Can elections reinforce autocratic power? An analysis of the stabilising and destabilising effects of elections under authoritarian rule

Abstract

Electoral practice has long since been associated with the well established tenets of democracy. However, in the modern world elections are practiced across the globe in countries which have little or none of the recognisable institutions or practices which would be classically associated with democracies. For many decades in an effort to become more sophisticated elections, among other things, have been adopted by autocratic leaders so as to disguise the inner workings of their regimes and shield them from scrutiny. Elections have become multiuse tools which perform a number of useful functions. The purpose of this study is to analyse how effective elections are in conjuring regime stability. This study seeks to show the stabilising and destabilising effects of elections and the reasons behind them. This will be achieved initially through definition and the exposition of key theoretical groundwork and then through an analysis of four separate case studies: Mexico, Kenya, Singapore and Belarus.