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JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKOW
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES



UNIVERSITY
of
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Democratization and Securitization
the ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine
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By Andrea Castagna
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Dr hab. Jacek Kołodzie
and Dr. Ammon Cheskin
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the acts of securitization on the process of democratization and it uses as case study the ban of the Russian channels in the post-Maidan Ukraine. By referring to these two concepts, the thesis explores the construction of the Ukrainian public discourse in relation to the issue of the Russian channels. Using a process tracing theory testing, the paper also analyses the concrete effects of the ban of Russian channels on the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine. The result is that Ukrainian securitization in the media sphere has little or no effects on Ukrainian democratization. Indeed, despite the assertions in its public discourse on national security, my thesis claims that Ukraine did not develop a more democratic and transparent media environment.

1. Introduction and Theoretical Sections

In this chapter, I will outline the researching context by providing a description of the issue of the ban of the Russian Channels in Ukraine. I will then present some characteristics of securitization theories with a focus on the development of security. I will then describe Russian media shaping power and give some examples of media aggression and propaganda within the context of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

1. Background

For more than two years, Ukraine has undergone a process of transformation from a semi-authoritarian regime that some scholars call “consolidation of democracy” or “democratization” (Schedler, 1998 p.91-92, Przeworski, 2003). Following the departure of President Viktor Yanukovich, many improvements in political pluralism, parliamentary elections, and government transparency took place in the country. EuroMaidan revolution in 2013-2014 has certainly opened the door to the flourishing of new political and civic activity in Ukraine. (Kuzio, 2016, p.498) Yet, Ukrainian specific pattern of democratization has been deeply wrecked by many factors (Kuzio 2016, p.499).

The outcome of such democratic consolidation is then not free of concerns. Since 2014 Ukraine has shown impetus to democratize and develop more democratic institutions. However, today the country’s goal of establishing a solid democracy is far from accomplished. Indeed, Ukraine is currently involved in a conflict with the Russian-backed military forces in the Donbas and Lugansk regions and such situation has certainly shaped the process of democratization. While the civil society has constantly demanded for democratic reforms, Ukraine is dealing with the military and financial implication of the external Russian aggression. Therefore, within Ukraine there is a unique political context in which two divergent processes co-exist and influence each other: the military response to the Russian aggression and democratization.

One of the key elements of this reciprocal influence, as I suggested, is the role of media and its impact on ordinary people’s lives. Despite the improvements in political pluralism and parliamentary elections, considerable problems persisted in the Ukrainian media sphere and very few studies have analysed the possible correlation between media and democratization in Ukraine after the break up of the conflict. Moreover, in a war time, the media play a vital role in the national security (Nye 2008, p.11), Within the context of Ukraine, Russian media certainly poses a security threat to Ukrainian

statehood because of the military conflict in the East. But it also poses a threat in relation to the democratization process. According to the Russian military doctrine, a disinformation campaign can be used to “disorganize and demoralize” the enemy to erode public faith in democratic and state institutions (Council of Europe, 2015) It is then not surprising that Ukrainian security policy is aimed at protecting its citizens from the Russian disinformation campaigns.

The most intrusive solution adopted by Ukraine to protect its media landscape was the ban of 14 Russian television channels from the state’s cable networks in 2014. The shut-down channels included: First Channel, Worldwide Network (Первый канал. Всемирная сеть), RTR-Planet (РТР-Планета), NTV-World (НТВ- Мир), Russia-24 (Россия-24), TVCI and RBKTV (РБК-ТВ). Providers were forbidden from transmitting another nine channels: Russia-1 (Россия-1), NTV (НТВ), TNT (ТНТ), Petersburg-5 (Петербург-5), Start (Звезда), REN-TV (РЕН-ТВ), Life News, Russia Today and History (История). Ukrainian Minister of Internal affairs and the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB) accused Russia of “broadcasting propaganda of war and violence” and stressed that “as an independent sovereign state, Ukraine [...] should protect its media space from aggression from Russia, which has been deliberately inciting hatred and discord among Ukrainian citizens” (Reuters, 2014). In other words, the orders to suspend the retransmission of certain Russian channels were motivated by a perceived threat for the national security within Ukraine. Hence, the ban of the Russian channels raised fundamental questions on the role of media in a process of democratization. The paradox of the Ukrainian democratization case lies thus in the fact that unlimited freedom of media in the Ukrainian context might represent a threat not only for the national security but also for democratization per se. In other words, the ban of the 14 Russian channels cannot be seen as traditional act of censorship but, on the contrary, it could paradoxically imply a way to consolidate Ukrainian specific pattern of democratization.

The mixed reactions to the ban are also a consequence of the Ukrainian democratization paradox. On one hand, the biggest Ukrainian political parties representing the Ukrainian citizens as well as the Council of the EU supported the law that banned the Russian channels. However, many observers have raised the issue of censorship. Russian Foreign Ministry openly accused Ukraine for not respecting the freedom of speech and the international community of ignoring “such manifestations of censorship”. OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović claimed that “banning broadcasts is one of the most extreme forms of interference in media freedom” and Ukrainian citizens “must have the right to receive all available information, irrespective of its source, without interference from the authorities and regardless of frontiers” (OSCE, 2014). Ukrainian Centre

for Democracy and Rule of Law, which is considered one of the most influential think-tanks in Ukraine, addressed the ban as a violation of the freedom of speech and asked the president Poroshenko to withdraw the law (CEDEM, 2014).

Hence, it exists a specific issue concerning the freedom of information and the ban of Russian channels in Ukraine. On the one hand, the process of democratic consolidation implies freedom of information and therefore the development of a more transparent and pluralistic media environment. In this context, media restrictions are a potential challenge to the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy. On the other hand, Russian media, as claimed in the Ukrainian public discourse, can pose a security threat to Ukrainian statehood and therefore to the process of democratization. Indeed, Russian media, as claimed in the following sections, are produced in a specific non-democratic environment and they might be detrimental for the Ukrainian statehood.

My thesis aimed thus at exploring the Ukrainian security and democratic dilemma since the ban of the Russian channels represents a *sui generis* event in the Ukrainian recent history. Indeed, for many years Ukraine did not consider the presence of the Russian channels as a security issue. However, before, during and after the breakout of the conflict in the eastern Ukraine, not only have Russian TV contents become a matter of security, but the Ukrainian government implemented extraordinary measures to stop Russian broadcasting in Ukraine. Certainly, security is one of the most important concepts in modern day politics. However, when political actors say that an issue is of vital importance to the national security, they declare the issue to be essential to its survival and different actions can be taken to respond to the specific issue. In other words, the specific issue is securitized in order to more promptly implement extraordinary measures to deal with it (Buzan et al., 1998, 121–2). Therefore, the ban of the Russian channels is not only an act of media control as such. In fact, it is the visible result of responding measures to a threat which became a matter of national security. This aspect which is one of key point of the theory securitization as it is explained in the chapter 3. Moreover, in the case of Ukraine, the act of securitization of the media sphere also have an impact on the process of democratization since the freedom of the media and information are two fundamental elements in every democratic system.

2. Media control and freedom of information

Freedom of information, defined as the freedom to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” has received special attention in the last few years in the context of Ukrainian democratization. However, only few scholars have analysed the relation

between freedom of information and national security as part of the Ukrainian democratization process.

Despite freedom of information is a fundamental human right recognized by the international law, all forms of public communication are subject to an element of state regulation and every country exercises control over broadcasting (Street, 2005). In liberal democracies, this controlling activity is generally indirect since regulations and controls activity are made in the interest of the people (Street, 2005).

However, different tools have been created to protect the government's regulation over media (Waisbord and Nancy, 2001). Censorship is still probably the most obvious and intrusive form of state control. It is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as "the suppression or prohibition of any parts of books, films, news, etc. that are considered obscene, politically unacceptable, or a threat to security" and in liberal democracies is adopted only in extreme circumstances. On the contrary, authoritarian political systems often influence the cultural life of their citizens through the suppression of free speech and censorship. By banning television, cinema and music, the state power can control information in order to silence the political opposition, damage social or national unity or avoid the spread of news (Waisbord and Nancy, 2001). While media controlling strategies are generally defensive, they can also shape contents in order to facilitate the regime survival (Waisbord and Nancy, 2001). Indeed, state censorship can take a variety of forms (institutionalized, informal, self-censorship) and it does not necessarily require a direct intervention of central actors. However, while acts of censorship may be indirect or self-induced, they are always the result of a political decision aimed at facilitating the endurance of a political system.

Moreover, acts of censorship and media banning are not confined to non-liberal states but they can take place in different context, including semi-democratic regimes, autarchies and consolidated democracies. In post-Soviet Russia Boris Yeltsin was known to deeply control national television stations, despite laws protecting freedom of speech (Becker, 2004, p.141). Moreover, during the first years of his presidency Yeltsin promoted freedom of press, after the first Chechen war press legislation became much more restrictive over time and this is a trend that Putin continued and secured (C.Jackson, 2016, p.354-360). In the UK, the coverage of Northern Ireland and terrorism has been strictly regulated (Curtis, 1998 p.12). Thus, state security can provide an excuse for censorship and strict regulations, especially when a country has undergone a stressful process of transformation or it is facing a threat for the national security (Street, 2005).

It is important to note that media restriction can occur because since media is not only be a tool for informing and educating the public. Indeed, media are a key element for state actors because they can

shape public debate on security policy as well as decision-making process. Therefore, the relationship between media and policy-makers are often complicated because governments and public officials may be interested in delaying or blocking the information provided by media (Strömberg, 2015, p.194-200; A.Robertson, 2015, p.120-126). However, in democracies, this kind of actions has an impact on the entire system. According to Gunther and Mughan's notion of procedural democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 2000, p.420-423), there is a relationship between citizens and elected officials based on specific procedures and practises. In a democratic system, political actors compete with each other in order to get the electoral support of citizens which indirectly participate to politics (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 80-85). From this perspective, media have a key role in democracies because it is the responsibility of a media system to provide information to the citizens in order to participate in processes of governance (Becker, 2004, p.7-9). Therefore, in democracies it is the media's responsibility to increase the opportunities for citizens to make political decisions and create an informed public opinion capable to critically evaluate elected representatives (Gunther and Mughan, 2000 p.423). According to normative democratic theory, the population must have access to the media and there must be a significant degree of pluralism in all media, either internal or external (Becker, 2004, p.7-9; Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 4-5). In addition, media should reflect different ideologies and views and they must not be under the control of the state nor under the control of a limited number of private owners (Gunther and Mughan, 2000 p. 421-423).

Hence, in consolidated democracy acts of censorships and media control are balanced with the so called "functional scope of media" which is defined as the result of the informing role of media (Becker, 2004, p.10; Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 5). In other words, the relationship between citizens and elected official makes it extremely complicated to have a full influence over media and therefore a certain degree of pluralism is often guaranteed. On the contrary, in non-democratic countries censorship and restrictive legislative procedures are relatively easy to implement (Strömberg, 2015, p.194-200) and they can be combined with other media shaping acts such as propaganda and media domination as well (Garth S. Jowett, and Victoria O'Donnell, 2015, p.389-399)

Therefore, in consolidated democratic states the informing role of free media cannot be simply ignored because it marks the difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes (Gunther and Mughan, 2000 p.422). Nevertheless, both in democratic and non-democratic systems media's informing role can influence the political decisions in the field of security. As it will be shown in the section 1.3, media can promote the speech acts of the securitization actors and sometimes shift them to a higher level (Dolinec, 2010, p. 14-15).

Concerning the role of media in a society, it is important to note that media are not isolated entities. Indeed, they are always influenced by several factors. Firstly, media are often part of a bigger economic structures. Thus, on paper the mission of media is always to inform and provide communication but in reality, in free-market country media (including state owned) are always subject to market regulation and business practices. Media economic dimension is not a prejudice to the democratic scope of media per se. But as in the case of Ukraine, as it will be show in the sections 2.2 and 2.3, media can be an instrument of controlling and promoting political and financial interests among a targeting audience (Minakov, 2016, p.3). In such context, the media's role is not simply to educate or inform citizens but also reinforce the elites' consensus (Minakov, 2016, p.4).

Secondly, media are closely associated with the concept of "soft power". Scholars have defined soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion" (Nye 2008, p.94). Yet, soft power can be inadequate to capture the complexity of state relations in terms of media influence. (Szostek, 2014, p.463). According to Nye (2008, p.100-101) modern governments compete for credibility not only with other governments but with a broad range of alternatives including news media and information companies. In foreign policy, media are particularly relevant because of their capacity to transmit messages and frame issues. It is not surprising that soft power and influencing policies can be "produced" by a country investing in broadcasting and public diplomacy such as in the cases of Al Jazeera in the Arabic speaking countries or Russian channels in the near abroad (Szostek, 2014, p.465-470). In such way, the soft power of a country is understood as a mean lying on three different resources: cultural aspects, political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2008, p.97). This understanding of soft power is extremely state-centric since media are seen as a tool to persuade subjects and to change people's values and priorities within national communities (Nye, 2008, p.97-98). In other words, in some cases government can intentionally influence or control media (both private and public) in order to reach specific political goals. Therefore, media are often used as a source of soft power due to their capacity to influence the relational power between states. (Nye, 2008, p.97) and become part of a broader national strategy aimed at influencing a specific target of people (Section 1.3) (Szostek, 2014, p.466). Moreover, as the next section shows, media might have an important impact on acts of securitization as well.

3. Securitization as a theory and the definition of security

The concept of security in the theory of international relations has predominantly been used in social science in reference to the nation state. National security is then understood as the security of the state (Wæver, 1996, p.104). This perspective goes hand in hand with the idea that security is always

characterized by a social dimension. In other words, it is impossible to describe national security without acknowledging its broader social frame. Moreover, security itself does not have an independent meaning but it needs to be associated with a referent object that is threatened and endorse emergency measures to alleviate the threat. (Wæver, 1996, p.105; Watson, 2011, p.5). Therefore, national security is only an aspect of the broader concept of security.

This sociological view on security has been the core of the Copenhagen school of securitization. In line with constructivists theorists, the members of Copenhagen school of securitization claim that security does not have an objective dimension but it is rather a process marked by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with sufficient saliency to have visible political effects (Watson, 2011, p.2; McSweeney, 1996 p.83). While the traditional idea of national security was often associated with military strength, security cannot be reduced to the military sector but it needs to refer to the political, economic, societal and environmental spheres. Indeed, the Copenhagen school stresses the idea that political actors can use and implement extraordinary measures in response of many issues by drawing on the discourse of security within different sector. Therefore, security does not exist per se, but it is always related to a threat since it has a discursive dimension that may be used to implement emergency policies.

It is also important to note that despite national security is traditionally the most used term in security studies, different forms of security revolve around claims about referent objects and their existential character (Watson, 2011, p.5-6). For instance, a security action can take place on behalf of or with reference to the concept of identity (Buzan et Al., 1998: 121–2). During the Cold War, the issue of the mutually assured destruction made scholars and intellectual to recognize humankind as a security referent object by creating the concept of human security. Another distinct form of security is humanitarian security that it is organized around the concept of human life and dignity (Watson, 2011, p.7) and it is particularly relevant in the context of the humanitarian intervention. Other kinds of security different from national security are then possible because of the existence of much wider scope of security threats in relation with the characteristics of particular referent object.

Through the theories of the Copenhagen School, one can claim that security is a process of social construction of threats. This act is called by social scientist securitization. By stating that a specific referent object is threatened in its existence, one (or more) securitizing actor claims the right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. In such way, the issue related to the referent object is removed from the sphere of normal politics and it becomes subject of emergency policies (Buzan, et Al., 1998, p. 29-33). Securitization studies aims also to understand the securitizing actor within a process of securitization. The securitizing actor is that who puts forward a claim to securitize an issue and the success of its attempt depends on its capacity to legitimate its claim as

matter of security. (Charrett, 2009, p. 24-27). Although, the Copenhagen School has explored many ways to define securitizing actors, state elite orientation remained of the most popular focus since discourse about security are often dominated by national elites (Charrett, 2009, p. 24; Buzan et Al., 1998, p. 33-34.) Thus, national security is still one of the most used concept among security studies. However, its dimension in securitization theories includes not only the military strength but also factors such as the referent objects and securitizing actors.

Moreover, securitization theorists claim that each securitization act needs to persuade a specific target to accept a specific issue as a security threat. The process of securitization, to be successful, must be accepted by a target audience. In such way, the actor's claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it. Nonetheless, acts of securitization can lead to further development in different sphere such as democratic consolidation. (Buzan et Al., 1998, p. 27-31.)

In my thesis, I claim that the ban of Russian channels in 2014 was an example of securitization of media sphere. According to Ukrainian public discourse, since Russian media exerted a considerable influence in Ukraine within the context of a hybrid war, the securitization of the media was aimed to implement extraordinary measure in the media in order to guarantee a certain level of information security. Indeed, the restriction of the freedom of information is an extraordinary measure taken by Ukraine in response to the external aggression of the Russian Federation. As mentioned before, what makes the Ukrainian case particularly interesting is the fact that Ukraine is not only implementing extraordinary security measures, but it is also trying to develop more democratic state structures. I then argue that in 2014 Ukraine was following two different and to some extent opposite paths: a process of democratic consolidation (that requires the development of free media) and securitization of media (which imply more control of media). The interaction between these two processes is the direct result of the paradox described before (Section 1.1). Hence, it is not easy to identify the referent object of the Ukrainian act of securitization since the two phenomena have certainly influenced each other. Generally, Copenhagen School's theorists recognize four different sectors as referent object. They are political sector, military sector, economic sector and environmental sector. What all of them have in common is that each of them must be designated as facing 'an existential threat requiring emergency action/special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience' (Buzan et Al., 1998, p. 27-28; Wilkinson, 2007, p. 11-12). Therefore, a referent object exists as such only in relation to a perceived threat which in the Ukrainian case is associated with the Russian aggression.

Also in securitization theories, security is not only an objective condition but the outcome of a specific social process. This process happens through the so-called securitizing speech acts. Theorists have defined speech acts as the process of message framing made by securitizing actors (representative of a power) within a process of securitization (Buzan et Al., 1998, p. 29-30). Speech acts do not create securitization as such, but they are rather securitizing move (Buzan et Al., 1998, p. 30). A securitizing actor might thus initiate a securitizing move, issuing some facts or events as existentially threatening through several speech acts. The securitizing move is successful and the issue can effectively be securitized only if an audience accepts this issue as such. (Norelius, 2015, p. 27-32).

One of the major issue concerning Copenhagen's theory of securitization is the conceptualization of the understanding of security. While the concept of security is ultimately constructed through representations made by relevant social and political actors, security is understood in different contexts and by different actors (McDonald, 2008, p.4). However, Copenhagen's theorists often define security as a "speech act with Securitization referring to that form of linguistic representation that positioned a particular issue as an existential threat (McDonald, 2008, p.5)". This approach ignores the central importance of the way in which security is understood and perceived in specific contexts. Indeed, the classic securitization theory claims that security acquires content only through representations of danger and threat. In the Securitization framework, thus the study of security is ultimately the study of the designation of threat which makes the definition of security narrow and limited to a speech act. On the contrary, other scholars such as McDonald (2008) or Roxanne Lynn Doty (2007) argue that effective securitization policies go beyond a generic construction of threat but they also change the perception of the threat among the people living in a given context. In facts, also images and material practices can contribute to the development of the concept of security (McDonald, 2008, p.564). For examples, bureaucratic practices or physical actions (which are not 'traditional' speech acts' according to Copenhagen theory) can also be are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed (McDonald, 2008, p.27). Therefore, security is not only the outcome of a specific speech act, but it is also the wider result of a securitization policy implying construction of a threat, physical actions and target audience's feedback. Consequently, securitization is a productive process focusing on the performative power of the speech act which makes the construction of security inter-subjectively constituted (McDonald, 2008, p.28).

At the state level, a successful act of securitization can lead to a new security strategy or, as in the case of the 9/11, to a military intervention (McDonald, 2008, p. 562). Indeed, US and British elites'

justification of the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq is one of the most studied case of securitization. In such case, American and British elites reacted to the 9/11 attacks by identifying international terrorism as a threat for both the national and the international community. In such way, the War on Terrorism was developed not just as an event related to the American national securitisation, but also as a macrosecuritisation process with the whole of the so called 'civilized' world (mainly western countries) and its principles of freedom, democracy, the market and openness as the referent object (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p.273-274). In such cases, security is conceptualized in terms of core values which need to be protected or as normative goals that should be reached in order to improve the sense of security (Roxanne Lynn Doty, 2007, p.10; McDonald, 2008, p. 562).

As this example shows, in successful securitization processes various factors play an important role. As Securitization is often initiated by a speech act, it is often facilitated by internal or linguistic factors and by external or contextual factors (Charrett, 2009, p.13). Nonetheless the social capital of the speaker and the nature of the threat can influence the outcome of securitization as well (Buzan and al., 1998, p. 33-35).

The ultimate goal securitization studies aim "to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)" (Buzan and Al., 1998, p. 33). However, since the perception of security is not only limited to the speech acts, the context in which securitization is taking place is also important. Indeed, securitization as performative act can impact on different process and therefore each act of securitization needs to be analysed within the historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place.

4. Russian media shaping power

The narratives by which Russia portrays itself position in Ukraine and in the international arena are inextricably linked to the grand nation-building mission that has been significantly intensified after Putin's second mandate. (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211) Unlike other post-Soviet nations such as Ukraine, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's long history as the core of a larger, imperial entity ended abruptly and it was left with no clear sense of its 'natural' boundaries and basis for 'belonging', or of its key national myths (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). Therefore, it is not surprising that anti-westernism has dramatically defined Russia's media position on the Maidan and the post-Yanukovich Ukraine.

Indeed, in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, Russia claim that the ability to project narratives to foreign audiences was considered a matter of national security. The Kremlin declared that it must 'create instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the world' and 'develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad' (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). This idea Russia owns a "near abroad" was thus connected with a specific internal/external dimension of Russia which considers the former soviet-republics as an extensions of Russia's geographical boundaries. Obviously, this perception dramatically shaped the Russian media development, particularly during Putin's presidency. While, critical and free voices were increasingly shouted down within Russia's domestic media environment, State control over news on the main television channels such as Channel 1, NTV or Rossiya 1 dramatically increased (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). As result, the Kremlin became able to portrait more effectively its narratives in the "near abroad", including Ukraine. Indeed, Gerber and Zavisca (2017) noticed that Russian narratives come from official statements and they spread through government-controlled Russian mass media and they are directed at both domestic and international audiences. Domestically, they legitimize Putin's policy in order to gain more political support. Internationally, they are part of a larger strategy to increase "Russian "soft power," sow doubts and uncertainty within the NATO alliance, weaken public support for policies countering Russian aggression in Ukraine, and solidify the allegiances of Russia's allies in former Soviet republics whom Russia considers part of its natural sphere of influence" (Gerber and Zavisca, 2017).

In particular, after Yanukovich refused to sign the association agreement and the Maidan took place anti-western narratives became a salient feature of Russian political and media discourse portrayed in the near abroad (Smyth and Soboleva, 2014, pp. 257-275). Generally, Russian narratives not only attribute negative features such as hypocrisy and lack of morality to the US and the European Union but they closely associate their action with several negative economic and social outcomes in countries like Ukraine, Georgia or the Baltic States. This tendency aimed at legitimising Russian behaviour in the eyes of the public and defend a perceived Russia's self-identity as "real Europe" (Yablokov, 2014, pp. 622-625). The Russian TV channels frequently mocks European and American leaders and officials for their lack of understanding and for making foolish errors (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). Particularly, the EU countries were portrayed as being controlled or manipulated by malign American influence and these narratives were observed throughout all the Russian media which are aligned with the state, particularly state-owned federal channels (Yablokov, 2014, pp. 622-625).

On the contrary, the Russia Federation was always portrayed as a global standard bearer for 'traditional values' against the Western lack of morality and American imperialism (Wilczewska and

Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211.. During the Maidan Russian TV channels increasingly use words such as ‘compatriots’ or ‘ethnic Russians’ to indicate those who were opposing firstly to the Maidan and later to Poroshenko’s government (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). Russian News broadcasts such as Novosti, constantly gave sympathetic treatment to demonstrations throughout Ukraine and called to reinforce the resistance of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in Crimea and Donbass (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). The constant use of these terms in Media reflects a ethnicization strategy of the national identity aimed at delegitimizing not only the image of Ukraine, but also the concept of Ukrainian identity as well (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). Therefore, the concept of “Ukraine” in the Russian media discourse was either associated with a perceived post-soviet brotherhood or framed in a negative sense.

The key element of this strategy was the use of propaganda and fake news to delegitimize the Maidan, Ukrainian army and Poroshenko’s government. Timothy Snyder (2016) observed that Russian propaganda about the Ukrainian crisis was based on two themes. Firstly that Ukrainian revolutionaries were fascists or in the hand of the west and secondly that the Ukrainian crisis was a geopolitical struggle between Russia and the United States.

During the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian TV channels consistently portrayed Euromaidan as being controlled by "ultranationalist", "fascist" or "neo-Nazi", groups. The revolution was shown as a violent and illegitimate coup d’état which was facilitated by the west to overthrow Yanukovich’s government (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). Such claim aimed at presenting the political changes as something not entirely Ukrainian and therefore illegitimate. Moreover, after the breakout of the conflict the Ukrainian army started to be targeted too. For example, in 2014 different Russian TV channels reported that the Ukrainian military batalion, composed of anti-Christian fascists, had crucified a small child after assembling the entire town in Lenin Square to watch. After that, the child’s mother was allegedly dragged to her death behind a tank (Haigh, Haigh and Kozak, 2017, p.1-27). In such way, the military operations of Ukraine were presented by Russian TV channels as illegitimate and against the interest of Russian speakers, ethnic Russians but also Ukrainians (Haigh, Haigh and Kozak, 2017, p.1-27). It is important to note that this use of media narratives is not only an endorsement of Russia’s military campaign, but a crucial part of it. Indeed, Russia aims at fighting a new kind of “hybrid warfare,” or “postmodern warfare,” in which military actions, propaganda, political activity, and online campaigns are seamlessly combined (Mitrokhin, 2015, p.219-249; Haigh, Haigh and Kozak, 2017, p.1-27). In this context, media and tv channels are thus a fundamental part of the war affaire because they can shape the general context of the conflict. In the case of Ukraine, thus, the Russian channels not only questioned the legitimacy of the Euromaidan and the

new elected government (Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2016, p.195-211). They were also a tool to shape the perception of Ukraine as a state, both internally and externally. As consequence, they represented a huge threat especially for the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine.

2. Context and related issues

Having defined the basic characteristics of Securitization theory in the chapter one, in this chapter I will first examine the relation between securitization and democratization. I will then focus on the specific Ukrainian context through the review of the literature. Lastly, I will provide an explanation about the massive presence of the Russian media content in Ukraine before 2014.

1. Securitization and democratization

In this thesis, I claim that the securitization of the media sphere in Ukraine might have a positive impact on the specific process of democratization in Ukraine. The idea that securitization can reinforce democratization is not new and it has been used several times in analysing post-communist cases (Williams, 2005; A.M. Stefan, 2009). Despite no or a few attempts have tried to analysis how the securitization of the media sphere can sustain democratization, some scholars have focused on the relations between securitization and democratization or security and democracy. In addition, different theories have focused on the empirical connection between democracy and different forms of security as well.

Providing security has always been one of the key functions of a state authority. In the name of the security of their citizens state actors have always taken measures against essential threats to individual as well as collective life (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006). Nonetheless, in the Western discourse “security” and “democracy” have been often treated as antonyms (Moss, 2011, p.13). But ‘security’ originally means only safety from danger and all kinds of serious material or immaterial damage (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006). The antinomy democracy-security has indeed emerged only after the last century of civil wars, infringements of minority rights, totalitarian dictatorships (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006).

However, since a democracy is a system of government, it is then clear that security does not represent a threat for democracy. Moreover, any form of security is characterized by a social dimension which have an impact on its perception. (Watson, 2011, p.3). In other words, security does not have a clear objective dimension but it is the result of a social interaction based on people’s perception of threat and acts of securitization. (Watson, 2011, p.2-4; McSweeney, 1996 p.83). Hence, the antinomy between democracies and security needs to be replaced since democracies guarantee both transparent acts of securitization and a better perception of security (Moss, 2011, p.13-14). For instance, democracies are well known to provide some forms of security (territorial security, social security or

financial security) more efficiently than other forms of governments due to the institutional capacity of democratic system to securitize different issues. (Mulligan, Gil and Martin, 2002).

Yet, democracy is deeply connected with political security, including national security as well. In particular, when a democracy fails to provide national security, the capacity of democratic systems can be compromised (Mulligan, Gill and Martin, 2002). Empirical evidences suggest that if violence interacts with democratic institutions, citizens react by withdrawing from public spaces, accepting the authority of non-state actors, or supporting hard-line responses (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Because of that, democracies are thus more prone to explore non-violent solutions to solve international crisis and they more rarely engage in war (Doyle, 1983). According to democratic peace theory, democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict and the state of peace is more easily sustained between democratic nations (Doyle, 1983). Hence, in consolidated democratic nations state-sponsored violence is rare and national security vis-à-vis externa and internal threat more effective.

Also, according to democratic peace theory, since democracy provides different forms of security better than other regimes, the more reliable path to stable and democratic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). A successful democratic change within a state ensures a stronger effect in terms of consolidating political institutions (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011) and makes the country more secure in terms of civil war, state-sponsored violence and international conflict (Hegre, 2001; Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). As result, transitional systems can securitize themselves in order to provide stability and national security, as the following parts of this section will explain.

However, the process of democratization can quite often have a negative outcome and a country can fail to democratise. For example, there are many cases of failed democratization when political actors failed to fulfil expectations in terms of security (see section 1.2). In particular, the transition from an illiberal democracy to a full democracy have a high risk of civil conflict (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Also, there are more difficulties when Democratization is taking place after a war or a prolonged period of authoritarian government (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). These legacies may limit the impact of the democratic change and can even facilitate the emergence of new forms of violence and insecurity. In addition, in such social and political context acts of securitization are less effective and political actors might take controversial decision to reach security (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011).

Yet, violence and insecurity can also persist in democratic contexts, even in countries which move out of so-called transition phases (Hegre, 2001; Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Systems without substantive and meaningful exercise of citizenship and constant respect of democratic rights may see the emergence of security risk factors which might compromise further democratic development (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006). Therefore, semi-democratic regimes can co-exist with high levels of violence and insecurity since this situation prevent them to democratize (Hegre, 2001; Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Indeed, in such context state responses to security issue can strengthen state and non-state security actors committed to reproducing violence, disproportionately affecting the poorest communities. (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011).

It is important to remark that when a regime changes, violence and issues related to security constantly increase and they usually end only when the transition is fully completed (Hegre, 2001). Yet, discourses about security are obviously not absent in full and consolidated democracy as already claimed. As we saw on the previous chapter, acts of securitization can have a performative dimension which can be shaped by speech acts and material practices (McDonald, 2008, p.564). Therefore, since security is inter-subjectively constituted, the context in which securitization is taking place is extremely important. Indeed, political actors in a democratic system need to take into account that popular consensus is a fundamental part of each act of securitization (Buzan and Al., 1998). While popular consensus within securitization is not a distinctive element of democracy, it is much more important than in hybrid democracies and authoritarian, regimes (Hegre, 2001). Popular support is also important for securitizing actors of systems under a process of democratization. However, in such context each reforms or political acts is aimed at developing more free and democratic political structures. Therefore, in analysing acts of securitization in democratizing countries (such as Ukraine) the popular consensus in is not the sole element to take into account.

According to Stefan (2009, p.4-8), democratization implies that new political actors become active participants within the society. This process is, however, extremely complex. In transitions from oppressive system to open democracy, the implementation of new democratic practices is often hard to reach due to the multifaceted security issues faced by the country. These issues include the level of integration of national minorities, the vulnerability of the new institutions and the role of internal and external actors. (Stefan 2009, p.6). Therefore, in order to positively democratize a political system, political actors may decide to securitize some specific issues (Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Moreover, the degree to which different societal actors are allowed to participate in the process

of securitization can be a valuable indicator of how advanced the level of democratization is (Stefan 2009, p.7). For example, Stefan (2009, p.10) identifies a mutually dependent process of democratization and securitization in 2000's Romania. According to this view, Romanian political actors developed in the early 2000s different securitization policies in three sectors (political, societal and environmental) in order to build a solid democracy and increase regional and national security. Emergency policies were thus implemented to reduce political vulnerabilities which were identified as key emerging factors of severe political crisis that took place in Romania during the 90s (Stepan, 2009, p.25-30). In this way, securitization and democratization were recognised as two different sides of the same process and allowed Bucharest to successfully achieved the EU membership (Stepan, 2009, p. 120-125).

Also, there are cases in which democratization itself can be securitized in order to guarantee the survival of a new democracy. As in Williams (2003, p. 3-8) leaders of Central and Eastern European countries imposed lustration in order to exclude those who were once affiliated with the Communist system. Lustration defined as “the exclusion of individuals from political life or their judicial punishment for past actions under a previous regime” (Letki, 2002, p.530) can be seen as a way to securitize a specific aspect of the political life in order to achieve a more stable democratic regime (Horne, 2014, p.10). In this context, lustration aimed at creating new moralities and new politics in order to initiate a more transparent and less corrupted democratic system (Williams, 2003, p.12; Horne, 2014, p.10). While lustration laws have been considered by scholars as controversial transitional justice mechanisms because of their structure and function (Williams, 2003, p.13), comparative studies notice a correlation between democratization and lustration. Lustration seems to strongly support democratization in different contexts, both in Central and Eastern Europe (Horne, 2014, p.10). In particular, lustration has positive long-lasting effects not only in terms of institutional change but also in public discourses and symbolic changes (Horne, 2014, p.10). For example, in a comparative study, Letki (2002) notes that lustration was extremely valuable in overcoming the legacy of communist regimes in at least five cases (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania) (Letki, 2002, p.530-548). With the exceptions of Estonia and Latvia which experienced a “ethnic lustration”, Letki’s study concludes that those countries which did not experience a full process of lustration have a lower level of democracies (Letki, 2002, p.548). Another comparative study shows that lustration have a positive and beneficial effects on citizen trust in public institutions (Horne, 2012, p.438). In particular, by improving institutional trustworthiness, lustration supports the larger process of democratic consolidation (Horne, 2012, p.439). In other words, there is a positive link between lustration as act of securitization and the process of democratic consolidation.

Hence, the scope of my dissertation is to investigate the meaning of the relation between securitization and democratization within the specific context of Ukraine. Despite scholars not focused on the relations between securitization of media and consolidation of democracy, I believe that Ukrainian case might be a unique starting point in this particular line of research as describe in the next section.

2. Russian Media and their presence in Ukraine

Media are closely associated with the concept of “soft power” in a way that goes beyond the traditional understanding of this concept. Scholars have defined soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion” (Nye 2008, p.94). Yet, soft power can be inadequate to capture the complexity states relation in terms of media influence. (Szostek, 2014, p.463).

As Nye (2008, p.100-101) modern governments compete for credibility not only with other governments but with a broad range of alternatives including news media and information companies. In foreign policy, media are particularly relevant because of their capacity to transmit messages and frame issues. It is not surprising that soft power and influencing policies can be “produced” by a country investing in broadcasting and public diplomacy (see section 1.2) In such a way, soft power of a country is understood as a mean relying on three different resources: cultural aspects, its political values and its foreign policies (Nye, 2008, p.97). This understanding of soft power is extremely state-centric since media is claimed to be a tool to persuade subjects and to change their values and priorities. In this context, the dichotomy of media as a source of soft power lie on the one hand on the relational power between state and media (Szostek, 2014, p.467-468). On the other hand, the relation between state actors can also facilitate the diffusion of specific messages through media and some specific contexts can also increase the presence of media influence within a specific media landscape (Szostek, 2014, p.469-470).

In the case of Ukraine, for example, the huge capacity of Russian media to penetrate Ukrainian broadcasting market was the result of several factors. Firstly, in different regions of Ukraine it exists a self-sustaining regional identity where both Russian and Ukrainian interact freely (A.Wilczewska and R. Sakwa, 2016, p.22). Therefore, Russian channels were perceived in terms of identity as “a normality” in many parts of Ukrainian territory (A.Wilczewska and R. Sakwa, 2016, p.63-65). This is due to both the post-Soviet legacy and the fact that before 2014 the legitimacy of Russian culture in Ukraine was never really challenged (Ryabinska, 2011, p.13; A.Wilczewska and R. Sakwa, 2016, p.22-25). This situation is often reflected in the Ukrainian media in terms of language. Russian channels and Russian speaking channels are thus more viewed in those area with a shared identity

with Russia. Even though the term identity does not imply only the issue of the language, for the purpose of this thesis the concept of identity will be closely associated with linguistic aspects.

[Identarian factor]

Secondly, in 2008 and 2013 Russian government included in its policy strategy the goal of developing “effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad” (Szostek, 2014, p.464). In other words, the huge mediatic presence of Russian channels in Ukraine was the result of a precise strategy. Russian leadership viewed mass communication as a crucial arena of international politics, in which rival powers work to pursue their own interests at others’ expense. Indeed, the ability to project narratives to foreign audiences is considered to be a matter of national security for the Russian elites, especially in the post-soviet countries such as Ukraine. (Hutchings and Szostek, 2015; Kudelia 2014). Therefore, Russian involvement in Ukraine’s media environment can be described as a smart power strategy involving both traditional soft power features (cultural elements) and intentional moves. (Szostek, 2014, p.464) [Soft power factor].

Thirdly, another key factor which facilitated the huge presence of Russian media in Ukraine was the specific Ukrainian media landscape. The lack of a free and transparent market and pluralism based on freedom of market, contributed to make Russian TV channels extremely popular in Ukraine, especially in Crimea and in the territories of Ukraine bordering with Russia (Szostek, 2014, p.465-470). Indeed, Russian TV industry used to offer Ukrainian audience programs of higher quality and variety than their Ukrainian counterpart. Also, Russian TV products were broadcasted by Ukrainian channels since they were extremely competitive in terms of price (Ryabinska, 2011, p.11). As consequence, Ukrainian media were characterized by the absence of pluralism, poor Ukrainian media products and a limited selection of channels (Kudelia, 2014). Because of that, the State Committee of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, in 2009 up to 80 percent of the broadcast time of Ukrainian radio and TV channels was filled with non-Ukrainian product (Ryabinska, 2011, p.12). [Quality factor].

Lastly, the extraordinarily large scale of the Russian presence in Ukrainian media market was the result of the absence of state regulations in the media landscape as well. Unlike in other Post-Soviet countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania but also Moldova), Ukrainian governments shown little knowledge of or interest in discouraging people watching Russian contents and prefer to treat the media as servants of the financial and political groups owned by oligarchs (Ryabinska, 2011, p.12). In other words, the lack of state regulations in media was a direct consequence of the lobbying activities of oligarchs who were also directly involved in the decision-making process as political actors. Therefore, Ukrainian authorities could not develop any strong legislation or national strategy to regulate media sphere . Indeed, the Ukrainian media sphere was dominated by the formal and

informal competition between oligarchs to reach a strong influence in the media sector. (Leshchenko, 2014, p.52). Through their political influence and financial capacity, oligarchs managed to bypass or control any national authority and develop both de jure and de facto a favourable media environment for their business purposes (Minakov, 2016). Moreover, the frequent changes in legislation caused several problems for the few independent media organizations and made them vulnerable to both oligarchs' pressure and competition (Ryabinska, 2011, p.14). Since Ukrainian media market was not strongly regulated at the state level and oligarchs created a media landscape based on monopolies rather than pluralism and quality of information, Russian media products could be broadcasted with no legislative limitations. Before Euromaidan more than 50% of media contents in Ukraine was produced abroad, mainly in Russia. The channels owned by oligarchs were often broadcasting Russian media content and state authority could not discourage the broadcasting of Russian channels [Political factor].

Despite all the four factors facilitated in different ways the emergence and the consolidation of Russian media's position in Ukraine, they have not contributed in the same way to the lack of transparency in the Ukrainian media sphere. On the contrary, the next section will show why media market factor has prevented the development of a free and democratic media landscape.

3. Media and Oligarchy in Ukraine

The competition between different financial groups in media is not a negative thing per se. However, Ukraine is a country where oligarchs and their financial political groups control almost every aspect of the society, including politics, economy and judicial sector (Minakov, 2016). Despite national authority is not completely overlapped by the oligarch system, oligarchs have often shaped many process of reforms in Ukraine. As consequence, oligarchs and other relevant political actors have controlled for many years the media sphere to achieve their political goals and only a few media outlets are beyond their reach (Minakov, 2016). In this context, the lack of strong regulations in media was a consequence of both the oligarch system and the weak independent state authority.

Researchers have paid little attention to the dynamics of Russian involvement in Ukrainian media landscape in relations to the oligarchic system and before 2014 only few studies analysed how and why Russian media consolidated their position in the Ukrainian market. Even Ukrainian authority did not create any national strategy vis-à-vis media development in terms of transparency and media freedom (Minakov, 2016). In an article written before the mass protests of Euromaidan, Szostek (2014, p.22) claimed that the high presence of Russian media in Ukraine was the result of a mix of

soft power, post-soviet legacy and a Kremlin's polarizing policy in the Near Abroad. However, this view lacks to take into account the huge effect of oligarchy on media.

As shown in the previous section, since most Ukrainians get their news from television, the broadcasting activity was always seen by oligarchs as a mean to pursue their political goals (Leshchenko, 2014, p.54). Moreover, Ukraine has never been ranked as a Free State in the Freedom House's ranking. Historically, Ukrainian poor scoring was often caused by the constant violation of freedom of speech and expression in media (Freedom House Archive, 2011). For example, in 2004 FH noticed that the Government influence in the broadcast sector was almost absolute. As consequence, many journalists were forced to practice self-censorship (Freedom House, 2004). In addition, without an effective public national broadcaster Ukraine could not enable the production of higher-quality and set editorial and professional national standards and channels were often used as political tools in the hands of oligarchs. Press freedom slightly improved after the Orange revolution in 2004 but from 2009 to 2014 Freedom of information was constantly deteriorating. Also, TV channels were subject to two distinct but related controls: a direct activity from the oligarchs and their financial political groups and indirect acts from the state authority that, as in any states, exercises control over broadcasting (see the section 1.2). In this context, it is not surprising that Ukraine has never developed a free and transparent broadcasting media market. However, the oligarch system was not only an issue for democracy, but it was also a key issue for security because it has indirectly facilitated the emergence and the consolidation of Russian media content in Ukraine (See sections 2.1 and 2.2). In other words, the internal struggle to control media at the national level has certainly made Ukrainian media landscape vulnerable to the external influence of Russia, but the specific Ukrainian system also prevent the creation of a free and democratic media market. Thus, Ukraine developed a unique dichotomy in its media market. On the one hand, financial and political monopolies and oligarchs' media concentration were facilitated by the absence of impartial policies in the media sphere and generated a unique struggle between rivalry groups of oligarchs to control media (Minakov, 2016). On the other hand, TV broadcasting was dominated by the huge presence of Russian products which was also facilitated by other factors as I explained in the section 2.2. Nevertheless, the other factors have little or no impact on the development of a free and transparent media market. On the contrary, I argue that the oligarch system is the only factor with a link with the two phenomena as the following graph shows.




Figure 1: The four factors which allowed the consolidation and the emergence of the Russian Channels in Ukraine.

3. Scope and Methods

Having outlined the relation between securitization and democratization, I will present the scope of my thesis, the research questions and the methodological part.

1. Scope of the research

Acts of securitization are extremely common in the context of conflicts and external threats (such as the ones faced by Ukraine). Indeed, the political and military context might force political actors to adopt extraordinary measures to deal with the threats (Buzan and Al., 1998, p. 28-30). The ban of Russian channels is thus a clear example of securitization aimed at developing emergency security policies in media. Indeed, after the outbreak of the conflict, the presence of Russian channels became a matter of security for Ukraine.

My thesis is based on the idea that a lack of national strategy vis-à-vis media development and the oligarchic system played a huge role in the consolidation of Russian channels in Ukraine. The presence of Russian channels is a consequence and not a cause for the lack of a free transparent media landscape and state regulations. However, literature and empirical evidences suggest that the

securitization of media can contribute to the development of a more democratic media landscape (see section 2.2). My thesis will try thus to understand if and to what extent the ban of Russian channels have contributed to the process of democratization. In particular, I will use the four mentioned factors as controlling elements to address the relations between democratization and the ban of the Russian channels. Taking into account the fact that the oligarchy system is the main element which has stopped the development of a free and transparent media market in Ukraine, my thesis aimed at investigating if changes within the four factors have contributed to the development of a more free media landscape and, as direct consequence, they sustain the process of democratization (see sections 2.1 and 2.2).

Also, my research will provide an explanation on how the concept of national security has evolved in Ukraine in the public discourse. In proposing a qualitative approach to analyse the development of Ukrainian national security, I would seek to go beyond a generic explanation of why Russia represented an issue for Ukrainian national security. On the contrary, I will investigate how Russian channels became a matter of security in the Ukrainian public discourse. In particular, looking at the case study of the ban of Russian channels, my analysis aimed the relation between the concept of national security and the process of democratization.

In light of what I claimed in the sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, my preliminary hypothesis is that the securitization of media has somehow positively influenced the process of democratization but the concrete results still need to be investigated. Also, as in the case of Romania or the cases of lustration in Central and Eastern Europe (see section 2.1), securitization and democratization in the case of Ukraine might be mutually dependent process. The scope of my thesis is thus to investigate if a mutual dependent process (securitization and democratization) is present in Ukraine as well.

2. Research Questions

Following these considerations and considering the specific context in which Ukrainian democratization is taking place, through my research I will try to answer the following research questions:

- How did the Ukrainian government develop the relation between the concepts of national security and democratization, specifically in the context of the ban of Russian channels?
- To what extent does the Securitization of the media space affect processes of Democratization in Ukraine?

3. Methodology

Since my thesis is answering two different and independent questions, I will then use two different qualitative methods in two different chapter of the thesis. The first research question will be answered through the discourse and text analysis of the Ukrainian public discourses. On the contrary, a testing process tracing will be use in order to answer the second research question.

1. Discourse and text analysis

To answer the first research question, I will use a discourse and text analysis (DTA) to better understand how the Ukrainian concept of national security has evolved in the context of the media and within Ukrainian public discourse.

My DTA will focus on five different sources. Firstly, I will analyse Poroshenko's speech at the inauguration of the Parliament. In this speech, for the first time Poroshenko as new-elected president outlined the concept of national security in relation to the external Russian aggression. Secondly, I will focus on Poroshenko's speech at the ceremony of the signing the Association Agreement (06/27/2014) During this event, Poroshenko signed the association agreement which legally confirms that Ukraine will pursue democracy. Also, Poroshenko gave his first international speech about the concept of democratization. Thirdly, I will analyse the two post on the Interior Ministry Anton Gerashchenko's official Facebook account in which the ban of the 14 Russian channels was officially announced and explained. Lastly, I will develop a DTA on the official text of the Ukrainian Law N.840 which made the ban legally effective.

Great attention will be given to the two concepts of security and democratization within the speech. My focus is aimed at understanding how Ukrainian official position about these two related phenomena. Moreover, my DTA assumes that actors involved in public discourses do not exclusively make use of their individual experiences and strategies, but they mainly rely upon collective frames of perceptions, called social representations." (A.Meyer, 2001, p.21-22). Thus, in my DTA I will also focus on the Ukrainian governments use of social representation of democratization and securitization in order to better develop my research.

My DTA will be content oriented. Therefore, I will not singularly address each source, but I will use different sources to address a specific different content. In other words, in each section of the chapter, I will create an analysis of the contents which uses all the five sources.

Generally, I will analyse the most sources according to the following six elements which they will be part of the content oriented analysis.

- Actors and context;
- References to external actors within the speech;
- Sources of knowledge reported by the actors,
- The kind and form of argumentation used;
- The collective symbolism or “figurativeness” reported by the actor;
- Implications and insinuations made by the actors.

A more comprehensive analysis of each source will be provided as appendix.

My DTA and more generally the first part of my research will be limited in terms of time. Indeed, the ban of Russian channels was announced already in March 2014 but took officially place on the 18th of August 2014. This period will be then the time-frame of my analysis concerning the first research question. Lastly, while the empirical part will focus on the most pertinent points for the research question, in the appendix will provide an in-deep-analysis of each content.

II. Testing process tracing

My second research question assumes the possibility that there is a casual mechanism between securitization and democratization, which is a process not limited in terms of timing.

My hypothesis is that the ban of Russian channels has contributed to the process of democratization in Ukraine and there is a casual mechanism between securitization of media sphere and democratization. Thus, I will need to prove the presence/absence of such mechanisms within the context of the issue of my thesis. I will then use a qualitative theory testing process tracing (PT) to test my hypothesis.

Testing process tracing method was first introduced in 1979 and then thoroughly developed through Bayes logic by George and Bennett in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (2005). Theory testing PT is case study approach that deduces a theory from existing literature and then tests whether there is evidence that such hypothesized casual mechanism can be verified in a given case (Beach, 2011). In theory testing PT, a casual mechanism is understood as the interactive influence of causes upon outcomes where causal forces are transmitted through a series of

interlocking steps to contribute to produce an outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Indeed, the main aim of PT is to look at ‘establishing the causal mechanism, by examining the fit of a theory to the intervening causal steps (Mahoney, 2012). In other words, researchers using the PT ask’ how does “X” produce a series of conditions that come together in some way (or do not) to produce “Y”? In particular, theory testing PT is often used when empirical correlations between X and Y have been found in previous researches but we are unsure about the presence of an actual casual mechanism linking the two variables (Beach, 2011). Moreover, the hypothesized correlation can arise not only from academic theories, but also from experts or observants such in my case¹.

In my research, I am trying to understand if the securitization of media sphere (X) contributes to democratization (Y) through the ban of Russian media as claimed in Ukrainian public discourse. In other words, since Ukraine used extraordinary measures to block the threat of the Russian channels (act of securitization), my thesis will investigate on the result of this act. In particular, I will test the effectiveness of the the act of securitization, the effects on the Ukrainian media and on the general national media system.

Theory testing PT perfectly fits in my research since I am looking at a single case study (Ukraine). Nevertheless, my scope is not to develop a general theory on securitization and democratization but to prove whether a casual mechanism is present/absent within this specific case (Mahoney, 2012). To do so, I will develop two different but related phases of PT. In the first part, which is included in this chapter, I will conceptualize a causal mechanism between X and Y based upon existing theorization (**conceptualization phase**). In the second part, I am going to translate the theorization into the specific case study of Ukrainian democratization (**operational phase**). These two phases are included in this sections.

It is important to also notice that in PT mechanisms are conceptualised as being made up of a number of ‘parts’, composed of entities (for example, people, organisations, systems which are linguistically defined as nouns) that engage in activities (for example, protesting, researching, campaigning which are linguistically defined as verbs) (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Each of the parts of the hypothesized casual mechanism can be described in terms of entities that engage in activities (Figure 2). Also, they produce a continuity, meaning that each of the parts are logically and linguistically connected to the next one. In my case, I will develop a three-part block that could explain how the The last phase of my research (**observation phases**) will allow me to collect and analyse empirical evidence that can be used to test the presence or the absence of the casual mechanism. In other words, in this phase I

¹ <http://uacrisis.org/249-yevgeny-utkin>

will be able to claim whether the securitization of media sphere has sustained (or not) the process of democratization.

Conceptualization and Operational Phases

Theoretical level: Securitization can sustain Democratization

The process X (Securitization) implies the process Y (D) through different parts as shown in the following graph:




Figure 2: the hypothesized casual mechanism on a theoretical level.

Within the specific case study, the ban of the Russian channels as act of securitization can sustain the Ukrainian process of democratization. To test it, I will build a process based on parts. Each part is characterised by an entity (subject) doing something (activity). Operationally, each part implies the following one and presupposes the previous one.

- 1) National Media becomes free of the negative external Russian Influence.
- 2) Without the negative Russian influence, the National media become more Ukrainian oriented and improve their quality and pluralism.
- 3) New free and Ukrainian oriented national media support democratization.

In particular, in the hypothesized process I claim that without the negative external Russian influence, Ukrainian media can significantly improve their contents' quality and pluralism and, at the same time, become more national oriented. Since they are more pluralistic and Ukrainian oriented, they can effectively support the process of democratization.

Within the process tracing the parts are included as in the following graph. Entities are highlighted in **bold** and activities are in *italics*.



Figure 3: the hypothesized casual mechanism on practical level.

Each part of the mechanism will be tested and proved taking into consideration one or more of the four factors described in the section 2.2 as shown in the next graph.




Figure 4: The four factors and the parts of the hypothesized casual mechanism.

My PT wants to test whether the casual mechanism is present within the specific case study of Ukraine. In the empirical sections, all the three parts will be analysed independently in order to prove each part of the mechanism. To prove the first part of the mechanism I will try to test if the soft power factor is still present in the Ukrainian media landscape. In particular, I will try to analyse the effectiveness of the ban and to what extent Russia is still using its own media content to spread its soft power within the Ukrainian media landscape. The second part will focus on both quality factor and identitarian factors. Indeed, I will try to analyse if the quality of Ukrainian media content has increased since the ban and to what extent the identitarian factor is still present in Ukrainian media. The second point will be analyse in terms pluralism, language tendency and TV audience in Ukraine. Lastly, I will try to see if the effect of the ban had or has not had a direct consequence on the political level. In particular, I will try to understand if and how the ban was influencing the presence of oligarchs within Ukrainian media landscape.

To analyse and draw conclusions I will use data and reports from different international organizations and NGOs, including the Council of Europe, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders and other reports on media freedom in Ukraine. I will conduct a textual and online analysis on the sources in order to address my research question within the process tracing (PT).

4. First Empirical Part: Discourse and Text Analysis (DTA)

In this empirical chapter, I will use a discourse and text analysis (DTA) to analyse the evolution of concept of national security in the Ukrainian public discourse. The section 4.1 provides a description of the sources analysed and a description of their content. The following sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 include the empirical analysis. Lastly, I will present the findings of the analysis in the section 4.5.

The DTA analysis of each sources is attached at the end of thesis as appendix.

1. Sources

As already explained in the section 3.3, my DTA will focus on five sources which will be presented in the following paragraphs of this section.

Each source has been divided in sections. The full analysis of each of the sources will be attached as appendix. The reference to source will be made according to this format: [NUMBER OF THE SOURCE.SECTION]. The DTA will follow a thematic division. Key words and concepts will be highlighted.

1. Poroshenko's speech at the inauguration of the Parliament (06/07/2014) – [Appendix I]

The speech was held by Poroshenko during the ceremony of inauguration of new President of Ukraine in the Verkhovna Rada. As mentioned in the section 3.3, this speech is particularly relevant since Poroshenko presented his presidential agenda for the first time. Thus, he was presenting the new government's view on concepts such as security, external aggression, democracy and reforms. The event was particularly important because 60 foreign official delegations, including 23 heads of state and government, parliament and heads of the international organizations participated. The context was highly formal and members of Ukrainian Army, Judicial system and national churches were standing in front of the new elected president. This speech did not focus specifically on the issue of the Russian channels. However, it contains important elements in terms of national security.

The key words of this speech are peace and security, which Poroshenko deeply connects to each other. Ukraine is often presented as a country that is symbolically breaking free from the external influence of Russia and therefore needs to complete an extra effort to achieve its political goals. Moreover,

historical facts and metaphors are used to explain that the recent changes in Ukraine are the result of an unavoidable historical path that Ukraine has been following for centuries.

However, in various parts of his speech Poroshenko recognizes Russia and its activity as the main threat for Ukrainian national security. Indeed, he claims that Ukraine has undergone a huge democratic change which caused a conflict in the East. Because of that, Ukrainian territorial integrity has been violated by Russia and therefore any further Russian interference in Ukraine must be blocked with emergency means. Therefore, the speech can be considered as a securitization speech act which recognizes Ukrainian territorial integrity as referent object of a securitization process.

II. Poroshenko's speech at the speech at the ceremony of signing the Association Agreement (06/27/2014) – [Appendix II]

The speech was held in English by Petro Poroshenko during the association agreement ceremony in Brussels, on the 27th of June 2014. It was the first Poroshenko's international speech in front of the leaders of the UE and UE member states. He delivered the speech next to the presidents of the European Council and EU Commission and in front of the EU Commissioner, members states delegations and journalists. Therefore, the context in it was delivered was quite formal but not as lofty as in his inauguration speech.

This speech is extremely important because the association agreement represents a legal obligation for Ukraine to pursue democracy. In the preamble of the association agreement it is said that democratic principles and democratic development are the base of thee cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. Also, in the article 9 says that the EU-Ukraine joint efforts aimed at promoting "stability, security and democratic development". Poroshenko's speech in this occasion has thus a highly symbolic and political meaning since it represents the view of Ukraine about the process of democratization.

In the speech, Poroshenko claim that Ukraine is a victim of history since it lies in the middle between a progressive and free Europe and the Soviet legacy represented by Russia. Therefore, Europe should recognize the "Ukrainians' will" to be part of their world and support the efforts of Ukraine to achieve its freedom and "European choice". In this context, the signature of the association agreement is a way to achieve not only prosperity, but also security. In his words, Poroshenko addresses the European leaders who are listening to his speech as "friends" or "colleagues" which imply that he thinks Ukraine and the EU share common goals and responsibilities. On the contrary, Russia is often presented as a subject which is opposing to the European common interest and therefore it represents a threat not only to Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries but also to the EU and the w West.

III. Kateryna Kotenko's speech at the Ukrainian Media Center (29/06/2014) at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center – [Appendix III]

The member of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine Kateryna Kotenko delivered a speech in Ukrainian about the issue of Russian propaganda and media disinformation at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, the biggest Ukrainian NGO which provides information and security content in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. This speech is particularly relevant for the research since Kotenko's position represent the one of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council. Furthermore, she is also the first member of the council to speak in public about the issues of the Russian information aggression after the signature of the association agreement. Moreover, she is also presenting the Ukrainian strategy to counter attack Russian propaganda and information aggression before the implementation of the ban through the law N.840.

The context in which the press conference was held was quite formal since Kotenko was in front of national and international journalist. Nonetheless, also members of the Ukrainian government and National board of Radio and TV broadcasting were present at the event.

In her word, Kotenko's main claim is that Russia created a fertile information background to attack Ukraine. The creation of such environment was possible because Ukraine underestimate the risk and therefore did not implement any defensive solution. However, after the emergence of the Ukrainian crisis Ukraine must elaborate a defensive strategy to block the influence of Russian media power. However, since Ukrainian strategy is a response to an external attack, the Ukrainian law is the base to every counter-propaganda action.

IV. Anton Gerashenko's two posts about the ban of the Russian (19/08/2014) – [Appendix IV]

The ban of the 14 Russian channels was officially announced on Facebook by the deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Gerashenko. He was the person who worked and developed the law N.840 which allows Ukrainian National Broadcaster to ban the Russian channels. Both of the posts are written in Russian. In his first post (IV.A) Gerashenko described the reasons behind the political decisions in terms of national security. In the second post (IV.A) he was referring to the concept "Russian Propaganda" and why common citizens should fight against the information aggression of the Russian Federation. The two posts are thus extremely relevant in order to understand the political and social context in which the ban was implemented. Moreover, the two posts can be considered as acts of speech concerning the securitization process by which Russian media are officially removed from the area of ordinary political actions.

The first post stresses the importance of cooperation as a way to effectively introduce the ban. Indeed, Russia is identified not only as a physical aggressor, but also as a threat in terms of information aggression for the Ukrainian people. The presence of Russian media contents in Ukraine is indeed symbolically and physically identified as the main cause of the situation in Donbas. In the second post, Gerashenko claims that Ukraine needs an immediate support from its citizens to stop the Russian broadcasting. Indeed, Gerashenko implicitly admits that the delay of the ban implementation has helped Russia to consolidated its media influence in Ukraine and Donbas.

V. *Ukrainian Law N. 840 (19/08/2014) – [Appendix V]*

The law N.840 refers to the issue of information security in Ukraine and it was published on the official journal of the Ukrainian government on the 19 of august 2014. It was signed by the Ukrainian minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov who is also the co-author of the text. This text is the concrete mean by which the Ukrainian government implemented the ban of the Russian channels. Moreover, it includes the rationale behind the decision to ban the Russian channels at the political and legislative level. Thus, the most important legislative document to understand the research issue.

Also, the law stresses that the rapid change of information space and use of technology is a key issue in Ukraine. Indeed, the use of psychological and media pressure are key element of the Russian Federation's strategy to influence the anti-terroristic operation in Ukraine. In this context, the text acknowledges the information security as the referent object of the securitization process of the media sphere. The ban of channels is indeed an extraordinary mean to protect the referent object from the external aggression.

2. The Russian double threat

National Security is a key goal for Ukrainian government since this concept is highly mentioned in all of the documents analysed. For example, in [I] Porosheenko identifies national security as the main political goals of his mandate. By saying that [I.4] "I am assuming the post of President in order to [...] provide long-term peace and guarantee stable security", Poroshenko set the a clear goal not only for himself, but also for his country and the [I.4] "Ukrainian people". He also remarks this concept with several metaphors [I.5] in order to better clarify why Ukraine needs to achieve peace. Moreover, he is insisting on the necessity of a peaceful solution [I.5]. In [II] the president presents the [II.10] "European solidarity" as a way to achieve security since it is a powerful deterrent for any Russian aggressive action. However, it is clear both in [I] and [II] that Poroshenko admits the possibilities to use extraordinary measure to stop such aggression.

In one of the most important part of [I] Poroshenko says that: [I.14] “The issue of territorial integrity of Ukraine is not to be discussed. As soon as I have sworn “to protect the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine with all my deeds,” I will always remain faithful to this sacred oath.” In this way, he identifies the ***territorial integrity*** of Ukraine as referent object of its policy. Acting as securitizing actor, Poroshenko claims thus the right to implement extraordinary measures to ensure the violation of the material and non-material borders of Ukraine. In such way, through a speech act the issue of territorial integrity is removed from the sphere of normal politics and it becomes a subject that deserves extraordinary measures. In the following sections [I.15-I.16] this idea is remarked by referring to patriotism and the European choice of Ukraine. In such way, Poroshenko is linking securitization with the broader concepts of patriotism and democratization. Therefore, in this act of speech the securitization strategy of Poroshenko follows this logic:

SECURTIZING ACTOR: Ukrainian Government (Poroshenko)

THREAT: Russian Aggression

PRIMARY REFERENT OBJECT: Territorial Integrity

In other word, Poroshenko claims that national security is in danger because Russia is threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Also, In Poroshenko reports that the changes brought out by Euromaidan imply the use of force to protect Ukraine from an external aggression. The Russian aggression has indeed two different dimensions. On the physical level, the aggression of Russia is threatening the national security because of the violation of the territorial integrity. On the cultural/identarian level, Russia has aggressively questioned the democratic choice of Ukrainian people. This concept is also present in [III.1] where the Russian threat for Ukraine is recognized to be a multi-levelled attack which includes information aggression as well. One of this level is the ***information aggression*** which is defined in [I.9] as the act of creation myths and disinformation to delegitimize Ukrainian government. The concept of information aggression is a key topic in [III], [IV] and [V] since these sources deeply focus on this issue.

In this context, the goal of peace can be achieved only if the limitation of the Russian aggression is removed both at the information and physical level. This necessity is present in [III.3] where Ukrainian citizens are said to be “under a considerable psychological pressure, caused by actions of Russian Federation military forces, presence of strangers that make terroristic and separatist activities in abovementioned regions” and “information pressure from Russian media”. Media are said to be means of spreading propaganda [IV] and [V] which targets especially people from Donbass and

Crimea. Media are said to be the instruments by which the Russian Federation is spreading myths about Ukrainian government especially in the eastern Ukraine [IV.6].

In addition, in [IV.7] the physical aggression in Donbas is said to be a direct result of the information aggression of Ukraine. The information aggression is recognized as a precondition to attack Ukraine on the physical level [III.4]. In this context, the information aggression is directly linked to the physical aggression. Therefore, any delay in banning the Russian channels will imply more losses in terms of territory for Ukraine [IV.6-7]. The idea that Donbas and Crimean people are more vulnerable to the Russian information aggression through media is also present in [I.8] when people in Donbas are presented as those who have already “felt the wonders”. In particular, in [I.8-I.14] Poroshenko switches the language (from Ukrainian to Russian) in order to acknowledge that people from Donetsk and Luhansk can have different political views from him. But the switch of language shows that he is somehow “othering” the citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk and the use of “we” to refer to Ukraine marks an implicit difference between the Ukrainian government and people in Donetsk and Luhansk [I.8]. The idea that people in Donbas are the “other” is also present in other parts of the speeches such as in [V.3], where the inhabitants of the Donbass are said to be under a huge psychological pressure in comparison to the other citizens of Ukraine. Hence, we can assume that Ukrainian government recognizes the information aggression as a major threat for the national security. Indeed, the Ukrainian government in [I], [II] and [V] acknowledges the cultural vulnerability of the Russian speaking population of Crimea and Donbas in terms of media influence.

The vulnerability of the Donbas people vis-à-vis information aggression implies a political difference as well. On the local and national level, Poroshenko accuses in [I.10] Yanukovich’s clan to be the only responsible for both the crisis in Donbas and the information aggression. Poroshenko blames “Yanukovich’s clan” to be the main cause of “the political and socio-economic situation which the region has ended up in. [Also, he is responsible] for unemployment, poverty and the refugees, for the murdered civilians and the tears of the mothers.” From the one hand, he is stressing that he can be criticised for what it is happening in Donbas. Furthermore, Yanukovich and his clan are identified as enemies of Donbas and, as consequences, of Ukraine as well [I.12.-I.13]. In [III.2] Yanukovich as former leader of Ukraine is said to be “indulgent” in relation to the Russian media influence in Ukraine. Therefore, his presidency is one of the causes of the Russian information aggression.

While the Russian is double levelled (physical aggression and information aggression), it also differs in terms of geopolitics. On *the international level*, the Russian aggression is presented in a broader

perspective since Poroshenko identifies Russian violation of territorial integrity and information aggression as reasons which pushed Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement [II.8]. In other words, the ***national level*** of the threat is linked to a broader geopolitical dimension. Therefore, Russia represents a threat not only for Ukrainian people but also for the European stability.

As consequence, the agreement with the EU is seen as something more than a simple political agreement, but it is also a mean to achieve security both at the national and international level. The double function of the Association Agreement is extremely evident in the section [II.8] and [II.9] where Poroshenko stresses the idea that the signature implies responsibilities for Ukraine since [II.8] it “takes enormous commitment in terms of reforms”. But he claims the existence of a shared EU responsibility vis-à-vis Ukraine as well. According to Poroshenko, Ukraine expects that “the EU will make everything to support our sovereign choice and protect Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity” [II.9]. The Association Agreement is then a way to achieve a concrete support for Ukrainian national security. Not only is Poroshenko saying that security and protection are part of the agreement, but he also claims that Ukrainian security is a joint responsibility of EU and Ukraine.

Moreover, in the section [II. 9] Poroshenko argues that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia “paid a high price to be in Europe and with Europe”. Hence, he presents the three mentioned countries as victims of the history and their people as culturally vulnerable in terms of Russian aggression. In particular, their history makes them vulnerable not only on a physical level, but also in terms of culture [II-9]. Therefore, Poroshenko implicitly admits that the Russian physical aggression and the cultural one is based on a ***cultural fragility*** of the post-Soviet countries. Because of that, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova need to receive a compensation for the what they are suffering at the local level. However, the three countries share the same threat with the rest of Europe since the aggression of Russia is not limited in terms of space (international level).

We can then claim that the Ukrainian idea of Russian aggression is based on a two different but related levels. On the one level, Russia is threatening the Ukrainian national security with a military aggression. The aggression resulted in many losses for Ukraine and needs to be stopped through the use of military forces [I.6]. However, the Russian threat has also an information dimension which is the direct result of the Yanukovych’s politics and the specific cultural aspects of the post-Soviet Ukraine. On the other level, Russia is a threat not only for Ukraine, but also for the security of the whole Europe. Russian hostile attitude is said to be a threat for both non-EU countries in the post-soviet space and EU member states. In this context, the association agreement is a social

representation of the new “European choice” of Ukraine [I.16] because the signature of the association agreement is seen by Ukrainian as declaration for mutually joint responsibilities in terms of security both at the physical and information level.

The content of this section is summarized in the following graph.




Figure 5: The construction of the Russian double threat on the Ukrainian public discourse.

3. The process of Democratization

The process of ***democratization*** is another key element in all the documents reported in the section 4.a. This concept is generally understood as the process to develop a more democratic and pluralistic society and to comply with the European standards of democracy (***Europeanization***) In [I] Poroshenko started his speech stating that the positive change which took place in the country was the result of the Ukrainian people’s will, but the process of reforms needs to be supported by peace and stability [I.5]. In [II] Poroshenko opening his speech by remarking that [II.1] the recent changes in Ukraine and the signature of the association agreement are unavoidable historical events. Because of that, he declares that [II.2] he would use the same pen that Yanukovich was supposed to use for the signature event in November. By doing so, he is remarking the difference between himself and the predecessor in terms of attitude and political choices in terms of democracy. Indeed, he is implicitly claiming that Yanukovich did not act in the interest of Ukrainian people. As mentioned in

the section 4.3, Yanukovich and his political decisions are seen by the new governments as the cause of all the events which lead to the crisis. Therefore, since Yanukovich and Russian propaganda spread [1.9] “the myth of the so-called illegitimate Kyiv government”, Russia and the former president are recognized as the main obstacles on the path towards democratization. Indeed, the information aggression questioned mainly the process of democratization.

However, the Russian aggression was aiming at stopping the process of compliance with EU standards in Ukraine. In [I] Poroshenko claims that Ukraine has undergone a huge democratic change which caused a conflict in the East and the annexation of Crimea since the people’s support for the democratic changes was huge [I.20-I.23]. The “European choice” of Ukraine [II.3] was thus the main reasons for Russia to violate Ukrainian territorial integrity and this has led the all country to insecurity. Hence it is clear that democratization and national security are deeply linked to each other in Poroshenko’s mind. The changes brought out by Euromaidan imply the use of force to protect Ukraine from an external aggression. Thus, the Ukrainian choice is symbolically identified as the reason for Russia to start the external aggression as in [I.15-I.16]. Therefore, the ban of the Russian channels and the process of democratic consolidation are claimed in Ukrainian public discourse to be two mutually dependent processes. By banning the Russian channels, Ukraine can remove a negative influence over the process of democratization while democratization can be pursued only by eliminating a negative external influence.

The N.840 is thus understood as a rapid and effective response to the information aggression which is challenging national security and democratization. The information aggression is generally identified as a collective and public issue. For example, in [IV.5] public spaces such as “schools, hospitals, hotels, recreation centres” are the areas in which the extraordinary security measures must be implemented first. Indeed, since the response to the informative aggression has a symbolic *collective dimension*, public places must be protected also in terms of media. In addition, the idea that a rapid and collective response can effectively stop Russian information aggression is a key element in different parts of [IV].

Ukrainian strategy to effectively eliminate the information aggression represented by the Russian channels requires two different measures. On the state level, the ban requires the cooperation between different state bodies [IV.3]. On the individual level [IV], citizens and state bodies are required to collaborate in order to effectively implement the ban requires and detect “the cable providers that violate the decision of National Council on stopping the broadcasting of 14 prohibited channels”. Therefore, the collective response to the information threat is aimed at [IV.14] showing citizens’ civic

affiliation and addressing the responsible for broadcasting the prohibited channels. In this context, citizens and state authorities have the same collective goal since Russia information aggression is limiting the effect of the collective process of democratization.

In conclusion, the concept of democratization and national security are deeply linked to each other since they are questioned by the same threat (the Russian aggression). Also, the information aggression is a key issue in relation to the process of democratization because it spreads myths about the legitimacy of Ukrainian government as seen in the previous section. Therefore, the ban of the Russian channels is a way to protect a negative influence Ukrainian statehood and its process of transformation.

4. Passive and active actors

As seen in the section 4.2, the Russian threat to Ukrainian territorial integrity has been presented by Poroshenko in a broader European perspective. Russia is said to be an enemy not only for the Ukrainian national security, but also as a threat to European democracy and peace [II.13]. Moreover, Ukraine is among those countries which have shown a new attitude in terms of freedom and democracy [II.3]. Indeed, the information aggression represent a key issue for the process of democratization.

However, while Ukraine is often presented as an independent state which controls its own destiny, Poroshenko implicitly recognizes in his speeches that Ukraine lie in between two different poles, Russia and the EU. In [I.21] he claims that the citizens of Ukraine cannot “feel the virtues of peace and security until we regulate our relations with Russia”. In other words, the relations with Russia jeopardise each political change in Ukraine. Russia is not only recognised as aggressor on the Ukrainian border but as an active subject which can actively influence or threaten each decision taking place in Ukraine [1.21-23]. Also, Poroshenko in [II.9] asks the EU to “make everything to support our sovereign choice and protect Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity” since through “European solidarity” [II.10] Ukraine can achieve long lasting security and stability. In these terms, the EU is identified as a proactive subject which might directly contribute to the stabilization of Ukraine. In other words, as claimed in 4.1, the association agreement [II.16] “is considered by Ukraine as an instrument of comprehensive preparation” and external support to achieve security and democracy. Therefore, the EU can actively contribute to economic stabilization and democratization in Ukraine in order to make the “European dreams” true [II.14].

Hence, Poroshenko insinuate the idea that both Russia and the EU have the power to (positively or negatively) shape the destiny of Ukraine. In particular, Russia has negatively influence Ukraine while the EU can positively support different changes in the country. But in these context, Ukraine has a

passive role in terms of national security and democratization because the country's political destiny is constantly shaped by an external actor. Indeed, Poroshenko makes an implicit recognition of the weakness of its country. On the one hand, national security and democratization are constantly questioned both at the physical and information level by Russia. On the other hand, Ukraine needs the support of the EU and western countries to escape the threat and achieve democratization. Paradoxically, also the "Europeanization" of the Russian or post-Soviet threat in [II.6-7] is a request to achieve more support from an external actor (the EU).

Therefore, in Poroshenko's speeches the concepts of national security and democratization are developed in a way which makes Ukraine a more passive actor while Russia and the EU have a more active dimension.

On the contrary, the ban of Russian channel is often presented as an active way to respond to a threat. While the past governments of Ukraine have tolerated the issue of the Russian channels and media content as in [III.2] or [I.9], the law N.840 and shows that Ukraine wants to adopt a more active approach to eliminate the Russian interference in its media space. Indeed, in [V.4] the negative psychological pressure from Russian media is identified as one of the main threat in relation to the event which are taking place in the ATO zone in Eastern Ukraine and it is claimed that it is responsibility of Ukraine to eliminate it. Therefore, in [V] the concept of information security is identified as the process of eliminating the negative external influence transmitted through media in order to achieve a stronger national security.

The more active approach in terms of media and security is also present in [IV], specifically in the context of the cooperation between state's institutions and citizens. For example, in [IV.8] the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs encourages citizens of Ukraine to actively participate in the detection of the forbidden channels. Indeed, cooperative relations between state institutions and citizens are said to be an effective response to the threat. Therefore, as democratization was identified as a collective process, also information security is characterized by a collective dimension with the Ukrainian national security's discourse.

Nonetheless, the collective approach is absent in Poroshenko's speeches where citizens have often a passive role. In [I.8-9] he claims that Yanukovich's clan has been exclusively ruled in Donbass over citizens or in [I.10] where he says to be the one to bring peace to the residents in the eastern Ukraine. Also, Poroshenko stressed the importance of Ukrainian's effort in pursue a better future [II.3]. However, he requires a formal and external recognition for such efforts [II.10]. Alternatively, in [III.6] the collective involvement of the citizens in identifying Russian information attack is recognised as fundamental by Ukrainian institutions as well. The cooperation between citizens is

stressed also in [IV.14] where volunteers are asked not only to detect disinformation, but also to stop the broadcasting of the forbidden media content.

Accordingly, the ban of the Russian channels implies also a symbolic dimension within the process of securitization. Great attention is given to citizens in relation to the issue of information security. While Poroshenko's argumentation often imply that the goals of democratization and national security cannot achieve independently by Ukraine, the ban of the Russian channels is based on the active and collective participation of state authorities and citizens. Democratization and national security have thus also another common element: the collectiveness.

5. Findings of the empirical analysis

My first research question asked how Ukrainian government developed the relation between the concept of national security and democratization in its public discourse, specifically in the context of the ban of the Russian channels. The answer is not a straight forward if one considers that this relation is shaped by many factors. However, one can identify at least five different common relations between the two concepts in the context of the ban of the Russian media.

Firstly, the concept of national security in all the five sources has been developed in relation to the Russian threat. Ukrainian discourse was developed in a way that the Russian aggression questioned the process of democratization both at the information and physical level. Indeed, Ukrainian governments recognizes its vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia and therefore it explores different solutions to restore peace and stability within its borders. The ban of the Russian channels is thus one of the way to safeguard and protect both national security and the process of democratization in Ukraine (Defence relation).

Secondly, Ukraine developed the relation between its own security in a broader European perspective. In this context, Russia represents not only a negative factor of democratic development, but also a potential enemy for Europe and the West. Indeed, Poroshenko's government recognizes the association agreement as a jointly responsibility for Ukraine and Europe to support each other. The ban of the Russian channels can thus be considered as a part of Ukrainian strategy to achieve a "European future". Also, one of the key element of Ukrainian national security is the concept of information security. By achieving information security, Ukrainian government can more easily fulfil the democratic and reforms criteria included in the association agreement (European goal relation).

Thirdly, the ban of the Russian channels is a way to remove the psychological pressure from the Donbas' residents. As Russian channels are seen as an informative threat, Ukrainian government claims the ban can prevent people from being influenced by disinformation and myths about the

legitimacy of Poroshenko's government. Therefore, by eliminating the information aggression through the ban of Russian channel Ukraine says it is able to restore its rule over the ATO zone and, as consequence, include all its citizens in the process of democratization (Restoration relation).

In the fourth place, in various sources the passiveness of Ukraine is recognized in relation to different phenomena included the democratization and the economic reforms. Indeed, Ukrainian rhetoric about democratization implies that the country passively lies somewhere in between two active subjects: Russia which negative influences the process of democratic consolidation and the EU that acts not only as a partner but also as facilitator of Ukrainian democratization. The ban of the Russian channels is then an instrument to increase the collective participation in both the democratization process and the increasing of national security (Cooperation relation).

Lastly, the process of Ukrainian emancipation from the Russian influence has been often presented as the result of the people's will and patriotism. In particular, the Russian aggression damaged not the only political dimension of Ukraine but also the cultural and identarian aspects as well. Therefore, Ukrainian information needs to be protected from both Russian physical aggression and Russian cultural aggression. The ban of the Russian channel is presented as a way to patriotically defend national security and therefore the people's will to develop a more democratic Ukraine (patriotic relation).

Since the five relations are deeply connected to each other, one can claim that the process of democratization and the concept of national security in the Ukrainian public discourse are also related to each other. In particular, in all the source national security implies the need to protect democratization. Despite the ban of Russian channels as act of censorship is a potential challenge to democratization, in the Ukrainian public discourse is presented as a way to achieve a more open and democratic society. Indeed, since Russian media poses a security threat to Ukrainian statehood which is detrimental to the Democratization process. Therefore, the public discourse emphasis the need to block and unconventionally protect the Ukrainian media space to pursue democratization. This view emphasises thus the role of the ban has an act which have a positive effect on the democratization process.

5. Second Empirical Part: Process Tracing (PT)

The analysis provided in the previous chapter shows that the ban of the Russian channels is claimed to be a non-conventional way to protect and thus achieve democratization. In this chapter, I will thus try to test the effectiveness of the claim.

To do so, as reported in the chapter 3, I will test and verify different parts of the casual mechanism in order to test my process tracing. Each part of the mechanism will be analysed through an observation phase which will be followed by the results' part.

1. Soft Power Factor

1. Observation Phase

- Part of the mechanism to be observed: *“National media become free of a negative external influence”*.

The ban of the Russian channels in 2016 has been followed by two additional bans to Russian channels and media content and Russian influence on Ukrainian media was highly limited (Unian, 2017). While the ban of 2014 was aiming at stopping a [III.4] “negative information-psychological pressure on Ukrainian citizens”, the following ban have different goals. In February 2015 the legislative procedure N.3395 on “Media information” was approved. The new law implemented "the protection of information television and radio space of Ukraine" and prohibited the showing on Ukrainian television of “any audio-visual content containing "popularization, propaganda, propaganda, any action of law enforcement agencies, armed forces, other military, military or security forces of an invader" (Unian, 2017) Also, more than 100 Russian-produced film and TV series were forbidden. In January 2016 The Ukrainian National TV and Radio Council declared that 15 Russian channels did not meet the requirements of the European Convention on trans-frontier Television. Therefore, their broadcasting in Ukrainian cable were also banned from the Ukrainian cable TV. In total, after the ban of 2014, over 50 more channels were banned in 2015 and 2016 (Espresso, 2016). Therefore, as at the June of 2016, no Russian channels had the license to broadcast in Ukraine and Russian content on Ukrainian TV had decreased from 3 to 4 times (Unian, 2017)). The fact that two more bans were implemented by Ukrainian government indicates that the securitization of the media sphere became more and more important for Ukrainian national security. Also, the persistent conflict in the east of the country required a more drastic approach to the issue of information aggression. As

consequence, the impact of Russian soft power in 2017 in the TV sphere was extremely low in comparison to the previous years.

In October 2016 two Russian channels “Радость моя” and “Еврокино” acquired the license to broadcast in Ukraine (Espresso, 2016) followed by four other channels in November/December. As today (July 2017), six Russian channels are available in the Ukrainian cable network.

Despite seeming to contradict the Ukrainian national policy over the ban of the Russian channels, the license given to the six channels is a result of the effectiveness of the Ukrainian media security policy. Indeed, while the most viewed and dangerous channels in terms of national security were blocked, some free and small channels could enter into Ukrainian market.

On the contrary, more issues persist in terms of ownership of some channels groups. For example, Inter Channel, the most popular Russian speaking channel in Ukraine, is still partially controlled by Russian Channel One’s group (Reporter Without Borders, 2015).² Also, many channels are in the hands of oligarchs with direct connections with the Russian government and might still be used by Russia to exercise its soft power in Ukraine. Hence, this is the weakest element of Ukrainian securitization policies since they were ineffective in breaking the cultural and economic ties between Russia and Ukrainian media.

However, in terms of quantity, the presence of Russian media content in Ukraine is dramatically decreased. In 2017 Ukrainians national channels are by far the most used source of information (87.1% of Ukrainians get information from them) and Russian channels have an extremely limited influence with only 7.9% of Ukrainian citizens consuming information from Russian sources. (Media Sapiens survey; 2017). As result, Ukrainians are certainly less influenced by Russian TV contents. This change of perspective has also a huge impact in terms of information security. As an information source about the Donbas conflict, the Ukrainian national channels are trusted the most. On the contrary, the trust to Russian TV channels is almost non-existing. Indeed, Media Sapiens’ survey shows that only 1.3% of Ukrainians trust Russian channels as an information source about the military conflict in Donbas. Even in the eastern Ukraine, the people who trust Russian channels as main source of information is almost zero (0.8%).

Different sources and data shows then a change of perception of Russian sources. While Russian media content were often perceived to be better than Ukrainian ones, nowadays the situation is the opposite. This perspective’s change is quite evident in relation to the war event. Indeed, as source of

information about the war events Russian TV-channels are among the less trusted channels in Ukraine. Only 1.7% of Ukrainians uses Channel One as main media information source, 1.1%, NTV and 0.9%, Dozhd (Media Sapiens's survey, 2017).

Nonetheless, despite the implementations of three different bans many Ukrainian citizens can still watch Russian-TV channels at home. 11.6% of the respondents of Media Sapiens' survey (2017) said that could watch Russian TV at home. The majority of them uses satellite dish (78.7%), cable (6.4%) or Internet (7.8%) while people living on the bordering regions with Russia can get access to Russian channels (5.8%) through analog antenna (Media Sapiens's survey, 2017). Therefore, on a technological level, Ukrainian securitization policies have a limitation to achieve the full ban of Russian TV channels. Therefore, despite the reduction of Russian TV contents in terms of both quality and quantity, the securitization policies of Ukraine could not achieve a full technological protection (technological gap).

II. Results

While Russian elite still see mass communication as a crucial arena of international politics, in the context of Ukraine the securitization policies have successfully reduce their impact. Russia still have some indirect ways to access Ukrainian media landscape.

This means include

- 1) The partial ownership of Ukrainian channels and direct connections with their owners;
- 2) The use of Russian channels which have the license to broadcast in Ukraine;
- 3) Regular broadcasting activities in the boarding regions and/or through satellite or cable tv due to the ban technological gap.

However, it seems that the Russian capacity to exercises soft power through TV in Ukraine is nowadays considerably limited. This is not only due to the securitization policies implemented by the Ukrainian government, but also to the general tendency to not trust Russian sources. Therefore, since Ukrainian media are now free of a negative external influence this part of the causal mechanism is verified.

2. Identarian Factor

I. Observation Phase

- Part of the mechanism to be observed: National media become more Ukrainian oriented and improve their quality and pluralism.
(This observation phase will focus on the Ukrainian orientation part.)

Until the recent time the identarian question have facilitated the broadcasting of Russian media content, especially in the Russian speaking area of Ukraine (A. Wilczewska and R. Sakwa, 2016, p.63-65). While in western Ukraine Russian media had a limited influence, due to ethnic and linguistic factors Russian and Russian speaking channels and media contents were always more popular than their Ukrainian counterpart. This situation does not seem to be changed since Russian TV channels are still more popular in the eastern part of the country than in the western Ukraine (Media Sapiens's survey, 2017). Also, 37,4% of residents in the East are still able to get access to the Russian channels (Media Sapiens's survey, 2017). This shows that a Russian speaking audience still exists in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government has tried to develop a stronger Ukrainian speaking media market through legislative procedures. The parliamentary discussion on this topic lasted for 3 years, from 2014 to 2017. On May 2017, the Verkhovna Rada passed the law n. 5313. The new law stipulates that in each national channel the Ukrainian-language content must be 75% of the broadcasting time during the day time. Since September 2017 all the national channels must provide at least 75% of Ukrainian-language programs and films and local and regional channels should provide at least 60% in Ukrainian (50% in the first reading). Therefore, the presence of Russian and Russian speaking content will considerably decrease in the following months. The law n.5313 is considered by Ukrainian government as a way to create a solid Ukrainian speaking TV market. However, some members of the opposition consider it as an example of Ukrainization and a total violation of human rights of national minorities (Ukrhot News, 2017).

Indeed, the implementation of the quota established by the law n. 5313 will be particularly problematic for those channels which broadcast mainly in Russian such as Inter (26% of Ukrainian content), Ukraina (26%) or K2 (36%) or regional channels in the southern-east part of the country. However, other channels such as Channel 5, Espresso and First already broadcast almost 100% of their content in Ukrainian (Rada Infographics, 2017).

Despite the government was totally in favour of the introduction of the quota, the percentage of people opposing to the law n. 5313 was considerably high. While 48% of people see the new quota as favourable, over 24% were against it (Center of Democratic Initiatives, 2017). Among the people who support the initiative, 77% live in western Ukraine, 50% in central Ukraine, 34% in the East and 22% in the South. However, in the Southern Ukraine people opposing to the new law was 41% and in the East 33%. Also, in the south and eastern part a considerable percentage of the people do not care about the implementation of the quota for the Ukrainian language, with respectively 26% in both

of the regions. Nonetheless some civic movements such as “Boycott Russian Films” support the quota introduction.

Another issue with the implementation of the law is the language of film and series. Currently, movies and series are broadcasted in Ukraine in different languages. Even Ukrainian national products are often produced and broadcasted in Russian. But after the introduction of the quota, films and series will need to be broadcasted exclusively in Ukrainian. As consequence, foreign production, Ukrainian productions in Russian, soviet movies and products filmed in the languages of the people of the USSR and dubbed in Russia can be broadcasted only outside the limits of the Ukrainian-language programs. Moreover, commercial advertising will be also counted within the limits and, as consequence, Russian advertising in Ukraine will probably disappear.

The problem of the consensus of both Media/TV groups and public opinion will be thus fundamental in achieving the Ukrainization of the national TV. In fact, in 2012, the Ukrainian government had already tried to implement a similar law. However, the low popular support and the media’s attention to the issue made its implementation a failure. As consequence, Ukrainian language tv did not really consolidate its position and during Yanukovich’s mandate, the “Kivalov-Kolesnichenko’s Law” decreased the quota of Ukrainian on the national channels. Indeed, Kivalov-Kolensinchenko’s law was highly supported by the people living in the southern-eastern part of the country and Russian speaking media groups.

II. Results

Due to the recent implementation of the law, it is problematic to claim that Ukrainian channels became more Ukrainian oriented after the ban of the Russian channel. Ukrainian government has successfully implemented the law n. 5313 which can effectively promote and create a new Ukrainian media landscape. However, the implementation of the law and its effectiveness will depend mainly on the level of support within the Ukrainian society.

Firstly, Ukrainian channels and media companies will need to create new business models to adapt their broadcasting activities to the Ukrainian quota. In particular, they will need to allocate more financial resources to the dubbing of old contents or the creation of new Ukrainian content. Since these processes of adaptation will be extremely costly, media companies might use their information power to lobby the Ukrainian government and make it to reduce the quota of Ukrainian contents. Also, companies which use TV advertising in Russia can oppose to the new quota since Russian advertises can achieve more effectively people from different regional parts of Ukraine.

Secondly, the level of popular support to the new quota will also be extremely important to test the effectiveness of the law. Indeed, people in southern and eastern Ukraine are highly opposing to the new language regulation. Therefore it is very likely that their level of affiliation to Ukrainian TV will decrease and, as consequence, they might start watching more Russian Federation's banned channels programmes through cable or satellite TV.

Consequently, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian legislative's means to eliminate the identarian factor is hard to measure. On the one hand, the quota for the Ukrainian language will certainly create a strong Ukrainian media landscape where the influence of Russian will be reduced. However, as said, the popular and business groups' support is extremely important in a long-term perspective.

Since Ukrainian channels are undoubtedly more Ukrainian oriented but the stability of the new tendency is still uncertain, this part of the mechanism is only partially oriented.

3. Quality Factor

1. Observation phase

- Part of the mechanism to be observed: *become more independent and improved their quality and pluralism after the ban of the Russian channels*
This observation will focus on the quality and pluralism.

Ukrainian government have tried to develop a quality-oriented media landscape by increasing pluralism and adopting new legislative procedures. Freedom House (FH) registered a slow but constant process of improvements in pluralism and quality of information in Ukraine. In particular, during Poroshenko's mandate in 2015's report FH recorded that the new presidency "brought considerable change to the Ukrainian media landscape, and the government no longer seeks to systematically control television". Also, in 2016's report FH noticed that within the law that banned over a dozen of Russian channel "Ukraine's national and regional state-owned broadcasters were transferred to a new public-service broadcasting corporation, with a supervisory council on which civil society representatives would hold a majority." (Freedom House Report, 2016). These changes are the result of a new attitude in Ukraine. While before Euromaidan Ukraine shown little or no interest in establishing a modern media market based on pluralism, the country increased media capacity to guarantee a quality-based pluralism through new legislation.

The Institute of Mass Information (IMI) in 2015 and 2016 recorded the same trend of FH. In particular, the violations of journalists' rights decreased from 995 in 2014 to respectively 310 in 2015 and 264 in 2016 (IMI Chronicle of Freedom of Speech, 2016). This trend has not a direct link with

the ban of Russian channels. However, the absence of trans-frontier televisions have certainly facilitated the implementation of a new national public broadcasting system. For example, the creation of a public broadcaster was a crucial priority within the Council of Europe Plan for Ukraine for 2015-2017. This Action Plan aimed at supporting Ukraine in fulfilling its statutory and specific obligations as a Council of Europe member state in order to contribute towards addressing fundamental issues of human rights and rule of law in Ukraine. Ukraine considers the creation of a new public broadcaster as the first step to increase the quality of media contents, reform regional broadcasting entities and set up new national standards that would positively impact on media environment based on European standard (Council of Europe, 2017). Also, the new public broadcaster introduced new supervisory bodies which are responsible to “control the use of broadcasting channels and financial and economic activities of the TV/radio company” and “give the approval of nominees to be a head and members of the Administrative Council of the Public TV and Radio Broadcasting”

Considering the new government’s attitude and the reform of the public broadcaster, Ukraine is considerably investing resources to increase the quality of its media and therefore their quality. However, despite the improvements in many sectors of media, Ukrainian TV channels are still perceived as unreliable by the great majority of Ukrainians. The trust in traditional media have constantly decreased since 2014 and only 40.6% of Ukrainians still trust TV channels (Detektor Media, 2016). Indeed, Ukrainians still consider national media as poor in terms of quality and claim they are responsible for information distortion. This tendency is particular interesting in light of what it was noticed in the section 5.2.I While nowadays the presence of Russian media in Ukraine is almost non-existing both in terms of quantity and quality, Ukrainian national media have the monopoly of the information environment but they failed to increase their perceptions among Ukrainian audience. Indeed TCH, one of the richest and most consolidated media in Ukraine, is by far the most trusted while other media outlets with lower financial resources are less trusted. As consequence, the level of pluralism based on quality is still low.

The perception of media quality is also shaped by the complexity of Ukrainian freedom of speech. Despite central government have facilitated the work of media since 2014, local authorities and public officials have constantly violated and threatened the freedom of speech (Chronicle of freedom of speech, 2016). This phenomenon has certainly an impact on the perception of media works, especially at the local level where media groups are closer to their audience. In addition, the perspective for the future are quite negative. The new public broadcaster is currently financed by the consortium of contribution to the action plan for Ukraine. The consortium includes 16 countries which will finance the

broadcaster until 31 December 2018. After that date, no plans for a further international contribution have been set yet (Council of Europe, 2017). At the moment, The Ukrainian public broadcaster “is woefully short of personnel, resources, and know-how” (Council of Europe, 2017).

II. Results

Ukraine has certainly developed a national strategy to increase the quality of its media system. This strategy includes a new government’s attitude to increase pluralism and the cooperation with international organization such as the Council of Europe to implement a new Public Broadcaster.

However, different issues persist in the perception of the quality of the information. In particular, people do not seem have changed attitude vis-à-vis media quality. Despite the absence of Russian channels, Ukrainian national media are still considered to be unreliable and manipulative. Therefore, the channels with more financial resources can more easily get popular among the Ukrainian audience.

Finally, the perspective for the future are still ambiguous. The public broadcaster is financially dependent on the Council of Europe’s consortium donations. Hence, its long-term capability can be negatively affected by the lack of resources.

Hence, despite Ukrainian ‘governments efforts, the quality and pluralism did not significantly change after the ban of the Russian channels. Therefore, this part of the mechanism is partially verified.

4. Political Factor

I. Observation phase

- Part of the mechanism to be observed: **National media** *support democratization*

As the political situation stabilized in 2015, conditions for the media in Ukraine showed signs of improvement in the political sphere as well. During the last 3 years, Ukraine has made big progress in media freedom, despite the conflict in East and several episodes of violence against journalists. For instance, the Reporters Without Borders reported that since 2015 the country has constantly improved its position in the Press Freedom Index, in 2016 Ukraine moved up 22 positions (from 129 in 2015 to 107) and in 2017 5 more positions (from 107 to 102). Ukrainians are also more aware of the media issues in their country. NGO Internews annual survey in 2015/2016 shows that “the number of people responding that they know who owns the local and national media has jumped up to 35%

(local) and 50% (national)” (Internews, 2016) In addition, around 40% of respondents believed that transparency around media ownership is an important issue in Ukraine while only 28% consider the issue as not important. The awareness that media ownership can influence content is a significant step within Ukrainian media landscape, which has long-defended by post-Soviet media practises (Inernnews, 2016).

The awareness of the ownership issue is reflected in the parliament as well. In 2015 Ukraine adopt and partially implement the law N.1831 which strengths the rules about transparency in media ownership and create a new State policy in the sphere of radio and TV broadcasting. The law prescribes certain limits in terms of media concentration and set transparent criteria for the trade in media sphere (IMI, 2016). In addition, FH noticed in a report (2016) that several positive steps were taken to solve the media system’s structural problems. For example, a law on public broadcasting was adopted on March 19 that harmonizes Ukrainian public broadcasting company with European standards. The new National Broadcasting Company’s Council has 17 members of which 9 form NGO’s and civil society and 8 from parliamentary groups.

Nonetheless, despite the legislative improvements, little or no changes have been noticed regarding the political factor in Ukraine. The Institute of Mass Information (IMI) and The Reporters without borders launched in 2014 a permanent project monitor media ownership in the country. The monitoring project recorded that ownership structure of the main media groups in Ukraine has not changed in the last three years. In particular, IMI disclosed two main area of risks: media ownership concentration and control over media financial resources and distribution networks.

Media ownership concentration

Oligarchs who controlled the Ukrainian TV market before 2014 are still in control of the main channels and media groups. Despite the adoption of the Transparency law in 2015 which oblige all TV and Radio outlets to disclose their ownership structures and make them public, oligarchs mediatic ties between politics and the business sector are still in place and the new legislative changes did not affect them. In addition, some oligarchs have even consolidated their position within the Ukrainian TV market. The regulatory safeguards concerning ownership concentration either do not exist or are not effectively used. Also, criteria to calculate media concentration (especially for TV groups) is extremely broad and therefore there is not an effective state’s controlling activity (IMI, 2016). Information and Reporters Without Borders (2016) claim that the weakness of a strong state regulation made private owners not only to dominate the Ukrainian TV marketplace, but to dominate it through their economic power.

In addition, without the Russian channels competition, audio-visual market became more concentrated in terms of audience as well. In 2016 FH noticed that oligarchic dominance of the Ukrainian media market continues to serve the political and economic interests of their owners. In particular, four major TV owners are now in control of more than three quarters of the media share (IMI, 2016).

The four groups are:

- StarLight Media (21.68% of the share) controlled by Victor Pinchuk;
- 1+1 media (20.49% of the share) partially controlled by Ihor Kolomoyskyi;
- Inter Media (21.42% of the share) partially controlled by Dmytro Firtash;
- Media Group Ukraine (12.66%) controlled by Rinat Akhmetov.

Ukrainian media system is not only still controlled by oligarchs' media groups, but also their media influence has grown. As consequence, the process of democratization can be intensively shaped by the oligarchs' media power since their media groups have also strong connections with politics. Indeed, the issue of the connections between politics and media owners persist in Ukraine and the securitization of the media sphere did not change this tendency.

Control over media financial resources and distribution networks

Different organization (OSCE, FH and IMI) claim that the advertising market and the media funding in Ukraine is not transparent. Generally, media companies do not make financial information or information related to advertisements public (IMI, 2016). Also, information about state advertising is not public either but IMI reports that "State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover all major media outlets in the country" (IMI, 2016). This is possible because Ukrainian legislation is still ambiguous regarding state advertising and funding. Indeed, financial information is currently available only for the Public Broadcasting Service. The issue has a huge impact on the media market since the majority of media companies have direct or indirect links to a political party (IMI, 2016). Therefore, political sectors and media are still financially linked to each other. Indeed, distribution networks are often politically affiliated and they still take occasionally actions to cut off some contents. (IMI, 2016)

The Council of Europe in a report of 2016 the interaction between politics and media funding in Ukraine is the first dynamic that keeps the oligarchy alive. Since running political campaign is extraordinarily expensive in a country with a real GDP of only 132 billion dollars, the controlling of media (in particular TV) implies the control of the electoral process. Indeed, the entire process of TV

and newspaper coverage during the electoral campaign is penetrated and regulated by money of which only a small part comes from media adverts. On the contrary, Ukrainian political campaigns involve huge amounts of patronage including gift distribution, corruption and bribery (CoE, 2016). Consequently, oligarchs owning the most viewed channels determine the visibility of politicians and even select them, particularly “the candidates who rely on “political technology” – the sophisticated, oligarch-funded industry of electoral manipulation” (CoE, 2016). In such context, new and more reform-minded parties, NGO activists and independent media platforms struggle to make their voices heard if they are not on oligarch-controlled TV system. As result, the financial control of oligarchs in the TV sphere make almost impossible to develop a real and transparent market which can concretely support the process of democratization.

II. Results

Ukrainian government has certainly tried to develop a more free and pluralistic media. However, has shown in previous two sections, the result has been partially achieved. As consequence, Ukrainian media are not free and pluralistic. The reforms implemented by the Ukrainian government were insufficient and they did not create a virtuous circle that supports democratization.

As consequence, the issues related to the oligarch system persisted today in Ukraine. Oligarchs are still in control of the great majority of media outlets. Without the competition of the Russian channels their media groups have increased their concentration in terms of audience. Despite this not being a negative event as such, it shows that Ukrainian market is not really free, mainly because the connections between oligarchs and politics is still in place. In particular, through their media power, oligarchs can significantly shape the process of democratization in Ukraine.

While media lobbying activities are common in democratic countries as well, in the case of Ukraine the highly connected relations between media outlets and elected officials make the process of democratization highly problematic (CoE, 2016). Indeed, the persistent dominance of oligarch-controlled TV channels allows for the maintain of the current political situation. Therefore, Ukrainian media nowadays are not free and pluralistic and they do not support the process of democratization. This part of the mechanism is thus not verified.

5. Result phase

Taking into account the analysis included in the previous chapter, the results of the process is included in the following graph:

Therefore, this specific casual mechanism is not present within the case study of Ukraine. As consequence, the effects of the securitization of media (X) through the ban of the Russian channels have a limited effect on the process of democratization (Y) in Ukraine.




Figure 5

6. Conclusions

Despite many other factors shape modern democracy, the role of media in promoting democracy is essential since it enhances public participation in the political sphere. The object of this MA dissertation was to look at the role of media within the process of democratization in the post-Maidan Ukraine. Particularly, the thesis focused on the acts of securitization that have taken place in relations to the threat of the Russian media described in the chapter 1 and its implication for the consolidation of democracy in the country. As it was argued throughout the thesis, Ukrainian democratization is a *sui generis* process since it is taking place while the country is experiencing an external aggression. As consequence, two different and opposite tendencies are present in the country. On the one hand, the Ukrainian government is trying to develop a more transparent and liberal political system to achieve democratization. On the other hand, Ukraine is also reacting to the Russian military aggression both on the military and informational level.

Literature and theories review have shown that states' media controlling activities can take place and be used in different political context. Their implementation can, however have different political and social consequences. Indeed, media are not only a tool for informing and educating citizens but they can shape public debate on key topics for a country's stability. Therefore, media controlling activities are quite common even in democratic states. However, acts of media restriction such as censorship are much more complicated to be implemented in democratic countries as they question the legitimacy of democracy. Because of that, in democratizing countries acts of censorship can limit or affect the democratic consolidation's outcome. Democratization implies substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction (Prezeworski, 2003) and consequently it also implies freedom of information. Media censorship is thus a potential challenge to a democratic consolidation process.

The case of Ukraine is even more complicated. The widespread presence of the Russian TV contents in Ukraine was a security issue not only because Russian media content limited (directly and indirectly) the emergence of a free and transparent Ukrainian market (Smyth and Soboleva, 2014, pp. 257-275). They posed a security threat to Ukrainian statehood because within the context of the Russian military aggression they have a huge influencing power over thousands of citizens. As result, Ukrainian democratic consolidation was questioned by Russian media contents. Indeed, the Kremlin considers mass communication (in particular, TV) as a crucial arena of international politics. According to the Russian national security strategy, the capability to project narratives to foreign audiences is a method to transmit messages and frame issues in the post-Soviet space (A.Wilczewska

and R. Sakwa, 2016, p.22-25). In the case of Ukraine, the manipulation of the information and the use of Russian media in Ukraine aimed at “demonizing” the new elected government and, as consequence, its efforts to create a more democratic Ukraine.

My analysis suggests that in the Ukrainian public discourse, Russian media strategy was understood as a mediatic precondition to invade Ukrainian territory on the physical level through the military aggression. In particular, Ukrainian political actors claim the existence of a considerable psychological pressure coming from Russian media and targeting residents of Donbass and Crimea to destabilize Ukraine. Also, in the Ukrainian public discourse, spreading myths about the legitimacy of Ukrainian government was seen as a part of a Russian strategy to prevent Ukrainians to achieve their “European Future” and “democracy”. Therefore, Russian hostile attitude towards Ukraine is often presented to be a threat not only for Ukraine and other post-Soviet country but also for the peace within the entire Europe. All these elements are used by Ukrainian governments to justify the ban of the Russian channels which was included within a bigger securitization strategy. In particular, the Ukrainian government claimed that as there are multiple relations between the process of democratization and national security, the ban of the Russian channels could have a positive impact on the consolidation of democracy. Within this view, the ban of the Russian channels is not seen as a conventional act of censorship but it is claimed to be an instrument to both respond to the Russian aggression and achieve a more open and democratic society.

On the practical level, a mutual dependent process between securitization and democratization has not been found. Therefore, the claim that the ban can have a positive influence on the development of a more democratic Ukraine seems problematic. The prohibition of broadcasting Russian media content has certainly been successfully implemented by the Ukrainian government as nowadays the impact of Russian channels in the Ukrainian media landscape is quite insignificant. However, several issues persist. Firstly, the absence of the Russian competition did not rapidly increase the quality and the quantity of the Ukrainian products. Ukrainians are generally more sceptical about the quality of their TV contents than before as they trust less and less Ukrainian newscasts. Also, the new Ukrainian public broadcaster has only been created through the international support of donors and it is still dramatically underfunded. As consequence, its impact on the Ukrainian media landscape is limited. Secondly, Ukraine introduced the law on the Ukrainian quota only in 2016. As consequence, a solid Ukrainian speaking TV market is absent in Ukraine and media groups still make use of Russian contents. Moreover, the popular support the quota’s introduction is low in those areas where Russian is more spoken. Lastly, the oligarchic system still controls the great majority of media outlets in Ukraine and some of them, after the introduction of the Russian ban, have paradoxically increase

their media influence in Ukraine. This proves that oligarchs' media concentration and financial capacity are still a huge problem since their existence prevent Ukraine to develop a free market landscape and, at the same time, to develop a more transparent relation between media and politics. In particular, the main issues are present in relation to the media ownership regulations which are still too weak to limit oligarchs' influence and the network distribution of contents and financial resources.

Consequently, the ban of the Russian channels has an extremely limited impact on the process of democratization in Ukraine. As extraordinary measure generated from an act of securitization, the ban of Russian channel has certainly blocked the Russian media threat. However, little or no improvements can be recorded in terms of democratic development in media. In fact, different media reforms did not generate a positive circle that facilitated the consolidation of free and pluralistic media environment.

As I mentioned in methodology chapter, my research depends on the idea that acts of securitization might positively effect democratization. Despite, this specific case-study shows that the two processes are partially related to each other, future theoretical research is needed to better develop the casual relation presented in chapter 4. In particular, a comparative analysis of media securitization and democratic consolidation might also be necessary to better understand to what extent the two processes influence each other.

Furthermore, a future research will also need to focus on this specific case study. Indeed, the effects of the ban of the Russian channel are still limited in terms of time. Therefore, a long-term study focusing on the development of pluralism and freedom of media in Ukraine will certainly better grasp the ban's influence on the process of consolidation of democracy. My personal recommendation for a future researcher is to apply quantitative methods on the development of media and Ukraine. By developing a system of measurements of different improvements in the media, it will be possible to test the casual mechanism in a long-term perspective and thus to record the developments of the media sectors within Ukraine.

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APPENDIX I

Poroshenko's speech at the inauguration of the Parliament (06/07/2014).

<p>1. The victorious Revolution of Dignity did not only change the government. The country became different. The people became different. The time for irreversible positive changes has come. In order to make them, we need, first and foremost, peace, security and unity.</p>	<p>Poroshenko starts his speech stating that the change in Ukraine needs to be supported by peace and security.</p>
<p>2. A real war, planned and developed in Ukrainian Donbas is standing in the way of the colossal opportunities for European modernisation of Ukraine, that presented themselves after the fall of tyranny. Before, many have thought that we gained Independence without any effort.</p>	<p>He claims that Ukraine was accused to achieve political goals without any effort. That had an impact on the current situation.</p>
<p>3. This is not true! Entire generations of Ukrainian patriots fought fought for our independence, our freedom. The heroes of the Heaven's Hundred fell for it. Ukrainian soldiers and peaceful civilians are dying for it. I am asking to commemorate those who fell for the will and independence of Ukraine in a moment of silence.</p>	<p>Poroshenko stressed the idea that Ukrainian freedom and independence required a huge effort.</p>
<p>4. I am assuming the post of President in order to preserve and reinforce Ukrainian unity. Provide long-term peace and guarantee stable security. I know that peace is the most important thing the Ukrainian people are wishing for today.</p>	<p>He identifies the political goals of his mandate with peace and security.</p>
<p>5. The head of state has a wide range of varied instruments for the provision of Ukraine's territorial integrity and peaceful life for the citizens. Power and determination will not be lacking. I don't want war. I don't want revenge. Though before my eyes is the enormous sacrifice that the Ukrainian people have made. I want peace and I will achieve unity for Ukraine. Therefore, I begin my work with a proposal of a peace plan.</p>	<p>Poroshenko is saying that he has the way to ensure security within Ukraine. However, he stresses his intention to work initially for a peace plan. In this sentence, he separates peace from security.</p>
<p>6. I insist that all those who got armed illegally, to put down their weapons. I return I guarantee, first, amnesty for those whose hands have not been stained with the blood of Ukrainian soldiers and peaceful</p>	<p>He announces the solutions of its peace plane. He uses a metaphor to better clarify why an amnesty is needed. Moreover, he is insisting on the necessity of a peaceful solution.</p>

<p>civilians. And those who are not involved in financing terrorism. Second, a controlled corridor for Russian mercenaries that are willing to return home. Third, peaceful dialogue.</p>	
<p>7. Naturally, not with “Streloks,” “Abwehrs,” “Devils” or any other filth. I am talking about dialogue with the peaceful citizens of Ukraine. Even those who have a vision of the future of Ukraine different from my own. Today, I want to address our compatriots from Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts separately.</p>	<p>He announces that he is ready to speak with people from Donetsk and Luhansk and admits that he can accept different political views.</p>
<p>8. (He starts speaking Russian) Our dear brothers and sisters, our compatriots! Many of you have already felt the “wonders” of terrorist government. They, besides pillaging and humiliating peaceful civilians, have brought the already crisis economy of the region to the brink of complete disaster. But we will not lead you under any circumstances.</p>	<p>By using Russian, he is “othering” the citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk. The use of “we” marks an implicit difference between the Ukrainian government and people in Donetsk and Luhansk. However, he announces that he wants to find a shared solution with the “other” as well.</p>
<p>9. The national elections of the President have put a complete stop to the myth of the so-called illegitimate Kyiv government. This myth was planted and grown by Russian propaganda and Yanukovich’s clan, which betrayed Donbas and stole more from it than the entire country.</p>	<p>He addresses Russian propaganda and Yanukovich’s clan as responsible for the disinformation in Donbas. He also accuses Yanukovich to have betrayed its citizens.</p>
<p>10. They exclusively ruled Donetsk Oblast for 17 years. And now they are financing terrorists. It is them who are totally responsible for the political and socio-economical situation which the region has ended up in. For unemployment, poverty and the refugees. And for the murdered civilians, and the tears of the mothers.</p>	<p>Once again, he stresses that those who have ruled Donbas are the sole responsible for the war. Yanukovich and his clan are then identified as enemy of their country.</p>
<p>11. What will I bring as President to you, when I come in the nearest future? Peace. A project for the decentralisation of government. The guarantee of free usage of the Russian language in your region. A firm intention not to divide Ukrainians into right and wrong. Respect for the specifics of the regions. The right of local communities to their own nuances in issues of historical memory, pantheon of heroes, religious traditions</p>	<p>He is saying to be the solution to all the problems in Donbas. He is offering solution to the problems faced by population in Donbas.</p>

<p>12. A project, which has been developed before the elections in collaboration with our partners from the European Union, to create new workplaces in the East of Ukraine. A perspective of investment, a project for economical reconstruction of Donbas</p>	<p>He recognizes EU as privileged partners for the future of both Ukraine and Donbas. Thus, he implicitly claims that Russia won't be part of its project.</p>
<p>13. Today we need a legitimate dialogue partner. We will not speak with terrorists. And the acting members of the local councils do not represent anyone anymore. And we are ready to declare early local elections in Donbas.</p>	<p>He stresses the need of a new legitimate partner. He is also saying that local military elite are a threat for democracy thus new elections are needed.</p>
<p>14. (He switches back to Ukrainian) This is my peace plan for Donbas and the entire country. The issue of territorial integrity of Ukraine is not to be discussed. As soon as I have sworn "to protect the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine with all my deeds," I will always remain faithful to this sacred oath.</p>	<p>Once again, he claims that his ultimate goal is to protect Ukraine. In this way, he is identifying the territorial integrity of Ukraine as referent object of its policy.</p>
<p>15. The number of people that I have had the honour to meet during my electoral campaign surpassed a million. Ukraine is varies, but it is strong in spirit, and in spirit it is united! The will for peace and unity of our state dominates in all Ukrainian oblasts. I am deeply touched by the patriotism of the citizens of southern and eastern Ukrainian oblasts from Odesa to Kharkiv oblasts.</p>	<p>Poroshenko stresses how important unity is for Ukraine and his mandate. He also underlines that patriotism has a positive impact in his country.</p>
<p>16. Peace has not yet come, but already today we can firmly state that tremendous ordeals have united the Ukrainian family. They made us stronger as a Ukrainian political nation, which is sure in its European choice. Our people have never been as strong as they are now. But freedom is not given once and for all. It has to be fought for constantly.</p>	<p>As in the opening sentence, he claims that the "European choice" has a tremendous potential. However, he also remarks that Ukraine needs to fight to achieve freedom.</p>
<p>17. The peace that we are hoping to reach in the nearest future will not last long if we don't strengthen our security accordingly. For peace to last, we need to get accustomed to living in conditions of constant preparation for war. We have to keep our gunpowder dry.</p>	<p>With this sentence, Poroshenko stressed that security is the most important goal Ukraine has to reach. Also, security needs to be reinforced to achieve peace.</p>

<p>18. The army and its rearmament using the efforts of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex is our main priority. What is more, the state orders to the military-industrial complex facilities will push for the re-industrialization of the economy. Those who save on feeding their own armed forces is feeding the enemy army. And our army has to become a real elite of Ukraine. The word “General” has to be associated not with the word “corruption,” but with the word “hero.”</p>	<p>Poroshenko identifies as key priority the rearmament through military-industrial complexes. This implies that huge investments will be made in the field of security. He wants to improve people’s opinion of military forces as well.</p>
<p>19. We have to make our own effort to achieve everything that the provision of stable peace and security of Ukraine depend on. Our best allies and best guarantees of peace are the army, the fleet, the National Guard and professional special services! Nobody will protect us until we learn to defend ourselves.</p>	<p>Security is identity again as key priority. However, here he claims that security can be achieved only through the improvements of the national armies. Only Ukraine must be responsible of its own defence.</p>
<p>20. I will use my diplomatic experience to ensure the signing of the international agreement which would replace the Budapest Memorandum. Such an agreement has to give direct and reliable guarantees of peace and security – to the extent of military support in case of threats to territorial integrity. Any aggressor on the Ukrainian border has to remember the Biblical wisdom: live by the sword, die by the sword!</p>	<p>Budapest Agreement needs to be reviewed and Poroshenko’s experience can be used to achieve this goal. Russia is not mentioned but it is implicitly recognised as aggressor on the Ukrainian border.</p>
<p>21. The citizens of Ukraine will be unable to feel the virtues of peace and security until we regulate our relations with Russia. Russia has occupied Crimea which was, is, and will be Ukrainian. Yesterday, during a meeting in Normandy, this is what I told Putin – Crimea is Ukrainian. Period. There cannot be compromise with anyone in issues of Crimea, European choice and state order. And the rest has to be discussed and decided at the talks table.</p>	<p>Relations with Russia are here recognized as a threat. Crime within Ukraine, democratization and the new state order cannot be object of any discussion with Putin.</p>
<p>22. Any attempts at external and internal enslavement of Ukrainians encounter and will encounter a confident response. We want to be free. And living in a new way is living freely in the conditions a political system which guarantees the rights and freedoms of the individual and the nation. I would like to emphasise my dedication to the idea of the parliamentary-presidential republic. No usurping of power!</p>	<p>Any further Russian interference in Ukraine will be stopped. Poroshenko stresses that a change is needed also in terms of political system. Once again, we see how security and democratization are linked in Poroshenko’s words.</p>

<p>23. European democracy for me is the best way of state government which has been invented by humans. European experience tells us that the majority of power already has to be delegated from the centre to the local government bodies. The reform regarding decentralisation will begin this year with amendments to the Constitution.</p>	<p>Democratization is recognized as a positive change. Further decentralisation policy will support this change.</p>
<p>24. The newly-elected local Council will receive new powers. However, Ukraine was, is, and will be a unitary state. Illusions of federation are ungrounded in Ukraine. An important part of social demands to the full reboot of the government are early elections of the Parliament.</p>	<p>Since territorial integrity was the referent object of his speech act, Poroshenko is willing to protect it even within democratization. Federal State is then not a goal.</p>
<p>25. Let us be frank. The acting members of this honorary body do not accord with the society's moods. Because it changed significantly in 2012. And living in a new way means not to go against the will of the people. Living freely means freely using one's mother-tongue. According to article 10 of the Constitution. It deems Ukrainian the only official language but guarantees the free development for Russian and other languages. The words "work," just like "peace," "salary," "pension," "stipend" sound the same or very similar in both Ukrainian and Russian.</p>	<p>Here he stresses again the importance of unity despite people's differences. The issue of the language won't be a problem in the future of Ukraine because the Constitution guarantees the use of Russian.</p>
<p>26. The availability of work is what gives a person the opportunity to live prosperously. I have received the biggest professional satisfaction from the creation of new jobs. What can make a person happier than work and a dignified salary for it? Workplaces have to be organised by business owners. And the head of state has to provide the conditions in which nobody and nothing prevents people from working.</p>	<p>He is claiming that his mandate will be based on his business experience. The State should encourage businessman to give job opportunities to people. However, it is also admitting that the government and the financial political groups will work side by side during his mandate.</p>
<p>27. The state will value the investment of the employer and taxpayer in the economy and social sphere. The provision of the people with work and dignified pay is the first guarantee of internal peace and national security</p>	<p>Securitization is also a matter of money. Cooperation with the financial political groups will be important</p>
<p>28. Though the government of economical processes belongs to the competence of the free market or the government, the President, as guarantee of the Constitution,</p>	<p>His presidency is seen as a way to facilitate democratization. New economic reforms and social justice are linked to each other.</p>

<p>is obliged to provide the conditions for innovational economy and social justice.</p>	
<p>29. An even distribution of national riches is of utmost importance today. But before we distribute national fortune, we have to multiply it. Ukraine has everything it needs to provide the people with European welfare.</p>	<p>European welfare is seen as a standard to achieve. New resources have then to be reallocated in order to do so.</p>
<p>30. We know how to and want to live on our own labour, we are able to be creative and innovative. We are even learning not to be jealous of the successes of one's neighbour or colleague. But we are still lagging behind. Why? Because, as opposed to us, the countries of the European community have built an economy of free competition. Of new ideas, business initiative, hard work, constant self-perfection. This is how it will be in Ukraine.</p>	<p>Economy is seen as a way to achieve social equality and democracy.</p>
<p>31. However, for this, we need to destroy corruption. We need a national anti-corruption pact between the government and the people. It is simple in its essence: the officials don't take, and the people don't give. We cannot change the country if we don't change ourselves, our own attitudes to our lives and to the lives of the entire country.</p> <p>32. Each one of us is partially responsible for the fact that Ukraine has entered a crisis of statehood. Some considered it a norm not to pay taxes. Some lived in luxury on state funds. Some voted and protested for money. Some got undeserved privileges and awards. And all together they ruined the foundation of social trust, bases of law and social organisation.</p>	<p>Corruption is identified as an issue which prevents social equality. Poroshenko addresses Ukrainians (we) as the responsible for this situation. A general change is then need to improve the social system.</p>
<p>33. Ukraine's European choice is the heart of our national ideal. This is the choice our ancestors and oracles have made. And what should we do, in order to live freely, live in prosperity, live in peace and security? All of this is written in the agreement for political association and the free trade zone with the European Union.</p> <p>We all made an effort for this document. Now I dream of making it reality, and for this we have to sign the economical part of the agreement as soon as possible. I have my pen in my hands, and as soon as the EU approves the according decision, the signature of the Ukrainian President will</p>	<p>European choice is seen as a way to achieve democracy and prosperity. The efforts to reach the agreement are linked back to Ukrainian history. Once again, economy is set as a priority.</p>

<p>immediately appear on this fateful document.</p>	
<p>34. We don't have the right to delay the signing of the economical part of the agreement. The same regards the swift implementation of a visa-free regime for Ukraine with the EU. We have finalised the first stage and will be able to finalise the second one very quickly, so that starting January 2015 Ukrainians will have the opportunity to travel without visas.</p>	<p>He identifies as key priority the visa free regime.</p>
<p>35. We see the association agreement as only the first step to Ukraine's full membership in the EU. Nobody has veto power on Ukraine's European choice. To admit this is to realise policies of peace and tranquillity in Ukraine. But this policy has gone bankrupt in the thirties of the previous century.</p>	<p>He associates modern Ukraine with the one in the thirties. The historical narrative used is then a way to recreate a new "old" threat.</p>
<p>36. To realise our ambitious plans, we need not only peace and unity of the country, but also the consolidation of all patriotic, pro-Ukrainian, pro-European powers. We have to constantly remember the harsh lessons of the national liberation battles of the 17-20's of the previous century. Back then our politicians were unable to unite and counter aggression together. Volodymyr Vynnichenko fought against Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Simon Petliura – against Pavlo Skoropadskiy. And Nestor Makhno – against everyone. The constant arguments and conflicts between leading Ukrainians caused the loss of our sovereignty. We have to draw conclusions not only from the century-old archives, but from the recent events as well.</p>	<p>By using historical narratives and references to important Ukrainian figures, he is underling the need of Ukrainian to unite and fight against the common threat.</p>
<p>37. We don't have the right to repeat old mistakes and we have to provide for the coordinated work of the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers. The time has come to build a new great country. Modern, highly technological, able to defend itself, able to compete. Let us account for the experience of the countries that appeared on the political map only several decades ago, but have become leaders, having betted on the development of intellect and modern</p>	<p>Here he is stressing the need to develop Ukrainian national security through both new technologies and human resources. The competition in which Ukraine will take a place is seen as a matter of defence and social development.</p>

<p>technologies. As the most valuable thing is not money, not factories and businesses, but the “human resource capital” that Ukraine has.</p>	
<p>38. There is no doubt that we will overcome all difficulties. We will fight for the territorial integrity of our state, we will provide peace and tranquility. Nobody will turn us into slaves of criminals and bureaucrats, into the servants of the colonial government. We have the support of the entire world. In the last three days I was able to see it for myself.</p>	<p>Here Poroshenko presents the “colonial argument” by which he identifies the threat of becoming a colony. In such way, he reconnects the idea of political development with security. Moreover, he stresses again the idea of security as key goal in his mandate.</p>
<p>39. All of Ukraine and all the Ukrainians in the world have united around the ideas of independence, freedom, dignity, legitimate state, European integration. The people have expressed their important opinion. During the revolutionary events. During the fight against aggression. During the elections. Now it is our turn, the government’s. I am extending a hand of peace to everyone who voted for me, and those who did not. To all those who will help establish peace, order and tranquility in Ukraine. And all those who believe in Ukraine’s European future.</p>	<p>Poroshenko claims to be the leader of all Ukrainians and present himself as a legitimate state actor. Moreover, he presents the European future as the path to follow.</p>
<p>40. We are a people that was torn away from its big Motherland – Europe – and we are returning to it. Finally and irreversibly. Peace to us! God bless us! Glory to Ukraine!</p>	<p>He concludes his speech with a mention to the concept of return. Ukraine is then perceived as a country which is breaking free from the external influence of Russia.</p>

APPENDIX II

Poroshenko's speech at the speech at the ceremony of signing the Association Agreement (06/27/2014).

<p>1. Dear Presidents! Dear Prime Ministers! Distinguished guests! What a great day! Maybe, the most important day for my country after the Independence Day. A moment of both historical and future importance. It shows how dramatically things can change in a short time.</p>	<p>Poroshenko opens its speech by addressing all the people present in the room. The opening sentence stresses the idea that the signature of the Association Agreement is the result of an historical process. But it has also been influence by the recent changes in the country.</p>
<p>2. I will sign up the Association Agreement by the pen which mentions: "EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Vilnius, 29 November". It didn't happen then. But the pen is the same demonstrating historic events are unavoidable.</p>	<p>He mentions that he is going to use the same pen that Yanukovich was supposed to signature event in November. By doing so he is remarking the difference between himself and the predecessor. Moreover, he presents himself as an actor of a unavoidable process.</p>
<p>3. The document that we will sign today is not just political and economic. It is a symbol of fate and unbreakable will. It is a tribute to people who gave their lives and health to make this moment happen. And it is the strongest reminder that today's Europe is and must be about people's determination to live in a better and fairer world.</p>	<p>Here he remarks the that the sign of the association agreement is based on people's will rather than a political decision. He is then acting not as the president of Ukraine but as the agent of Ukrainians' will.</p>
<p>4. It took Ukraine 7 long years to walk the terrible, thorny road towards the political association and economic integration with the EU. This road saw its ups and downs, but today, we are finally here. All Ukraine, including Crimea, is starting to be a member of the Association Agreement with the EU.</p>	<p>He stresses that Crimea is and it will be part of Ukraine. By doing so, he is admitting that the territorial integrity of Ukraine might be considered as a problem by someone but it not for him.</p>
<p>5. Dear friends! United Europe is the interest of all nations. Yet, this doesn't mean that it has no opponents. There have been many efforts to undermine the European unification project. Like they did in Ukraine throughout last months.</p>	<p>He is still addressing the people in the Room as Friends. By mentioning friends and opponents in the same sentence, he admits that there are difficulties in the path towards Europeanization. However, with the efforts of both Ukrainians and Europeans it can be achieved.</p>
<p>6. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are the countries that demonstrate new economic goals. But first and foremost it is freedom and democracy in the post-Soviet space that</p>	<p>He stresses that these three countries have a common past and future. He presents them as countries in between since they share not only a</p>

<p>will depend on the ability of these three countries to implement necessary reforms stipulated by the Agreement.</p>	<p>common past, but also common threats and challenges.</p>
<p>7. Of course, all of us would have wished to sign up the Agreement under different, more comfortable circumstances. On the other hand, the external aggression faced by Ukraine gives another strong reason for this crucial step.</p>	<p>Here he presents Ukraine as a unique case among the three countries mentioned before. The external aggression is a reason which push Ukraine to sign the association agreement. As consequence, the Association Agreement is seen as something more than a simple political agreement, but it is also a mean to achieve security.</p>
<p>8. By signing this Agreement, Ukraine takes enormous commitment in terms of reforms. But it is also a document of joint responsibility.</p>	<p>He stresses the idea that the signature implies responsibilities for Ukraine too. But he claims that also EU countries must be responsible for Ukraine as well.</p>
<p>9. So, in the spirit of the political association, we also expect that the EU will make everything to support our sovereign choice and protect Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity.</p>	<p>Here is the crucial point. The Association Agreement is seen as a way to achieve support for security. Not only Porshenko is saying that security and protection are part of it, but he also claims that Ukrainian security is a joint responsibility.</p>
<p>10. A lot will depend on the European solidarity with these three countries that paid a high price to be in Europe and with Europe. Will Europe be free or partly free? Will it have to worry about more wars and annexation? Or will it be confident in future? These aren't idle questions. And the answer will depend on success or failure of the documents that we will sign today.</p>	<p>Since his claim could be seen as a controversial point, he is saying that the three mentioned countries are victims of the history and they need to receive a compensation for it.</p> <p>He is avoiding to mention Russia, but he is implying that Europe can be a huge deterrent vis-à-vis Russian aggressive foreign policy.</p>
<p>11. Ukraine is determined to make it work. Our three countries embark on the way of painful but long overdue reforms. Economic integration and political association with the EU is our understanding of successful development.</p>	<p>Once again, he presents Economic development as a way to integrate into Europe. No mentions about Democracy at all.</p>
<p>12. To make it work, we are ready to proceed with ratification as soon as possible. We do hope ratification in the EU capitals will be ensured promptly.</p>	<p>He is asking again European to do "their job".</p>
<p>13. Over the last months, Ukraine paid the highest possible price to make its European dreams come true. It must be worth something. For instance, to finally consider a simple statement on the part of the EU. Once Ukraine will be ready it will be in.</p>	<p>Ukraine once again is presented as the special case. The country has paid the highest price therefore it has to get more from the EU.</p>
<p>14. A statement that could cost you nothing but would mean the world of my country. Therefore, in the context of today's signing, I would like to make a unilateral declaration: By signing the agreement with the EU, Ukraine, as a European state,</p>	<p>Here Poroshenko stresses that the future of Ukraine will be European. By making a unilateral statement on the full-membership, he is presenting himself as the person in charge to ensure a European future for Ukraine.</p>

<p>sharing common values of democracy and the rule of law, is underlining its sovereign choice in favor of future membership in the EU in accordance with article 49 of the EU Treaty.</p>	
<p>15. The Association Agreement is considered by Ukraine as an instrument of comprehensive preparation to the achievement of this goal. The EU is more than just an exclusive club of rich nations, the EU is an idea, the right answer for Europe. And today, we all, EU and non-EU, make an important step to turn this idea to the reality.</p>	<p>In this part he remarks that EU can not be a closed club but it needs to open its door to other country sharing the same values. By presenting EU as the right answer for EU, he is implicitly recognizing the existing of a wrong Europe which can be identified with the non-mentioned Russia.</p>
<p>16. I express gratitude to all of you, dear Presidents. Dear Heads of the Government. Dear President of the Commission. Dear President of the Council. Dear Commissioners.</p>	<p>Again he stresses the he is not acting alone, but within a community.</p>
<p>17. It is the result of our joint efforts. And it is very important for the people of Ukraine and the people of the European Union. Glory to the European Union! Glory to Ukraine!</p>	<p>Once again he stresses that AA is something valuable for Ukraine and Europe but it implies jointed responsibility.</p>

APPENDIX III

Kateryna Kotenko's speech at the Ukrainian Media Center (29/06/2014) at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center.

<p>1. Good Afternoon. It is good to see media which are not against us be present here today. It is not a secret that Russian Federation are continuing the hybrid war against Ukraine on different levels and frontline including cyber and informative sphere. This situation is creating a considerable psychological pressure on us.</p>	<p>Russia Federation is identified as the main aggressor to Ukraine. The threat for Ukraine is multi-levelled and includes information aggression as well.</p>
<p>2. Our strategic partner made some information campaign about these issue which made us laugh. But the truth is that we were to indulgent. Indeed, now we are facing the fact that information shapes the reality. We saw the effect of disinformation in the reality and in the parliamentary discussion.</p>	<p>Some countries are said to have implemented a different strategy to information security. But Ukraine did not implement it and the effect of such delay are quite evident.</p>
<p>[...]</p>	
<p>3. We see news about crucifying babies on the Russian channels, which is not a myth. It is a bloody fantasy. We could not imagine something like that some months ago but now we can see from the figures that two third of the Russians support everything has been done against our country.</p>	<p>The delay is still stressed here. The great support for the aggression to Ukraine is said to be a result of the information campaign in Russia.</p>
<p>4. And that happened because a ground was prepared. There were preconditions which were set to achieve this situation in Ukraine. Because of that, the creation of the new national board for radio and broadcasting is a way to counter attack the propaganda.</p>	<p>Again, Russia has created a fertile ground to attack Ukraine. Information preconditions are said to be set in order to attack Ukraine. The new national board is now a way to protect Ukraine.</p>
<p>[...]</p>	
<p>5. So for the first time, we protected ourselves. We were not attacking anyone, we detect information. Despite people accused us to be not democratic. Our plan was a defensive strategy. We observe and if we identify a threat, we check if the channel or radio station is breaking the Ukrainian law. The sanctions are possible through the work of a special court.</p>	<p>The Ukrainian strategy is defensive. Each action is the result of the Russian aggression. Each counter attack is justified in terms of law.</p>
<p>6. Everyone is thus aware that the ban can take place. However, this is not a</p>	<p>A clear information space is identified as the way to achieve security. No censorship will be put in place</p>

<p>punishment. We want to clear our information space. The scope of our work is to stop the propagandistic and false information. As national board, we do not initiate anything but our goal is to reply to reports and for our investigation we use twitter, Facebook and other platform as well to detect false information. And starting from the 9th of July we also have a hotline to be used by Ukrainian citizens. What I would like to say, it is a matter of principle. Today, people are maybe readier for censorship, but we are not ready for it.</p>	<p>but every violation of Ukrainian law will be prosecuted.</p>
<p>[...]</p>	
<p>7. We are not talking about the content we are dislike as patriots or citizens. We are talking about content which are against Russian legislation. If Yalta is a Ukrainian city, it is against the Ukrainian legislation to say the opposite.</p>	<p>The content is not the base of any legal procedure. Only the violation of the Ukrainian law is said to be considered.</p>
<p>8. Despite the power of government and society, media is also powerful. It is the fifth power. It is in your hand as journalist to tell the truth. Please, talk more about the liberated territory or the achievements of our army. And not only about Kyiv.</p>	<p>No effective counter-attacking strategy can be implemented without the implementation a new media attitude.</p>
<p>[...]</p>	
<p>9. Tell the truth and give people facts. Give facts about different regions of Ukraine and report them to people living in other regions. This is the only way to achieve the truth. Nowadays some Russian channels are temporary blocked but the final decision will be a responsibility of the court or the executive power. We might consider closing more channels and extent the ban. But this would be useless without the everybody's efforts.</p>	<p>While temporary solution are already adopted, the door for more drastic approaches is still open.</p>

APPENDIX IV

Anton Gerashenko's two posts about the ban of the Russian (19/08/2014.)

<p>1. (First Post) 14 Russian channels must stop broadcasting in public and private internal cable network in Ukraine!</p>	<p>The opening sentence is the announcement of the content.</p>
<p>2. Arsen Avakov, Minister of Internal Affairs, signs the order No.840 today as of August 19, 2014 on collaboration of MIA and National Council of television and radio broadcasting of Ukraine in order to control the law obligation concerning the temporary ban of broadcasting of Russian channels which continue propagandizing war and violence in Ukraine.</p>	<p>The ban is claimed to be temporary. However, it is clear that the ban is a consequence of the Russian behavior.</p>
<p>3. The territorial departments of MIA ordered to neighborhood police inspector to collaborate with the National Council of television and radio broadcasting of Ukraine. The scope of the collaboration is detecting the cable providers that violate the decision of National Council on stopping the broadcasting of 14 prohibited channels in Ukraine specified by the Law.</p>	<p>Cooperation between different state bodies is the way in which Ukraine wants to achieve security.</p>
<p>4. Those cable providers that will be caught out in non-observance of courts' and National Council's decisions will be brought to the responsibility according to the current Law of Ukraine.</p>	<p>Cable providers are concretely responsible to stop the broadcasting. While the government implemented the law, cable providers are asked to make it works.</p>
<p>5. Furthermore, territorial departments of MIA will be monitoring the broadcasting of Russian channels in internal cable network of all types of property: at schools, hospitals, hotels, recreation centers. The demand to turn on Russian channels is illegal as well.</p>	<p>The law recognizes the channels as illegal in every situation. No exception are allowed.</p>
<p>6. MIA reminds that the first thing that the Russian Federation did during illicit Crimea annexation was turning off Ukrainian channels and turning on Russian ones instead. In addition, no Ukrainian channel is broadcasted on territory of the Russian Federation.</p>	<p>Russia is accused to be the first responsible of the media war. By turning off Ukrainian Channels, they violated the freedom of information in Crimea.</p>
<p>7. The result is terroristic war on Donbass outbroken with participation of now banned Russian channels.</p>	<p>The war in Donbas is recognized to be a direct consequence of the information aggression.</p>
<p>8. MIA encourages directors of public and municipal establishments, as well as owners of hotels, health</p>	<p>The cooperation with citizens is therefore the only way to achieve information</p>

<p>retreats and recreation centers to stop broadcasting in internal network of Russian channels banned by the law, without waiting for representatives of enforcement authority</p>	<p>security.</p>
<p>9. P.S. My position on putting things right in information space was announced today on briefing concerning issues of national security in information agency "Ukrinform". The list of temporary banned Russian television channels on the territory of Ukraine is attached.</p>	<p>/</p>
<p>10. The list of temporary banned Russian television channels on the territory of Ukraine is attached.</p> <p>Russian channels which were forbidden for broadcasting on the territory of Ukraine according to decisions of National council No. 292 and 297 as of July 17, 2014 and decisions of the County administrative court in Kyiv:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pervyi kanal. Vsemirnaya set 2. RTR-Planeta 3. Rossiya 24 4. NTV-Mir 5. TVCI (TV Tsentri) 6. Rossiya 1 7. NTV 8. TNT 9. Peterburg 5 10. Zvezda 11. REN-TV 12. Life News 13. Russia Today 14. RBK-TV 	<p>List of the channel banned.</p>
<p>11. (Second Post) With the object that citizens could inform MIA and National Council of television and radio broadcasting of Ukraine about the cable network providers which in violation of law continue broadcasting 14 banned Russian channels, with help of volunteers I registered a page on Facebook.</p> <p>https://www.facebook.com/StopRussianPropaganda</p>	<p>The cooperation with citizens is fundamental to effectively ban the Russian channels. Volunteers are then recognized to be extremely important.</p>
<p>12. You are kindly asked to inform on this page or in private messages that in your city or banned Russian channels are still broadcasted through cable networks.</p>	<p>He addressed the citizens and inform the authorities where the banned channels are still available.</p>
<p>13. Please, mention in your message the name of cable provider or the name of health retreat and preferably contact telephone number.</p>	<p>No anonymous information are possible.</p>
<p>14. Besides, I ask all the patriots of Ukraine show their</p>	<p>The post recognizes once again the</p>

<p>civic-affiliation and personally address the administration of cable provider, director of hospital or managing director of hotel after having revealed the broadcasting of banned Russian channels with demand to stop the broadcasting.</p>	<p>fundamental element of cooperation with citizens. No ban can be achieved without the cooperation.</p>
<p>15. On the same page we will inform the society about the facts of bearing the responsibility of cable providers which violated the law.</p>	<p>The FB page will also be use to effectively communicate with citizens.</p>
<p>16. I ask maximal REPOSTING in order that as many citizens as possible knew about the page and began to spread information about violation of information security of Ukraine.</p>	<p>The immediate spreading of the news is also recognized as a way to effectively achieved security in media sphere.</p>

APPENDIX V

Ukrainian Law N. 840 (19/08/2014).

<p>1. MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFIARS OF UKRAINE ORDER As of August, 19 2014 N 840 Of some questions of information security of Ukraine</p> <p>Considering the conditions of rapid formation and development of information community in Ukraine, as well as information space, wide use of information-communication technology in all spheres of life, problems of information security are more and more important.</p>	<p>The law stresses the rapid change of information space and use of technology. It stresses that security is getting more and more important and the problem of information has particular relevance in Ukraine.</p>
<p>2. By the decisions of county administrative court of Kyiv as of March, 25 2014 and July, 17 2014, National Council of Television and radio broadcasting in Ukraine as of July, 17 2014 N 292 (Decision N 292) ra N 297 (Decision N 297), as of July, 24 2014 poky N 490 (Decision N 490), as of August, 07 2014 poky N 663 (Decision N 663) distribution on the territory of Ukraine of such Russian channels as "Channel One Russia. Worldwide", "RTR-Planeta", "NTV-Mir", "Russia-24", "TVCI", "Russia-1", "NTV", "TNT", "Petersburg-Channel5", "Zvezda"; "REN TV", "Life News", "Russia Today" ra "RBC-TV" (hereinafter referred to as prohibited programmes).</p>	<p>This part referes to previous decision on media from the National Council of Televison and Radio Broadcasting. They name selected is partulary significant "Prohibited Programmes"</p>
<p>3. Inhabitants of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions of Donetsk and Luhansk stay under a considerable psychological pressure, caused by actions of Russian Federation military forces, presence of strangers that make terroristic and separatist activities in abovementioned regions, furthermore with information pressure from Russian media.</p>	<p>Main threats are recognized to come from the Russian Federation in relation to Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. The use of psychological and media pressure is identified within a broader strategy of the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>4. Negative information-psychological pressure on Ukrainian citizens grows from the part of media of above-mentioned country, which expansion in Ukrainian</p>	<p>Negative psychological pressure from media is identified as one of the main threat in relation to the event which are taking place in the ATO zone.</p>

<p>media scene is becoming stronger and continues in the area of Anti-Terroristic Operation and other regions of Ukraine.</p>	
<p>5. According to art.2 and art.11 of Law of Ukraine “On Police” and in order to assume the measures to guarantee the information security of Ukraine, establish cooperation with National Council of Television and radio broadcasting in Ukraine, provide effective reaction on violation of law I order:</p>	<p>Information security is identified as securitization object of the policy. The new law is understood as a rapid and effective response to a threat.</p>
<p>6. To heads of main departments, departments of MIA of Ukraine in regions, city of Kyiv, on transport to provide: effective cooperation between representatives of National Council of Television and radio broadcasting in Ukraine in regions and taking measures in their competence concerning proper organization of subordinate offices, aimed at detection and stopping illegal activities.</p>	<p>The cooperation of different bodies is seen as the only effective response to the threat.</p>
<p>7 Providers which practice illegal broadcasting of prohibited programmes in places of mass recreation and congestion (hotels, recreational compound, entertaining establishments, etc.) or selling of products which allow to watch prohibited programmes or program packages which contain prohibited programmes; Media that spread messages that incite hatred and separatism in Ukraine (on certain territory, in locality, etc.), encroach on sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p>	<p>Providers are addressed as the main actor to whom the new law is targeting. Prohibited programmes and their content are said to be prohibited everywhere on Ukrainian territory. The law stresses the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the referent object is again territorial integrity and the ban of channels is a mean to protect it from the external aggression.</p>
<p>8 1. The time awareness of the <i>Public Relations Department of MIA</i> of Ukraine established one day before the entering in force of detection and stopping of such illegal activities. 2. The Public Relations Department of MIA of Ukraine (Volkova L. V.) to generalize information provided by General Directorate of MIA, Directorate of MIA for reporting to Headship of Ministry and further notice to National Council of Television and radio broadcasting.</p>	<p>Broadcasting from the prohibited channels becomes illegal because of the negative its psychological effects on citizens. The concrete implementation is a duty of different organizations and state agency. The monitoring implementation is however of the ministry of internal affairs.</p>

<p>I reserve control over the implementation of this order.</p> <p>Minister Avakov A.B.</p>	
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THESIS AUTHORSHIP STATEMENT

Name/ Student ID number:

Andrea Castagna
1140592


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