![University of Glasgow logo]

Crim, Juliana Jane (2017) *Russian and US media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield: before and after Crimea.* [MA]

http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/189/

Russian and US media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield: Before and after Crimea

23,204 words

Juliana Jane Crim

Indeks: 1140590 (Jagiellonian University)
Matriculation number: 2193936 (University of Glasgow)

Master's thesis written under the supervision of
Dr Eamonn Butler and Dr hab. Artur Gruszczak

International Masters in Russian, Central and East European
Studies (IM) from University of Glasgow and Master of Arts in
European Studies from Jagiellonian University

11 September 2017
Krakow, Poland

PLVS RATIO QVAM VIS

Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the following people who have kindly and generously helped me along the way.

First, I would like to thank my parents, John and Jane Crim, for their continued love and support during the two and a half decades it has taken to reach this point. My father graciously proofread the entirety of this dissertation (plus some) and is unfailingly eager to give me words of encouragement when I'm feeling unsettled. My mother is always there for me, showering me with words of love, kindness and fortitude when I need them the most. Words cannot suffice to say how grateful I am for both of my parents and how much I appreciate all that they have done for me throughout my life. I would not be the person I am today without their love, support and guidance.

Second, I would like to thank my dear friend Josephine Assmus for her perpetual kindness, generosity and willingness to help me over the course of our friendship in many aspects, especially regarding the submission of this dissertation.

Third, I must thank my dissertation supervisors, Dr Eamonn Butler and Dr hab. Artur Gruszczak, for their thorough and detailed assistance in the research and preparation of this dissertation. Without their guidance, I would be completely lost, and I greatly appreciate the amount of time and effort they have taken to help me.

Finally, I would like to thank my grandparents, Steve and Sandra Bomar, for their continued and constant devotion and support throughout my life, especially during the past six years. Their kind, loving and generous spirits are a legacy that I one day aspire to uphold. Furthermore, my many years of studies would not have been possible without their support, in all senses of the word. They are the rocks on which our family stands, and I can never properly express how thankful and blessed I am for their strong presence in my life.

Abstract

This dissertation analyses and compares the change in portrayals by the US and Russian media regarding the US/NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield in Europe before and after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The development of a multi-part shield in Europe has perpetually incited controversy, particularly within Russia, ie the state most vocally opposed to the shield's presence. This research examines the change, or lack thereof, in US and Russian media portrayals of the US/NATO BMD shield during two periods: from US President Barack Obama's announcement of a new US missile defence policy in Europe in September 2009 to January 2014; and from the annexation of Crimea in February 2014 to the end of President Obama's term in January 2017. Through the critical discourse analysis of a wide range of articles from news sources across each country's political spectrum, this dissertation examines how the shield is portrayed and instances of securitisation that took place in the media.

Keywords: ballistic missile defence, US media, Russian media, securitisation theory, constructivism, critical discourse analysis

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

1. Introduction

Beginning with the first explorations of missile defence in the 1960s, the United States has been pursuing various avenues for missile defence since the Cold War era, both domestically and abroad. Since the early 2000s, the United States has explored and implemented a ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield in Europe, ostensibly to provide protection and coverage for its allies in continental Europe. By declaring the necessity of implementing a BMD shield over the European continent in order to protect from what political elites deem to be "threats", this dissertation will explore the process of securitisation in the media, along with the way in which the US and Russian print and electronic media approach this concept, both in terms of securitisation of the US/NATO BMD shield and in terms of a positive, neutral or negative portrayal of the shield by the media.

Although ballistic missile defence has been discussed extensively within the news media, it has not been examined thoroughly from an academic point of view. Similarly, securitisation has been frequently explored in academic research, but securitisation in the media remains under-researched. Because the news media plays a critical role in shaping public opinion and political action, it is worthwhile to examine how media outlets are portraying this topic and thereby potentially influencing opinions and policies.

This dissertation is organised into seven chapters: Chapter 1: *Introduction* discusses the necessary background for understanding the evolution of US/NATO BMD in Europe; Chapter 2: *Literature review* explores the literature surrounding the topic of this research, ultimately outlining the position of this research within the existing literature. Chapter 3: *Theory* will elaborate on the theoretical framework within which this research lies, discussing constructivism theory in international relations and securitisation theory. Chapter 4: *Methodology* outlines the methodological considerations for this dissertation, explaining the steps undertaken for this research. Chapter 5: *US media portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield* discusses the findings of this research, discussing results from each US media outlet considered, comparing and contrasting them with other US outlets and analysing their portrayals of the BMD shield. Chapter 6: *Russian media portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield* will perform the same exploration and analysis as Chapter 5, but with the Russian media outlets in

this research. Finally, Chapter 7: *Conclusion* will summarise the findings of this dissertation.

1.1. Background: European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for Ballistic Missile Defense

The United States has been pursuing some form of missile defence for many years, since the Cold War era. However, during US President George W Bush's administration (2001-2009), American policymakers and military figures began to formulate a plan to implement a BMD shield in continental Europe for the purpose of protecting US allies from threats originating in the Middle East, with the US government stating that the shield was essential to "protect the US and Europe from possible attack by hostile nations such as Iran" (BBC News, 2007a). The US entered negotiations with governments in the Czech Republic and Poland to place BMD sites on their territories, as their Central European location would enable the shield to protect as many NATO Allies as possible, although it would not reach far enough south or east to protect Greece or Turkey.

The concept of implementing a BMD shield was met with mixed reactions. NATO's then-Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer expressed support and stated that the US's shield would be able "to work alongside any additional NATO defensive system to extend coverage to these two member states [Greece and Turkey]" (BBC News, 2007a). At the same time, the public's reaction to the potential implementation of the shield in the Czech Republic was overwhelmingly negative, and the Czech government ended their involvement with the project in 2011 (Dempsey & Bilefsky, 2011).

Although the placement of a BMD site in Poland was unpopular domestically, the Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński of the conservative and nationalist Law and Justice Party,[1] supported the idea of participating in the US BMD shield (Bartosz, 2008: 101). The Kaczyński administration believed that hosting the site would be crucial to Poland's security, as a US military base itself would create a more secure position for the country internationally (Dylla, 2011).

---

[1] Name in Polish: *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*; commonly called *PiS*

However, in 2007, the Civic Platform[2] party was elected, heralding a shift in policy (Bartosz, 2008: 106-7). Prime Minister Donald Tusk's support for placing a BMD site in Poland came with reservations, primarily that the site would undermine Poland's international security, consequently inviting added danger (Dylla, 2011: 29). Therefore, when the Polish delegation, headed by Defence Minister Bogdan Klich, travelled to Washington in February 2008 to continue negotiations, they outlined Poland's new requirements for participation, ie security guarantees from the US, particularly the delivery of multiple mobile air defence systems (Dylla, 2011: 29-30). In August of that same year, the Polish and American governments came to an agreement to place ten ground-based missile interceptors in northern Poland, while also increasing strategic cooperation, in order to emphasise the "intentions of Poland and the US to enhance their mutual security by cooperating in the industrial, research and technology areas of defence and, above all, through sharing information regarding political-military concerns" while also "work[ing] together to counter military as well as non-military threats posed by third parties" (Dylla, 2011: 30). This benefitted both countries, as the US had successfully found a central location for their BMD site, while Poland had procured US guarantees of support in the event of any security threat arising from its participation in the project (Dylla, 2011).

However, in September 2009, new US President Barack Obama announced his administration's plan for a shift from the Bush-era BMD plan to a new plan, referred to as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) (Obama White House, 2009). The EPAA was to consist of four phases: Phase I, in 2011, would consist of building a radar system and relocating US Navy ships to the Mediterranean Sea; Phase II, in 2015, involved the construction of an interceptor site (whose implementation was later agreed to be located in Deveselu, Romania) that would be capable of countering short- and medium-range threats; Phase III, in 2018, would involve creating an interceptor site (later agreed to be located in Redzikowo, Poland) that could counter short-, medium- and intermediate-range threats; and Phase IV, in 2020, in which an interceptor able to counter medium- and intermediate-range threats would be deployed (Obama White House, 2009).

These aims would be realised through the US Missile Defense Agency's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), which is one of the core missions of the US Navy.

---

[2] Name in Polish: *Platforma Obywatelska*; commonly called *PO*

The Aegis BMD "builds upon the existing Aegis Weapon System (AWS), Standard Missile (SM), and Navy control and communication systems" and uses multiple types of interceptors[3] able to counter threats from a variety of distances, which they are able to launch from either land (known as Aegis Ashore) or sea (U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 2016). Although the Aegis BMD was constructed by the United States, it is a national contribution designed to be part of an integrated NATO BMD system. Therefore, this shield will be referred to as the US/NATO BMD shield throughout this dissertation.

Figure 1 below shows the locations of the different elements of the US/NATO BMD system in and around Europe.

Figure 1. Infographic of the US/NATO BMD shield.

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (nd).

To be able to understand the Russian reaction (discussed in section 1.1.2) to the US/NATO BMD shield, it is crucial to understand how the shield works, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below. If a missile is launched toward Europe, satellites above the continent will recognise the threat. The satellite system will transmit this

---

[3] The interceptors used in the Aegis BMD are: the SM-3, the SM-2 Block IV and the SM-6 Dual I/II (U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 2016).

information to the radar system, located in Poland, Romania and Turkey. The radar system will track the incoming missile and, depending on where the missile is directed, an interceptor will be launched from either a ship or land. The interceptor is an inert object, not a missile, that is designed to collide with the missile and destroy it before it can re-enter the atmosphere.

Figure 2. Infographic of how the missile defence system works.

Source: BBC News (2016b).

According to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the first deployment of the EPAA, Phase I, occurred in March 2011, when the USS *Monterey* (CG-61), deployed to the Mediterranean equipped with SM-3 Block IA missiles (U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 2016), along with the placement of an early warning radar in Malatya, Turkey (CNN Wire Staff, 2012). Phase II began in February 2014 with the deployment of Aegis BMD ships that can fire SM-3 Block IB missiles, ending with the inauguration of the Aegis Ashore base in Romania, which took place in May 2016 (Ferdinando, 2016a). Phase III commenced in May 2016, with the groundbreaking ceremony of the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland (Ferdinando, 2016b). Phase IV, which was heavily opposed by Russia, was ultimately cancelled in March 2013 (Herszenhorn & Gordon, 2016).

1.1.1. NATO's reaction to the EPAA

Following the United States' announcement of a new approach to missile defence in Europe, NATO's then-Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was vocal in his support for the endeavour. In his opinion piece for *The New York Times*, Rasmussen (2010) stated that there was indeed a threat to NATO territories from missiles and advocated for the implementation of a shield for protection, listing the benefits of such a system for the Allies.

Rasmussen's editorial fell in line with conclusions reached during the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit. This summit had particular significance for the EPAA because the Allies revised NATO's Strategic Concept to include that NATO would "develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces" as a core element of its collective defence, additionally inviting Russia to cooperate with this objective (NATO, 2010: § 2). NATO also expressed support for the US EPAA, welcoming it as a "valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture" (NATO, 2010: § 37).

In NATO's 2012 "Deterrence and Defense Posture Review", the Allies further expounded on this issue, adding that "missile defense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them" (NATO, 2012: § 20).

In September 2014, the Allies gathered for the Wales Summit, which addressed Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in February and March of 2016, declaring that "Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace" (NATO, 2014: § 1). In response to the Crimean annexation, along with increasing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, the Allies agreed to move toward a guideline that each member state spend a minimum of two per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence annually (NATO, 2014: § 14).

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO declared Initial Operational Capability of its BMD system and reaffirmed the Allies' commitment to "deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities" (NATO, 2016: § 52) and continues work on its goal to create a comprehensive missile defence shield in Europe. In addition, they concluded that, "NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD

system is not capable against Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent […] Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive" (NATO, 2016: § 59).

1.1.2. Russia's reaction to the EPAA

Since its inception during the George W Bush administration, the BMD shield has drawn repeated and intense criticism from Russia. Although the US and NATO have continually attempted to reassure Russia that the BMD shield is for use solely against threats from other countries, particularly Iran, the Kremlin has maintained its position that the shield's true purpose is for use against Russia, placing Russia at a heightened state of threat.

When the Bush administration's missile defence plans surfaced in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the shield was of an aggressive nature towards Russia, a claim which then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice deemed "ludicrous" (BBC News, 2007b). Later that year, during his annual address to the Federal Assembly, Russia's parliament, Putin threatened that Russia might withdraw from the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, a move with potentially far-reaching ramifications, as the treaty ensures a key part of European defence by limiting military deployments in Europe. Putin believed that US and NATO actions violated this treaty (BBC News, 2007b).

In response to Putin's comments, NATO's then-Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated, "Ten interceptors will not and cannot affect the strategic balance, and ten interceptors can also not pose a threat to Russia" (BBC News, 2007a).

Despite reassurances, NATO-Russia relations further broke down when Russia suspended all military ties with NATO in August 2008 as a response to NATO's urging that Russia withdraw its troops from Georgia, where they were clashing with Georgian troops in the disputed territory of South Ossetia (NBC News, 2008). Soon after, Russian military expert Major General (retired) Pavel Zolotarev warned that the BMD shield, which he believed was covertly intended to eliminate Russian ballistic missiles, was poised to initiate a proliferation of anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe, thereby altering the fragile post-Cold War balance of power (Zolotarev, 2008).

Years later, in October 2015, President Putin gave a speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club, stating "[The US was] lying. It was not about the

hypothetical Iranian threat, which never existed. It was about an attempt to destroy the strategic balance, to change the balance of forces in their favour not only to dominate, but to have the opportunity to dictate their will to all: to their geopolitical competition and, I believe, to their allies as well" (President of Russia, 2015).

The following year, at a press conference in May 2016, after the BMD site in Romania was declared active, Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the "Aegis Ashore systems being deployed in Romania and Poland feature launching devices virtually identical to those being used aboard US Navy warships for launching missile interceptors and Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Moreover, she continued, "We [Russia] view the deployment of ground-based launchers as running counter to a key provision of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The United States has therefore violated the INF Treaty. We have to state this openly, without any additional diplomatic wording" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

The US and the USSR signed the INF Treaty on 8 December 1987, in an effort to decrease Cold War tensions stemming from the global arms race. Per the terms of the treaty, each party must destroy their "ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment" (US Department of State, nd). After the USSR dissolved in 1991, the US sought the revision of the treaty to include Soviet successor states, particularly Russia (US Department of State, nd).

Furthermore, Zakharova's claims that the US was in violation of the INF and that the BMD shield is a threat to Russia have been repeated countless times over the past decade. From Russia's perspective, the partnership between the US and NATO in this capacity is both an offensive and a defensive threat: offensive, because they claim that the launchers are "virtually identical" to those which launch Tomahawk cruise missiles (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016); and defensive because they believe the shield is capable of neutralising a potential incoming missile from Russia and, in their view, rendering Russia defenceless and giving the US and NATO time to launch an offensive against Russia (Walker, 2016).

On the same day, Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov reemphasised these notions, stating, "We have been saying right from when this story started that our experts are convinced that the deployment of the ABM system poses a certain threat to

the Russian Federation […] Measures are being taken to ensure the necessary level of security for Russia" (Kramer, 2016).

In response to these statements from Zakharova and Peskov, the US repeated that the sites did not contain any Tomahawk missiles, followed by then-US Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work reiterating that there are "no plans at all" to extend the shield for use against Russia (Kramer, 2016). However, Russian academic Konstantin Bogdanov cautioned that these sites might make their hosts targets in the reawakening of Cold War tensions (Kramer, 2016).

1.2. Background: The annexation of Crimea

In February 2014, unmarked forces entered the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. These "little green men", as they soon became dubbed by the international media, were discovered to be members of the Russian armed forces, despite the Kremlin's claims to the contrary (Shevchenko, 2014). Within days, the little green men had taken control of Crimea from Ukraine, leading to a territorial dispute that continues to present day.

On 16 March 2014, a referendum within the peninsula took place, on the topic of joining the Russian Federation. Following a positive result, the Crimean government officially requested to join Russia, which was confirmed by the Russian Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament, on 21 March 2014.

Russia (and others) have justified this violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine through the use of historical claims. Crimea first became part of the Russian Empire in 1783, during the rule of Catherine the Great. Crimea remained part of Russia until 1954, when then-Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine (BBC News, 2016a). Pro-Russian narratives relating to Crimea frequently point to the historical ties between Crimea and Russia, disregarding the fact that it officially became part of the newly-created state of Ukraine upon Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 (Sasse, 2017).

Shortly after the referendum took place, NATO's then-Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen gave an address in which he said that, "Russia's military aggression in Ukraine […] is a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The annexation of Crimea through a so-called referendum held at gunpoint is illegal and illegitimate," labelling the annexation as "the gravest threat to European security and stability since the end of the Cold War" (Dews, 2014).

The use of Crimea as a turning point in this research is due to the fact that the annexation of Crimea came as a surprise on the international stage. The thinly-disguised Russian invasion of the peninsula in February 2014 ultimately became a blatant coup, resulting in an ongoing territorial dispute. Crimea became a symbol of Russia's power and disregard for international law with the annexation bringing fear and threats to the European sphere. The international realm began to realise what Russia is capable of, leading to increased concern among the countries along Russia's borders. Because of Crimea's unique situation as a turning point and blatant territorial usurpation, it is plausible that the opinions of the US/NATO BMD shield could have changed based on the new international situation. Therefore, this research will examine the portrayal of the shield before and after the Crimean annexation[4] to see if there was any change after this significant security event.

---

[4] For the sake of simplicity, the word *Crimea* in this dissertation may be used to refer to the Crimean annexation.

2. Literature review

This chapter examines literature in the same vein of research as this dissertation, while carving out a place for this dissertation in the existing research. This will be achieved by examining existing studies on missile defence and on securitisation in the media.

2.1. Studies on missile defence

There have been a number of studies on the topic of missile defence in recent years. Diesen and Keane (2016) discuss missile defence in the context of offence-defence theory. They argue that "the method for assessing the offence-defence posture of missile defence must be focused on constraints on future development, as the initial rudimentary capabilities become a distraction" (Diesen & Keane, 2016: 130). In this, they estimate these constraints by examining international arms control agreements and the structural designs of the technologies to distinguish an offensive or defensive posture. Their study concluded that the "method for measuring the impact of weapons technology on the offence-defence balance can be deceptive if limited to existing technology and currently announced deployments" (Diesen & Keane, 2016: 139). Additionally, they argue that the US/NATO missile defence system sets a "precarious precedent, since even discussions about an integrated offence-defence agreement have categorically been rejected" (Diesen & Keane, 2016: 140).

Frühling (2016) discusses the maturation and implementation of missile defence in a number of different countries, especially how they fit into NATO strategy. His article proposes that instead of focusing on how missile defence could substitute for a reduction in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, Allies should also "expect disagreements on how to best make use of missile defence itself […] missile defence is best understood as a tool for the management of escalation" of a disagreement into a political-security crisis (Frühling, 2016: 81). Frühling (2016: 93) argues that the implementation of missile defence over the continental United States and its allies in Europe and Asia is "an unequivocal positive for the West" because the shields create "options to control escalation in conflicts […] that were not there before."

Wilkening (2012: 33) examines whether the US/NATO BMD shield threatens Russia, stating that it is only natural for a country in Russia's position to feel threatened by the implementation of missile defence nearby, but that "this understandable

psychological state should be grounded in technical reality." Following extensive technical analysis of the shields' capabilities, Wilkening (2012: 49) concluded that "Moscow's concern lacks technical merit." He recommends that the US and NATO should employ confidence-building measures to alleviate Russian concerns, which could have long-term benefits.

Senn (2012) discusses the potential role ballistic missile defence could play in nuclear disarmament and abolition. He determines that BMD could contain nuclear proliferation in certain regions by the US and its allies, but it also has the potential to aggravate existing arms dynamics in the Middle East and the southern and eastern areas of Asia. He also concludes that "[in] Europe, missile defence could provide an alternative way of transatlantic burden sharing and would thus make the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons more likely" (Senn, 2012: 763). Furthermore, Senn (2012: 763-4) states that missile defence could derail nuclear disarmament efforts in Russia and China due to their concerns about future vulnerability due to "the open-ended nature of US BMD and the perception that missile defence in combination with other military technologies consolidates US pre-eminence at the expense of Russian and Chinese security."

Wu (2013) focuses on the reasons for China's concerns regarding the US BMD systems in the Asia-Pacific region. Wu discusses both the technical and political basis for these concerns. He advocates for a solution in which the US commits to a minimal level of BMD in the region, while China agrees to not expand its nuclear arsenal (Wu, 2013: 44). Wu states that, because "Beijing has no desire to achieve either nuclear parity or assured retaliation, but simply wishes to maintain a degree of first-strike uncertainty in the presence of BMD[, i]t is therefore possible for the United States and China to find a solution" (Wu, 2013: 48).

Grimal (2014: 317) discusses missile defence options located in the US, Japan and Israel, attempting to answer the question of if missile defence shields "help support the existence of a wider right of anticipatory self-defence." Furthermore, he analyses whether the shields' automated responses fall in line with lawful use of self-defence, or if they violate the parameters of international law. Grimal (2014: 339) concludes, following an in-depth technical analysis, that widespread proliferation of BMD would indeed support anticipatory self-defence, so long as its use was limited. Furthermore, he also states that "there is certainly concern that automated missile interception might not ever fall within the existing parameters of self-defence" (Grimal, 2014: 339).

Steff (2013: 94) utilises defensive realism to find solutions for improving relations between the US, China and Russia by "stressing joint deployment of BMD as the basis for a new paradigm of strategic relations." He argues that, according to the principles of defensive realism, strategic stability may only be achieved when there is consensus among the great powers, cautioning that if no consensus is reached, the "most likely alternative is worsening strategic action-reaction dynamics with unpredictable consequences" (Steff (2013: 94).

2.2. Studies on securitisation in the media

Securitisation in the media, although a pertinent topic, has yet to be extensively studied. When searching online academic databases, few results can be found in this area of research. However, there have been multiple previous studies on the securitisation of various topics in the media.

Vultee (2010) examines securitisation in the US media regarding the War on Terror from 2001-2006, with the use of three US newspapers to demonstrate the creation, invocation and change over time of securitisation in the media. Ultimately, Vultee (2010: 45) concludes that "political actors fight to control the securitization switch because it is worth controlling." He also uses examples of varying portrayals of the same event to underscore the importance of using multiple media sources.

Rasmussen (2015: 197) states that there is little research on the way people understand and respond to securitisation, especially through social media. Therefore, Rasmussen explores attitudes on Twitter surrounding the Norwegian terror alert in July 2014. Quoting Buzan (1998), Foucault (2009), MacDonald (2013) and Stenvall (2003), Rasmussen (2015:209) reiterates that security is a "future-oriented control apparatus" and that antiterrorism research has demonstrated that discourse between securitising actors is "often vague and abstract", making it difficult to identify this communication. Rasmussen's (2015: 209) study focuses on how Twitter users react to such concrete albeit ambiguous securitising language, finding that Twitter users "recontextualize the actions of the authorities in ways that convey certain attitudes". In addition, Rasmussen examined the linguistic nature of the Tweets, stating that, "the messages on twitter [*sic*] are understood here as a potential force in shaping securitization" (2015: 211). He also notes that following a nationwide poll conducted via telephone, 85 % of the Norwegian population approved of the government's decision to publicly announce a terror

warning, which is a clear legitimisation of their communication (2015: 211). Additionally, Rasmussen (2015: 211) stated that, even though authorities might never see the public's Twitter communications, Twitter provided many citizens an opportunity to express their thoughts about securitisation and form opinions.

Joobani and Helmy (2016) explored the reaction of the Chinese media to the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. Citing Chan (2002), Joobani and Helmy (2016: 377) state that the Chinese government practised agenda-setting by using the media to securitise the discourse on the events in Egypt to alleviate any "contagious effects of the Arab Spring on China's social and economic stability" as part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s larger policy of the "guidance of public opinion". The authors identify the CCP as the securitising actor and their policy of guiding public opinion as a securitising move. They state that the referent object is the "security, stability and social harmony of the country" (2016: 377). The speech act was performed by the various national newspapers, which also assumed roles of securitising actors by framing the news and convincing the public that the Egyptian Revolution was a threat to the Chinese way of life. Joobani and Helmy's research provides a look into securitisation and the use of media in the politics of authoritarian countries.

O'Reilly (2008) examined the US news media's securitisation of the war in Iraq in the early 2000s, specifically focusing on how the US government used the media to exploit the heightened patriotism following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to push for war in Iraq. Citing Balzacq's (2005) research in the field of securitisation, O'Reilly disagrees with many other researchers and states that the Iraq War was indeed securitised. The basis for other researchers deeming the Iraq War as not being successfully securitised was because the international community did not approve of the war. However, O'Reilly (2008: 67) states that, "while the majority of the international community was not convinced [of the justification for the war], this may not have been necessarily essential." O'Reilly puts forward the idea of *critical mass*, in which securitisation is achieved, "when the securitizing actor has convinced *enough of the right people* that someone or something constitutes a legitimate security threat" (2008: 67). In the context of the Iraq War, the "right people" are considered to be the US Senate and the American public, as they are the groups whose opinion mattered. O'Reilly criticises Buzan et al (1998) in that they do not acknowledge that the referent object and the audience, which will be further elaborated on in Chapter 3, during the process of securitisation are often the same. Furthermore, he criticises Buzan et al for

"the lack of consideration of the influence of wider forces and context in the process of securitization" (2008: 71). O'Reilly frequently emphasises the significance of the media's role in shaping public opinion and that the importance of this role in securitisation cannot be overstated, saying that "the role of the media as provider of information, facilitator of communication between the two [the securitising actor and the referent object/audience] and bastion of truth and investigation is fundamental" (2008: 71).

Schäfer, Scheffran and Penniket (2016) focus on securitisation in a different realm: climate change. Their research analysed over 101,000 articles from newspapers in nine different countries over a fourteen-year period (1996-2010). The countries they analysed were: Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The articles were then searched for instances of securitising language in relation to climate change. They discovered that "the number of articles on climate change using securitizing language as a proportion of total newspaper articles increased six-fold over the analysed time span" (Schäfer et al, 2016: 85) and that there is a clear securitisation of climate change discourse in the print media. Their research showed that an increase in climate change coverage coincided with certain events (such as the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the premiere of the documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* in 2006). However, they emphasised that correlation does not necessarily equal causation in this case. They also compared the two main securitisation discourses in the media (human security and national security), discussing which were most prominent in each state's media coverage and the potential reasons why. Ultimately, Schäfer, Scheffran and Penniket (2016: 89-90) found that securitisation of climate change was present in the mass media and that there was a clear increase in securitising language in the media discourse.

Linnemann (2012) explores the topic of securitisation in the US media surrounding illegal use of the drug methamphetamine (meth) in the rural Midwestern US. Linnemann argues that "by overstating realities of use, politicizing official statistics and reframing key events, authorities discursively link meth control to the wars on drugs and terror and broader securitization projects" (2012: 39). In the 1980s, crystal meth usage in the US soared, leading to an abundance of news articles, political statements and documentary films in the years since. Linnemann believes that the pervasiveness of meth usage is easy to sensationalise in the media because it is a drug with significant racial and class associations (ie its usage is most prevalent in poor, rural, white-

dominated communities), which often contradicts the sometimes-idealised perception of those regions, or the "golden echo of rural goodness" (2012: 43). Linnemann's research on securitisation analysed articles from 2004 to 2009 and revealed a predominance of securitising language in the discourse. By using language with strongly negative connotations and by "placing meth, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina on equal footing", Linnemann's (2012: 48) research found that the media discourse was indeed securitising and sensationalising the "war on meth" in the Midwestern US.

2.3. Chapter summary

In this chapter, seven articles on missile defence and six articles on securitisation in the media were analysed.

Diesen and Keane (2016) explore missile defence in the context of the offence-defence theory, ultimately concluding that they are not in favour of the US/NATO BMD shield. Frühling (2016) discusses the evolution of missile defence in the NATO member states, advocating for increased missile defence because of its potential to control crisis escalation. Wilkening (2012) examines the veracity of claims that the US/NATO BMD shield threatens Russia, ultimately refuting these claims as being technologically unfounded. Senn (2012) researches the role of BMD in nuclear disarmament and abolition, cautioning that BMD has the capacity to derail nuclear disarmament efforts in Russia and China, who might perceive increased BMD as a threat. Wu (2013) discusses China's concerns regarding US BMD in the Asia-Pacific region, stating that the US should implement minimal BMD in the region, while China should agree to not increase its nuclear arsenal. Grimal (2014) questions whether BMD violates international law, concluding that it does not, as it may be categorised as anticipatory self-defence, so long as its use is limited. Finally, Steff (2013), through the paradigm of defensive realism, cautions that the US, Russia and China, as the three great world powers, must reach a strategic consensus in order to maintain the balance of power, advocating for a joint BMD deployment as the foundation for this endeavour.

Vultee (2010) study securitisation in the US media regarding the War on Terror between 2001 and 2006. Rasmussen (2015) examines securitisation of the 2014 Norwegian terror alert on Twitter. Joobani and Helmy (2016) looks at securitisation of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Chinese media. O'Reilly (2008) discusses securitisation of the Iraq War in the US media in the early 2000s. In a completely

different vein, Schäfer, Scheffran and Penniket (2016) analyse the securitisation of climate change discourse in the media of nine countries during the years 1996 to 2010. Finally, Linnemann (2012) researches the US media's securitisation of meth usage in the Midwestern US from 2004 to 2009.

Although research exists on both missile defence and securitisation in the media, there has yet to be research on the intersection between these two topics. Therefore, this dissertation examines the crossroads between missile defence and media securitisation in the context of the US/NATO BMD shield.

3. Theory

This chapter discusses and justifies the theoretical framework for this research by exploring the relevant aspects of social constructivism for security issues, then elaborating on securitisation theory and the military sector within the theory, under which this research can be categorised. This chapter will outline how this research fits into the theoretical framework and explain why this approach is relevant.

3.1. Social constructivism

When researching within the field of international relations, there are a multitude of paradigms to choose from, including realism, liberalism, constructivism and functionalism. This research will be conducted through the lens of constructivism, and more specifically, social constructivism.

The term constructivism was first used in the realm of international affairs in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf (Wendt, 1999: 1). Wendt (1999: 1) identifies two fundamental principles of constructivism. The first principle is that "the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces" (Wendt, 1999: 1). The second principle he identifies is that "the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given in nature" (Wendt, 1999: 1). Wendt, who is one of the core figures of constructivist research in international relations, has developed a "moderate [version of constructivism] that draws especially on structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology", in which he advocates a "scientific approach to social inquiry" (Wendt, 1999: 1).

Social constructivism, in its most basic form, posits that none of life's social aspects are given. The world is always contextual because humans, despite existing in contexts that inform their actions, also construct their world through their actions. This process is social, meaning that it cannot be done by one person, but only through engagement with others (Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis, 2010: 183). Ruggie (1998: 199) states that constructivism "is interested as much in the 'making' of circumstances […], as in their being 'found'," with two major questions driving actions: "What do people make of their circumstances in the sense of understanding them? And what do they make of their circumstances in the sense of acting on whatever understanding they may hold?"

However, although constructivism has been "described and explained, applied empirically and contrasted to other International Relations approaches," Adler (1997: 320) maintains that there is "very little clarity and even less consensus as to its nature and substance". However, Adler (1997: 320) states that "the core of the debate about constructivism is […] the nature of social science itself", defining constructivism as "the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (1997: 322). Additionally, Adler (1997: 323) asserts that constructivism, unlike other theories of international relations, is not a political theory but rather a social one. Adler (1997: 345) also states that, in order to understand security in the context of constructivism, one must not rely solely on previously-constructed categories, but primarily recognise that "policy-makers may have the ability to act upon the world with new knowledge and new understanding about how to organize security".

Social constructivism is particularly salient for this dissertation because it places a premium on the role of discourse in its studies. Discourse is key to constructivists because, without communication, they would not be able to study institutions, norms or ideas. As Huysmans (2002: 44) points out, "although the process cannot be reduced to a linguistic one, the social mobilization of security expectations relies heavily on the use of security language." One of the instances in which security language may be discussed is in the media, which portrays a certain interpretation of danger or lack thereof (Huysmans, 2002: 44). Speaking or writing about a specific security issue, such as the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield, has the capability to connect isolated features into a meaningful whole, because the "language operates as a mediating instrument that brings social practices into a particular communicative, institutionalized framework […] it is a defining force, integrating social relations" (Huysmans, 2002: 44-5). This is a key idea of social constructivism, which maintains that language is not merely *an* act; language is *the* act. Social constructivism theorises that a security problem is created by successfully speaking or writing it (Huysmans, 2002: 45), ie *securitising* it, a concept that is discussed further in the following section.

In his 1989 book *World of Our Making*, Nicholas Onuf provides a vision of constructivism that focuses on language and sociology, primarily focusing on the significance of speech acts in creating rules that dictate reality. Onuf believes that there is no separation between word and world, and that individuals actively participate in the creation of reality (Onuf, 1989: 39). As such, Onuf places great importance on the

power of language in the construction of rules, which are in turn involved in directing an individual's behaviour and thereby constructing reality. He culminates in categorising each of these into three human senses, which he calls 'paradigms of experience', saying that these comprise the entirety of how humans experience the world (Onuf, 1989: 290-3).

Within the realm of security in constructivism, Hopf (1998: 199) argues that "[s]ince what constitutes a threat can never be stated as an a priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction of an Other, and theorized at that level." He explains that, because identities, norms and social practices are key in maintaining security, the security dilemma itself should not be the starting point for analysing relations between states. Instead, when studying how they (may not) cooperate with each other, it is necessary to emphasise "how their understandings of each other generate their relevant interests" (Hopf, 1998: 199).

Social constructivism was chosen as the major school of international relations for this research because of its emphasis on discourse. Because this research entails the use of critical discourse analysis, which will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4, it is natural that this research will fall under the aegis of social constructivism.

3.2. Securitisation theory

This section explores the primary school from which securitisation theory is derived, ie the Copenhagen School. Within this school, there are five sectors, the most relevant of them to this research being the military sector, which will be examined in section 3.2.1.1. Additionally, we will discuss alternate views of securitisation theory.

3.2.1. The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies began with the publication of Barry Buzan's 1983 book *People, States and Fear*.[5] The publication of Buzan's work catalysed further studies of security issues at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI),[6] leading to a body of interrelated publications and theories that became

---

[5] Buzan, B. (1983). *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations*. New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

[6] The COPRI merged with other organisations to become the Danish Institute of International Affairs in 2003.

known as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, a branch of theory within the realm of international relations (McSweeney, 1996: 81).

One of the main tenets of the Copenhagen School is securitisation theory, outlined in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde's 1998 book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Securitisation theory "aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (ie what explains when securitization is successful)" (Wæver, 1998a: 32).

In discussing what makes something a security issue in international relations, they posit that international security, rooted in power politics, is about survival. Therefore, any issue that could potentially pose an existential threat to a referent object (ie, the object that is threatened) becomes a security threat (Wæver, 1998a: 21). Additionally, security threats are able to justify unusual measures to handle them. The invocation of a security threat is crucial to the legitimisation of the use of force, particularly in allowing the state special powers to eliminate the threat. Once a security threat is invoked, "a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development" (Wæver, 1998a: 21). When analysing an existential threat, it is important to identify the sector in which the threat occurs, as a threat may change based on the sector in which it resides. Therefore, Wæver (1998a: 22-3) identifies five distinct sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. This dissertation focuses on the military sector, as this is the most relevant to the topic.

Security frames issues as a special kind of politics or as being above politics by presenting an issue "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Wæver, 1998a: 23-4). An issue becomes a security issue when it is argued that the issue is more pressing than others and should be given precedence. However, it is important to note that even if an issue is presented as an existential threat, this does not in and of itself create securitisation; this would merely be considered a *securitising move*. The issue may only be considered as securitised if the audience accepts it as securitised (Wæver, 1998a: 25). The existential threat must be given credence in order to legitimise emergency measures that would not have been able to occur without the acceptance of a threat; therefore, if a securitising move is not accepted by its audience, it cannot be considered as securitised (Wæver, 1998a: 25).

There are three elements to securitisation: existential threats, emergency action and "effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Wæver, 1998a: 26). The distinctive marker of securitisation is its specific rhetoric: survival combined with a claim for necessary absolute priority in order to fix a problem that will be unable to be remedied later because the referent object will no longer exist (Wæver, 1998a: 26). Securitisation is a speech act, meaning that the assertion itself is the act; it has spoken something into existence. "By saying the words, something is done" (Wæver, 1998a: 26). Significantly, the speech act does not necessarily need to use the term "security" specifically; rather, it may sometimes allude to a security reference in a metaphor. Additionally, security may either be ad hoc or institutionalised; if a threat is recurrent, the response may become institutionalised, especially within the military sector, in which states that face recurring armed threats have created bureaucracies and procedures to deal with them (Wæver, 1998a: 27-8).

While speaking about security, it is important to note that security can either be objective (meaning that a threat is real) or subjective (meaning that a threat is perceived). However, it is impossible for security to be truly objective, as there is not yet an objective measure of security, and different states evaluate security in different ways (Wæver, 1998a: 30). Therefore, securitisation understands that the process of securitisation is both intersubjective and socially constructed. Using any sort of conceptualisation of security is always a choice; it is socially constructed (Wæver, 1998a: 32). Securitisation will not be successful only due to the agent performing the act of securitisation; the audience of the security speech act are the deciding factor of success, or lack thereof (Wæver, 1998a: 31).

To create a special speech act, Wæver (1998a: 32), referencing Austin, says that there are both internal (ie linguistic and grammatical) and external (ie contextual and social) conditions that must be met. From the internal perspective, one must create a narrative that includes an "existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible way out" (Wæver, 1998a: 33). Regarding the external aspect, there are two key conditions that should be met: social capital of the securitising actor as an authoritative figure (though not necessarily as an official authority), which will increase the likelihood of the audience accepting the threat; and the presence of certain objects, both tangible (eg weapons) and intangible (eg hostile sentiments) that can be referred to as threats. This is not necessary for securitisation but markedly facilitates the process (Wæver, 1998a: 33).

Securitisation theory identifies three different units in security analysis: referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors (Wæver, 1998a: 36). Referent objects are entities that ostensibly face an existential threat and have a legitimate claim to survival. Securitising actors are those who perform the speech act and securitise an issue by declaring the referent object to be existentially threatened. Functional actors are those who affect dynamics; although they are neither the referent object nor the securitising actor, they are able to significantly influence security decisions (Wæver, 1998a: 36).

Securitisation theory was selected as the predominant theory in this research because it discusses how speech acts can affect security, which is coherent with the aims of this research, namely: to determine how the US and Russian media have portrayed the BMD shield and how this relates to a security context. Additionally, the method used to analyse the data in this research is critical discourse analysis, further discussed in Chapter 4, which also emphasises the importance of context in speech acts.

3.2.1.1.   The military sector

Out of the five sectors identified in securitisation theory, the sector that is most salient for this research is the military sector because the securitised threat in this research is of a military nature (ie a ballistic missile defence shield). Wæver explicitly states that if military means are used, the threat will fall into the military sector.

In comparison to the other four sectors, the process of securitisation in the military sector is the most likely to be institutionalised, in the sense that it is most likely to be performed by officials within official organisations (Buzan, 1998: 49). In this research, the states (namely Russia and the US) have taken the role of referent object.

When the referent object is the state, there are typically clear boundaries as to who can and cannot be a securitising actor. Representatives of the state who have the authority to speak on behalf of the state may fill this role. Examples of securitising actors in this research include, but are not limited to: Russian President/former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin; Russian Prime Minister/former President Dmitry Medvedev; US President Barack Obama; NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen; NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova; Press Secretary for the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov; and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov.

Many functional actors, ie those actors who are able to influence dynamics within the situation besides the referent object or the securitising actor, exist in the military sector. These include: agencies of force, eg mercenaries, defence bureaucracies and armies; and providers of instruments, eg the arms industry. Other functional actors can include the government of a state (which may be hard to distinguish from the government as a securitising actor) and the military (Buzan, 1998: 56-7).

To understand the foundation of military security matters, one must keep in mind the idea of state sovereignty, in which one has a unique right to self-govern within a given territory over a given population. One of the most basic methods of securing this fundamental right is through the use of military force; therefore, "[…] the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats" (Buzan, 1998: 50). For this research, we will focus on external threats, as those are most pertinent in this context. Buzan states that, relative to the securitisation of external threats, military security focuses on the relationship between two components: first, the actual offensive and defensive capabilities of a state, and second, the states' perceptions of the other's capabilities and intentions. Once states begin to treat other states' capabilities as threatening, this leads to the military security dilemma, ie a spiralling situation in which each state builds up their capabilities to match or overcome the other's, leading to an arms race that is usually desired by neither. This relationship is deeply affected by political relations between the two (Buzan, 1998: 51-2).

In addition to understanding state sovereignty, one must also understand the logic of threats. As securitisation theory fits into the framework of constructivism, the author states that "the senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent" (Buzan, 1998: 57). Despite being socially constructed, the presence or existence of certain elements may facilitate the process of securitisation. Additionally, different states view and respond to threat perceptions in different ways. Within the military sector, the logic of threats depends on two elements: the relationship between their individual military capabilities; and the degree of amity and enmity between the two states (Buzan, 1998: 58). Once two states reach a point of enmity in their relationship, threats become perceived mainly by the military potential of the other. It is important to note that both actual and potential

capabilities of the other state are taken into account relative to the state's own. Due to troubled relations between the US and Russia, it follows that both would view the actions of the other through a lens of enmity.

When discussing a military threat, there are three main ways that a referent object can choose to pursue military security: the first involves internal balancing, in which the state increases its own capabilities to make itself less vulnerable; the second, external balancing, involves partnering with allies who also perceive the threat; and third, bandwagoning, in which the state either appeases or succumbs to the source of the threat (Buzan, 1998: 58). Russia has done the first two in response to the threat of the US/NATO BMD shield. In terms of internal balancing, Russia has focused on increasing and flaunting its own capabilities, including: the deployment of a radar in Kaliningrad to counter the BMD shield (Sputnik News, 2011b); proclamations that Russia has more ballistic missile interceptors than the US (Sputnik News, 2014); declarations that Russian Topol ICBMs can "outwit" the BMD shield (Sputnik News, 2015); the creation of a new RS-26 ICBM that renders the BMD shield "absolutely useless" (Sputnik News, 2016a); and the addition of a brand-new Yu-74 "ultra-maneuverable" hypersonic glide vehicle (Sputnik News, 2016d). In terms of external balancing, Russia entered talks with NATO to collaborate on the BMD shield (Cody, 2010). However, when these crumbled, Russia began to align itself more with China and Iran on military issues (Escobar, 2015).

Aside from military capabilities, there are three main elements that are significant in the installation and perpetuation of military securitisation: geography, history and politics.

Geography can affect threat perception through two factors: distance and terrain. Terrain is not especially relevant for this research, but distance is. States tend to feel more alert toward their neighbours than toward more distant states, primarily because it is more difficult to cause harm to a state from a further distance; therefore, if a neighbouring state or a great power is projecting military power nearby, the threat perception will be higher than under different circumstances (Buzan, 1998: 59). As distance relates to our research, Russia has felt increasingly threatened by the BMD shield because the elements were in its own figurative backyard: Poland, Turkey and Romania.

History also may have a profound impact on threat perception, as "the existence of historical enmity and repeated war will tend to amplify present perceptions of threat"

(Buzan, 1998: 59). Russia, previously as the USSR, and the US have experienced a historically rocky relationship over the past decades, filled with suspicion and distrust, as the two great powers of a historically bipolar world. Although the USSR no longer exists, the memories of the Cold War era remain with both parties, and these memories facilitate the perception of threats.

The third element affecting securitisation in the military sector is politics, primarily due to conflicting ideologies (Buzan, 1998: 60). In the past, the US and the USSR maintained a continual ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, which served to perpetuate military securitisation. Although this ideological discrepancy no longer exists, the historical memory does. Additionally, the US and Russia do not see eye-to-eye on many political matters, both domestically and internationally, which may not be strong enough to provoke securitisation, but certainly does not promote desecuritisation.

3.2.2. Alternative views of securitisation theory

Balzacq (2005) disagrees with some of the main tenets of the Copenhagen School's vision of securitisation theory, primarily that power derives from using certain words alongside rules that govern speech acts. He argues that a "speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in 'real situations'" (2005: 171). As such, Balzacq (2005: 171) proposes three basic assumptions as a corrective: first, "that an effective securitization is audience-centered"; second, "that securitization is context-dependent"; and third, "that an effective securitization is power-laden". Balzacq (2005: 172) criticises the Copenhagen School's view that the discursive invocation of security itself affects the social order. Balzacq states that this vision of securitisation has too high of a degree of formality. In contrast to the Copenhagen School, he believes that securitisation "is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as a part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction" (Balzacq, 2005: 172), as opposed to the more rigid and formal view of the Copenhagen School.

Williams (2003: 511) tends to agree with the Copenhagen School's view of securitisation, but he cautions that the "increasing impact of televisual communication in security relations provides a fundamental challenge for understanding the processes

and institutions involved in securitization […]". This is due to the fact that, as political communication takes non-traditional forms, "the processes of securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institutional linkages that cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act [*sic*] alone (Williams, 2003: 512). In other words, limiting securitisation only to speech acts is too narrow to fully encompass all modern forms of communication. Furthermore, Williams (2003: 521) also advocates for a more detailed examination of ethics in securitisation theory.

Ciută (2009) points out that securitisation theory is stuck between two seemingly contradictory positions: its attempt to establish the nature of security, while also perpetuating that security is constructed by the actors involved. Ciută argues that, in order for securitisation to be effective, it must further define its main argument, that security is a construct. In considering that security is constructed, one must especially take into account the context surrounding the situation. Ciută (2009: 317) outlines five different areas in which to further develop and outline the criteria for securitisation. In the first area, the construction of threats, he states that, along with identifying pre-existing threats, one must also examine threats based on "the actors' history, identities, and strategic myths" (Ciută, 2009: 317). In the second area, detailing the construction of referent objects, he stresses the importance of empirically examining the entire process, not only the end result. In the third area, regarding the construction of securitising actors, Ciută states that, because actors do not have equal capabilities to perform securitising speech acts, it is crucial to examine the context in which their development takes place, particularly as a cultural construct. In the fourth area, referring to the construction of security measures, Ciută (2009: 317) argues the importance of "investigating the logic of interaction, criteria of rationality, normative structures, and so on, which make these actions intelligible and contextually adequate as *security* policies." Finally, in the fifth area, regarding the construction of the meaning of security, Ciută (2009: 317) states that this must be established "by studying the categories of meaning that circumscribe actors' interactions."

Hansen (2000) is critical of the Copenhagen School due to its absence of gender discussions. She outlines two problems for gender in terms of securitisation: the first, which she labels "security as silence", takes place when insecurity cannot be vocalised because doing so is either impossible or could aggravate the threat; the second, "subsuming security" occurs "because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject's gendered identity and other aspects of the

subject's identity" (Hansen, 2000: 287). Hansen argues that, because identity and context are so crucial for the construction of security, gender cannot and should not be ignored by the Copenhagen School.

3.3. Chapter summary

This chapter has discussed the two main theoretical frameworks within which this research exists: social constructivism and securitisation theory. Social constructivism believes in the importance of institutions, ideas and norms in shaping interests and the environment around them. Furthermore, it emphasises that these are constructed in a social context, and discourse is key to this concept and the study of it; without discourse and communication, none of this would be able to exist.

Securitisation theory operates in the security component of social constructivism, believing that security threats are essentially able to be spoken into existence; threats do not exist until someone identifies them as a threat. Actors can perform securitising moves, but a threat cannot become truly securitised unless it is accepted as such by an audience. Securitisation theory also identifies five different sectors in which a threat can reside: military, political, environmental, economic and societal. This research focuses on the military sector and the ways in which certain factors can affect military securitisation, including geography, history and politics. Furthermore, the referent object can choose to react to a threat via internal balancing, external balancing and/or appeasement.

In discussing alternate views of securitisation theory, Balzacq opposes the more formal view of the Copenhagen School and argues for the importance of context in analysing securitisation. Williams tends to align with the Copenhagen School, but cautions that, with the development and proliferation of various modes of televisual communication, securitisation theory must adjust accordingly. Ciută sees the basic ideas of securitisation theory as contradictory and outlines five different areas for improvement and clarification. Hansen argues for the inclusion of gender discussion in the framework of securitisation theory.

4. Methodology

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, language is a powerful tool, especially in the arena of security. Because of this power, it is important to study different arenas of discourse, including the media, to investigate how they both portray security problems and speak them into existence.

This chapter discusses and justifies the chosen research design and methods for this research. The discussed methods determined the approach to collecting, interpreting and analysing the data, which comprise the findings of this dissertation. The methodology follows the Stage Model of Qualitative Content Analysis, as laid out by Berg (2004: 286). Data was collected from six different print news sources: three from the US and three from Russia. Following data collection, each article was coded in terms of seven elements: lexis; transitivity; modality; source attribution; text coherence and cohesion; nonverbal components; and presupposition. Following this analysis, each article was sorted into one of three categories based on their portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: positive, neutral or negative.

4.1. Research approach and method

This research was conducted following the Stage Model of Qualitative Content Analysis, as laid out by Berg (2004:286). This study examines media portrayals of the BMD shield and securitisation, and these portrayals will be analysed in a qualitative manner. A qualitative approach was selected because this research is most interested in *what* was said and *how* it was said, which are, by nature, not quantitative objectives. Therefore, Berg's qualitative model is most relevant for the research objectives, which are further outlined in section 4.1.1.

The first step of this model necessitates outlining questions to guide the research. The second step involves determining the analytic categories for analysis by reading relevant literature and creating links to the research question. The third step is to read through the data and identify relevant themes and category labels related to the research question. In doing this, the analytic and grounded categories will be determined. The fourth step is to establish objective criteria for selection and define coding rules for each category. The fifth step involves sorting the data correspondingly either manually or by using software. After sorting several pieces of data, the categories and selection criteria should also be reviewed and revised accordingly. In step six, the data are studied to

discover any patterns (or lack thereof). Additionally, counting the number of entries for each category allows for the examination of descriptive statistics. Finally, in step seven, the patterns and findings are compared to the relevant extant literature and an explanation is given. For a more detailed figure of Berg's (2004: 286) model, please see Figure 27 of Appendix A.

Additionally, Mautner (2008: 44) points out that "a fine-grained linguistic investigation needs to recognize the relevance of the social, cultural, political and economic background against which texts are written and read." Keeping this in mind, this dissertation will discuss the backdrop against which these articles are set in order to obtain the clearest picture possible of the environment in which they take place.

This study uses critical discourse analysis to determine the polarity of US and Russian media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield. This method was chosen due to its relevance for analysing print media and also for its emphasis on examining texts in relation to their context. Fairclough (1995: 57-62) discusses a three-part framework for critical discourse analysis, in which three separate forms of analysis are combined to create an all-encompassing analysis, rather than keeping them as isolated events: analysis of written texts, analysis of discourse practice (such as text production, distribution, and consumption) and the analysis of "discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice."[7]

4.1.1. Research questions and hypothesis

Research questions are designed to guide the process of collecting and analysing the data by creating objectives and aims for the thesis as a whole.

The research questions for this dissertation include:

- How do portrayals of the US/NATO BMD shield by US and Russian print and electronic media compare before and after the Crimean annexation?
- How is the missile defence shield portrayed by print and electronic media in the United States and in Russia, and how does this differ?
- Has securitisation taken place in either the US or in Russia regarding the BMD shield?

---

[7] For a visual representation of Fairclough's (1995:59) framework, please see Figure 28 of Appendix A.

Because this research is deductive, a hypothesis was established before beginning the research and will be either proven or disproven. The hypothesis guiding this research is: *Prior to the Crimean annexation, the US media portrays the shield positively, while the Russian media portrays it negatively. Following the Crimean annexation, the US media portrays the shield more positively, while the Russian media portrays it either equally or more negatively*. This hypothesis was developed through preliminary readings from the print and electronic media sources, whose selection is outlined in the section below.

4.1.2. Data collection

Because this is a qualitative research project, random sampling is not appropriate (Bauer & Aarts, 2000: 19). This is due to the fact that the size of the population is unknown and because "the variety of representations […] should not be determined *a priori*" (Mautner, 2008: 35). A top-down approach was used to collect data. This approach, adapted from Mautner (2008: 36), suggests beginning with a broad category, such as print media, then successively narrowing these categories down until you select the sources to be analysed. This will result in a "specialized, topic-oriented and diachronic corpus" (Mautner, 2008: 36). However, Mautner (2008: 36) also recommends pausing data collection periodically and performing small-scale analyses, then revising data selection decisions based on the results of these analyses. This is done to ensure that the data being collected are consistently suitable for the research being performed and prevents "amassing data […] that turn out to be unsuitable for answering your research question" (Mautner, 2008: 37).[8]

Additionally, Mautner (2008: 37) cautions that if "an issue is polarized politically, you would have to make sure that print media associated with different political camps are selected". Keeping this in mind, six print and electronic media sources were chosen to be analysed for this study, all from different political stances.

The three sources from the US media are *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *Fox News*. *The New York Times* represents the American political left, while *Fox News* is decidedly right-wing. *The Washington Post* is a centre-left publication.

---

[8] For a visual representation of the data selection process, please refer to Figure 29 of Appendix A.

The three sources chosen from the Russian media are *Novaya Gazeta*,[9] *Sputnik News* and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*.[10] *Novaya Gazeta* is an independent investigative newspaper on the opposite end of the political spectrum from the government, while *Sputnik News* is a Russian government-owned, international news agency that reports in over 30 languages and is solely aimed for consumption outside of Russia. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* is the official Russian government newspaper of record.

The scope of this research includes print media and all articles that were published in a written format online; videos, radio and broadcast media are not included. All articles were gathered from the websites for each media outlet, which are as follows: nytimes.com for *The New York Times*; thewashingtonpost.com for *The Washington Post*; foxnews.com for *Fox News*; novayagazeta.ru for *Novaya Gazeta*; sputniknews.com for *Sputnik News*; and rg.ru for *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. The search feature on each website was used to gather articles for analysis.

The search terms used to find articles were: *missile defense*, *NATO*, *ballistic*, *Aegis* and *shield*, either in English or the Russian equivalent.[11] These five search terms were selected with the purpose of obtaining the most comprehensive selection of articles on the subject possible. *Missile defense*[12] was chosen because, of course, that is the most basic subject of this study. *NATO* was selected because NATO is involved in the shield's development and will return more specific results than if a search was performed for *US* or *United States*. *Ballistic* was chosen because we are discussing ballistic missile defence, so if an article did not appear for some reason under the *missile defense* search term, it would be likely to appear under *ballistic*. *Aegis* is the fourth search term because the components of the BMD shield are part of the Aegis system, so Aegis is a very specific term relating to this research. Finally, *shield* was used because sometimes articles only refer to the subject of our study as the *shield*. Thus, similar to the logic used when including *ballistic*, *shield* was included to ensure that no relevant articles would be missed.

The date parameter was set from 17 September 2009 to 20 January 2017. 17 September 2009 was chosen as the lower bound because this is when US President Barack Obama announced the United States' new "Phased, Adaptive Approach for

---

[9] Name in Russian: *Новая газета*

[10] Name in Russian: *Российская Газета*

[11] The search terms used in Russian are, respectively: *противоракетная оборона*, *НАТО*, *баллистическая*, *Иджис* and *щит*.

[12] I use the American spelling of *defense* because all English-language data in this dissertation are written in American English.

Missile Defense in Europe", which was his administration's plan to replace the Bush-era approach to missile defence (Obama White House, 2009). The upper bound was set as 20 January 2017, as this was the end date of Barack Obama's presidency.

It is important to note that some of the articles identified as relevant from *The Washington Post*, *Fox News*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and *Novaya Gazeta* originated from wire services, such as the *Associated Press*[13] and *Reuters*,[14] or taken from other news agencies, including *Ekho Moskvy*,[15] *RIA Novosti*[16] and *BBC Russian*.[17] The decision was made to not exclude such articles from this research for a few reasons. First, the journalists from the analysed media outlets had to decide what articles or parts of articles to publish or combine with other sources, even if they were not their own original content. Second, the articles appear to be written by *Fox News*, *The Washington Post*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* or *Novaya Gazeta*, not by a different agency. Although the articles do state that they contain wire content either in the byline or at the end, they have the appearance of being produced by these publications, using the same formatting as articles with original content from these sources. Because certain wire articles were chosen by the publications to post on their websites, it was determined that they were relevant for this research, as this study examines media portrayals.

Analysing every article that was identified using the aforementioned search parameters is outside the scope of this research, as there were tens of thousands of articles that appeared to be relevant. Therefore, all returned search results were considered, and the articles that appeared to be most relevant (ie those which mentioned the US/NATO BMD shield specifically) were identified. Following this, the articles were then pared down with a goal of selecting 30-35 from each source to include in this research. In order to do this, the articles with the most amount of information about the BMD shield were selected, and those with either a minimal amount of information regarding the shield, or those that were repeats of already-selected articles were excluded. In total, there were 97 articles from US media sources and 93 articles from Russian media sources. The breakdown of these articles will be discussed in the following chapter.

---

[13] ap.org
[14] reuters.com
[15] Name in Russian: *Эхо Москвы*; echo.msk.ru
[16] Name in Russian: *РИА Новости*; ria.ru
[17] bbc.com/russian

4.1.3. Coding

After exhausting all search functions and identifying all relevant articles within the selected timeframe, the articles were skimmed and reoccurring themes were listed. From these themes, categories were selected and operational definitions for each category were given. When defining the categories, it is important to ensure that the categories do not overlap, are mutually exclusive and are comprehensive (Berg, 2004: 285-97). The categorical definitions will be given in the next sections. Additionally, the data were analysed while keeping in mind that non-instances are just as important to note as instances; the lack of an occurrence is just as important as the occurrence itself.

To determine which category an article belonged to, seven different components, adopted from Mautner (2008: 38-44) and Richardson (2007: 46-74) were analysed: lexis; transitivity; modality; source attribution; textual coherence and cohesion; nonverbal components; and presupposition.

4.1.3.1. Lexis

According to Richardson (2007: 47), almost all analysis of news texts begins with analysing the lexis used by the author. Lexis applies to identifying a pattern in the choice of words, which Hunston (2004: 157) calls an "evaluative meaning", or a particular polarity. Some examples of this would be the labelling of news actors in a certain way, using adjectives with negative or positive polarity, using adjectives or verbs with specific connotations, and explicitly mentioning but also implying things (Mautner, 2008: 38).

Lexis is significant because "words convey the imprint of society and of value judgements in particular – they convey connoted as well as denoted meanings", particularly adjectives, adverbs, nouns and verbs (Richardson, 2007: 47). Word choices, for better or for worse, frame the messages of texts in a "direct and unavoidable" way (Richardson, 2007: 48).

In addition, Van Dijk (1983) makes the significant distinction that even "neutral" or "positive" words can gain a negative connotation in certain contexts, or vice versa. Therefore, it is important to take into account the context of the word, not solely the word itself.

4.1.3.2. Transitivity

Transitivity examines specific verbal processes. This is discerned by looking at how different verbs and structures are used to manufacture alternate versions of reality for a singular event (Mautner, 2008: 41). Richardson (2007: 54) defines transitivity as "describ[ing] the relationships between participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting", forming "the very heart of representation, describing the relationships between participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting."

Instances of transitivity can frequently be found in news reporting. For example, then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2009) wrote in an op-ed published in *The New York Times*: "*This shift has even been distorted* as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan" (emphasis added). When he writes this, he does not name anyone who is distorting the shift; instead, he uses the grammatical passive voice to avoid identifying the actor(s).

4.1.3.3. Modality

Modality is defined by Stubbs (1996: 202) as "the ways in which language is used to encode meanings such as degrees of certainty and commitment, or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment, personal beliefs versus generally accepted or taken for granted knowledge." For example, the author or speaker can have either a *high* or *low* commitment, or modality, to what they are saying; they can either be certain or vague (Mautner, 2008: 42). In other words, modality refers to the attitude and opinion of the author regarding the truth of what they are writing. Richardson (2007: 59) says that modality "is usually indicated via the use of modal verbs (such as *may*, *could*, *should*, *will* and *must*), their negations (*may not*, *could not*, *should not*, *will not* and *must not*) or through adverbs (*certainly*)."

There are two ways that modality is expressed: truth modality and obligation (or duty) modality. Truth modality varies from the absolute (eg "This war *will* be stopped") to a certain level of limited modality (eg "This war *can* be stopped") to reduced certainty (eg "This war *could* be stopped if *only* someone intervened") (Richardson, 2007: 60). Obligation modality applies to future events and the degree to which the author believes something should happen. This can be expressed as absolute (eg

"Children's rights *must* take precedence") or hedged (eg "Children's rights *ought to* take precedence") (Richardson, 2007: 60).

According to Richardson (2007: 60), absolute modal truth claims "appear more authoritative than hedged claims and therefore tend to be used more frequently, particularly in more sensationalised or more vigorously argued copy." However, even if one uses words of lower modality, when combined with certain words, it can have a significant effect on framing the event. For example, in an article from *Sputnik News*, the author writes, referring to the BMD shield, "Moscow has warned that the system *could* be detrimental for global peace and stability" (emphasis added) (Sputnik News, 2016c). By combining the modal claim with the verb *to warn*, it heightens the sense of threat by making it seem like the event is a real possibility, something that Richardson (2007: 60) refers to as a "propagandistic technique."

However, when analysing modality, it is important to keep in mind the context of the sentence. As Simpson (1993: 49) points out, when adding a modal verb to something that would otherwise be an absolute assertion (eg "You are" or "She was") paradoxically results in a weaker claim. For instance, adding *must*, which is a modal verb relaying absoluteness, can actually make a claim weaker (eg "You are right" vs "You *must* be right", in which case the first sentence has a stronger claim) (Simpson, 1993: 49).

4.1.3.4.   Source attribution

Source attribution fits with the concept of modality. Sentences that have a lower modality may have used a distancing function through the utilisation of source attribution. However, according to Mautner (2008: 42), "the overall effect of certainty is not impaired. In fact, references to élite sources serve a legitimizing function, supporting the author's view and bolstering his credibility."

Along with source attribution, there is also significance in how the author chooses to name someone in the discourse. Richardson (2007: 49) states that, "the way that people are named in news discourse can have significant impact on the way in which they are viewed." For example, in an article from *The Washington Post* entitled, "Obama Acquiesces to Russia on Missile Defense" (Kramer, 2009), the author refers to the US president as either "Obama" or "Barack Obama", never associating him with the proper title of President. However, when he refers to George W Bush and Dmitry

Medvedev, he refers to them as President Bush and President Medvedev. In this way, he could be perceived as subtly showing less respect to President Obama than he showed to Presidents Bush and Medvedev.

4.1.3.5. Text coherence and cohesion

Text coherence and cohesion pertains to how the text is connected. For example, one may examine key argumentative strategies and various "text-connecting features", such as repetition, paraphrasing, co-referencing and ellipses (Hoey, 2001: 41).

Van Dijk (1983: 31) discusses the importance of stylistic coherence: "[T]hroughout the text, lexical choices will be made from the same register and, in order to denote the same referents, will be subject to the same evaluative dimensions." This leads to the creation of an encompassing macrostructure, in which an overall concept of a participant is formed, even if not all denominations match this concept, eg an overall negative idea may be formed despite the fact that not all lexical choices are negative.

4.1.3.6. Nonverbal components

Nonverbal message components can have a powerful impact on an article and may be comprised of many different elements, including visuals, photographs, page layout, font size and style, charts, boxed inserts, and frames (Mautner, 2008: 43). It is often possible to infer the macrostructure of the article by its prominent position in the layout or a change in font, bolding or capital letters (Van Dijk, 1983: 34). Therefore, it is important to analyse the headline, because it "will typically express the most important macroproposition, where 'importance' is defined in terms of general knowledge and beliefs defining the newsworthiness criteria" (Van Dijk, 1983: 34).

The layout of an article is also significant since, following the headline, "sentences will then progressively specify further details of the events, with the less important ones at the end […] News in the daily press is organized by the principle of relevance or importance, along a dimension of decreasing prominence with respect to the macrostructure. This means that one can read only the headlines or the lead, or only some part of the discourse, and still process the most important information" (Van Dijk, 1983: 34-5).

4.1.3.7.   Presupposition

In addition to meanings that are readily available in the text, such as many of the ones listed above, there may also be meanings that are concealed or presupposed. Richardson (2007: 63) defines a presupposition as "a taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance."

Reah (2002: 106) identifies three ways in which to identify presupposition in a text. The first way is the use of certain words, including verbs that indicate a change of state (eg *stop*, *begin*, *continue*) or implicative verbs (eg *manage*, *forget*). These verbs presuppose meanings: for example, *stop* implies that there was an action happening before, while *forget* presupposes an effort to recall something.

The second manner of identifying presupposition is the use of the definite article *the*[18] and the use of possessive articles (*his*, *her*, *their*). For example, if one says, "the challenge to the Russia-US relationship", it implies that there exists not only a challenge but also a relationship between Russia and the US.

The third marker of presupposition is included in the questions *who*, *what*, *when*, *where* and *why*. If the question "Why do the US and NATO want to create a BMD shield?" is asked, the presuppositions are: first, the US and NATO actually want to create a BMD shield; and secondly, that *both* the US and NATO want to do this, not just one or the other.

4.1.4.   Categorisation

After viewing each article through the above-listed paradigms, the articles were divided into three categories based on their portrayal of the BMD shield: positive, neutral and negative. All seven dimensions were analysed and categorised as positive or negative within the article itself. If the article contained primarily positive elements, it was categorised as positive, and if most elements were negative, it was determined to be negative. However, if the article contained equal amounts of both positive and negative components, or if the article did not contain a significant amount of positive or negative components at all, it was categorised as neutral. Once all articles were assigned a category, the data in each category were examined to see if they were consistent with the stated hypothesis of this study.

---

[18] It is important to note that *the* cannot be used to mark presupposition in Russian, as the Russian language does not have an equivalent to *the*.

4.2. Advantages and limitations

One of the main advantages of this research design is that, as this dissertation involves secondary research, the budget and time required to carry out this study are less intense than would be necessary for primary research, which would likely require travel or interviewing, both of which can be expensive and time-consuming. Additionally, this research is unobtrusive in the sense that no one needs to be interviewed or fill out questionnaires; all of the data required for this study have already been produced (Berg, 2004: 287).

However, secondary data does require time to analyse properly, especially in the case of this study, which involved sorting, reading and reviewing thousands of different articles in both English and Russian. To be thorough and accurate demands the devotion of a large amount of time, though likely not as much time as primary research would entail. Another limitation of critical discourse analysis is that it is "ineffective for testing causal relationships between variables" (Berg, 2004: 288). For this research, correlation does not necessarily equal causation. It is important to keep in mind that, just because media opinions and portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield may have changed before and after the Crimean annexation does not necessarily mean that this change was caused by the Crimean annexation itself. There are many variables in play, and isolating them is outside the scope of this research.

In addition to the limitations above, there are also language limitations. Because I am a native English speaker, performing critical discourse analysis on the multitude of English language articles did not pose as much of a challenge as the Russian language articles. Although every effort was made to correctly analyse each article in Russian, there are natural limitations that occur for me as a non-native speaker.

4.3. Chapter summary

This research was conducted through a constructivist paradigm. Social constructivism maintains that security problems are able to be spoken or written into existence by various actors, including the media. Because of this, it is important to analyse how the media portrays security issues, specifically the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield for this study, to view and understand connections between the media and the security problem.

This study follows Berg's (2004) Stage Model of Qualitative Content Analysis, which outlines the steps required to perform this research. Articles from six media outlets in the United States and in Russia were identified using key search terms in English or Russian, then the most relevant articles were selected for further analysis. Through the use of critical discourse analysis, the articles were coded, specifically examining their lexis, transitivity, modality, source attribution, textual coherence and cohesion, nonverbal components and presupposition. Based on the results of the coding, the articles were categorised as either positive, neutral or negative regarding their portrayal of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield.

5. US media portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield

This chapter discusses results from the critical discourse analysis of articles from three US news outlets: *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *Fox News*. In addition to the results of this study, this chapter will also provide background into each of these media outlets, as well as an analysis of the overall findings for the US media portrayal of the shield.

5.1. *The New York Times*

The New York Times, based in New York City, was established in September 1851, eventually rising to a position as "long the newspaper of record in the United States", known for its "editorial excellence" (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017a). The newspaper has a mainly liberal audience, according to the Pew Research Center (2016). Although the newspaper is primarily in English, they also feature editions in Chinese and Spanish.

The newspaper's parent company, The New York Times Company, is a publicly-traded company on the New York Stock Exchange. The largest shareholder is Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim Helú, who owns approximately 17 per cent of the company (Goliya, 2015). The editor-in-chief of the newspaper has been Dean Baquet since 2014.

Since their beginning, *The New York Times* have continued to use the same slogan: "All the News That's Fit to Print".

5.1.1. Findings

Upon searching *The New York Times*' website[19] using the methodological criteria outlined in Chapter 4, 82 articles were identified as having potential for analysis. Upon further screening, it was determined that 32 articles met the criteria to be considered in this research: 27 from prior to the Crimean annexation and five following.[20]

Out of 32 articles, zero were from wire services. The earliest article fitting the criteria prior to the Crimean annexation was from 17 September 2009, while the latest

---

[19] nytimes.com

[20] For a complete list of *The New York Times* articles analysed, along with their categorisations, see Appendix B.

was published on 29 March 2013.[21] Among these articles, 48 per cent were categorised as having a positive portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, while 19 per cent were neutral and 33 per cent were determined to portray a negative depiction of the shield, which can be seen in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. *The New York Times'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

Of the articles published following the Crimean annexation, the earliest was from 30 July 2014, and the latest was published on 31 May 2016. Only 20 per cent of these articles were found to relay a positive image of the shield, while another 20 per cent were neutral and 60 per cent were found to have a negative portrayal, as illustrated in Figure 4 below.

---

[21] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix E, Figure 30.

Figure 4. *The New York Times'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.

The New York Times: Post-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

Source: Own calculations.

As shown in Figure 5 below, there was a sharp decrease in articles positively portraying the shield by 28 per cent. The percentage of neutral articles remained relatively the same, only increasing by one per cent. Additionally, there was a steep increase in articles with negative opinions of the shield, rising by 27 per cent.

Figure 5. *The New York Times'* portrayal of the BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

The New York Times: Pre- vs. Post-Crimea
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

Source: Own calculations.

5.2. *The Washington Post*

The Washington Post, based in Washington, DC, was established in December 1877 (Bell, 2011). Since that time, it has become one of the most well-known newspapers in the United States and is especially dominant within the capital (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017b). The Pew Research Center has identified *The Washington Post* as being read by primarily politically centre-left audiences (Pew Research Center, 2016). In 2013, the newspaper was purchased for $250 million[22] by Nash Holdings LLC, the private investment company of Jeff Bezos, CEO and founder of Amazon.com (Farhi, 2013). The newspaper's editor-in-chief has been Martin Baron since 2013.

The Washington Post, widely known for its reputation as an investigative newspaper, is perhaps most well-known for being the newspaper that broke the Watergate Scandal in 1972. Only available in English, *The Washington Post*'s audience is comprised of English-language readers. In 2017, they adopted a new slogan: "Democracy Dies in Darkness" (Farhi, 2017). Before the announcement was made, owner Bezos hinted at the reasons for this slogan, saying that "certain institutions have a very important role in making sure that there is light" (Farhi, 2017), which he gave as one of his reasons for buying the newspaper.

5.2.1. Findings

When searching *The Washington Post*'s website[23] using the parameters outlined in the previous chapter, 56 articles were identified as possibly meeting the criteria for consideration. After reviewing the content of the articles, it was determined that 32 were eligible to be analysed for this dissertation: 24 articles before and eight articles after the Crimean annexation.[24]

Only four per cent of the pre-Crimea articles were from wire services, while 38 per cent of the articles post-Crimea were. The earliest of the pre-Crimea articles was published on 18 September 2009, while the latest was from 6 August 2012.[25] Among these articles, 42 per cent were categorised as portraying a positive attitude towards the

---

[22] US dollars
[23] thewashingtonpost.com
[24] For a complete list of Washington Post articles analysed, along with their categorisations, see Appendix C.
[25] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix E, Figure 31.

US/NATO BMD shield, 17 per cent were categorised as neutral and 42 per cent were categorised as negative.

Figure 6. *The Washington Post*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.[26]

Source: Own calculations.

The dates of the articles from the post-Crimea period ranged from 18 March 2014 to 13 May 2016. During this period, there was a shift in the portrayals: 63 per cent of the articles analysed were classified as having a positive portrayal, 13 per cent had a neutral attitude, and 25 per cent portrayed the BMD shield negatively, as demonstrated in Figure 7 below.

---

[26] Note: The percentages in Figure 6 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

Figure 7. *The Washington Post*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.[27]

The Washington Post: Post-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

- Positive
- Neutral
- Negative

25 %

13 %

63 %

Source: Own calculations.

Referring to Figure 8 below, it is obvious that there was a significant increase (21 per cent) in positive articles, while there was a slight decrease (four per cent) of neutral articles and a significant decrease (17 per cent) in negative articles.

---

[27] Note: The percentages in Figure 7 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

Figure 8. *The Washington Post*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

*The Washington Post*: Pre- vs. Post-Crimea
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

Source: Own calculations.

5.3. *Fox News*

The Fox News channel was founded in October 1996 and is based in New York City. *Fox News* maintains multiple television channels and radio stations, as well as online print content. Until recently, the *Fox News* slogan was "Fair & Balanced", sometimes alternated with "We Report. You Decide." However, following a series of scandals in 2016 and the departure of co-founder Roger Ailes, the network marked its transition to a new era with a new slogan: "Most Watched, Most Trusted." (Grynbaum, 2017). *Fox News* is broadcast on television and radio, as well as published online, in English, indicating that their target audience is solely English-language speakers.

Fox News is well-known for its close connections with the US Republican Party, evidenced by its conservative leanings and stable of high-level Republicans who frequently serve as commentators onscreen and online. Additionally, *Fox News* has publicly supported the Tea Party, an ultra-conservative grassroots movement (Ray, 2017). The Pew Research Center (2016) identified most *Fox News* readers as having a very conservative political orientation.

Fox News is owned by 21st Century Fox, which was created upon the breakup of co-founder Rupert Murdoch's media conglomerate News Corporation. 21st Century Fox

is a publicly-traded company on the NASDAQ and is run by Rupert Murdoch and his sons Lachlan and James.

5.3.1. Findings

After searching the *Fox News* website,[28] 107 articles were identified as potentially analysable. Upon further examination, 33 articles were found to fit the criteria for this research: 21 before and 12 after Crimea. [29]

Of the articles before Crimea, 38 per cent came from wire services, with this number increasing to 75 per cent following Crimea. The time range of the pre-Crimea articles extended from 17 September 2009 to 9 February 2014.[30] Of these, 14 per cent were considered to have positive portrayals of the US/NATO BMD shield, another 14 per cent with neutral portrayals and 71 per cent that portrayed it negatively, as shown in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9. *Fox News'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.[31]

Source: Own calculations.

---

[28] foxnews.com

[29] For a complete list of *Fox News* articles analysed, along with their categorisations, see Appendix D.

[30] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix E, Figure 32.

[31] Note: The percentages in Figure 9 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

The articles in the post-Crimea period ranged from 24 March 2014 to 11 October 2016. 25 per cent of these articles were found to demonstrate a positive view of the shield, while 17 per cent maintained a neutral attitude and 58 per cent portrayed the shield negatively. This is illustrated in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10. *Fox News'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

Compared to the articles from the pre-Crimea period, the positively-portrayed post-Crimea articles rose by 11 per cent. The percentage of neutral articles slightly rose as well, by just three per cent. However, the number of articles with negative portrayals decreased by 13 per cent. This is illustrated in Figure 11 below.

Figure 11. *Fox News'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

5.4.   US media findings overall

Results from the three US media outlets (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *Fox News*) were combined to achieve an overall result for US media, in order to prove or disprove the hypothesis of this paper. There were 97 articles analysed from US media in total, with 72 pre-Crimea and 25 post-Crimea.

The pre-Crimea articles found ranged from 17 September 2009 to 29 March 2013.[32] Of the 72 articles prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority portrayed a negative image of the shield (47 per cent), while positive-leaning articles comprised 17 per cent and negative articles 36 per cent. This is illustrated in Figure 12 below.

---

[32] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix E, Figure 33.

Figure 12. The US media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre-Crimea.

US Media: Pre-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

36 %

47 %

17 %

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative

Source: Own calculations.

Of the articles in the post-Crimea period, 36 per cent were found to be positive, 16 per cent were classified as neutral and 48 per cent were deemed to be negative. This is illustrated in Figure 13 below.

Figure 13. The US media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Post-Crimea.

US Media: Post-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

36 %

48 %

16 %

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative

Source: Own calculations.

When looking at Figure 14 below, we can see that there is almost no change in the number of articles in each category before and after the Crimean annexation. Although the numbers changed within the different news outlets, it appears that these shifts counterbalanced each other, leaving the overall portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield by the US media as negative almost half the time.

Figure 14. The US media's portrayal of US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

Although the BMD shield was portrayed negatively in the cumulative US results, it is important to note each news outlet's reasoning for the negative portrayal. *The New York Times* had very mixed portrayals of the shield prior to the Crimean annexation, with some staff writers expressing scepticism that Obama's EPAA plan would be effective, or that the plan was even worth pursuing in the face of Russian opposition and threats to delay or cancel negotiations to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This scepticism was counterbalanced by positive editorials from political elites, including: then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; former US Senator and co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn; former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov; former German ambassador to the UK and US Wolfgang Ischinger; then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen; and then-US Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder. Overall, *The New York Times'* articles in the pre-Crimea period were positive (48 per cent).

In the post-Crimea period, the overall orientation of articles in *The New York Times* shifted to negative (60 per cent). The negative articles primarily focused on threats from Russia, along with the potential repercussions of continuing the BMD shield project, while the others discussed NATO's intentions with the shield, along with the veracity (or not) of claims that it was not directed against Russia.

In *The Washington Post*, the majority of articles from the pre-Crimea period were evenly distributed between positive and negative portrayals (both at 42 per cent). The negative articles accused the Obama administration of attempting to placate Russia by replacing the Bush-era plan and discussing how the new plan would affect the START negotiations and relations with Russia. Alternatively, the positive articles quoted elite US and NATO political figures in maintaining that the new shield would be more cost effective and better tailored to newly-identified threats than the old plan.

Among articles in *The Washington Post* from the post-Crimea period, the majority portrayed a positive image of the BMD shield, with 63 per cent. The positive articles mentioned the need to defend against Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe, framing the shield as a necessity. Other articles described the Kremlin's threats and statements regarding what would happen if they continued with the shield.

The *Fox News* articles in the pre-Crimea period were overwhelmingly negative (71 per cent), with positive and neutral articles each comprising 14 per cent of the total. Although *Fox News* is a primarily right-wing, conservative outlet, and US conservatives tend to be more hawkish than their liberal counterparts, *Fox News* was continuously critical in its coverage of the shield. The primary argument for their unfavourable portrayal of the shield was that they believed it to be less comprehensive than the Bush-era shield, repeatedly expressing doubts that the shield was capable of serving its main purpose: to protect US allies against the threat of attack from rogue states. Additionally, *Fox News* heavily criticised President Obama for what they referred to as his "appeasement" of Russia. The only positive articles referred to NATO's commitment to construct a BMD shield in Europe, a partnership with Romania for placing a shield site in Deveselu and Obama's refusal to acquiesce to Russian requests to cease construction on the shield.

In the *Fox News* articles that followed the annexation of Crimea, the percentage of negative articles decreased to 58 per cent, albeit they were still the majority. One article referenced the Crimean annexation specifically, stating that it was "time to rally around our European allies with missile defense and more" (Heinrichs, 2014). However,

this article portrayed the shield negatively, criticising the US for not "fulfill[ing] its commitment" to Poland during the Bush era by "appeasing Moscow", advocating for a resurrection of the Bush-era plan.

The hypothesis for this research, which stated that the US media would portray the shield positively before the Crimean annexation and would portray the BMD shield increasingly more positively after the Crimea, has been disproven. Nearly half of the articles have a negative portrayal of the shield, both before and after Crimea. Additionally, the number of positive articles decreased by one per cent following the Crimean annexation.

5.4.1.   Securitisation in the US media

Based on the articles analysed in this dissertation, there were many instances of securitising speech acts in the US media regarding the BMD shield. From the US perspective, there are multiple threats: from Iran (given as the primary reason for implementing a BMD shield as Iran continued developing short-, intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles); from North Korea (a secondary reason for implementing the shield); and Russia (due to Russian threats to deploy missiles towards the shield and to withdraw from START negotiations and other treaties). To further investigate instances of securitising language, each article was searched for any mention of the word *threat* or its derivative forms.[33]

In *The New York Times*, 63 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 60 per cent of the post-Crimea articles mentioned the word *threat*. For example, a September 2009 article stated that President Obama was implementing the EPAA to "meet a changing *threat* from Iran" (emphasis added) (Baker, 2009). In a September 2009 editorial from former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, he states that SM-3 interceptor missiles would be placed "in the areas where we see the greatest *threat* to Europe" (emphasis added) (Gates, 2009). In this statement, Secretary Gates not only uses securitising language but also uses presupposition in the phrase "the greatest *threat*" (emphasis added), implying that there are multiple threats in existence. In a May 2016 article, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was quoted as calling the shield a "certain *threat* to the Russian Federation" (emphasis added), while Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

---

[33] Including *threaten*, *threatened*, *threatening*, etc.

spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated the shield was a "direct *threat* to global and regional security" (emphasis added) (Kramer, 2016).

In *The Washington Post*, 71 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 63 per cent of the post-Crimea articles contained the word *threat*. For example, in November 2010, then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, discussing who the shield was protecting against, was quoted as saying, "The *threat* comes from Iran" (emphasis added) (Cody, 2010). In November 2011, US Navy Captain and then-Pentagon spokesman John Kirby reiterated the US position that the EPAA is "not a *threat*" to Russia and "is focused on addressing the growing missile *threat* from Iran" (emphasis added) (Englund & Wan, 2011). *The Washington Post* also referred to potential Russian plans as "Russia's *threat* to install countermeasures against a planned missile-defense system" (emphasis added) (DeYoung, 2011). In a May 2014 article, like in many others, the newspaper repeatedly refers to threats from Iranian missiles (Kessler, 2014).

Among the articles from *Fox News*, 86 per cent pre-Crimea and 83 per cent post-Crimea used the word *threat*. In a September 2009 editorial, the author states that there is a "growing Iranian missile *threat*, which *threatens* to go nuclear" (emphasis added) (McFarland, 2009). In November 2011, *Fox News* referred to "the *threat* of ballistic missiles from states are outside of international norms" (emphasis added) (Fox News, 2011). Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted by *Fox News* as saying that "references to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear missile *threat*" (emphasis added) were diversions from the real purpose of the shield, which he claimed was to neutralise the nuclear potential of Russia (Fox News, 2015).

Overall, 72 per cent of pre-Crimea articles and 64 per cent of post-Crimea articles in the US media contained at least one instance of the word *threat* or its derivative forms. There is definitely securitising language present in the US media discourse on the BMD shield. However, it is impossible to say if securitisation actually occurred, as this process requires approval from an audience, and analysing Americans' approval of this discourse is outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it is clear that the process of securitisation in the US media was begun.

5.5. Chapter summary

In this chapter, I discussed the findings of this research with regards to the US media. The findings for the US media were overall negative, at 47 per cent and 48 per

cent before and after the Crimean annexation, respectively. These figures had a negligible change when comparing both time frames; however, the individual news media outlets showed significant shifts.

Left-leaning newspaper *The New York Times* initially had a positive portrayal towards the shield, with 48 per cent of the before articles classified as positive. However, the articles after the Crimean annexation demonstrated a significant shift towards a negative portrayal, at 60 per cent.

Centre-left newspaper *The Washington Post* was found to have mixed positive and negative articles, with both of these categories at 42 per cent in the pre-Crimea time period. However, in the post-Crimea time period, there was a decided shift towards positive portrayals, with the percentage totalling 63 per cent.

Right-wing media outlet *Fox News* demonstrated significantly negative-oriented articles pre-Crimea, with the percentage amounting to 71 per cent. The articles in the post-Crimea period were still primarily negative, but showed a shift in the other direction, with the negative articles equalling 58 per cent.

Additionally, there were securitising speech acts in many of the articles: in *The New York Times*, 63 per cent prior to and 60 per cent of articles following the Crimean annexation mentioned threats; 71 per cent pre- and 63 per cent post-Crimea articles in *The Washington Post* discussed threats; and 86 per cent before and 83 per cent of *Fox News* articles after Crimea spoke of threats. Overall, 72 per cent of US media articles prior to and 64 per cent of the articles post-Crimea mentioned the word *threat*, which is one of the many words indicative of securitising speech. Although determining the extent of securitisation is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is apparent that securitising speech acts took place in the US media regarding the US/NATO BMD shield.

Through the analysis of this data, it was determined that the hypothesis as it relates to the US media was incorrect on both accounts. The hypothesis stated that the US media would portray a positive image of the BMD shield prior to the Crimean annexation, and that this positive portrayal would increase following the annexation. However, data analysis revealed that, prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority of articles had a negative portrayal of the shield, at just below half. Following the annexation, this number did not significantly change; therefore, we can conclude that the data do not support this hypothesis.

6.   Russian media portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield

This chapter discusses results from the critical discourse analysis of three Russian news outlets: *Novaya Gazeta*, *Sputnik News* and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Furthermore, background into each of the news outlets will be provided, in addition to the cumulative findings of the Russian media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield. Finally, this chapter will discuss the presence of securitisation in Russian media discourse.

6.1.   *Novaya Gazeta*

Novaya Gazeta was founded in April 1993, when a group of approximately 50 journalists left *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*[34] in protest of its bias toward the Russian government (Paramonova, 1993). Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, used part of his prize money to fund the start-up of the paper and buy its first computers (Bigg, 2013).

Novaya Gazeta has become the prominent opposition newspaper in Russia, focusing on exposing rights violations and corruption within the Russian government. As an investigative newspaper, *Novaya Gazeta* has brought many scandals to light that some in power would refer to remain dark, leading to a slew of death threats, assaults and assassinations. Multiple people associated with the newspaper have been assassinated including: Yuri Shchekochikhin,[35] Stanislav Markelov,[36] Anastasia Baburova,[37] Natalya Estemirova[38] and, perhaps most famously, Anna Politkovskaya.[39]

Currently, the majority share of *Novaya Gazeta* is owned by its staff, while Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev both own minority shares

---

[34] Name in Russian: *Комсомольская правда*; kp.ru

[35] Shchekochikhin, whose investigations included the Chechen Wars and the 2002 Nord-Ost siege, died suddenly in July 2003. Many news outlets suspected that his death was related to poisoning, but this has never been confirmed, as the government would not allow an independent autopsy (O'Halloran, 2007).

[36] Markelov, a human rights lawyer who had previously defended Anna Politkovskaya, among others, was shot in the back of the head in broad daylight in central Moscow in January 2009 (Schwirtz, 2009).

[37] Baburova, a freelance journalist for *Novaya Gazeta* who was with Markelov at the time of his murder, was also shot and killed in the same incident (Schwirtz, 2009).

[38] Estemirova, a human rights activist and contributor to *Novaya Gazeta*, was kidnapped near her home in Grozny, Chechnya in July 2009. Her body was found, shot, in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia later that day (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

[39] Politkovskaya, a fervent Kremlin critic who frequently wrote for *Novaya Gazeta*, was gunned down in her block of flats on 7 October 2006 (coincidentally Vladimir Putin's birthday). Five men were sentenced to prison in 2014, but the mastermind of the assassination remains unknown (Roth, 2014).

(Bigg, 2013). A former KGB agent who has since become an outspoken critic of the Russian government, Lebedev also owns *The Evening Standard*[40] and *The Independent*,[41] both of which are based in the UK (Forbes, nd). The newspaper's editor-in-chief is Dmitry Muratov. *Novaya Gazeta* is only available in Russian, suggesting that their target audience is solely Russian (or Russian speakers). Based on Internet searches, it appears that there was an English edition of *Novaya Gazeta* available beginning in 2011, but all evidence of this has been removed from their website, and all links to English-language articles are no longer valid. This further reinforces the idea that their primary audience is Russian.

6.1.1. Findings

Using the methodological criteria discussed in Chapter 4, a search of *Novaya Gazeta*'s website[42] returned 42 articles that were potentially relevant. Upon further examination of the articles, 30 were deemed appropriate for this research: 22 pre-Crimea and eight post-Crimea.[43] 27 per cent of the articles from the pre-Crimea period originated from other news sources, primarily Ekho Moskvy. All of the articles in the post-Crimea period were original content from *Novaya Gazeta*.

The pre-Crimea articles found ranged from 29 January 2011 to 19 October 2013.[44] Of the 22 articles prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority were found to have a neutral portrayal of the shield (45 per cent), while positive-leaning articles comprised 23 per cent and negative articles 32 per cent. This is illustrated in Figure 15 below.

---

[40] standard.co.uk

[41] independent.co.uk

[42] novayagazeta.ru

[43] For a bibliography of the articles analysed, including their categorisations, see Appendix F.

[44] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix I, Figure 34.

Figure 15. *Novaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.

Novaya Gazeta: Pre-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

- 23 %
- 45 %
- 32 %

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative

Source: Own calculations.

The post-Crimea articles ranged from 22 August 2014 to 19 May 2016. Of the eight articles analysed from the post-Crimea period, the majority of the articles were, once again, neutral, at 63 per cent. 25 per cent of the articles demonstrated a negative portrayal, while 13 per cent showed a positive slant, which can be seen in Figure 16 below.

Figure 16. *Novaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.[45]

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 17 below demonstrates the changes in articles' portrayals pre- and post-Crimea. The percentage of neutral portrayals rose markedly, by 18 per cent. Both positive- and negative-categorised articles decreased by ten per cent and seven per cent respectively.

---

[45] The percentages in Figure 16 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

Figure 17. *Novaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

6.2. *Sputnik News*

*Sputnik News* was launched in November 2014. *Sputnik* is the successor to *RIA Novosti*,[46] the Russian state-owned international media outlet that was declared defunct in 2013. President Putin declared that *RIA Novosti*'s international component[47] was to be liquidated and reincarnated as *Rossiya Segodnya*,[48] ostensibly to make public media more efficient (President of Russia, 2013). In 2014, this international component became *Sputnik News*, which describes itself as "a major new media brand with modern multimedia centers in dozens of countries" (Sputnik News, nd). *Sputnik* is "entirely geared towards foreign audiences" (Sputnik News, nd), with their default edition in English. Aside from English, there are over 30 other languages available in which to access *Sputnik News*. Although *Sputnik*, whose parent agency is entirely owned by the Russian government, is headquartered in Moscow, they maintain regional offices in

---

[46] Name in Russian: *РИА Новости*

[47] *Rossiya Segodnya* continues broadcasting domestic news in Russia under the name of the formerly-defunct *RIA Novosti* [ria.ru]; however, it does not produce content for foreign audiences, a task which has been delegated to *Sputnik News*.

[48] *Rossiya Segodnya*, which translated means "Russia Today", is not to be confused with *RT* [rt.com] (formerly called *Russia Today* until its rebranding in 2009), which is a separate Russian internationally-oriented news channel and is distinct from *Rossiya Segodnya*.

Beijing, Cairo, Montevideo and Washington, DC (Sputnik News, 2017). *Sputnik*'s tagline is "Telling the Untold".

6.2.1. Findings

Using the methodological criteria previously laid out in Chapter 4, a search of *Sputnik News*' website[49] revealed 116 articles that were potentially eligible for analysis. Upon further examination of the articles, 32 were deemed appropriate for this research: 16 pre-Crimea and 16 post-Crimea.[50] None of these articles came from wire services, but it is important to note that, as *Sputnik News* was not formed until 2014, the articles prior to that time that are accessible on the *Sputnik* website are from *Sputnik*'s predecessor news outlet, *RIA Novosti*.

The pre-Crimea articles analysed ranged from 18 September 2009 to 13 December 2013.[51] Of the 16 articles prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority demonstrated a negative portrayal of the shield (63 per cent), while positive and neutral portraying articles each comprised 19 per cent. This is illustrated in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. *Sputnik News*' portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.[52]

Source: Own calculations.

---

[49] sputniknews.com

[50] For a bibliography of the articles analysed, including their categorisations, see Appendix G.

[51] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix I, Figure 35.

[52] The percentages in Figure 18 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

The post-Crimea articles ranged from 4 December 2014 to 9 June 2016. Of the 16 articles analysed from the post-Crimea period, 100 per cent were categorised as having negative portrayals of the shield. There were no articles with positive or neutral orientations, which can be seen in Figure 19 below.

Figure 19. *Sputnik News'* portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 20 below demonstrates the changes in articles' orientations pre- and post-Crimea. Both positive and neutral-classified articles decreased by 19 per cent, becoming non-existent in the post-Crimea period. The percentage of negative portrayals rose significantly, by 37 per cent, becoming the exclusive orientation of post-Crimea articles.

Figure 20. *Sputnik News*' portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

6.3. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*

Rossiyskaya Gazeta was founded in November 1990, and the Russian government is its sole owner. The newspaper is designated as the official newspaper of the Russian government, and its editor-in-chief is Vladislav Fronin.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta is charged with publishing government documents, laws, decrees, reports and interviews of government officials, "extremist lists" of organisations and individuals accused of terrorism, "other socially important documents" and more (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, nd). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has 14 head offices throughout Russia and 15 bureaus abroad. Despite the multitude of bureaus abroad, its content is only available in Russian, suggesting that its main audience is solely Russian (or Russian-language speakers).

6.3.1. Findings

After performing a search of *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*'s website[53] according to the methodological parameters, 78 articles were identified. Upon further examination of the articles, 31 were found to be appropriate for this research: 17 pre-Crimea and 14 post-

---

[53] rg.ru

Crimea.[54] 24 per cent of the pre-Crimea *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* articles were from other news agencies, while all of the articles post-Crimea were original content from *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*.

The pre-Crimea articles ranged from 8 October 2009 to 18 December 2013.[55] Of the 17 articles from before the Crimean annexation, the majority were found to have a negative portrayal of the shield (65 per cent) and 35 per cent were classified as neutral. There were no positive articles. This is illustrated in Figure 21 below.

Figure 21. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

The post-Crimea articles ranged from 5 September 2014 to 11 October 2016. Of the 14 articles analysed from the post-Crimea period, 79 per cent were found to have a negative portrayal of the shield. 21 per cent of the articles were neutral and there were no positive articles, which can be seen in Figure 22 below.

---

[54] For a bibliography of the articles analysed, including their categorisations, see Appendix H.
[55] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix I, Figure 36.

Figure 22. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Post-Crimean Annexation
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

21 %

79 %

▪ Positive   ▪ Neutral   ▪ Negative

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 23 shows the changes in articles' orientations pre- and post-Crimea. The number of articles with a positive orientation remained at zero, while the neutral articles decreased by 14 per cent and the negative articles increased by 14 per cent.

Figure 23. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*'s portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Pre- vs. Post-Crimea
US/NATO BMD Shield Portrayal

Percentage of articles portrayed

100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 %
0 %

Pre-Crimea   Post-Crimea

Positive   Neutral   Negative

Source: Own calculations.

6.4.   Russian media findings overall

The data from all three Russian print media sources (*Novaya Gazeta*, *Sputnik News* and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*) was combined to determine the overall position of the Russian media regarding the US/NATO BMD shield. In total, there were 93 articles from Russian print and electronic media: 55 articles pre-Crimea and 38 post-Crimea.

The pre-Crimea articles analysed ranged from 18 September 2009 to 18 December 2013.[56] Of the 55 articles prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority had a negative portrayal of the shield (51 per cent). The percentage of positive articles equalled 15 per cent, while the percentage of neutral articles equalled 35 per cent. This is illustrated in Figure 24 below.

Figure 24. The Russian media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, pre-Crimea.[57]


Source: Own calculations.

The post-Crimea articles ranged from 22 August 2014 to 11 October 2016. Of the 38 articles in the post-Crimea period, 76 per cent portrayed a negative image of the shield. The percentage of positive articles was only three per cent, while the number of neutral articles was 21 per cent, which can be seen in Figure 25 below.

---

[56] For a breakdown of the number of articles analysed per year, see Appendix I, Figure 37.
[57] The percentages in Figure 24 do not equal 100 per cent due to rounding.

Figure 25. The Russian media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield, post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

As demonstrated in Figure 26 below, both the positive- and neutral-classified articles decreased by 12 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. The percentage of negative portrayals rose significantly, by 25 per cent.

Figure 26. The Russian media's portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield: Pre- vs post-Crimea.

Source: Own calculations.

To have a more complete picture of the positions of the Russian media with regards to the US/NATO BMD shield, it is necessary to individually examine the positions of each media outlet.

Novaya Gazeta's articles from the pre-Crimea period were mainly neutral, at 45 per cent, with negative articles equalling 32 per cent and positive articles 23 per cent. There was a fairly random distribution of article orientations; unlike the other Russian media sources, it did not appear that there was a strong correlation between dates and article orientations.

Similarly, *Novaya Gazeta*'s articles in the post-Crimea period were primarily neutral, at 63 per cent, followed by negative at 25 per cent and positive at 13 per cent. The articles were consistently neutral throughout, with the only two negative articles appearing most recently, in late 2015 and mid-2016.

Sputnik News' articles from the pre-Crimea period were predominately negative, at 63 per cent, followed by positive and neutral, which both equalled 19 per cent. For the first couple of months after the EPAA was announced, the articles were either positive or neutral, reflecting the Russian government's favourable position towards the disposal of the Bush-era plan. However, Russian elites soon realised that the EPAA was still not what they had hoped for in terms of European missile defence, and they soon began vocally opposing the idea, which is reflected in the ensuing negative coverage of the shield. The main tenet of *Sputnik News*' argument against the shield is that it threatens the military capabilities of Russia.

The articles from *Sputnik News*' post-Crimea period were entirely negative (100 per cent). These articles frequently labelled the BMD shield as a threat to Russia, while also criticising its ability to be effective, its costly price point and its location.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta's articles from the pre-Crimea period were primarily negative (65 per cent), with neutral articles at 35 per cent. There were no articles categorised as positively portraying the BMD shield. Towards the beginning of the period analysed, the articles were neutral, but as time progressed, the articles shifted to a predominantly negative standpoint, with a few neutral articles throughout.

Finally, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*'s articles in the post-Crimea period were overwhelmingly negative, at 79 per cent, with 21 per cent neutral-oriented articles and zero positive articles. There did not appear to be any pattern regarding the temporal occurrence of neutral and negative articles.

6.4.1.   Securitisation in the Russian media[58]

Based on the articles analysed in this dissertation, there were many instances of securitising speech acts in the Russian media regarding the BMD shield. From the Russian perspective, there are two primary threats repeated in the media discourse: from the shield (seen as a threat against Russia's nuclear deterrent, especially after the nuclear deal with Iran was signed in July 2015, as well as being potentially capable of launching offensive as well as defensive weapons); and to "global security" (a phrase frequently repeated throughout the Russian articles). To further investigate instances of securitising language, each article was searched for any mention of the word *threat* or its derivative forms.[59]

In *Novaya Gazeta*, 64 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 38 per cent of the post-Crimea articles mentioned the word *threat*. However, many of the articles in *Novaya Gazeta* use the word *threat* to describe what the BMD shield is not. For example, in a January 2012 article criticising how Putin had declared himself an expert on missile defence and declaring that he was influenced by the Russian military, the author writes that, "Reports on the *threat* of European missile defence are regularly compiled by the General Staff on the basis of intelligence from the GRU.[60] As a result, Putin developed a real fear of missiles, and the defence budget swelled before his eyes"[61] (emphasis added) (Fel'gengauer, 2012). One article's title states that the "Russian bear is *threatening* America",[62] (emphasis added) (Fel'gengauer, 2011) not the other way around. In a 2016 article about the placement of a BMD interceptor in Romania, the author discussed the journey to this point: "At various NATO meetings and summits of the European Union, they [Romania], referring to the[63] *threat* from Russia, and they persistently asked to strengthen their security through soldiers, missiles and ships"[64] (emphasis added) (Chursin, 2016).

---

[58] I have provided all Russian-to-English translations in this section.

[59] Including *угроза* (threat), *грозить/угрожать* (to threaten), *угрожающий* (threatening), etc.

[60] The GRU, or the Main Intelligence Directorate, is the foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian military.

[61] Original sentence in Russian: "*Доклады об угрозе ЕвроПРО регулярно сочиняют в Генштабе на основании разведданных ГРУ. В результате у Путина развилась настоящая ракетобоязнь, а оборонный бюджет пухнет на глазах.*"

[62] Original headline in Russian: "*Русский медведь угрожает Америке*"

[63] It should be noted that, because Russian grammar does not use articles, either *a* or *the* could be placed here. However, based on the context, *the* seemed to be the most logical and appropriate choice. This is significant because the use of *the* presupposes that there is indeed a threat from Russia.

[64] Original sentence in Russian: "*На различных натовских встречах и саммитах Евросоюза они, ссылаясь на угрозу со стороны России, настойчиво просили укрепить их безопасность солдатами, ракетами, кораблями.*"

From *Sputnik News*, 94 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 100 per cent of the post-Crimea articles contained the word *threat*. For example, a May 2011 article quoted a General Staff official as saying that the shield "is a real *threat* to our strategic nuclear forces" (emphasis added) (Sputnik News, 2011a). In February 2013, they discussed Russia's response to the shield, saying that, "Russia has *threatened* to launch a range of countermeasures to tackle NATO's missile defenses" (emphasis added) (Sputnik News, 2013). In a May 2016 article entitled, "Russia has last seen such amassing of hostile forces on its borders in 1941", *Sputnik News* reports that, "Russian officials and experts have also questioned whether it was reasonable to build a shield […] considering that Tehran does not pose any *threat* to its neighbors and beyond" (emphasis added) (Sputnik News, 2016c). Another headline declared that "Moscow has 'right to feel *threatened*' by US missile defense in Europe" (emphasis added) (Sputnik News, 2016b).

Among the articles from *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 41 per cent pre-Crimea and 71 per cent post-Crimea used the word *threat*. For example, a May 2011 headline reads, "Russian General Staff: American missile defence in Europe presents a real *threat* to Russia"[65] (emphasis added) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2011). In January 2013, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* quoted Prime Minister Medvedev as saying, "We do not want future generations of politicians to make decisions in 2019 or 2020 that will open a new page in the arms race. And such a *threat* exists"[66] (emphasis added) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2013). A November 2014 article quoted a Russian lawmaker, who was speaking about Russia's military capability to overcome the BMD shield, as saying that, "now no one has doubts and illusions that the US initially displayed these resources against Russia and not against the alleged Iranian *threat*"[67] (emphasis added) (Zamakhina, 2014). While claiming that the BMD shield could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Yevgeny Lukyanov was quoted in an April 2016 article as saying, "The deployment of a missile defence system at Russian borders is a clear *threat* and danger to Russia"[68] (emphasis added) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta,

---

[65] Original headline in Russian: "*Генштаб РФ: Американская ПРО в Европе представляет реальную угрозу России*"

[66] Original sentence in Russian: "*Мы не хотим, чтобы будущие поколения политиков году этак в 2019-м или в 2020-м принимали решения, которые откроют новую страницу в гонке вооружений. А такая угроза есть*"

[67] Original sentence in Russian: "*[С]ейчас уже ни у кого нет сомнений и иллюзий, что изначально США выставляли эти средства против России, а не против якобы иранской угрозы.*"

[68] Original sentence in Russian: "*Размещение системы ПРО у российских границ - это явная угроза и опасность для России.*"

2016a). A headline from October 2016 read, "In the Kremlin, they announced a *threat* to the security of Russia from US missile defence"[69] (emphasis added) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2016b).

Overall, 65 per cent of pre-Crimea articles and 76 per cent of post-Crimea articles in the Russian media contained at least one instance of the word *threat* or its derivative forms. There is clearly securitising language present in the Russian media discourse on the BMD shield. However, like the US media in the previous chapter, it is impossible to say if securitisation occurred, as this requires approval from an audience, and analysing Russians' approval of this discourse is outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it is apparent that securitising acts took place.

6.5. Chapter summary

In this chapter, we discussed the findings of this research with regards to the Russian media. The findings for the Russian media were, as with the US media, overall negative, at 51 per cent and 76 per cent before and after the Crimean annexation, respectively. There was a significant increase of 25 per cent following the Crimean annexation. However, it is impossible to say if the events in Crimea caused this increase.

Independent newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* had a neutral portrayal of the shield both before and after Crimea, with 45 per cent and 63 per cent of the respective articles categorised as neutral.

Russian government international media outlet *Sputnik News* was found to have primarily negative articles in the pre-Crimea period, at 63 per cent. However, in the post-Crimea period, the articles became exclusively negative, categorised at 100 per cent.

Official Russian government newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* also demonstrated predominantly negative articles, with 65 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 79 per cent of the post-Crimea articles categorised as negative.

Additionally, there were securitising speech acts in many of the articles: in *Novaya Gazeta*, 64 per cent prior to and 38 per cent of articles following the Crimean annexation mentioned threats; 94 per cent pre- and 100 per cent of the post-Crimea articles from *Sputnik News* discussed threats; and 41 per cent before and 71 per cent of

---

[69] Original headline in Russian: "*В Кремле заявили об угрозе безопасности РФ из-за ПРО США*"

Rossiyskaya Gazeta articles after Crimea spoke of threats. Overall, 65 per cent of US media articles prior to and 76 per cent of the articles post-Crimea mentioned the word *threat*, which is an indicator of securitising speech. Although determining the extent of securitisation is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is clear that securitising speech acts took place in the Russian media regarding the US/NATO BMD shield.

After analysing the previously-mentioned data, it was determined that the hypothesis as it relates to the Russian media was correct on both accounts. The hypothesis stated that the Russian media would portray a negative image of the BMD shield prior to the Crimean annexation, and that this negative portrayal would either stay the same or increase following the annexation. The data conclude that the Russian articles were categorised as negative before the annexation, and the number of negative articles increased following the annexation; therefore, the data are consistent with the hypothesis.

7. Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on US and Russian media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield in Europe before and after the Crimean annexation, along with examining the presence of securitisation in the media discourse surrounding this topic.

In Chapter 1: *Introduction*, the background relating to the topic was discussed, including the history of BMD in Europe, NATO and Russian reactions to the most recent incarnation of a European BMD shield and historical background relating to the annexation of Crimea.

In Chapter 2: *Literature review*, seven articles on missile defence and six articles on securitisation in the media were analysed. The topics of the articles on missile defence focused on: missile defence in the context of offence-defence theory; the evolution of BMD in NATO member states; the veracity of Russian claims that US/NATO BMD is a threat; the role of BMD in nuclear disarmament and abolition; Chinese concerns about US BMD in the Asia-Pacific region; whether BMD violates international law; and BMD through the paradigm of defensive realism. The topics of the articles on securitisation included: securitisation in the US media regarding the War on Terror; securitisation of the 2014 Norwegian terror alert on Twitter; securitisation of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Chinese media; securitisation of the Iraq War in the US media; securitisation of climate change discourse in the media; and the US media's securitisation of meth usage in the Midwestern US.

Chapter 3: *Theory* discussed the two main theoretical frameworks within which this research exists: social constructivism and securitisation theory. Social constructivism highlights the importance of institutions, ideas and norms in shaping interests and the environment around them. Securitisation theory operates in the security component of social constructivism, arguing that security threats are essentially able to be spoken into existence; threats do not exist until someone identifies them as a threat. Actors can perform securitising moves, but a threat cannot become truly securitised unless it is accepted as such by an audience. This research focuses on the military sector of securitisation theory and the ways in which certain factors can affect military securitisation. Additionally, alternative views of securitisation (from Balzacq, Williams, Ciută and Hansen) were explored.

Constructivism and securitisation theory are both central to this research, as this dissertation focuses on discourse and the portrayals of the US/NATO BMD shield by the US and Russian media. Constructivism is the theory in which critical discourse analysis resides, the process that allows for the examination of these articles on both a linguistic and contextual level. Securitisation theory outlines the process and the actors involved in securitisation, allowing for the exploration of threat perception and portrayal in the US and Russian media.

Chapter 4: *Methodology* discusses the methodological considerations for this research, following Berg's (2004) Stage Model of Qualitative Content Analysis, which outlines the steps required to perform this research. Articles from six media outlets in the United States and in Russia were identified using key search terms in English or Russian, then the most relevant articles were selected for further analysis. Through the use of critical discourse analysis, the articles were coded, specifically examining their lexis, transitivity, modality, source attribution, textual coherence and cohesion, nonverbal components and presupposition. Based on the results of the coding, the articles were categorised as either positive, neutral or negative regarding their portrayal of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield.

In Chapter 5: *US media portrayal of the US/NATO BMD shield*, I discussed the findings of this research with regards to the US media, which were overall negative, at 47 per cent and 48 per cent before and after the Crimean annexation, respectively.

Left-leaning newspaper *The New York Times* initially had a positive portrayal towards the shield, with 48 per cent of the before articles classified as positive. However, the articles after the Crimean annexation demonstrated a significant shift towards a negative portrayal, at 60 per cent.

Centre-left newspaper *The Washington Post* was found to have mixed positive and negative articles, with both of these categories at 42 per cent in the pre-Crimea time period. However, in the post-Crimea time period, there was a decided shift towards positive portrayals, with the percentage totalling 63 per cent.

Right-wing media outlet *Fox News* demonstrated significantly negative-oriented articles pre-Crimea, with the percentage amounting to 71 per cent. The articles in the post-Crimea period were still primarily negative, but showed a shift in the other direction, with the negative articles equalling 58 per cent.

Chapter 5 also discussed securitising speech acts in the US media: in *The New York Times*, 63 per cent prior to and 60 per cent of articles following the Crimean

annexation mentioned threats; 71 per cent pre- and 63 per cent post-Crimea articles in *The Washington Post* discussed threats; and 86 per cent before and 83 per cent of *Fox News* articles after Crimea spoke of threats. Over all, 72 per cent of US media articles prior to and 64 per cent of the articles post-Crimea mentioned the word *threat*, which is one of the many words indicative of securitising speech. Although determining the extent of securitisation is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is apparent that securitising speech acts took place in the US media regarding the US/NATO BMD shield.

Following the analysis of this data, it was determined that both aspects of the hypothesis as it relates to the US media were incorrect. The hypothesis stated that the US media would portray a positive image of the BMD shield prior to the Crimean annexation, and that this positive portrayal would increase following the annexation. However, the data analysis revealed that, prior to the Crimean annexation, the majority of articles had a negative portrayal of the shield, at just below half. Following the annexation, this number did not significantly change; therefore, we can conclude that the data do not support this hypothesis.

In Chapter 6: *Russian media portrayals of the US/NATO BMD shield*, I discussed the findings of this research with regards to the Russian media, which were overall negative, at 51 per cent and 76 per cent before and after the Crimean annexation, respectively. There was a significant increase of 25 per cent following the Crimean annexation. However, it is impossible to say if the events in Crimea caused this increase.

Independent newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* had a neutral portrayal of the shield both before and after Crimea, with 45 per cent and 63 per cent of the respective articles categorised as neutral.

Russian government international media outlet *Sputnik News* was found to have primarily negative articles in the pre-Crimea period, at 63 per cent. However, in the post-Crimea period, the articles became exclusively negative, categorised at 100 per cent.

Official Russian government newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* also demonstrated predominantly negative articles, with 65 per cent of the pre-Crimea articles and 79 per cent of the post-Crimea articles categorised as negative.

In the Russian articles, there were also a significant portion containing securitising speech acts: in *Novaya Gazeta*, 64 per cent prior to and 38 per cent of

articles following the Crimean annexation mentioned threats; 94 per cent pre- and 100 per cent post-Crimea articles from *Sputnik News* discussed threats; and 41 per cent before and 71 per cent of *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* articles after Crimea spoke of threats. Overall, 65 per cent of US media articles prior to and 76 per cent of the articles post-Crimea mentioned the word *threat*, which is an indicator of securitising speech. Although determining the extent of securitisation is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is clear that securitising speech acts took place in the Russian media regarding the US/NATO BMD shield.

After analysing the previously-mentioned data, it was determined that both aspects of the hypothesis as it relates to the Russian media were correct. The hypothesis stated that the Russian media would portray a negative image of the BMD shield prior to the Crimean annexation, and that this negative portrayal would either stay the same increase following the annexation. The data conclude that the Russian articles were categorised as negative before the annexation, and the number of negative articles increased following the annexation; therefore, the data are consistent with the hypothesis.

Bibliography

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, *3* (3), 319-363.

Baker, P. (2009). White house scraps Bush's approach to missile shield. *The New York Times*, 17 September. Retrieved on 30 June 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html

Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (2), 171-201.

Bartosz, J. (2008). Poles reject anti-missile shield. *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, *16* (1), 101-7.

Bauer, M.W., & Aarts, B. (2000). Corpus construction: A principle for qualitative data collection. In M.W. Bauer, & G. Gaskell (Eds.), *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound* (1st ed.), (19-37). London: Sage.

BBC News. (2007a). NATO chief dismisses Russia fears. *BBC News*, 19 April. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6570533.stm

BBC News. (2007b). Russia in defence warning to US. *BBC News*, 26 April. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6594379.stm

BBC News. (2016a). Crimea profile. *BBC News*, 21 April. Retrieved on 1 August 2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18287223

BBC News. (2016b). US activates $800m missile shield base in Romania. *BBC News*, 12 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36272686

Bell, M. (2011). The Washington Post – 134 years young. *The Washington Post*, 6 December. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/the-washington-post--134-years-young/2011/12/06/gIQA8dm7ZO_blog.html

Berg, B.L. (2004). An introduction to content analysis. In *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences* (5th ed.), (265-98). Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.

Bigg, C. (2013). Russia's 'Novaya Gazeta' marks 20th anniversary. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 1 April. Retrieved on 30 June 2017 from https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-novaya-gazeta-20-years/24944376.html

Buzan, B. (1998). The military sector. In B. Buzan, O. Wæver, & J. de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis* (49-70). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Chan, A. (2002). From propaganda to hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China's media policy. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *11* (30), 35-51.

Chursin, A. (2016). *Raketnyy dzhoker Bukharesta* [The rocket joker of Bucharest]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 19 May. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/05/19/68648-raketnyy-dzhoker-buharesta

Ciută, F. (2009). Security and the problem of context: A hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory. *Review of International Studies*, *35*, 301-26.

CNN Wire Staff. (2012). Part of NATO missile defense system goes live in Turkey. *CNN*, 16 January. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/16/world/europe/turkey-radar-station/index.html

Cody, E. (2010). Russia to aid NATO on anti-missile network in Europe. *The Washington Post*, 20 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/20/AR2010112002542_pf.html

Dempsey, J. & Bilefsky, D. (2011). Czechs, disliking role, pull out of U.S. missile defense project. *The New York Times*, 15 June. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/europe/16shield.html

Dews, F. (2014). NATO Secretary-General: Russia's annexation of Crimea is illegal and illegitimate. *The Brookings Institution*, 19 March. Retrieved on 1 August 2017 from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2014/03/19/nato-secretary-general-russias-annexation-of-crimea-is-illegal-and-illegitimate

DeYoung, K. (2011). NATO rebuffs Russian threats to counter missile shield. *The Washington Post*, 7 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-chief-rebuffs-russian-threats-to-counter-missile-shield/2011/12/07/gIQAtyRxcO_story.html

Diesen, G., & Keane, C. (2016). Constraining missile defence. *Defense & Security Analysis*, *32* (2), 129-43.

Dylla, D. (2011). The Polish missile defence decision: Reviewing the 'scrapping' of the Bush-era missile defence plan. *CEJISS*, *4* (2), 28-40.

Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2017a). The New York Times. *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-New-York-Times

Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2017b). The Washington Post. *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Washington-Post

Englund, W., & Wan, W. (2011). Medvedev threatens to target U.S. missile shield in Europe if no deal is reached. *The Washington Post*, 23 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-will-target-us-missile-shield-in-europe-if-no-deal-is-reached-medvedev-says/2011/11/23/gIQAT4ZKoN_story.html

Escobar, P. (2015). The Pentagon's 'long war' pits NATO against China, Russia and Iran. *Sputnik News*, 29 April. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/columnists/201504291021520970

Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical analysis of media discourse. In *Media discourse*, (53-74). London: Arnold.

Farhi, P. (2013). Washington Post closes sale to Amazon founder Jeff Bezos. *The Washington Post*, 1 October. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/washington-post-closes-sale-to-amazon-founder-jeff-bezos/2013/10/01/fca3b16a-2acf-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html

Farhi, P. (2017). The Washington Post's new slogan turns out to be an old saying. *The Washington Post*, 24 February. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-washington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cda-fa02-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html

Fel'gengauer, P. (2011). *Russkiy medved' ugrozhaet Amerike* [The Russian bear threatens America]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 24 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/11/24/46948-russkiy-medved-ugrozhaet-amerike

Fel'gengauer, P. (2012). *PRO Putina* [Putin's missile defence]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 22
January. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/01/22/47827-pro-putina

Ferdinando, L. (2016a). Work helps to inaugurate ballistic missile defense site in
Romania. *U.S. Department of Defense*, 12 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/758307/work-helps-to-
inaugurate-ballistic-missile-defense-site-in-romania

Ferdinando, L. (2016b). Work joins groundbreaking for ballistic missile defense site in
Poland. *U.S. Department of Defense*, 13 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/759662/work-joins-
groundbreaking-for-ballistic-missile-defense-site-in-poland

Forbes. (nd) Alexander Lebedev. *Forbes*. Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from
https://www.forbes.com/profile/alexander-lebedev

Foucault, M. (2009). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France
1977-1978*. New York: Picador.

Fox News. (2011). Official: U.S. will not change plans for missile defense despite
Russia warning. *Fox News*, 23 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/11/23/as-russia-balks-at-us-missile-
defense-plan-in-europe-us-says-nothing-to-fear.html

Fox News. (2015). Take that: Putin says Russia will build weapons capable of piercing
US missile shield. *Fox News*, 10 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/11/10/take-that-putin-says-russia-will-
build-weapons-capable-piercing-us-missile.html

Frühling, S. (2016). Managing escalation: Missile defence, strategy and US alliances.
International Affairs, *92* (1), 81-95.

Gates, R.M. (2009). A better missile defense for a safer Europe. *The New York Times*,
19 September. Retrieved from on 31 May 2017
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html

Goliya, K. (2015). Carlos Slim becomes top New York Times shareholder. *Reuters*, 14
January. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-
york-times-warrants-carlos-slim-idUSKBN0KN2M820150114

Grimal, F. (2014). Missile defence shields: Automated and anticipatory self-defence?
Journal of Conflict & Security Law, *19* (2), 317-39.

Grynbaum, M. (2017). Fox News drops 'Fair and Balanced' motto. *The New York Times*, 14 June. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/media/fox-news-fair-and-balanced.html

Hansen, L. (2000). The Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *29* (2), 285-306.

Heinrichs, R. (2014). After Crimea annexation, time to rally around our European allies with missile defense and more. *Fox News*, 24 March. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/24/after-crimea-annexation-time-to-rally-around-our-european-allies-with-missile

Herszenhorn, D.M. & Gordon, M.R. (2013). U.S. cancels part of missile defense that Russia opposed. *The New York Times*, 16 March. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html

Hoey, M. (2001). *Textual interaction: An introduction to written discourse analysis* (1st ed.). London: Routledge.

Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. *International Security*, *23* (1), 171-200.

Human Rights Watch. (2016). Seven years after brazen murder of Natalia Estemirova – and still no justice. *Human Rights Watch*, 15 July. Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/video/2016/07/15/seven-years-after-brazen-murder-natalia-estemirova-and-still-no

Hunston, S. (2004). Counting the uncountable: Problems of identifying evaluation in a text and in a corpus. In A. Partington, J. Morley, & L. Haarman (Eds.), *Corpora and discourse* (1st ed.), (157-88). Bern: Peter Lang.

Huysmans, J. (2002). Defining social constructivism in security studies: The normative dilemma of writing security. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *27* (1), 41-62.

Joobani, H.A., & Helmy, N. (2016). China's media policy on the Egyptian Revolution: A case for securitization. *Asian Politics & Policy*, *8* (2), 377-82.

Kessler, G. (2014). Cheney's claim that Obama dropped Bush's missile defense plan after a 'mere request' from Putin. *The Washington Post*, 20 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/20/cheneys-claim-that-obama-dropped-bushs-missile-defense-plan-after-a-mere-request-from-putin

Kramer, A.E. (2016). Russia calls new U.S. missile defense system a "direct threat". *The New York Times*, 12 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html

Kramer, D.J. (2009). Obama acquiesces to Russia on missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091702303.html

Linnemann, T. (2012). Governing through meth: Local politics, drug control and the drift toward securitization. *Crime Media Culture*, *9* (1), 39-61.

MacDonald, M.N., Hunter, D., & O'Regan, J.P. (2013). Citizenship, community, and counter-terrorism: UK security discourse, 2001-2011. *Journal of Language & Politics*, 12 (3), 445-73.

Mautner, G. (2008). Analyzing newspapers, magazines and other print media. In R. Wodak, & M. Krzyżanowski (Eds.), *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences* (1st ed.), (30-53). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

McFarland, K.T. (2009). Obama tosses an ally overboard – and we get zip. *Fox News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 30 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2009/09/18/kt-mcfarland-missile-defense-obama-poland-russia.html

McSweeney, B. (1996). Review: Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies*, *22* (1), 81-93.

NATO. (2010). Lisbon Summit Declaration. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 20 November. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm

NATO. (2012). Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 20 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm

NATO. (2014). Wales Summit Declaration. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 5
September. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

NATO. (2016). Warsaw Summit Communiqué. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 9
July. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

NBC News. (2008). Norway: Russia to freeze NATO military ties. *NBC News*, 20
August. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26315674/#.WIN7N7YrLGI

O'Halloran, J. (2007). Russia's poisoning 'without a poison'. *BBC News*, 6 February.
Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/6324241.stm

O'Reilly, C. (2008). Primetime patriotism: News media and the securitization of Iraq.
Journal of Politics and Law, *1* (3), 66-72.

Obama White House (2009). Fact sheet: U.S. missile defense policy a 'phased, adaptive
approach' for missile defense in Europe. The Obama White House, 17
September. Retrieved on 20 May 2017 from
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-us-missile-
defense-policy-a-phased-adaptive-approach-missile-defense-eur

Onuf, N.G. (1989). *World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and
international relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Paramonova, E. (1993). *Parovozniy svistok mozhet stat' politicheskim faktorom* [A
locomotive whistle can become a political factor]. *Kommersant"*, 2 April.
Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/43882

Pew Research Center. (2016). Ideological placement of each source's audience. *Pew
Research Center*, 26 January. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from
http://www.pewresearch.org/pj_14-10-21_mediapolarization-08-2

President of Russia. (2013). *Ukaz o merakh po povysheniiu effektivnosti deiatel'nosti
gosudarstvennykh SMI* [Decree on measures to improve the efficiency of state-
owned media]. *Prezident Rossii* [President of Russia], 9 December. Retrieved on
20 June 2017 from http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19805

President of Russia. (2015). Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
President of Russia, 22 October. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (nd). European missile defense system. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from https://www.rferl.org/a/european-missile-defense-system/27730983.html

Rasmussen, A.F. (2010). NATO needs a missile defense. *The New York Times*, 12 October. Retrieved on 30 July 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/opinion/13iht-edrasmussen.html

Rasmussen, J. (2015). 'Should each of us take over the role as watcher?' Attitudes on Twitter towards the 2014 Norwegian terror alert. *Journal of Multicultural Discourse*, *10* (2), 197-213.

Ray, M. (2017). Fox News Channel. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 15 June. Retrieved on 16 July 2017 from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fox-News-Channel

Reah, D. (2002) *The language of newspapers* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Richardson, J.E. (2007). *Analysing newspapers: An approach from critical discourse analysis* (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (nd). *O gazete* [About the newspaper]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Retrieved on 9 July 2017 from https://rg.ru/about

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011). *Genshtab RF: Amerikanskaya PRO v Evrope predstavlyaet real'nuyu ugrozu Rossii*. [RF General Staff: US missile defence in Europe presents a real threat to Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 20 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/05/20/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2013). *Medvedev zayavil, shto sblizheniya pozitsiy RF i SSha v oblasti PRO net* [Medvedev declared that there is no rapprochement between the positions of the RF and USA in the field of missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 27 January. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2013/01/27/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016a). *Sovbez RF: PRO v Evrope mozhet ispol'zovat'sya v nastupatel'nykh tselyakh* [Russia's Security Council: Missile defence in Europe can be used for offensive purposes]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 13 April. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/04/13/sovbez-rf-pro-v-evrope-mozhet-ispolzovatsia-v-nastupatelnyh-celiah.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016b). *V Kremle zayavili ob ugroze bezopasnosti RF iz-za PRO SShA* [The Kremlin announced a threat to Russia's security due to US missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 October. Retrieved on 5 Jun 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/10/11/v-kremle-konstatirovali-ugrozu-bezopasnosti-rf-iz-za-pro-ssha.html

Roth, A. (2014). Prison for 5 in murder of journalist. *The New York Times*, 9 June. Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/world/europe/moscow-court-sentences-5-to-prison-for-contract-killing-of-anna-politkovskaya.html

Ruggie, J.G. (1998). *Constructing the world polity: Essays on international institutionalization*. London and New York: Routledge.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). Briefing with Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, May 12, 2016. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*, 12 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2276895#7

Sasse, G. (2017). Revisiting the 2014 annexation of Crimea. *Carnegie Europe*, 15 March. Retrieved on 1 August 2017 from http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/15/revisiting-2014-annexation-of-crimea-pub-68423

Schäfer, M.S., Scheffran, J., & Penniket, L. (2016). Securitization of media reporting on climate change? A cross-national analysis in nine countries. *Security Dialogue*, *47* (1), 76-96.

Schwirtz, M. (2009). Leading Russian rights lawyer is shot to death in Moscow, along with journalist. *The New York Times*, 19 January. Retrieved on 8 July 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/world/europe/20chechnya.html

Senn, M. (2012). Spoiler and enabler: The role of ballistic-missile [*sic*] defence in nuclear abolition. *International Journal*, *67* (3), 747-64.

Shevchenko, V. (2014). "Little green men" or Russian invaders"? *BBC News*, 11 March. Retrieved on 1 August 2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154

Simpson, P. (1993). *Language, ideology and point of view* (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge.

Sputnik News. (nd). About us. *Sputnik News*. Retrieved on 20 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html

Sputnik News. (2011a). U.S. missile defense in Europe 'real threat' to Russia – General

        Staff. *Sputnik News*, 20 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/russia/20110520164133194

Sputnik News. (2011b). Russia's radar to counter missile shield, says Medvedev.

        Sputnik News, 29 November. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/military/201111129169142667

Sputnik News. (2013). Medvedev paints gloomy picture of US missile defense dispute.

        Sputnik News, 23 February. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/world/20130223179638300-Medvedev-Paints-Gloomy-

        Picture-of-US-Missile-Defense-Dispute

Sputnik News. (2014). Russia has more ballistic missile interceptors than US: Arms

        control. *Sputnik News*, 19 November. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/military/201411191014901247

Sputnik News. (2015). Russian ICBMs can 'outwit' NATO missile shield. *Sputnik

        News*, 24 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/europe/201512241032274622-russia-nato-missile-

        shield

Sputnik News. (2016a). Doomsday weapon: Russia's new missile shocks and dazzles

        US, China. *Sputnik News*, 9 March. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/russia/201603091036002714-russia-missile-shocker

Sputnik News. (2016b). Moscow has 'right to feel threatened' by US missile defense in

        Europe. Sputnik News, 15 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605151039640414-us-missile-shield-russia/

Sputnik News. (2016c). Russia has last seen such amassing of hostile forces on its

        borders in 1941. Sputnik News, 21 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605211040012274-russia-us-nato-buildup

Sputnik News. (2016d). Russian top secret hypersonic glider can penetrate any missile

        defense. *Sputnik News*, 11 June. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from

        https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606111041185729-russia-hypersonic-glider

Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, T., & El-Anis, I. (2010). *An introduction to international

        relations theory: Perspectives and themes* (3rd ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education

        Limited.

Steff, R. (2013). Cooperative ballistic missile defence for America, China, and Russia. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *34*, (1), 94-119.

Stenvall, M. (2003). An actor or an undefined threat? *Journal of Language & Politics*, *2* (2), 361-404.

Stubbs, M. (1996). *Text and corpus analysis* (1ˢᵗ ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

U.S. Department of State. (nd). Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty). *U.S. Department of State*. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

U.S. Missile Defense Agency. (2016). Fact sheet: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. *U.S. Missile Defense Agency*, 28 July. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis.pdf

Van Dijk, T.A. (1983). Discourse analysis: Its development and application to the structure of news. *Journal of Communication*, *33* (2), 20-43.

Vultee, F. (2010). Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the "war on terror". *Journalism Practice*, *4* (1), 33-47.

Walker, S. (2016). Kremlin angered as US switches on missile shield in Romania. *The Guardian*, 12 May. Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/12/us-hails-important-step-as-missile-defences-go-live-in-romania

Wæver, O. (1998a). Security analysis: Conceptual apparatus. In B. Buzan, O. Wæver, & J. de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis* (21-48). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Wæver, O. (1998b). The political sector. In B. Buzan, O. Wæver, & J. de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis* (141-162). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkening, D.A. (2012). Does missile defence in Europe threaten Russia? *Survival*, *54* (1), 31-52.

Williams, M.C. (2003). Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, *47*, 511-31.

Wu, R. (2013). China's anxiety about US missile defence: A solution. *Survival*, *55* (5), 29-52.

Zamakhina, T. (2014). *Rossiyskie rakety pri neobkhodimosti smogut preodolet' PRO SShA* [Russian missiles can overcome US missile defence if necessary]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 7 November. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2014/11/07/raketi-site-anons.html

Zolotarev, P.S. (2008). *Protivoraketnaya oborona: Istoriya i perspektivy* (Missile defence: History and perspectives). *Rossiya v global'noy politike* (*Russia in Global Politics*), 15 June). Retrieved on 15 July 2017 from http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10948

Appendix

Appendix A.

Figure 27. The stage model of qualitative content analysis.

Identify research question

↓

Determine analytic categories (sociological constructs)

↓

Read through data and establish grounded categories (open and axial coding)

↓

Determine systematic (objective) criteria of selection for sorting data chunks into the analytic and grounded categories

↓

Begin sorting the data into the various categories (revise categories or selection criteria after several cases have been completed)

↓

- Count the number of entries in each category for descriptive statistics and allow for the demonstation of magnitude
- Review textual materials as sorted into various categories seeking patterns
- Remember, no apparent pattern is a pattern

↓

- Consider the patterns in light of relevant literature and/or theory (show possible links to theory or other research)
- Offer an explanation (analysis) of your findings
- Relate your analysis to the extant literature of the subject

Source: Berg (2004: 286).

Figure 28. Framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event.

Source: Fairclough (1995:59).

Figure 29. Visual representation of the media selection process.

Adapted from: Mautner (2008).

Appendix B. Bibliography of analysed articles from *The New York Times*, colour-coded with their categorisations.

	Arsu, S. (2011). Turkey: New site for missile shield plan. *The New York Times*, 15 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/europe/turkey-new-site-for-missile-shield-plan.html
	Baker, P. (2009). White House scraps Bush's approach to missile shield. *The New York Times*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html
	Barry, E. (2010). Russia: Missile defense delaying arms talks, top general says. *The New York Times*, 10 February. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/world/europe/10briefs-Russia.html
	Barry, E. (2011). Russia: Missiles may be deployed if U.S. talks fail. *The New York Times*, 21 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/world/europe/russia-missiles-may-be-deployed-if-us-talks-fail.html
	Broad, W.J., & Sanger, D.E. (2010). Review cites flaws in U.S. antimissile program. *The New York Times*, 17 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.html
	Butt, Y. (2011). The delusion of missile defense. *The New York Times*, 20 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/opinion/21iht-edbutt21.html
	Daalder, I.H. (2010). The case for a NATO missile defense. *The New York Times*, 15 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/opinion/16iht-eddaalder.html
	Daalder, I.H. (2012). A new shield over Europe. *The New York Times*, 6 June. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/opinion/a-new-shield-over-europe.html
	Dempsey, J. (2009). Poland to accept U.S. offer on shield. *The New York Times*, 20 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/europe/21biden.html
	Dempsey, J. (2011). Russia seeks pledge from NATO on missile defense. *The New York Times*, 21 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/world/europe/22nato.html
	Erlanger, S., & Calmes, J. (2010). NATO agrees to build missile defense system. *The New York Times*, 19 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/world/europe/20prexy.html
	Erlanger, S. (2016). NATO ratchets up missile defense despite Russian criticism. *The New York Times*, 5 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/world/europe/nato-russia-poland.html
	Erlanger, S. (2016). Tested by Russia, NATO struggles to stay credible. *The New York Times*, 31 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/world/europe/nato-russia.html
	Gates, R.M. (2009). A better missile defense for a safer Europe. *The New York Times*, 19 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html
	Herszenhorn, D.M. (2011). Russia elevates warning about U.S. missile-defense [*sic*] plan in Europe. *The New York Times*, 23 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/europe/russia-elevates-warning-about-us-missile-defense-shield-plan.html
	Herszenhorn, D.M., & Gordon, M.R. (2013). U.S. cancels part of missile defense that Russia opposed. *The New York Times*, 16 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html
	Herszenhorn, D.M. (2015). Russia warns Denmark on joining NATO missile defense. *The New York Times*, 22 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/world/europe/russian-warns-denmark-on-joining-nato-missile-defense.html
	Jorgensen, J.A. (2011). U.S. missile defense strategy. *The New York Times*, 23 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/opinion/24iht-edlet24.html

Kramer, A.E. (2012a). Russia: President urges military to defeat U.S. missile shield. *The New York Times*, 20 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-addresses-us-missile-shield.html

Kramer, A.E. (2012b). Russian general makes threat on missile-defense [*sic*] sites. *The New York Times*, 3 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/world/europe/russian-general-threatens-pre-emptive-attacks-on-missile-defense-sites.html

Kramer, A.E. (2016). Russia calls new U.S. missile defense system a 'direct threat'. *The New York Times*, 12 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html

Kulish, N., & Dempsey, J. (2009). In face of U.S. shift, Europeans recalibrate. *The New York Times*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18europe.html

Kulish, N., & Barry, E. (2010). Romanians accept plan for basing of missiles. *The New York Times*, 4 February. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/europe/05romania.html

MacFarquhar, N. (2014). Russia: Officials deny violating treaty. *The New York Times*, 30 July. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/europe/russia-officials-deny-violating-treaty.html

Nunn, S., Ivanov, I., & Ischinger, W. (2010). All together now: Missile defense. *The New York Times*, 21 July. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/opinion/22iht-edischinger.html

Obering III, H.A., & Heinrichs, R. (2011). In defense of U.S. missile defense. *The New York Times*, 27 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/opinion/28iht-edlet28.html

Pifer, S.K. (2013). Will Russia take 'yes' for an answer? *The New York Times*, 29 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/opinion/global/the-u-s-missile-defense-plan-in-europe.html

Rasmussen, A.F. (2010). NATO needs a missile defense. *The New York Times*, 12 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/opinion/13iht-edrasmussen.html

Shanker, T., & Barry, E. (2011). U.S. and Romania move on missile plan. *The New York Times*, 3 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/europe/04missile.html

Shanker, T. (2011). U.S. hails deal with Turkey on missile shield. *The New York Times*, 15 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missile-radar-for-nato-defense-against-iran.html

Shanker, T., & Herszenhorn, D.M. (2011). U.S. official says missile-defense shield will move forward. *The New York Times*, 2 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/world/europe/us-official-says-missile-defense-shield-will-move-forward.html

The New York Times. (2009). Missile sense. *The New York Times*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/opinion/18fri1.html

Appendix C. Bibliography of analysed articles from *The Washington Post*, colour-coded with their categorisations.

Binnendijk, H. (2012). Missile defense, missile threats. *The Washington Post*, 6 August. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/missile-defense-missile-threats/2012/08/06/4726bf5e-dfd9-11e1-8d48-2b1243f34c85_story.html

Butt, Y.M. (2009). The politics of missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 30 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/29/AR2009092903572.html

Butt, Y.M. (2011). A good start for Pentagon cuts: Missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 30 June. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-good-start-for-pentagon-cuts-missile-defense/2011/06/30/AGPYBmsH_story.html

Cody, E. (2010). Russia to aid NATO on antimissile network in Europe. *The Washington Post*, 21 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/20/AR2010112003852.html

Demirjian, K. (2015). House adopts defense conference report, but can't override veto. *The Washington Post*, 1 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/10/01/house-adopts-defense-conference-report-but-cant-override-veto

DeYoung, K. (2011). NATO rebuffs Russian threats to counter missile shield. *The Washington Post*, 7 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-chief-rebuffs-russian-threats-to-counter-missile-shield/2011/12/07/gIQAtyRxcO_story.html

DeYoung, K. (2014). Hagel tours U.S. naval cruiser off Romania, reiterates commitment to regional security. *The Washington Post*, 5 June. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hagel-tours-us-naval-cruiser-off-romania-reiterates-commitment-to-regional-security/2014/06/05/adf43172-ecbf-11e3-b98c-72cef4a00499_story.html

Englund, W. (2010). Russia's Putin speaks bluntly of arms buildup. *The Washington Post*, 1 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/01/AR2010120102195.html

Englund, W., & Wan, W. (2011). Medvedev threatens to target U.S. missile shield in Europe if no deal is reached. *The Washington Post*, 23 November. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-will-target-us-missile-shield-in-europe-if-no-deal-is-reached-medvedev-says/2011/11/23/gIQAT4ZKoN_story.html

Englund, W. (2012). Medvedev calls missile defense a threat to Russia. *The Washington Post*, 23 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/medvedev-calls-missile-defense-a-threat-to-russia/2012/03/23/gIQA9Id2VS_story.html

Kessler, G. (2014). The GOP claim that Obama scrapped a missile defense system as 'a gift' to Putin. *The Washington Post*, 28 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/03/28/the-gop-claim-that-obama-scrapped-a-missile-defense-system-as-a-gift-to-putin

Kessler, G. (2014). Cheney's claim that Obama dropped Bush's missile defense plan after a 'mere request' from Putin. *The Washington Post*, 20 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/20/cheneys-claim-that-obama-dropped-bushs-missile-defense-plan-after-a-mere-request-from-putin

Kramer, D.J. (2009). Obama acquiesces to Russia on missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091702303.html

Krauthammer, C. (2012). The 'flexibility' doctrine. *The Washington Post*, 29 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-flexibility-doctrine/2012/03/29/gIQA9ZMtjS_story.html

Lally, K. (2010). Russian president Medvedev sees new arms race if cooperation fails. *The Washington Post*, 1 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/30/AR2010113004144.html

Pan, P.P., & Wilgoren, D. (2009). NATO chief proposes joint effort with Russia on missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/18/AR2009091800847.html

Pincus, W. (2009a). Poland, Czech Republic may get roles in missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 1 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/01/AR2009100104217.html

Pincus, W. (2009b). New missile plan would link Allies' radar, other systems. *The Washington Post*, 8 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100703889.html

Pincus, W. (2011). Cold War issues linger overarms-control [*sic*] negotiations. *The Washington Post*, 18 January. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/17/AR2011011703964.html

Shear, M.D., & Tyson, A.S. (2009). Obama shifts focus of missile shield. *The Washington Post*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091700639.html

Sheridan, M.B. (2010a). Missile defense looms over START ratification. *The Washington Post*, 13 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/12/AR2010121204151.html

	Sheridan, M.B. (2010b). In letter to Senate, Obama promises that New START treaty won't limit missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 19 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/AR2010121802999.html
	The Washington Post. (2011). Pentagon sending radar-equipped warship o [*sic*] Mediterranean. *The Washington Post*, 2 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR201030106424.html
	The Washington Post. (2015a). World digest: March 21, 2015. *The Washington Post*, 21 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/world-digest-march-21-2015/2015/03/21/663f8d1e-cff3-11e4-8c54-ffb5ba6f2f69_story.html
	The Washington Post. (2015b). World digest: Nov. 10, 2015. *The Washington Post*, 10 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/world-digest-nov-10-2015/2015/11/10/1db8ee12-87bf-11e5-be8b-1ae2e4f50f76_story.html
	The Washington Post. (2016). World digest: May 13, 2016. *The Washington Post*, 13 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/world-digest-may-13-2016/2016/05/13/34e583ac-190f-11e6-924d-838753295f9a_story.html
	Whitlock, C. (2010a). U.S. nears key step in European defense shield against Iranian missiles. *The Washington Post*, 1 August. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073103048.html
	Whitlock, C. (2010b). European missile shield plan is expected to gain support. *The Washington Post*, 14 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/14/AR2010101405260.html
	Whitlock, C. (2011a). Russia, U.S. warm up on missile defense. *The Washington Post*, 21 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-us-warm-up-on-missile-defense/2011/03/21/ABY7ei7_story.html
	Whitlock, C. (2011b). Turkey agrees to host U.S. radar site. *The Washington Post*, 15 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/turkey-agrees-to-host-us-radar-site/2011/09/15/gIQAKu4UVK_story.html
	Wilson, S. (2012). Boehner asks Obama to explain 'flexibility' remark. *The Washington Post*, 28 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/boehner-asks-obama-to-explain-open-mike-comments/2012/03/28/gIQAtLbFhS_blog.html
	Wilson, S. (2014). Biden in Europe to 'reassure our allies' over Russia's moves in Ukraine. *The Washington Post*, 18 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-in-europe-to-reassure-our-allies-over-russias-moves-in-ukraine/2014/03/18/ff05b5be-ae84-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html

Appendix D. Bibliography of analysed articles from *Fox News*, colour-coded with their categorisations.

	Barrett, W. (2012). Obama jokes again about Medvedev hot mic moment. *Fox News*, 3 April. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/04/03/obama-jokes-again-about-medvedev-hot-mic-moment.html
	Bendikova, M. (2011). Medvedev threatens, while Team Obama prepares for defense cuts. *Fox News*, 23 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/11/23/medvedev-threatens-while-team-obama-prepares-for-defense-cuts.html
	Chernenkoff, K. (2009a). Conservatives call Obama defense shift a misfire. *Fox News*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/17/conservatives-call-obama-defense-shift-misfire.html
	Chernenkoff, K. (2009b). Clinton fights back at missile defense critics. *Fox News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/18/clinton-fights-back-at-missile-defense-critics.html
	Fox News. (2009a). Decision to shelve missile shield will 'empower' Russia, Obama's critics in Congress say. *Fox News*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/17/decision-shelve-missile-shield-empower-russia-obamas-critics-congress-say.html

Fox News. (2009b). Obama defends decision to shelve European missile shield. *Fox News*, 17 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/17/obama-defends-decision-shelve-european-missile-shield.html

Fox News. (2009c). Intel used by Obama found Iran long-range missile capacity would take 3-5 years longer. *Fox News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/18/intel-used-obama-iran-long-range-missile-capacity-years-longer.html

Fox News. (2009d). Polish prime minister, peeved over missile shield reversal, rejects call from Clinton. *Fox News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/18/polish-prime-minister-peeved-missile-shield-reversal-rejects-clinton.html

Fox News. (2010). Obama: NATO to erect missile shield for Europe. *Fox News*, 19 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/19/afghanistan-handover-issue-hangs-nato-summit-440124980.html

Fox News. (2011a). US, Romania announce plan for missile defense site. *Fox News*, 3 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/03/romania-announce-plan-missile-defense-site.html

Fox News. (2011b). Czech Republic pulls out of U.S. missile defense plans. *Fox News*, 15 June. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/15/czech-republic-pulls-out-us-missile-defense-plans.html

Fox News. (2011c). Official: U.S. will not change plans for missile defense despite Russia warning. *Fox News*, 23 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/11/23/as-russia-balks-at-us-missile-defense-plan-in-europe-us-says-nothing-to-fear.html

Fox News. (2012a). Russia urges quick missile defense deal with US. *Fox News*, 18 January. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/01/18/russia-urges-quick-missile-defense-deal-with-us.html

Fox News. (2012b). Russian official: No missile deal at NATO summit. *Fox News*, 13 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/13/russian-official-no-missile-deal-at-nato-summit.html

Fox News. (2012c). Russia issues new warnings over US missile defense. *Fox News*, 23 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/23/russia-issues-new-warnings-over-us-missile-defense.html

Fox News. (2012d). Science group casts doubt on Obama administration's European missile defense. *Fox News*, 4 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/05/04/science-group-casts-doubt-on-obama-administration-european-missile-defense.html

Fox News. (2013). Report casts doubt on whether missile shield would protect US. *Fox News*, 9 February. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/09/report-casts-doubt-on-whether-missile-shield-would-protect-us.html

Fox News. (2015a). Danish foreign minister in quarrel with Russian ambassador over missile shield comment. *Fox News*, 21 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/03/21/danish-foreign-minister-in-quarrel-with-russian-ambassador-over-missile-shield.html

Fox News. (2015b). UK defense chief rejects Russian missile-shield comments, says NATO members won't be cowed. *Fox News*, 23 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/03/23/uk-defense-chief-rejects-russian-missile-shield-comments-says-nato-members-wont.html

Fox News. (2015c). Top Ukraine security official says country open to hosting missile defense system. *Fox News*, 20 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/05/20/top-ukraine-security-official-says-country-open-to-hosting-missile-defense.html

Fox News. (2015d). Take that: Putin says Russia will build weapons capable of piercing US missile shield. *Fox News*, 10 November. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/11/10/take-that-putin-says-russia-will-build-weapons-capable-piercing-us-missile.html

Fox News. (2015e). Russia's strategic forces chief says prospective weapons capable of "neutralizing" US shield. *Fox News*, 16 December. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/12/16/russia-strategic-forces-chief-says-prospective-weapons-capable-neutralizing-us.html

Fox News. (2016a). US missile defense site opens in Romania; Russia cries foul. *Fox News*, 12 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/12/us-missile-defense-system-in-romania-set-to-become-operational.html

Fox News. (2016b). NATO, Polish leaders to break ground for defense site. *Fox News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/13/nato-polish-leaders-to-break-ground-for-defense-site.html

Fox News. (2016c). Putin warns Russia will respond to NATO missile shield. *Fox News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/13/putin-warns-russia-will-respond-to-nato-missile-shield.html

Fox News. (2016d). Russia fights back against NATO missile shield with upgraded launch detection radar. *Fox News*, 17 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/17/russia-fights-back-against-nato-missile-shield-with-upgraded-launch-detection-radar.html

Fox News. (2016e). Putin warns Romania, Poland over implementing US missile shield. *Fox News*, 28 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/28/putin-warns-romania-poland-over-implementing-us-missile-shield.html

Fox News. (2016f). Russia, China to mull joint response to US missile shield. *Fox News*, 11 October. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/10/11/russia-china-to-mull-joint-response-to-us-missile-shield.html

Heinrichs, R. (2014). After Crimea annexation, time to rally around our European allies with missile defense and more. *Fox News*, 24 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/24/after-crimea-annexation-time-to-rally-around-our-european-allies-with-missile.html

McFarland, K.T. (2009, 18 Sep). Obama tosses an ally overboard – and we get zip. *Fox News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2009/09/18/kt-mcfarland-missile-defense-obama-poland-russia.html

Rosen, J. (2011). Medvedev uncorks a stunner on U.S. missile defense shield. *Fox News*, 26 May. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/26/medvedev-uncorks-stunner-russia-missile-defense-shield.html

Rove, K. (2012). Why Obama's open mic slip could seriously hurt his reelection hopes. *Fox News*, 27 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/03/27/why-obamas-open-mic-slip-could-seriously-hurt-his-reelection-hopes.html

Whiton, C. (2012). The terrible truth told by Obama's open mic slip. *Fox News*, 27 March. Retrieved on 31 May 2017 from http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/03/27/terrible-truth-told-by-obamas-open-mic-slip.html

Appendix E. Graphs demonstrating the breakdown of articles by year (US print and electronic media).

**Figure 30.** Number of articles from *The New York Times* analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

**Figure 31.** Number of articles from *The Washington Post* analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 32. Number of articles from *Fox News* analysed per year.

Fox News: Articles by Year

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 33. Number of US media articles analysed per year.

US Media: Articles by Year

Source: Own calculations.

Appendix F. Bibliography of analysed articles from *Novaya Gazeta*, colour-coded with their categorisations.

	Chursin, A. (2016). *Raketnyy dzhoker Bukharesta* [The rocket joker of Bucharest]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 19 May. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/05/19/68648-raketnyy-dzhoker-buharesta
	Fel'gengauer, P. (2010). *PRO – veshch' sugubo intimnaya* [Missile defence – a purely personal thing]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 23 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/11/24/540-pro-vesch-sugubo-intimnaya
	Fel'gengauer, P. (2011a). *Napryazhenie na vysshem urovne* [Tension at the highest level]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 17 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/10/17/46311-napryazhenie-na-vysshem-urovne
	Fel'gengauer, P. (2011b). *V MIDe ne vidyat priznakov eskalatsii napryazheniya s SShA, no gonku vooruzheniy Rossiya prodolzhaet* [Foreign Ministry sees no signs of escalating tension with USA, but Russia continues arms race]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 5 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/11/05/46645-v-mide-ne-vidyat-priznakov-eskalatsii-napryazheniya-s-ssha-no-gonku-vooruzheniy-rossiya-prodolzhaet
	Fel'gengauer, P. (2011c). *Russkiy medved' ugrozhaet Amerike* [The Russian bear threatens America]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 24 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/11/24/46948-russkiy-medved-ugrozhaet-amerike
	Fel'gengauer, P. (2012). *PRO Putina* [Putin's missile defence]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 22 January. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/01/22/47827-pro-putina
	Lipskiy, A. (2011). *Ugrozy net. Otvetnye mery bessmyslenny* [There is no threat. Countermeasures are meaningless]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 24 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/11/24/46949-ugrozy-net-otvetnye-mery-bessmyslenny
	Mineev, A. (2011a). *Sozdanie sovmestnoy s NATO protivoraketnoy oborony v Evrope stanovitsya vneshnepoliticheskim khitom predvyboronogo goda v Rossii* [Creation of a joint NATO missile defence system in Europe becomes foreign policy hit of pre-election year in Russia]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 29 January. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/01/29/5372-sozdanie-sovmestnoy-s-nato-protivoraketnoy-oborony-v-evrope-stanovitsya-vneshnepoliticheskim-hitom-predvybornogo-goda-v-rossii
	Mineev, A. (2011b). *PRO kak element predvybornoy kampanii* [Missile defence as an element of the pre-election campaign]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 31 January. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/02/01/7070-pro-kak-element-predvybornoy-kampanii
	Mineev, A. (2011c). *Rossiya i NATO tak i ne smogli dogovorit'sya o tom, kakie sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony stroit' v Evrope i kak vzaimodeystvovat' v etom dele* [Russia and NATO have not been able to agree on what missile defence systems to build in Europe and how to interact on this matter]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 9 June. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/06/09/48695-rossiya-i-nato-tak-i-ne-smogli-dogovoritsya-o-tom-kakie-sistemy-protivoraketnoy-oborony-stroit-v-evrope-i-kak-vzaimodeystvovat-v-etom-dele
	Mineev, A. (2011d). *Zashchita ot starykh podozreniy* [Protection from old suspicions]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 2 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/10/02/46141-zaschita-ot-staryh-podozreniy
	Novaya Gazeta. (2009a). *Protivoraketnaya oborona: Barak Obama protiv Dzhordzha Busha* [Missile defence: Barack Obama vs. George Bush]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 1 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2009/10/02/41116-protivoraketnaya-oborona-barak-obama-protiv-dzhordzha-busha
	Novaya Gazeta. (2009b). *Rossiya i SShA provedut konsul'tatsii po protivoratketnoy oborone* [Russia and USA will hold consultations on missile defence]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 7 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2009/10/07/47400-rossiya-i-ssha-provedut-konsultatsii-po-protivoraketnoy-oborone
	Novaya Gazeta. (2010). *Administratsiya Baraka Obamy nachala novyy etap razmeshcheniya sistem PRO v Vostochnoy Evrope* [The Barack Obama administration began a new stage of deployment of missile defence system in Eastern Europe]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 6 February. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2010/02/06/371-administratsiya-baraka-obamy-nachala-novyy-etap-razmescheniya-sistem-pro-v-vostochnoy-evrope

Novaya Gazeta. (2011a). *Rossiya nastaivaet na garantiyakh nenapravlennosti protiv nee sredstv PRO SShA v Evrope* [Russia insists on guarantees that US missile defence facilities in Europe are not directed against them]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 2 September. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/09/02/50146-rossiya-nastaivaet-na-garantiyah-nenapravlennosti-protiv-nee-sredstv-pro-ssha-v-evrope

Novaya Gazeta. (2011b). *Vnov' obostrilic' rossiysko-amerikanskie protivorechiya v sfere protivoraketnoy oborony* [Russian-American contradictions in the sphere of missile defence are exacerbated again]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 6 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/10/06/50780-vnov-obostrilis-rossiysko-amerikanskie-protivorechiya-v-sfere-protivoraketnoy-oborony

Novaya Gazeta. (2011c). *Rossiya gotova prodolzhat' dialog s SShA i NATO po probleme EvroPRO* [Russia ready to continue dialogue with USA and NATO on issue of missile defence]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 28 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/11/28/51887-rossiya-gotova-prodolzhat-dialog-s-ssha-i-nato-po-probleme-evropro

Novaya Gazeta. (2011d). *SShA prodolzhit sozdavat' EvroPRO nezavisimo ot mneniya Moskvy* [USA will continue to create European missile defence regardless of Moscow's opinions]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 3 December. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2011/12/03/52058-ssha-prodolzhit-sozdavat-evropro-nezavisimo-ot-mneniya-moskvy

Novaya Gazeta. (2012a). *SShA gotovy podtverdit' na bumage bezopasnost' sistemy EvroPRO dlya Rossii* [USA ready to confirm on paper security of European missile defence system for Russia]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 18 January. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2012/01/18/53167-ssha-gotovy-podtverdit-na-bumage-bezopasnost-sistemy-evropro-dlya-rossii

Novaya Gazeta. (2012b). *RF otvergla v Myunkhene predlozhenie po PRO* [The Russian Federation rejected the proposal on missile defence in Munich]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 6 February. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2012/02/06/53641-rf-otvergla-v-myunhene-predlozhenie-po-pro

Novaya Gazeta. (2012c). *Gensek NATO Anders fog* [*sic*] *Rasmussen zayavil, shto EvroPRO ne ugrozhaet Rossii i ne narushaet strategicheskiy balans* [General Secretary of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that European missile defence shield does not threaten Russia and does not violate the strategic balance]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 19 April. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2012/04/19/55861-gensek-nato-anders-fog-rasmussen-zayavil-chto-evropro-ne-ugrozhaet-rossii-i-ne-narushaet-strategicheskiy-balans

Novaya Gazeta. (2012d). *NATO soobshchaet o chastichoy* [*sic*] *gotovnosti sistemy PRO* [NATO reports partial readiness of missile defence system]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 21 May. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2012/05/21/56535-nato-soobschaet-o-chastichoy-gotovnosti-sistemy-pro

Novaya Gazeta. (2013). *V oktyabre SShA nachnut stroitel'stvo ob"ekta PRO v Rumynii* [In October, USA will begin construction of missile defence facility in Romania]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 19 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2013/10/19/76903-v-oktyabre-ssha-nachnut-stroitelstvo-ob-ekta-pro-v-rumynii

Novaya Gazeta. (2014a). *Daniya prisoedinyaetsya k sisteme PRO NATO v Evrope* [Denmark joins NATO missile defence system in Europe]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 22 August. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2014/08/22/104596-daniya-prisoedinyaetsya-k-sisteme-pro-nato-v-evrope

Novaya Gazeta. (2014b). *SShA uspeshno ispytali modernizirovannuyu sistemu PRO* [USA successfully tested modernised missile defence system]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 7 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2014/11/07/107580-ssha-uspeshno-ispytali-modernizirovannuyu-sistemu-pro

Novaya Gazeta. (2015a). *Rossiyskiy posol prigrozil Danii yadernymi raketami* [Russian Ambassador threatened Denmark with nuclear missiles]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 22 March. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/03/22/110987-rossiyskiy-posol-prigrozil-danii-yadernymi-raketami

Novaya Gazeta. (2015b). *Kreml' ob"yavil o gotovnosti prinyat' otvetnye mery na razmeshchenie v Ukraine PRO* [The Kremlin announced its readiness to take reactive measures toward the deployment of missile defence in Ukraine]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 20 May. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/20/112339-kreml-ob-yavil-o-gotovnosti-prinyat-otvetnye-mery-na-razmeschenie-v-ukraine-pro

	Novaya Gazeta. (2015c). *Gosdep: u SShA i NATO net planov razmeshchat'' PRO v Ukraine* [State Department: The USA and NATO do not have plans to deploy missile defence in Ukraine]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 21 May. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/21/112360-gosdep-u-ssha-i-nato-net-planov-razmeschat-pro-v-ukraine
	Novaya Gazeta. (2015d). *SShA vylozhili video pervykh ispytaniy sistemy PRO v Evrope* [The USA posted a video of the first tests of the missile defence system in Europe]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 21 October. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/10/21/115749-ssha-vylozhili-video-pervyh-ispytaniy-sistemy-pro-v-evrope
	Novaya Gazeta. (2015e). *Putin poobeshchal razvivat' udarnye sistemy v otvet na razvertyvanie SShA sistem PRO* [Putin promises to develop strike systems in response to deployment of US missile defence system]. *Novaya Gazeta*, 10 November. Retrieved on 1 June 2017 from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/11/10/116217-putin-poobeschal-razvivat-udarnye-sistemy-v-otvet-na-razvertyvanie-ssha-sistem-pro

Appendix G. Bibliography of analysed articles from Sputnik News, colour-coded with their categorisations.

	Sputnik News. (2009a). Russian NATO envoy skeptical about new U.S [*sic*] missile shield plans. *Sputnik News*, 18 September. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/20090918156167898
	Sputnik News. (2009b). U.S. missile defense reversal no concession to Russia – Gates. *Sputnik News*, 20 September. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20090920156192524
	Sputnik News. (2009c). Russia prepares response to revised U.S. missile shield plans. *Sputnik News*, 1 October. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/20091001156317134
	Sputnik News. (2009d). New U.S. missile defense plans pose no threat to Russia – Lavrov. *Sputnik News*, 7 October. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/20091007156382046
	Sputnik News. (2009e). Turkey opposed to U.S. missile defense deployment. *Sputnik News*, 16 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20091216157260838
	Sputnik News. (2011). U.S. missile defense in Europe 'real threat' to Russia – General Staff. *Sputnik News*, 20 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/20110520164133194
	Sputnik News. (2012a). NATO anti-missile radar in Turkey put into operation. *Sputnik News*, 17 January. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/military/20120117170796159
	Sputnik News. (2012b). Putin slams U.S. missile shield ahead of Munich security talks. *Sputnik News*, 3 February. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20120203171103829
	Sputnik News. (2012c). Putin: Russia ready to respond to U.S. missile defense. *Sputnik News*, 14 June. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/military/20120614174030933
	Sputnik News. (2012d). Poland calls 'mistake' [*sic*] cooperation with U.S. over missile defense – President. *Sputnik News*, 4 August. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20120804174979250
	Sputnik News. (2013a). 'No flexibility' in US missile talks – Medvedev. *Sputnik News*, 27 January. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/20130127179063928
	Sputnik News. (2013b). Medvedev paints gloomy picture of US missile defense dispute. *Sputnik News*, 23 February. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20130223179638300
	Sputnik News. (2013c). Moscow to discuss changes in US missile defense plans. *Sputnik News*, 20 March. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20130320180138892
	Sputnik News. (2013d). US missile shield no threat to Russia – Deputy PM. *Sputnik News*, 16 April. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20130416180661245
	Sputnik News. (2013e). Russia says Iran deal makes US missile shield plan redundant. *Sputnik News*, 13 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/world/20131213185520474
	Sputnik News. (2014a). Putin: US creating strategic missile shield threatens Russia, EU, US itself. *Sputnik News*, 4 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/201412041015487813

Sputnik News. (2014b). Putin: US creates threats for Russia by building missile shield. *Sputnik News*, 18 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/russia/201412181015980045

Sputnik News. (2015a). US Aegis ships could pose threat to Russia – Russian diplomat. *Sputnik News*, 21 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/military/201505211022394345

Sputnik News. (2015b). NATO's anti-Russia policy, anti-missile shield [*sic*] threaten balance – Moscow. *Sputnik News*, 14 December. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/military/201512141031708136

Sputnik News. (2016a). Why Washington's ballistic missile defense in Europe makes no sense. *Sputnik News*, 22 March. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201603221036771662

Sputnik News. (2016b). Costly US missile defense systems in Romania, Poland unlikely to work. *Sputnik News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201605131039540866

Sputnik News (2016c). 'Have no illusions': US missile defense system is 'directed against Russia'. *Sputnik News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605131039548489

Sputnik News. (2016d). US air defense shield not defense, but nuclear potential in Europe – Putin. *Sputnik News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605131039562554

Sputnik News. (2016e). US missile shield in EU designed to provoke Russia – Global peace activist. *Sputnik News*, 13 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/military/201605131039538879

Sputnik News. (2016f). In Aegis' shadow: US uses 'Central Europe to encircle Russia'. *Sputnik News*, 15 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605151039633525

Sputnik News. (2016g). Moscow has 'right to feel threatened' by US missile defense in Europe. *Sputnik News*, 15 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605151039640414

Sputnik News. (2016h). US missile defense in Romania: 'Too expensive, inefficient, totally wrong'. *Sputnik News*, 17 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/europe/201605171039752751

Sputnik News. (2016i). 'It's amazing' that no NATO member opposes US missile shield in Europe. *Sputnik News*, 20 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605201039944674

Sputnik News. (2016j). Russia has last seen such amassing of hostile forces on its borders in 1941. *Sputnik News*, 21 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605211040012274

Sputnik News. (2016k). Romania 'surprised' by Putin's remarks on US missile defense system. *Sputnik News*, 28 May. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605281040417711

Sputnik News. (2016l). NATO is possibly about to make 'one of the biggest mistakes in its history'. *Sputnik News*, 9 June). Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/europe/201606091041088748

Yevseyev, V. (2010). The U.S. anti-missile project in Romania: New administration, same old policy. *Sputnik News*, 24 February. Retrieved on 2 June 2017 from https://sputniknews.com/analysis/20100224157995687

Appendix H. Bibliography of analysed articles from *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, colour-coded with their categorisations.

Fedyakina, A. (2012). *NATO zavershila pervuyu fazu sozdaniya PRO* [NATO has completed the first phase of missile defence construction]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 21 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2012/05/21/nato-site.html

Petrov, I. (2015). *Sovbez RF: Iz-za amerikanskoy PRO Rumyniya i Pol'sha stali tselyami RF* [Russian Security Council: Due to American missile defence Romania and Poland have become targets of Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 24 June. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2015/06/24/pro-site-anons.html

Petrov, I. (2016a). *Sovbez RF uvidel ugrozu v EvroPRO* [Russian Security Council saw a threat in European missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/05/23/sovbez-rf-uvidel-ugrozu-v-evropro.html

Petrov, V. (2016b). *Pushkov usomnilsya v chestnosti genseka NATO po voprosu PRO v Rumynii* [Pushkov doubted the honesty of NATO General Secretary on the issue of missile defence in Romania]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 14 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/05/14/pushkov-usomnilsia-v-chestnosti-genseka-nato-po-voprosu-pro-v-rumynii.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2010). *Rasmussen: NATO predlozhit Rossii sotrudnichestvo v oblasti PRO* [Rasmussen: NATO will offer Russia cooperation in the field of missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 8 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2010/10/08/nato-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011a). *Genshtab: sozdanie sistemy EvroPRO bez uchastiya Rossii privedet k sovershenno novoy strategicheskoy situatsii* [General Staff: The creation of a European missile defence system without Russia will lead to a completely new strategic situation]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 4 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/05/04/makarov-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011b, 20 May). *Dmitriy Medvedev: Bez soglasiya po EvroPRO mogut vernut'sya vremena "kholodnoy voyny"* [Dmitry Medvedev: Without an agreement on missile defence, a return to "Cold War" times is possible]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 20 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/05/20/medvedev-pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011c, 20 May). *Genshtab RF: Amerikanskaya PRO v Evrope predstavlyaet real'nuyu ugrozu Rossii* [Russian General Staff: US missile defence in Europe presents a real threat to Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 20 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/05/20/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011d). *Lavrov: SShA po-prezhnemu ne dayut garantii nenapravlennosti EvroPRO na Rossiyu* [Lavrov: US still does not guarantee the non-directionality of European missile defence against Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1 September. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/09/01/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011e). *Rogozin: Radar EvroPro v Turtsii ne ugrozhaet bezopasnosti Rossii* [Rogozin: European missile defence radar in Turkey does not threaten the security of Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 2 September. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/09/02/bezopasnost-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011f). *MID RF: Deystviya SShA v sfere PRO nepriemlemy* [Russian Ministry of Foreign of Affairs: US actions in the sphere of missile defence are unacceptable]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 6 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/10/06/mid-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011g). *Prezident vystupil s zayavleniem po Evropro* [The President gave a statement on European missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 November. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/11/23/otvet-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2011h). *Medvedev: Plany SShA po PRO nesut ushcherb strategicheskomu paritetu v mire* [Medvedev: US missile defence plans are damaging to worldwide strategic parity]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1 December. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2011/12/01/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2012a). *Makarov: Genshtab ne isklyuchaet uprezhdayushchego udara po EvroPRO* [Makarov: General Staff does not rule out a pre-emptive strike against European missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 3 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2012/05/03/evropro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2012b). *Vladimir Putin: Problema PRO ne budet reshena v blizhayshee vremya* [Vladimir Putin: The issue of missile defense will not be solved soon]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 20 June. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2012/06/20/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2012c). *RF budet otvechat' na EvroPRO, esli ne udast'sya dogovorit'sya s NATO* [Russia will respond to European missile defence if an agreement is not reached with NATO]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 20 December. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2012/12/20/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2013a). *Medvedev zayavil, shto sblizheniya pozitsiy RF i SSha v oblasti PRO net* [Medvedev declared that there is no rapprochement between the positions of Russia and the US in the field of missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 27 January. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2013/01/27/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2013b). *Rossii nedostatochno politicheskikh garantiy ot SShA v sfere PRO* [Russia has insufficient political guarantees from the US in the field of missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 25 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2013/05/25/garantii-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2013c). *Genshtab razrabotaet zashchitu ot PRO* [General Staff will develop protection from missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 16 December. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2013/12/16/shoigu-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2013d). *Lavrov: Programmu EvroPRO nado pereosmyslit'* [Lavrov: The European missile defence programme needs to be rethought]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 18 December. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2013/12/18/posizia-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2014). *Rasmussen: NATO ne perenatselit sistemu PRO na Rossiyu* [Rasmussen: NATO will not redirect missile defence system against Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 5 September. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2014/09/05/nato2-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2015a). *Genshtab: Rossiya otvetit na sozdanie sistemy PRO SShA* [General Staff: Russia will respond to the development of US missile defence system]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 30 January. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2015/01/30/otvet-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2015b). *MID RF: NATO pora otkazat'sya ot odnostoronnikh shagov v sfere PRO* [Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: It's time for NATO to abandon unilateral steps in the sphere of missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 25 March. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2015/03/25/pro-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2015c). *Putin: PRO SShA ugrozhaet yadernomu potentsialu RF* [Putin: US missile defence threatens Russia's nuclear potential]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 22 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2015/10/22/iran-anons.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016a). *Sovbez RF: PRO v Evrope mozhet ispol'zovat'sya v nastupatel'nykh tselyakh* [Russian Security Council: Missile defence in Europe can be used for offensive purposes]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 13 April. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/04/13/sovbez-rf-pro-v-evrope-mozhet-ispolzovatsia-v-nastupatelnyh-celiah.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016b). *Genshtab: PRO SShA ugrozhaet bezopasnosti Rossii i Kitaya* [General Staff: US missile defence threatens the security of Russia and China]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/10/11/genshtab-globalnaia-pro-nuzhna-ssha-dlia-prevoshodstva-nad-rf-i-kitaem.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016c). *Genshtab: Rossiya gotova vozobnovit' kontakty po PRO s SShA i NATO* [General Staff: Russia ready to resume communications on missile defence with US and NATO]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/10/11/genshtab-rossiia-gotova-vozobnovit-kontakty-po-pro-s-ssha-i-nato.html

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2016d, 11 Oct). *V Kremle zayavili ob ugroze bezopasnosti RF iz-za PRO SShA* [The Kremlin announced a threat to Russia's security due to US missile defence]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 October. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/10/11/v-kremle-konstatirovali-ugrozu-bezopasnosti-rf-iz-za-pro-ssha.html

Samozhnev, A. (2016). *MID RF: Rossiya ostavila za soboy pravo otveta na PRO SShA v Evrope* [Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Russia reserves the right to respond to US missile defence in Europe]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 14 May. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/05/14/mid-rf-rossiia-ostavila-za-soboj-pravo-otveta-na-pro-ssha-v-evrope.html

Volkov, K. (2016). *MID: SShA dolzhny garantirovat', shto PRO ne napravlena protiv Rossii* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: US should guarantee that missile defence is not directed against Russia]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 June Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2016/06/23/mid-ssha-dolzhny-garantirovat-chto-pro-ne-napravlena-protiv-rossii.html

Zamakhina, T. (2014, 7 Nov). *Rossiyskie rakety pri neobkhodimosti smogut preodolet' PRO SShA* [Russian missiles can overcome US missile defence if necessary]. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 7 November. Retrieved on 5 June 2017 from https://rg.ru/2014/11/07/raketi-site-anons.html

Appendix I. Graphs demonstrating the breakdown of articles by year (Russian print media).

**Figure 34.** Number of articles from *Novaya Gazeta* analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

**Figure 35.** Number of articles from *Sputnik News* analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 36. Number of articles from *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

Figure 37. Number of Russian media articles analysed per year.

Source: Own calculations.

University of Glasgow

School of Social & Political Sciences

Postgraduate Coursework Coversheet

After you have submitted your electronic copy through the course Moodle, complete this coversheet in full and attach to the front of your paper copy. Refer to your course handbook for submission deadlines and presentation requirements.

Please attach to each copy of your work

Student Number:

2	1	9	3	9	3	6

Course Title: IMRCEES

Essay/Assignment Title: Russian and US media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield: Before and after Crimea

Course Co-ordinator: Dr Eamonn Butler

Date of Submission: 11 September 2017

Word Count: 23,204

Confirmation of electronic copy submission (read & tick in box below):
Please note: You must upload the final version of your work to the course Moodle **before** handing in your printed copy. The Course Administrator will check Moodle shortly after the deadline and if your electronic copy is missing, normal late penalties will apply until you provide it.

I confirm that I have uploaded my electronic copy to the course Moodle before handing in this paper copy	X

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKOW
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

THESIS AUTHORSHIP STATEMENT

Name/ Student ID number:

Juliana Jane Crim

1140590

Title of thesis:

Russian and US media portrayals of the US/NATO ballistic missile defence shield: Before and after Crimea

I hereby confirm that this paper is my own work and that all sources have been properly and clearly credited. I am familiar with the Centre for European Studies and Jagiellonian University's policy on plagiarism, detailed in the Student Handbook and defined as "the practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own". I understand that this practice is considered unethical and expressly prohibited, that even an unintentional failure to properly credit text, images or ideas may be considered plagiarism, and that perpetrators may be called before the Ethics Board and/or expelled from the university.

Date:

11 September 2017

Signature:

Juliana Crim

PLVS RATIO QVAM VIS