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Emotional Capital and Political Gain: Vladimir Putin's use of affective memories as a justification strategy

MSC IN RUSSIAN, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

As the saying goes, “*hindsight is a wonderful thing*”, and that is certainly the case for policy makers and speech writers. The use of memory and history in politics is not a new practice, with an extensive array of literature on the topic, especially regarding Post-War Germany. But what is it about the use of histories and memories that makes them an effective tool for speeches? Whilst the debates surrounding the politicisation of memories seems ever-expansive, I believe there is a gap in the discussion which could help us better understand the effect of its impact. The study of emotions has traditionally been the reserve of psychologists, but in recent years the research on emotions has expanded into the humanities and social sciences. Taking the sociological theory of social capital, I want to consider whether the gap in understanding the use of memories as a political tool can be further explained through emotional capital – the exchange of emotions for the establishment of an action.

With arguably one of the best propaganda mechanisms of the 21st century, from his theatrical entrances into conferences and state addresses, to his image being used on t-shirts and being photoshopped riding a bear, it would appear Vladimir Putin has most genres to express ‘sovereign democracy’ and his influence, covered. In addition to the visual tools, Putin and his speech writers have proven to create rousing and impactful speeches. The Russian Federation’s President is well known for his use of histories and memories in his speeches, recently and rather notably his address on 18th March 2014 which had Crimea as its main theme. But how is it his speeches resonate so well with his audience, why does his

use of memory work so well in justifying himself? This dissertation aims to consider how Putin uses emotional capital to gain support for an action through his speeches, and therefore justifying the action and subsequent policy. I will be analysing transcripts from Putin's speeches from 2012-2014, adopting Johnathan Charteris-Black's framework for Critical Discourse Analysis to answer my main research question.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

My research is primarily concerned with the use of collective memory in legitimising political actions, and the role of emotion within that. To answer this I will also be considering the following questions to build a comprehensive answer:

- How does Putin describe memories and the aesthetics of the memories?
- Which memories? What emotions are attached to those memories?
- How does Putin use a distant, indirect but collective memory and make it more immediate and personal?

By answering these questions, I also hope to discover if there are any patterns in Putin's usage of memories, such as whether there are specific emotions and memories he calls upon. I intend to explore this by analysing speeches Putin has given and assessing which memories are used, and the emotions Putin associates with them.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

First and foremost, I will define collective memory using Maurice Halbwachs definition,

“when people gather together to remember in common the deeds and accomplishments of long-departed members of the group...stored and interpreted by social institutions”

(Halbwachs 1992: 24). This definition is further supported by Jan-Werner Müller’s definition of ‘collective’ or ‘national’ memory as a *“social framework through which nationally conscious individuals can organise their memory”* (Müller 2002: 3). It is important for me to state the definition of memory and collective memory I will be considering, though I am primarily concerned with the emotions attached to these memories and how they are used for political gain.

The primary basis for my dissertation is the idea of the use of emotional capital. The term was first used by Edgar Jackson in 1959 in his work on grief, death and religion, though Jackson’s definition is different to how I will be defining emotional capital (Cottingham 2016: 453). Much like Jackson, however, I am basing my definition on Pierre Bourdieu’s framework of social mechanisms and exchanges – the theory of social progression through non-economic capital (Grenfell 2008: 101). I am defining emotional capital as the individual and collective emotions attached to events, histories, memories, actions, arts, music and other cultural institutions and systems, and how that is used in social and cultural exchanges to gain power. I will be using existing work on emotion and memory to further define emotional capital. According to the *Encyclopaedia of Psychology*, *“emotions influence the style of information processing”* and can influence our cognitive processes, so it is possible there is a link between our emotions, memories and our judgements, and therefore the

possibility to capitalise on that for political gain (Kazdin 2000: 165). Furthermore, according to neurobiologist, James McGaugh, on his analysis of studies of memory-forming,

“significant public events can be very well remembered after long delays...Emotionally significant events create stronger, longer-lasting memories” (McGaugh 2003: 89-90).

Working on this premise, it is feasible to suggest the idea of using a publicly significant event and memory to arouse emotional support for an action. Therefore, I will explore the link between memory and emotion, the instrumentalist use and function of memory as a justification strategy, and whether there is a specific emotional capital used for specific actions.

METHODOLOGY

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: I will be using Jonathan Charteris-Black’s framework for Critical Discourse Analysis when looking at political speeches as the structure for my methodology. Charteris-Black, a Professor of Linguistics at University of West England, focusses his work on political rhetoric and rhetorical choices, and has written a number of books and articles on the use of metaphors in political speech. He has developed several frameworks for analysing political speech depending on what the researcher is looking to focus on, in his book *Analysing political speeches: Rhetoric, discourse and metaphor* (2014), and is where the framework I shall be using can be found.

According to Charteris-Black, Critical Discourse Analysis of political speech determines social power relations through language. To effectively analyse political speech, he proposes following a framework of analysing “*speech circumstances*”, identifying and analysing the features of speech, and interpreting and explaining your findings (Charteris-Black 2014: 83).

I believe this framework for Critical Discourse Analysis to be the most appropriate for

answering my questions on the emotional semantic fields, to analyse the structures and patterns of the speeches, and analysing the systemic linguistics and speech circumstances. I will be looking at the use of metaphors and other descriptive language to assess how he portrays a memory and the associated emotions. I will also be looking at Putin's speeches in wider context, considering his speech circumstances – when was the speech, what purpose did the speech have, who were the audience etc.

I will not just be considering singular utterances, but also looking at the texts in segments and as a whole, to determine if there is a structure to Putin's use of memory. As Wood and Kroger suggest for the use of Critical Discourse Analysis, it is about finding what is being performed in the discourse, its function and purpose, and how it is achieved (Wood and Kroger 2005: 95).

SOURCES: For my main data set I will be using transcripts of Putin's speeches sourced from the official Kremlin website. I will be using the transcripts from these websites because this will be more time-effective and as I am not currently a proficient enough Russian speaker, the transcripts are already readily available in English.

I have chosen the timeframe of 2012-2014 because those years proved to be particularly interesting years for the implementation of new policies, assertions, and actions: Late 2012 into early 2013 Russia declared its *Concept of the Foreign Policy*; over the two-year span relations with Ukraine changed dramatically, and in 2014 Putin gave a speech about the Crimea, and a speech about deeming "*The New World Order*".

An obvious weakness to my proposal is language – I am not a proficient Russian speaker therefore I am having to rely on pre-translated transcripts which is itself another limit.

Whilst the transcripts will be translated to a consistent standard because they are produced by the Kremlin, I will not be able to tell if there are certain phrases, words, or notions which have not been translated in a way which gives justice to their intended meaning. Due to a limited timeframe, work pace and word count, I will be limited on the number of samples I can use for analysis.

Another possible weakness to my dissertation is whether I will face difficulty in determining the differences between memory and emotional capital; whether emotional capital and memory are too closely linked to be definitively defined.

In regards to the scope and significance of my thesis, I am looking beyond the use of memory as a tool for justification or the politicisation of memories, and looking at the engagement of emotional capital as a justification strategy; exchanging emotional capital for political progression. The focus on emotional capital has the potential for originality; I have so far found no reading on the use of emotional capital as part of a justification strategy in politics, but there are works in other fields and with different definitions to my own proposal. There is extensive literature available focused on the politicisation of memories, and the use of memory to change or form policy; for example, memory and its political application relating to Post-War Germany and Yugoslavia regarding their political decision making processes. However, many of these debates are about the idea of using memory to protect and prevent similar events and practices from occurring again, how we remember, and whether we should commemorate certain histories and memories. Much of the existing literature offers valid arguments for how memory should or should not be used in politics, as well as the ethics surrounding the use of histories and memories, but which I think would be applicable to the consideration of the ethics of the use of emotional capital.

Should my research prove to be credible, there is scope to argue that emotional capital could be a method of assessing the way political leaders apply affective memory for political gain, and the theory can be extended beyond Vladimir Putin's use to other politicians, present and past.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

I will begin my thesis by offering a review of some of the literature on the conceptualisation and politicisation of memories in relation to contemporary Russia. In doing so, I hope to identify where my proposed concept of emotional capital fits into existing concepts on the use of memories in politics, and the extent of originality my concept holds. I will then discuss the theoretical basis for my proposed concept, outlining the key definitions and drawing the links between emotion and memory. I will further determine my methodological framework for my critical discourse analysis, highlighting the codes I will be using and offering a more detailed explanation of the framework I am adopting. I will discuss my empirical results using a combination of inductive and thematic execution, by looking at speeches made to a national audience and to international audiences. I hope to identify three or four arguments that have come through from analysing my data, as well as answer my key research questions. In my conclusion, I will evaluate my findings and fully answer my research questions as well as answer my thesis title, and I will offer scope for future applications and developments.

LITERATURE REVIEW

My research project will consider how Putin justifies his actions in his speeches by applying the concept of emotional capital – the use of emotions attached to a specific collective memory or history to gain public support for political action. Using Critical Discourse Analysis for my methodology, and the principles of Pierre Bourdieu’s *Forms of Capital* to build my own theoretical framework, I hope to develop my own original approach to assessing Putin’s justification strategies for his actions and policies. Whilst the politicisation of memory and history is a well explored and discussed topic of research, the concepts and frameworks for assessing its use and impact continue to develop with the changing of governments, and the platforms in which their impact can be assessed.

In this literature review, I aim to consider how memory and history has been studied in relation to Putin and contemporary Russia and looking at the different themes that emerge, and offer a consideration of where my research would fit in to the wider debate on Putin’s use of memory. Russia and Putin’s use of memory is well discussed and has been studied from a wide range of perspectives, using both top-down and bottom-up approaches. But I believe there is a gap in the perspectives on the relationship Russia and its President has with memory.

NOSTALGIA

A popular perspective for discussing Russia’s relationship with its use of memory and history is considering both international and domestic perspectives. Encompassing different theoretical perspectives to look at Putin and Russia’s policies and interactions with other

nations, international perspectives tend to focus on post-Soviet state interactions and Russia's European identity. From questions on conflicting historical narratives between Russia and the Baltic states (Fofanova and Morozov 2009: 15-32) to how it determines its identity post-collapse (Graham 2015: 103-133), this perspective puts Russia's relations with memory into a wider context. As well as how Soviet legacies have influenced global discussions, the theme of Soviet and post-Soviet memories and histories crosses over almost all the approaches to studying contemporary Russia, especially from the perspective of nostalgia. In many ways Russia is still processing its Soviet past, and a popular theme for the study of the use of memory in politics is the theme of re-Stalinisation. Re-Stalinisation looks at the positive rehabilitation of the role of Stalin in history, the image of Stalin, and recycling some of his policies. Through political narratives and social mechanisms (such as education), the rehabilitation of Stalin is used to facilitate various agendas. One popularly suggested agenda is the use of Stalinist history for political gain. Numerous studies cover the importance of historical narratives in manipulating discursive shifts so that the history being used suits the agenda of the moment (Sherlock 2011: 93-109). Through the carefully selected meta-narratives for the effective rehabilitation of Stalin and Soviet history, it is suggested that Putin and the Kremlin aim to propel Russia as an independent international power, and use history as a case for this to be achieved again. The issue of the need to confront sensitive historical issues in contexts wider than just politically is highlighted from this perspective, especially if re-Stalinisation is to 'survive' in Russian political narratives. One of the ways in which re-Stalinisation is kept 'alive' however, and which has been covered extensively by historians and social scientists, is the 'gaps' in the memories of Stalinist histories. These 'gaps' have allowed for the state to process the 'unprocessed memories' and fill social and political gaps to their advantage. By relying on the "*state-*

sponsored” memory as opposed to popular memory or victims’ memory, the State uses unprocessed memories to fuel re-Stalinisation, particularly under Putin (Khapaeva 2016: 61-73). The plethora of work available on the use of history and memory in pursuit of Re-Stalinisation is wide, and growing in its sophistication of methodologies and theories. However, there is little research which considers the affective elements of memories and histories, perhaps because of the ‘gaps’ which have left these histories and memories open for re-interpretation by the state. This space in the link between affective memory and nostalgia suggests there is room to explore the concept of emotional capital and the application of this concept to Putin’s speeches, as well as the scope for it to be relevant to narratives on the rehabilitation of Soviet policies and re-Stalinisation.

MNEMONIC MEMORY

As discussed above, whilst state narratives can be used to increase legitimacy of a political authority, there is also a need to consider societal memory. The question of who creates and propagates collective memories can be explored by looking at mnemonic actors: *“political forces that are interested in a specific interpretation of the past. They often treat history instrumentally in order to construct a vision of the past that they assume will generate the most effective legitimation for their efforts to gain and hold power”* (Bernhard and Kubik 2014: 4). Mnemonic actors’ use of memory and history to resurrect or reinvent a former Soviet policy in contemporary Russian politics is a well discussed theme. Philipp Bürger’s *State Programs* brings two themes together to argue his concept of the use of historical narratives to provide legitimacy for political regimes and institutions in Russia. Primarily concerned with the use of heroic historical narratives in education and communications,

Bürger explores the development of these heroic Soviet narratives and how it is not only the Soviet past which is rehabilitated in the effort to justify and legitimate the existing government, but also previous patriotism policies. His primary argument is that Russian government's use of memory to facilitate "*patriotic-education initiative*" is a representation of "*an institutionalised and planned form of memory policy*" (Bürger 2016: 174). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the practise of using this memory policy was attempted in order to fill the ideological gap the collapse left, however was unsuccessful in forming a new identity for Russia. Bürger argues this memory policy has been resurrected and adapted to make use of contemporary platforms such as social media and other online communication platforms, with Boris Yeltsin's Law on Days of Military Glory providing the model for state programs in post-2000 Russia (Bürger 2016: 174-5). The theme of rehabilitating and manipulating historical and collective memories to suit political agendas and legitimate structures show the relevance of politicisation of memory and why it is important to explore, particularly when the actors using memory policies have been shown to manipulate some memories and histories to support their cause, especially when, as Bürger's work explored, the results of using this strategy haven't worked. As Bürger summarises: "*historical narratives can force political actors to react in different ways; indeed, memory policies created as a tool of legitimization can ultimately turn on their creators as a double-edged sword*" (Bürger 2016: 190). The state is important therefore, in the top-down approach to memory-formation and as a mnemonic actor. It has the means to determine the different institutions in which people engage with memory, the power to influence how and what they engage with, but also the responsibility to manage and respond to peoples' reactions to the state's interpretations.

EDUCATION

Working on a similar concept to nostalgic historical narratives within political discourse and mnemonic memory, modern Russian history education has been a hotly debated topic for study, particularly following the Filippov school textbook debate. In 2008, the printing of a new Russian history textbook covering the years 1945-2008 stirred much controversy over whether it projected state-sponsored, pro-Soviet narratives. Some research has suggested the use of history for political gain is applied to the context of the use and ‘abuse’ of historical narratives to suit the efforts of forging and strengthening Putin’s political identity, and Russia’s history. Through historical narratives produced by the President and the Kremlin and distributed through educational materials and policies, Putin is attempting to update and sustain a “*national identity but also give the work of [himself] a historical meaning*” (Liñán 2010: 168). Through Russia’s consumption of media and education, a crucial part of their communication, it can be argued there is a potential for significant impact from using history in propaganda and Putin’s success in achieving and retaining his presidency being assisted by historically motivated propaganda through education. Another way of approaching education and historical narratives has been to consider whether there are any threads of propaganda within history education – vice versa of the above example. Once again, the Filippov textbook has been central to many studies of contemporary Russian education, and used in comparisons with Soviet educational textbooks; looking for discourses of Soviet power and symbolism, to discussion on the extent of the Kremlin’s control on modern society (Solonari 2009: 835-846; Nelson 2015: 37-65).

COMMEMORATION

Literature on commemoration in post-Soviet Russia is vast, but once again considers Russia and its leaders' interesting relationship with memory and history. Russian authorities have attempted to monopolise many aspects of commemoration, through institutions like education and the military, but also through cultural bodies. Cultural establishments such as media networks and even public spaces, are increasingly used as tools of memory production which aim to mobilise political goals. With studies on every aspect of the processes of commemoration, from what event or actor to commemorate, whether the commemoration should be manifested physically in the form of a statue or a dedicated day, to the policies on commemoration, the majority appear to draw on similar themes of the efforts to mediate the commemoration of the Soviet past (Boele 2011: 3-29; Onken 2007: 23-46). Other studies have even looked at the medium of film and television; with the rise in popularity of World War Two films and television series in Russia, there are arguments to suggest these popular channels for culture have become an important vehicle for the Kremlin's memory politics, and contribute to wider nationalistic and pro-Soviet narratives (Norris 2007: 163-189; Gillespie 2005).

Despite the vast array of perspectives and themes on the use of memory and history in contemporary Russia and under Putin, there is still room for further considerations in this saturated field. It is well documented and discussed Putin's use of memory and history in his political discourse, particularly references to the Great Patriotic War, which has generated lots of themes on nationalism and the rehabilitation of Soviet ideologies and policies (Wiseman 2014: 10-12). However, little in-depth study has been pursued on capturing

political imperatives or on the affective elements of Putin's discourse. Previous studies have looked at the level of state involvement in mnemonic practices and fields, but they do not examine who or how the narratives produced by the Kremlin work and operate. This is where the strength of my thesis lies, in not only looking more closely at the use of collective memory and history in his political discourse but incorporating an emotional element too.

Perhaps closest in relation to what I am aiming to achieve with my research is Georgeta Cislaru's chapter *Emotions as a rhetorical tool in political discourse*. Cislaru's work argues the concept "*emotion is a rhetorical tool used by politicians, by media discourse and also by citizens in order to impact on the opinion or to build it*" (Cislaru 2012: 107). The aim of her research is to look at the embedding of rhetorical strategies in web comments on politics. Her methodology applies this concept to French politicians, media, and public opinion web comments and newspaper clippings, and she specifically focusses on negative emotions of fear and anger surrounding the contexts of sanitary risks and terrorist attacks and the political comments and actions that follow. By applying her concept to these discourses, she aims to demonstrate "*Political discourse simply capitalises on a situation by using the basic principles of sharing emotion process: the appropriate language and the appropriate emotion*" (Cislaru 2016: 112). Cislaru's work highlights the 'gap in the market' for the concept of emotional capital as a political tool, and a concept which can be applied to different discourses not just surrounding Russia and Putin. Where Cislaru's work differs to mine, is her approach regarding emotions and the discourse. The purpose of my research is not to look at the political frameworks and contexts that Putin's speeches emerge from or how effective they are, but how he uses emotions in his rhetoric and how this is linked with memory.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“One way of understanding the relationship between memory and power is to conceptualise memory itself as a kind of ‘symbolic power’, which can be marshalled in much the same way as material power” (Müller 2002: 25)

The politicisation of histories and memories is a well-covered field, with a vast body of work available across a broad spectrum of time periods and countries. Indeed, as my literature review has shown there are many conceptualisations on how and why their politicisation has been used and the varying effects. I hope to contribute to this field with an original development for a concept and theoretical framework, incorporating Bourdieu’s theories of capital and existing research on the connection between memory and emotion to create emotional capital.

The significance of the development of emotional capital is to contribute not only to the existing work on the politicisation of memory, but also serve as a justification strategy in contemporary politics for the implementation of policies and actions. As Müller suggests, the role of memory in terms of politics and power is two-fold: it has the potential to be used to determine a political agenda, but also determine legitimacy (Müller 2002: 26-7).

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: MEMORY & EMOTION

Before I define my concept, I need to discuss which concepts of memory I intend to use, and the link between memory and emotion. I will be using Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory, where the group are a collection of individuals with a shared memory, and the concept of historical memory, where memories are indirectly remembered through

social institutions (Coser 1992: 22-24). I am using both collective and historical memory because, as with many concepts on the politicisation of memory, it considers memories on current events informing political discourse as well as past events. With historical memories, whilst individuals with direct memories may no longer be around, their memories of events and emotions have been captured and institutionalised so that we can still relate and indirectly remember too.

Linking memory to emotion, according to the Encyclopaedia of Psychology, there is evidence to suggest that emotions can influence cognitive processes such as cognition and information processing, and including memories and memory forming (Kazdin 2000: 165). More specifically, research conducted by James McGaugh, a research professor in neurobiology at University of California Irvine, suggests that “*intense emotional arousal*”, both positive and negative, is highly effective in forming lasting memories (McGaugh 2003: 7). He states that:

“Emotionally significant events create stronger, longer-lasting memories. Whether subjects experience the events, witness them, hear about them on the radio, seem them or reports about them on television, or learn about them from friends and neighbours, the events are likely to be recalled months or even years later”
(McGaugh 2003: 90-91).

These standout events can be referred to as flashbulb memories, coined in the study done by Brown and Kulik, where much like the flashing of a camera, the event is surprising but captured for a lifetime (Brown and Kulik 1977: 74). Both Brown and Kulik, and McGaugh, state that whilst the details and facts surrounding the flashbulb memory may be inaccurate,

the emotions attached to the event will be vivid, as well as reinforcing the strength of the memory (McGaugh 2003: 94; Brown and Kulik 1977: 75).

With these psychological/neurobiological principles in mind, it is the emotions attached to these flashbulb collective and historical memories I am concerned with in forming emotional capital.

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: CAPITAL

Using Pierre Bourdieu's *Theories of Capital*, capital can be defined as the assets which are exchanged within networks into another field (Moore 2012: 99). Specifically, cultural capital can be defined as symbolic capital, embodied or objectified, which is exchanged in order to increase social status (Moore 2012: 99). The features of symbolic capital include: acquisition through systemic inculcation, bringing value to an agent relative to their field so that their habitus is more or less-formed, and they're transposable across fields (Moore 2012: 111).

With these basic principles for determining a capital and their function, I argue the emotions associated with a collective or historical memory serve as a symbolic capital: its repeated use, its value to those using it and those whose support it is trying to exchange with, and the ability for the emotion to be exchanged for different types of support across different fields.

I am defining emotional capital, therefore, as a specific emotion associated with a collective or historical memory; this capital is exchanged for the acquisition of emotional support in the political field.

METHODOLOGY

“Language games are an important component of security interaction, which is certainly the case of Russia’s relations with its major Western partners” (Makarychev 2014: 410)

According to Aristotle, any effective political speech should contain three elements: logos – logical element, pathos – empathetic element, and ethos – ethical element (Charteris-Black 2014: 8); these elements can be changed depending on what the orator is aiming to achieve with their speech. Aristotle focused on the use of pathos as being a particularly important tool, because appealing to emotions could significantly impact opinions and judgements of the audience (Charteris-Black 2014: 14). The notion of emotional appeal can also be linked to the *Encyclopaedia of Psychology’s* definition suggesting emotions influence memory forming – appealing to a specific emotion can appeal to a specific memory, and vice versa (Kazdin 2000: 165).

As stated in my introduction, I will be analysing speeches made by Vladimir Putin during the years 2012-2014. I am taking a top-down approach, so I am aiming to look at how Putin presents emotions and memories, but I will not be looking at the effects of this on the audience as this is out of the means of this thesis and would warrant an entire body of research of its own. Where my research will face difficulty is in pin-pointing emotions in speech, however I’m not looking to define emotions just simply to identify them. For my

methodology, I am adopting Critical Discourse Analysis as I believe this to be the most appropriate process for gathering the data I require from Putin's speeches. I will be using the framework set out by Jonathan Charteris-Black in his work on analysing political speech, which I will layout in this chapter. At this point however, I find it relevant to state how I am defining a political speech, and again I will be using Charteris-Black as reference for definition:

"a coherent stream of spoken language that is usually prepared for delivery by a speaker to an audience for a purpose on a political occasion" (Charteris-Black 2014: xiii).

Due to the constraints of this thesis, I will not be differentiating between deliberative and epideictic speeches, however the speech's circumstance will be taken into consideration.

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: FRAMEWORK

Critical Discourse Analysis is concerned with social power relations, and the unequal distribution of power achieved through language, and how this is achieved (Charteris-Black 2014: 83-6). Specific lexical choices and language features determine whether the intended audience is persuaded to side with the speaker: how effectively the pathos of a speech is presented to the audience. One of the linguistic tools of persuasion is the use of emotions, be it through the use of metaphors or repetition of specific utterances, especially when they are conducive to the circumstance the speech is given. Jonathan Charteris-Black sets out a 3-stage process for analysing political speech, which I will be adapting to incorporate the affective elements of Putin's speeches:

STAGE 1 – ANALYSIS OF SPEECH CIRCUMSTANCES: In this stage, the situational circumstances are analysed, looking at the setting of the speech, who the speaker is, the date, the occasion, and the audience. Any background knowledge is established, looking at the speaker's and audience's beliefs, assumptions and purposes (Charteris-Black 2014: 87-9).

STAGE 2 – IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF FEATURES: This stage covers linguistic analysis, so *“lexical choices; larger units e.g. syntactic patterns of sentences; stylistic features that permeate a whole speech, command of modal system”* (Charteris-Black 2014: 89).

Whilst analysing the language, I will identify emotional semantic fields and whether there are any negative or positive associations, and where in the speech they are situated. I will be identifying emotional semantic fields using P. Johnson-Laird and Keith Oatley's work on emotions semantics. In their research they suggest that human beings experience five basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust) which semantics will relate to (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989: 85). These emotions can be derived from physical experiences (e.g. hurt), consciousness of a situation (e.g. embarrassment), and bodily sensations (e.g. hunger) (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989: 85-86). Therefore, emotion semantics contain *“words denoting basic emotions, emotional relations, caused emotions, causes of emotions, emotional goals, and complex emotions”* (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989: 106).

In addition, I will be looking at the modality of Putin's speeches to deduce his conviction with what is being said. Charteris-Black indicates in this stage that the performative elements be analysed, such as appearances and gestures, however, because I am only

focussing on speech and will not be including the visual aspects I do not find it relevant to look at this.

STAGE 3 – INTERPRETATION AND EXPLANATION: This stage looks at the interaction between the previous two stages – how the situational circumstances and the language work together (or don't) in order to process the persuasion potential with what is said. Charteris-Black also suggests at this stage to evaluate the reactions to the speech, however this is out of the means and purpose of my thesis so will not be considered. Stage 3 would be part of my empirical write up process, as it is dependent on the data I will collect and is not so much a part of the research method, but more in processing the data as a result.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

Due to adopting a top-down approach to my research, I will have some themes for coding in mind, however, I will execute my research conductively and thematically. I am taking this approach because I do not want my research to be limited by too narrow a coding range and potentially miss some themes, however I will require some direction in order not to be faced with too broad a set of results to analyse. The key coding themes I will be starting out with for my research are emotional semantic fields, both positive and negative. Whilst broad, at first I hope the further through my data set I get, the narrower and more specific the emotions become. I will also be looking for references to Soviet-period memories; Putin is well known for his use of Soviet references, however I want to look more at how he uses them. Finally, I will be looking for justification lexis and the positioning of it in relation to any emotional or memory-related utterances.

SOURCES

As mentioned in my introduction, I will be analysing transcripts of Putin's speeches from the years 2012-14. The specific transcripts I have chosen are the annual addresses to the Federal Assembly, Valdai Discussion Club plenaries, and the presidential address following the annexation of Crimea. I have chosen these sources because they have similar speech circumstances: the audiences consist mostly of government officials, state experts, and civil society representatives who have been invited to attend these occasions. In addition, whilst the majority of the audience is a home crowd, there are other international representatives present at the speeches too. The similar speech circumstances and whether this can be used to assess how the speeches can be interpreted will be discussed in the empirical results chapter, but it is worth noting now as a contributing factor in choosing my data set.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The aim of this chapter is to not only determine any trends that have emerged from analysing my data, but also aiming to answer my key research questions:

How does Putin describe memories and the aesthetics of the memories? Which memories are used, and what emotions are attached to those memories? How does Putin use a distant, indirect but collective memory and make it more immediate and personal?

As aforementioned in my methodology, I have adopted a top-down approach to analysing my data, so whilst I have had some themes in mind, I deemed it more appropriate to adopt an inductive approach. I will be structuring the discussion of my findings using the themes that have emerged from my analyses, incorporating my Critical Discourse Analysis and theoretical analysis into the discussions.

NEGATIVE JUSTIFICATION

Perhaps the most interesting use of collective memories and histories by Vladimir Putin in his speeches, is not so much in the positive justification for the Kremlin's policies and actions, but the negative justification and condemning of Western actions. I am defining negative justification as the use of negative historical and contemporary motivations for adopting an action or policy.

Speeches from 2014 proved to have the strongest presence of anti-Western sentiment and negative justification. Considering the speech circumstances for the speeches made in 2014, they follow the run-up and aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and Russian involvement in events in Eastern Ukraine, which was met with heavy objection from many Western

states and resulted in sanctions on Russia from around the globe. In addition, all the speeches analysed from 2014 have distinctly domestic audiences and included members of the government and state officials, with the exception of the Valdai International Discussion Club which included audience members from outside of Russia (Putin 2014b).

In these speeches, a pattern emerges in the types of histories and memories used, when they are used, and the type of language used to describe the aesthetics of those memories, and incite and highlight specific emotions with those memories. In this extract from the Presidential Address on Crimea in 2014, the most common structure for using a collective history or memory is demonstrated:

“Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, still during the times of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are still in effect. In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally” (Putin, 2014c).

Here, a statement is made about sanctions, followed by a Cold War reference and general historic reference, followed by emotional commentary. In the statement about sanctions, by using the pronouns “we”, “our” and “us” rather than Russia, the “threat” of sanctions is made to seem more personal. The rhetorical mechanism of the power-of-three is used to emphasise the extent of the impact of sanctions when used in conjunction with these inclusive pronouns: “significant for us, our economy and our nation.” In addition, the use of “threatened”, “restricted”, “limitations”, “containment” incited defensive feelings due to the sense of danger and restriction being created, suggesting emotions of anger. The combination of inclusive personal pronouns, angry emotional semantic field, and persuasion devices contribute towards the establishment of an emotional capital built on angry emotions associated and used to linguistically frame the memory of sanctions on the USSR. The reference to the Cold War sanctions on the USSR by the US and “other nations” is used to exemplify the historical limitations Russia has supposedly always faced. This reference is immediately followed by statements which are loaded with more defensive discourse that uses the same rhetorical mechanisms as the primary statement. The repeated use of “limited” semantics in combination with quantities creates the image of Russia being contained, and appeals to emotions of anger previously aroused: “many limitations are still in effect...the infamous policy of containment...constantly trying to sweep us into a corner.” In addition, by drawing parallels between the Cold War memory and contemporary circumstances, the memory is made to seem less distant and more immediate – the actions by the West today are a continuation of their actions in the Cold War, and never really ended. By justifying the West’s attempts to contain Russia with sanctions as a means to control it and prevent it acting independently without consequence, history and memory are used to provide evidence of this but also add depth to the attempts to engage anger. In

line with my theoretical framework, the anger being associated with the memory of Western-imposed sanctions during the Cold War (and “*over the centuries*”) acts as the emotional capital, and in turn this capital is exchanged in support of protesting contemporary sanctions in relation to Crimea and Ukraine. As well as negatively justifying the “*policy of containment*”, allusions to supporting terrorism in Russia and the Central Asian states were made in the Valdai Discussion Club plenary speech in 2014. The theme of this plenary, “*The World Order: New Rules or a Game without Rules*”, concentrated on analysing the factors eroding the current system of institutions and norms of international law. On the discussion of sovereignty, Putin talks about the issue of “*imposing one’s own model*” as a means of managing global security mechanisms accountable for “*the growing spread of chaos*” (Putin 2014b). Although he has not immediately stated about which country and their model he is talking about, he eventually calls out the United States as the example:

"Why do they support such people? They do this because they decide to use them as instruments along the way in achieving their goals but then burn their fingers and recoil. I never cease to be amazed by the way that our partners just keep stepping on the same rake, as we say here in Russia, that is to say, make the same mistake over and over. They once supported Islamic extremist movements to fight the Soviet Union. Those groups got their battle experience in Afghanistan and later gave birth to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The West if not supported, at least closed its eyes, and, I would say, gave information, political and financial support to international terrorists' invasion of Russia (we have not forgotten this) and the Central Asian region's countries. Only after horrific terrorist attacks were committed on US soil

itself did the United States wake up to the common threat of terrorism. Let me remind you we were the first country to support the American people back then, the first to react as friends and partners to the terrible tragedy of September 11” (Putin 2014b).

Using the collective memory of the Soviet-Afghan War as a negative justification for US dominance of global security models has several purposes. Firstly, it provides a collective memory that can be related to the rise of modern Islamic extremism and terrorism, linking any emotional memory to modern day feelings on the issue the audience may have. Secondly, it is used to engage particularly with Russian and Central Asian members of the audience who hold memory of the terrorist invasion and also build an emotional capital based on audience experience or memory of the events. By doing this, support for Putin’s suggestions of American past links to terrorism and its acknowledgement of the “*common threat of terrorism*” being realised is strengthened. This is achieved by using inclusive personal pronouns to include those audience members, as well as stating “*we have not forgotten this*” to suggest Putin remembers alongside those audience members in their collective memory of the war. Finally, the memory is used to stress positive projections from Russia to the West despite their apparent links to terrorism in the past: “*Let me remind you we were the first country to support the American people back then, the first to react as friends and partners to the terrible tragedy.*” In doing this, Russia is portrayed as a forgiving and caring “partner” despite its allies flaws.

Another impactful use of negative justification was during the annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly (Putin 2014a). Once again, the topic of Western-imposed sanctions on Russia following events in Crimea and Ukraine is the action which is being contested:

“Speaking of the sanctions, they are not just a knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the United States or its allies to our position regarding the events and the coup in Ukraine, or even the so-called Crimean Spring. I’m sure that if these events had never happened – I want to point out specifically for you as politicians sitting in this auditorium – if none of that had ever happened, they would have come up with some other excuse to try to contain Russia’s growing capabilities, affect our country in some way, or even take advantage of it.

The policy of containment was not invented yesterday. It has been carried out against our country for many years, always, if not centuries. In short, whenever someone thinks that Russia has become too strong or independent, these tools are quickly put into use. However, talking to Russia from a position of force is an exercise in futility, even when it was faced with domestic hardships, as in the 1900s and early 2000s. We remember well how and who, almost openly, supported separatism back then and even outright terrorism in Russia, referred to murderers, whose hands were stained with blood, none other than rebels and organised high-level receptions for them. These “rebels” showed up in Chechnya again. I’m sure the local guys, the local law enforcement authorities, will take proper care of them. They are now working to eliminate another terrorist raid. Let’s support them.

Let me reiterate, we remember high-level receptions for terrorists dubbed as fighters for freedom and democracy. Back then, we realised that the more ground we give

and the more excuses we make, the more our opponents become brazen and the more cynical and aggressive their demeanour becomes. Despite our unprecedented openness back then and our willingness to cooperate in all, even the most sensitive issues, despite the fact that we considered – and all of you are aware of this and remember it – our former adversaries as close friends and even allies, the support for separatism in Russia from across the pond, including information, political and financial support and support provided by the special services – was absolutely obvious and left no doubt that they would gladly let Russia follow the Yugoslav scenario of disintegration and dismemberment. With all the tragic fallout for the people of Russia. It didn't work. We didn't allow that to happen. Just as it didn't work for Hitler with his people-hating ideas, who set out to destroy Russia and push us back beyond the Urals. Everyone should remember how it ended” (Putin 2014a).

Again, the pattern of when the histories and memories are used is repeated: statement, collective history/memory, further persuasive commentary. In this extract, Putin is arguing that the sanctions imposed on Russia in the spring and summer of 2014 immediately following the crisis were a response to Russia's “*growing capabilities*” rather than the events that unfolded in Ukraine. This notion is then followed by another reference to the “*policy of containment*” which has supposedly been carried out against Russia “*for years, always, if not centuries.*” By describing the history of this policy using increasingly lengthening periods of time, Russia is painted as a power that has faced these attempts to contain it and yet is still going, creating feelings of a strong and enduring nation. This sentiment is further emphasised by the comments of any forceful position taken against Russia being an “*exercise in futility.*” An angry, defensive rhetoric continues although what is interesting to

note is the vague collective memory reference: *“We remember well how and who, almost openly, supported separatism back then and even outright terrorism in Russia...Let me reiterate, we remember high-level receptions for terrorists dubbed as fighters for freedom and democracy.”* Despite no specific memory being indicated at this point, the use of *“we remember”* not only acts as a point of audience interaction but feeds the audience into the aggressive rhetoric which will follow. The collective memory referenced is then further described, alluding (though not confirmed) to the 1999 Apartment Bombings across Moscow and other Russian cities. The actions of Russia are described as *“unprecedented openness...willingness to cooperate”* in comparison with others’ actions being described as *“gladly let Russia...disintegration and dismemberment. With all the tragic fallout for the people of Russia.”* The contrast of an open and cooperative Russia against a ‘cruel’ other who would have allowed for Russia’s disembodiment, connotes feelings of strength and defiance on Russia’s part, particularly when the memory is closed with declarative statements of the oppositional actor’s actions and attitudes being ineffective. The non-specific reference to the other actor/s in this memory, and the general details used in describing the memory, allow for Russia’s actions to be the focus of the memory whilst the audience is being told how it felt through the continued use of inclusive pronouns. This also allows Putin to determine the emotional capital by determining the emotions the audience are supposed to remember and experience when recollecting the periods of *“domestic hardships.”* The indirect parallels in the closing statements drawn between Hitler and his efforts to *“destroy Russia”* and the issue of Western sanctions, try to show both times that efforts made to restrict and diminish Russia have failed and will fail again: *“Everyone should remember how it ended.”* In addition, although a comparison isn’t directly made, comparing the West to Hitler is not only inflammatory in its indirect association, but also suggests the

West's actions historically and contemporarily are on a par and are as aggressive in nature, but Russia's strength couldn't be quashed.

The use of memory and history in these extracts is multi-faceted, and the emotions attempted to be riled also reflect this. The "*policy of containment*" has proven to be a popular argument in Putin's negative justification for the West's attempts to impose restrictions, supposedly for "*centuries*" because of Russia's growing strength. By describing the aesthetics of the often vague memories and histories with defensive and aggressive language, feelings of anger and defiance are encouraged from the audience, acting as the capital in exchange for the support to protest and defy contemporary sanctions from the West. This also allows for the emotive language to command focus away from the specific details of the memory. Emphasising the recurrence of the 'policy' throughout history adds to the image created of a strong and resilient Russia, as well as another motivation behind justifying the West's actions – they have a history of attempting to restrain Russia, so this behaviour is a pattern. By repeatedly using inclusive pronouns such as 'we' and 'our' when describing the histories and memories as well as the contemporary situation and actions, the audience is constantly made to feel actively involved in recent memory and therefore the memory and the action or stance it is being used to justify, is made to feel more personal. The building of an emotional capital on anger associated with the "*policy of containment*" memories is achieved, therefore, through the repeated use of aggressive and defensive language in the aesthetics of the memory.

DOMESTIC VS FOREIGN CONTEXT

All the speeches analysed covered both foreign and domestic policies and actions in some capacity, either by addressing a specific policy or event (e.g. Presidential Address on Crimea, Putin 18.3.2014), or covering a few topics in a general address (e.g. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin 12.12.2013). But what began to emerge from my analysis was the way in which collective memories and histories used changed depending on whether there was a discussion of domestic, regional or international policy or action.

When discussing domestic issues, one of the most popular uses for memories and histories was in building support for policies of national consciousness and sovereignty. References to ancient Rus, particularly the founding of Rus, or to the Soviet Union were the most commonly used, and in doing so, claims of any developments being made in national interests were justified as being in line with historical precedence. This is demonstrated in the annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in December 2012, on the topic of reviving national consciousness within the military. It was stressed in the speech:

“[we] need to link historical eras and get back to understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but rather, that [we] have a common, continuous history spanning over one thousand years, and we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national development” (Putin 2012).

Here the link to justifying the proceeding comments on military policy with history is overt, directly linking the “*strength and purpose*” of national development to Russia’s history. By

explicitly stating the “*common, continuous*” history of the region must be relied upon to “*find inner strength and purpose*”, the emphasis on the collective and shared history immediately draws the audience into feeling a sense of importance around Russia’s history and continuing a legacy. This is further cemented and made more relatable when Putin stresses the importance in the connection between history and military/national strengths with more contemporary references:

“We spoke about how important it is to preserve the historical military memory of the Fatherland. After all, is it fair that we still do not have a single worthy national monument to the heroes of World War I? Our predecessors called it the great war, but it was undeservingly forgotten and struck from our historical memory and history for political and ideological reasons. Meanwhile, the morale of our Armed Forces is held up by traditions, by a living connection to history, by the examples of bravery and selflessness of our heroes. I feel that we should revive the names of the most renowned regiments, military units and major formations of past eras within the Russian army – both Soviet times and earlier eras, such as Preobrazhensky and Semenovskiy regiments. The Defence Minister should present corresponding suggestions” (Putin 2012).

In this extract, the use of collective history and memory is subtle, as is the development of emotional capital. Firstly, the relationship between military strength and national consciousness and history is suggested by describing the armed forces as a “*living connection to history*.” This shows the theme of continuing to create a “*common, continuous*” history to develop “*inner strength and purpose*” can be achieved with the

institutionalisation, and even physical commemoration, of the past. Putin then goes on to suggest the resurrection of various military units and conventions which should be endorsed and expanded upon by the Defence Minister. By justifying this resurrection as continuing a historical legacy and which the country's strength relies on before actually stating the intended action, this allows the emotional capital to be established and strengthened and allows for the audience to be persuaded beforehand. By describing the soldiers in World War I as brave and selfless, their efforts "*worthy*" of a national monument, and creating a juxtaposition between this view and the Soviet outlook which saw the Great War as "*undeservingly forgotten*", a sense of pride is encouraged around all military efforts past and present. It is at this point Putin chooses to introduce the revival of some past military infrastructure, when the audience has already been convinced of the importance in continuing and progressing national consciousness and strength, with the military as a means of achieving this. As aforementioned, whilst the use of history to justify this action is explicitly stated, the collective histories and memories used to justify it are vague in their details, making it quite weak in emotional capital. The simple strategy of claiming historical legacy is relied upon to add depth to the argument, rather than using an emotional appeal.

In contrast to this is the President's address on the Crimean referendum and subsequent annexation (Putin 2014c). As perhaps the most significant international action taken by Russia in my chosen time frame for analysis, this speech was rich in uses of collective memories and histories, more detailed in their accounts, and proved to be loaded with emotional capital. Looking first at the histories and memories used, Putin opens his speech by suggesting that the results of the referendum can be understood by understanding the shared history between Crimea and Russia:

“Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire area also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour” (Putin 2014c)

References to the ancient founding of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are made here, with particular emphasis on the spiritual nature of their beginnings. The spiritual appeal is culturally important due to significant numbers of both Ukraine and Russia’s populations identifying as Orthodox. It is implied here that the shared history and spirituality should act as a source for national pride because of the connecting histories and foundations of the countries, but what is interesting here is that Putin indicates only Russian *“military glory and outstanding valour”* is symbolised. Whilst the shared origins of the region are mentioned, the audience is reminded of Russia’s dominating presence in the territory. This extract is also another example of the use of ancient history to determine national consciousness; by establishing this link early in the speech, the audience is reminded that Russia’s strength is being determined by its history. Putin goes on to state that *“Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia”*, and describes the historical developments of how Russia,

Crimea and Sevastopol came to be separated. At this point, greater description of the history is given:

“Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine, along with Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a federal city. This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out. What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact. People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole – and we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within boundaries of a single state. Back then it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened. Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. Things developed so swiftly that few people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be. Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained empty promises, while the big country was gone. It was only when Crimea

ended up as part of another country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered” (Putin 2014c).

The purpose of the use of memory here is to attempt to explain to the audience the historical precedent of how the referendum in Crimea came about, however, the way the memory is recalled places emphasis on Russia’s position rather than that of Crimea: *“Russia realised it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.”* The memory is presented in a way that makes it look as though Russia was the victim of Soviet actions and post-Soviet promises that never came into being, creating a feeling of injustice and loss. At this point in the speech the audience has had this image of brotherly nations with shared cultures and historical foundations built up for them, only for these brothers to be passed around and then separated from each other. In line with my theoretical framework, the emotional capital here is based upon emotions of loss and sadness. This has been built to harness support for the result and integrity of the referendum, regardless of whether it was held *“in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms”* or not (Putin 2014c). Therefore, a bank of support is established which will then be built upon when the speech turns to the wider international community’s response to events in Crimea.

As the Address turns to international reactions, the rhetoric is distinctly more aggressive, and the details of the memories used become even more specific. This is demonstrated in this extract where Putin draws comparisons to how the events unfolded in Crimea with events in Kosovo:

“As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied it. Why is that? Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and “General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” Crystal clear, as they say. I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official document: the Written Statement of the United States of American of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law.” End quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians,

Ukrainians and Crimean Tartars are not allowed. Again, one wonders why” (putin 2014c).

The questioning of Western actions and statements, and directly addressing official articles from the UN, create a confrontational tone as well as continuing the sense of injustice developed at the beginning of the speech. In addition, by using the memory of events in Kosovo as a point for comparison rather than any other state. The memory is contextually specific to the region as well as a former Soviet republic; a link is then created with the beginning of the speech and the discussion of the shared struggles and histories, to another regional ex-Soviet partner’s battle for independence. As Putin states, Kosovo’s calls for independence were accepted yet Crimea’s is contested. Having used a regionally relevant and more detailed description to exemplify why Russian action in Crimea should be supported, the confrontational and aggressive rhetoric does temporarily subside when Putin appeals for a European understanding of the situation:

“I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity” (Putin 2014c)

By once again relating the Crimean situation to a supposedly similar case, the reunification of Germany puts the 'struggle' into a wider context. However, by following the more descriptive account of Kosovo with the example of Germany, the less detailed and challenging tone is relied upon to build on the emotional capital established earlier. By calling for understanding and attempts to reason with Europe, the feeling of injustice first established at the beginning of the speech is added to. Putin is essentially arguing then, that if the independence efforts of a country in recent memory and from outside the region can successfully be reunited despite supposed objection to the matter, so too can Russia and Crimea.

What my analysis identifies then, is a pattern in the structuring of the use of collective memories and histories, a pattern which is repeated across all the speeches. Arguments using temporal references are typically structured as opening with the description of a history or memory, followed by a policy or action, a justification of this action, and finishing with further emotional appeal. Though there are consistencies in the patterns of structuring the use of histories and memories, the specific histories and memories used and how they are described varies depending on whether the action or policy is of domestic or foreign concern. Foreign actions, be it Russian actions abroad or the actions of a foreign actor, exclusively use contemporary collective memories and occasionally Soviet references. In addition, speeches on foreign actions and policies used more specific details when describing the memories, rather than general references or insinuations like with the use of ancient collective histories. The use of more aggressive and anger-inducing language to describe the aesthetics, and rhetorical devices such as directly questioning the actions of the West, contributed to the development of a strong, negative emotional capital. However

domestic topics saw a greater use of ancient histories, and the aesthetics of these were distinctly more positive in their descriptions. The histories acted as a positive reinforcement for supporting any issues or policies of sovereignty and national consciousness. The building of emotional capital, therefore, relied upon the contrast between ancient historical legacy and contemporary events – modern actions were disrupting the ancient history of Russia’s sovereignty. This creates a sense of loss but also desire for Russia to successfully continue to maintain its heritage, so having been persuaded of this in the opening statements of the speech, a strong emotional capital is garnered and acts as a support-base for the rest of the speech.

USE OF SOVIET REFERENCES

As the most predictable theme to emerge from my research, the use of Soviet histories and memories was present in all the speeches analysed. Putin is well known for his use of Soviet references in his speeches, as discussed previously in the literature review, but by applying my theoretical framework and assessing how the memories and histories are used, I still hope to contribute to this existing debate. I will be focusing on the references to Soviet history used in the Valdai International Discussion Club plenaries 2013 and 2014 because their choices of histories and their uses are interesting when considering the speech circumstances for these speeches, and the international reactions they received. The Valdai Discussion Club “*aims to promote dialogue of Russian and international intellectual elites and to deliver independent objective scholarly analysis of political, economic, and social developments in Russia and the world*” (www.valdaiclub.com) through a series of programmes across various regions worldwide, and holds annual meetings which President Putin has attended each year. Despite the international audience, this hasn’t stopped pro-

Russian/anti-Western sentiments being made in Putin's speeches, most notably in 2014 when Western journalists interpreted his speech, titled "*The World Order: New Rules or a Game without Rules*", as accusing the United States of disrupting the world order and being the cause for global chaos (Buckley 2014). An international stage is an interesting choice then, for Russia and Putin's complicated relationship with the Soviet past to be projected.

The complex and contradictory relationship is demonstrated in these extracts from the Valdai Discussion 2013, whose theme is on "*Russia's Diversity in a Modern World*":

"For us (and I am talking about Russians and Russia), questions about who we are and who we want to be are increasingly prominent in our society. We have left behind Soviet ideology, and there will be no return. Proponents of fundamental conservatism who idealise pre-1917 Russia seem to be similarly far from reality, as are supporters of an extreme, western-style liberalism. It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination. Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor we will succeed in global competitions. Today their main focuses are economic-technological and ideological-informational. Military-political problems and general conditions are worsening. The world is becoming rigid, and sometimes forgoes not merely international law, but also basic democracy" (Putin 2013b).

In this first extract, Putin clearly and directly states there will be no returning to Soviet ideology but also that those whose political persuasions are in line with pre-Soviet or western ideas were not favourable for Russia either. Describing the alternative political

ideologies as “*far from reality*” and “*extreme*” suggests Putin deems them inappropriate for Russia to adopt, however he does not offer any reasoning for why Soviet ideology will not be returned to. By describing the other ideologies, what little comments on Soviet ideology are made are easily forgotten and do not hold much impact; a sense of indifference towards Soviet ideology is suggested. As the speech continues to delve further into the theme of Russia’s evolving national identity, contradictory comments are made to avoiding a return to Soviet politics. Describing Russia’s role in global politics, Putin refers to past significant treaty signings and their impacts, suggesting Russia’s involvement was a determining factor for success:

“This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia’s role in global politics. Our present position has deep historical roots. Russia itself has evolved on the basis of diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage. I want to remind you that the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the agreements made at Yalta in 1945, taken with Russia’s very active participation, secured a lasting peace. Russia’s strength, the strength of a winning nation at those critical junctures, manifested itself as generosity and justice. And let us remember [the Treaty of] Versailles, concluded without Russia’s participation. Many experts, and I absolutely agree with them, believe that Versailles laid the foundation for the Second World War because the Treaty of Versailles was unfair to the German people: it imposed restrictions with which they could not cope, and the course of the next century became clear” (Putin 2013b)

Although Putin isn't referring solely to Soviet histories, he is still attributing peace in Europe to Russia's strength and describes this history as a positive demonstration and example of Russia's global legacy. The use of history here is two-fold: as it acts as supposed evidence for Russia being an integral factor in determining stability and peace in a continually diversifying Europe and modern world, but also begins to subtly build a positive image of Soviet politics by associating it with strength and peace and "*generosity and justice.*" This positive image is then developed further when Putin credits the Soviet success of respecting multiculturalism:

"Over the past centuries in Russia, which some have tried to label as the "prison of nations", not even the smallest ethnic group has disappeared. And they have retained not only their internal autonomy and cultural identity, but also their historical space. You know, I was interested to learn (I did not even know this) that in Soviet times [authorities] paid such careful attention to this that virtually every small ethnic group had its own print publication, support for its language, and for its national literature. We should bring back and take on board much of what has been done in this respect" (Putin 2013b).

Here once again the notion of not returning to Soviet ideas is contradicted by describing the apparent success of the Soviet preservation and protection of other ethnicities and calling for this to be taken on board. By beginning the 2013 plenary with an indifferent reference to Soviet ideology and how it would not be an option for Russia in modern politics, Soviet histories and memories are then used to build a strong, diplomatic image of the period and politics, before suggesting progressive lessons should be learned from past policies.

Throughout the 2013 speech there are no overwhelmingly negative recollections or descriptions of Soviet histories, and little is given away on whether Putin is wanting to condemn or condone past actions; on the one hand, he speaks of Soviet legacies affecting foreign relations, but then speaks of the need to learn and adapt previous policies. The confusion over the purpose of the use of Soviet histories and Putin's stance at Valdai could be reflective of Russia's relationship with its past and how it is still processing it. In addition, because of the lack of clarity in the intentions for the use of collective histories here and the vague descriptions, it is difficult to apply my theoretical framework in this instance.

Looking at the Valdai Discussion Club plenary 2014, this speech also offers mixed interpretations of the Soviet past, though there is a much clearer indication of being in support of Soviet ideas and using Soviet histories to dispute modern governing mechanisms. In the opening discussions of the speech, the theme of *"The World Order: New Rules or a Game without Rules"* is immediately addressed and already the use of Soviet references makes an appearance, giving some indication of viewing the Soviet period in a positive light:

"This system has become seriously weakened, fragmented and deformed. The international and regional political, economic, and cultural cooperation organisations are also going through difficult times. Yes, many of the mechanisms we have for ensuring the world order were created quite a long time ago now, including and above all in the period immediately following World War II. Let me stress that the solidity of the system created back then rested not only on the balance of power and the rights of the victor countries, but on the fact that this system's 'founding fathers' had respect for each other, did not try to put the squeeze on others, but attempted to

reach agreements. The main thing is that this system needs to develop, and despite its various shortcomings, needs to at least be capable of keeping the world's current problems within certain limits and regulating the intensity of the natural competition between countries. It is my conviction that we could not take this mechanism of checks and balances that we built over the last decades, sometimes with such effort and difficulty, and simply tear it apart without building anything in its place. Otherwise we would be left with no instruments other than brute force. What we needed to do was carry out a rational reconstruction and adapt it to the new realities in the system of international relations. But the United States, having declared itself the winner of the Cold War, saw no need for this. Instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential for maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep imbalance. The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called 'victors' in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests. If the existing system of international relations, international law and the checks and balances in place got in the way of these aims, this system was declared worthless, outdated and in need of immediate demolition" (Putin 2014b).

In this opening extract, the Soviet mechanisms for governing world order which were built on the international balance of power at the time is defended, and it is indicated that today has much to learn from it. Putin argues for a reconstruction and adaptation of the Soviet model; by arguing against contemporary frameworks using Soviet memories, Putin is

justifying remembering and reintroducing Soviet structures. The end of the Cold War is used as the turning point for the shift in the global balance of power, indicating that it is considered the period against which subsequent world order systems are measured. Whilst no specific memory is detailed, the comparison and advocating for the adaptation of a similar model to the Soviet mechanisms encourages a nostalgic and idealistic aesthetic of Soviet structures policies, in particular the Cold War.

The Soviet period continues to be an age for comparison, with Putin continuing to argue the lessons to be learnt from the “*models of global management*”, however in this extract the argument takes a much more aggressive tone towards the United States rather than the nostalgic manner used earlier in the speech:

"Today, we are seeing new efforts to fragment the world, draw new dividing lines, put together coalitions not built for something but directed against someone, anyone, create the image of an enemy as was the case during the Cold War years, and obtain the right to this leadership, or diktat if you wish. The situation was presented this way during the Cold War. We all understand and know this. The United States always told its allies: "We have a common enemy, a terrible foe, the centre of evil, and we are defending you, our allies, from this foe, and so we have the right to order you around, force you to sacrifice your political and economic interests and pay your share of the costs for this collective defence, but we will be the ones in charge of it all of course." In short, we see today attempts in anew and changing world to reproduce the familiar models of global management, and all this so as to guarantee their [the US'] exceptional position and reap political and economic

dividends. But these attempts are increasingly divorced from reality and are in contradiction with the world's diversity. Steps of this kind inevitably create confrontation and countermeasures and have the opposite effect to the hoped-for goals. We see what happens when politics rashly starts meddling in the economy and the logic of rational decisions gives way to the logic of confrontation that only hurts one's own economic positions and interests, including national business interests" (Putin 2014b).

Not only is this directly challenging towards the United States and its conduct during and after the Cold War in regards to establishing these "*models of global management*", but the use and description of Soviet memory here is different to earlier uses. The increased use of inclusive personal pronouns when describing the memory involves the audience more so than in earlier descriptions, whilst the characterisation of American actions during the Cold War period mocks the United States. The Soviet reference here is used to lead into Putin's criticisms and perceptions of current global politics, building a negative image of the United States and its role in past and current political frays, and setting up an anti-American tone for when he goes on to address the sanctions on Russia. Again though, it is difficult to apply my theoretical framework to these uses of Soviet memory and history because of how little description and detail is offered. The use of Soviet references in both the Valdai plenaries have acted as building blocks in a wider anti-American or Soviet-policy-recycling rhetoric, but have not directly contributed to the development of any emotional capital.

CONCLUSION

To conclude my dissertation, I shall answer my initial research questions and offer further concluding remarks on what I have found during my research, as well as consider the scope for further research.

Looking at which memories and histories were used and the emotions attached to them, these varied depending on the agendas of the speeches. Unsurprisingly, the use of Soviet memories occurred in all the speeches analysed, but it was the aesthetics and functions of these memories that were interesting. In the same speech, there would be conflicting emotions surrounding the descriptions of the Soviet memories. On the one hand there were efforts and desires to shake off any Soviet legacies, but on the other hand suggestions for the revival of Soviet policies were also made, so the aesthetics and purposes of any Soviet memories used were often conflicted emotionally and instrumentally.

The use of histories and memories also varied depending on whether a domestic or foreign action was being justified. Foreign actions were exclusively justified using contemporary collective memories and occasionally Soviet references, whilst domestic and regional policies and actions used older, ancient histories. Usually, speeches which directly confronted the West developed the strongest capital, with the most common 'currency' for emotional capital being anger. Although there was variation in the use of memories, a consistent pattern of use emerged, typically structured by opening with the description of a

history or memory, followed by a policy or action, a justification of this action, and finishing with further emotional appeal

When applying my theoretical framework of emotional capital, the development of capital was greatest when Soviet and contemporary memories were used. These memories tended to have the most details when described, and had the most emotive descriptors which significantly contributed to the development of emotional capital. The way these memories either explicitly or implicitly expressed emotional states determined how effectively the capital was generated. However, because of the varied use of collective memories and histories, and the degree of detail used in describing them, it did prove difficult to create a stronger basis in supporting my theoretical framework. In addition, there were instances when Putin would tell the audience how they felt about memory, rather than use language to incite emotion. It would have perhaps been of greater benefit to focus on speeches which immediately followed significant events to Russia, such as Moscow bombings 2010 or the conclusion of the Russo-Georgian War 2008.

In exploring the question of how Putin describes memories and histories, the level of detail used in describing the memories varied across all the speeches. There was a trend between the tone of the argument and the level of detail; the more aggressive the tone of the speech was, the more detailed the account or aesthetic of the memories and histories used. In addition, the purpose for the use of a memory or history determined their aesthetics. If the memory was being used as a negative justification, the memories were distinctly more detailed and there was a greater use of emotional semantics. In addition, when collective memories or histories which may seem otherwise indirect or impersonal were used,

personal anecdotes and exclusive personal pronouns were rarely used, whilst phrases such as “*we remember*” and “*we know this*” were planted in the midst of a description in order to include the audience and make it feel more immediate and inclusive.

Considering the scope and significance following my research, whilst it was not the most successful execution of my theoretical framework, where it did work well was on speeches following events of greater significance e.g. the address following the annexation of Crimea. This suggests that my theoretical framework is contextually reliant as well as linguistically, but through further research the framework can become more sophisticated, and prove its application on other political actors other than Vladimir Putin. In addition, further research could explore how effective the use of emotional capital was at ground level, or whether the extent of state involvement in the commemoration and production of memory has effected the way the audiences interact with the speeches.

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