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A Critical Perspective of the Western Sahara Conflict: Influences of Moroccan Occupation on Sahrawi Resistance

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Research Question: From a critical perspective, how does Moroccan occupation influence Sahrawi resistance in the Western Sahara conflict?

Abstract:

With more than forty years of conflict irresolution it has been remarkable that Western Saharan resistance has stayed persistent and developed from an armed struggle to predominantly peaceful civil resistance. Understanding resistance as reactions to imposed dominations, a critical perspective allows a better insight into how the Moroccan occupation - initiated in 1975 and still ongoing today - has influenced the Sahrawi inhabitants and provoked various forms of resistance. Honneth's recognition theory and Foucault's theorisations of sovereign and disciplinary power help shed light onto the motives and mechanisms of resistance. It is concluded that Sahrawi's struggle for the recognition of their right to self-determination stays constant throughout the conflict. The transformation from violent to peaceful resistance can be seen as a consequence of limitations imposed by the merging of Moroccan sovereign and disciplinary power in the 1980s as well as the fear of alienating international recognition and support for Sahrawi rights due to the de-legitimising effect violent resistance can have on their struggle. While the theories are successful in predicting that resistance will target the mechanisms of power, they are unable to fully make sense of the transformation from violent to peaceful resistance.

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1. Introduction:

The Western Sahara conflict has been marked by violence, conflict irresolution and more recently the puzzle of nonviolence. Throughout developments of decolonisation, war, occupation and a peace stalemate, Sahrawis, the native people of the Western Sahara region, have not laid down their claims or efforts to self-determination. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the influences of Moroccan occupation on Sahrawi resistance in the Western Sahara conflict through the lens of critical theory's conceptualisations of power and resistance. Particularly intriguing are the questions: what motives drive Sahrawi resistance? Which conditions and power structures shape its mechanisms? And how and why has Sahrawi resistance developed from a violent armed struggle to the almost exclusive practice of peaceful civil resistance? The Western Sahara conflict, currently reaching more than 40 years of conflict irresolution, is still an academically under-researched phenomenon that has received little international attention. The answers to these questions therefore hold theoretical and practical significance that can help political thinkers and actors understand the factors facilitating and maintaining the current peace stalemate as well as the resistance movement's key motives and strategies. Theoretical examinations of these questions help make sense of what is at stake for the natives of the Western Sahara and makes sense of Sahrawi resistance as direct reactions to Moroccan subjecting actions. These theoretical investigations may then offer practical guidance for future reconciliation efforts.

While the Western Sahara conflict is recognised to include a majority of actors such as Algeria and Mauritania, the analysis of power and resistance will focus exclusively on the Kingdom of Morocco and the ethno-nationalist group of Western Saharans or 'Sahrawis'. It is recognised that the term 'Sahrawi' also relates to an ethnic group found in north-western Africa yet this dissertation uses the term according to its popular use which refers to the group of native Western Saharans in favour of independence, rather than the widely dispersed ethnicity (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Within the larger group of Western Saharans there are two recognisable sub-groups. These are the Western Saharans associated with the Polisario Front, including refugees living under Polisario administration in Algerian based refugee camps and the Western Saharans within the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. A plurality of recent studies found overwhelming support for Western Saharan independence amongst both groups and so the term 'Sahrawis' in this dissertation refers to both groups (Barca and

Zunes, 2009; Fernandez-Molina, 2015; Mundy and Zunes, 2015; Porges and Leuprecht, 2016).

Two significant aspects of Sahrawi resistance need to be analysed to help make sense of how occupation influences it. These are the motives and mechanisms of resistance. This dissertation argues that Honneth's recognition theory and Foucault's conceptualisations of sovereign and disciplinary power are able to help explain Sahrawi resistance in these two aspects. Honneth's critical theory (1995) presumes that social conflicts are motivated by feelings of deep disrespect and indignation that occur when one actor denies or misrecognises another actor's love, rights or esteem. Foucault's types of power are theorised to be targeted by resistance that challenges power's specific mechanisms. Sovereign power seeks to supress and produce obedient subjects that are loyal to the might of the sovereign, the primary ruler of a people or country, often through violence and punishment (Foucault, 1977). Disciplinary power on the other hand produces subjects that fulfil the interests of those exercising it, and therefore establishes institutionalised norms, surveillance and dominates discourse and ideas. Under the assumption that distinct forms of power will provoke distinct forms of resistance, Foucault's conceptualisations of sovereign and disciplinary power are applied to the context of the 1975-1991 Morocco-Polisario war and peaceful civil resistance practices that emerged after the annexation of the Western Sahara to explore how occupation influences resistance.

The first chapter explores the theorisations of resistance and power within critical theory and engages more deeply with the strengths and weaknesses of Honneth's recognition theory and Foucault's sovereign and disciplinary power. The second and third chapters move on to apply the theory onto firstly violent and secondly peaceful resistance and determines the theories' abilities to explain how resistance responds to Moroccan exercises of power and the developments from violent to peaceful tactics.

Overall Honneth and Foucault's theories provide valuable insights into how Sahrawi resistance developed in response and under constraints from Moroccan occupation. During the initial stages of occupation, Morocco's use of violence and repression during the war are identified as direct exercises of sovereign power rooted in the Moroccan monarchy's need to establish its strength. This brings about theory predicted counter-power and armed resistance against the Moroccan forces. Once the Moroccan wall was built in 1981, enclosing most of the Western Sahara territory, one can identify the merging of sovereign and disciplinary power where violence continued but also sought to discipline Sahrawi loyalty for its occupiers. Under the new conditions of the Moroccan occupation, resistance turned from violent to peaceful for two reasons. The first is Morocco’s exercise of power’s ability to severely inhibit armed resistance. The second is rooted in Sahrawi’s struggle for recognition for their right to self-determination; the violent resistance options available after occupation are feared to deflect international recognition and support for Sahrawi rights and therefor withheld from. While the theories provide these insights, they lack a rigid explanation for when resistance specifically opts to turn violent or peaceful. They nonetheless maintain their value when applied as explanatory frameworks that allow for key motives and mechanisms of resistance to be identified in specific socio-historical contexts rather than rigid predictive frameworks.

2. Chapter One: Critical Theory and the Conceptualisation of Power and Resistance

Critical theory, understood as a broad umbrella concept, originally developed from Marxist theory and the Frankfurt school and is concerned with critiquing and challenging dominant forms of instrumental rationality meant to define modern society (Dryzek et al, 2013). Instead, it focuses on studying subjects as socially constituted within their historical-social context and often seeks to criticise "mechanisms, structures, and relationships which impede human beings in realising their potential" (Frankenberg, 2010).

While the existing literature on the Western Sahara conflict predominantly regards resistance through a rational choice framework - which posits that political developments are consequences of actors' logical preferences based on utility calculations - this dissertation argues that critical theory allows for a more insightful analysis of occupation and resistance. Examples have focussed on the causes of conflict as natural-resource interests or driven by the preferences of the Moroccan government and Polisario leaders (Allan, 2016; Pham, 2010; Joffé, 2010). Rationalist perspectives offer compelling insights into how conflicting interests lead to confrontation, but they insufficiently address the context which enables or restricts individual or group actions. The asymmetry of groups' abilities to achieve their interests is neglected. Honneth (1995) critiques the fixation on interests, where they are typically regarded as ultimate or original within the rationalist framework. Interests should rather be regarded as constituted within a "horizon of moral experience" in their given historical-social contexts (Honneth, 1995: 166).

Critical theory allows Moroccan occupation and Sahrawi resistance to be recognised as not primarily driven by rationalisations and pragmatism, but rather as reactions that are enabled or constrained within a very specific power structure. A deeper understanding of this structure allows to more clearly understand how different types of resistances, especially the shift from violent to peaceful, have emerged in reaction to and within limitations imposed by power. When applying critical theory to the Western Sahara it is recognised that any totalising theory is unlikely to fully explain the developments of occupation and resistance. Instead it offers an understanding of the relation between Morocco and Sahrawis as a field wherein power exists and is exercised through varying mechanisms which will necessarily invoke and respond to varying forms of resistance.

The subsequent section 2.1 will outline the critical understandings of power and resistance that will be used throughout the dissertation, section 2.2 considers Honneth's recognition theory, and sections 2.3 and 2.4 cover Foucault's theorisations of two forms of power – sovereign and disciplinary – and the resistance they elicit.

2.1 Power and Resistance in Critical Theory

Power as a concept, function or structure has long been considered in critical theory sometimes in reference to resistance. Since several scholars including Foucault have posited that "resistances […] by definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations", it is important to consider power and resistance individually as well as their interactions (1981: 95).

In a Foucauldian sense "power" can be understood as an "interaction of warring parties, as the decentred network of bodily, face-to-face confrontations, and ultimately as the productive penetration and subjectivising subjugation of a bodily opponent" (Habermas, 1994: 63–64, cited in Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014: 108). So power is not a possessed quality, but rather an exercise that brings about favourable changes and status quos for those who exercise it (Foucault, 1980; 1982; 1977). This leads to the creation of power structures, which as understood by Foucault, are networks of relations wherein certain actors exercise power which influences others. He further emphasises that power is ubiquitous and diffuse, meaning that it can be present in any interaction, relation, or communication rather than being localised in places such as the space between states and their citizens or classes (Foucault, 1977). This understanding allows analyses of power within all kinds of relations, liberating analysis from a limited focus on specific structures where one would expect power to be exercised, such as institutions. Foucault argues that power can be understood in negative terms, such as 'suppressive' and 'destructive', but also in positive terms, like 'productive' and 'creative' where one recognises that power can produce knowledge and individuals according to its interests (1981; 1977). Exercises of coercion or violence could therefore be regarded as negative exercises of power. Discourse seeking to normalise certain ideals subjects should adhere to is an example of productive power.

Resistance within critical theory has been understood in a multitude of ways. While there exists the assumption that resistance constitutes another form of power, there is a more convincing argument for resistance as a distinct yet inter-connected element (Barbalet, 1985; Foucault, 1977; Holloway, 2002). Since Foucault regards power structures as not univocal, "they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations" (1977: 27). Therefore, resistance occurs wherever power's grip is not all-encompassing and ultimately aims at escaping and/or challenging its effects. Resistance is conceptualised by Foucault (1977) as the element which eludes power (Pickett, 1996). Still resistance is not simply a negation of power but is also able to be productive, affirmative and even borrow its techniques (Pickett, 1996). In the relationship between "power and a strategy of struggle […] there is a reciprocal appeal" (Foucault, 1982: 795). Since resistance is related to power, it responds to its particular mechanisms. Different "forms of resistance are shaped by existing power relations but resistance also, paradoxically, reinforces and/or creates power relations" (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014: 111). While power is concerned with organising multiplicities and creating hierarchies, resistance aims at breaking these apart (Foucault, 1977). Resistance in this way aims at challenging what power produces, ranging from hierarchies, norms and subjects as well as the techniques through which power suppresses. This theorisation of resistance tends to be less structural and more post-structural, allowing for the emergence of spectrum-based typologies, usefully allowing theory to be applied more diversely (McGee, 2016). It highlights resistance's complexities in relation to power and its mechanisms and limits.

2.2 (Non-)Recognition as the Driving Force of Resistance

In *The Struggle for Recognition* Honneth (1995) establishes a critical theory that explores societal changes brought about by normative claims structurally embedded in social relations of mutual recognition. Central to the theory is the assumption that persons require an undistorted relation to oneself to be fully and truly capable of realising one's own needs and interests as an unconditionally autonomous being. This is achieved through the three forms of recognition: love, social esteem and rights. The recognition of each of these yields experiences of self-recognition, self-respect, and self-esteem which enable identity formation. An individual's perception of the self is intersubjective as it relies on recognition from other individuals and society to fully perceive oneself as individuated. The misrecognition or denial of any of these creates deep feelings of moral indignation because individuals feel they are denied the ways they ought to be recognised. These feelings become the motives for social struggle which aim at establishing mechanisms of mutual recognition.

From three forms of recognition Honneth (1995) distinguishes the denial of social esteem and rights as appropriate contexts for societal conflicts. For the analysis of the Western Sahara conflict the recognition of rights is the most interesting as it allows to investigate the struggle of Sahrawis in response to the denial of rights to “self-determination” which will be explored more closely in chapters two and three. Honneth defines the recognition of rights as typically “referring to those individual claims that a person can legitimately expect to have socially met because he or she participates, with equal rights, in the institutional order as a full-fledged member of a community” (1995:133). This requires legally institutionalised mechanisms that recognise a person or group’s autonomy. By obeying the law, a person recognises other members of its society as autonomous beings capable of reaching reasonable decisions about their shared moral norms (Honneth, 1995). The recognition of an individual’s or social group’s rights hence provides the basis for “self-respect” which is the “ability to relate [to] oneself as a legally equal interaction partner with all fellow humans” and protects the social integrity of the subject (Ibid: 134).

When any form of recognition is denied this becomes the motive and catalyst for social struggle (Honneth, 1995). In the specific case for non – or mis-recognition of rights, the individual becomes subjected through the structural exclusion of the possession of rights within a society. This brings about the “forcible restriction of personal autonomy” along with feelings of no longer enjoying the “status of a full-fledged partner to interaction, equally endowed with moral rights” (1995:133). This experience harms the subject’s sense of self-respect. While disrespect can be experienced on an individual level, group-shared moral feelings of indignation enable the motive for struggles and actions which can be manifested through “rebellion, protest, and resistance” (1995:161). Resistance and struggles against denied recognitions will then aim at expanding or creating processes of mutual recognition, to restore one’s sense of self-respect. Collective struggles often aim at creating institutional and cultural forms of recognition of group rights.

Honneth’s emphasis on moral feelings as primary causes of struggle offers a refreshing approach to understanding conflicts and investigates the experiences of those who are consistently and systematically marginalised and ignored. Especially a focus on the normative force of expectations for recognition allows an insight into the motives of individual and group resistances. While Honneth's theory explains that resistance's objective is to achieve modes of mutual recognition, it lacks a specific framework for which exact forms struggle may take specific to love, esteem and rights. Although this may cause the analysis of a specific conflict to be less coherent, it may also carry the merit that it allows the framework to be applied to a wide variety of resistances. This usefully allows for, as Honneth (1995) points out, resistance to be understood in both violent and peaceful terms (O'Neill, 2010). Despite this, critics argue that Honneth's theory lacks a satisfactory analysis of power (Allen, 2010). Since Honneth (1995) stated the intention to integrate Foucault's theoretical insights into struggles for recognition and to more completely understand how power influences resistance the next section turns to Foucault's theorisations.

2.3 Sovereign Power and Resistance to It

Foucault concept of 'sovereign power' is grounded in the might of the sovereign, the primary ruler of a people or country. Its primary objective is to establish a monopoly of rule and create subordinate subjects (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). It is characterised as suppressive, because it subordinates individuals through tactics of violence, terror and humiliation. It therefore does not accept public dissent or loyalty to other entities. Sovereign power exercises control through punishment. It tends to use the law and can be legislative, prohibitive and censoring (Foucault 1978: 83–85). Violations of the law calls for punishment because the sovereign needs to exact revenge for its challenged power. Foucault argues: "Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign" (1977:47). Furthermore: "The right to punish, therefore, is an aspect of the sovereign's right to make war on his enemies" (Ibid: 48). Punishment can take several forms, such as torture and public executions. These punishments often require an audience because they are not merely aimed at retribution, but they ought to display the strength of the sovereign and "the dissymmetry between the subject who dared to violate the law and all-powerful sovereign" (Foucault, 1977: 49). The punishment is therefore aimed at displaying a spectacle "of imbalance and excess" (Ibid).

Since sovereign power grounds its legitimacy in the "might of the sovereign" it is challenged by a resistance that claims "a different sovereignty that undermines the monopoly of the king, or that defies the pressure to obey and to subordinate to the sword" (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014: 113). Anti-authoritarian resistance will aim "to attack […] a technique, a form of power” (Foucault, 1982: 781). In this sense resistance seeks to undermine the mechanisms through which power is able to produce subordinate subjects either through circumventing or undermining it. While Foucault does not outline the specific forms resistance against sovereign power would adopt, Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) theorise that it could include a wide array of forms such as peaceful tactics, competing violence, counter-power, and strategies of power play. Resistance therefore could “challenge key mechanisms of power: commands, prohibitions, punishments, monopoly of violence, fear, obedience habits, status symbols, claims of legitimacy or legality or sovereignty” (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014: 113). Foucault nevertheless explains that ritualised violence “provided a support for the confrontation between the violence of the king and the violence of the people” (1977: 73). When subjects observe that the sovereign exacts obedience through violence, they soon learn that one could challenge the sovereign “only with blood” (Lachére, 1791, cited in Foucault, 1977: 73).

2.4 Disciplinary Power and Resistance to It

Foucault’s disciplinary power seeks to create subjects which willingly fulfill the interests of its exercisers. Central to discipline is “a relation of docility-utility” (1977: 137). Foucault states: ‘discipline […] arranges a positive economy; […] it is a question of extracting, from time, evermore available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces’ (1977: 154). It establishes “the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination” (Foucault, 1977: 138). It therefore transforms individuals into tools that serve its interests (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). It furthermore “makes individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1977: 170). To achieve these aims its main mechanisms are “hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and […] examination” (Ibid). In this way, discipline operates through close surveillance and constant monitoring of its subjects. It constructs norms that its subjects are encouraged to adhere to. Through “value-giving”, subjects that conform become more valuable than those who do not and non-conformity requires punishment or correction (Foucault, 1977: 183). Finally, it examines, through the combined use of observation and normalising judgement, whether subjects have successfully transformed into the tools that carry out the interests of its exercisers.

Since the central aim of disciplinary power is to create subjects both docile and useful, the aim of resistance will be to defy this process and the mechanisms that enforce it. So resistance to this type of power will refuse to participate in the construction of a new subjectivity or will include the self-transformation into a social construction that is not useful for the power interests (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). Unrebuked delineations from imposed norms create “a new de facto line […] governing what may be said and gestured” effectively challenging it (Scott, 1989: 59). Resisting disciplinary power means escaping or challenging its mechanisms of observation, normalising judgments and examinations. Surveillance, enabled by the control of space, will be obstructed by challenging the tools of surveillance or breaking free of confined spaces (such as the formation of underground tunnels to move discreetly, away from disciplinary power’s gaze). Resistance will actively aim at challenging normalising judgements by escaping or disrupting institutional control of ‘ideal’ behaviour or by avoiding or rearticulating its discourses. One example is “reversed discourses” where the resistor adopts vocabulary and terminology used by disciplinary power to speak about the norm in a way that challenges and renegotiates it (Foucault, 1981). An example Foucault explores is homosexuality’s demand for its “naturality” to be acknowledged, using the same term by which it was medically disqualified (Ibid: 101). In this way resistance also negotiates “subjectification”, the process that produces subjects (Foucault, 1977). Examination, as a combination of observation and normalisation, is undermined by challenging either of the latter.

Foucault’s theorisation of power as multi-formational beneficially recognises power as a complex exercise that does not always have the same intentions or yield the same results. Rather, it has differing objectives and mechanisms to achieve them. While any realistic power structure is unlikely to use one form of power in isolation, Foucault’s types of power allows the identification of archetypal characteristics and mechanisms when applied to socio-historical contexts. Dependent on the forms of power, Foucault’s theorisations usefully identify various forms of resistance either eluding or challenging power’s influence.

Generally, Foucault and Honneth’s theories lack a confident prediction of the precise forms resistance will take and instead rely on broadly characterising resistance and contemplating possible forms it *could* take. While this hinders precise predictions of how Sahrawi resistance will react in specific contexts scholars argue that studies cannot consider resistance simply in formal properties as mechanical responses to distinct forms of power (Barbalet, 1985; Johansson and Vinthagen, 2014). Rather the application of resistance frameworks ought to be a fluid and ongoing process and *must* consider the systemic context of power relations. Therefore, the next chapters will turn to the application of these critical theories to analyse how power is exercised in relations between the Moroccan regime and Western Saharan inhabitants to better understand how distinct exercises and forms of power can evoke varying forms of resistance.

3. Chapter Two: Decolonisation and Invasion of the Western Sahara: Sovereign Power and Violent Resistance

This section will analyse more closely Moroccan claims for a rightful rule and the 1975 invasion into the Western Sahara territory. These actions are seen to ignore and deny the Sahrawi right to self-determination as outlined by recognition theory, therefore providing Sahrawis with the motive to resist. The invasion and violent treatment of the local Sahrawi population are characteristic of Foucauldian suppressive sovereign power. Morocco's claims to a rightful sovereignty and military advance into the Western Sahara territory has prompted the two-fold response of firstly the declaration of a Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic (SADR) and secondly armed resistance against Morocco's military invasion. The first response reflects recognition theory's explanation of social conflict being rooted in denied recognition and that it therefore seeks to create mutual recognition. The second response meets Foucault's predictions and employs counter-violence in the form of guerrilla warfare in the 1975-1991 war led by the Polisario Front to resist subordination to the Moroccan crown.

3.1 Denied Rights, Sovereign Power and a Greater Morocco

According to Honneth's recognition theory, motives for social struggles arise when a collective group has its rights or esteem denied. Throughout the conflict Morocco identifiably denies the Sahrawi right to self-determination. Self-determination is normatively and mutually understood by the international political community as: "The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people" (UN, cited in Thuerer and Burri, 2008). It has therefore developed in the way that recognition theory claims – through a moral consensus which unofficially governs the distribution of rights (Honneth, 1995; Thuerer and Burri, 2008).

Sahrawi rights were originally internationally recognised in the late 20th century when the Spanish protectorate in the Western Sahara territory, originally established in 1884, faced dissent and insurgencies organised by native Sahrawi inhabitants. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed Resolution 2229 in 1966 which affirmed the right to self-determination for the Sahrawi population in the Spanish Sahara and later in 1972 resolution

2983 (XXVII) which reaffirmed “the inalienable right of the Sahara to self-determination and independence” (UN, 1975: 580, cited in Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 102). Spain thereafter began negotiations with the Polisario Front, an armed revolutionary movement claiming to represent native Western Saharans, which was established in 1973 and fought for independence from the Spanish colony (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Morocco and Mauritania challenged the handover of territory to Polisario, claiming the land rightfully belonged under their rule, and the contestation was taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975. The ICJ rejected the former two countries’ claims to the territory and again reaffirmed that native Sahrawis had a right to self-determination (Zunes and Mundy, 2010; Joffé, 2010). The UN resolutions and ICJ ruling recognised Sahrawi rights but more significantly also deepened the Sahrawi expectation that their rights ought to be recognised by the political community.

Despite the ICJ ruling, Hassan II, the king of Morocco continued to publically deny Sahrawi rights by announcing to the Moroccan population that the court had ruled in their favour (Zunes and Mundy, 2010; Joffé, 2010). Morocco continued to pressure Spain which led to the signing of the Madrid Accords in November 1975, an agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania for a divide of the territory between the latter two countries (Joffé, 2010). The settlement was reached without consultation of the indigenous Sahrawi population, violated negotiations between Polisario and Spain and most significantly disrespected Sahrawi rights. Sahrawis are seen to be treated as non-entities by Morocco, Spain and Mauritania and are excluded from an international political system based on the inter-subjective recognition of each nation’s autonomy. In the face of these developments Sahrawis felt betrayed by the Spanish and likely experienced what Honneth (1995) describes as feelings of moral indignation due to the denial of their rights (Zunes and Mundy, 2010).

To understand the effects of Moroccan occupation on Sahrawi resistance it is important to recognise that Morocco’s idealised identity of a “Greater Morocco” is a manifestation of the Foucauldian sovereign’s aim to establish a monopoly of rule (Dann, 2014; Zunes and Mundy, 2010). The idea of a Greater Morocco developed from Moroccan post-colonial nationalism and posited that European colonialism had robbed Morocco of its true pre-colonial territories including parts of Algeria, northern Mali, Mauritania and the Western Sahara (Mundy and Zunes, 2015; Mundy, 2009). After French decolonisation in 1956 the monarchy sought to re-establish the strong, autonomous country they believed Morocco was before foreign control (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). This identity and ideological claim is automatically resentful of any Western Saharan dissent which declared its own autonomy.

Eager to establish a Greater Morocco on October 31st 1975 the Moroccan military invaded the north-eastern border of the Western Sahara territory (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975, cited in Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Morocco's invasion was faced with armed resistance leading to a 16-year long war with Polisario (Porges and Leuprecht, 2016). The invasion and war-time repression of native Western Saharans is seen to exercise typical tactics of sovereign power. For instance, November 6th 1975 King Hassan II called upon Moroccan civilians to reclaim the territory and led approximately 350,000 civilians accompanied by Moroccan forces – in what became known as the Green March - as a deliberate effort to display 'the might of the sovereign' to the Sahrawis (Joffé, 2010; Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Additionally, during the war the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (RAF) used typical sovereign tactics of violence and punishment to create a population subordinate and loyal to the Moroccan monarchy. By executing the will of the sovereign, the RAF became an apparatus of sovereign power. Those who resisted subordination were regarded as 'criminals' who challenged the sovereign and therefore ought to be punished. The condition that was produced between 1976-79 can be described as a "totalitarian situation" where fear and anger were widespread among the West Saharan population (Mundy and Zunes, 2015: 29).

> "The soldiers […] have butchered hundreds and perhaps thousands of Sahrawis, including children and old people who refused to publicly acknowledge the king of Morocco. […] Some have seen their children killed in front of them by way of intimidation […] Women described to us how they have been tortured and how soldiers cut off young men's fingers to make them unable to fight" (Harrel-Bond 1981: II:5-6).

Accounts of Sahrawi experiences of the invasion, such as the quote above, demonstrate how any inhabitants in the invaded region that refused to accept an imposed legitimacy of Moroccan sovereignty were punished through the violent means of extra-judicial killings, torture, sex crimes, and imprisonments (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Especially the disappearances of approximately 1,500 Sahrawis created a "culture of fear" characteristic of Foucault's sovereign power (Ibid: 29). While punishments aim to display the dissymmetry of power between the sovereign and those it considers criminals for not obeying its will, they can also be seen to make use of an audience. In this case the audience is the Sahrawi population amongst whom Morocco is attempting to establish its rule. Brutalities such as the killing of children, public executions and the burying of whole families in the desert (Mundy and Zunes, 2015) sought to terrorise the Sahrawi audience into submission and made a spectacle “of imbalance and excess[ive] force” (Foucault, 1977: 49).

According to recognition theory (Honneth, 1995) one would expect Sahrawi resistance to respond to the denial of their right to self-determination through resistance that seeks to create a means through which Sahrawi rights would be recognised by the Moroccan government. Resistance would also actively challenge the imposed Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Possible tactics include peaceful negotiations, internationally shaming Morocco to accept UN and ICJ re-affirmations, or forcefully expelling Moroccan forces. Resistance against Moroccan exercises of sovereign power, according to Foucault’s theorisations, would target precisely the means through which Morocco attempts to establish its control. As this was a military invasion, escape or a counter-attack would be expected. Morocco’s violence - including torture, imprisonments and siege of cities - would also be expected to be targeted by violent or peaceful means. This would most likely occur by, as Foucault argues, challenging the apparatuses that enforce these tactics.

3.2 Sahrawi Nationalism and Armed Resistance

Sahrawi resistance can be identified as a struggle for recognition as theorised by Honneth. Resistance appears rooted in moral feelings of disrespect and indignation because Sahrawi’s right to self-determination was severely violated originally by the Spanish colony and then by Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion. Sahrawi collective feelings and struggles for independence can be seen as early as the Spanish colonisation when tribes organised raids and insurgencies against the Spanish protectorate in the territory (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). By the 1970s the development of the insurgency coalesced into Sahrawi nationalism which sought to shake off the dominance of any foreign control (Naylor, 2010). The 1975 Moroccan invasion further denied Sahrawi right to self-determination and provoked a struggle to defend the Sahrawi autonomy and nationalist identity on a legal and international level. A month after the invasion on November 28th 1975 the majority of native Sahrawi representatives and leaders signed the Galtah Zammur declaration which named Polisario as “the sole legitimate authority of the Saharan people” (Hultman and Larkin 1985: 32). This declaration was ignored by Morocco, whose forces continued to invade the region. On February 27th 1976 Polisario announced the formation of a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and declared Western Sahara as an independent nation as a further demand for recognition of Sahrawi rights and an act of resistance against the Moroccan demand for submission (Martin, 2005; Zunes and Mundy, 2010). By establishing and announcing a Sahrawi government, the Sahrawi people are precisely resisting domination and demanding Morocco to recognise that they are moral agents capable of self-determination and governing themselves in the realm of international politics. Additionally, if Morocco is pursuing the establishment of control over the Western Sahara territory and its inhabitants through sovereign power, Sahrawi resistance is seen to challenge this, as the theory predicts, by claiming legitimacy for their own sovereignty. Thus the Polisario Front challenged Morocco's expression of "sovereignty as the innate right of a state to express sovereign power over its territory", by claiming that sovereignty should instead reflect "the rights of a nation inhabiting a territory to claim sovereignty over it – the essence of self-determination" (Joffé, 2010: 376).

When Morocco invaded the Western Sahara territory an independence movement mobilised to challenge Moroccan claimed supremacy over the area (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Foucault (1977) theorises resistance as the element that eludes and/or challenges power's effects (Pickett, 1996). Despite the theory's lack of specification when resistance either eludes and/or challenges, Sahrawi resistance can be observed to do both. Moroccan violence from 1975-1976 caused a mass Sahrawi exodus to Algeria near the city Tindouf. This escape can be regarded as resisting Morocco's sovereign power by fleeing the areas it had occupied and exercised power in. On the other hand, the Polisario Front as a representative of Sahrawis, responded to Moroccan forces with counter-violence as the only means available to both resist sovereign power and preserve the right to self-determination over the territory. By setting up refugee camps and the SADR 'government in exile' in Tindouf, Polisario was effectively able to both enter the Western Sahara to attack Moroccan forces and challenge the mechanisms of sovereign power as well as elude them by escaping back through the porous borders into Algeria where Moroccan power could not reach due to fear of the Algerian sovereignty (Zunes and Mundy, 2010).

Violent guerrilla resistance became the primary means through which the Polisario Front aimed at undermining Morocco's sovereign violence and 'might'. O'Neill (2010) posits that violence should be theorised as a legitimate mechanism of resistance against non-recognitions defined by Honneth. Those who are "brutalised by state violence, will inevitably feel disrespected, humiliated and deeply alienated from the existing order" (O'Neill, 2010: 134). This leads to the justified use of political violence and increasingly "desperate means of struggle in resisting the [experienced] injustices" (Ibid: 135). Foucault also predicted that the sovereign power's use of violence could prompt adversaries to perceive violence as the only means by which it can be challenged, which appears to be Polisario's response to the Moroccan invasion although it does not exact the same extent of brutality.

Moroccan violence motivated large numbers of Sahrawis to join Polisario's Saharan People's Liberation Army (ELPS) because the conditions of the invasion eroded normal life (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Most fighting-age men of the Western Saharan population were involved in the insurgency either as soldiers in the ELPS or as workers in supporting roles. Sahrawi women took care of the refugee camps and underwent arms training to defend them. The mere mobilisation of an army made of local Sahrawis and mass defections of Sahrawi soldiers from Tropas Nomados, the Spanish colonial military forces, already marked disobedience to Moroccan dominance and a readiness to employ counter-violence. Even the ELPS' military strategy of *al-ghazi* reflected the resistance's ability to both challenge and elude Morocco's power. The centuries-old practice of *al-ghazi*, a raid, made use of quick assaults and retreats (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). The assaults directly attacked the RAF, which are direct tools of sovereign power, while the rapid retreats would then elude the RAF's ability to retaliate. Polisario's armed struggle was celebrated when they returned to the Algerian-based camps with the waving of flags where they paraded Moroccan prisoners and captured weapons (Martin, 2005). These practices inflicted serious military damage and undermined the credibility of the RAF and thereby the legitimacy of Moroccan sovereignty (Cobo and Menéndez, 2006).

Since Morocco exercised its sovereign power through the RAF they became the primary targets of the armed struggle. The ELPS attacked RAF positions, military columns, and supply convoys and power supplies to, as Foucault (1977) predicts, render the tools of power enforcement ineffective (Cobo and Menéndez, 2006). Armed resistance against Foucault's sovereign power is theorised by Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) to effectively undermine the sovereign's monopoly of violence by limiting the influence of power in at least certain geographic areas. Throughout the 1970s the Polisario armed struggle enjoyed these successes. They managed to expel Mauritanian forces by 1979 and thereafter became bolder in their attacks against the RAF. While Moroccan forces aimed at conquering certain posts in the territory and then defending them, the Sahrawi forces made use of the wide gaps between these fixed positions (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). The use of these gaps effectively demonstrates ELPS' resistance by exercising their own freedom of movement, allowing their behaviour to remain uncontrolled by sovereign power's efforts to constrain. In an interview a Sahrawi fighter explained: "It isn't enough to hold the post - the land in between has to be occupied, and if it isn't, it will be hell for them […] That is where we are at home" (Weexsteen, 1976: 3, cited in Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 8). Describing the territory as "home" further opposes the imposed legitimacy of Moroccan rule. In the first years of the war this tactic, knowledge of the terrain and arms supplies from neighbouring countries allowed Sahrawi resistance to push the Moroccan invasion into a few pockets in the Western Sahara. Much of the territory was open to Polisario and the armed struggle effectively resisted Moroccan attempts at establishing obedience in the territory (Zunes and Mundy, 2010; Mundy and Zunes, 2015: 24).

As the RAF used torture and violence to create subordinate Western Saharan individuals, the Polisario Front targeted the military armies to liberate indigenous Sahrawis. While Moroccan forces were putting cities under siege, occupying them, torturing and imprisoning Sahrawi inhabitants, the Polisario Front aimed at taking back control of those cities. Attacks on Moroccan occupied cities frequently aimed at freeing Sahrawi prisoners. One example of this is the January 28th 1979 two-hour invasion of the Moroccan city Tan Tan which had a predominantly Sahrawi ethnic population and managed to free political prisoners (Mundy, 2009). In another example, the ELPS conducted a daring three-sided attack on the heavily militarily occupied Western Saharan city Smara on October 6th and claimed to have freed hundreds of political prisoners, seeking to undo and attack Moroccan punishment of the disobedient Sahrawi native population (Africa Research Bulletin, 1979, cited in Zunes and Mundy, 2010).

As a defensive military strategy Morocco started building a wall in 1981 in response to Polisario insurgency to secure and control the activities in the cities and territory it had seized. The wall was originally constructed from sand, dirt and stone embankments that were one to two meters tall, mined on the Polisario side, monitored by electronic sensing devices and guarded by approximately 100,000 to 150,000 Moroccan soldiers (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). This severely limited the freedom of movement of the ELPS. The ELPS continued to resist the Moroccan sovereign demand for obedience from the Sahrawi population to its might by targeting the wall. They removed mines, the wall's barbed wire and subverted electronic detection devices (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Mines were often moved to the Moroccan side. The wall could sometimes be secretly penetrated which allowed the ELPS to continue the strategy of counter-violence and attack Moroccan posts from an undefended rear. Despite these efforts to challenge and circumvent sovereign violent mechanisms the wall limited Sahrawi’s ability to move in the territory freely. As the wall was bolstered, it constrained the Sahrawi guerrilla resistance so much it could no longer defeat the Moroccan army. Towards the end of the 1980s a military stalemate developed.

4. Chapter Three: Western Sahara after the War: Disciplinary Power and Peaceful Resistance

As Moroccan forces successfully occupied the Western Sahara territory, the ultimate aim of sovereign power to create subjects obedient to the Moroccan regime and power mechanisms relating to violence and punishment persisted. However, at the start of the 1980s the regime "realised it could not terrorise the population into submission" (Mundy and Zunes, 2015: 29) and started to employ tactics that disciplined Sahrawis into fulfilling Moroccan interests. The building of the wall and therefore newly achieved control of the territory significantly allowed for the merging of sovereign and disciplinary power tactics to not only create subjects obedient to the Moroccan sovereignty but to additionally mould the occupied Sahrawi population into subjects that identified with and supported a Moroccan regime. With the majority of the Sahrawi population in exile and a fraction under occupation Sahrawi indignation, struggle for recognition and resistance against Moroccan domination continued. The new dynamic created by the use of sovereign and disciplinary power constrained the ability for Sahrawis to resist violently, while instead new opportunities for peaceful resistance emerged. These were either openly defiant, such as protests, or more covert making use of discourse, poetry and cultural celebrations. Sahrawi's struggle for recognition furthermore constrained resistance to a peaceful form to avoid averting the international community from supporting their rights.

4.1 Disciplinary Power under Moroccan Occupation

Morocco's "great wall" built in 1981 marks the beginnings of the enforcement of disciplinary power, which according to Foucault (1977) begins with the control of space or enclosure. At the end of its construction the wall constituted the "largest functional military barrier in the world" (Copson, 1994: 660) allowing Morocco "more or less absolute control over 80 percent of Western Sahara" (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 21). It enclosed virtually all major Western Saharan towns (Zunes, 2006). The hereby established control of movement and monitoring of Western Saharan inhabitants greatly enabled Morocco's ability to enforce discipline. Disciplinary power seeks to establish a "positive economy" producing "useful forces" which fulfil the interests of its exercisers (Foucault, 1977). What followed was a disciplinary Moroccan administration of the Sahrawi population, which sought to establish a docile population which could be utilised to fulfil Moroccan interests. At the same time Morocco's objective to create obedient subjects loyal to its crown remained and violent sovereign mechanisms continued, including the threat of disappearances, torture, or arbitrary arrest of Sahrawis who openly supported independence (Zunes, 2010). No longer employing 'spectacles of violence' (Foucault, 1977), repression became quieter and less visible but remained forceful. Dissent against the regime was now constrained by kidnapping suspected nationalists during the night-time and torturing independence supporters in prisons (Barca and Zunes, 2009). The disciplinary enclosure and control of space even enabled sovereign violence to be exercised more easily because the subjects it seeks to influence, the around 150,000 Sahrawis (Zunes and Mundy, 2010), are easily accessible in one location. The result of the merging of disciplinary and sovereign tactics was an occupation which sought to normalise Moroccan rule among the native Sahrawi population while violently but more covertly suppressing dissent. The next paragraphs will focus exclusively on the disciplinary tactics.

The use of normalising judgements to encourage Sahrawis to subscribe to certain norms, as a major mechanism of disciplinary power, is clearly identifiable in 'Moroccanisation' efforts. The aim of this policy was to negotiate and ultimately generate a new subjectivity for Sahrawis; where they previously identified themselves as having a distinct cultural history and an autonomous people deserving of a nation, Morocco disciplined Sahrawis to accept an identity and norm wherein they would see themselves as 'Moroccan'. Moroccan discourse promoted a Moroccan state of multi-ethnic national unity of which Sahrawis are merely a minority group, not a distinct national entity (Boum, 2007, cited in Deubel, 2012: 297). The Moroccanisation policy also sought to assimilate Sahrawis by offering economic incentives such as employment and free housing inside Morocco (Stephan and Mundy, 2006). It furthermore seeks to diminish Sahrawi culture and heritage through the ban of the Sahrawi hassaniya dialect and encouragement of the use of Moroccan dialects in the education system and public institutions (Murphy and Omar, 2013). The Moroccanisation policy included both mechanisms of threats, incentives, and value-giving. Polisario members are intimidated and bribed to abandon the Sahrawi nationalist cause and support Moroccan integration; when this is achieved they are rewarded financially, assigned a higher value and often required to internationally denounce their former association (Stephan and Mundy, 2006).

Following the UN brokered ceasefire in 1991 Morocco and Polisario agreed upon a UN monitored referendum on the question of Western Saharan independence (Stephan and Mundy, 2006). Morocco took extensive measures of disciplinary coercion against the Sahrawi population to generate support for Moroccan integration. Even though the referendum today is still delayed by the Moroccan regime today, the preparations it took to generate Moroccan support were notable. Morocco's initial agreement to the referendum used disciplinary measures by seeking to increase the "aptitude" of Sahrawi subjects by enabling them to exercise a choice, while at the same time increasing their "utility" and "domination" (Foucault, 1977: 138) by controlling *how* they vote, namely in support of Moroccan interests for integration. Sahrawi refugees who had fled to Algeria during the war and Sahrawis native to the Western Sahara were meant to vote, but through disciplinary control of space Morocco hindered repatriation. Morocco additionally re-settled large numbers of Moroccan civilians into the territory disguising them as Sahrawis and arguing for their vote in the referendum, hence utilising them too to fulfil Moroccan interests (Zunes and Mundy, 2010).

To effectively control Sahrawi inhabitants, disciplinary power needs to organise them. This is achieved through the control of space, supervision, and partitioning (Foucault, 1977). The wall effectively cut Sahrawis under occupation off from their friends and relatives in the Algeria-based refugee camps. Urban areas became ruled in ways characteristic to a repressive police state with secret Moroccan police which monitored Sahrawi sentiments and behaviour and restricted civilian freedom of movement (Barca and Zunes, 2009; Mundy and Zunes, 2015). The use of economic partitioning in Western Sahara was particularly evident. Moroccan administration ruled the Western Sahara through "a system of handpicked clients that are handsomely rewarded for their obedience to the crown", including tribal elders and notable Sahrawis such as high profile Polisario defectors (Mundy, 2006: 264). Locally elected officials on the other hand are kept in check by the Moroccan government. The enclosed Western Sahara territory is furthermore "partitioned" through economic marginalisation. While the Moroccan government claims to have invested millions of dollars into improving the living standards of the region, figures show that the economy in Western Sahara is the poorest in relation to Moroccan provinces (Shelley, 2005). Moroccan settlers and Sahrawi collaborators are given preference for housing and employment while the remainder of the native Sahrawi population rarely enjoys any benefit from the region's rich fisheries and phosphate deposits (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Creating an economically difficult environment for native Sahrawis within the occupied Western Sahara, paired with promises of economic rewards when demonstrating support for the Moroccan sovereignty, seeks to re-direct and discipline Sahrawi loyalty to the Moroccan nation.

Since Morocco continues to deny Sahrawi rights, according to recognition theory resistance would continue to demand for Sahrawi recognition. Polisario while in exile could attempt negotiations with Mororcco and/or internationally shame them, while Sahrawis under occupation could demand recognition through social movements. According to Foucault's conceptualisation of disciplinary power Sahrawi resistance would respond to Moroccan disciplinary measures by disrupting institutions and mechanisms set in place to discipline Sahrawis to conform to norms created by the Moroccan regime. Essentially resistance will have to resist Moroccanisation and continue to champion a Sahrawi nationalist identity. Tactics could include disobedience or violence towards Moroccan security forces and police, refusing to follow Moroccan rules, and self-created narratives and discourses on what it means to be a Sahrawi as opposed to Moroccan.

4.2 Sahrawi Identity under Occupation and Peaceful Resistance

As conditions in the Western Sahara region changed from colonialism, to war, to occupation the core motive for struggle - generating Moroccan recognition for the Sahrawi right to self-determination - remained constant. Sahrawis hoped that drawing attention to the conditions of the occupation would solidify international solidarity and pressure Morocco and its supporters in the UN to change their policies in the region, whereby Morocco would *have to* recognise Sahrawi rights (Dann, 2014; Mundy and Zunes, 2015). The exiled Polisario Front engaged in an "international diplomatic campaign" (Mundy and Zunes, 2015: 30). As the war developed into a military stalemate Polisario accepted the UN-proposed 1991 Settlement Plan which aimed at organising a free and fair referendum on the question of Western Saharan (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Repeated Moroccan appeals against a voter list, fearing the original 1974 Spanish census would yield a result in favour of independence, suspended the referendum. Despite unsuccessful resolution efforts by the UN, Polisario continued to aim at creating international support (Smith, 2007). While these efforts had some success with the SADR being recognised by approximately 80 states and becoming a full member of the African Union, it has failed to animate the international community to seriously pressure Morocco to cease denying Sahrawi self-determination (Barca and Zunes, 2009). In the occupied Western Sahara peaceful demonstrations aspire to draw international attention to the desire for independence. This is often done by timing demonstrations to take place when international actors or Moroccan royalty are visiting the territory (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). For example, in 1995 Sahrawi activists carefully organised demonstrations to coincide with the visit of a UN delegation to the territory to monitor the progress of the referendum. These efforts sometimes attracted attention such as 2005 when images and videos surfaced online showing the police violently beating Sahrawis during peaceful protests. As of yet civil resistance movements have not gained enough international attention to successfully delegitimise and shame the Moroccan occupation, contributing to the persistence of today's peace stalemate (Dann, 2014).

The shift from violent to an almost complete use of peaceful resistance is attributed to two factors. The first is the limitations produced by the wall. Theorisations of resistance regard it as the element that eludes and/or challenges power but that at the same time it is also an activity that happens within the confines of power (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014; Foucault, 1977; Pickett, 1996). The wall controlled Polisario forces' movement around the terrain so much they were no longer able to militarily defeat the Moroccan army (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Since the success of the ELPS' guerrilla tactics lied in the *al-ghazi* raid, knowledge of the terrain, and porous borders, the control of their movement successfully undermined their armed struggle. Due to the new enclosure and thereby control of what happens within this enclosed space, the few available options for violent resistance were urban warfare or terrorism (Mundy, 2006; Zunes and Mundy, 2010). These options however are in conflict with the principle aim of Sahrawi resistance: the establishment of recognition for their right to self-determination. This is the second factor that has re-directed Sahrawi resistance to peaceful means. Tactics of terrorism were identified by Polisario leaders and Western Saharan inhabitants to easily alienate international recognition and support for their rights (Porges and Leuprecht, 2016). Other forms of violent resistance against Moroccan occupation, such as attacking police or arson, are feared to allow Morocco to internationally de-legitimise Sahrawi autonomy by portraying them as terrorists. The change from violent to peaceful resistance also demonstrates an acceptance that one is limited under power, yet holds a persistent aim to avoid and modify its influences (Vinthagen, 2006).

Under the occupation resistance opposing Moroccan sovereign control over the territory and Sahrawi population took more covert forms. Because Moroccan violent sovereign tactics against open sentiments of independence and Sahrawi nationalism remained harsh, the Moroccan rule was resisted more discreetly and silently, for example through cultural celebrations with political overtones (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Resistance instead more openly targeted the disciplinary tactics of control of norms, space, organisation, and partitioning. Resistance against the Moroccan disciplinary administration of the region made use of open disobedience, non-cooperation as well as hidden practices (Barca and Zunes, 2009). Peaceful resistance tactics used against surveillance and imposed organisation of Sahrawi activity include leafletting and graffiti (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Cultural celebrations where traditional clothing was worn became dubbed by some activists as “the silent protest” (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 164). All these resistance practices seek to avoid the realm of disciplinary control by creating their own Sahrawi channels of communication and assimilation with one another wherein they can express and experience their distinct Sahrawi identity and autonomy, rather than allowing Moroccan administration to discipline Sahrawi life.

Protests are amongst the more prominent forms of disobedience against Moroccan disciplinary power. Early protests deliberately demanded better conditions within the territory rather than independence to test the boundaries of dissent under occupation (Barca and Zunes, 2009). One example is the September 1999 protest organised by students who made demands for more scholarships and transportation subsidies from the government. Future protests made similar complaints about the lack of economic and social opportunities (Dann, 2014). One of the most noticeable examples is the protest at Gdim Izik just outside of the city of Al-Ayun between October and November 2005. This protest, while not deliberately demanding independence, called for socio-economic reform to challenge the way in which Morocco administered the region and how it controlled economic and social ‘partitioning’. It addressed housing and employment opportunities and complained of economic and social discrimination. The protest camps that were set up attracted around 10,000 native Sahrawis, a remarkable size for protests within the occupied territory, and lasted for a whole month (Dann, 2014; Mundy and Zunes, 2015; Murphy and Omar, 2013). The specific choice to protest outside the city Al-Ayun in the desert landscape served to avoid disciplinary control of space and assimilation by avoiding Morocco’s matrix of security within the cities and urban areas. Even the physical occupation of a public space through sitting-in and setting up tents is significant as it sought to take back control of their space (Dann, 2014). The setting up of tents has allegedly been forbidden since this protest, therefore transforming the tent into a symbol of resistance and non-cooperation. The protest was so unexpected to Moroccan security forces that they could not manage to disrupt the protests before they had attracted a significant amount of Sahrawis (Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Police violently broke up the camp using tear gas and hoses to disperse protestors, and also beating, shooting or arresting suspected activists; hundreds of Sahrawis disappeared after the protest (Zunes, 2010). Virtually all protests within the occupied territory have been forcefully dismantled by Moroccan forces, signifying that sovereign power still preserves its stronghold and can successfully demand obedience, but Moroccan disciplinary efforts are regularly challenged.

Despite efforts to Moroccanise the Sahrawi population, a Sahrawi nationalist subjectivity and identity became strengthened to resist disciplinary efforts to normalise the occupation and attempts to "hegemonise Moroccan identity" (Martin, 2005: 566). Multiple forms of nonviolent resistance did this, including institutional challenges and cultural practices. Contrary to recognition theory's position that the denial of recognition will impede the formation of identity, Moroccan misrecognition and resistance are seen to have a "galvanising effect on Western Saharan nationalism" (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 25). Twenty years of armed struggle transformed Western Saharan nationalism into a "lived practice" and provided "a reason for living and dying" (Ibid). A strengthening of Sahrawi nationalist identity can be observed as a form of resistance against Morocco's attempts at erasing Sahrawis identities. Zunes and Mundy observe that: "The term *Sahrawi*, as nationalists used it and as observers adopted it, was born of an act of symbolic resistance and partial negation" (2010: 111). The term is a departure from the previous name 'Spanish Sahara' or Sahrawi Spani in Arabic and demonstrates that the people of the Western Sahara were "simply Saharans, free of oppressive qualifiers" (Ibid). The term emphasises that the Sahrawi people similarly don't belong to a Moroccan Sahara. In contrast to recognition theory's assumption that recognition of love, rights and self-esteem must first be granted to develop a fully autonomous identity, it is more useful to understand identity as an "outcome of the historical interaction of dominant and subordinate social forces" (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 111). This understanding of identity-formation is further supported by Foucault's theorisations where resistance against disciplinary power has to challenge its efforts at creating identities compliant to the interests of its exercisers. Therefore, we can see that Sahrawis who denied Moroccan attempts at re-negotiating Sahrawi identity were celebrated, while those who did conform and let themselves be disciplined were shamed and regarded as traitors (Boulay, 2016; Zunes and Mundy, 2010).

The transformation into a tool and identity useful and docile to the Moroccan regime was successfully targeted by resistance, as was argued would be necessary by Foucault's theorisations; multiple methods were used to resist Moroccanisation and the negotiation of Sahrawi identity. Protests after the violent disruption of Gdim Izik invigorated more open defiance of both the Moroccan sovereignty and the norm of loyalty to it by instead demonstrating loyalty to their own Sahrawi identity and nationalism (Dann, 2014; Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Flags of the SADR were waved during protests, hung on major streets during the night and pro-independence slogans were chanted (Barca and Zunes, 2009; Mundy and Zunes, 2015). Other forms of resistance included the use of discourse to resist the Moroccan normalising discourse of a multi-ethnic Morocco to which Sahrawis belonged. The Western Saharan independence movement for example celebrated and named the "disappeared" as martyrs (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). Furthermore, the establishment of an underground education system that offered classes in the Sahrawi hassaniya dialect, which was shunned by Morocco who sought to discipline Sahrawis to use Moroccan-Arabic, strived to keep the distinct Sahrawi identity alive (Barca and Zunes, 2009). Furthermore, the genre hassaniya poetry became an acknowledged mechanism of Sahrawi resistance, assisting in the promotion of Sahrawi cultural heritage and spreading opposing political agendas (Deubel, 2012). Poetry is practiced orally, making it "uncontrollable and without borders", thus a useful resistance mechanism against discipline's control of space (Boulay, 2016: 669). One type of poetry called 'ralliés', while not very widespread, aims to deflect Sahrawis from being persuaded by Moroccan integration. These poems are directed at 'returnees', Sahrawis who abandoned Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria to reside in Morocco and enjoy economic benefits (Boulay, 2016). These 'ralliés' will often shame 'returnees', although their numbers aren't estimated to be high, for abandoning their support for Western Saharan independence and will portray them as traitors (Ibid; Barca and Zunes, 2009). One poem written by a prominent poet of the Sahrawi Polisario Front, Bechir Ould Ely (collected and translated by an anonymised Sahrawi colleague of Boulay, 2016) reads:

He leaves under the weight of some unknown curse
We see him lower himself in front of sordid servants
He kisses his hands, may he be cursed
Hands that are covered in blood
Such is the attitude of a nobody
        Degradation, weakness

The ongoingness of these resistances demonstrate that the ultimate aims of disciplinary power, to create new subjects docile and useful to its exercisers' interests, largely failed. Sahrawi peaceful resistance demonstrate a strong livelihood of a distinct Sahrawi identity and culture, typically loyal to the independence of its people. Disciplinary mechanisms such as partitioning, surveillance, control of space and assimilation remain, but are continuously challenged openly or through covert resistance. The Moroccan grip of sovereign power, however, continues to control the occupied Sahrawi population contributing heavily to the current peace stalemate. Especially with the ongoingness of violent repression and a recorded interest among younger Sahrawis to return to the times of armed struggle (Mundy and Zunes, 2015), Foucault's theorisations are unable to explain precisely why violent resistance is withheld from. While the abstinence from violence is identified as rooted in the struggle to have Sahrawi rights recognised, Honneth's theory itself similarly does not predict precisely why resistance can be violent or peaceful and merely claims that both are possible. While Sahrawi civil resistance continues to struggle for recognition and countering Moroccan exercises of power, it has not managed to achieve a successful over-turning of power relations. Nonetheless ongoing resistance efforts demonstrate that Morocco is still far from 'normalising' its control over the territory (Martin, 2005).

5. Conclusion

> "*Yet the fact that Western Saharan nationalism continues to thrive in the face of such immense macrolevel forces suggests that the world is far more complicated than any totalising theory can imagine."* (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 139)

As Zunes and Mundy point out, to explain Sahrawi resistance through a single totalising theory would likely not offer intricate explanations into its transformations and ongoingness. Nonetheless Honneth's theory of recognition and Foucault's sovereign and disciplinary power offer substantial insights into how occupation has influenced and continues to influence Sahrawi resistance. Sahrawi resistance's motive to achieve recognition for their right to self-determination and thereby rightful inclusion in the international political community as a people able to self-govern themselves was outlined well by Honneth's theorisation of the denial of rights. As Sahrawi rights are continuously denied by the Moroccan regime through invasion and occupation this motive remains the constant facilitator for resistance. Foucault's estimations that resistance mechanisms would target the techniques of power was likewise regularly identified. The differing objectives and mechanisms of sovereign and disciplinary power helped further distinguish how Morocco exercises control over the Sahrawi population and the ways that resistance can target these powers while still being constrained by them. We can therefore see that Moroccan violence characteristic of sovereign power during the war provoked armed struggle and disciplinary efforts to create useful and loyal Sahrawi subjects to the Moroccan regime were countered through disobedient discourse, protests and smaller, covert forms of resistance.

While the theories helped analyse Moroccan occupation and its influence on Sahrawi resistance and highlighted several aspects of how resistance can respond to power, it insufficiently explained specifically why the Sahrawi resistance developed from an armed struggle to peaceful civil resistance. Honneth's (1995) theory usefully legitimises the use of both violent or peaceful resistance, yet it fails to distinguish when resistance will take either form. Foucault's (1977) theorisations too lack an exploration into why resistance practices change their nature. While it may be too demanding to expect a critical framework to predict precisely what resistance will respond to power exercises, an exploration into when peaceful and violent resistances are more likely is necessary to make the framework more applicable. Despite the theories' inability to predict resistance transformations, this dissertation argues that it is the precise conditions of the combination of sovereign and disciplinary power and the inherent struggle for recognition that manages to restrict violent resistance and redirect it to peaceful forms. Polisario's armed struggle was inhibited by Morocco's wall and the remaining options of urban warfare and terrorism are feared to turn away international recognition and support for Sahrawi's struggle for self-determination and so refrained from.

Overall the theories should be recognised for being capable of highlighting the key motive and mechanisms Sahrawi resistance has taken in response to imposed Moroccan power in the specific socio-historical context of the Western Sahara conflict. While they loosely characterise resistance and the forms it may take in response to power, this approach is still more widely applicable than overly rigid frameworks which define resistance as mechanical responses to power which may constrict the understanding of resistance to only a thin variety of forms (Johansson and Vinthagen, 2014). Especially theorisations of disciplinary power enable the exploration of more abstract forms of resistance, such as discourse and norm-resisting, which don't always yield physical results but are nonetheless essential to resisting power's efforts to normalise its influence. Honneth and Foucault's theorisations are insightful and explanatory when used in "continuum- or spectrum-based, relativist typologies" (McGee, 2016: 110) and applied to specific socio-historical contexts and should not be regarded as rigid predictors of exact forms of resistances.

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