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School of Social and Political Sciences

What Is The Relationship Between Shifts In Public Opinion And Shifts In New Far Right Populist Parties' Right-Left Positioning Within A European Context?

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1. Abstract

What Is The Relationship Between Shifts In Public Opinion And Shifts In New Far Right Populist Parties? Previous research on mainstream parties proposes two theories: 'Issue Ownership' and 'Riding The Wave'. The former suggests that individual parties can be dominant over particular issues; the latter, that parties react to public opinion. It has been supposed, but never statistically modelled, that populist parties will be Issue Owning: they will not react strongly in shifts to the mean ideological placement of the public. This study builds on previous research (Adams et al, 2004; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Klüver and Spoon, 2014) by providing a focus on populist, new far right parties in a European context. It offers a definition of a new far right populist party and outlines current theory regarding 'Issue Ownership' and 'Riding The Wave'. Through regression analysis of fifteen parties from twelve European Union countries over ninety-four instances between 1956-2015, the study concludes that populist parties are affected by shifts in the mean ideological placement of voters albeit with this reaction delayed by one election cycle.

2. Introduction

2.1 Background

Much has been written about the relationship between the public and political parties. Works such as Klüver and Spoon (2014), Spoon and Klüver (2014), Adams *et al* (2004; 2006), Klüver and Sagarzazu (2015), Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013) and Wagner and Mayer (2014) have all made noteworthy contributions to the body of research surrounding this relationship. One reason for the interest in this research is that, as Klüver and Spoon state, "one of the central functions of parties in democracies is to link citizens with political decision makers" (2014, pp. 633). The two predominant theories that have been put forward by researches are 'Issue Ownership' and 'Riding The Wave'. In short, the first states that people are drawn towards the party, when the

issues the party has 'ownership' over are salient in the public's mind. The second states that parties shift their position in response to shifts in public opinion, and it is this theory that most research has found to be true for the mainstream, historically successful parties (ibid). As for niche parties, such as populist ones, less research has been conducted, however some, including Schumacher *et al* (2013) and Klüver and Sagarzazu (2015) believe that the prior theory would hold true.

Klüver and Spoon's above point about a party's function is still valid, however the dynamics between party and citizen have changed greatly in post-war Western Europe, and particularly so since the later decades of the twentieth century (Ignazi, 1996, pp. 549-553; Kitschelt, 2004, pp. 194). For example, the growth of new actors such as pressure groups and the increasing importance of social movements has challenged the position of 'the party' as the primary link between people, their interests and their government. This is evidenced through a growing lack of partisanship that can be seen in many democracies (Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 633, Evans and Whitefield, 1993, pp. 527). The relationship has been even more unconventional in Eastern and post-Soviet Europe, where the links between party and people are still in development (Evans and Whitefield, 1993). Connected to this growth of new actors is the growth of populism. Across Europe there has been an increase in the number of far right populist parties competing in elections. Austria's *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, Italy's *Lega Nord*, and Finland's *Perussuomalaiset - Sannfinländarna* are all examples of established populist parties having more notable success. Hence; firstly, in light of the changing relationship between people and party; secondly, the increased attention given to the perceived growth of populism; and thirdly, the lack of attention paid to populism, particularly populism in regions other than Western and Northern Europe in previous studies; this paper seeks to further explore the relationship between people and party. Specifically, the relationship between the electorates of twelve European countries and fifteen new far right populist parties in order to identify in which direction influence travels, if it does at all, and which factors in particular have an effect on the ideological positioning of these parties.

2.2 Aims and Objectives

This work will:

- > Explore current theory regarding the relationship between public opinion and political party ideological placement;
- > Construct a definition of a 'new far-right populist party' (hereafter NFRPP);
- > Utilise Eurobarometer, the Manifesto Project, ParlGov and Electoral System Change in Europe databases to construct models in an attempt to describe the relationship between public opinion and political party ideological placement.

3. Theory

3.1 The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Party

Positioning

The investigation into the directional relationship between public opinion and political party policy is not a new one, with research being conducted frequently over recent decades. However, there has been a resurgence in recent years. Indeed, Franzmann and Kaiser (2006), Ezrow *et al* (2008) and Adams *et al* (2004) have all conducted similar work, albeit with a slightly different focus. A majority of works have addressed this relationship exclusively for mainstream parties (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2015; Budge 1994) ('mainstream parties' being defined in short as large parties which typically gain office or become the major power if in a multi-party system). Some research also looks at the differences between mainstream and niche parties (populist, green, pirate and communist parties, to name the main niche ideologies). However, it would seem there are few, if any, studies which have looked at the relationship between popular opinion and NFRPPs exclusively. The need for this focus is increasingly important because many NFRPPs have demonstrated that what was once considered a minority view is moving (or has moved) into popularity, winning significant

shares of the popular vote and even sometimes taking power (Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 638; Spoon and Klüver, 2014, pp. 57).

It is important to identify the different types of parties there are. Müller and Strøm (1999, pp. 5-9) define three types of political party: office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-seeking. These three concepts are intrinsically linked to the prevailing theories of party-public-opinion behaviour. An office-seeking party's aim is to control as much of the executive as possible in order to manage the overall policy agenda and for the political leadership to reap the benefits of office, both present and future (ibid). Examples of such parties would include *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti* (Swedish Social Democratic Party, Sweden) and (newly renamed) *Les Républicains* (The Republicans, France). A policy-seeking party is less interested in personal gains or full control of the government agenda but, instead, wishes to maximise its policy-influencing agenda. This may include participating in or expressing support for a coalition and may range from a more broad set of issues to a primary key issue (Budge, 1994, pp. 447). Examples of a policy-seeking party include *Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue - Svenska folkpartiet i Finland* (Swedish People's Party of Finland, Finland) with its primary aim being to protect and enhance the rights of the Swedish speaking minority in Finland and *UK Independence Party* (UK) with its primary aim being to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union. A vote-seeking party's aim is to get into power. As it is harder to take outright power in a multi-party system, a vote-seeking party in this setting may aim to be in a position of governmental involvement, be it through a coalition or informal agreements, whichever is more advantageous. In order to do so, a vote-seeking party must be vote maximising. This is often associated with (alongside the behaviour of office seeking parties) the Downsian theory of democracy. The Downsian theory, in short, is about the application of economic theories to explain party behavior (Budge, 1994, pp. 447). Specifically, that "parties maximise votes by adopting positions on policy dimensions" (Green and Hobolt, 2008, pp. 460), with this being in the hope that that these dimensions, and the positions they take on them, are the ones that will help capture the largest mass of the electorate. Either of the two big American parties are examples, as is *CDS – Partido*

Popular (CDS - People's Party, Portugal). In short, office, policy and vote-seeking equates to power for the leadership, control over policy and involvement in or control of government respectively. Typically, but not exclusively, mainstream parties will be office and vote-seeking; niche parties will be policy-seeking.

In the research field there are two prevailing theories as to which direction influence travels between people and party. 'Riding the Wave' is the theory that public opinion dictates political party opinion. Referred to as the *General Dynamic Representation Hypothesis* by Adams *et al* (2004), their hypothesis suggests that all mainstream parties will "systematically shift their positions in response to shifts in public opinion" (pp. 592). Research has found that this is the way in which most mainstream parties will act given that they are typically office or vote-seeking parties (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013, pp. 5-7; Adams *et al*, 2004; Wagner and Mayer, 2014; Klüver and Spoon, 2014). This is theorised for a number of reasons. Firstly, because given their desire to gain power and/or office, they will seek to be vote maximising. To do so, it logically follows that they will seek to appeal to the public's priorities (Spoon and Klüver, 2014, pp. 54). Secondly, because mainstream parties are typically larger in size, they often have more resources at their disposal (money, staff, media etc.) and are therefore able to respond to public interest in specific issues quicker and in greater depth than a smaller, less organised party would (Wagner and Mayer, 2014, 1021-2). When thinking about the current political scene, this would seem to ring true, as increasingly parties- particularly centre-right mainstream parties have taken a harder stance on issues regarding immigration and terrorism, issues very salient in the electorate's mind. Angela Merkel's newfound support for a 'Burka Ban' is a good example of this (BBC, 2016a). Bale's 2003 research also supports this point. There are, however, certain caveats which need to be taken into consideration that can affect research. One such caveat is that theories manifest themselves in different ways between two-party and multi-party systems. For example, in countries such as the UK and USA that (usually) have only two major parties with a realistic chance of entering government (Labour and the Conservatives, Republicans and Democrats respectively), the parties may seek out the median voter as calculated across *all* voters. An example

of this would be Tony Blair's decision to shift the Labour party rightwards with the aim to become more catch-all. In a multi-party system, you may seek out the median voter of your ideological bloc, i.e. the median voter of the centre left and the median voter of the centre right (Huber, 1989, pp. 601-2). In addition, in a multi-party system, representing the centre, centre left or centre right should also put the party in a better bargaining position come coalition formation, as both the voters and other parties are more responsive to its moderate stances and wider appeal. Finally, Schumacher, de Vries and Vis state that "...parties are responsive to policy shifts of rival parties within the same ideological family... party position shifts can be explained through parties' strategic incentives to safeguard or advance their position within the system" (2013, pp. 8). This is a national problem that parties in a two-party system do not have to contend with to the same extent (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Somer-Topcu, 2009 in Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013, pp. 4).

The second theory, 'Issue Ownership', proposes that a party will become synonymous with one (or a few) issues and take 'ownership' of that issue (or issues). Parties capitalise on these issues in an attempt to capture the attention of the public. However, this theory is proven to be true only in relation to niche, policy-seeking parties (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2015, pp. 283-4). This is logical, Green parties 'own' the environment, Pirate parties 'own' intellectual property. Catch-all parties cannot afford to implement such a strategy, given their need to be broad-based and cover all major issues. When one of these 'owned' issues is salient in the electorate's mind, it creates the conditions for these 'issue owning' (including NFRPPs) parties to succeed. Similarly, when a niche party attempts to moderate its viewpoint, bringing it closer to the centre, it performs worse in national elections (Adams *et al*, 2006, pp. 314). Crucially, it has also been suggested that niche parties react primarily to shifts in their own supporters' ideological positioning (Ezrow, 2008, pp. 1). However, there are caveats. Klüver and Spoon (2014, pp. 683) highlight that the niche, policy seeking NFRPPs are no longer small and, in many cases, are now becoming prominent players, making it more difficult to maintain the 'ideological consistency' needed in order to remain in favour (Cox in Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 683). This difficulty can be seen in *Perussuomalaiset*, the Finnish

NFRPP, which is both the second-largest party in the Parliament and in the governing coalition. Its popular support has dropped dramatically due to compromising on its values to form a stable coalition (Yle Uutiset, 2015). For most NFRPPs, this ascent to power can be particularly problematic when campaigning on an anti-establishment platform.

These two theories are by no means exclusive but there is ample evidence to suggest they are generalisable (Ezrow *et al*, 2008; Klüver and Spoon, 2014). Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson put it well, that “Liberals and conservatives do not change their stripes, but they do engage in strategic behavior either to minimize risk from movements adverse to their positions or to maximize electoral payoff from movements supportive of their positions” (1995, pp. 545). However, to date there has been no study which focuses on the directional relationship between public opinion and the growing NFRPPs exclusively. There has been plenty of general research about niche parties with the greens, communists and populist parties forming a single grouping. These contributions provide good grounding for this investigation, however, Europe has progressed from the emergence of these ‘new politics’ parties. Future research will benefit from the ungrouping of these parties. Given the increasing successes of NFRPPs, and their gradual transition to power and the mainstream, there is a need to investigate them as their own entity. This is further supported by the desire of Klüver and Sagarzazu to “...explore whether niche parties tend to emphasise policy issues that they own while mainstream parties tend to highlight issues that are salient to voters...” (2015, pp. 396).

3.2 Moral Considerations When Researching Populism

There has been ongoing debate between researchers about the rhetoric studies should use when referring to populist and new far right parties. There are essentially two sides to the debate, and “In most cases, this decision [as to which rhetoric to use] is at least as much political as it is scientific.” (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1171). The first takes an extremist view: the *normal pathology thesis*. Populist and new far right parties are a pathology and should be approached as such (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1170-2; Kaltwasser,

2012, pp. 187). This view stems from a European approach to right wing populism, identifying the phenomenon as detrimental to democracy and stemming from fascism. If one accepts that populism is a pathology, then it cannot not be described using mainstream concepts and theories. Firstly, because they are too alien to the current system, and secondly because in using mainstream theories, one grants legitimacy to the supposedly anti-truth and anti-equality ideology which runs contrary to the values of the research community (ibid). However, the opposing side of the debate is underpinned by Bale's point: "Far right parties can no longer be thought of as somehow pathological or even parasitical. They have a significant number of loyal voters..." (2003; pp. 67). Mudde (2010) refers to it as *pathological normalcy*. The latter half of this statement can be said to be true, although the first half of the statement is debatable. Although NFRPPs have not yet gained absolute majorities, they *have* gained a plurality in many places, notably in regions of France and Austria. Views which have traditionally been associated with the far right are also becoming mainstream, with 43% of Europeans harbouring negative views of Muslims (Wike *et al*, 2016).

This paper opts for the latter approach because although one does not want to perpetuate potentially dangerous views, to ground the theoretical approach in personal feeling towards the phenomenon would be an additional moral issue in itself. Also, the fear of legitimising NFRPPs is no longer valid, as society has generally accepted them as mainstream as evidenced by actions the ballot box. The latter approach, whereby mainstream theories and arguments can be applied, will produce results comparable to the majority of more recent work.

3.3 European Populism and New Far Right Parties

Increase in support for NFRPPs is not a new phenomenon; it has been on the increase since the 1990s (Bornschiefer, 2010). Although there have been a handful of electoral victories for the far right ideology in 2016: The election of Donald Trump, the successful campaign to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union, and a close loss for Freedom For Austria's Norbert Hofer; this is debatably only a new chapter in a phenomenon that began further back, post-World War Two. One could also argue that

the populism trend has only grown more prominent in 2016 because it is now prominent in cultural soft-power centres and countries where the two-party dynamic is relatively and comparatively stronger- the USA and UK. Mainland Europe has been working with far-right as partners in government for many years, from *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria, Austria) in 2000-05, *Lega Nord* (Northern League, Italy) in 2008-11, and *Perussuomalaiset* (Finns Party, Finland) presently, since 2015.

Populism is a broad concept. Focusing on right wing populism, Kaltwasser (2012) offers three definitions of populism: *Liberal*, *Radical* and *Minimal*. The *liberal definition* is inherently linked to the liberal view of populism, defining it as a “democratic pathology” (pp. 188). It is seen to stem specifically from the fact that fascist factions still existed in many regions of post-war Europe. Today, however, the liberal definition of populism has been compared to more anti-European Union sentiments. Kaltwasser (ibid) put it: “When the links between the demos and the political elite are failing it may lead to a breeding ground for the emergence of populism” (pp. 188). For example, a clear connection can be drawn between the generally accepted point that for many there is a perception that the European Union has grown due to elite pacts and closed door negotiation, causing a disconnect between politician and public, (Kriesi, 2014, pp. 364), and that in turn this has caused anti-establishment, anti-EU stances NFRPPs to manifest (further). Essentially, the *liberal definition* is a negative definition of populism because “it is against political representation and constitutionalism” (Kaltwasser, 2012, pp. 189). The *radical definition* is simpler to define. It takes a more positive view and identifies populism as an integral part of democracy, some going as far as to say it is democracy in its purest form (Tännsjö, 1992). This definition expects common sense and mainstream ‘feeling’ to take precedence over political institutions and the associated constraints (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1175). In the UK this approach can be seen through sections of society being unaccepting of high court judge rulings on the grounds they have impeded the progress of the UK withdrawing from the European Union, given withdrawing was majority mood of the electorate at the referendum. This example fits with Kaltwasser’s (2012, pp. 191) final point on radical populism, that it

forms when people share joint frustration with the political establishment. The third definition is the *minimal definition*, which emphasises being unprejudiced and less normative (ibid). It is also the definition this study will utilise. The minimal view acknowledges the conflict between the people and the political, similar to the *radical definition*. However, rather than taking an economic, philosophical or emotional view, it states populism is due to failings with the mainstream political parties. The classic parties are failing to do their duty to citizens, not engaging fully with them as evidenced though declining turnout and increasing voter volatility. A minimal approach is also claimed to be more conducive to making generalisations across nations, a requirement for this study (Kaltwasser, 2012, pp. 195). Using a minimal definition means what is classed as 'populist' becomes wider allowing for better, more useful descriptions of this currently occurring phenomenon (Taggart, 2004, pp. 272). This is particularly useful when analyzing NFRPPs across all of the European Union, and not just in Western Europe as most other studies have done (Taggart, 1995; Mudde 2010; Adams *et al*, 2006).

The study has identified what populism is in *theory*, and that this paper will be using a minimalist definition, but what is populism in *practice*? Many scholars define it is an ideology which crosses the political spectrum in its rawest form (Taggart, 2004, pp. 274-5; Kriesi, 2014, pp. 362). Populism does not have a set of universal core values nor does it draw support from a specific section of society, and this is reflected in the policy choices and support bases of NFRPPs. Descriptions of populism in practice will not be universal across all countries, but are true when making generalisations. However, Taggart (2004, pp. 273-276) does identify some common features in far left, right and far right populism. These have an effect on policy making. Firstly, there is a common hostility towards representative politics with demands for more vertical rather than horizontal power structures. Secondly, there is an idea of a 'heartland' (similar but not identical to the idea of a core 'people'). Finally, that support for populism often arises as a reaction to extreme crisis: "Populism is not the politics of the stable" (Taggart, 2004, pp. 275). It is also proposed that in Europe, far left, right and far right

populism will also take an anti-EU stance (pp. 281) however the latter two taking this stance for very different reasons to the prior.

Building on the overview above, a specific definition of *far-right wing* populism can now be constructed. Taggart (1995, pp. 35-39) gives a very general definition which is defined by the 'negative'. The first negative is that right wing populism is anti-establishment; it is so because it sees large sections of society (be this true or only perceived as true) as being left behind due to globalisation, over-regulation or ignorance of elites. It capitalises on disenfranchisement and alienation of the average citizen (Mudde, 2010). Unlike left-wing populism which proposes that an 'overlooked people' forms as a result of social-class divisions, the right conceptualises the 'overlooked people' in terms of those which belong to the nation (the heartland) and hold the nation's values at heart, i.e. that there is a 'true people' (Kriesi, 2014, pp. 362). In a British context, the difference between left-wing and right-wing populism can be identified in the Scottish Nationalist Party and the UK Independence Party: the first taking a left wing, anti-Westminster (anti-Establishment) rather than anti-English stance; the latter taking an anti-immigrant, pro-British people and values stance. The second negative is the exclusion, rather than inclusion, of others. Due to the idea of a 'true people', xenophobia is core to right wing populism (Mudde, 1997, pp. 187). The idea of a 'true people' is always related to national identity, but can vary from party to party. This ranges from accepting those who may be of different ethnicity but who make efforts to assimilate to the national way of life, to only blood based assessments of someone's worth. Related to both the point of exclusion and anti-establishment stance is the third negative: an anti-minority stance. This position is often taken because the rights a state may grant to minorities are seen as being overly-regulatory and against the will of the common people (Taggart, 1995, pp. 36; Taggart, 2004, pp. 273; Mudde 2010, pp. 1175). For example, the short lived Dutch, *List Pym Fortuyn* (Pym Fortuyn List) is portrayed as "defending Dutch multiculturalism against Islam" (Taggart, 2004, pp. 281) A final but significant negative is that of negative freedoms, people should be free to do as they wish without the interference of others including

government, given that the common sense of the people should always take precedence (Taggart, 1995, 38-9).

What defines a New Far Right Party? A NFRPP should be born out of the new politics movement, a movement which brought with it other post-materialist ideologies such as ecologism (Taggart, 1995, pp. 36-9). This is as opposed to being born from mid-twentieth century European fascism, the old far right (ibid). Also, many have argued, that an NFRPP must also claim to be anti-establishment despite potentially being mainstream itself (Taggart, 1995, pp. 36), and be led by a charismatic leader (e.g. *Front National's* Marine Le Pen; *Partij voor de Vrijheid's* Geert Wilders) (Lubbers et al, 2002, pp. 351-2). As this definition of an NFRPP used is a thin, wide-encompassing, pathological normalcy definition, this study can draw meaningful comparisons across all of Europe (not just Western Europe).

3.4 The Right-Left Scale

This paper uses the standard political right-left scale (RILE) to measure ideological shift. According to Budge of the Manifesto Project (2013, pp. 6) the debate about the benefits of right-left scales can be a bone of contention between researchers: "Entering into a full blown debate about the merits of RILE every time an alternative is proposed is however counterproductive, as so many differing (and sometimes contradictory) alternatives have been put forward.". However, RILE is common for most studies of this type, for example Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Spoon and Klüver, 2014 and Ezrow *et al*, 2008. It is widely accepted as a basic measure of ideological leaning. In each of this paper's models, the dependent variable is measured in terms of *RILE scores*, whereby an actor's low or high score denotes how left or right they are, respectively. However, the right-left scale, more generally, is not without fault, with a number of researchers highlighting this: Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov, 2011; Knutsen, 1995; and Castles and Mair, 1984. These limitations are mostly related to defining what is 'left' and what is 'right, including: what measures one uses to create a scale; the changing connotations of both terms; and regional differences in meaning.

Castles and Mair (1984, pp. 73-74) describe the right-left scale as always being “created on an ad hoc basis...”. The problem of creation is twofold. Firstly, there is not now, nor has there ever been, one widely accepted scale; and secondly, each scale is constructed using its own set of unique but often overlapping criteria. Castles and Mair provide examples of such criteria: the adherence to a particular ideology; deriving it from a class basis; and propensity to align with particular policy goals. However, regardless of the dimension used, the right-left scale is still a measure of an artificial social construction. The problems of creating a definitive scale (that is, one that allows for the attributing of numerical values to calculate a right-left placement based on a set of fixed rules) are exaggerated when one begins to analyze what is ‘right’ and ‘left’ on a granular level. It is a subjective activity to decide if a particular policy, action or party statement is ‘right’ or ‘left’, and to what extent.

It can be argued that despite the ambiguity around defining what is ‘right’ and ‘left’, that there is still some consensus over the broad concepts that define each, however, these concepts are ever-changing and not universal. The terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ have origins in the French revolution. At one point ‘right’ referred to aristocracy and conservatism, with egalitarianism and social reform being values of the ‘left’ (Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov, 2011, pp. 514). With time the rhetoric changed to that of class conflict and economic arguments, but still with the same grounding, that leftist ideologies are those of the working class and the rightist being those of individuals with ownership over production (Kunsten, 1995, pp. 64-65). However, with the advent of ‘new politics’, that is the shift towards post-material politics, the economic (or class) dimension to right-left issues has diminished somewhat (ibid). Inglehart (in Kunsten, 1995, pp. 65) argues that the ‘right’ will be associated with material issues such as the economy and productivity; the ‘left’ associated with post-material issues, for example minority rights and social welfare. Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov (2011) take this argument further, finding in their paper that in liberal countries “basic personal values have indeed assumed a more important role than social structural position as determinants of political orientations” (pp. 558). The same study also proves that ‘left’ and ‘right’, in Europe, mean different things in different regions: “...‘left’ is sometimes linked to Western

liberalism and sometimes to communism...” (pp. 555). A more specific example being that in Czechia six of the paper’s ten ‘values’ map closely to conceptualisations of ‘left’ and ‘right’, as do four of the same six in Slovenia, but in the opposite direction (pp. 555).

Despite the the criticism, Knutsen’s statement (derived from Inglehart and Klingemann’s 1976 work (pp. 244-245)) “The left-right schema is thus a taxonomic system, an efficient way to understand, order and store political information.” (1995, pp. 65) is nonetheless a true one. There is no other system that is as universally applicable or widely understood as the right-left scale, even if each scale is constructed and interpreted slightly differently. This is evidenced by the extensive use of a right-left scale by most studies investigating ideological shift, examples of which as stated above.

4. Hypotheses

This study proposes four hypotheses to address the question research question: ‘What is the relationship between shifts in public opinion and shifts in new far right populist parties’ right-left positioning within a European context?’.

Hypotheses one and two investigate the effect the opinion of the electorate has on NFRPP positioning. From the theory discussed thus far, it is suggested that niche parties will be affected only by their own supporters, hence hypothesis one assumes NFRPPs will not be affected by shifts in the mean ideological position of all voters, and hypothesis two assumes that NFRPPs will be affected by those who support the party.

Hypothesis One: *New Far Right Populist Party Shifts In Right-Left Positioning At The Previous Election ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY Shifts In Public Right-Left Positioning.*

Hypothesis Two: *New Far Right Populist Party Shifts In Right-Left Positioning At The Previous Election ARE AFFECTED BY Shifts In Party Supporter Right-Left Positioning.*

Hypotheses three and four address the direction in which influence flows between public and party. They both use voter ideological positioning as their dependent variable. Hypothesis three supposes that shifts in NFRPP positioning will not have a significant effect on mean voter positioning, given that there is no theory currently that would suggest it does. Hypothesis four acts somewhat like a null hypothesis: because hypothesis two claims that the parties will be affected by their supporters change in ideological positioning, it is logical to assume this relationship does not work in reverse.

Hypothesis Three: *New Far Right Populist Party Shifts In Right-Left Positioning At The Previous Election DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT Shifts In Public Right-Left Positioning.*

Hypothesis Four: *New Far Right Populist Party Shifts In Right-Left Positioning At The Previous Election DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT Shifts In Party Supporter Right-Left Positioning.*

5. Methods

5.1 Data Sources

The Manifesto Project (TMP, formerly Comparative Manifesto Project, formerly Manifesto Research Project) and Eurobarometer surveys (EbS) serve as the primary data sources for this piece of research. They are complemented by the Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov) and the Electoral System Change in Europe Since 1945 (ESCE) project.

Addressing each in turn, the ParlGov database (founded in 2010) is a database that records the election results. Specifically: vote share, number of seats and cabinet

inclusion of approximately 1,500 parties across 37 democracies. It is one of the most comprehensive and easily accessible databases of its type, and according to those involved, the first to carry as advanced functionality and comprehensive data (Döring and Manow, 2011, pp. 2). Data is collected primarily through national statistics offices and supplemented through other sources, for example ECPR's Political Data Yearbook. ParlGov's party abbreviations are also the ones that have been adopted by this paper. Another notable metric they include is that of the left-right position of parties. Their RILE scores have not been used by this paper for a number of reasons. Primarily, because they only offer one score for the party, rather than a unique score for each election in which the party contests. Secondly, there is less written about the calculation of these scores compared to TMP's and similarly they have not, as far as this study can find, been used in any study similar to this one to analyse the relationship between party positioning and public opinion. Finally, because the majority of scores are accurate only to (usually) one decimal place with values between 1 and 10, offering less precision than the manifesto projects' three decimal places with values between -100 and 100. Overall, the ParlGov database is the most comprehensive and detailed online, English language database of historical party data, well suited to the needs of this study. One element that the ParlGov database did not cover was the *percentage* of seats that parties won, giving only the *total* number of seats. Because of this, information is taken from the Electoral System Change in Europe Since 1945 project. It has an extensive series of reports covering the changes in electoral systems and total number of available seats in chambers across thirty European states. Each of ESCE's reports are regularly updated and well cited, with a number compiled with the assistance of local experts, so the quality and reliability of the work is assured.

The Eurobarometer Survey (specifically the *Standard* Eurobarometer Survey, as opposed to the *Special* Eurobarometer Survey) is a large scale, cross-country, cross-sectional and long running biannual survey conducted by the European Commission. The EbS conducts (primarily) face-to-face interviews with approximately 1,000 (mean $n \approx 843$ in this study, excluding 'don't know' and 'refuse' responses) respondents from each EU state between two and five times a year, with two reports

being published each year. Surveying has been conducted since 1973, on a variety of issues including politics, quality of life and European affairs. Aside from being the largest and longest running database of information pertaining to European political views and values, the EbS has been used by a number of similar studies including Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Adams *et al*, 2006; and Castles and Mair, 1984 for similar purposes to this study. As such, it can be deemed to be a suitable and reliable source to measure mean ideological placement of voters in a particular EU state. Two questions were utilised by this study: "In Political Matters People Talk of "The Left" and "The Right". How Would You Place Your Views on This Scale?" and "If There Were a General Election Tomorrow (Say if Contact Under 18: And You Had a Vote), Which Party Would You Support?". However, variations in the meaning of 'right' and 'left' across different European countries aside, there are still a number of limitations with the EbS. Firstly, the Standard EbS only interviews within EU member state. This means that some years of data are missing for countries that joined after the year their NFRPPs were deemed significant by TMP, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland and Slovakia. Similarly, the EbS stopped regularly asking the question "Which Party Would You Support?" after the turn of the millennium, and as such all data from 2000-2015 is missing. Similarly, there is also missing data when the NFRPP in question was not included as an option for respondents. For example, it overlooked *Vlaams Belang* and *Perussuomalaiset* for some time. Despite these negatives, the wide usage and lack of alternative suitable sources mean the EbS is the most appropriate source to measure the ideological positioning of voters.

Finally, the Manifesto Project is an award winning database that compiles and codes information about over 1,000 parties across 50 countries since 1945. The database works by allowing a wide team of researchers to systematically code the content of a party's manifesto. Of interest to this study, the coders generate a RILE score following a formulaic approach accounting for thirteen right wing emphases and thirteen left wing emphases (Budge, 2013). It is a resource that has been used by previous studies: Adams *et al*, 2004 and Ezrow *et al*, 2008. However, TMP has been criticised by a number of studies. Franzmann and Kaiser state that there are a number of implausible

scores, "...too many problematic cases to be accepted" (2004, pp. 164). They also state that "...factor analysis for all variables gives 19 dimensions which are very difficult to interpret in most instances." (pp. 165). In this study, they attempt to separate valence, position and irrelevant issues to then focus only on position issues, and base what is 'right' and 'left' on which of these position issues major parties of each side prioritise (pp. 166-172), in opposition to TMP's static, all-issue encompassing, metric based construct of 'right' and 'left'. However, although the criticism is valid the model that they construct is nonetheless reliant on data from TMP. Also, as their model actively excludes regionalist and ethnic parties on the grounds of their ideological heterogeneity, it cannot act as a suitable replacement to TMP (pp. 171-172). Pelizzo's 2003 study finds that TMP scores are an indication of direction: "that is how (and how much) parties move to adjust to changing political conditions..." (pp. 68) and through a case study analysis of Italian parties and RILE scores point out a number of peculiar results. Once again valid points are made, but practical solutions to the problem are not offered. As Budge of the Manifesto Project outlines, there are many alternative models that can measure RILE scores, and the arguments to change their definition come from all directions, with some suggesting it should be further grounded in economics and others in equality issues (pp. 5-6). Taking Budge's conclusion, that one should "Stick to RILE as a general measure if it serves your research purposes." (pp. 7), this study is confident in its use of this commonly utilised data source.

5.2 Method

5.2.1 Discussion of Method

This paper followed the following steps in order to conduct its study:

1. Gather a long-list of parties
2. Shortlist and finalise parties to be included in study
3. 'Sanity Check' that parties are NFRPP
4. Produce a list of additional variables for consideration
5. Construct models
6. Collect, re-scale and re-code data
7. Run regression analysis

Steps one through four, and six will be discussed in this section; the construction of models is discussed in section 5.2.2; and regression analysis results in section 6.

The first step; a long list of NFRPPs was drawn up by analysing primarily academic sources, but supplemented by some media. Sources included, but were not limited to: Bale, 2003; Akkerman, 2012; and BBC, 2016b. Next, each party from this long-list was looked up in TMP's database. If less than two election cycle's worth of data were provided, as was the case for the UK's *UK Independence Party* and Sweden's *Sverigedemokraterna* (Sweden Democrats), they were omitted. A near final list of parties was then created, and is listed in Table 1. Of the fifteen parties included, two had only two cycle's worth of usable data, and hence *Partija tvarka ir teisingumas* and *Jobbik* are not included where variables are lagged in the models. In total, data was collected from fifteen parties from twelve countries over fifty-nine years. The number of election cycles ranged from two to sixteen, with an average of six. This equates to measurements taken ninety-four elections, equating to seventy-nine pairs of data (as calculating shifts means the first cycle of data is lost from each party).

Table 1: Countries and Parties Included In Study

Country	Party Name (Previous Name) English Name (Previous Names)	Abbreviation	Years
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs <i>Freedom Party of Austria</i>	FPÖ	1956-2008
Belgium	Vlaams Belang (Vlaams Blok) <i>Flemish Interest (Flemish Block)</i>	VB	1978-2003
Bulgaria	Атака <i>Attack</i>	Ataka	2005-2013
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti <i>Danish People's Party</i>	DF	1998-2011
	Fremskridtspartiet <i>Progress Party</i>	FrP	1973-1998
Finland	Perussuomalaiset (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue) Sannfinländarna (Finlands landsbygdsparti) <i>Finns Party (True Finns; Finnish Rural Party)</i>	PS	1970-2011
France	Front National <i>National Front</i>	FN	1986-2012
Greece	Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος - Χρυσή Αυγή <i>Popular Association - Golden Dawn</i>	LS-CA	2012-2015
	Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες <i>Independent Greeks</i>	AE	2012-2015
Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom <i>(Jobbik) Movement for a Better Hungary</i>	Job	2010-2014
Italy	Alleanza Nazionale <i>National Alliance</i>	AN	1994-2006
	Lega Nord <i>Northern League</i>	LN	1992-2013
Lithuania	Partija tvarka ir teisingumas <i>Order and Justice</i>	TT	2008-2012
Slovakia	Slovenská národná strana <i>Slovak National Party</i>	SNS	1990-2012
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid <i>Party for Freedom</i>	PVV	2006-2012

Previous studies have been reliant on TMP's 'Party Family' system whereby parties are grouped by ideology to categorise parties in their own study. This was used as the 'sanity check' to ensure that the parties identified are indeed are far right populist. Of course, not all parties that are classified as a 'Nationalist' or 'Ethnic and Regional' party (the party families that this study deemed to need no further investigation should a party be classified under them) will be populist, but this test coupled with the sources used to identify them in the first instance provide a sufficient level of confidence that they are. Three of the fifteen parties returned families other than 'Ethnic and regional' or 'Nationalist'. *Perussuomalaiset* is classified as 'Agrarian', and at one point it was, as it is born from the former *Suomen Maaseudun Puolue* (Finnish Rural Party). The change from agrarian to populist has not been reflected in TMP data, but it has the

features of a NFRPP: a charismatic leader, an emphasis on 'Finnishness', an anti-immigrant and an anti-establishment stance (Arter, 2010, pp. 502-504). *Fremskridtspartiet* is classified as a 'Special Issue Party', but the work of Hainsworth (2008, pp. 49) and their many citations reassure that the party is indeed populist. The 'Special Issue' status likely comes from its origins as a "tax-populist, anti-bureaucracy, protest party" (ibid). Lithuania's *Partija tvarka ir teisingumas* is classified as a 'Liberal' party, however this is likely an error. The party was formerly called the Liberal Democratic Party, but according to The Democratic Society (an organisation focused on researching Democracy and participation) the party is "a populist party based around the personality of Rolandas Paksas". It also acknowledges that the party "maintains an oddball ideology comprised of a mixture of liberal, conservative and right-wing populist themes"; and this may account for the incorrect party family classification (Terry, 2014). Overall there is a satisfactory amount of evidence to attest to the populist, new far right credentials of the all parties included in the study.

In order to effectively analyse the relationship between shifts in public opinion and shifts in NFRPPs right-left positioning additional factors have to be taken into account. Inspired by the work of Klüver and Spoon (2014) and Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013), the following variables, alongside *Change In Party Positioning*, *Change In Mean Voter Positioning* and *Change In Mean Supporter Positioning* are introduced. Firstly, *Change in Popular Vote* is included as an additional measure of support for the party in question. This has a secondary use, in complementing the small amount of missing data for *Change In Median Voter Positioning*. All of the variables listed so far are measured as the change between election t and $t-1$, or $t-1$ and $t-2$ if in a model where the variables are lagged. Related to the popular vote is *Electoral Defeat At Previous Election*, a measurement proposed by Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013) on the grounds that that a party may be more likely to take risks in the knowledge that their current ideological position will not yield results. The variable is coded as either '1' or '0', where '0' denotes a change in popular vote between $t-1$ and $t-2 \geq 0\%$ and '1' when $< 0\%$. Next are two variables that measure the party's size at the previous election: *Party Size By Vote Share At Previous Election* and *Party Size By Seat Share*

At Previous Election. These variables are important because they are a measure of how mainstream a party is, and in turn how responsive (Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 635). *Cabinet Inclusion After Pervious Election* is included as a party is usually in a better position to emphasise its position when in opposition, given that an incumbent party is somewhat restricted to hold the policy positions they had while in government (Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 637). '1' and '0' coding is utilised, where '1' denotes inclusion within a cabinet between t and t-1, and '0' denoting exclusion. Finally, *Region of Europe* is a variable that has not been included in previous studies, but is introduced given discrepancies between countries definitions of 'left' and 'right', as discussed by Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov (2011). Also, because all other studies have focused exclusively on Western Europe. A '0' is coded if the country is located in West or North Europe, and a '1' for East or South Europe, as defined by EuroVox (an EU organisation).

It is also of note, that TMP RILE scores were recoded from a scale of -100 (Left) to 100 (Right), to a scale of 1 (Left) to 10 (Right) brining it in line with the EbS RILE scores. This allows for clearer comparisons to be made between the two when discussing results. The use of *shift* in RILE scores rather than actual values overcomes the issue of comparing a methodically calculated scale with one which has scores generated by subjective self-placement. *Shift* ensures the scales are not being directly compared to one another, and instead a change in direction and magnitude is compared. When checking the data, no anomalous entries were found, however some NFRPPs, such as *Vlaams Belang*, according to TMP data do not shift their position every election. These cases were not removed, as this in itself is an active choice by the party.

5.2.2 Models

Thirteen models have been constructed and regression run for each using the SPSS modeling software. They are based somewhat on those of Klüver and Spoon (2014) and Schumacher, de Vries, Vis (2013). Where data is missing, cases were excluded pair-wise. Models I-VII address hypotheses one and two, and models VIII-XIII address hypotheses three and four.

All models are constructed where:

- ΔIP_{Xt} = Change in right-left position of party 'X' at election t , when compared to its placement at election $t-1$, as per Manifesto Project scoring.
- ΔIA_{xt} = Change in mean right-left position of respondents in country 'x' at election t , when compared to position at election $t-1$, as per Eurobarometer data.
- ΔV_t = Change in popular vote at t , when compared to result at $t-1$, as per ParlGov data.
- ΔIS_{Xt} = Change in mean right-left position of respondents who support party 'X' at election t , when compared to position at election $t-1$, as per Eurobarometer data.
- D_{Xt-1} = Electoral defeat of party 'X' at election $t-1$, as per ParlGov data.
- SV_{Xt-1} = Size of party 'X' in terms of vote share at $t-1$, as per ParlGov data.
- SS_{Xt-1} = Size of party 'X' in terms of seat share at $t-1$, as per ParlGov and the ESEC project.
- C_{Xt} = Cabinet inclusion of party 'X' between t and $t-1$, as per ParlGov data.
- R_x = Region of Europe country 'x' is in, as per EuroVoc classifications.

For models I-VII, *Change In Party Positioning* (ΔIP_{Xt}) is the dependent variable, this variable is never lagged in these models. Models I and II are the *Simple Opinion* models, where only ΔIA_{xt} and ΔV_t are included as independent variables, with model II lagging these variables. ΔIS_{Xt} is not included given the significantly small amount of data it carries, instead, it is included in models III and IV, the *Expanded Opinion* models. All variables are lagged in model IV. For model V, only the additional variables are included: D_{Xt-1} , SV_{Xt-1} , SS_{Xt-1} , C_{Xt} and R_x . This model is the *Structural Factors* model. Models VI and VII combine the *Expanded Opinion* model with the *Structural Factors* model to produce the *Full* model, where all variables are included. In model VII, the *Opinion variables* are lagged. Hence, the *full lagged* model (VII) is as follows:

$$\Delta IP_{Xt} = \beta_1 + \beta_2(\Delta IA_{xt-1}) + \beta_3(\Delta V_{t-1}) + \beta_4(\Delta IS_{Xt-1}) + \beta_5(D_{Xt-1}) + \beta_6(SV_{Xt-1}) \\ + \beta_7(SS_{Xt-1}) + \beta_8(C_{Xt}) + \beta_9(R_x)$$

Models VIII-XII address hypotheses three and four, using *Change In Party Positioning* (ΔIP_{Xt}) as the independent variable. These models discard the structural factors, as they inherently affect party placement more. The additional factors here, such as the effect of the media, are harder to measure numerically for a study of this scale, but the following basic models should offer first approximations. All odd numbered models lag the independent variable. Models VIII and IX use ΔIA_{Xt} as the dependent variable; X and XI use ΔV_t ; and XII and XIII use ΔIS_{Xt} .

6. Results

For each linear regression, the R^2 or Adjusted R^2 (if there are multiple independent variables) values are provided as a test for how much variability is explained by the model. Unstandard Coefficient 'b' values are provided, allowing for the effect one variable has on the dependent to be quantified. Finally the significance (p) for each variable and the ANOVA significance (where there is multi-variable regression) is provided, with values $p < 0.050$ (that is, where there is 95% certainty there is a relationship) being deemed statistically significant.

Table 2 On Page 27

Table 2: Regression Results With Change In Party Positioning Is The Dependent

Variable

Test / Model	I	II*	III	IV*	V	VI	VII*
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.150	0.145	0.277	-0.072	-0.128	0.079
Sig. (ANOVA)	0.197	0.017	0.281	0.272	0.974	0.913	0.205
Δ All Voter Mean Ideological Position	0.135 -0.725	0.008 1.502	0.238 -1.400	0.157 2.140	-	0.243 -0.770	0.007 1.653
Δ Popular Vote Share	0.317 -0.028	0.263 0.033	0.990 -0.001	0.646 0.032	-	0.412 -0.031	0.136 0.096
Δ Party Supporter Mean Ideological Position	-	-	0.086 1.025	0.122 -0.960	-	Missing* *	Missing* *
Electoral Defeat at Previous Election	-	-	-	-	0.702 -0.097	0.791 0.095	0.345 0.401
Party Size by Vote Share At Previous Election	-	-	-	-	0.624 -0.022	0.678 -0.025	0.610 -0.027
Party Size by Seat Share At Previous Electio	-	-	-	-	0.510 2.739	0.664 2.343	0.388 4.194
Cabinet Exclusion After Previous Election	-	-	-	-	0.827 0.077	0.826 0.100	0.826 -0.091
Region of Europe	-	-	-	-	0.740 -0.096	0.678 -0.159	0.854 0.062

Top number indicates significance, bottom number indicates result for Unstandardised Coefficients 'b test'.

Values in bold highlight where $p \leq 0.05$.

* Denotes all independent variables that can be lagged, are lagged

** Missing correlations, automatically omitted from regression analysis

From Table 2, only two models return statistically significant results: models II and VII. For both, it is the *Change In Median Supporter Positioning* variable that is significant. This goes against the literature, proving hypothesis one wrong. Hypothesis two also appears to be proven wrong, however it must be noted that there were a small number of cases available for reasons already outlined in 5.1 ($n = 12$, $n = 9$ when lagged), so it cannot be discarded with complete confidence. This small 'n' is also the cause of missing data in models VI and VII. The results show the mean placement of all voters significantly affects the ideological placement of NFRPPs, but that these shifts in party positioning are not evident until one election cycle after the mean voter shift because only in models where the variables are lagged can significance be found. In-turn, this demonstrates that, contrary to past research, which only addressed the responsiveness of NFRPPs as a part of a wider 'niech' grouping (Ezrow *et al*, 2008; pp. 17; Adams *et al*, 2006, pp. 525; Klüver and Spoon, 2014, pp. 650), that the theory of

'riding the wave' is the optimum theory to describe the behaviour of NFRPPs. From the 'b' values in models II and VIII, we see that for every shift of 1 point (on the 1-10 Right-Left scale) in the mean ideological positioning of all voters, the NFRPP will react by moving its position, on average, 1.578 points in the same direction. However, in model II there is a modest adjusted R² score, suggesting that only 15.0% of the variance is explained by the model.

Although all models are deemed statistically insignificant, model V, the *Structural Factors* model, is noteworthy. It suggests that none of the additional structural factors have an effect. The 'b' values offer further support for their insignificance to NFRPPs. Supposedly, a 1% change in proportion of the vote won at the previous election will marginally shift the parties position, but a 1% change in the proportion of seats won at the previous election will shift the ideological positioning of the party by 2.739 points in the *opposite* direction. This is exaggerated further in model VII where a 1% increase in the proportion of seats won at the previous election shifts the party's ideological positioning by 4.194 points, almost half of the RILE scale.

Table 3's regressions are used to explore hypotheses three and four; the effect party positioning has on public opinion. To prove both hypothesis, no significant results are expected.

Table 3: Regression Results Where Change In Party Positioning Is The Independent Variable

Test / Model	VIII	IX*	X	XI*	XII	XIII*
R ²	0.043	0.001	0.019	0.000	0.258	0.625
Δ Party Ideological Position	0.133 0.059	0.849 0.008	0.225 -0.684	0.888 -0.087	0.111 -0.311	0.004 -0.532

Top number indicates significance, bottom number indicates result for Unstandardised Coefficients 'b test'.

Values in bold highlight where p ≤ 0.05.

** Denotes all independent variables that can be lagged, are lagged*

As models VIII-XI bear insignificant results, we can be assured that hypothesis three, that NFRPP shifts in right-left positioning at the previous election does not significantly

affect shifts in public right-left positioning, is valid. The same cannot be said for hypothesis four, that there is no effect from party on party supporter. Only Model XIII yields a significant result. The model shows that as a NFRPP shifts its position, one election cycle later party supporters shift their position 0.532 points in the opposite direction. This however, does not seem intuitive, and there is a large possibility that it is incorrect, as in the model $n = 9$, too low to draw any meaningful conclusions. What it does however, is flag the need for this to be investigated further in the future.

7. Conclusion

This paper has explored current theory regarding the relationship between public opinion and party political ideological placement by discussing the two primary theories: 'Issue Ownership' and 'Riding the Wave'. It also investigated what is, and can be, meant by 'populism' in theory, before constructing a definition of what a NFRPP looks like in practice. The piece also discussed the problems surrounding the right-left scale, and what can be meant by both terms. Finally, it answered the question: "What is the relationship between shifts in public opinion and shifts in new far right populist parties' right-left positioning within a European context?" through regression analysis of thirteen models, across fifteen parties and fifty-nine years.

What the study found was unexpected. The major finding is that NFRPPs are significantly affected by shifts in median voter ideological placement with a lag of one election cycle. This clearly demonstrates that 'riding the wave' is the better theory to describe NFRPP behaviour. Although this finding goes against the thinking of Ezrow *et al* (2008), Adams *et al* (2006) and Klüver and Spoon (2014), no past research had investigated NFRPPs specifically, rather grouping them with other niche party ideologies such as ecological and communist. Indeed, this research has filled a gap. It is a gap that Spoon and Klüver alluded to in 2014 by stating that "In future research, we hope to open the political party box to further comprehend parties' issue prioritization..." (pp. 57). This study's reliability too can be assured, as the models used as based on those of past research, specifically that of Klüver and Spoon (2014) and

Schumacher, de Vries, Vis (2013). All available data from the TMP and EbS was incorporated into the study, meaning the reliability of this major finding is assured, and can be re-tested as and when more election cycles occur.

The study cannot be confident that its second, minor finding that NFRPPs influence the mean ideological positioning of its supporters (again, lagged by one election cycle) is a valid one given the small sample size. Similarly, due to the small sample size it cannot be said with confidence that the influence does not travel in the other direction, however it does seem less likely. Furthermore, all additional structural factors taken into consideration have been proven insignificant. This includes the regionality factor, an interesting result given studies such as Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov (2011) finding that 'right' and 'left' values alter from country to country, and significantly so in post-communist Europe. However, the list of additional structural factors explored could of course be expanded upon in the future, for example: the media's effects, party funding structures and global crises may all have a potential impact. Going forward, additional databases and/or methods to capture the ideological placements of specific party supporters will need to be developed to generate significant results to prove or disprove this minor finding. Similarly, it would be of interest to understand *why* NFRPPs act differently from their fellow niche parties.

Adams *et al* state: "a failure to recognize parties' behavioural patterns would be a guarantee that we cannot explain them. Understanding how parties behave is not the end of the process, but it is the best beginning" (2004, pp. 609). This sentiment is in-line with the achievements of this study, because this paper has given good first approximations in response to its overarching research question. Overall, this paper has provided a greater understanding of the way NFRPPs act and challenged past thinking. This is something critical should future research want to explore the growing phenomenon of new far right populism, and no doubt it will.

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II. Appendix

II.I. Output From Regressions

A substantial amount of data was generated through the regression analysis process.

An example is provided below from model II. The full set of outputs can be found online, here: www.goo.gl/hrKsEm

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Change In Popular Vote (Lag), Ideological Shift of All Voters (Lag) ^b		Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Ideological Shift of Party (Raw)

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.438 ^a	.192	.150	.856582354

a. Predictors: (Constant), Change In Popular Vote (Lag), Ideological Shift of All Voters (Lag)

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.634	2	3.317	4.521	.017 ^b
	Residual	27.882	38	.734		
	Total	34.516	40			

a. Dependent Variable: Ideological Shift of Party (Raw)

b. Predictors: (Constant), Change In Popular Vote (Lag), Ideological Shift of All Voters (Lag)

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.116	.140		.826	.414
	Ideological Shift of All Voters (Lag)	1.502	.539	.407	2.789	.008
	Change In Popular Vote (Lag)	.033	.029	.166	1.136	.263

a. Dependent Variable: Ideological Shift of Party (Raw)

II.II. List of All Variables and Associated Values

ID	Party	Election	Party/Ideological Position Shift (DVA)	Lagged Party Position Shift (DVB)	All Voter Opinion Shift (V1A)	Lagged All Voter Position Shift (V1B)	Party Voter Position Shift (V2A)	Lagged Party Voter Position Shift (V2A)	Popular Vote Change (V2A)	Lagged Popular Vote Change (V2B)	Electoral Defeat At (t-1) (V4)	Party Size by Popular Vote at (t-1) (V5)	Party Size by Seat Share at (t-1) (V6)	Cabinet Exclusion at (t-1) (V7)	Region Of Europe (V8) (E or S = 1)
1	AN	April 1996	0.00045	0.54235	0.1066895	0.1425312			2.2		-3.7	13.5	0.17301587	1	1
2	AN	April 2001	0.54235	1.327950	0.1428512	-0.21832964			-3.7		0.3	15.7	0.14761905	0	1
3	AN	April 2006	1.327950	-	-0.21832964				0.3		0.3	12.0	0.15714286	1	1
4	DF	November 2001	1.137510	0.135000	0.03082978	0.13625669			-0.4		1.3	0.07428571	0	0	0
5	DF	February 2005	0.135000	-1.039770	0.13625669	-0.23583479			1.3		0.6	12.0	0.12571429	0	0
6	DF	November 2007	-1.039770	0.730350	-0.23583479	-0.31750551			0.6		-1.6	13.3	0.13714286	0	0
7	DF	September 2011	0.730350	-	-0.31750551				-1.6		-0.6	13.9	0.14285714	0	0
8	FPO	May 1959	1.143000	-2.061000					1.2		-0.6	6.5	0.03636364	1	0
9	FPO	November 1962	-2.061000	-0.195750					-0.6		-1.7	7.7	0.04848485	1	0
10	FPO	March 1966	-0.195750	-0.195750					-1.7		0.1	7.1	0.04848485	0	0
11	FPO	March 1970	-0.195750	1.201500					0.1		0.0	5.4	0.03636364	0	0
12	FPO	October 1971	1.201500	-0.238500					0.0		-0.1	5.5	0.03636364	1	0
13	FPO	October 1975	-0.238500	0.378000					-0.1		1.2	5.5	0.0564481	0	0
14	FPO	October 1975	0.378000	0.837000					1.2		-1.6	5.4	0.0564481	0	0
15	FPO	May 1979	0.837000	-0.945000					-1.6		4.7	6.6	0.06010929	0	0
16	FPO	November 1986	-0.945000	0.936000					4.7		6.9	5.0	0.06557377	0	0
17	FPO	October 1990	0.936000	1.479980					6.9		5.9	9.7	0.09836066	1	0
18	FPO	October 1994	1.479980	-1.041705					5.9		-0.6	16.6	0.18032787	1	0
19	FPO	October 1999	-1.041705	-1.920015					-0.6		5.0	22.5	0.22850820	0	0
20	FPO	November 2002	-1.920015	0.617400	-0.03068585	-0.02193175			5.0		-15.9	21.9	0.22404372	1	0
21	FPO	October 2006	0.617400	0.135405	-0.07036245				-15.9		6.5	26.9	0.28415301	1	0
22	FPO	September 2008	0.135405	-	-0.02193175				6.5		6.5	11.0	0.11475410	0	0
23	FPP	October 1979	1.665000	-0.416500	0.27688840	0.07478753	0.19384615	-0.02136535	-3.6	-2.1	1	14.6	0.14857143	0	0
24	FPP	December 1981	-0.416500	0.364185	0.07478750	-0.01363650	-0.02136535	0.74806202	-2.1	-5.3	1	11.0	0.11428571	0	0
25	FPP	January 1984	0.364185	-1.546680	-0.01363650	0.14357628	0.74806202	-0.50000000	-5.3	1.2	1.2	8.9	0.09142857	0	0
26	FPP	September 1987	-1.546680	0.794475	0.14357630	0.057828789	-0.50000000	-0.50000000	1.2	4.2	4.2	3.6	0.03428571	0	0
27	FPP	May 1988	0.794475	-0.106155	0.05782870	-0.27796085	0.30476190	-1.12360248	4.2	-2.6	-2.6	4.8	0.05142857	1	0
28	FPP	December 1990	-0.106155	0.866295	-0.27796085	-0.15185950	-1.12360248	0.7350725	-2.6	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.09142857	0	0
29	FPP	September 1994	0.866295	-0.480140	-0.15185950	0.10451888	0.7350725		0.0	4.0	-4.0	6.4	0.06857143	0	0
30	FPP	March 1998	-0.480140	0.000000	0.10451888	-0.08200456	-0.08200456	-0.08200456	4.0	2.6	2.6	6.4	0.05285714	0	0
31	FN	June 1988	0.481770	0.000000	-0.21621620	-0.08200456	-0.06157228		2.6	2.6	0	9.8	0.06065858	0	0
32	FN	March 1993	0.000000	0.481815	-0.08200460	-0.14327684			2.6	2.5	0	9.8	0.00173310	0	0
33	FN	May 1997	0.481815	-1.039635	-0.14327680	0.33263100			2.5	-3.6	1	12.4	0.00000000	0	0
34	FN	June 2002	-1.039635	0.041670	0.33263100	0.04443228			-3.6	-7.0	1	14.9	0.00173310	0	0
35	FN	June 2007	0.041670	-0.918405	0.04443230	-0.30524416			-7.0	9.3	9.3	11.3	0.00000000	0	0
36	FN	June 2012	-0.918405	-	-0.30524420				9.3			4.3	0.00000000	0	0
37	Jobbik	April 2014	-0.974340	-	0.12643660				3.5			16.7	0.12178166	0	1
38	LN	March 1994	0.000000	0.397530	0.12786390	0.10668955			-0.3	1.7	0	8.7	0.08730159	0	1
39	LN	April 1996	0.397530	0.054360	0.10668970	0.14285312			1.7	-6.2	1	8.4	0.18571429	1	1
40	LN	May 2001	0.054360	1.327950	0.14285310	-0.21832964			-6.2	0.7	0	10.1	0.09365079	1	1
41	LN	April 2006	1.327950	-2.337300	-0.21832960	0.53976703			0.7	3.7	3.7	3.9	0.04761905	1	1
42	LN	April 2008	-2.337300	0.340200	0.53976700	-0.63921844			3.7	-4.2	-4.2	4.6	0.04128984	1	1
43	LN	February 2013	0.340200	-	-0.63921840				-4.2			8.3	0.09523810	1	1
44	PVV	June 2010	-1.143540	0.106560	-0.05959000	-0.10344890			14.5		6.1	5.9	0.06000000	0	0
45	PVV	September 2012	0.106560	-	-0.10344890				6.1			20.4	0.16000000	0	0
46	TT	October 2012	-0.288935	-					0.0		-5.6	12.7	0.10838288	0	0
47	PS	January 1972	-0.426815	-0.206460					-1.3		0	10.5	0.09000000	0	0
48	PS	September 1975	-0.206460	1.010790					-5.6	1.0	0	9.2	0.09000000	0	0

ID	Party	Election	Party Ideological Position Shift (DVA)	Lagged Party Position Shift (DVB)	All Voter Opinion Shift (V1A)	Lagged All Voter Shift (V1B)	Party Voter Position Shift (V2A)	Lagged Party Voter Position Shift (V2A)	Popular Vote Change (V3A)	Lagged Popular Vote Change (V3B)	Electoral Defeat At (t-1) (V4)	Party Size by Popular Vote at (t-1) (V5)	Party Size by Seat Share at (t-1) (V6)	Cabinet Exclusion at (t-1) (V7)	Region Of Europe (V8) (E or S = 1)
49	PS	March 1979	1.010790	-2.139885					1.0	5.1	0	3.6	0.01000000	0	0
50	PS	March 1983	-2.139885	-0.662355					5.1	-3.4	1	4.6	0.03000000	0	0
51	PS	March 1987	-0.662355	1.660230					-3.4	-1.5	1	9.7	0.08500000	1	0
52	PS	March 1991	1.660230	0.000000					-1.5	-3.5	1	6.3	0.04500000	1	0
53	PS	March 1995	0.000000	-0.953470					-3.5	-0.3	1	4.8	0.03500000	0	0
54	PS	March 1999	-0.953470	0.000000					-0.3	0.6	0	1.3	0.00500000	0	0
55	PS	March 2003	0.000000	-0.028620					0.6	3.1	0	1.0	0.00500000	0	0
56	PS	March 2007	-0.028620	0.314550					3.1	14.3	0	1.6	0.01500000	0	0
57	PS	April 2011	0.314550	-					14.3	-	0	4.7	0.02500000	0	0
58	SNS	June 1992	-1.507445	-0.228620					-6.0	-2.5	1	13.9	0.14666667	0	0
59	SNS	September 1994	-0.228620	0.693090					-2.5	3.7	0	7.9	0.10000000	0	1
60	SNS	September 1998	0.693090	-					3.7	-5.8	1	5.4	0.06000000	1	1
61	SNS	September 2002	-	-0.282285					-5.8	8.4	0	9.1	0.08333333	0	1
62	SNS	June 2006	-0.282285	0.256005					8.4	-6.6	1	3.3	0.00000000	0	0
63	SNS	June 2010	0.256005	0.096460					-6.6	-0.5	1	11.7	0.13333333	1	1
64	SNS	March 2012	0.096460	-					-0.5	0.3	0	5.1	0.06000000	0	0
65	VB	November 1981	0.000000	0.000000					0.3	0.3	0	1.4	0.00471698	0	0
66	VB	October 1985	0.000000	0.000000					0.3	0.5	0	1.1	0.00471698	0	0
67	VB	December 1987	0.000000	0.000000					0.5	4.7	0	1.4	0.00471698	0	0
68	VB	November 1991	0.000000	-0.003990					4.7	1.2	0	1.9	0.00943396	0	0
69	VB	May 1995	-0.003990	0.000000					1.2	2.1	0	6.6	0.05860377	0	0
70	VB	June 1999	0.000000	0.000000					2.1	1.7	0	7.8	0.07333333	0	0
71	VB	May 2003	0.000000	1.240560					1.7	0.4	0	9.9	0.10000000	0	0
72	VB	June 2007	1.240560	0.668240					0.4	-4.2	1	11.6	0.12000000	0	0
73	VB	June 2010	0.668240	-					-4.2	-	0	12.0	0.11333333	0	0
74	AE	June 2012	0.000000	2.626540					-3.1	-2.7	1	10.6	0.11458333	0	1
75	AE	January 2015	2.626540	-					-2.7	-	1	7.5	0.06944444	0	1
76	LS-CA	June 2012	0.000000	-1.613070					-0.1	-0.6	1	7.0	0.07291667	0	0
77	LS-CA	January 2015	-1.613070	-					-0.6	-	1	6.9	0.06250000	0	1
78	Ataka	July 2009	-0.236520	-0.578295					1.3	-4.9	1	8.1	0.08750000	0	1
79	Ataka	May 2013	-0.578295	-					-4.9	-	1	9.4	0.08750000	0	1