blame

Factors of Blame Attribution

	Factor 1: The EU	Factor 2: National Government	Factor 3: Societal
Germany	**.753**		
The EU	**.721**		
Globalisation	**.717**		
The Euro	.680		
Foreign investors, speculators	.616		
The Greek banks	.547		
Samaras government (2012 - 2015)		**.826**	
Papademos government (2011-2012)		**.788**	
Papandreou government (2009-2011)		.617	
Karamanlis government (2004-2009)		.510	
Each and every one of us			**.826**
Corruption in Greece			.581
Eigenvalue	4.1	1.4	1.1
% of Variance (cumulative)	34.1	45.7	55.1

Source: Karyotis and Rüdig (2015); Austerity Politics Study, Wave 4
Notes: Factor loadings taken from varimax rotation; values < .5 not listed; For complete outputs see Appendix A

Factor 2 then follows blame variables on a national level, comprising strictly of blame towards past Greek governments. Interestingly, the closer to the start of economic crisis, the higher the factor loading value associated with *National* blame. Notably, the Papandreou government had the highest number of respondents attribute "extreme responsible" blame at 61%. And lastly, the third factor, and variable to test later in analyses, indicates *Societal* blame: blame attributed to "each and every one of us" and to the pervasiveness of Greek corruption. Although the former category has a closer association with Factor 3, 72% of individuals responded corruption was "extremely responsible", the highest scoring for any category, across factors. Though earlier hypothesis was structured around two levels of blame

(EU and national), *Societal* blame was also incorporated into further analyses due to its relevant extraction and for exploratory purposes. In sum, Greeks interestingly attribute blame along 3 clear levels: domestically at the individual and national level, and externally, primarily at the EU level.

4.5.2 Institutional Trust

Similarly, to extract factors indicating Greek institutional trust, PCA was used on an 8-part survey question, in which asked respondents scored on a scale of 0-10 on how much they trust the given variables. Figure 6 depicts each element and its relative strength involved in each factor. Both factors found account for high amounts of variance, overall about 63%. I again label Factor 1 as *The EU*, which is substantively made of trust towards "The EU", "The Parliament", and "The Political Parties". The latter factor is comprised of trust towards the current Prime Minister Tsipras and new SYRIZA government.

Figure 5: Primary factor components of Greek institutional trust

Factors of Institutional Trust

	Factor 1: The EU	Factor 2: National Government
The EU	**.796**	
The Political Parties	**.781**	
The Parliament	**.776**	
The Civil Service	.655	
The Troika	.612	
The new government		**.936**
The new Prime Minister Tsipras		**.941**
Eigenvalue	3.0	2.1
% of Variance (cumulative)	37.4	63.0

Source: Karyotis and Rüdig (2015); Austerity Politics Study, Wave 4
Notes: Factor loadings taken from varimax rotation; variables and values < .5 not listed; For complete outputs see Appendix A

While these variables group nicely into split EU-national levels, which fits well with earlier theory and hypotheses made, descriptive statistics reveal a sizable difference in survey responses on trust. For instance, 21% of respondents said, to different degrees, they do not trust Prime Minister Tsipras and the SYRIZA government. In contrast, 54% and 59% of individuals said they do not trust "The EU" and "The Parliament", respectively. And over 3 times the number of respondents do not trust "The Political Parties" (67%) in comparison to the new national government. Though these variable descriptors do not answer the broader question regarding how this lack of trust at either level drives levels of support for EI, the stark difference in public trust between national and EU levels is an unanticipated find that will be addressed in the next chapter.

4.6 Conclusion

      The 5 primary factors found in blame and trust through PCA extraction, as well as the variables recoded in section 4.4, were generated for use in the next sections binary logistic regressions. Thus, they are used to test whether the hypotheses made for each category of drivers in Chapter 3 are proven. Findings from this quantitative analysis, and their implications for and beyond Greek attitudes of EI, are continued in the next chapters.

Chapter 5: Results

5.1 Introduction

A series of binary logistic regressions were generated to quantitatively demonstrate the significance and substantive measure of each driver - sociotropic, egocentric, political, blame, trust and identity - on the Greek public's diffuse support for EI. Each category is tested individually, and the final model incorporates all variables for a collective analysis, allowing for interaction and possible controls across several explanatory variables.

First, a preliminary analysis of the dependent variable's descriptive statistics showed that in the spring of 2015, a simple majority of Greeks (51%) still wanted to push integration further with another 17% neutral. Consider, then, these levels of Greek support for EI were found during a year SYRIZA was elected into government while running on an anti-austerity platform, a referendum was called wherein Greeks voted against continuing the EU-inspired austerity measures, and, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, positive perceptions of the EU were rapidly falling. Thus, despite a sizable increase in negative attitudes towards EU and state membership, European integration was volatile. This then, adds a paradox of sustained support for EI during crisis. Based off the findings described below, section 5.3 also incorporates initial findings and theory for a holistic discussion on this paper's results.

5.2 Findings

Figure 6 shows the results of seven binary regression models. Though the beta values displayed cannot be directly interpreted for substantive measure against one another, they do indicate the direction of the independent driver's relationship with support for EI. Levels of significance were also included. Models 1-6 analyze the 6 hypothetical

drivers separately, each including a set of control variables. Model 7 includes all previously-defined variables and controls.

First, Model 1 in Figure 6 shows that negative views of the present Greek economy in comparison to the past year is the only significant variable driving individuals' attitudes towards EI. A negative retrospective evaluation is associated with a lower probability of an individual supporting EI. In contrast, sociotropic prospective outlooks of the national economy, while more optimistic than their retrospective counterparts, show no significance on affecting attitudes towards EI.

At the egocentric level, descriptive statistics reveal that Greeks are more hopeful for their personal economic situation than the overall state economy. Though very few citizens (8%) feel they are in a better place now compared to one year ago, 39% perceive their personal economic situation will improve in the upcoming year. It is possible this difference can be attributed to the random mix of individual attitudes collected, a resilient culture, or the unsettling fact that economic situations deteriorated to the point that many individuals felt they had hit a rigid bottom; personal financial circumstances could not get worse and thus must improve. However, despite the national and personal differences in prospective outlooks, Model 2's significance levels suggest a Greek's personal, prospective economic outlook, whether viewed as better or worse than their current situation, does not change their attitude towards European integration. Much like Model 1, an individual's negative retrospective evaluation was the closest to obtaining a significance (at .091), but even so is not a significant variable based on the standards of this model. In sum, egocentric economic perceptions are not a significant driver of the public's attitudes towards EI.

Figure 6: Binary logistic regression results across seven models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Sociotropic							
Retrospective- Worse	-.309(.156)*						-.319(.203)
Retrospective- Better	.205(.233)						.047(.276)
Prospective- Worse	.259(.246)						.178(.357)
Prospective- Better	-.161(.173)						-.259(.253)
Egocentric							
Retrospective- Worse		-.254(.150)					.264(.204)
Retrospective- Better		.433(.294)					.481(.335)
Prospective- Worse		.024(.209)					-.435(.331)
Prospective- Better		-.076(.157)					.121(.225)
Political							
Right			.345(.193)				.118(.243)
Left			-.414(.168)*				-.210(.206)
Cognitive mobility			.022(.161)				-.057(.197)
Trust							
EU				.625(.085)***			.458(.108)***
National				-.260(.078)***			-.147(.123)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Blame							
EU					-.735(.089)***		-.516(.108)***
National					-.161(.080)*		.056(.107)
Individual					.068(.078)		.011(.090)
Identity							
Economic Xenophobic						-.397(.143)**	-.182(.179)
Authoritarianism						.189(.143)	.206(.176)
Controls							
Age	.010(.005)*	.013(.004)**	.009(.004)*	.005(.005)	.007(.005)	.011(.004)*	.006(.006)
Male	-.121(.147)	-.159(.145)	-.111(.145)	-.216(.15)	-.136(.157)	-.208(.144)	-.075(.176)
University	-.045(.175)	.071(.172)	.118(.177)	-.165(.183)	-.012(.187)	.004(.173)	-.190(.214)
Manual	-.322(.214)	-.166(.212)	-.120(.215)	-.09(.221)	-.078(.235)	-.199(.211)	-.020(.265)
Professional	.021(.195)	.007(.192)	.082(.194)	.052(.2)	.160(.208)	.002(.190)	.047(.231)
Interpersonal Trust				.218(.157)			.145(.185)
Nagelkerke R2	.031	.026	.040	.124	.140	.028	.188

Source: Karyotis and Rüdig (2015) Austerity Politics Study, Wave 4; See Appendix B for a detailed list of variable questions and transformations
Notes: Standard Error in parenthesis. *Significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level; ***significant at the .001 level.

The third model shows the connection between individual political variables and the likelihood of support for EI. A Greek citizen who aligns with the political left is less likely to support EI. Understandably, the far-left party of SYRIZA played on individuals' anti-EU sentiments as a platform for election. Model 3 however, does not show the opposite to be significant; personal alignment with the political right does not correlate with positive attitudes towards EI. And political cognitive mobilisation, has no significance on Greek EI attitudes as well.

Models 4 and 5 reveal institution variables are strong drivers of diffuse support for EI. Those who blamed economic crisis on external influences, primarily the EU but also globalisation, were significantly likely to oppose EI. National blame, found both in theory and empirically as a factor, was also a significant predictor of individuals to oppose EI. However, societal blame was irrelevant in this case.

Variables of trust imitate these findings in significance; both EU and national levels of trust drive EI support. Individuals with EU trust are likely to support EI, however National trust shows a negative correlation with attitudes towards integration. That is, individuals who trust the new national government are less likely to trust the EU.

Identity variables also have partial explanatory power in Model 6. Economic xenophobia is a significant factor that drives individuals to oppose current or further EI. High levels of immigration to Greece as a gateway to Europe, along with contentious issues on open borders and refusal of refugees, understandably make this an important issue for individuals living in Greece and assessing EI so far. Whether this accurately reflects the exclusive national identity of Greeks is further discussed below. In this regard, it is notable that Model 6 shows no significance in linking authoritarian values, a proxy for national exclusive identity that is theoretically also related to xenophobic attitudes, with the probability of an individual supporting or opposing EI.

Overall, a final, comprehensive regression analysis further limits the partial significance found through identity, political,

sociotropic economic, blame, and trust independent models. Model 7 shows sustained significance of institution variables only at the EU level. Again, EU blame and EU trust are the key factors that change the likelihood of EI support and in a consistent manner with Models 4 and 5. Because the listed log coefficients offer restricted interpretation, Figure 7 lists their exponentiation, resulting in the odds ratios for drivers found to be significant in Models 1 – 7. It is then apparent that Greek individuals' trust in the EU is the strongest driver for changing attitudes towards EI. Those who trust the EU have approximately 1.6 times greater odds of supporting further EI or the current status of integration than those lacking EU trust.

Figure 7: Odds ratios of significant drivers

Odds Ratios

Independent Variable	Exp (B)	
	Individual models	Model 7
Negative Sociotropic Retrospect	.734	-
Political Ideology - Left	.661	-
EU Trust	1.869	1.581
National Trust	.771	-
EU Blame	.480	0.597
National Blame	.852	-
Economic Xenophobia	.685	-

For individuals who blame the EU, the odds of supporting current or further integration decrease by a factor of approximately .6. Likewise, Greeks who view immigrants as bad for the economy (*Economic Xenophobic*), ideologically align with the political left (*Political Ideology – Left*), or view the current national economic situation as worse than a year ago around (*Negative Sociotropic Retrospect*) decrease by a factor of .7 in support for EI. However, note these variables only remain significant when separated from reality – the multitude of factors that coverage in an individuals' mind to make a decision. Put more simply then, trust in the EU is the only driver that makes an individual more likely to support EI and by a factor twice as

large as any variables driving individuals to oppose integration. These findings and their theoretical contributions and limitations are further discussed below.

5.3 Discussion

To some extent, hypothesis were confirmed in five out of six explanatory variable categories. Politics, economics, identity, blame, and trust all have a part to play in influencing individuals' attitudes towards EI. However, significance in each of these categories is partial at best. The primary findings seen through the last, comprehensive model confirm Hooghe and Marks (2008) suggestion: ideational motivators are more powerful than material. Blame and trust that is directly-attributed to the EU are the key drivers of support for integration.

5.3.1 Material-based Support

The isolated significance of sociotropic economic variables to economic-specific models suggests material predictors are an indirect or specific-level variable affecting diffuse attitudes towards EI. This agrees with Anderson's findings (1998:588), which state the influence of economic conditions is indirect and significance is lessened when combined with political variables. Though a negative association between citizens' perceptions of worsening economic conditions and support for EI is logical, particularly considering the aforementioned attributions of blame and distrust of the EU, its significance on individuals' EI attitudes does not show in an inclusive model.

The finding that Greeks' perceptions of personal financial conditions have no quantitative significance on their support for EI contradicts ideas from several authors. Findings from Loveless and Rohrschneider (2008) reinsure the implications of material gains and losses in determining attitudes towards EI. Yet as a whole, the insignificance of all economic variables included in the final,

comprehensive model suggests that even during crisis, economic considerations are not as influential, or detrimental, to EI support as studies like Braun and Tausendpfund (2014:243) boldly conclude:

> *…the presented empirical evidence can be interpreted as a threat to the future of the EU. If public support which is considered as 'the political foundation for integration' (Gabel 1998, 333) depends on economic considerations, it represents a rather unstable foundation for the future of European integration.*

One outcome of this paper, then, is the verdict that the future of EU integration is driven less directly by output-based support and more by ideational attitudes, accurately measured by diffuse support. While Greeks' negative perspective on their national economy in comparison to the past matters, it does not significantly predict the likelihood of an individual's support on EI when encountering many other real-world variables. Put another way, individuals consider economics but are not likely to sway their attitude towards integration more broadly. As a result, this relationship also explains the paradox encountered earlier, wherein Greeks were largely neutral or approved of further integration despite blatant economic hardship and a noticeable increase in negative attitudes towards the EU itself.

5.3.2 Ideational Support

Explanatory variables of blame and trust provided the greatest substantive significance for predicting EI support. First, the significance of blame attributions on EI attitudes is a major contribution to this field of research due to its original nature. The relevance individuals' attributions of responsibility on their attitude towards integration has had little direct, quantitative proof thus far. The findings here support Hobolt and Tilley's (2014): the public can attribute blame directly to the EU level. Yet context must also be considered, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Greek government's

rhetoric placed heavy blame on the EU and external conditions, particularly when the crisis first began. Thus as Hobolt and Tilley (2014:16) also predicted, institutions took advantage of EU complexity and opacity to shift blame.

Interactions between national and EU levels leads to the next finding: the significance of national blame in an isolated model. This suggests that blame attribution to the national government moves diffuse support but to a lesser extent than EU blame. This finding also differs from the hypothesis created earlier because blame towards national government results in a greater likelihood of *negative* attitudes towards EI. In evaluation of blame, then, the system proxy theory seemingly holds true as individual assessments at the EU level follow those at the national level.

Lastly, the investigation into societal corruption and blame driving EI attitudes did not deliver. However, its insignificance is interesting considering the variable descriptions in Section 4.5, which showed individuals placed far more "extreme" blame on corruption than any other singular entity. Though the EU and external variables were less severely blamed for the crisis in comparison to corruption and domestic governments, EU level blame was still the most significant in predicting individuals' support for EI. In sum then, blame towards the EU, not blame on society or national country, for the economic crisis is the significant variable that drives individuals to likely oppose further EU integration.

Alongside blame, EU trust is the standout significant and substantive driver for individuals' EI attitudes. Here, trust is quantitatively shown to be a critical driver. However, this proves only one of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3. In the isolated model dealing with trust, system proxy theory does not hold true in that individuals who trust the national government are more likely not to support EI. That is, Greeks who put more confidence in their nation have less desire to integrate with the EU. This suggests an exclusivity in assigning trust between levels of governance. It also begs the question

of whether this is due to specific circumstances of Greece or if any EU citizens' trust in their respective national government would generate less support for EI overall. Recalling that the national government analyzed here is represented by the newly-elected "protest" Prime Minister Tsipras, it would seem this finding could be temporal and specific to Greece's circumstance. In addition, national level blame in the previous model was represented by past national governments in comparison to present-day EU institutions. If national blame had been scored according to the SYRIZA government, its relation with EU level blame may have been similar to that of trust. Meaning, with little history to warrant blame on the SYRIZA party, they may receive relatively greater trust than past incumbent parties. This relationship requires further quantitative analysis for concrete explanation. However, the overall suggestion is that trust and blame do not present contradicting national-EU relationships, rather negative EI attitudes exist on the EU level regardless of trust and blame on the national level.

To reiterate the key finding in both comprehensive and isolated analyses, then, trust in the EU drives support for integration. This reaffirms the theoretical claim mentioned earlier by Easton (1975): trust and legitimacy are the main expressions of diffuse support. Though notably I posit here, trust is a driver, rather than an expression, of support for EI due to integration's continual redefinitions and fluctuating nature. This difference in direction of causation is further addressed in the next section. Regardless, the powerful nature of this relationship suggests individual trust in the EU should be the immediate concern for the continuation of integration.

Blame and trust, then, are statistically the most important and significant drivers of EI attitudes in the Greek public. Upon further consideration, it is theoretically plausible and perhaps necessary to separate blame and trust from other ideational drivers, such as politics and identity. Consider that blame and trust are only something an individual would have in reference to another object. That is to say,

these are *reactions* to already existing ideas or entities. The result of this conceptual separation would not lessen their significance or substantive influence on attitudes towards EI but is a major consideration when spatially showing how variables connect to EI support. For instance, Hobolt and Tilley argue, "…the legitimacy of EU institutions is dependent on performance and on the extent to which people credit or blame those institutions for good and bad performance." In sum, the authors' conclusion combines this point as well as the previous section's discussion. Blame and trust, as reactions to economic outcomes, may be directly related to EI attitudes due to their medial position between outputs and resulting attitudinal responses.

Political alignment is also an ideational variable that is a reference for blame and trust. The findings here show individuals who follow the political left ideology are associated with negative attitudes towards integration, which logically follows the platform of the Greece's far-left political parties at the time. While this confirms several findings (more recently McLaren 2002; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Armingeon and Ceka 2013) in EI research, political ideology's isolated significance does not indicate in itself whether this is due to Greek party cues or the general leftist attitude against the uneven distributional consequences of EI.

Consider the context of this survey was taken in the immediate aftermath of a largely-supported SYRIZA election. While SYRIZA was initially an anti-systemic and protest party, their stance on Europe had shifted to the centre leading up to 2015. A protest vote for SYRIZA then was less against integration and more to fight austerity itself (Exadaktylos 2015). One plausible argument against this is that austerity is a historical foundation of Eurozone economics, and Greece's austerity is EU-supported. So by the transitive property, Greeks against austerity would be against the EU and integration within it.

Yet herein again lies the value in differentiating between specific and diffuse support. To recap from the findings section, a majority of Greeks were either neutral or pro-integration in early 2015. This suggests that while discontent with the current EU and its policies existed, overall support for integration was affected less. That is, arguably, individuals voting left didn't want *out* of the system but rather they wanted to *change* the system. This would also explain the insignificance of left-right politics on EI attitudes when combined with other variables in the final model. Furthermore, right-wing supporters' political stance does not drive attitudes towards EI in any model. These finding may hint, then, to a reversed causality case wherein individuals pre-existing attitudes towards integration, mainly those opposed to it, were drawn to the left, particularly by new-mainstream parties that take advantage of public discontent. Regardless, the results of the statistical analysis for politics is similar to those of economics: political ideology matters but is less apparent driver for individuals' attitudes towards EI.

The next section assesses the last variable, identity, and its results as a driver of EI attitudes. Though partially significant, identity is limited to interpretation and thus an element to restructure in future work. Section 5.3.3 continues by addressing other limiting features in this research and makes recommendations for future work.

5.3.3 Limitations and Future Work

One of the distinguishable limitations in this work is the operationalization of abstract factors, particularly identity in comparison to all other independent variables. While theory on exclusive and inclusive national identities is intriguing, statistically proving such relationships with individuals' support for EI is challenging. The use of proxies creates imprecise measurements and interpretations, and the resulting statistical analysis is often multiple steps removed from its core concept. For example, Hymans suggests (2002) applying social identity theory (SIT) as an explanatory variable in International Relations presents many issues with

oversimplification, generally by inaccurately assessing identities in terms of basic dyads and field-ready application.

Therefore, deriving concrete interpretations while using indirect variables creates a theoretical stretch. For example in the Greek case, authoritarian attitudes is an umbrella attitude that threads through multiple identity attributes. Though this research deems its relationship with EI support insignificant, a more direct assessment limits its interpretation to simply conclude that authoritarian attitudes, not exclusive national identity as it represents, are not significantly linked to EI support. In addition, when dealing with public opinion, applying SIT is problematic because the researcher is assessing the individual, rather than the typical elites or states as actors. One must then consider that each individual surveyed is choosing to reply on behalf of "various group selves": on behalf of their family, their nation, or possibly their EU-self (Hyman 2002:17). As a result, context and framing is key to correctly interpreting findings. In sum, using proxies for identity means one cannot definitively say national or European identities were or were not a driver in individuals' decision to support integration.

Yet, identity remains a conceptually strong point for future work in EI. Ideally, surveys containing questions directly asking for exclusive and inclusive individual associations with national and EU identity would provide a strong platform on which to test identity as a driver of EI attitudes. In addition, specific questions on immigration, such as defining intergroup versus outgroup discrimination and definitively attributing who is "other" versus "The Other", would allow for more nuanced relationships to be quantitatively-assessed and concretely-interpreted.

A second limiting element relates to research design. While using multiple variables allows a multi-faceted look at drivers, assessing a wide breadth of independent variables limits the depth of research and statistical analysis for each. In some ways, each variable used here has its own vantage point, and how each driver interacts with EI attitudes, as well as one another, could be further applied to this

data. For instance, limited survey questions and space inhibited measuring associations between specific and diffuse support, as well as the interactions between independent variables, such as economics, politics, and identity. Is specific support a combination filter through which these drivers influence an individual's final attitude towards EI? Statistical techniques such as structural equation modelling and path analysis can be used to quantitatively show how these variables interact with one another.

The statistic used in this research are robust, and results on the significance of blame and trust on Greeks' EI attitudes are clear. However the direction of causality is not. Public attitudes towards EI may also be interpreted as a prediction of independent variables in this model. For instance, one of the few but extensive writers on blame and EI attitudes suggests that individuals' pre-existing attitudes towards EI determines where they attribute blame (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). The authors suggest "perceptual screens" of the EU determine a citizen's reactions (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Likewise, the previous section suggested political parties may draw and reflect, rather than instigate, individuals' anti-integration attitudes. And even beyond the causal nature of these associations, more complex interactions between several variables simultaneously complicates these findings. Hobolt and Tilley (2014:134) also note that attribution of blame and economic performance, especially with large institutions like the EU, can be linked to an individual's ability to trust an institution. Thus, the plausible interactions between 7 variables used in this analysis are seemingly-endless; indeed they may be cyclical. Therefore, the ability to concretely determine the flow of each relationship is limited.

On this note, the last limitation is the generalizability of the Greek case presented here; can these results hold in other specific EU member states, or can these findings be reproduced in cross-national studies. Though I argued Greece is a critical and timely case, one could also argue the recent "Brexit", at least on the surface, promotes the seemingly opposite situation of individuals' EI attitudes. Though the

UK remained relatively strong through a global economic crisis and is geographically farther from immigration issues, the public voted to leave the EU – the ultimate retraction from integration. A study analyzing the context and drivers in the UK case, then, is appropriate to compare these two different outcomes. Specifically, an analysis of Britain using more precise identity-related variables would add depth to how these variables do or do not influence public attitudes in the context of different states.

5.4 Conclusion

The discussion above gave an overview of the importance of trust and blame in findings, particularly above those in politics and economics. Identity was also partially significant, and with attentiveness, provides promising theory for further research. Overall, the field of EI is ripe with questions and interwoven variables that individuals internalize to create one end result, their level of support for EI. Concluding remarks will give a brief overview of the arguments and findings this paper offers to the EI field, as well as the wider implications taken from such a study.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The theoretical base and empirical analyses presented in this paper boils down the complex nature of public attitudes towards European integration. Though initial EI research focused on elite perspectives, the public's increasing power over the future of integration makes the variables affecting their support a pertinent investigation. Through a single case study analysing Greece during economic crisis, I demonstrated the primary significance and substantial importance of institutional trust and attributions of blame that drive individuals to support EI.

6.2 Overview

Statistical analysis through seven binary logistic regression models was used to quantitatively test several hypothesis and compare potential drivers of individuals' attitudes towards EI. In models concerning economics, only negative retrospective perceptions of national-level economic circumstances significantly drove attitude levels for EI support. Though this is a logical relationship, its limited substantive power and significance when included in a comprehensive demonstrates a crucial point: even during economic crisis when EU-linked austerity is visibly affecting the public, perceptions of individual and national financial situations have inadequate power to sway individuals' diffuse support for EI. Likewise, personal political alignment with the left and economic xenophobia contribute isolated significance as drivers motivating individuals to have less support for EI. Overall, these elements are insignificant in a model including diverse independent variables.

Institutional factors, though, are substantial and highly significant in all models. Blame and trust at the EU level are by far the most prominent variables included that affect Greeks' attitudes towards

EI. Individual have an ability to directly attribute blame to the EU, which in turn drivers less EI support. On the other side, trust in the EU drives positive attitudes towards EI. These findings are prominent in both contributing to the existing literature, of which few include blame attributions, and for their practical implications in the EU's approach to project sustainability and progression.

6.3 Implications

One theoretical implication found through this research is demonstrated in the Greeks' relatively-stable support for European integration despite the public's drastic drop in support for the EU itself. This hints at the necessity to differentiate between specific and diffuse support. In addition, the importance of blame and trust above more frequently-tested variables suggests a need for incorporating ideational elements into future analyses. Extended studies should search for statistical links between specific support – such as perceptions of the EU – and diffuse – attitudes towards integration and unification. There is a theoretical need to decipher the pathways in which independent variables interact to eventually form individuals' support.

To leave on an optimistic conclusion, the process of integration in the EU is more stable than specific support and recent events indicate. The public's response to changes in EU economics is insignificant in terms of diffuse support, even during major economic crisis when this issue is at the forefront of political dialogue and issue transparency. Rather, the increase of negative attitudes towards the EU is a reflection of dropping specific support, which can be attributed to the EU's lack of mechanisms for the public to instigate change (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). EU structural flaws eventually lead to EU-directed blame attributions and erosion of trust, which in turn affects diffuse support. Yet because EI's broad support erodes at a slow pace, the revelation of these flaws can also be an opportunity to bring the EU closer through policy reform. As a final implication, then, the EU

would benefit from greater transparency and democracy. This would rebuild public trust by allowing individual's to have a direct hand in policy at the EU level.

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Appendix A: Factor Analyses

Blame Attributions

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	**4.096**	**34.131**	**34.131**	**4.096**	**34.131**	**34.131**	**2.916**	**24.301**	**24.301**
2	**1.383**	**11.525**	**45.656**	**1.383**	**11.525**	**45.656**	**2.475**	**20.623**	**44.924**
3	**1.127**	**9.395**	**55.052**	**1.127**	**9.395**	**55.052**	**1.215**	**10.127**	**55.052**
4	0.958	7.984	63.036						
5	0.888	7.401	70.437						
6	0.788	6.567	77.004						
7	0.641	5.339	82.343						
8	0.605	5.038	87.381						
9	0.581	4.842	92.223						
10	0.443	3.694	95.917						
11	0.265	2.212	98.129						
12	0.225	1.871	100						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Blame Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component		
	1	2	3
Q6a. Blame: Samaras government (2012 - 2015)	.215	**.826**	.063
Q6b. Blame: Papademos government (2011-2012)	.296	**.788**	.020
Q6c. Blame: Papandreou government (2009-2011)	.138	.617	-.007
Q6d. Blame: Karamanlis government (2004-2009)	-.040	.510	.355
Q6e. Blame: The EU	**.721**	.367	-.047
Q6f. Blame: Germany	**.753**	.348	-.069
Q6g. Blame: The Greek banks	.547	.330	.188
Q6h. Blame: Foreign investors, speculators	.616	.262	.022
Q6i. Blame: The Euro	.680	.007	.043
Q6j. Blame: Globalisation	**.717**	-.088	.139
Q6k. Blame: Corruption in Greece	.142	.277	.581
Q6l. Blame: Each and every one of us	.014	-.112	**.826**

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 5 iterations

.

Institutional Trust

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	**2.989**	**37.36**	**37.36**	**2.989**	**37.36**	**37.36**	**2.923**	**36.535**	**36.535**
2	**2.058**	**25.724**	**63.084**	**2.058**	**25.724**	**63.084**	**2.124**	**26.549**	**63.084**
3	0.908	11.347	74.431						
4	0.755	9.443	83.874						
5	0.553	6.912	90.786						
6	0.354	4.426	95.212						
7	0.3	3.756	98.968						
8	0.083	1.032	100						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Trust Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component	
	1	2
Q32a. Trust: The Police	.498	.062
Q32b. Trust: The Civil Service	.655	.201
Q32c. Trust: The Parliament	**.776**	.254
Q32d. Trust: The Political Parties	**.781**	.131
Q32e. Trust: The EU	**.796**	-.219
Q32f. Trust: The Troika	.612	-.435
Q32g. Trust: The new government	.122	**.936**
Q32h. Trust: The new Prime Minister Tsipras	.111	**.941**

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 3 iterations

Appendix B: Variable Details

Variable	Question	Transformation
Independent		
Egocentric		
Retrospective	How is your personal economic situation compared with a year ago?	1-5 scale; 3 recoded as 0 for reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Worse"; 4-5 recoded as 2 for "Better"
Prospective	How do you think <u>your own</u> financial situation will be in 12 months?	1-5 scale; 3 recoded as 0 for reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Worse"; 4-5 recoded as 2 for "Better"
Sociotropic		
Retrospective	Compared to a year ago, do you think that the current economic situation in Greece now is…?	1-5 scale; 3 recoded as 0 for reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Worse"; 4-5 recoded as 2 for "Better"
Prospective	How do you think <u>the economy</u> will be in 12 months?	1-5 scale; 3 recoded as 0 for reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Worse"; 4-5 recoded as 2 for "Better"
Political		
Personal ideology	In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this 0-10 scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	0-10 scale; 5 recoded as 0 for reference; 0-4 recoded as 1 for "Left"; 6-10 recoded as "Right"
Cognitive mobility	How interested are you in politics?	1-4 scale; 3-4 recoded as 0 for "Not Interested" reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Interested"

Trust

EU Trust	Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much your personally trust each of the European and Greek institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust… The Police; The Civil Service; The Parliament; The Political Parties; The EU; The Troika; The new government; The new Prime Minister Tsipras	Used PCM to discover and extract 2 factors (see Appendix A for results); SPSS-generated scale variables for each
National Trust		

Blame

EU Blame	Who is responsible for the current economic crisis in Greece? How responsible would you say each of the following is? … Samaras government (2012 - 2015); Papademos government (2011-2012); Papandreou government (2009-2011); Karamanlis government (2004-2009); The EU; Germany; The Greek banks; Foreign investors, speculators; The Euro; Globalisation; Corruption in Greece; Each and every one of us	Used PCM to discover and extract 3 factors (see Appendix A for results); SPSS-generated scale variables for each
National Blame		
Societal Blame		

Identity

Economic Xenophobic	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following… Immigrants are generally good for the Greek economy	1-5 scale; 3-5 recoded as 0 for reference; 1-2 recoded as 1 for "Xenophobic"
Authoritarian	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following… One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often	1-5 scale; 1-3 recoded as 0 for reference; 4-5 recoded as 1 for "Authoritarian"

Dependent

Diffuse support	Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? In the same scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further', what is your position?	0-10 scale; 0-4 coded as 0 - opposed to unification; 5-10 coded as 1 - neutral or supporting further unification

Control

Age	Which age group do you belong in?	Used as scale
Gender	What is your gender?	Recoded as 0 for female; 1 for male
Interpersonal Trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful dealing with people? Please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate your view, where 0 means 'can't be too careful' and 10 means 'most people can be trusted'.	0-10 scale; 5-10 recoded as 0 for reference; 0-4 recoded as 1 for not trusting
Manual	What is your current employment status?	Answers of "semi-skilled or un-skilled manual" and skilled manual" coded as 0; Recoded all other categories as 1 for reference
Professional	What is your current employment status?	Answers of "Professional or highly technical work" and "Manager or Senior Administrator" recoded as 0; Recoded all other categories as 1 for reference
University	What level of education have you completed or currently studying for?	Answers of "university, undergraduate" and "university, postgraduate" recoded as 0; Recoded all other categories as 1 for reference