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University
of Glasgow

**MSc Russian, East European &
Eurasian Studies**

*Is a Civilisational Turn occurring in Russia's
Security Thought?
Through the Lens of Securitisation Theory*

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Introduction

Introductory Remarks

During the Cold War, cursed with a real threat of a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies, many Western social scientists warned of the American-dominated study of strategic thinking and culture. Jones (2012), who provides an interesting analysis of contributions towards this topic, states that “a more appropriate conclusion is that U.S. policymakers and strategists have remained largely ignorant of the vast literature that exists on strategic culture and political psychology and its application within the national security, and strategy-making processes.” (287). In his article, he discusses the importance of an understanding of the culture, history and identity of countries and regions to grasp the logic behind their strategic thought process. Some opinions that he provides include those of Ermath, who states that the American’s and Soviet’s strategic thinking processes were not at all similar and that to presume so would be “cultural self-centeredness” (290), and that of Snyder, who asserts that “neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, pre-conception-free game theorists. Their [nuclear] doctrines have developed in different organizational and technological constraints.” (289).¹

Even though there was an argument and a modestly developed literature advocating for a better understanding of cultural and historical aspects in order to comprehend a country’s strategic thought process, the study of security and strategy within international

¹ Jones quotes these from: Ermath, F. W., 1975. Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought. *International Security*, 13(2), pp. 138-155. & Snyder, J. L., 1977. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for limited Nuclear Operations*. 1st ed. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

relations theory was still dominated by a traditional, state-centric, realist outlook, considering only the state's military capabilities to understand their thought processes. The concept of *security* during this period was described by Walt (1991: 212) as being “the study of the threat, use and control of military force.” Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, the meaning and approach to the word *security* has come under much discussion and has indeed developed in the eyes of many academics. Some of the most detailed contributions towards security studies were those from the so-called Copenhagen school, whose aim was to ‘widen’ the scope of security from military to other areas (societal, environmental, political & economic).

Tsygankov & Tsygankov (2010) similarly share their distaste to the American- and Western-dominated field of social sciences in international relations theory, stating that “it is important to look beyond the already explored case of the West.” (663). In order to combat this, they argue the need to understand the significance of national ideology to deduce the actions and behaviour of a certain country, and in their study they attempt to form an international relations theory adapted to Russian history and culture. They argue that the history and culture of Russia has endured persistent patterns over the past 150 years which has developed three potential strands of Russian international ideology: *Westernism* (Russia must integrate with the West in order to achieve its full potential), *Statism* (Russia is an independent powerful state which must work pragmatically with the West) and *Civilizationism* (Russia is an independent powerful civilisation which must resist harmful influences from the West).

This dissertation agrees with the preceding views that security has been both far too American-dominated and far too ‘narrow’ in terms of scope, and thus seek to provide an understanding into the role and influence of Russia's national identity in its strategic thinking and security decisions. Therefore, this dissertation aims to contribute some modest thoughts

to this literature, primarily looking at the ‘societal sector’ of security (although the political and military realms will also come under consideration at times) by examining the ways in which Russia attempts to securitise Russian society and protect its civilisational identity.

Research Aims

Tsygankov & Tsygankov (2010) focus their attention of national ideology on concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy. This dissertation aims to add an additional factor which can cross all three of these concepts: security. Our first research question involves asking if there can be a nexus between national ideology and security decisions/ strategic thinking of the Russian Federation. Tsygankov (2013) indicates that a ‘civilisational turn’ may have started occurring from 2012 towards the third national ideological strand (Civilisationism). As such, we will present further literature on Civilisationism, in particular the sub-category known as *Neo-Eurasianism*. Through an analysis of the literature of these topics, this dissertation will highlight the main features of Eurasianism and its place within a wider civilisational context, which we will compare against the security decisions made to demonstrate if these features have had any presence on the decisions taken.

In order to identify the presence of Civilisationism and Neo-Eurasianism within security issues and dilemmas in Russia, this dissertation will use the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory (Buzan, et al., 1998), which expands the definition of security to societal and cultural issues, which can be influenced by national ideology. This theory gives a structured framework to study how a security issue is framed by an actor and presented to an audience through a ‘speech act’. The aim is to convince the audience to accept that something is under threat and requires extraordinary means to deal with it. By examining the ‘speech act’

of the Russian government, we can determine to what extent a Civilisational rhetoric is appearing. The theory has, however, been an extremely controversial strand of security studies and has received much criticism, and thus this dissertation's secondary purpose will be to examine if securitisation theory can be an effective tool to analyse security decisions, and if in particular it can be used with the Russian Federation.

The main research questions can be summarised below:

1. Has Russia turned towards a national ideology of Civilisationism/ Neo-Eurasianism in its security realm?
2. Can securitisation theory offer a suitable lens to study and understand Russia's security decisions?

Dissertation Structure

Firstly, this dissertation will discuss the literature surrounding Eurasianism and Civilisationism and aims to present the principal features of this ideology which can potentially have an influence on Russia's international outlook and security decisions. Secondly, the theoretical framework of securitisation theory will be presented. I will also consider some of the main criticisms of this theory and whilst defending the framework, I will also present the reasoning why I believe this theory is beneficial for this research project. Thirdly, the methodology which I use will be examined, discussing the speech act of securitisation theory at a deeper level and how discourse analysis can be used to decipher and interpret the security process. In this section, the sources themselves will be discussed, accompanied by potential limitations and the steps which will be taken to overcome these.

The principal section of this dissertation will demonstrate the findings of the research performed. Case studies using securitisation theory within the societal sector will be presented, analysing speeches from Putin and other governmental officials, as well as official governmental security documents. During the discussion of the findings, a wide range of secondary reading will be used to help reach convincing conclusions, as well as providing additional discussion into national identity and security. The dissertation will conclude with the main ideas discovered during the research and aims to answer the two dominant questions which this project investigates. Some brief ideas will also be provided on further potential research which can stem from this piece of work.

Civilisationism, Eurasianism & Neo-

Eurasianism

Civilisational Turns

As we have mentioned, there can be three strands of Russian ideology within international relations theory: Westernism, Statism and Civilisationism. This dissertation argues that Russia has experienced both of the first strands and has now entered a period of Civilisationism. At the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin clearly wanted to take Russia in a Western direction, believing that integration with the West and its markets was key to the success of Russia. However, this Westernism idea was short lived, due to both international and domestic factors. As Tsygankov (2007: 389) states, “the domestic context of growing disorder, corruption, and poverty that had resulted from Yeltsin’s Westernism reforms was simply not conducive to sustaining the chosen civilizational direction.” On the international stage, many in Russia felt that it had been shunned and rejected by the West; for example, with NATO expanding its membership to welcome former Communist and Soviet countries, thus allowing NATO to be on Russia’s doorstep.

This failure of Westernism forced Russia to change ideological direction. After Yeltsin, Putin took charge of the country, however, he did not completely abandon the idea of Russia becoming closer to the West. It can be said that Putin’s early presidency leaned towards an ideology of Statism, with Tsygankov (2007: 385 & 377) explaining that the new president’s arrival marked a change in foreign policy, and that “Putin’s policies reflect the vision of Russia as a European nation with great power capabilities and special relations outside Europe.” Nevertheless, Putin also made clear that Russia was its own power and must

develop at its own pace without outside interference. During this period, we can witness a more pragmatic approach of Russia's foreign policy objectives; Russia still intended to work alongside the West (without becoming fully integrated), whilst also increasing the rhetoric of Russia's power within the region. For example, there were several suggestions to increase relations including Putin's proposed visa-free zone between Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Putin also rejected Western invitations, such as the European Union's peace-keeping mission in Moldova; a country within Russia's former Soviet neighbourhood. (Tsygankov, 2007: 387).

Howbeit, it is clear that relations between Russia and the West started to deteriorate, with events such as the colour revolutions in Former Soviet countries and the Russian war with Georgia straining Russia's relationship with the West. Although President Obama had optimistic ideas with a 'reset' of US-Russian relations with President Medvedev, relations worsened between the two countries, in particular with Putin becoming President once more. (Zygar, 2016). Tsygankov recognises the start of another civilisational turn in his 2013 article with a noticeable change of rhetoric from Putin. However, at this point Tsygankov did not believe that a full civilisational turn had taken place, explaining that "such an interpretation of Russia's civilizational turn is premature because the Kremlin is yet to deviate from the standard line of preserving strong relations with Europe and the United States in a global world" and that "Russia is likely to stay the course by trying to manage external and internal cultural diversity and positioning itself as a voice in favour of tolerance and dialogue." (5-7). Of course, the year after this article was written Russia shocked the world by occupying and annexing Crimea from Ukraine. Obviously, Putin would have known that such a military offensive against another sovereign country would earn world-wide hostility towards Russia, causing the country to be more isolated than ever. Nevertheless, Putin chose this action, signalling that this pragmatic period of Statism has perhaps come to an end.

Concepts of Civilisationism, Eurasianism & Neo-Eurasianism

Unfortunately, there is not an abundance of translations in English of the Civilisationist ideas which Tsygankov & Tsygankov present to us. One exception is Eurasianism, or more specifically, Neo-Eurasianism, which provides a wealth of translation and materials. Much of this material comes from the works and opinions of Alexander Dugin, a prominent Russian ultranationalist academic who is at the helm of the Neo-Eurasianist movement. His place in the Russian political scene is interesting, as he boasts many connections with politicians and military generals and is a great supporter of Putin. This section will present the main concepts and objectives of Neo-Eurasianism and its place within the wider field of Civilisationism. Fully understanding both Civilisationism and Eurasianism is an arduous task due to there being no agreed set of theoretical components and concepts, and at times it seems that the ideas presented in these ideologies can be flexible. Also, occasionally, different areas of Civilisationism will conflict with each other, which we will point out during this research. Nevertheless, we can identify common shared ground of both Eurasianists and Civilisationists.

The concept of Eurasianism presents us with a world which has influences from both Europe and Asia, where “Russia and its ‘margins’ occupy a dual or median position between Europe and Asia, that their specific traits have to do with their culture being a ‘mix’ born of the fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim peoples, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features.” (Laruelle, 2008: 1). In addition to this, the Eurasianist idea presents Russia and its periphery to be an independent civilisation, with Dugin stating “the primary concern of Eurasianist philosophy is civilization.” (2014: 8). This idea harks back to the time of Ivan the Great, where many proclaimed Moscow as being the Third Rome, with this civilisational idea continuing throughout the 19th century where the Slavophiles identified the

Western world as being a threat against the Slavic civilisation. The history of Eurasianism merits a dissertation of its own, and thus this research will concentrate on the “most elaborated” (Laruelle, 2008) form of Eurasianism: Neo-Eurasianism, which surfaced in the mid-80s and continues today. As mentioned, Dugin is at the forefront of this ideological strand and is “simultaneously on the fringe and at the center of the Russian nationalist phenomenon.” (Laruelle, 2008: 107). Dugin’s view of Eurasianism, as Laruelle points out, has many flaws and contradictory claims, nevertheless, this dissertation’s aim is not to criticise nor defend Dugin, but to analyse the impact that Neo-Eurasianism and its place in Civilisationism has had on Putin’s discourse and decision making concerning security matters.

As stated, the idea of Russia being a civilisation is at the heart of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist philosophy, which is described in his book *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (2014). The principal idea is that the world contains four geopolitical poles (or belts) which each contain dominant civilisations: The Anglo-American zone, the Euro-African zone, the Pacific-Far East zone and the Pan-Eurasian zone. Each of these civilisations has its own cultural, historical and political realities which define them. Within these civilisations there are human societies, which should only be studied and understood within the context of their civilisation. By reading Dugin’s ideas more closely, we can identify three important points which will be used as a loose framework in this dissertation regarding Neo-Eurasianism and Civilisationism more generally.

Firstly, the traditions and values of the civilisation must be protected from any outside influence. Dugin states that civilisations have their own identity and ambitions, and it is extremely important that no other outside force influences or interferes with these, stating that “we have all the reason to share our truths with others but we must never impose it by force.” (39). He makes it clear that in today’s world, the American-dominated West is doing exactly this and must be resisted. In this point we can see a clear battle between traditionalism and

modernism. Although he accepts that European and Anglo-American civilisations have their own route of modernism, the Russian idea of traditionalism must be protected. He also emphasises the importance of traditional religion and spirituality of the Eurasian idea, claiming that “spiritual development is the main priority of life, which cannot be replaced by any economic or social benefits”, and that religions “deserve the utmost care and concern”. (67). On this point, there may be a slight difference to other civilisational pillars who claim Orthodox Christianity to be the basis of the Russian/Eurasian empire. Nevertheless, the extent to which Dugin and other Eurasianists view other religions as important is questionable to some, such as Pryce (2013: 37), who points out that “Eurasianists claim that Islam has an important role to play in Russian society, yet insist that this role entails subservience to Orthodox Christianity and Orthodox values.” Indeed, when being asked about the role of religion in the world, Dugin claims that “For us Russians, it is Orthodox Christianity... We see our tradition as being a continuation of the earlier, pre-Christian traditions of Russia, as is reflected in our veneration of the saints and icons, among other aspects” (176), thus confirming Pryce’s point that although Eurasianists do argue for the importance of other religions, it is clear that Orthodox Christianity is the essential religion for their movement.

Secondly, within the Pan-Eurasian zone, the rhetoric made by Dugin suggests that Russia has to be the dominant player and principal civilisation within this pole. In his work he discusses the complex implications of uniting countries together to form a Eurasian partnership (such as with Iran, Ukraine, the Caucasus) and it is clear that it is the interests of the Russian Federation which must be met to successfully integrate these countries. (49-54). Additionally, Dugin confirms this by explaining that his Eurasian movement “considers the Russian Federation to be its main launching pad and the main base for its activity.” The justification which he provides is that Russians strive for a “historical mission, which is why Russia is destined to become the leader of a new global Eurasian alternative to the Western

vision of the future.” (73). Other Civilisationists and Eurasianists also share this view, with Tsygankov (2007: 384) explaining that despite not agreeing on the actual boundaries of the civilisation, Russia is the “Heartland” of the region and should be the country responsible for the security and stability of the post-Soviet region.

Thirdly, the key geopolitical aim of the Eurasianist movement is to rid the world of the current unipolar system, in which the United States is at its centre, replacing it with the multipolar system which he presents. The United States and its Atlanticist supporters are the main enemies for Eurasianists, as they support the westernisation and modernisation of the world outside the West. Dugin states that with four geopolitical poles, each having its own centre of power, civilisations will be able to develop without interference, and the likelihood of war will be greatly diminished, stating that “Russia and its partners in the Eurasian continental belt will establish harmonious relations not only with the neighbouring belts... but also with its antipode: The American belt.” (61). Nevertheless, he suggests that aggressive action must be taken against the current unipolar model and that a global revolution needs to happen: “The American empire should be destroyed, and sooner or later, it will be.” (61).

We will thus use these main points as indicators when analysing political speeches and documents to determine whether aspects this rhetoric are becoming more present in Russia’s security actions. It is important to note here, that although we will primarily be using the Eurasianist views as indicators, it will be extremely difficult to distinguish if Eurasianism itself or other strands of civilisational thought will be influencing this. Nevertheless, this dissertation’s aim is to distinguish if a general turn towards Civilisationism is occurring, and will also keep in mind other civilisational actors, such as the Orthodox Church, and their influences, rather than solely the influence of Dugin and his Eurasianist movement.

Theoretical Framework: Securitisation Theory

This chapter aims to give an overview of securitisation theory, firstly discussing its background and development. We will then look at the actual process of the theory and describe the actors involved. Finally, we will examine some of the main criticisms related to this framework, which has been “subjected to a seemingly never-ending stream of criticism enthused by moral and ethical motives.” (Taureck, 2006: 53). Here, the critical analysis of Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006) will be scrutinised, who provide four apparent weaknesses of the Copenhagen school’s framework. We will defend securitisation theory, however, some criticisms and suggestions, although may not be deemed fair and reasonable, can offer some enhancements and additional elements to consider whilst writing this dissertation.

Background

The concept of securitisation (and desecuritisation) comes from the so-called Copenhagen School of Security Studies, whose main contributors include Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. The most detailed work to come from the school which describes securitisation theory is *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998) written by the three above mentioned authors. Their book aims to redefine the meaning of security and is deemed as one of the most significant contributions to the field of security studies after the Cold War. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, before and during the Cold War, the term ‘security’ had strong realist military and state connotations. This book offers a new insight on how one can understand ‘security’ by going beyond the realist perspective of military power. The main argument which the authors put forward which separates

themselves from the more traditional points of view is that security threats are not objective, easy to identify targets. Instead, the process of security is a socially constructed process dependent on a **speech act** to convince a certain **audience** that something is an **existential threat** to a **referent object** (whether it is indeed a true threat or not is another question) which needs to be dealt with by extraordinary means.

Thus, the starting point of securitisation theory is that there must be an existential threat which threatens a certain group. This existential threat is decided by a **securitising actor** (or agent). What constitutes as an existential threat can be difficult to determine, due to it being subjective, with the book stating that “existential threat can only be understood in relation of the particular character of the referent object in question. We are not dealing here with a universal standard based in some sense on what threatens individual human life.” (21). As such, many issues can potentially become security threats, and to explore these, the authors seek to ‘widen’ the scope of security studies beyond the traditional military element. In their work, although they include a chapter on military security and recognise its importance, they expand the potential security threats to the political (protecting the sovereignty of the state and the survival of government), environmental (protecting the environment), economic (protecting the economy) and societal (protecting national identity) realms. For this dissertation, we will concentrate mainly on the societal sector. However, as Buzan et al. (1998: 136) note, in the case of the former Soviet Union, the political, military and societal sectors can overlap to a great extent. Østbø (2017: 201-202) believes that the security situation in Russia is changing, and this change is a reaction from Putin following the protests of tens of thousands of people in 2011 demanding for his resignation. Putin carefully uses societal and military security to consolidate political security, or in other words, to assure the survival of his current regime.

Although the authors seem to keep a traditional realist view that “security is about survival” (21), the deeper meaning of the concept reveals a constructivist view, describing security as “self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.” (24).

Process

First of all, the framework states that an issue can be within one of three camps: **non-politicised**, **politicised**, or **securitised**. The first camp described is when an issue is not in the political realm at all and is not being debated. Once it moves into the second camp, the issue is “part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance.” Finally, an issue becomes securitised when it requires extraordinary means to be dealt with, beyond the political norms. (23).




Figure 1: Securitization Spectrum (Emmers, 2007)

In order for an issue to reach the securitised camp, the proposed existential threat is firstly decided by a securitising agent or actor (who are normally the elite powers of the state, but can also be non-state actors), and then presented to an audience through a **speech act**. Presenting an existential threat with a speech act is called the **securitising move**, which aims to convince a certain audience that a **referent object** (which the act is supposedly



Figure 2: Components of securitising move

protecting) is under existential threat. The referent object has traditionally been the state, but by following this theory, “in principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object.” It is something which one can point and say, “it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...” (36). However, the authors make clear that a threat being presented to an audience does not automatically make an issue securitised; this is just the securitising move. For the purpose of this dissertation, we are not looking to prove if a threat has been securitised or not; what is important to this research is to see what is being attempted to be securitised and why.

The audience can either accept the securitising agent’s speech act that there is an existential threat which has to be dealt with, or they can reject it, which may cause the securitisation process to stall, or to advance with little support and perhaps cause serious repercussions for the securitising actor’s integrity. If the move is accepted by the audience, “the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.” (24). This takes the process outside of the politicised

zone and into that of the securitised, or alternatively, takes the threat to a more extreme version of politicisation. (23).

During the examination of case studies in this dissertation, this theoretical framework will be used in order to identify issues which are deemed to be a security threat to Russia. Due to the authoritarian nature of the governmental regime in the Russian Federation, it is safe to say that the securitising actor will almost always be Putin and his government, although the Orthodox Church also has the capacity in Russia to be a securitising actor. Along with this, we will identify the existential threat, what it is threatening and who the audience are (and if they are important). The final element will be to compare what its being securitised (and the rhetoric of the speech act) and the main elements of national identity that were discussed in the literature review.

Criticism and Additional Elements

The first criticism which Anthony & Emmers (2006) provide is that the securitisation process does not explain the motivations behind *why* something has been chosen to be securitised, stating that “a series of motives and intentions can explain an act of securitization.” (5).

Although securitisation theory’s main aim is not to examine *why* something has been securitised (it aims to look at *how*), this point must be considered carefully for the benefit of this dissertation, as we are essentially trying to establish a link between what is being securitised and the rational logic behind this. In their book, *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation* (2006), the editors decide to incorporate additional elements into the framework of securitisation theory, with one being the **issue area**, where “beyond identifying what is the existential threat, we examine whether there is consensus among various actors, such as governments and society groups, on the nature of the threat.” (6). This

dissertation will take this point into careful consideration, and we will examine if there are any areas in which different parties have common ground in Russia, and whether the country's national identity can be seen as an issue area which motivates the government to securitise a threat. This criticism and the author's suggestion enhancing the security framework is therefore central to this dissertation, allowing us to gain a deeper understanding of *why* and *how* certain items are considered worthy of securitisation.

Secondly, the authors believe that there is simply not enough empirical research based on the theory: "scholars of Copenhagen school have focussed on developing a broad theoretical approach to security studies without paying much attention to empiricism." (5). This may seem slightly unjustified as the aim of the book is to provide a theoretical framework on how to analyse security. Nevertheless, this dissertation recognises the importance of empirical findings, which can give strength and improvement to a theoretical framework. In his own article, Emmers (2007) acknowledges that more and more empirical research is being carried out with securitisation theory as framework, saying that it has "been applied to a broad range of issues including health [...], transnational crime [...], and international institutions." (136). This dissertation aims to add another modest contribution to the empirical findings of securitisation theory.

Thirdly, it is claimed that the securitisation process is too Euro-centric as "its notion of securitisation is based on European history and culture." (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2006: 5-6). Their explanation does not go into more detail to explain why this is case. Emmers (2007) in his own article explains this only slightly further, saying that although the Copenhagen school's book is to provide a broad general analysis of security studies, the area of societal security in particular (which is what this dissertation will be analysing), "very much derives from a European experience" due to the "construction of a collective European identity" and "the existence of a similar sense of community in many other regions or parts of

the world is disputable.” (137). Despite this criticism, Buzan et al. (1998) do give some mention to regions outside Europe in their societal sector chapter, consisting of Africa, Latin America, North America, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and “probably still the most complex case for regional analysis”, the Former Soviet Union. (116-138). This dissertation will thus provide not only a contribution to empirical findings in general, but will also provide some answers to this criticism using the case of Russia, whose national identity, as we have seen, separates itself from Europe. We will therefore have a stronger idea if securitisation theory can indeed be used beyond Europe successfully, or whether some modifications to the theory would be required to adapt to the region in question.

Finally, one common criticism against securitisation theory is its ethical position on security. Anthony et al. (2006) claim that the school “is not particularly concerned with assessing the policy effectiveness of securitization and desecuritization policies. Nor does it pay much attention to the unintended consequences of these processes.” (6). This point is shared amongst various academics, including Aradau (2001), who states that “both securitising and desecuritising techniques can have disquieting consequences and [...] ethico-political concerns should have prevalence with both securitization and desecuritization, or, paraphrasing Michal Dillion, that the story of security should be an ethical one.” (*quoted by Taureck, 2006*).² This dissertation believes that this negative view of securitisation theory is entirely unfounded and unreasonable. As mentioned previously, the aim of securitisation theory is to allow the analyst to reveal *how* an issue of security arises and *how* it is treated as such. It is not intended to provide ethical solutions to a security dilemma. I therefore agree with Taureck’s opinion of this criticism, who, whilst dismissing Aradau’s claim above,

² This quote is used by Taureck from Aradau’s article: Claudia Aradau, 2001. *Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization Techniques*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.coursehero.com/file/16731599/Claudia-Aradau-Beyond-Good-and-Evil-Ethics-and-Securitization-Desecuritization-Techniques-pdf/> [Accessed 2 July 2017].

emphasises that “securitization theory by itself does not enable the analyst to say what security should be/ not be. Securitization theory thus seeks to answer the question – what does security do? – and little beyond this.” (55). It is indeed quite obvious that there must be some level of confusion amongst critics on what the theory’s main aims and purposes are. As such, this final piece of criticism, although important to discuss and tackle, will not be taken into account during this research.

Methodology

Analysis

As stated in securitisation theory, the vital aspect of securitising a threat is through the ‘speech act’, where “the utterance itself is the act... By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Waever, 1995: 54-55). As such, this dissertation will use discourse analysis as an analytical tool when examining rhetoric from Putin and other government officials or allies, and will compare this against the theoretical framework of securitisation theory.

When analysing a speech act, Waever (32-33) believes that there must be “facilitating conditions” for it to be considered a successful act as part of the securitisation process. These conditions are put into two main categories: the “internal, linguistic-grammatical” category, and that of the “external, contextual and social”, with Waever explaining that “a successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech.” Under the first ‘internal’ category, it is essential to adhere to the “grammar of security, and construct a plot that indicates existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out.” Here, it will be important to distinguish if a security act is actually occurring and if the securitising actor is following the rules of this ‘grammar of security’. The second ‘external’ category relates to the social contextual factors which influence a security decision and the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience. The rhetoric used to describe the threat will thus be examined here, as will the position in which the securitising actor positions itself in relation to the audience that must be convinced. We will also take into consideration any rhetoric that is repeated on multiple

occasions. By identifying common recurrences and themes in the rhetoric of the securitising actor, and taking into account the external social factors, we may be able to determine if a civilisational turn is indeed taking place.

Primary Sources

As stated, the principle type of source that we will use is the actual spoken word of Putin, government officials and allies (such as the Orthodox Church). The timeframe this dissertation will implement is from 2012 to 2017. 2012 is an important year for Russia as it was a year of presidential elections and mass protests, and it can be said these events caused a change in rhetoric from the government (Tsygankov, 2013; Østbø, 2017), which can indicate a turn taking place. Firstly, this research will use a number of Putin's speeches to analyse and compare. These speeches will be sourced from the official President of Russia website (Kremlin.ru), which provides a wealth of transcripts of speeches of the president translated into English. Interviews involving Putin and other officials will also be examined, as well as direct quotes from secondary journalistic material.

In addition to spoken-word materials, official documents relating to national security will also be considered, in particular the Russian National Security Strategy (2015). This document provides an in-depth examination of what the Russian government believes should be its security priorities. By stating these threats in a security document, this can perhaps be seen as the initiation of securitisation processes of several items. The findings from these documents will then be compared with the rhetoric of the speech act to strengthen any argument that the country's perception of security issues is taking a civilisational turn.

One limitation which this research faces is that the deep linguistic elements and nuances of the Russian language will not be able to be examined (although at times a basic

analysis of this may be possible), and we will be limited to translations into English.

Nevertheless, a thorough and clear discussion of speeches, interviews and documents will be presented, and will be able to offer a deep and precise analysis of the security dilemmas which the Kremlin faces.

Societal Security

This section of the dissertation aims to examine the societal sector of securitisation theory, which is perhaps the most striking sector due to its importance in Russian security strategy. We argue that the security analyst must possess an effective understanding of Russian society in order to decipher the country's strategic thought and decisions. Buzan et al. (1998: 199) argue the importance of this sector of security, explaining that "national security has been the established key concept for the entire area of security affairs, but, paradoxically, there has been little reflection on the national as a security unit", and by examining the national closely, the societal area of security comes to light.

As we have already mentioned, societal security can overlap greatly with political security, albeit having distinct differences. This is indeed true for Russia, as Buzan et al. (1998) recognise, and in this section we will witness that it is the government who represents society against threats, attempting to securitise its own vision of Russian society that is distinct from Europe and the West. This securitisation of society, as we have already argued, can be a method to protect the political integrity of the regime. Nevertheless, securitisation theory can only understand what is being presented to us and in this section we will demonstrate what the government considers threatening and to whom.

The key concept of societal security, according to the authors, is identity, and "societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentially as a threat to their survival as a community." (119). To explain further, when an identity of a community is formed, a rhetoric of 'we' develops. When a perceived threat of the identity of a group (and thus its survival) is defined, the 'we' can be described as 'us', separating themselves from the threatening group ('them'). The complexity and ambiguities of nationhood and the difference from the concept of statehood are also emphasised: "state is

based on fixed territory and formal membership, whereas social integration is a much more varied phenomenon... even transcending the spatial dimension altogether.” (119). This point is extremely valid for the case of Russia, as many Russians were ‘displaced’ in newly formed countries after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Military conflicts in these former Soviet states argue the need for an understanding of the strategic thought behind these actions, in particular with Ukraine, which we will discuss later.

The aim of this section is to analyse primary evidence through discourse analysis to determine whether a civilisational turn towards Eurasianism is occurring. We will attempt to identify if a strong Russian identity is being used by the Russian government to convince the audience that it must be protected. We will firstly look at the overall general securitisation of the ‘spiritual and moral values’ of Russia, which has appeared increasingly within government rhetoric. Secondly, we will examine the growing relationship between the government and the Orthodox Church and how the securitisation of religion contributes to the securitisation of society, and thirdly, the case of how the government perceives homosexuality will be analysed as a threat to Russian societal values. Finally, the largest section of empirical findings will look at the securitisation of Russian identity abroad, specifically in Crimea. In this final section we will also briefly discuss the military sector in conjunction with the societal sector to help better our understanding of Russia’s security thought process.

Russian National Security Strategy & Spiritual-Moral Values

The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy was signed and ratified on 31 December 2015 by Putin, defining Russia’s principal security priorities and concerns. When examining the document, the most striking element is its constant reference to ‘spiritual values’ and

‘spiritual and moral values’, which are discussed at great length and appear no less than fifteen times in the document:

Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are being revived.

Preserving and developing culture and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values... (*under National Interests and Strategic National Priorities*)

Threats to national security in the sphere of culture are the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values... (*under Culture*)

the preservation and augmentation of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the foundation of Russian society... (*under Culture*)

the activities of radical public associations and groups using nationalist and religious extremist ideology, foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, and financial and economic structures, and also individuals, focused on destroying the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the domestic political and social situation -- including through inciting "color revolutions" -- and destroying traditional Russian religious and moral values. (*under State and Public Security*)

First of all, it is important to note that this discussion of such values is new to Russian security documents, with Østbø (2017: 201) pointing out that these values were merely mentioned in previous documents, and Oliker (2016) stating that “this formulation is new – prior government strategic documents references values, but not in quite this way, and certainly not this often.” Secondly, although these values are discussed frequently throughout, there is no concrete description of what these values actually consist of. However, these concepts go hand in hand with the word ‘traditional’, which we will see is a recurring word throughout recent Russian security thought. Østbø (2017: 201) states that these values are constructed as ‘traditional’, and that SMV (spiritual-moral values) “is an emotionally charged term that conveys a deep sense of *ressentiment*. It has strong anti-Western connotations, standing in opposition to a particular, constructed image of the West.” These spiritual and moral values of Russia have also been incorporated into the speeches of various Russian politicians, including Valentina Matvienko (*quoted by Østbø: 211*), who, when speaking at a meeting of the Federation Council, stated that “These traditional, or more correctly,

fundamental, values, define out national, Russian [rossiiskii] identity. It is precisely these values that unite and consolidate the society, the nation.” It is important to notice here that the word ‘rossiiskii’, showing that the speaker is referring to all ethnic identities within Russian state rather than ethnic Russians (russkii) alone. The use of this term has also become more common within nation building policies, with Foxall (2015) pointing out that in the National Ethnic Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2025, signed in 2012, mentions that there is “a unique socio-cultural civilizational communist, the multi-people Russian [rossiiskii] nation”, with ethnic Russians having a “unifying role” of this identity. This contrasts with the previous policy from 1996, which states the “state-forming role of the Russian [russkii] people”. (*quoted by Foxall*). This change of rhetoric suits Eurasianists well, who believe that for the Eurasian empire to succeed, there must be cooperation and partnership of all ethnic identities and religions.

The national security document also discusses the importance of cultural elements in relation to spiritual security of Russian society, supporting Østbø’s claim that these values are inherently anti-Western, declaring that “national security in the culture sphere is strengthened by: ... ensuring of the Russian Federation’s cultural sovereignty by means of taking measures to protect Russian society against external expansion of ideologies and values and destructive information and psychological impact.” It can be said that cultural life in Russia is becoming securitised, especially artistic forms which speak against traditional and moral values. For example, whilst speaking to Russian artists, Putin (although apparently in favour for the freedom of artistic expression) warned that “any freedom has another side: responsibility... There is a very narrow edge between dangerous buffoonery and freedom of expression.” Another example is that of Alexei Uchitel’s *Matilda*, which tells the story of an affair between Nicholas II (who was canonised by the Orthodox Church) and a ballet dancer. The film has received much criticism from conservatives, and despite clearing the film as

appropriate to be shown, the Russian cultural ministry reminded that individual regions have the power to ban the film.

When analysing this security document through the lens of securitisation theory, it is discernible that a securitisation move is occurring. Evidently, it is the government adopting the role of the securitising actor by stating this threat in a security document, with the rhetoric being repeated in speeches by significant governmental officials. The document makes clear that the country's traditional, spiritual and moral values of Russian society are "under attack and must be protected" (Østbø, 2017: 201), and this is therefore the referent object. Although not implicitly stated in the security document, from politician's statements it can be deemed that the existential threat to these values is Western values and their interference. The audience primarily is the Russian nation, who must be convinced that their values and society are under threat. However, security strategies, such as this one, can be used as a message (or a warning) to other countries.

From this analysis, it can be argued that there is a strong Civilisationist (and in particular Eurasianist) influence in the security strategy and politician's speeches. The new and repeated emphasis on spiritual and moral values represents Russia's 'traditional' society, which is deemed by the Eurasianist movement to be a key aspect of Russian identity ("spiritual development is the main priority of life" (Dugin, 2014: 67)). We can also see that foreign influence from the West is a clear existential threat to the government, which relates to the Eurasianist vision that the West's influence of 'modernism' is threatening to Russia's distinct 'traditional' civilisational identity, and must be securitised.

Religion and the Orthodox Church

As Paul Roe (2007: 179) indicates in his analysis of Waever's description of societal security, religion (along with ethno-national identity) is the biggest political mobilizer in terms of security as "religion possesses the ability to reproduce its 'we' identity more or less unconsciously across generations. It is also able to generate a feeling of self-identification, which can be as intense as that of nationalism." We argue here that the Russian Orthodox Church has been attempting to produce their religious identity as a crucial element to Russian civilisation, and the Russian government has been helping their cause. This section will examine how Putin uses the Orthodox Church as a tool to securitise the afore mentioned spiritual and moral values and how he has become an ally to the Church by further securitising Orthodoxy within Russia.

The Orthodox Church in Russia has had an increasing influence within politics and has frequently been advocating the government to securitise its values since the end of the Soviet era, with the term 'spiritual security' being used in religious circles. These efforts had some success in the mid-90s, where laws were introduced to hinder the running of smaller 'minority' religions, or in some cases as they were called, 'totalitarian sects'. (Elkner, 2005). The introduction of these laws marked the turning away from Westernism to another civilisational route which holds Orthodoxy as a principal feature of Russian ideology. In recent years, the relationship between the government and the Orthodox Church has greatly increased, which is obvious through the dozens of religious events which Putin attends every year. Listed below are some extracts from speeches which Putin has delivered at Orthodox events:

Easter celebrations, widely held all over the country, remind us of the multi-century traditions of our ancestors, serve to strengthen the persistent moral values and ideals of our society... With deep satisfaction I would like to highlight the creative, truly self-sacrificing word of the Russian Orthodox Church, and representatives of other Christian confessions, who strive to

solve important social problems... And, of course, their role in preserving our richest historical, cultural heritage is immeasurable. (2017)

For centuries the Russian Orthodox Church has played a special role in the establishment and development of Russian statehood and in the consolidation in society of timeless moral, ethical and family values... I am certain that your decisions will help strengthen the constructive interaction between the Church and state and civil society institutions in such key areas as resolving pressing social values... and promoting respect among the younger generation for the rich historical, cultural and spiritual heritage of the peoples of Russia. (2016)

The Russian Orthodox Church plays an enormous formative role in preserving our rich historical and cultural heritage and in reviving eternal moral values. (2015)

The acceptance of Christianity determined Russia's fate and choice of civilisation; it became a decisive turning point in the Russian state's ecclesiastical and secular history. The moral foundations of the Orthodox faith played a major role in the formation of our national character and the mentality of Russia's peoples, revealing the best creative qualities of our nation, helping Russia hold a dignified place among the European and global civilisations. (2013)

Before all else, the ever-growing relationship between the Church and the Russian government is a clear sign of a trend towards Civilisationism, as the Orthodox Church itself can be considered one of the major Civilisationist groups. As we will see later, the Church attempts fiercely to implement its traditional vision not only upon Russian society, but with other societies with Orthodox followers such as Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The rejection of the immoral influences from the West is also common rhetoric, with, for example, the Orthodox Bishop of Balti in Moldova stating that Europe has "definitely given us lots of money but wants too much in return. It demands that we pay with our souls, that we alienate ourselves from God. This is not acceptable." (*quoted by Higgins, 2016*). Although taking a clear turn towards the Orthodox view of Civilisationism, the argument of this being linked to Eurasianism is slightly more ambiguous. As we have discussed previously, Dugin states that there must be partnership throughout all the major religions, yet seems to agree that Orthodoxy should be the dominant religion. Indeed, the clear close relationship that Putin has with the Church shows an obvious preference to this religion.

To continue, by reading these extracts from Putin it is evident that he establishes a clear link between the Orthodox Church's values and the spiritual and moral values that have appeared from the country's security strategy and from politicians. Putin repeatedly speaks highly of the Church's effort to spread the message of and protect the values which he believes to be fundamental for Russian society, and he seems to establish the Church as the overall guardian of these values. This dissertation believes that this ever-growing alliance with the Church is part of the wider securitisation process of spiritual and moral values. By aligning themselves with the voice of the Church and giving them more protection, the Church is able to spread and defend vigorously the traditional values of what both the government and Church believe to be central to Russian identity. Referring back to Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006), this can be a clear example of an 'issue area', where different groups have a consensus on what they believe to be an existential threat. This 'issue area' allows Putin (and the Church) to gain a powerful ally and to help each other to strengthen the referent object and to eliminate the existential threat.

In addition, Putin emphasises the historical aspect of the Orthodox Church and its relation with Russian identity, clearly implying that Russian identity has been moulded by the centuries-old ideas of the Church, while seemingly ignoring the many years of religious oppression during the Soviet era. By emphasising the 'old' and its relevance to today, it is evident that this links to the 'traditional' stance that the Russian state is trying to protect. It should also be noted that in these speeches the importance of young people understanding and accepting these traditional concepts is paramount, aiming to protect these values over generations. Again, this is undoubtedly supported by the Civilisationist and Eurasianist viewpoint that Russian civilisation is reliant on the old, traditional ways of life, in contrast to the modern, immoral ways of the West.

As we can see there is a clear and consistent rhetoric of the importance of the Orthodox Church to national identity, and the government pursues this by further securitising religion in favour of the Orthodox Church. Over the past few years, various laws have been used to counter apparent attacks against religion. The best known of these recent cases is that of Pussy Riot, who were sentenced to two years in a prison colony after being found guilty of ‘hooliganism motivated by religious hatred’ which offended religious believers. (Elder, 2012). Another case involved Russian YouTuber Ruslan Sokolovsky, who posted a video of him playing Pokémon Go inside a church, leading to his arrest and a three-and-a-half year suspended sentence for ‘inciting religious hatred’. (Cresci, 2017). The government has also been using its extremism laws against minority religions, when these were originally intended for terrorist-related Islamic extremism. As stated earlier, laws were introduced in the 90s which already made life for minority religions very difficult in Russia, and their survival has recently become much more arduous. In 2017, the Russian Supreme Court announced that Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be considered as an ‘extremist’ group and would no longer be permitted to operate on Russian soil. As a result, all property of the organisation would be confiscated by the state. (Dearden, 2017). These examples of using the law to protect the Orthodox Church show a clear securitisation move which takes religion into the politicised zone. This again favours the Civilisationist view (although perhaps not entirely the Eurasianist view) that Russia must keep its distinct culture and values strong and resistant from Western influences, and in order to do this, there must be a strong and protected presence of the Orthodox Church with Orthodox Christianity being the dominant religion of Russia.

Homosexuality & ‘Non-Traditional’ lifestyles

One ‘issue area’ which the Russian government and the Orthodox Church have in common is the apparent negative effect of homosexuality and other ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientations and lifestyles. Here we will discuss the manner in which homosexuality and other concepts have been securitised and how this relates to a turn towards Civilisationism. The Orthodox Church takes an aggressive stance towards homosexuality, stating in ‘The Basis of the Social Concept’ (2000) that “the divinely established marital union of a man and woman cannot be compared to the perverted manifestations of sexuality. She [the Church] believes homosexuality to be a sinful distortion of human nature” and “the Church is resolutely against the attempts to present this sinful tendency as a ‘norm’ and even something to be proud of and emulate. This is why the Church denounces any propaganda of homosexuality.” Clearly, the Civilisationist view of the Church is against the apparent Western influences and their liberal stances on sexuality, and it can be said that the case of homosexuality can represent this influence from Europe and the West, seeking to destroy traditional Russian culture. In recent years, the government has been aligning itself progressively with the Church involving non-traditional relationships. In his article, whilst discussing Russia’s anti-gay laws, Wilkinson (2013) observes that although the lives of LGBT citizens were far from perfect after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation was improving. Attempts to recriminalise homosexuality were denied by the government in 2002, 2003 and 2004, it was declassified as a mental illness in 1999, and public perception of homosexuality was becoming slowly more favourable. During these years, we can witness that the government did not perceive homosexuality as a threat to society (indicating a period of Westernism), and this change of position to a more hostile relationship with homosexuality (and even more so to other lifestyles) demonstrates a possible turn towards Civilisationism.

The most controversial law introduced covering this topic is the Russian federal law ‘for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values’, more commonly known as the ‘gay propaganda law’. This law was influenced by one which was implemented by the Saint Petersburg Duma in March 2012, prohibiting ‘public acts aimed at the propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality and transgenderism amongst minors’. In Wilkinson’s article, there is a quote from the politician behind this law, Vitaly Milonov. Wilkinson provides a basic analysis of the discourse which we will discuss here:

As a person, I am profoundly against gay parades, because I am an Orthodox Christian and the demonstration of the sin of Sodom is repellent to me. If, God forbid, I happened to see a crowd of those citizens — like they do in Berlin, I’ve seen photographs where men with all sorts of dildos are running around semi-naked — it’s natural that I’d try to take my children aside, so that they would not see this perversion. (Vitaly Milonov)

Wilkinson firstly identifies the need to protect children, and we can label this as a clear referent object which must be protected from homosexuality. We will also see later that children are also used as a referent object by the Federal government. We can also state that the existential threat is obviously homosexuality and by mentioning the apparent source of such parades, Europe, it is clear that there is a distinction between the immoral lifestyles of Europe “that are personified by LGBT people” (Wilkinson) and the traditional dignified ways of Russian civilisation. Lastly, Wilkinson mentions that the quote contains references to the Orthodox Church, labelling it as a “moral guardian” of Russia’s national identity.

At the Federal level, the government of Russia soon followed the lead of the Saint Petersburg Duma and introduced similar discriminatory laws which banned the ‘propaganda’ of non-traditional relationships to those under-18. By introducing such laws, the government has clearly taken the issue of homosexuality and non-traditional relationships into the political sector in order to securitise it. Here we will examine the speech act of Putin in order

to justify such laws being implemented. Most of the comments in English regarding this matter come from international interviews involving Putin:

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in Russia, unlike in one third of the world's countries, being gay is not a crime. (*Andrew Marr Show*)

so there's no danger for individuals of this non-traditional orientation. (*Andrew Marr Show*)

Secondly, I would like to ask our colleagues and friends, before criticising us, to sort out their own problems first. In some states in the US, homosexuality is criminalised. So how can they criticise us, for taking a far gentler and more liberal approach than they have back home? (*Andrew Marr Show*)

Here, Putin is not nearly as aggressive as the Orthodox Church, although we must consider that in these international interviews, he will be aware that the main audience will be Anglophone listeners who may be less prone to accepting his rhetoric and he must treat such issues in a delicate manner. From these points, Putin seems to be trying to mute the discrimination and violence against the LGBT community in Russia, deflecting the point by claiming that Russia does not treat this community as harshly as other countries. He makes clear that this new law is not as severe as laws in other countries, including that of the United States where he claims laws totally banning homosexuality exist. This can be perhaps to convince the audience that Russia is in fact much more civilised in the treatment of homosexuals than even Western countries. It can also show that Putin may not be against homosexuals themselves, but the idea of homosexuality and the influence the West has on homosexuals all over the world; Dugin (2014) explains Putin's position by saying that "Putin struggles with such laws not against homosexual relations but against application of liberal ideology in the form of obligatory law, against normativization and juridical legitimation of what is considered a moral and psychological perversion." Nevertheless, when examining deeper we have again the buzzword 'non-traditional'. As described, the 'traditional' ways of Russian life are vital to identity, and anything that is labelled 'non-traditional' automatically becomes a threat to Russian identity.

Do they want to live in a normal, natural marriage or a non-traditional one? (*60 Minutes*)

We have recently passed a law prohibiting propaganda and not of homosexuality only, but of homosexuality and child abuse, child sex abuse. (*Andrew Marr Show*)

There are countries, including in Europe, where they're debating the possibility of legalising paedophilia! Publically discussing this in Parliament. (*Andrew Marr Show*)

The [reasoning] behind this law is to provide children with an opportunity to grow up without impacting their consciousness. (*Oliver Stone Interviews Vladimir Putin*)

This is not about imposing any kind of sanctions against homosexuality... This is about protecting children. (*quoted by Herszenhorn*)

One can feel relaxed and at ease, but please leave the children in peace. (*quoted by the Associated Press*)

In these comments Putin identifies a clear referent object which is under threat by homosexuality: children. Children seem a perfect group to protect (no matter what the actual reason of such laws may be) and again can aid Putin to an international audience by sharing a referent object which most cultures would deem to be most vulnerable. Furthermore, children can be viewed as the future of the nation's survival, and thus must be brought up with these traditional values. The Russian government may perceive children as being more susceptible to Western influences, and thus becoming tolerant of homosexuality etc., which risks young people losing loyalty to the Russian civilisational identity which is being protected. We can also link this back to the religious section, where Putin emphasises the importance of young people having a strong interest in Orthodox values, thus conditioning them into this civilisational mind-set. In addition, he boldly links homosexuality to paedophilia, deepening the existential threat by trying to convince the audience that by accepting such 'non-traditional' concepts as a norm in Russia, it may lead to the introduction of more heinous crimes which he claims are beginning to happen in Europe.

They can do what they want, but the people of Russia have their own cultural code, their own traditions. (*The Andrew Marr Show*)

Finally, we can see here that he emphasises the difference between Russian civilisation and that of the West by stating that Russia has its own set of traditions.

In this section we have recognised that the government has embraced the Church's views on homosexuality and thus has attempted to bring it into the securitised zone in order to protect, apparently, the children against this liberal idea from the West. By taking such actions, despite the situation regarding LGBT citizens slowly improving, it is clear that there is a strong influence from Civilisationists who want to resist cultural and political influences from the West. Homosexuality and other forms of relationships are viewed by many as a product of the West which is spreading across the globe and must be fought against to protect the spiritual and moral values which form Russian identity. Dugin (2014) explains that the laws are "quite correct" as "liberalism insists on the freedom and liberation from any form of collective identity... The liberals have liberated the human being from national identity, religious identity and so on." As such, the securitisation of homosexuality and other sexual identities have a clear Eurasianist and wider Civilisationist rhetoric.

Crimea, Ukraine & Russian Society Abroad

Perhaps one of the key indicators that Russia has had a civilisational turn was its decision to annex Crimea from Ukraine, sparking international outcry and resulting in heavy sanctions from the United States and the European Union. The situation in Ukraine at the time was extremely volatile, with pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich fleeing to Russia which resulted in the formation of a new interim Ukrainian government. Russia did not recognise this newly formed government and the regional government of Crimea demanded a

referendum to take place. On 18 March 2014, Russia took action with ‘little green men’ (Shevchenko, 2014) appearing and taking control of the peninsula’s infrastructure and surrounding Ukrainian military posts. A referendum was held which overwhelmingly supported separating from Ukraine and joining with the Russian Federation, resulting in Crimea being reinstated as a republic of Russia and Sevastopol as a federal city. This section will analyse the securitisation of Crimea and the reasoning Russia has presented to justify such military action. Most points will come under the societal sector, but as we will see, some points will also come under the military sector, which may provide more convincing reasons to why such action occurred.

Following the annexation, Putin presented a speech on March 18 2014 (which we will refer to as the ‘Crimea Speech’). This speech is the most classic example of a speech act, which Putin used to convince the audience that the extraordinary means that he took were justified to protect Crimea from threats. It is interesting to note here that if we consider this as the primary speech act of securitising Crimea, it actually comes after the extraordinary move to complete the securitisation process rather than before. Indeed, this was a military operation and the success of such a move would have been partly due to its element of surprise, preventing the securitising actor to speak too freely beforehand of what he had in mind. In addition, Putin is clearly confident that he would have had the population’s support for carrying out such a manoeuvre, stating that “the most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens”, followed by more figures. (2014). However, even after the securitisation event took place, and confident that he had wide public support, Putin still decided to convince the audience that this was a necessary action. One may ask if such a speech act was necessary, as after all, Putin’s authoritarian-style government can carry out such actions without the

resistance of functional actors which exist in democratic systems. This issue links back to the argument that securitisation theory is too European-centric, being formed on the history of the democratic governments of Western Europe. In his article discussing securitisation theory with non-democratic regimes, Vuori (2008) argues that the speech act is still necessary, claiming that “legitimacy is perhaps the most significant element in the survival of any social institution and all governments must exercise a minimum of both persuasion and coercion in order to survive.”³ Therefore, it can be argued that securitisation theory is still relevant to non-European countries such as Russia, yet it may be necessary to alter the securitisation process slightly, such as performing the extraordinary move before the speech act.

Let us now examine the speech act. In this speech, we can witness several referent objects and several existential threats. It should be noted that in this final section all indented quotes are taken from the ‘Crimea Speech’ (Putin: 2014):

It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.

...Outrageous historical justice...

Everything in Crimea speaks of our history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

First of all, Putin presents the history of Russia as a referent object which external forces are trying to erase. He attempts to convince the audience that it was a historical error on behalf of Khrushchev that the peninsula was taken away from Russia and handed over to Ukraine. Here he uses history, or how many Russians may perceive history, to attempt to motivate nationalistic feelings of Russians by convincing them that by taking Crimea, the historical foundations of Russia will be more secure. He utilises historical figures and events

³ He refers to Wiberg for this argument: Wiberg, Matti (1988) ‘Between Apathy and Revolution — Explications of the Conditions for Political Legitimacy’. PhD Dissertation. Turku: University of Turku

central to Russian identity in order to justify his actions: the baptism of Prince Vladimir and the adoption of Orthodoxy, which determined the future history of Russia. Furthermore, by viewing Crimea being given to Ukraine as an error in history, Putin presents himself as the saviour by fixing this error by returning the peninsula to its rightful place, despite the fact of it being a part of another sovereign state. This use of history clearly has Eurasianist overtones as Eurasianists view Russia as the heart and leader of its Eurasian empire, and as such, has the responsibility and duty to protect its own historical destiny.

Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders. (Putin: 2014)

...we hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law. However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation.

Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means.

Here, it is obvious that Putin is forming the idea that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and Ukraine are a referent object under threat, and this is the most mentioned referent object in his speech act. He again points to history, claiming that Russians were the most affected victims in the past, mainly due to the collapse of the Soviet Union which caused millions of Russians to be displaced in newly formed countries. In the present time, he makes clear that Russians are the victims of discrimination against their societal construct including language and culture, blaming the Ukrainian elite for trying to assimilate them into Ukrainian culture and erasing their Russian roots.

The topic of Russian citizens and Russian-speakers abroad is a complicated issue that has been greatly discussed by politicians and academics alike, and thus we will not go into too much detail here. However, two important terms that have appeared are ‘Compatriots Abroad’, coined by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and the ‘Russian World’, being more relevant to our topic. Zevelev (2016) sees these two terms as being different but having many similarities and says that “basically they both reflect the tension between actual Russian Federation state borders and the mental maps of ‘Russianness’ that exist in the minds of many Russians.” It is evident why Putin would use Russian society in post-Soviet countries as a referent object to justify his actions in Crimea: as the audience he is trying to convince has this idea of ‘Russianness’ imprinted into their identity, they are more likely to accept the securitisation act of annexing Crimea as it will be protecting Russian identity. Thus, the securitisation act is successful. In addition, policies regarding Russians and Russian-speakers abroad have generally been quite ambiguous in terms of who exactly the policies involve. As we can see in Putin’s rhetoric, he always mentions ‘Russian citizens and Russian-speakers’. These terms can be difficult to determine, especially with the case of Ukraine, as the vast majority of citizens will speak Russian, even if their primary language is Ukrainian. This ambiguity can thus be quite useful and purposeful in terms of the foreign policy and security objectives of Russia, with Gigitashvili (2016) mentioning in his article, exploring the securitisation of ‘Russian world’ and Latvia, that “it is worth emphasizing that ill-defined boundaries of ‘Russian world’ are quite enabling for current regime in Russia: it can attach different connotations to this concept for the sake of more effective use in foreign policy repertoire.” This allows us to question the real motives of Putin’s actions in Crimea. Putin may claim that the principal reason for his actions was to protect Russian society abroad, so why has he not given the same attention to the self-proclaimed republics in Eastern Ukraine which also wish to be part of the Russian Federation? Perhaps it is that Russia has less

historical 'legitimacy' in these republics as it does in Crimea, or it may be that Russia is conscious that it could lead to a full-scale war with Ukraine which would be detrimental to economic security (and perhaps military security if the West were to involve themselves). Or, a more convincing reason could be the strategic importance of Crimea to Russian military security, which we will examine later. By taking the surrounding content into account, we can witness the use of referent objects being threatened by existential threats to different levels. Clearly, Putin uses Russian society abroad as an effective referent object, but with further knowledge of geopolitics, history and strategy, it can be argued that this is not the primary reason for such actions and this must be taken into consideration when reading a speech act.

From this point we can witness a clear civilisational turn in regards to protecting Russian society abroad. By annexing Crimea, Russia is moving its security from the state to the national level by infringing upon the sovereign territory of Ukraine, with Zevelev (2014) stating that "the ideas of a post-Soviet revanche and of Russia as a unifier of the Russian world divided by artificial state borders have become an official ideology." He also explains that this idea of the 'Russian world' did not have much influence in the realms of Russian foreign policy or security decisions, however, the extremely volatile situation in Ukraine allowed Russia to securitise Russian identity in Crimea. By securitising Russian identity through the speech act, this gives Putin the platform to warn international leaders that the country is now prepared to use military means to protect Russians abroad, and indeed, Russia is becoming more aggressive in securitising threats. We can also witness this civilisational turn by comparing the relations with Ukraine and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under Yeltsin, or during *Westernism* years, Russia was attempting to improve its relations with Ukraine and to integrate with the West. As Zevelev (2014) mentions, the hopes of a productive partnership between Moscow and Kiev were optimistic, with positive steps

taking place such as the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. This treaty, however, was polemical in Russia, as by signing the treaty Russia was effectively denouncing all claims to Crimea and accepting that it is part of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Nevertheless, the treaty was signed. The actions of 2014 have totally voided this past admission of Crimea being Ukrainian, because, according to Zevelev (2014), relations with the West are no longer a priority. By taking such an action Russia would have known that it would destroy the progress of integration and partnership with the West, which would more than likely resort to sanctions. Nevertheless, Putin has tried to show that such a relationship with the West is subordinate to that of protecting Russian values abroad; a prime example of a turn towards Eurasianism. Russia, viewing itself as head of its imperial zone, has the responsibility to protect the region and its people, and will infringe upon subordinate nations if necessary. The fact that Putin continues the ambiguous definition of who he is trying to defend helps him justify the cause, as it resonates with the Russian people. Putin's Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov (*quoted by Gigitashvili, 2016*) sums up this idea well, saying that "Russia is the country that underlies the 'Russian World', and the president of that country is Putin; President of the Russian Federation is a guarantor of security for the 'Russian World'".

This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia's Black Sea Fleet... dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour. (Putin: 2014)

Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO's navy would be right there in this city of Russia's military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia.

For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory.

From this point we have a more traditional, realist referent object which is more likely to be classed under the military sector of securitisation: the Black Sea Fleet and thus Russian military presence and projection in the area. Nevertheless, we will discuss it here as it may provide a more convincing argument to the security analyst as to why Russia annexed Crimea. Sevastopol has always been a city of significant strategic naval importance to Russia and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had an agreement with Ukraine to lease the base for military purposes (the 'Kharkiv Pact'). To present a convincing argument, Putin again uses the historical dimension to and routinely reminds the audience of the historical importance of Sevastopol in relation to Russia's military power. Similarly, to the previous point of 'Russianness' being imprinted into the fabric of Russian society, the country's quest for military power and memory of military glory of Russia's imperial past can also be attributed to this, and thus this mention of Russia's military power is aimed to evoke a sense of pride and emotion within the audience. In addition to this historical significance of Russian identity, he mentions that the consequences of Ukraine joining NATO would result in Russia losing this base to Western forces. This reason is more traditional in the realm of security studies; being part of one of the four principal fleets of Russia, the presence of the Black Sea Fleet gives Russia enormous naval projection capabilities in the Black Sea region, and withdrawing from this base would result in the loss of this military influence.

The existential threat here is of course NATO and its naval power, who would replace Russia's warships in the city. This would be a clear embarrassment to Russia as it would lose one of its oldest military installations to the perceived enemy. In addition, it would also give NATO an extremely advantageous strategic military position, having direct access to the south of Russia, as Putin fears, and its Black Sea territory. Russia remains extremely wary of NATO's expansion in its region of influence and there remains a sense of betrayal after NATO accepted many former Soviet and Soviet satellite countries into the alliance (making

NATO direct neighbours with Russia), despite Russia attempting to improve relations and integrate with the West. (Clark & Spohr, 2015). Taking action in Crimea shows that a civilisational turn may be occurring, as now Russia is willing to use its military force to prevent such expansion happening again. This idea links to the Dugin's Eurasianist thoughts of civilisational areas, believing that there should not be any infringement upon another civilisational space, and that an important tool to defend one's civilisational space is to have a powerful military.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. (*referring to the colour revolutions*). (Putin: 2014)

...with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line...

However, what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms international law. Firstly, it's a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never.

After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability... Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they play: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle "if you are not with us, you are against us."

The West's political objectives (along with its military objectives as we have already discussed) can be seen as the dominant existential threat to Russia. Putin obviously focusses the blame on the West for the conflict in Ukraine, and in other occasions he has referred to the ousting of the Ukrainian government as a 'coup d'état' supported by the West (Reuters, 2016), whose aim is to halt the interests of Russia's integration within its sphere of influence. He also explains the more general threat of the West in relation to international relations and global politics, claiming that the world was a safer place in the time when a unilateral political system did not exist. This rhetoric is identical to that of Dugin's idea of a multipolar world where, in order for Russian civilisation to survive, there must be four equally balanced

civilisational areas. According to Dugin, the current unilateral power of the United States and its allies is preventing this from happening and is a serious threat to the survival of Russian civilisation. This similarity in rhetoric can help prove that a civilisational turn towards Eurasianism is occurring.

I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities in power during the years of Ukraine's independence. Presidents, prime ministers and parliamentarians changed, but their attitude to the country and its people remained the same. They milked the country, fought amongst themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did not care much about the ordinary people. (Putin: 2014)

However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.

I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine's unity for their political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine's greatness, but they are the ones who did everything to divide the nation.

We are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.

The final existential threat which Putin points out is the Ukrainian government and elite since the birth of Ukraine as a state. The reason for this can be that the pro-Russian president was ousted due to protests and riots demanding for the country to be closer to Europe rather than Russia, leaving an interim government until elections could take place. The current government is now a coalition with the largest party being Petro Poroshenko's 'Solidarity' party, which is pro-European and wishes to join the European Union. The Russian elite would have been fearful of integration of Ukraine with Western opponents, and as such, Putin tries to convince the audience that the government and those who sought to give them power are criminals and fascists aided by the West. Furthermore, it is important to

note that Putin directly speaks to the Ukrainian people several times in his speech act, giving a sense of empathy to their situation, claiming that he understands why they are not happy with the current situation. Ukrainians can thus be seen as a quasi-audience in terms of securitisation theory, and perhaps even a quasi-referent object. This may be to attempt to persuade them that their government does not have the Ukrainian people's best interests at heart, and that Russia is doing the right thing by protecting Crimea from such a government. Moreover, Putin cannot afford to make an enemy of the Ukrainian population, as this could potentially create further conflict for Russians in Ukraine and even Ukrainians in Russia. This strong desire to depict Ukrainian and Russians as one people has strong Civilisationist undertones with an idea of Pan-Slavic identity, revealing that after over 25 years of independence, the Russian state still does not recognise Ukrainians as being a distinct people. This also can be regarded as an issue area with the Orthodox Church, where 40% of its parishes are located in Ukraine (Suslov, 2017). And, with Ukraine being much more religious than Russia (Suslov, 2017), it would be wise for Putin to try and prevent further separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Russian Orthodox Church, as this could weaken the influence of the Church over Ukrainian citizens, and in turn the influence of the Russian government.

Conclusion

This research has intended to answer two primary questions: has Russia turned towards a national ideology of Civilisationism, and in particular Eurasianism in its security realm? and can securitisation theory offer a suitable lens to study and understand Russia's security decisions?

In reference to the first question, this dissertation has provided many examples which can indicate there is a civilisational turn occurring in Russia, particularly in terms of security. Firstly, by reading the country's most recent security strategy document, there is a sudden and repeated idea of spiritual and moral values which is tied to traditional ideas which fight against modern, Western influences. We have also seen these spiritual and moral values as an 'issue area' for the Orthodox Church and the government, and as such the government is clearly securitising the Church to make it almost untouchable to criticism. Working so closely with the Church (which itself is a major civilisational force) and protecting its status clearly indicates a turn towards Civilisationism. Nevertheless, there is too much ambiguity from the Eurasianist movement to decipher whether we can prove this to be a turn towards Eurasianism in particular. Homosexuality is also an 'issue area', and we have shown that homosexuality and other non-traditional lifestyles are seen as a Western influence harmful to the civilisational identity which is being constructed. We have also witnessed a clear imperial move by Russia through its annexation of Crimea, showing that it is prepared to protect Russian society outside state borders. This move fits well within the Eurasianist idea of civilisational areas where one dominant player is responsible for the region and its people. In addition, during the speech act, Putin constantly refers to the historical glory of the Russian Empire, attempting to evoke emotion within the population. The strong anti-Western rhetoric

in this speech act also can show a Eurasianist turn, coinciding with Dugin's view that the unipolar world must be changed to multipolar.

With regards to the second question, this dissertation has proved that securitisation theory can indeed be an effective way to understand Russia's security thought. By examining the rhetoric of Putin and other important figures, this theory allows us to clearly view how threats are created, who the potential victims are and who must be convinced. Once we have this information, the theory allows us to think about the reasoning behind such security decisions. In addition, by taking 'issue areas' into account, we can see how different influential groups can work together to securitise threats. We must, however, be careful when analysing what the security actor is saying, as the reasons he/she gives to convince the audience of a threat may not entirely be the main reasons for extraordinary actions. For example, although Putin claims that the dominant reason of annexing Crimea was to protect Russian society on the peninsula, we saw that perhaps a more obvious reason was the military and political implications that could appear if Ukraine were to join NATO. We have also shown that securitisation theory can be used outside Western Europe and the full securitisation process is very much needed in authoritarian regimes such as Russia. Nevertheless, some alterations of the theory may be necessary, such as changing the order which securitisation theory takes place.

Many research projects can stem from this dissertation. Other sectors of securitisation theory can be studied in relation with Russia. For example, the economic sector can bring many interesting research ideas, due to Putin's ambitions of Eurasian economic integration. The relationship between the Orthodox Church and government also has many questions to be answered, and more can be said about this relationship, in particular within Russian-Ukrainian relations. Finally, one could wait a few years more and return to this question, as

currently events are unfolding at a fast pace. It will be interesting to see if Russia securitises other objects which may have civilisational overtones.

Finally, returning to the first paragraph of this dissertation, this research has ultimately proved that the security analyst needs to look beyond the old, Western-American dominated view of security studies which places too much emphasis on state and military security. With the case of Russia, it is paramount that we have knowledge of the country's history, culture and national identity in order to decipher, and perhaps predict its strategic and security decisions.

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