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University
of Glasgow

School of Social and Political Sciences

**Cross Strait Relations and CCP's Taiwan Policy: The
Image of KMT and DPP in the People's Daily from 2002
to 2016**

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Contents

1	Introduction.....	3
2	Cross-Strait Relations.....	4
2.1	The Complex Taiwan Strait	5
2.1.1	Taiwan Before 1949 and the Rival Period from 1949 to 1979.....	5
2.1.2	Ice melting period: 1979 to 1996.....	5
2.1.3	Tension return: 1996 to 2008	6
2.1.4	Harmony on the tide: 2008 to 2016.....	7
2.2	What is missing in the study of Cross-Strait Relations?.....	8
3	Media Control serving Foreign Policy	8
4	The “Taiwan Issue” - What CCP want the Chinese public know	11
5	Agenda-Setting and Framing Theoretical Review	13
6	Methodology	14
6.1	Newspaper choice.....	15
6.2	Time period choosing.....	16
6.3	Data Collection, Screening, and Sampling	16
6.4	Coding Rules.....	17
6.5	The questions.....	18
6.6	Limitations.....	19
7	Results and Analysis	19
7.1	Overview of the reports.....	19
7.2	Image of DPP and KMT.....	22
7.3	Changes of image with leadership change	23
7.4	Image in topics.....	27
8	Discussion.....	30
8.1	What Does the decrease in the news report mean?	30
8.2	DPP in the news	31
8.3	KMT in the news	33
9	Conclusion and the Contemporary Challenges of CCP’s framing on Taiwan.....	34
10	Bibliography	36
11	Appendix.....	40
11.1	Appendix 1: DPP-related News	40
11.2	Appendix 2: KMT-Related News	44
11.3	Appendix 3: DPP Origin Database	52
11.4	Appendix 4: KMT Origin Database	59

1 Introduction

Tsai Ing-wen, as the new president of Taiwan, is also active as the president of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is the major pro-independence political power on the island (Sui, 2016). It is unclear yet whether Tsai will follow in the footsteps of Chen Shui-bian to pursue de jure independence or keep the status quo (Sui, 2016). Furthermore, Beijing has been highly concerned since US president-elect Donald Trump had direct talks with Tsai Ing-wen on 2 December 2016, which nearly broke the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué that was set in 1979 (BBC, 2016). This was declared by Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China, recognizing that the One-China Principle is the core to China-US relations (BBC, 2016). The new president of the United States, Donald Trump, and the return of DPP as Taiwan's ruling party bring about more uncertainty to the peace in the Taiwan Strait.

As it highly relates to the geopolitics, peace, and security of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the Sino-US relationship, Cross-Strait relations and People's Republic of China (PRC)'s policy towards to Taiwan are worth more attention from scholars. Certainly, there are numerous studies focusing on Cross-Strait relations and PRC's Taiwan policy by looking at Cross-Strait history, Taiwan's domestic politics development and transformation, the official message and policies by both sides of the government, the Taiwan Strait Crisis, and Cross-Strait exchanges. But, there are quite a few scholars who studied Cross-Strait relations and China's Taiwan policy from a media aspect. In a popular authoritarian regime, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is holding its one-party ruling with legitimacy from nationalist public support and using its media control to frame public opinion to serve its foreign policy. Since Taiwan can be taken by CCP and the Chinese public as one of the core issues of state sovereignty, how Taiwan affairs can be framed to the Chinese public is highly related to Cross-Strait relations and CCP's Taiwan policy.

There are several scholars who have studied the domestic frame by CCP on Taiwan's affairs from different angles. But none of them studied the portrayed image of Taiwan's society, Taiwan's politics, the Taiwanese public, or other objects in the Chinese media. It will certainly be a great contribution to the study of Cross-Strait relations and CCP's Taiwan

policy by finding out the frames in Taiwan-related reports in China. However, this task is too ambitious for this paper. Instead, this paper provide only a limited answer to this question by examining the image of the two major political parties in Taiwan, Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP, in Chinese media reports.

Particularly, this paper attempt to find out what the images of KMT and DPP are in Chinese media reports and how their image is portrayed. To answer the question, I will use quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse the agenda setting and frames in the People's Daily news reports that related to KMT and DPP from 2002 to 2016. Through my research into 129 KMT-related articles and 69 DPP-related articles, I found out that KMT is generally portrayed as a positive actor for its effort in Cross-Strait exchanges and in respect to the 1992 Consensus, rather than achieving outstanding domestic governance in Taiwan. On the other side, DPP is overwhelmingly negatively portrayed in the reports; its pro-independent policy and poor governance in Taiwan hurt both Taiwan society and Cross-Strait relations, which highly disgusted the Taiwanese public.

This paper will start by reviewing the history and scholars' studies on Cross-Strait relations, focusing on the turnovers between the two sides and the general situation changes in different periods. Then, this paper will stress the missed angle to study CCP's Taiwan policy by understanding the relation between Chinese media control and government foreign policy. After reviewing other scholars' studies on CCP's frame on the Taiwan issue, as well as agenda-setting theory and framing theory, the design of the methodology will be described in detail. The data will be analysed by SPSS tests and then applied to further illustrations on the images of DPP and KMT. Finally, the conclusion will draw on the relation between the images of KMT and DPP in media reports and CCP's Taiwan policy, and give some suggestions for further research concerning the recent circumstances between PRC and Taiwan.

2 Cross-Strait Relations

To understand the complexity of the Taiwan issue, it is necessary to review its history. This section will introduce the basic timeline and major issues of Cross-Strait relations from 1949

to 2016 by reviewing scholars' studies on Cross-Strait relations. The following four periods of Cross-Strait relations history are divided based on the turnovers of Cross-Strait relations.

2.1 The Complex Taiwan Strait

2.1.1 Taiwan Before 1949 and the Rival Period from 1949 to 1979

Taiwan, in its history as an isolated island in the Pacific Ocean, had been ruled by different sovereignties, such as the Spanish Empire, Dutch Empire, Ming dynasty, the Kingdom of Tungning, the Qing dynasty, and the Empire of Japan (Wills, 2015:84-106). These remarkable discontinuities in Taiwan's history somehow planted the root of the Taiwan issue (Charney and Prescott, 2000:453-458). The colonialism rule of the Empire of Japan in Taiwan ended in 1945 when Japan surrendered its loss in WWII, followed by the Republic of China (ROC) claiming its sovereignty over Taiwan, which then became internationally legalized when the Treaty of San Francisco took effect in 1952 (Charney and Prescott, 2000:457-458). In the meantime, the Chinese Civil War between Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended in KMT retreating to Taiwan and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by CCP in Beijing in 1949 (Charney and Prescott, 2000:458-473). After that, the tension of military confrontation between ROC in Taiwan and PRC in mainland China lasted for the next three decades, during which time the Taiwan Strait Crisis and several military conflicts occurred (Tsang, 1993:57-79). At that time, the Taiwan issue was mainly the prolonged Chinese Civil War between CCP and KMT in the context of the Cold War (Tsang, 1993).

2.1.2 Ice melting period: 1979 to 1996

The fifth "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" was released by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 26, 1978, which marks the transition of PRC's Taiwan policy from military stalemate to primarily pursuing peaceful unification by building deeper communication and opening the 'Three Linkages' across the Taiwan Strait. The policy's blueprint was to open up postal, transportation and trade links ("Three Linkages" or "Three Links") between mainland China and Taiwan, with the goal of ultimately unifying mainland China and Taiwan (Romberg, 2007:3).

In response to PRC's attempts to have direct contact with ROC by adopting the 'Three Links', Taiwan established its "Three-Noes" policy in 1979, namely, "no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation" with the PRC government (Sutter, 2002:524). However, the policy was accidentally broken because of the hijacking accident of a China Airlines cargo plane in 1986, which forced ROC to have negotiation with PRC (Sutter, 2002). Later, with the authorization from the ROC government to the Red Cross to issue permits allowing people from Taiwan to travel to the Chinese mainland for family reunions in 1987 makes the "Three-Noes" policy exist only in name (Sutter, 2002).

Followed by the establishment of the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) by the ROC government to deal with the mainland affairs, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was settled by PRC in 1991 to negotiate issues with ROC (Sheng, 2002: 14). PRC and ROC then started to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty (Sheng, 2002: 15). Notably, the 1992 Consensus was reached by statesmen Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan under which both sides agreed to deliberate ambiguity on questions of sovereignty, for purpose of engaging in operational problems affecting both sides (Sheng, 2002: 15). The 1992 Consensus then came to be the cornerstone for Cross-Strait relations and the One-China principle: both Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single "China"(Sheng, 2002:15).

2.1.3 Tension return: 1996 to 2008

Prior to the 1990s, ROC had been an authoritarian regime ruled by KMT and committed to the eventual unification with China, which is coherent with the One-China policy. However, having experienced the democratic reformation during the 1990s, the general public in Taiwan with arising sense of Taiwanese identity, began to influence the future of Taiwan (Bush, 2008:91). As a result, the ROC government led by Lee Tung-hui gradually abolished its traditional commitment to the One-China Principle and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan in the late 1990s (Bush, 2008:91). Whereas, this outrageous transition was not tolerated by Jiang Zemin. As a result, a number of military exercises were taken by PRC in Taiwan Strait during the 1996 ROC election period for warning the pro-independence political powers in Taiwan, which is known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (He and Feng,

2009:502). By 1998, semi-official talks were totally broken down between the two sides, together with the following Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1999 (He and Feng, 2009).

The successive Taiwan president after Lee was Chen Shui-bian, who favoured Taiwan independence and made several attempts to pursue such a goal, which made the Cross-Strait relations on politics endangered for nearly entire period in office. Initially, even though there is a divergence between political parties in Taiwan, resulting from their vote-maximizing strategy under a democratic institution, the convergent pattern existed in their mainland policies (Wu, 1999:566). For instance, DPP was toning down its independence tradition and emphasizing an economic development in 1999 for attracting the swing voters (Wu, 1999: 567-573). Furthermore, in his first two years of governance, Chen replaced Lee's 'no haste, go slow' policy with 'active opening, effective management' as his Cross-Strait policy to allow more economic exchange between the two sides (Green, 2016: 135-136).

However, worrying about decreasing popularity due to a prolonged economic deterioration, the DPP eventually turned to secure public support by adopting a more tough and populist Taiwan nationalist position (Green, 2016:136). To counter DPP's separatist activities, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress of PRC in 2005, legalizing "non-peaceful means" as an alternative in case of a formal declaration of de jure independence by Chen administration (Romberg, 2007:6).

2.1.4 Harmony on the tide: 2008 to 2016

The changing point was Ma Ying-jeou's win in the 2008 Taiwan presidential election on 22 March, and he took office on 20 May 2008. The dialogue through SEF and ARATS reopened on 12 June (Green, 2016:137). In 2008, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, the first meeting between the leaders of CCP and KMT was held in Beijing, which marked the re-normalization of semi-official communication (Green, 2016:137). The following progressions are the full restoration of the Three Linkages, which officially commenced on 15 December 2008, with inaugural direct shipping, direct flights, and direct mail (Green, 2016:137). The increased connection can mainly be seen from economic ties. The most remarkable moment was the meeting between the president of PRC, Xi Jinping, and Ma in 2015, which is the first

ever meeting between the Cross-Strait government leaders since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 (BBC, 2015).

It is generally believed by scholars that the economic connection between PRC and Taiwan is highly significant in contemporary Cross-Strait relations. Reilly (2012: 122) has illustrated multiple cases in his study about how the Chinese government takes its given economic influence to enhance its power in international relations by using unilateral sanctions. The economy of Taiwan is now highly dependent on PRC under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (Lin, 2016: 220). It is pointed out by Lin (2016: 220) that DPP is now facing a dilemma under the pressures from fixing Taiwan's languishing economy and the popularity of Taiwan's autonomy.

2.2 What is missing in the study of Cross-Strait Relations?

Certainly, the complicated Cross-Strait relations and CCP's Taiwan Policy has attracted attentions from scholars. The studies comprehensively covered the Cross-Strait relations from different perspectives, such as historical evolvement (Wills, 2015), international law (Charney and Prescott, 2000), PRC official documents and policy changes (Romberg, 2007), Taiwan's domestic politics and democratic elections (Tsang, 1993; Wu, 1999; Bush, 2008; Sheng, 2002), Taiwan Strait Crisis (He and Feng, 2009), business dynamism and other across-strait exchanges (Sutter, 2002; Green, 2016; Lin S., 2016). However, rarely have scholars noticed that the special media condition under authoritarian rule of CCP might be able to provide another angle with which to study the Cross-Strait relations and CCP's Taiwan policy.

3 Media Control serving Foreign Policy

The media control adopted by CCP to ensure its governance legitimacy has been widely recognized. A conventional wisdom is that the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime itself is weak, because its ruling is not generated from democratic elections (Beetham, 1991:16-19). However, several surveys reflect a roughly 70% support rate for CCP from the Chinese public from the 1990s to 2008, and it did not experience any noticeable fluctuation (Kennedy, 2009:517). It is generally believed by scholars that the ruling legitimacy of CCP is no longer

established on a moral level, but is sourced from nationalism and government performance (Chen, 1997; Zhu, 2011; Callahan, 2015; Schubert, 2008). As pointed out by Downs and Saunders (1998:118), nationalism could be used by authoritarian regimes to divert attention from the state's inability to meet societal demands for security and effective international tensions. Xu and Yang (2005, 41-45) illustrate that, under the threat of "globalized identity", China stresses the national interest, independence, and sovereignty security to counter-argue. Particularly, CCP was deemed by Downs and Saunders (1998:122) as seeking to shore up its nationalistic credentials through propaganda targets to the domestic audience, in order to consolidate its legitimacy.

However, a backlash can originate from the public's over-patriotism. By reviewing the domestic public criticism to CCP's failure in defending China's territory in the 1990 and 1996 Diaoyu Island crises, Downs and Saunders (1998: 126) figured out that the promoted nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment had pressurised the Chinese government into making a strong response to deal with the conflicts. However, although there are still scholars who argue against the view that the decision made on the foreign policy by CCP was influenced by public opinion, the pressure for foreign policy decision making to be influenced by public opinion cannot be denied. Wang and Wang (2014:216) argue that the Chinese media are currently enjoying more freedom in providing more pluralistic information. Therefore, they can shape the agenda for foreign policy makers, narrow down the policy options, change the pace of policy making, or even potentially influence the final decision (Wang & Wang., 2014).

Nevertheless, on the other side, CCP has not yet halted its endeavour to shape domestic public opinion by using media control skills, regardless of Chinese media marketization. Since the late 1970s, most authoritarian regimes have opened their media markets, which has also happened in China (Stockmann, 2013). But, most of the media is still under strict control by the Central Propaganda Department under the CCP Central Committee (Stockmann, 2013). Kennedy (2009: 517) adopted the exposure-acceptance model to explain the overwhelmingly high public support for the central government in China, by which he confirmed the significant role of media propaganda. Chan (2002:48) put forward that the media policy of CCP has gradually changed from propaganda to mainly agenda-setting

(yulun-daoxiang) since the late 1990s. By changing its primary tool, the new media policy compromised with the people's new demands, allowing people to express dissatisfaction and critique local governments, without reducing the credibility of the central government and CCP itself (Chan, 2002).

Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) tested the media coverage of 26 nations and public views on the US's vital interests in nations, as well as media coverage of 21 nations and public feelings toward these countries. As a result, although not all nations correlated perfectly, the general result of the civilian impression of 26 nations proved that positive news has a positive correlation to the audiences' view of a nation's image (Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004:374). Thus, the media coverage of countries may have an effect on the public's attitude to those countries and, further, make a difference to an individual's perception of international relations. The Chinese government is believed to be using media reports to frame the public's perspective about foreign issues. During China's signing onto WTO as an official member, CCP used the 'silence' strategy to reduce the possible public opposition to WTO entry (Zhao, 2008). Precisely, the official and target newspapers contained no information about the content of the deal (Zhao, 2008:35). Besides, not a single article referred to the two-sided influences of the WTO entry on domestic workers and farmers, including Farmers' Daily and Workers' Daily (Zhao, 2008:38). Another fact to be noticed is that the Seattle protests, which reveal negative influences of WTO, have been either ignored or marginalized in the Chinese newspapers (Zhao, 2008:51). In addition to the WTO entry case, another study made by Wang (2003) demonstrated that the Chinese government has been framing its own image in international news to increase public support by claiming its achievements and magnifying its importance to international affairs.

Although it is hard to know the actual effect on public opinion by media propaganda, the attempt by CCP to use its media control to focus and frame international news for the public is widely recognized (Shirk, 2011). Therefore, discovering how CCP will use its media propaganda tool to encapsulate Taiwan is an interesting topic that might be relevant to its Taiwan policy and Cross-Strait relations.

4 The “Taiwan Issue” - What CCP want the Chinese public know

The Taiwan issue has been framed by PRC as the core issue to China’s territory and sovereignty, which is one of the highest “national interests” (Lin G. , 2016). Noticeably, unification of Taiwan has been repeatedly claimed as the historical mission for PRC and an important component for the great rejuvenation of China by CCP leaders (Li C. , 2014). Hence, Taiwan is considered by CCP to be an isolated province from mainland China, and is taken by civilians as a core interest to all Chinese people (Lin S. , 2016:223). Failing to reunify with Taiwan could cause serious damage to CCP’s legitimacy (Lin S. , 2016:223).

He and Feng (2009:517-518) argue that the Taiwan Strait crisis took place during 1995–96 and 1999–2000 when Chinese leaders faced both domestic instability and international insecurity. Admitted by a think-tank expert in China, all of the information relating to Taiwan’s affairs for the public on official or popular press, including the internet, come through Chinese government lenses (Shirk, 2011:61). Chinese audiences are restricted from directly assessing the Taiwanese people’s own perspectives on Taiwanese society and politics (Brady, 2015:800). For instance, no more than five Taiwanese films could be shown in China each year, and no more than ten Taiwanese television programmes per year could be broadcasted (Brady, 2015:801). The reason behind these might be the confirmed increasing pressure from nationalist public opinion by Chinese officials (Shirk, 2011:57).

Therefore, some scholars turned their focus on CCP’s framing of Taiwan’s affairs. Li (2014) analysed the public messages about Taiwan by the CCP’s leaders from 2003 to 2013 and how they related to their Taiwan policy. In detail, the messages repeatedly stress the 1992 Consensus and One-China principle to oppose Taiwan’s separatist forces (Li, 2014:81-82). Besides, the sincere goodwill and efforts of mainland China to solve the conflicts and achieve ultimate reunification has been emphasized (Li, 2014:82). Although the frequency and rhetoric of these reinforced core principles by the regime might vary in different messages, well-established patterns in the messages can still be identified (Li, 2014).

Furthermore, some scholars are also paying particularly close attention to media reports. Han (2007) employed a framing analysis of online news in China by comparing how mainstream websites in China framed the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan. The frames introduced in his study were confluent, game, ideology, and military consequences (Han, 2007). By finding out the parallel pattern of significance for the same frame, Han (*ibid*: 54) believes that the Chinese government played a crucial role in setting frames in traditional media, even on the internet. Precisely, the online news reports focus more on political parties' conflicts in Taiwan and the election result and its potential effect on Cross-Strait relations (Han, *ibid*: 54).

Brady (2015) used framing theory to understand CCP's information control on Taiwanese affairs and the system of Beijing's propaganda organizations. Brady (2015:787) illustrates that the censorship and propaganda strategy of the CCP are designed to mould both global and domestic public opinion on Taiwan issues. In the domestic media reports, the requirements for the correct frame when talking about Taiwan was officially published as a policy document in 2002 by the Taiwan Affairs Office: "Suggestions on the Correct Terminology for Taiwan-related Propaganda" (Central Taiwan Affairs Office, 2002) (Brady, *ibid*: 794). The 29 rules were designed precisely to guide the media on the rhetoric and terminology chosen in their reports for moulding public discourse when relating to Taiwanese affairs. In addition to the "Suggestions", the Central Propaganda Department would issue specific instructions to the public media when controversial situations occur in Taiwan (Brady, *ibid*:798).

However, these studies relating to the Chinese government's frame for Taiwanese affairs mainly focus on the government's message and documents, or a specific period of time that is highly related to certain political issues; namely, elections. Barely have studies been done to examine the image of Taiwan-related objects in Chinese media reports, such as the Taiwanese public, Taiwanese society, Taiwan's economy, Taiwan's political parties, and so on. Restricted by limited resources and time, what I am going to do in this paper is to find out the portrayed image of KMT and DPP in the Chinese media by introducing Agenda-Setting theory and Framing theory. In spite of the multi-party democracy system in Taiwan, KMT and DPP, as the two dominant parties, are showing a tendency of a rotating shift in holding the seat of Taiwan's president. To understand what kind of images CCP attempts to portray

them as to the China domestic public might make a constructive contribution to understanding Cross-Strait relations and PRC's Taiwan policy.

5 Agenda-Setting and Framing Theoretical Review

The importance of the media has been figured out by evolving the ideology of constructionism. Agenda-Setting theory and Framing theory are the most convenient two for studying mass communication.

Agenda-Setting theory mainly focuses on how the media influence the topics of public agenda. Lippmann (1922) originally came up with the ideology of a "pseudo environment": the majority of people recognize the external world by public media, and the media can report in a conscious way to build public opinion on a certain issue, which will influence their behaviour in the real environment. Norton Long (1958), in his 'The Local Community as an Ecology of Games', says that newspapers can have an effect on an individual's focus and attention to certain issues, which, along with the spill-over effect in the social community, can determine public agenda. These developments on agenda-setting gradually influenced the study on government and policy as well. Cohen (1963) argues that the government may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is successful in telling them what to think about. In 1968, McCombs and Shaw (1972) tested and researched the news reports about the US presidential election and public opinion transformation during the election campaign. As a result, they found that more news reports in the media about a certain event will make the public place more importance on the event and treat it with extra consideration (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). This is normally taken as first-level agenda setting. Further, the idea that media influences how people think can also be tested and proved as second-level agenda setting. For example, McComb et al. (1997) found that the substantive and effective descriptions of the media during the 1996 Spanish general election had a positive correlation with the election result. Therefore, the media can tell people what to think about, and even probably how to think.

Similarly, framing theory is also rooted in social constructionism. Goffman (1974) considers a frame to be a set of concepts that organize experiences and guide the actions of individuals,

groups, even societies. In other words, an objective fact can be understood differently according to the frame that an individual holds. Gitlin (1980) studied the correlation between the left-wing movement and media reports, and argues: 'Ruling class's domination of subordinate classes and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology into their common sense and everyday practice' (Gitlin, 1980:253). Relating to public agenda, Kinder and Sanders (1990) combined sociology and psychology definitions on framing; considering framing to be an inside construction of an individual mind can also serve as an agenda to set a topic for the public. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) define media framing as a designed story line to describe the meaning of a certain issue to the target audience. Therefore, the audience's opinion about a certain issue is mainly determined by the framing that was served by the media in advance once they receive the message. A recent debate about agenda-setting theory and framing theory is whether they are connected to each other or are independent from each other. Framing theory is, in many ways, tied very closely to agenda-setting theory since both of them focus on how the media set the agenda for individuals. Although framing theory takes this a step further, as the way in which the news is presented creates a frame for that information, the idea might have common ground with second-level agenda-setting.

Normally, mass communication research concerns the three types of agenda settings: public, media, and policy, which interact with each other (Dearing and Mrogers, 1988). Considering the special condition of the Chinese authoritarian regime and its control on the media and public agenda, the interaction between the government agenda and public agenda barely exist (Chan, 2007). As mentioned above, the media could serve as the major actor in sending messages from the government to the public. In this paper, I combine agenda-setting theory and framing theory together to study what image of DPP and KMT is portrayed in the news reports.

6 Methodology

This study will be based on the reports that relate to KMT and DPP in the People's Daily from 2002 to 2016. The e-editions of the news reports as the resource will be collected and downloaded from CNKI, which will further be screened and sampled into two smaller sample

bases for KMT and DPP. The major variable I am going to code for in the news reports in the sample is its year of publication, “Portrayed Image of the Party”, and “Topic of the Article”.

In the following research, I will use the quantitative method to analyse the agenda-setting by the People’s Daily when reporting about KMT and DPP. In particular, I will test the reports’ change in quantity over the years, the general portrayed image of KMT and DPP and its consistency during different periods, the relation between the portrayed image, and the topics of news reports. After looking through the agenda-setting on different parties’ images by SPSS test results, I will then turn to look deeply at the quantitative test results by figuring out the framing used by the People’s Daily to picture the image of DPP and KMT with the qualitative method in the discussion section. Noticeably, this study will analyse the media reports’ agenda and frame itself, rather than discovering the specific influence of them on the public opinion.

6.1 Newspaper choice

According to the circulation of newspapers in China, the top 10 Chinese newspapers are: Reference News, the People's Daily, Guangzhou Daily, Nanfang Daily, Yangtse Evening Post, Qianjiang Evening News, Qilu Evening News, Information Times, Metro Express, and Global Times (World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, 2014). Despite the commercialization of the Chinese media since the economic reforms at the end of the 1970s, the People’s Daily still serves as the mouthpiece of the CCP and propagates policies to the public (Stockmann, 2013:71). As a national newspaper, and also the most prominent and authoritative official news source, the People’s Daily is accepted generally as the voice of the CCP (Li, Qin, and Kluver, 2003). While the People’s Daily is no longer the most popular newspaper with the Chinese public, it can provide a reliable source and demonstrate what and how CCP want the media to report on the major political parties in Taiwan to domestic citizens. Hence, it is the one with the most credibility to study in order to learn about CCP’s Taiwan Policy.

6.2 Time period choosing

In order to study whether there are changes because of government transactions, the time period covered in this research is from 15 November 2002 to 19 May 2016. The reason for such time framing is because this basically covers the PRC government under the Former-President Hu Jintao from 15 November 2002 to 14 November 2012 and President Xi Jinping from 15 November 2012 to 19 May 2016. On the other side, this time period can also be divided into two periods of Taiwan's administration that were under Chen Shuibian (DPP) from 15 November 2002 to 19 May 2008 and Ma Ing-jeou (KMT) from 20 May 2009 to 19 May 2016. This time period choice can help us to understand the consistency of CCP's propaganda about the two parties along with the leadership changes on both sides.

6.3 Data Collection, Screening, and Sampling

The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI)¹ is a national information construction project, and supported by the PRC Ministry of Education, PRC Ministry of Science and other major PRC government departments (CNKI, 2017). CNKI.Net is the largest electronic academic bibliographical database in China, which also covers all of the mainstream newspaper reports that have been published since 2000 (CNKI, 2017). In 2008, CNKI signed a cooperation contract with Springer Science+ Business Media to share documents and databases (Springer, 2008).

By searching the news reports by the People's Daily that mentioned both "Taiwan" and "KMT" in CNKI, I accumulated 710 news reports (Appendix 4). Using the same method, the reports that mentioned both "Taiwan" and "DPP" accounted for 276 articles (Appendix 3). This database was directly collected by the search engine, yet it is not a proper one for this study; some of the reports do not talk about contemporary Taiwanese affairs. For the sample

¹ Originally, I wanted to get resources from <http://www.cnki.net/>. However, during my research period, the database had a few systematic problems. Firstly, the news reports in the People's Daily from 2010 were mostly missing. Secondly, searching newspaper articles with the keyword "DPP" (民进党) is not allowed, since it has been settled as a sensitive word by the CNKI website. Confirmed by the CNKI contactor team, CNKI.Taiwan has the same database without the previously mentioned two systematic problems. Thus, the resources are directly received from CNKI.Taiwan instead of CNKI.com.

reports of DPP, because it became a newly established Taiwan political party after the WWII, there are no news reports that need to be picked out from that database. However, a great number of reports in the KMT sample base should not be included in this study. Firstly, instead of KMT, the reports that solely mention the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (中国国民党革命委员会), a mainland Chinese democratic party, could not be screened out by the CNKI searching system because of the homonym problem with KMT. Secondly, some of the reports are mainly a review of WWII history and the Chinese Civil War. These reports do not directly influence the public image of KMT nowadays. Specifically, the People's Daily tends to use the terminology "Kuomintang Reactionaries" (国民党反动派) to make a difference when referring to KMT before 1949, and using simply "KMT" in articles reporting contemporary Taiwan affairs. Thirdly, the news mentioned other countries' political parties, such as the Macedonia National Party (马其顿国民党), whose name translated into Chinese shares the same abbreviation as KMT, and should be screened out. In total, without those 195 reports that are irrelevant to our study, the remaining 515 reports construct the KMT database (Appendix 4).

Because of the highly restricted time limit for doing the research, the databases then had to be systematically sampled into a smaller one. Firstly, all of the reports in the two databases were listed by their publication date. Then, I introduced a random number to code them and disturb the sequence of the reports. After repeating the random sequence five times, I coded all of the reports as Numbers 1 to 4. Starting from the first in the sequence, I arranged every fourth report into the final database for analyses. By doing so, the examined samples for this paper were 129 news reports referring to KMT and 69 news reports relating to DPP from 2002 to 2016 (Appendix 1)(Appendix 2).

6.4 Coding Rules

The first variable is the "Portrayed Image of the Party" in the article, which can basically be coded as positive/neutral/negative based on the rhetoric when talking about the parties directly. For instance, negative news about a party should involve certain absolute negative rhetoric or words to describe their behavior, such as "Trick" (诡计), "Smear others" (抹黑), or blaming certain issues or problems on them. The news reports will be coded as positive if

it confirmed the positive contribution made by a certain party or its members to society or Cross-Strait relations. Noticeably, if a certain person is mentioned without referring to his party background, it is then not taken as an image framing that party. For example, the official claims that mentioned DPP's independence tendency without any further censure would be coded as neutral rather than negative (Appendix 1:11). Besides, if an article mentioned that DPP is unpopular with the Taiwanese public but also mentioned the positive side of DPP, it would be classified as neutral (Appendix 1:27).

Although terminologies like "Pan-Blue" and "Pan-Green" usually related to KMT or DPP as well, it is not a focus in this study because it is referring to other political parties in Taiwan. Besides, the "Taiwan administration" (台湾当局), as the term used by the People's Daily to refer to Taiwan's government, also does not apply to our study. This is because the Taiwan administration mainly being referred to is from 2000 to 2008, under the Chen Shui-bian ruling, and it barely mentions Ma's presidential period. Therefore, this study only focuses on the descriptions and pictures of KMT and DPP when they are directly quoted.

The other variable is the "Topic of the Article", which means the major topic in the article that relates to the portrayed party. The PRC official declaration by the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) or other official leaders are coded as "PRC Official Message", as it is more a kind of official declaration rather than a media report. "Taiwan Politics" and "Taiwan Society" are divided based on whether the story is purely about political activity or a ruling problem. The elections, demonstrations, and other political activities are classified as "Taiwan Politics"; the social or economic problems or conditions that relate to a certain party's behavior are the components of "Taiwan Society". The exchanges between Taiwan and China, like the Three Linkages, Cross-Strait forums and exchange activities, bilateral visits, and meetings of political leaders, belong to "Cross-Strait Exchange". If an article talked about more than one topic, it will only be coded by the main topic of the part that mentioned the party directly.

6.5 The questions

This paper will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. How has the media exposure of DPP and KMT changed over the years?

2. What is the general portrayed image of DPP and KMT from 2002 to 2016?
3. Are DPP and KMT's images highly consistent, even with the transitions of leadership in mainland China and Taiwan?
4. How are the images of the parties portrayed under different topics?

6.6 Limitations

The major problem with this study is the limited number of news reports. This might influence the test results of correlation significance. Thus, although most of the relations might not be proved, its existing possibility could be proved by further studies with a bigger sample base. The other issue that needs to be noted is that all of the coding was made by myself without being validated by others, which might generate a bias on coding and classification accounting because of my personal feelings towards the diction in the article.

This research has only analysed one newspaper, and has not covered any other newspaper. Newspapers such as HaixiaDaoBao and Tuanjie Bao are more Taiwan focused, which might have brought more material to analyse. Besides, because the resources were download directly from CNKI, without reading the printed newspaper, it missed the opportunity to evaluate the component layout of the article on its page and combined pictures, which can supply more information for further studies. A relatively important message would be put in the middle or at the head of the page, and, also, the combined picture is highly related to the image of the parties in the news.

7 Results and Analysis

7.1 Overview of the reports

To overview the news reports in the publication years, I made a simple variable univariate frequencies test for DPP-related reports and KMT-related reports. In Table 1 and Table 2, it turns out that the distribution frequency of the sample reports of DPP and KMT in the chosen years is not quite even. Although the total number of news reports that mentioned KMT is around two times those that mentioned DPP, they share a common trend of changes over the years. From the view of the histograms and general curves in Graph 1 and Graph 2, both

parties' news reports had increased since 2002 and hit a peak around 2006 to 2007, and then it experienced a decreasing tendency with fluctuation. In other words, the exposure of both parties has decreased a lot since around 2006. However, a slightly increasing tendency from 2014 to 2016 needs to be noticed. Particularly, the reports that we collected in this study were only until 19 May 2016, and are not all of the reports for the whole year.

Table 1: Year of the News Reports Publication (KMT-related)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2002	1	.8	.8	.8
	2003	3	2.3	2.3	3.1
	2004	7	5.4	5.4	8.5
	2005	27	20.9	20.9	29.5
	2006	27	20.9	20.9	50.4
	2007	19	14.7	14.7	65.1
	2008	5	3.9	3.9	69.0
	2009	8	6.2	6.2	75.2
	2010	10	7.8	7.8	82.9
	2011	4	3.1	3.1	86.0
	2012	8	6.2	6.2	92.2
	2013	2	1.6	1.6	93.8
	2014	3	2.3	2.3	96.1
	2015	5	3.9	3.9	100.0
	Total	129	100.0	100.0	


Table 2: Year of the News Reports Publication (DPP-related)


		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2003	6	8.7	8.7	8.7
	2004	2	2.9	2.9	11.6
	2005	16	23.2	23.2	34.8
	2006	14	20.3	20.3	55.1
	2007	11	15.9	15.9	71.0
	2008	4	5.8	5.8	76.8
	2009	3	4.3	4.3	81.2
	2010	2	2.9	2.9	84.1
	2012	3	4.3	4.3	88.4
	2014	2	2.9	2.9	91.3

2015	3	4.3	4.3	95.7
2016	3	4.3	4.3	100.0
Total	69	100.0	100.0	

Graph 1

Histogram





7.2 Image of DPP and KMT

The following Table 3 shows the result of the crosstab test for “The Major Party as a Character in the News” and “Portrayed Image in the News” from 2002 to 2016. The result shows that the images of DPP and KMT are actually counter to each other. Both of them received a neutral image in around 25% of the reports that related to them. Overwhelmingly, KMT shows an overall good image, with 65.2% positive versus the general negative image (65.9%) of DPP. Looking at the Chi-Square Test, the statistical significance is not just demonstrated, but with $p=0$, which means that there are no exceptions in any of the sampled news reports. In other words, KMT is acting as a positive party and DDP is painted as an absolutely negative actor in Taiwan-related news in the People’s Daily.

Table 3: The Major Party as Character in the News * Portrayed Image in the News Crosstabulation

	Portrayed Image in the News	Total

			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
The Major Party as Character in the News	DPP	Count	45	18	6	69
		% within The Major Party as Character in the News	65.2%	26.1%	8.7%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image in the News	83.3%	34.0%	6.6%	34.8%
	KMT	Count	9	35	85	129
		% within The Major Party as Character in the News	7.0%	27.1%	65.9%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image in the News	16.7%	66.0%	93.4%	65.2%
Total		Count	54	53	91	198
		% within The Major Party as Character in the News	27.3%	26.8%	46.0%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 3

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	87.928 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	95.207	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	85.463	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	198		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.47.

7.3 Changes of image with leadership change

Having reached a basic view of the images of DPP and KMT in the previous test, the next question that needs to be answered is whether the image of the two parties changed because of the government transitions in Taiwan or PRC. I made crosstab analyses for “Portrayed Image of DPP” with “Taiwan Ruling Party” and “PRC Leadership”. The changes of leaderships are put as an independent variable and the Portrayed Image of KMT is put into the column of dependent variable. The following Table 4 shows that DPP got fewer negative reports under Xi’s administration with only 37.5% of negative reports, which is roughly half of that during Hu-Wen’s administration. Besides, the neutral reports doubled in percentage during Xi’s administration. But, since there are only eight reports relating to DPP in Xi’s presidential period, it is quite easy to generate a result with a bias because it is such a small

sample. This doubt can be confirmed by Chi-Square Tests with an Asymp significance value of 0.202, which is significantly bigger than 0.01. Therefore, it is highly possible that the result was a coincidence, and the image of DPP in the news is probably not influenced by the transition of the Chinese leaderships.

Table 4: Crosstab of PRC Leadership * Portrayed Image of DPP in the News

			Portrayed Image of DPP in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
PRC Leadership	Hu-Wen administration	Count	42	14	5	61
		% within PRC Leadership	68.9%	23.0%	8.2%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	93.3%	77.8%	83.3%	88.4%
	Xi Administration	Count	3	4	1	8
		% within PRC Leadership	37.5%	50.0%	12.5%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	6.7%	22.2%	16.7%	11.6%
Total	Count	45	18	6	69	
	% within PRC Leadership	65.2%	26.1%	8.7%	100.0%	
	% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Chi-Square Tests for Table 4

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.200 ^a	2	.202
Likelihood Ratio	2.989	2	.224
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.112	1	.146
N of Valid Cases	69		

a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70.

Turning to look at the test between DPP's image and Taiwan's ruling party transition in Table 5. With decreased negative reports and increased exposure on the neutral and positive sides, generally the image of DPP turned into a better one after 2008. Whereas, the Chi-Square Test rejected the assumption with an Asymp. significance value of 0.139. Arguably, the value is still sufficiently over 0.01; yet it is less than the significance value of 0.202 in the test between the PRC leadership transition and DPP's image. Considering that the sample that

was collected in this study for DPP were only 69 reports, it is reasonable to say that a correlation between Taiwan's ruling party transition and DPP's image in the media might exist, which has a higher possibility than with the PRC leadership change.

Table 5: Crosstab of Taiwan Ruling Party * Portrayed Image of DPP in the News

			Portrayed Image of DPP in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Taiwan Ruling Party Administration	Count		37	12	3	52
	% within Taiwan Ruling Party		71.2%	23.1%	5.8%	100.0%
	% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News		82.2%	66.7%	50.0%	75.4%
Ma Ing-jeou Administration	Count		8	6	3	17
	% within Taiwan Ruling Party		47.1%	35.3%	17.6%	100.0%
	% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News		17.8%	33.3%	50.0%	24.6%
Total	Count		45	18	6	69
	% within Taiwan Ruling Party		65.2%	26.1%	8.7%	100.0%
	% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 5

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.952 ^a	2	.139
Likelihood Ratio	3.695	2	.158
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.893	1	.048
N of Valid Cases	69		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.48.

On the KMT side, the same approach is adopted to test its image correlation with the government transitions. There are two facts we need to stress in Table 6. Firstly, KMT was reported without any negative image. Secondly, it seems that its image turned out to be more neutral than it was in 2002-2012. Restricted by our limited sample, the possible relation between KMT's image and PRC's leadership change can still be rejected by the Chi-Square with 0.278 Asymp. significance. However, an exception can be found in this section once we look at the Crosstab test between KMT's image and Taiwan's ruling party transitions in Table 7. Certainly, KMT received very positive images in the news generally. But, the positive reports increased from 56.5% of the total reports to 84.1% when they were holding administrative power. The result of the Chi-Square is impressive as the significance was proved to be 0.007, which is less than 0.01. Hence, it is certain that KMT's image changed because of its return to Taipei office. Besides, this finding can strengthen the previous assumption that the negative image of DPP was mitigated resulting from its loss of the president seat.

Table 6: Crosstab of PRC Leadership * Portrayed Image of KMT in the News

			Portrayed Image of KMT in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
PRC Leadership	Hu-Wen administration	Count	9	30	79	118
		% within PRC Leadership	7.6%	25.4%	66.9%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	100.0%	85.7%	92.9%	91.5%
Xi Administration	Xi Administration	Count	0	5	6	11
		% within PRC Leadership	0.0%	45.5%	54.5%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	0.0%	14.3%	7.1%	8.5%
Total		Count	9	35	85	129
		% within PRC Leadership	7.0%	27.1%	65.9%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 6

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.562 ^a	2	.278
Likelihood Ratio	3.111	2	.211
Linear-by-Linear Association	.060	1	.807
N of Valid Cases	129		

a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77.

Table 7: Crosstab of Taiwan Ruling Party * Portrayed Image of KMT in the News

			Portrayed Image of KMT in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Taiwan Ruling Party	Chen Shuibian Administration	Count	8	29	48	85
		% within Taiwan Ruling Party	9.4%	34.1%	56.5%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	88.9%	82.9%	56.5%	65.9%
	Ma Ing-jeou Administration	Count	1	6	37	44
		% within Taiwan Ruling Party	2.3%	13.6%	84.1%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	11.1%	17.1%	43.5%	34.1%
Total		Count	9	35	85	129
		% within Taiwan Ruling Party	7.0%	27.1%	65.9%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 7

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.957 ^a	2	.007
Likelihood Ratio	10.816	2	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.109	1	.003
N of Valid Cases	129		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.07.

7.4 Image in topics

The following Table 8 is the Crosstab test between “DPP Portrayed Image” and “Topic of the News”. Basically, the reports related to DPP are almost evenly divided on topics. Roughly, most of them amount to around 20-30% of the total reports, in which “Taiwan Politics” count for most with around 35%. Except for the image of “PRC’s official message”, which received less than 50% of the negative reports, the other three topics relating to DPP basically hold a 60-80% negative rate. The Pearson Chi-Square significance value is 0.189, which means that there is not a significant difference between DPP’s image among different topics. Hence, the

negative image of DPP is probably not particularly pictured by one topic but a general character.

Table 8: Topic of the News * Portrayed Image of DPP in the News
Crosstabulation

			Portrayed Image of DPP in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Topic of the News	PRC Message	Count	6	6	2	14
		% within Topic of the News	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	13.3%	33.3%	33.3%	20.3%
Taiwan Society		Count	10	1	1	12
		% within Topic of the News	83.3%	8.3%	8.3%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	22.2%	5.6%	16.7%	17.4%
Taiwan Politics		Count	17	7	0	24
		% within Topic of the News	70.8%	29.2%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	37.8%	38.9%	0.0%	34.8%
Cross-Strait Exchange		Count	12	4	3	19
		% within Topic of the News	63.2%	21.1%	15.8%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	26.7%	22.2%	50.0%	27.5%
Total		Count	45	18	6	69
		% within Topic of the News	65.2%	26.1%	8.7%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of DPP in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 8

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.728 ^a	6	.189
Likelihood Ratio	10.904	6	.091
Linear-by-Linear Association	.436	1	.509
N of Valid Cases	69		

- a. 7 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.04.

KMT, on the other side, have different results. The crosstabulation between “KMT portrayed image” and “Topic of the News” shows a strong correlation in Table 9. Basically, the proportion of topics in the reports vary widely. The dominant topic is “Cross-Strait Exchanges”, counting for nearly half of the total reports. The “PRC Message” and “Taiwan Politics” share approximately 30% and 20%, respectively. Obviously, “Taiwan Society” got the least attention, with barely six reports out of 129 samples. These findings require more attention as the positive image of KMT might mainly be constructed by the reports that are talking about PRC’s official messages and Cross-Strait Exchanges. Noticeably, the overwhelmingly positive reports about Cross-Strait Exchanges are nearly 90%. On the other side, KMT appeared to be a neutral actor when it is talking about Taiwan Politics. More interestingly, although there are only six reports about Taiwan Society, the results are quite polarized, with no neutral reports. According to the Chi-Square Test, the significant difference of KMT’s image among topics absolutely exists, with an Asymp. Significance value at 0, stressing that there is no coincidence with this finding. Therefore, it is necessary to study KMT’s image difference among topics with qualitative analyses.

Table 9: Topic of the News * Portrayed Image of KMT in the News Crosstabulation

			Portrayed Image of KMT in the News			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Topic of the News	PRC Message	Count	0	7	18	25
		% within Topic of the News	0.0%	28.0%	72.0%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	0.0%	20.0%	21.2%	19.4%
Taiwan Society		Count	3	0	3	6
		% within Topic of the News	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	33.3%	0.0%	3.5%	4.7%
Taiwan Politics		Count	5	22	12	39
		% within Topic of the News	12.8%	56.4%	30.8%	100.0%
		% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	55.6%	62.9%	14.1%	30.2%
Cross-Straits Exchange		Count	1	6	52	59
		% within Topic of the News	1.7%	10.2%	88.1%	100.0%

	% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	11.1%	17.1%	61.2%	45.7%
Total	Count	9	35	85	129
	% within Topic of the News	7.0%	27.1%	65.9%	100.0%
	% within Portrayed Image of KMT in the News	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests for Table 9

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	54.248 ^a	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	49.452	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.761	1	.097
N of Valid Cases	129		

a. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .42.

8 Discussion

In this section, I will talk more about combining the statistic results with Cross-Strait relations and PRC's Taiwan policy.

8.1 What Does the decrease in the news report mean?

It might be taken as a sign that the Taiwan issue nowadays is not as important as it was because of the highly decreased news reports about DPP and KMT after 2006. However, this is not the case once we review the Cross-Strait relation history. There are two reasons why the reports aggressively increased in 2006 and 2007. Hu Jintao made a moderate shift to Taiwan on resuming negotiations for the "Three Links", reducing misunderstandings, and increasing communication in his May 17 Statement in 2004 (Romberg, 2007). This relatively friendly declaration was followed by an official visit by KMT chairman Lien Chan in 2005 (Romberg, 2007). Ever since, there have been multiple visits made between CCP and Taiwan's political parties. Simply in 2005, there are 12 out of 28 news reports in our sample either with direct propaganda or praising the achievement of these visits between the two sides (Appendix 2:12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27). The other source for booming news reports during that period is the pro-independence activities by the Chen administration, such as the suspension of the National Unification Council and the Taiwanese

UN membership referendums, which greatly raised the concern from the PRC side. For instance, there are eight out of 15 reports relating to DPP in 2005 that explicitly refer to these issues (Appendix 1: 11,12,13,14,15,17,18,19).

The Cross-Strait exchanges did not in fact decrease with the reduced reports. Either from a semi-official or civil aspect, the interaction between the two sides has greatly advanced, such as the liberalization and full restoration of the Three Linkages; the establishment of the Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum; as well as the legitimization of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (Green, 2016). Given the increasing connection between the two sides, decreasing reports is clearly an idiosyncratic phenomenon. As mentioned above, the general curve in Graph 1 and Graph 2 did not show that there is actually a slight increase in reports in 2014-2016. By looking at the reports particularly, the major focus in these years are the Taiwan elections and the concerns about the return of DPP as the ruling party (Appendix 2: 123, 124, 125, 127; Appendix 1: 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69). Particularly, all of the reports that relate to DPP in 2016 are the official messages sent by PRC to forcibly persuade DPP to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus and One-China Policy (Appendix 1: 67, 68, 69). Therefore, the Taiwan issue should still be part of the core strategy for the PRC.

8.2 DPP in the news

Basically, DPP is portrayed as an absolutely negative party, regardless of the topic the reports are mainly relating to. Although its image turned out to be more neutral after its loss in the 2008 presidential election, nearly half of the reports still focus on its negative side. Even though the correlation between DPP's 'Portrayed Image' and 'Article Topic' was not proven in Table 8, I still found five frames by reading these news reports and coded them from 1 to 6 (Appendix 1), with only three out of 69 reports not being classified into these six frames.

Firstly, the first frame is DPP's poor governance harming Taiwanese society, leading to popular indignation. There are mainly two approaches. One is to put a major agenda on its poor governance and report on its corruption issues (Appendix 1: 22, 28, 29, 35, 36, 38, 50) and abuse of power (Appendix 1: 23, 40), resulting in a divided society full of social

problems (Appendix 1: 47,48). On the other side are the news reports emphasizing its loss in various elections to indirectly show how unpopular its governance was (Appendix 1: 1, 27, 49). The second frame articles highly connecting to Taiwan politics do not simply picture DPP as a party using conspiracies and bribes to strive for votes (Appendix 1: 2, 6, 24, 37, 58, 62), but also a political party with endless internal conflict (Appendix 1: 26, 31). Under the third frame, DPP is frequently mentioned for its resistance to Cross-Strait exchanges (Appendix 1: 7, 12, 15, 17, 25, 32, 41, 56), which is against the Taiwan public's willingness to have interactions with mainland China (Appendix 1: 9, 10, 20, 59, 60).

The fourth frame talks about how DPP pursue de jure Taiwan independence or de-Sinicization policies, which is resisted by other countries or the international community (Appendix 1: 21, 33, 44, 51), alarms PRC officials (Appendix 1: 43, 45,46), is resisted by other parties (Appendix 1: 3, 18), and rejected by the Taiwan public (Appendix 1: 4, 5, 8, 19, 39, 42). Partly, few reports as the fifth frame refer to some members of DPP who are willing to promote Cross-Strait exchanges (Appendix 1: 30, 34, 52) and suggest positive policies to Taiwan's government (Appendix 1: 53, 65). Last but not least, the sixth frame is a message from CCP to persuade DPP to accept the One-China Principle, with which CCP would like to negotiate directly (Appendix 1: 57, 61, 67, 68, 69). Noticeably, three of these messages are concentrated in March of 2016, after DPP's win of the presidential election. As stressed by Wang (2001:728), the acceptance of the One-China principle is the precondition for the resumption of Cross-Strait talks. The PRC leadership had refused to have direct dialogue with DPP institution officials after the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election for Chen-Shuibian's win. Likewise, confirmed by the spokesman of TAO, the semi-offical connection between ARATS and SEF has been suspended because of the Tsai administration's amphibolous attitude to the One-China Policy (BBC, 2016). Certainly, the major issue between DPP and CCP is still the Taiwan independence problem.

All in all, DPP in the People's Daily news is a party with poor governance capability, keen on power struggles to fight for votes but against the public's wonder for a Cross-Strait exchange. Its tendency and actions for Taiwan independence result in great opposition, both internationally and domestically. But still, it is not a completely intolerable and incurable party, with some visionary members, and DPP can still make a contribution to both sides of

the Taiwan Strait as long as they acknowledge the One-China Policy and abandon its pro-independency policy.

8.3 KMT in the news

Generally, KMT has an overall positive image, especially after it returned as the ruling party in 2008. However, this positive image of KMT is not generated from its contribution in Taiwan. Instead, the image is mainly being portrayed by reports about the Cross-Strait exchange and PRC's official message stressing the achievement of Cross-Strait relations. Thus, KMT in the news is presented as a Taiwanese party that has a close relationship with CCP and attempts to build a bridge for a Cross-Strait exchange.

Following the "Cross-Strait Exchanges" reports, the articles talking about Taiwanese politics amounted to 30% of all the reports. Different from the overly good image in the previous two topics, the neutral reports count for more than half in this topic. The image of KMT in this case is more as a kind of participator in its domestic political activities rather than an absolutely prominent political party. But still, the positive reports counted for roughly 30%, which is still significantly more than the 12.8% of negative reports. Noticeably, the negative reports were all published before the first CCP-KMT leadership meeting in 2005. During that period, KMT in the news reports is more or less the same as DPP as a party full of internal problems and keen on a power struggle. Therefore, its return to enforcing Cross-Strait exchanges and stressing the 1992 Consensus could possibly be the reason for this image change in the media.

The 12 positive reports under the "Taiwan Politics" topic were mainly published before the Ma administration period. There were 10 of them that were published during 2005 to 2007, in which KMT are taken as a direct opponent to Chen Shui-Bian's administration's pro-independence activities or corruption issues. The remaining two reports were separately published in 2010 and 2015. The one that was published in 2015 has a kind of similar story to the ones published before 2008. It points out that, although KMT lost the election, it is still better than DPP for its commitment to the 1992 Consensus and its contribution to enhancing

Cross-Strait exchanges. Generally, KMT is not an absolute outstanding party in Taiwan, but a relatively better alternative than DPP.

Looking at the reports about ‘Taiwan Society’, there are barely any reports about KMT’s domestic governance achievement or failure in its administration period from 2008 to 2016. Moreover, the only report talking about its governance in Taiwan is negative and framing its poor ruling (Appendix 2: 117). It seems that the People’s Daily is not willing to give too much credit to KMT, apart from its efforts on the Cross-Strait exchange. Additionally, the democratic election is portrayed as a game in order to pursue votes with political jugglery and violence (Appendix 1: 6, 24, 58; Appendix 2: 127), which ignored the real demand of public (Appendix 1: 37; Appendix 2: 85, 124). Although Romberg (2007:12) asserts that what Beijing opposes is separatism rather than democracy when relating to the Taiwan issue, it is clear that the Chinese government does not favor a democratic ideology by its description of Taiwan’s political institution.

9 Conclusion and the Contemporary Challenges of CCP’s framing on Taiwan.

This paper has reviewed the history of Cross-Strait relations and its major issues, which shows that there is a lack of focus in Chinese media reports about Cross-Strait relations and CCP’s Taiwan policy. The popular nationalist legitimacy of CCP in China has put pressure on its decision making about foreign policy. But still, with a highly controlled media, the PRC government also employs media reports to frame public opinion of its government performance, especially when relating to international issues. Li (2014), Han (2007), and Brady (2015), respectively, studied Cross-Strait relations by focusing on the official message frame, Chinese media reports during Taiwan’s elections, and propaganda control on Taiwan-related reports in China. Along this direction, I focused on finding out the agenda-setting and framing being provided by the Chinese mainstream media when talking about KMT and DPP, and attempted to find out how their images were portrayed in different periods and topics.

As a result, although this research was highly restricted by the number of samples and might have a problem with personal bias, the image of KMT and DPP is relatively obvious and easy to find out. The decrease in the amount of reports in recent years is probably not because of the decreased importance of the Taiwan issue to PRC strategy but due to reduced concern about Taiwan independence movements. Neither parties' image was influenced because of the PRC leadership change, but there is a high possibility that they are related to the Taiwan government transitions. DPP is generally a negative party in the news, not only because of its pro-independence tendency and obstructions to Cross-Strait exchanges but also its poor governance in Taiwan. In the news, DPP is normally against any domestic political parties and the majority of Taiwanese, as well as international, factors. KMT is a positive party in the news, and is a builder for Cross-Strait exchanges and a defender of the 1992 Consensus, and so it brings benefits to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, it is not outstanding in terms of its governance performance in Taiwan, and it is also stuck in the inefficient Taiwanese democratic institution with endless competitions. Generally, a pro-independence party is definitely going to fail and be unpopular; recognizing the One-China Principle and improving Cross-Strait relations is the right standpoint for Taiwanese parties.

Nevertheless, official media framing on Taiwan is undergoing a unidirectional collapse and might eventually fail. As Snow and Benford (1988:208) illustrated, official frames do not necessarily succeed unless they ensure that the relevance between the framing and target audience's daily experiences are highly attuned. After a separation of more than 60 years, it can be clearly seen from public opinion poll that unification is losing its support in Taiwan, which is different from the People's Daily's propaganda about the Taiwanese public (Wang, 2015). The increasing tourism between the two sides can highly change the Chinese public's impression and opinion of Taiwanese people and Taiwan's society (Rowen, 2014). Besides, the increasing use of the internet has made traditional media and inclusively official media weak on propaganda (People.cn, 2016). It is impossible for CCP censors to screen out all information from Taiwan that might upset the public. The image of Taiwan is no longer as strictly controlled as it used to be.

These gradually changed facts provide new challenges and inevitable troubles for CCP to control public opinion on Taiwan-related affairs. As Yu, Yu, and Lin (2016:374) believe,

Andrew Moravcski's two-level game model, whereby the domestic public are the major actors in influencing international relations and government foreign policy, is adaptable for studying Cross-Strait relations. Therefore, with increasing interaction between the two sides, a suggestion for future studies is to focus on social media and figure out what really is the Chinese domestic public's opinion on Taiwan's affairs nowadays, and whether it matches the frame provided by the Chinese media and government messages. It is hard to predict the future of the relations between Taiwan and mainland China, but public opinion is a dependable source that can provide us with a clue about the development and direction of Cross-Strait relations.

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11 Appendix

11.1 Appendix 1: DPP-related News

DPP-related News Report Samples					
No.	Title (English title be roughly translated/ Original Chinese title)	Publication Date	Image: 2-Positive 1-Neutral 0-Negative	Topics: 1-PRC Messages 2-Taiwan Society 3-Taiwan Politics 4-Cross-Strait Exchanges	Frames : 1-DPP's poor governance harming Taiwan society 2-Taiwan domestic political competition 3-DPP hindering Cross-Strait Exchanges 4-DPP's pro-independence activities be rejected by various actors 5-Some DPP members be praised 6 -Message from CCP to persuade DPP to abandon its pro-independency policy 9 - Others
1	Turn to see "pan-purple" /彷徨無計看“泛紫”	20/08/2003	0	3	1
2	"Preparing for Election War"(假公濟私忙“備戰”)	27/08/2003	0	3	2
3	Alas "The Republic of China"(哀哉“中華民國”)	24/09/2003	0	2	4
4	The connection cannot be cutten/ 剪不斷 理還亂	24/09/2003	1	3	4
5	Ulterior motives/ 醉翁之意不在酒	29/10/2003	0	3	4
6	Investigation "KMT party property" lively started/ 清查“黨產”熱鬧開場	24/12/2003	0	3	2
7	Fake and truth/ 假作真時真亦假	13/10/2004	1	4	3
8	Absurd words and deeds/ 荒唐言行 險惡用心	17/11/2004	0	2	4
9	How far is "three links" ?/ 包機落幕, “三通”還有多遠?	21/02/2005	0	4	3

10	Future of Cross-strait agricultural cooperation/ 兩岸農業交流合作空間廣闊	02/03/2005	0	4	3
11	Interview of Chen Yunlin/ 中共中央臺灣工作辦公室主任陳云林就中國國民黨副主席江丙坤率團來大陸參訪答新華社記者問	01/04/2005	1	1	6
12	Don'ts against the tide/ 逆流而動 不智之舉	13/04/2005	0	4	3
13	Mainland would like to have a talk/ 大陸對同臺灣什么人談判沒有成見	14/04/2005	1	1	6
14	Big format/ 大格局才有大作為	27/04/2005	1	4	6
15	Cherish our historical step/ 非常珍惜我們歷史的一步	04/05/2005	0	4	3
16	Taiwan people come mainland for license/ 臺灣人時興到大陸考證照	01/06/2005	1	3	9
17	The chairman of the SEF is a mystery/ 海基會董事長人選 內藏玄機	08/06/2005	0	4	3
18	The "second constitution" just around the corner/ “末代國代”走入歷史 “二次憲改”蠢蠢欲動	15/06/2005	0	3	4
19	Compatriots identity, is our pride/ 同胞的認同, 就是我們的收穫	13/07/2005	0	4	4
20	Man-made trouble/ 人為困擾何時了	27/07/2005	0	4	3
21	Chen Shui-bian acts as a "sending money boy"/ 陳水扁又當“散財童子”	28/09/2005	0	3	4
22	Kaohsiung railway case hit the DPP/ 高雄捷運案重創民進黨	12/10/2005	0	2	1
23	Why at this moment? / 為何在這個當口“法辦”?	09/11/2005	0	2	1
24	When will the "visious election culture" end/ “惡質選舉文化”何時休?	30/11/2005	0	3	2
25	No hope for 'Economy development organization'/ 幻滅“經發會”	25/01/2006	0	4	3

26	Former Chairman of the DPP Lin Yixiong announced his withdraw from the party/ 民進黨前主席林義雄宣布退黨	25/01/2006	0	3	2
27	Cross - strait relations new hopes/ 兩岸關係開新局	04/03/2006	1	4	1
28	Politics "tumbler" fell/ 政壇“不倒翁”倒了	12/04/2006	0	3	1
29	Governance problems/ 弊案不斷氣自衰	19/04/2006	0	3	1
30	Do not against the popular/ 人心不可違 潮流不可擋	28/04/2006	2	4	5
31	Election conflicts/ 選戰烽煙起 冷熱意味長	10/05/2006	0	3	2
32	Who is setting the trick?/ “經續會”：誰在精心設局？	02/08/2006	1	4	3
33	"fight diplomacy" / 高調“拼外交” 百官來造勢	06/09/2006	0	3	4
34	aiwan businessmen create great benefits for Taiwan/ 臺商西進為臺灣創造巨大利益	20/09/2006	2	4	5
35	Detonate Taiwan politics/ 引爆臺灣政壇	08/11/2006	0	3	1
36	Corruption issues/ “貪腐”無恙 “良心”不安	15/11/2006	1	3	1
37	Election and chaos/ 選戰結束 塵埃未定	13/12/2006	0	3	2
38	"National confidential fee" case hearing/ “國務機要費”案開庭	20/12/2006	0	3	1
39	Heal the history of trauma for a better future/ 撫平歷史創傷 共創美好未來	01/03/2007	0	2	4
40	Taiwan authorities changed seven "News Director" in seven years/ 臺當局 7 年換了 7 個“新聞局長”	11/04/2007	0	2	1
41	The Third Cross - Strait Economic and Trade Forum was held in Beijing/ 第三屆兩岸經貿文化論壇在京舉行	29/04/2007	0	1	3
42	The DPP's so-called "Taiwan" joining the United Nations referendum was rejected/ 民進黨所謂以“臺灣”名義加入聯合國公投案遭否決	30/06/2007	1	3	4

43	The head of the Taiwan Affairs Office claims/ 中臺辦國臺辦負責人發表談話	25/07/2007	0	1	4
44	Funny "diplomacy"/ "凱子外交"徒留笑柄	29/08/2007	0	2	4
45	A speech by TAO statesman/ 國務院臺辦發言人發表談話	17/09/2007	0	1	4
46	The head of the Central Committee of the CPC Central Committee comment on the DPP so-called "normal state resolution"/ 中共中央臺辦負責人就民進黨通過所謂“正常國家決議文”發表談話	02/10/2007	1	1	4
47	Careless "King"/ "晉惠帝式發言"何其多	07/11/2007	0	2	1
48	War on the name/ 拆區起“戰火”	12/12/2007	0	3	1
49	Year review on Cross-Strait relations/ 歲末回眸看兩岸	29/12/2007	1	3	1
50	Taiwan authorities secretly set up arms companies/ 臺當局秘密籌設軍火公司	20/02/2008	0	2	1
51	Yang Jiechi talks with Rice/ 楊潔篪與賴斯會談	27/02/2008	0	1	4
52	Hu Jintao and Xiao Wanchang's meeting has positive significance/ 胡錦濤與蕭萬長的會見具有重要的積極意義	17/04/2008	2	1	5
53	Be realistic/ 切中肯綮 務實之舉	24/09/2008	1	2	5
54	Expand Cross - Strait Civil Communication and Promote Cross - Strait Cooperation and Development/ 賈慶林,. 擴大兩岸民間交流 促進兩岸合作發展	18/05/2009	2	1	5
55	Prospect of peaceful development of cross-strait relations/ 開創兩岸關係和平發展的前景	06/06/2009	2	4	5
56	DPP should turn around/ 民進黨莫要一條道走到黑	14/08/2009	0	4	3

57	For the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and great renaissance/ 為了中華民族的根本利益和偉大復興	30/04/2010	0	1	6
58	And look at Taiwan "fight culture"/ 且看臺灣“打架文化”	16/07/2010	0	3	2
59	Why the environment is not conducive to the DPP/ 大環境為何不利于民進黨	24/02/2012	0	4	3
60	Lose is not a shame/ 輸不丟人怕才丟人	25/05/2012	0	4	3
61	Jia Qinglin met with delegations in the Straits Forum/ 賈慶林會見出席海峽論壇兩岸各界人士	17/06/2012	1	1	6
62	Spring Festival, the test of Taiwan's high-speed road system/ 春運, 考驗臺灣高速路計費系統	30/01/2014	0	2	2
63	Endless conflicts/ 曲終人將散 紛爭猶未止	10/04/2014	1	3	9
64	Peaceful development is future/ 當和平發展成為兩岸新常態	26/03/2015	0	4	3
65	Taiwan's teaching reformation: 20 years of gains and losses/ 臺灣教改 20 年的得與失	14/05/2015	2	2	5
66	The Kuomintang filled the "blue melancholy"/ 國民黨瀰漫“藍色憂郁”	22/05/2015	1	3	9
67	Declare a firm stand to express sincere goodwill/ 宣示堅定立場 表達誠摯善意	07/03/2016	1	1	6
68	Compatriots work together to create a better future/ 同胞共同努力 開創共同未來	15/03/2016	1	1	6
69	Adhere to the bottom line, motivate development/ 堅持底線 融合發展 行穩致遠	24/03/2016	0	1	6

11.2 Appendix 2: KMT-Related News

KMT-related News Report Samples

No.	Title (English title be roughly translated/ Original Chinese title)	Publication Date	Image: 2-Positive 1-Neutral 0-Negative	Topics: 1-PRC Messages 2-Taiwan Society 3-Taiwan Politics 4-Cross-Strait Exchanges
1	Wandering in disappointment/ 在失望中徘徊	22/12/2002	0	4
2	Commemorate the 56th anniversary of the "February 28" uprising/ 紀念“二·二八”起義 56 周年	27/02/2003	0	2
3	Gratifying red packets with potential threat/ 喜人紅包 后患難料	23/07/2003	0	3
4	Investigation "KMT party property" lively started/ 清查“黨產”熱鬧開場	24/12/2003	0	3
5	"two twenty-eight"/ 恩怨分明“二·二八”	25/02/2004	0	2
6	Finally realize it/ 沉重的清醒	25/02/2004	0	3
7	Humor and worry/ 幽默與憂心	19/05/2004	0	3
8	The chaos is full of variables/ 亂云飛渡 充滿變數	26/05/2004	1	3
9	Combined with vertical and horizontal, hot and cold intertwined/ 合縱連橫 熱冷交織	03/11/2004	1	3
10	Weak Morale/ 士氣低迷 積弱難起	10/11/2004	0	3
11	Legislature conflicts is endless/ “立院”角力 風云再起	22/12/2004	1	3
12	Chen Yunlin Interview/ 中共中央臺灣工作辦公室主任陳云林就中國國民黨副主席江丙坤率團來大陸參訪答新華社記者問	01/04/2005	2	1
13	Taiwan's major political parties strongly condemned the "Taiwan independence" supporters for visting the Yasukuni Shrine/ 臺灣主要政黨強烈譴責“臺獨”分子參拜靖國神社	05/04/2005	2	3
14	Highly expected Lien's visit/ 對連戰大陸之行 臺灣各界寄予高度期待	27/04/2005	2	4
15	Hu Jintao expressed his expectation to meet with Lien Chan in Beijing/ 胡錦濤表示期待在北京同連戰見面并會談	29/04/2005	2	1
16	Cross-strait agricultural cooperation/ 兩岸農業合作：春風得意馬蹄急	29/04/2005	2	4

17	Lien Chan and Kuomintang group arrived in the mainland/ 連戰率中國國民黨大陸訪問團抵京	29/04/2005	2	4
18	Achievements by Lien Chan's mainland visit/ 連戰大陸行成果概括為“三項體認”和“五個促進”	04/05/2005	2	1
19	International attention and praises on Lien Chan's visit/ 海外華僑華人和媒體積極評價連戰訪問大陸	04/05/2005	2	4
20	New opportunities for Cross-Strait relations/ 攜手開創兩岸關係發展新局	04/05/2005	2	4
21	In line with the trend/ 符合時代發展潮流的舉措	13/05/2005	2	4
22	Yu Muming delivered a speech at Renmin University of China/ 郁慕明在中國人民大學演講	13/07/2005	1	3
23	Hu Jintao meets with New Party members/ 胡錦濤會見新黨大陸訪問團	13/07/2005	1	1
24	Social security problems/ “惡龍”落網警界歡喜 黑槍泛濫治安堪憂	20/07/2005	1	3
25	We should work together to implement the consensus reached by the CCP, KMT and the New Party/ 應共同努力落實好中共與國、親、新三黨達成的共識	29/07/2005	2	1
26	From next month fifteen kinds of Taiwan fruit enjoying no-tariff import/ 下月起十五種臺灣水果進口零關稅	29/07/2005	1	4
27	"3·19 shooting case" ceased/ “3·19 槍擊案”不了了之	24/08/2005	2	4
28	Taiwan "military purchase case"/ 臺“軍購案”欲再闖關	31/08/2005	1	3
29	Jia Qinglin met with Taiwan veterans and other veterans/ 賈慶林會見許歷農等臺灣抗戰老戰士	05/09/2005	2	1
30	Taiwan authorities suffered "ass" crisis/ 臺灣當局遭遇“馬屁”危機	07/09/2005	1	3
31	Ma Song formal talks, Pan Blue seeking integration/ 馬宋正式會談 泛藍謀求整合	14/09/2005	2	3
32	The first Cross - Strait Elite Forum was held in Shanghai/ 第一屆兩岸民間菁英論壇在上海舉行	16/09/2005	2	1
33	Chen Shui-bian acts as a "sending money boy"/ 陳水扁又當“散財童子”	28/09/2005	1	3
34	Taiwan "Legislative" violence / 臺灣“立法院”再演全武行	19/10/2005	1	3
35	President of the Kuomintang Ma Ying-jeou expressed regret and protest against Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine/ 中國國民黨主席馬英九對小泉參拜靖國神社表示遺憾與抗議	20/10/2005	2	2

36	Celebration Taiwan's return in 1945/ 臺灣光復一甲子 島內各界舉行形式多樣紀念活動	26/10/2005	2	2
37	When will "Vicious election culture" disappear?/ "惡質選舉文化"何時休?	30/11/2005	2	3
38	Chaos after election/ 選后政壇飛短流長	14/12/2005	2	3
39	Jia Qinglin meets with representatives of the Taiwan Affairs Office/ 賈慶林會見全國臺辦主任會議代表	19/01/2006	1	1
40	The significance of the Eight Claims/ 八項主張具有重大意義	26/01/2006	1	4
41	Peaceful reunification will benefit both sides/ 和平統一定會造福兩岸同胞	30/01/2006	2	4
42	The mainland is willing to exchange opinions / 大陸愿與包括民進黨在內的政黨、團體人士就兩岸客貨運包機和大陸居民赴臺旅游交換意見	23/02/2006	1	1
43	The mainland has never rejected the cross-strait cargo charter negotiations/ 大陸從未排斥兩岸貨運包機的商談	23/02/2006	1	1
44	Hong Kong and Macao citizens strongly condemned Chen Shui-bian's "Taiwan independence" behavior/ 港澳各界人士強烈譴責陳水扁的“臺獨”行徑	01/03/2006	1	4
45	Hu Jintao's four views on Taiwan have a positive and far-reaching impact on cross-strait relations/ 胡錦濤對臺四點意見對兩岸關係產生積極深遠影響	03/03/2006	1	1
46	"One China" is beyond doubt/ "一個中國"的認知毋庸置疑	20/03/2006	2	4
47	The Kuomintang Central base has moved/ 國民黨中央黨部要搬家了	29/03/2006	2	2
48	Cross-strait Economic and Trade forum achieved proposals/ 兩岸經貿論壇通過共同建議	16/04/2006	2	4
49	Cross - Strait Economic and Trade Forum Closed in Beijing/ 兩岸經貿論壇在北京閉幕	16/04/2006	2	4
50	Internal problems/ 弊案不斷氣自衰	19/04/2006	2	3
51	Lien Chan in hometown/ 連戰在漳州祭祖	20/04/2006	2	4
52	Overseas Chinese highly praised Hu Jintao's "four-point proposal"/ 華僑華人高度評價胡錦濤“四點建議”	20/04/2006	2	4
53	Election war/ 選戰烽煙起 冷熱意味長	10/05/2006	2	3
54	The 4th Straits Youth Forum was held in Fuzhou/ 第四屆海峽青年論壇在福州舉行	17/06/2006	2	4

55	Kuomintang Hsinchu County Party delegation to end the exchange trip in Chongqing/ 中國國民黨新竹縣黨部訪問團結束在渝交流行程	17/06/2006	2	4
56	Promoting the commercial banks to issue special loans for small and medium-sized Taiwan-funded enterprises/ 將推動商業銀行為中小臺資企業發放專項貸款	08/07/2006	2	1
57	Chen Shui-bian suffered a "life and death door"/ 陳水扁遭遇“生死門”	19/07/2006	1	3
58	Fujian and Taiwan Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee was established in Xiamen/ 閩臺經濟合作促進委員會在廈門成立	09/09/2006	2	4
59	September 12 - "Anti Chen-Shuibian" into the fourth day/ 9月12日——“倒扁”進入第四天	13/09/2006	2	3
60	China Western Sea Fair held in Chengdu/ 中國西部海博會在成都舉行	17/09/2006	2	4
61	Strengthen the protection of Taiwan businessmen rights and interests/ 強化臺商權益保護的佳音	20/09/2006	1	4
62	SOGO case investigation/ SOGO 案偵結疑點重重“炮聲”隆	11/10/2006	1	3
63	The largest agricultural exhibition in Across-strait was held in Xiamen/ 兩岸最大規模農業展會在廈門舉行	20/10/2006	2	4
64	Corruption issues/ “貪腐”無恙 “良心”不安	15/11/2006	1	3
65	Fight for Taipei and Gaoxiong/ 北高選舉最后冲刺	06/12/2006	1	3
66	New tricks/ 圖解套,綠營再打“釋憲”牌	31/01/2007	1	3
67	The separatist activities of the Taiwan administration are unpopular/ 臺灣當局“去中國化”的分裂活動不得人心	15/02/2007	1	1
68	The Kuomintang will only come up with one group of candidates for 2008/ 國民黨將只推一組候選人參選 2008	17/02/2007	2	3
69	The Taiwan Affairs Office held a regular press conference/ 國臺辦舉行例行記者會	01/03/2007	1	1
70	Peaceful development is what people want/ 和平發展深入民心	05/03/2007	2	4
71	The Kuomintang held a parade against the so-called "rectification" by the DPP authorities/ 國民黨舉行游行集會反對民進黨當局所謂“正名”活動	01/04/2007	2	3
72	Wu Boxiong became chairman of the Chinese Kuomintang/ 吳伯雄就任中國國民黨主席	12/04/2007	1	3

73	common ancestor of the Chinese/ “軒轅黃帝是我們中華民族共同的始祖”	20/04/2007	2	4
74	opportunity to build KMT- People First Party Union/ 國親合併 機會重現	25/04/2007	1	3
75	The Third Cross - Strait Economic and Trade Forum was held in Beijing/ 第三屆兩岸經貿文化論壇在京舉行	29/04/2007	2	4
76	New breakthrough/ 又踏層峰望眼開	30/04/2007	2	4
77	The third cross - strait economic and trade forum/ 第三屆兩岸經貿文化論壇共同建議	30/04/2007	2	4
78	"Ma Xie duel"/ “馬謝對決”初成形	09/05/2007	2	3
79	"Kick off" / “臨門一腳”何時踢出	23/05/2007	2	4
80	Tricks under story/ 舊事重提玄機多	18/07/2007	1	3
81	CCP and KMT consensus/國共兩黨有關機構第三次保護臺商合法權益工作會談達成十項共同意見	26/07/2007	2	1
82	Shanxi three stage play moved Taiwanese/ 山西三部舞臺劇感動臺灣	03/08/2007	2	4
83	Cross-strait exchanges 20 years extraordinary development/ 兩岸交流 20 年走過不平凡發展歷程	02/11/2007	2	4
84	Sincere to pursue wellbeing of the compatriots on both sides and seek peace in Taiwan Strait/ 真誠為兩岸同胞謀福祉、為臺海地區謀和平	21/11/2007	2	1
85	The election campaign is lively but public does not care about politics competition/ 選戰熱鬧 選情冷清	09/01/2008	1	3
86	Wu Boxiong and Chinese Kuomintang delegation arrived in Nanjing/ 吳伯雄率中國國民黨大陸訪問團抵達南京	27/05/2008	2	4
87	Willing to contribute to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations/ 愿意為兩岸關係和平發展盡心力	31/05/2008	2	4
88	Cross-Strait News and Communication Research Exchange Center was established/ 海峽兩岸新聞與傳播研究交流中心成立	09/06/2008	2	4
89	Shao Qiwei meets with the Chinese Kuomintang Chairman Wu Boxiong/ 邵琪偉拜會中國國民黨主席吳伯雄	06/07/2008	2	4
90	Yu Zhengsheng meets with Lien Chan/ 俞正聲會見連戰	14/04/2009	2	1
91	The First Straits Forum - refreshed Cross - Straits Exchange record/ 首屆海峽論壇——刷新兩岸交流紀錄	23/05/2009	2	4

92	Talking about trade with Taiwan/ 從赴臺採購談起	03/06/2009	1	4
93	prospect of peaceful development of cross-strait relations/ 開創兩岸關係和平發展的前景	06/06/2009	2	4
94	Optimistic about future/ 樂觀其成 期待利好	10/06/2009	2	4
95	Jia Qinglin Meets with KMT Chairman Wu Boxiong/ 賈慶林會見中國國民黨主席吳伯雄	11/07/2009	2	1
96	The 5th Cross - Strait Economic and Trade Forum/ 第五屆兩岸經貿文化論壇共同建議	13/07/2009	2	4
97	Reunification: the wind and waves will have an end/ 統一大業：長風破浪會有期	22/09/2009	2	4
98	Cross - strait cultural exchanges through the time and space/ 兩岸文化交流穿越時空的使者	21/05/2010	2	4
99	Zhou Tienong met with the Chinese Kuomintang youth elite delegation/ 周鐵農會見中國國民黨青年菁英大陸參訪團	07/06/2010	2	4
100	Jia Qinglin met with delegation in the Second Strait Forum/ 賈慶林會見出席第二屆海峽論壇兩岸各界人士	20/06/2010	2	1
101	The second session of the Straits Forum was held in Xiamen/ 第二屆海峽論壇大會在廈門舉行	21/06/2010	2	4
102	The second session of the Straits Forum "folk song" loud and clear response to the two sides/ 第二屆海峽論壇“民歌”嘹亮回響兩岸	27/06/2010	2	4
103	The opening of the 6th cross - strait economic and trade forum / 第六屆兩岸經貿文化論壇開幕	11/07/2010	2	4
104	The closing of the 6th cross - strait economic and trade forum / 第六屆兩岸經貿文化論壇圓滿閉幕	12/07/2010	2	4
105	The two sides work together to create a better future for Chinese/ 兩岸攜手共創中華民族美好未來	26/10/2010	2	4
106	Hu Jintao Meets with Lien Chan/ 胡錦濤會見連戰	14/11/2010	2	1
107	violent election in Taiwan/ 臺灣選舉 暴力多 誰之過	03/12/2010	2	3
108	Jia Qinglin Meets with KMT Honorary President Wu Boxiong/ 賈慶林會見中國國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄	07/05/2011	2	1
109	The opening of the 7th cross - strait economic and trade forum/ 第七屆兩岸經貿文化論壇開幕	08/05/2011	2	4

110	Hu Jintao Meets with Wu Boxiong/ 胡錦濤會見吳伯雄	11/05/2011	2	1
111	The third session of the Straits Forum opened in Xiamen/ 第三屆海峽論壇在廈門開幕	12/06/2011	2	4
112	Li Keqiang met with Wu Danyi/ 李克強會見吳敦義一行	02/04/2012	2	1
113	Promote cooperation by deepening exchanges with culture as a link/ 以文化為紐帶深化交流促進合作	18/06/2012	2	4
114	New achievement of cross - strait cultural communication/ 兩岸文化溝通的新果實	20/07/2012	2	4
115	Speech by Jia Qinglin at the Opening Ceremony of the 8th Cross - Strait Economic and Trade Forum/ 賈慶林在第八屆兩岸經貿文化論壇開幕式上的致辭	29/07/2012	2	1
116	The 8th cross - strait economic and trade culture forum/ 第八屆兩岸經貿文化論壇共同建議	30/07/2012	2	4
117	Cross - strait marriage, refraction of the times/ 兩岸婚姻, 折射時代光影	23/10/2012	0	2
118	Trampled into the road/ 踏平坎坷成大道	25/10/2012	2	4
119	Communication and cooperation to let the heart closer/ 交流與合作讓心貼得更近	28/12/2012	1	3
120	Dialogue with Taiwan New Party Chairman Yu Mu Ming/ 對話臺灣新黨主席郁慕明	27/06/2013	1	4
121	Xi Jinping congrats Ma Yingjiu elected chairman of KMT/ 中共中央總書記習近平電賀馬英九當選中國國民黨主席	21/07/2013	2	1
122	Xi Jinping will meet with the honorary chairman of the Kuomintang- Lien Chan/ 中共中央總書記習近平將會見中國國民黨榮譽主席連戰	18/02/2014	2	4
123	Three strong opponents become thriving/ 三強爭霸變一枝獨秀	17/04/2014	1	3
124	"Gas explosion" to pull out the "political victims"/ "氣爆"牽出"政壇受災戶"	14/08/2014	1	3
125	The Kuomintang president election/ 國民黨選主席 懸念小挑戰大	15/01/2015	1	3
126	Total cross-strait tourism and visit in 2014 hit a record high/ 2014年兩岸人員往來總量再創歷史新高	15/01/2015	2	4
127	"Wiping red" is actually slander/ "抹紅"的實質是抹黑	14/05/2015	2	3

128	For the reunification/ 為統一大業牽思榮懷	17/09/2015	2	4
129	Important milestones, open a new chapter/ 重要里程碑 開啟新篇章	09/11/2015	2	4

11.3 Appendix 3: DPP Origin Database

No. by publication date	Title
1	[1]劉歡,查文曄,. 專家呼吁堅持“九二共識”維護兩岸關係和平發展[N]. 人民日報,2016-05-10(006).
2	[2] 不承認“九二共識”就是破壞兩岸關係共同政治基礎[N]. 人民日報,2016-05-05(001).
3	[3]吳儲岐,孫立極,. “綠營”回應太“溫柔”[N]. 人民日報,2016-05-05(020).
4	[4]孫立極,. 在臺灣 如何有尊嚴地養老[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-31(020).
5	[5]倪永杰,. 堅持底線 融合發展 行穩致遠[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-24(020).
6	[6]木鳴,. “九二共識”是最務實的選擇[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-17(020).
7	[7] 同胞共同努力 開創共同未來[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-15(013).
8	[8]孫立極,張璉,蘇銀成,曹玲娟,吳秋余,溫素威,. 堅持四個不變 兩岸行穩致遠[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-07(004).
9	[9]王昀加,何自力,王海權,柳新勇,. 宣示堅定立場 表達誠摯善意[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-07(004).
10	[10] “九二共識”的核心意涵不能回避[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-07(004).
11	[11]吳儲岐,. 堅決遏制任何形式的“臺獨”分裂行徑[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-07(004).
12	[12]趙博,李志暉,劉巍巍,涂洪長,. 習總書記重要講話體現對臺工作“三個自信”[N]. 人民日報,2016-03-06(004).
13	[13]吳儲岐,. 只要認同“九二共識”, 大陸都愿同其交往[N]. 人民日報,2016-02-25(006).
14	[14]吳儲岐,. 兩岸關係的大方向大格局沒有根本改變[N]. 人民日報,2016-01-21(020).
15	[15]遠猷,. 臺灣“反課綱”誰是“藏鏡人”[N]. 人民日報,2015-08-06(020).
16	[16]吳亞明,張稚丹,. 臺灣教科書: 排“獨”有多難? [N]. 人民日報,2015-07-30(020).
17	[17]孫立極,吳亞明,. 女人之戰 儼然成形[N]. 人民日報,2015-06-18(018).
18	[18]王堯,. “趕考”不要押錯題[N]. 人民日報,2015-06-11(020).
19	[19]孫立極, 吳亞明,. “小辣椒”炒“空心菜”? [N]. 人民日報,2015-06-04(020).
20	[20]吳亞明, 王堯,. 國民黨瀰漫“藍色憂郁”[N]. 人民日報,2015-05-22(020).
21	[21]王堯,. “抹紅”的實質是抹黑[N]. 人民日報,2015-05-14(020).
22	[22]吳亞明,任成琦,. 臺灣教改 20 年的得與失[N]. 人民日報,2015-05-14(020).
23	[23]王堯,. 共創兩岸關係新未來 建設兩岸命運共同體[N]. 人民日報,2015-05-06(008).
24	[24]連戰,. 兩岸“和平之旅”十周年之回顧與展望[N]. 人民日報,2015-04-29(011).
25	[25]遠猷,. “渾水摸魚”行不通[N]. 人民日報,2015-04-16(020).
26	[26]王堯,吳亞明,. 國民黨初試“初選” “小辣椒”一馬當先[N]. 人民日報,2015-04-16(020).
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11.4 Appendix 4: KMT Origin Database

No.	Title of the Articles (The irrelevant articles are marked in shadow)
1	[1]吳儲岐,孫立極,. “綠營”回應太“溫柔”[N]. 人民日報,2016-05-05(020).
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