



University
of Glasgow

Zeller, Michael C. (2015) *Engines of the Right: a comparative examination of Hungarian right-wing party youth groups*. [MA]

<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/194/>

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author(s)

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author(s)

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, institution and date must be given

ENGINES OF THE RIGHT

A Comparative Examination of Hungarian Right-Wing Party Youth Groups

Michael C. Zeller

School of Social & Political Sciences - Central & Eastern European Studies

University of Glasgow

--

Faculty of Social Sciences - Department of Political Science

Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Dissertation submitted for the degrees of Master of Political Science and International Master of
Russia, Central & Eastern European Studies

Word Count: 25,052

Student Matriculation Number: 2067627Z

2015

I, Michael C. Zeller, confirm that the work presented in this dissertation is my own. Where information from other sources has been used, I confirm that this has been appropriately cited in the dissertation.

X_____

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the assistance of a number of people it is unlikely this project would have met with success. First, I want to thank my dissertation supervisors, Dr. Eamonn Butler (University of Glasgow) and Dr. Zoltan Balazs (Corvinus University of Budapest, CUB). Their timely and precise advice, their guidance in focusing and refining my study, as well as their confidence in my ability to work independently were crucial to the project's success. Dr. Dániel Róna (CUB) generously afforded me similar support, despite being under no obligation to do so. His thorough expertise and preexisting experience within the field was invaluable. Dr. Andras Lanczi (CUB) and his associate Ms. Marianna Toth kindly helped arrange my focus group with Fidelitas; without their assistance it seems unlikely that I would have obtained that interview. In the early stages of my project, the translation work of Dr. Zsuzsanna Varga (University of Glasgow) and the advice of Dr. Erin Saltman provided me with vital support that prepared me well for the work to come. Throughout the project, the prompt and efficient assistance of the University of Glasgow staff (particularly Mrs. Maggie Baister) and of Corvinus University of Budapest staff (particularly Mrs. Kathleen Bede)—including a project grant from the CUB Department of Political Science—made the conduct of my research drastically easier than it might have been otherwise. Most importantly, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Mr. Máté Kaló. He acted as my translator in each interview and steadfastly supported my subsequent processing of the data. Throughout all this, Mr. Kaló comported himself with unique professionalism and skill. His work and company are tremendously appreciated.

Additionally, the support of my friends and colleagues bears mentioning. The camaraderie, mutual commiseration, and even insistent alleviating distraction of my fellows lightened the load of my project. And, the advice, encouragement, good cheer, and much more furnished me by my great friend Dr. Dale Billingsley was, is, and shall ever remain a vital element of my success and happiness.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: Project Conception

1	Introduction	7
2	An Overview of Hungarian Politics	11
	2.1 A Note on Hungarian Political Culture	11
	2.2 The Party System and Political Environment	15
	2.3 Parties in Profile	20
	2.3.1 Fidesz-KDNP	
	2.3.2 Jobbik	
3	Methodology	29
4	Theories and Frames of Analysis	32
	4.1 Youth Political Socialization in Hungary	32
	4.2 Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Ideology	34
	4.3 Shifting Political Dynamics: Realignment versus dealignment	36

PART TWO: Research Results

5	Focus Group Findings*	40
	5.1 Political Socialization	41
	5.2 Dimensions of Ideology	43
	5.2.1 Socio-economic	
	5.2.2 Religious	
	5.2.3 Cultural-ethnic	
	5.2.4 Urban-rural	
	5.2.5 Regime support	
	5.2.6 Foreign Policy	
	5.2.7 Post-materialism	
	5.3 Additional findings and observations	58
6	Assessing Hungary's Right-wing Youth Groups	63
7	Conclusion	68
	Appendix 1. Focus Group Interview Questions Outline	70
	Appendix 2. Table of Jobbik Implemented by the first Fidesz-KDNP government	73
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	75

* Quotes from focus groups in the original Hungarian are included in endnotes.

REFERENCE TABLE OF COMMONLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Full title
Fidesz (Fidesz-KDNP)	<i>Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség</i> (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union)
KDNP (Fidesz-KDNP)	<i>Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt</i> (Christian Democratic People’s Party)
Jobbik	<i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i> (Movement for a Better Hungary)
MSZP	<i>Magyar Szocialista Párt</i> (Hungarian Socialist Party)
LMP	<i>Lehet Más a Politika</i> (Politics Can Be Different party)
Fidesz IT	<i>Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat</i> (Fidesz Youth Division)
Jobbik IT	<i>Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat</i> (Jobbik Youth Division)
IKSZ	<i>Ifjúsági Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség</i> (Young Christian Democratic Union)
MSZMP	<i>Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt</i> (the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party)

PART ONE

Project Conception

1. INTRODUCTION

Many observers heralded the emancipation of the Eastern Bloc countries and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a new flowering of democracy (or, if you like, part of a ‘third wave of democratization’). Rapidly, the liberated states set out to liberalize, democratize, and ‘return to Europe;’ parity of rights and liberties, of economic opportunity and performance, and of membership in European/Western institutions represented common goals. To attain these ends, policies often prioritized equally efficacy *and* speed—the rush to build free-market liberal democracy in the 1990s was supposed to culminate in the realization of all or most objectives in the 2000s. And indeed, the expansions of NATO and the EU in that first decade of the new century suggested the express route had worked. Yet the decade also witnessed two events that would fundamentally spawn or spur on formidable challenges to the democratic consolidation of ‘new Europe’—that is, the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe—and to the integrity of liberal democracy in more established regimes of the West: the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent American-led interventions in the Middle East and western Asia, and the global economic crisis that began in 2008.

First, Western intervention in certain countries of the Islamic world in the years after 2001 to some extent exacerbated terrorist activity visited upon Western countries. Heightened awareness of terrorist threats and a tangible increase thereof reinforced and perhaps spread antagonistic inclinations of segments of Western societies toward Muslim communities. Distinct and obstinate stances on issues of national identity and immigration—that is, opposing any of the latter’s effects on the former—won considerable support for European far-right parties. The Freedom Party of Austria, the Front National in France, and Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands—these and several other parties attained new levels of prominence from voters who supported their ideological and policy responses to the nexus of issues resulting from immigration and wars against terrorism.

Second, the world economic recession that began in 2008 provoked populist recriminations of mismanagement and corruption by political elites in countries throughout Europe. In ensuing election cycles voters frequently ousted governments in favor of center-right parties—which often enjoyed a perception of greater fiscal responsibility—or in support of

emergent far-right parties—which represented revitalized populist elements on societal margins and a conspicuous anti-establishment sentiment.

Together, these events two events, along with the preconditions and circumstances that accompanied them, have jarred European political systems. Despite the optimistic aspirations and projections of democratic dispersion in the 1990s, the past decade and a half brought forth challenges to democratization in emancipated states, uncertain democratic consolidation, and menaces to established democracies. Far-right parties stand in the vanguard of this array of challenges. The resulting condition, the fruits of false-halcyon days have sobered democracy scholars and champions: *Et in Arcadia ego*—liberal democracy is a delicate system, always at risk wherever it reigns.

The aim of this study is to reconnoiter a pivotal facet of invigorated political competition between the center-right and the far-right: political party youth groups. In Hungary—a country that is no exception to the trend of ascendant right-wing politics, though with some interesting distinctions—the youth groups of the governing center-right party and the increasingly influential far-right party are central to the overall success of each.

Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (or simply Fidesz), along with its alliance partner *Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* (the Christian Democratic People’s Party, or KDNP)¹, and *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (or simply Jobbik) are the two largest right-wing parties in Hungary. In fact, they are arguably the two largest parties irrespective of position on the political spectrum. Their political successes owes significantly to their mobilization of young segments of the population, chiefly through party-sponsored groups. Thus, a precise understanding of these groups, of these engines of party success is essential to meaningful comprehension of contemporary Hungarian politics.

This paper uses data obtained from focus group interviews with members of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youth groups to critically examine the facets of socialization and the ideological dimensions that characterize, unify, and divide the them, and further argues that the resultant conditions have contributed to a realignment in the country’s political system—from

¹ Although a formal division still exists between Fidesz and KDNP, the Christian Democrats are unquestionably the junior partner and subservient to and to some extent subsumed under Fidesz. This paper, therefore, deals with the Fidesz-KDNP alliance as one party.

centripetal party competition between centrist parties to centrifugal competition predominantly between the right and the far-right.

The first part of the dissertation details the project conception. The second chapter outlines the political scene in Hungary. A summary of Hungarian political culture forms the foundation of this overview, affording a sense of the thick political, social, and cultural milieu steeped in which are the political affairs of the country. Then, a broad description of the concerned parties—Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik—serves as context for analysis of the youth groups that they sponsor.

In the third chapter, the paper unfolds the design and methodology of the research, including the elaboration of interview questions, the recruitment of interview participants, and the actual conduct of the focus groups.

In the fourth chapter, entitled “Theory and Research,” the paper describes two analytical frames employed to examine the interview data: the manner of youth political socialization experienced and the dimensions of ideology represented by youth party members. Furthermore, a discussion of forces that act on a party system presages an argument advanced in the analysis section which holds that the prominence of Hungary’s right-wing youth groups and that their ideological characteristics suggest that the country’s political system has realigned and will likely persist in this new ordering.

In the second part of the dissertation, the research findings are presented. First, the paper makes an exposition of the testimony derived from focus group participants. It arrays this information thematically under headings that correspond to the aforementioned analytical frames. The data from the separate youth groups is subdivided under the thematic headings.

Second, the paper presents a comprehensive and comparative assessment of the political party youth groups. This section extracts the key findings from the project interviews and synthesizes them with other information to facilitate inferences about Hungary’s political system.

Finally, the paper summarizes the project outcomes and advances conclusions of the research pertaining to Hungary’s democratic future and broadly to the tenor of democratic development across Europe.

In short and in sum, this study offers another lens with which to view Hungary’s youth politics, adding to a significant (though perhaps still insufficient) body of literature. It comes at a time when Jobbik has arguably surpassed MSZP as Hungary’s second strongest party (Kuli,

‘Hungary’s ruling party...’, 2014), when Fidesz-KDNP has identified and targeted Jobbik as the chief obstacle to its continued predominance (Hungary Around the Clock, ‘Fidesz Turns its sights on Jobbik’, 2014), and when levels of support for Jobbik and for Fidesz are as close as they have ever been (Hungary Matters, ‘Jobbik at all-time high...’, 2015). This study reconnoiters a crucial aspect of that potent political dynamic.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF HUNGARIAN POLITICS

Examining a specific phenomenon of a country's political affairs necessitates a degree of understanding about the wider context in which that phenomenon is occurring; indeed, it seems the more specified the focus of inquiry, the richer the contextualization ought to be. Therefore, this chapter reviews the context surrounding the political affairs of Hungary—the long train of events and the culmination of historical experiences that generates the country's political culture, the party system and political environment that currently preside, and the two right-wing political parties that operate therein.

2.1 A NOTE ON HUNGARIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture, though a somewhat nebulous concept, is adequately defined as the political attitudes, orientations, beliefs, and values of a group or society. Attempts to distill the political culture shaping a state's politics is disadvantaged by the fact that cultural boundaries do not necessarily, perhaps even rarely coincide with political boundaries. Yet the causal ubiquity of political culture warrants the venture; the people of a political space are naturally molded and prompted by their political culture. An advantage of the foreign researcher is simultaneously to grasp and view phenomena through that actuating frame of political culture, and to use consciously his own frame and experience of other political cultures as a unique tool of analysis.

Summaries of Hungarian political culture commonly traces historical legacy back only so far as the early twentieth century. A modicum of further contextualization, however, provides a disproportionately richer understanding, particularly given some of the nation-building cultural narratives espoused and enacted by Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik. Hungarians locate their cultural origins in the Hunnic Empire forged by Attila. (The name “Attila” remains a popular choice for Hungarian boys.) They mark the foundation of Hungary as 896 C.E., when Prince Árpád led a group of tribes (chiefly the ‘Magyar’ tribe) into the Carpathian basin. Far from relics or historical curiosities, these traditions reverberate in modern Hungary: the Turul bird—a divine bird of prey said to perch atop the tree of life, similar to Central Asian mythology—adorns Hungarian buildings (such as the Royal Castle in Budapest) and state insignia (such as the emblem of the

Hungarian army [*Magyar Honvédség*]); and, the state coat of arms features the so-called ‘Árpád stripes’ (four argent and four gules stripes). Saint Stephen, the Holy Crown, and other historical iconography persist in Hungary’s contemporary politics and nation/state symbolism.

The distinction between state and national symbolism deserves note. The fact that the Hungarian nation preceded the Hungarian state generates a strain that often emphasizes *national* symbols; this variation presumably is more prominent within Jobbik. Conversely, the long persistence of the Hungarian state accommodated in the Carpathian basin—much more so than other states in the surrounding region—endorses primary observance of *state* symbolism; if for no other reason than its governmental position, this variation is presumably more prominent within Fidesz-KDNP. The considerable extent to which these paradigms overlap is suggested in Fidesz-KDNP’s enshrinement of nation/state symbolism in, for example, the new Basic Law.

The conquest and settlement of the Carpathian Basin positioned Hungary at a cultural crossroads. Its subsequent history witnessed a variety of interactions with neighboring cultures—occupation by the Ottoman Empire, junior rank in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, diverse ethnic populations, encirclement by many varied and utterly dissimilar languages, and so on. Consequently, Hungary is familiar with ethnic interaction (friction and tense peace), and the struggle of dealing with conflicts arising therefrom. (In view of this condition, it is curious that Mr. Orbán would say that ‘Hungary has never been a multicultural society’ and that ‘we consider it a value that Hungary is a homogenous country—homogenous in its culture, way of thinking, and civilized habits’ [Index.hu, ‘Orbán: sosem...’, 2015, translated by author].) Today, ongoing tension between ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian Roma most prominently represents the continuation of this struggle.

From the early sixteenth century until the end of the Great War, Hungary was subsumed under varying degrees of foreign rule by the Habsburg dynasty of Austria. Subject and secondary status to Vienna—forcibly maintained in suppressing the revolution of 1848 (which ultimately sought Hungarian independence), and persevered culturally even after the Compromise of 1867 that inaugurated the dual-monarchy of Austria-Hungary—arguably inculcated Hungarians with a pronounced sensitivity for the condition of their state’s sovereignty. This disposition is perhaps not unique in the region, though Hungary’s repeated and dramatic struggles for sovereignty distinguishes it still.

The end of the Great War signaled the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and a traumatic climacteric in the development of Hungarian political culture. With the 1920 Treaty of Trianon the lands of St. Stephen's Crown (often equated to Hungary in casual political or historical discourse) lost almost three-quarters of its size and saw significant numbers of ethnic Hungarians displaced outside the newly established borders of Hungary. A conservative interwar regime under the regency of Miklós Horthy sought the return of these lands and peoples. Irredentist sentiment—alongside historical connections—impelled Hungary to ally with Nazi Germany. Late in the war, March 1944, Nazi Germany occupied Hungary and subsequently supplanted Horthy with a government of the Arrow Cross Party (*Nyilaskeresztes Párt*), a national-socialist party and arguably the progenitor of Hungary's far-right. The new 'Basic Law' (passed in 2011 by Fidesz-KDNP) marks 19 March 1944 as the day when Hungary lost its sovereignty, unrecovered until 1990.

Following the Second World War, Hungary found itself still subject to foreign domination, then under the Soviet Union. The communist era² lasted over four decades and shaped the political culture of Hungary. Soviet suppression of the 1956 revolution—in itself a climacteric of Hungary's political cultural development—inaugurated the regime of János Kádár. Under his soft dictatorship, András Köröseyi (1999: 12) writes,

The family was almost the only community that remained more or less autonomous. Communities fell apart and society became individualized and atomized. The semi-legal but tolerated 'second economy' that began to emerge from the end of the 1960s was also based primarily upon the family. In the eyes of many, public life became suspicious, and a career in public life was associated with opportunism. Private life and the family remained a sphere free from politics. Among other effects, this created a "dual value system," encompassing political cynicism and concomitant expectations of corruption and disregard for the rule of law. These enduring traditions of and effects from Kádár's liberal communist regime led Köröseyi to categorize Hungary's as a *subject political culture* within the conceptual framework of Gabriel Almond and

² When alluding to the regime presiding in Hungary from the end of the Second World War to the collapse of the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc, this paper uses terms like 'communist' and 'post-communist.' In doing so, the author does not intend to take up arms in the rather intense semantic debate about ascribing 'socialist' or 'communist' labels to the Soviet Union and its confederates, but simply to use a familiar terminological set that is far from damnable.

Sydney Verba³. That is, Hungarian political culture seems largely concerned with political outputs, but passive in respect of political inputs. This class stands between *parochial*—in which political cognisance is minimal—and *participant*—in which political awareness is pervasive and the interactivity of politics and citizenries is appreciated—political cultures. The latter is, of course, characteristic of a democratically oriented populace.

Thus far, it seems, the politics of post-communist Hungary have done little to inspire a participant political cultural shift. Transformation from communism was negotiated and executed largely at the elite political level, relegating popular inputs to secondary or tertiary status. Subsequent political and economic performance dashed expectations of prosperity ushered in by democratic governance. The scandals and societal upheavals of the second Gyurcsány government (2006 to 2009) represent the nadir of popular democratic experience in post-communist Hungary. In the fall of 2009, respondents to the *Standard Eurobarometer*⁴ question on democratic satisfaction were overwhelmingly dissatisfied: 75 percent ‘not satisfied’ and 23 percent ‘satisfied.’ The present circumstances: five years removed (and scarcely recovered) from a major economic downturn, a governing party and leader with some democratically regressive proposals and enactments, and a menacing trend of reemerging nationalism. Yet the most recent survey results—late in 2014⁵—reveal increased satisfaction at 35 percent (against 64 percent dissatisfaction), which suggests approval of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government (and perhaps implicitly of his advocacy for and movement toward “illiberal democracy”⁶).

Lastly, the climacterics of the past three decades created a degree of generational division in Hungarian politics. The regime change coincided with drastically decreased youth support for the *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (the Hungarian Socialist Party, or MSZP)—the successor party to the communist-era party, *Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt* (the Hungarian Socialist Workers’

³ See Almond, G. & Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. New York: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 72 (Autumn 2009) p. 151; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm.

⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 82 (November 2014) p. 138; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_en.htm.

⁶ See Prime Minister Orbán’s speech in July 2014: Orbán, V. (2014, July 29). The era of the work-based state is approaching (a speech in Tusnádfürdő, Romania at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp). Retrieved April 1, 2015, from <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-era-of-the-work-based-state-is-approaching>.

Party, or MSZMP). The trend of low youth support for MSZP has persisted ever since (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 25). The generation that was in its political infancy in the early 1990s and that is now in middle age (40s to 50s) is disproportionately represented in the Fidesz-KDNP electorate—sharing the image of Viktor Orbán’s 1989 speech in Heroes’ Square (on the occasion of Imre Nagy’s reburial) as an actuating political experience. The newest political generations, which matured after the regime transition, “does not see Fidesz as a ‘game-changing’ party” and views Fidesz-KDNP and MSZP as “old-fashioned” (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 49). While some scholars assert that this youngest generation has no distinctive political experience (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 49), this study finds some evidence to suggest that Prime Minister Gyurcsány’s leaked Balatonöszöd speech scandal represents a significant political climacteric, one that pushed droves of younger voters away from mainstream parties (particularly MSZP)—which had acquired, it seemed, the odor of rank corruption—and toward new groups like Jobbik and LMP (Sitter 2011) or, alternatively, toward skepticism and uncertainty regarding the political system (See “cluster 1,” Szabó *et al.* 2013: 64). By its contribution to more politically unaligned voters, this latter eventuality creates conditions for electoral volatility. The salience of Hungary’s generational divide is difficult to approximate, though doubtlessly an affecting political condition.

What generally discernable traits of contemporary Hungarian political culture appear from the sum of these historical experiences and enduring conditions? An un-unique though still notable affinity for charismatic leaders (from the oft-lionized Stephen I to contemporary figures like Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona, who rely on their dynamic political persona), a historical tradition of ethnic tension, a heightened sensitivity to external imposition, a lacerated and wronged ethnic nation, a right-wing political tradition dating from the Horthy and Arrow Cross regimes, and a three decade development from dilute socialism to political transition and dynamism to dilute democracy—producing recognizable generational divisions, and engendering and/or reinforcing a subject political culture.

2.2 THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A political phenomenon like the youth politics of Hungary’s right-wing stretches up from the soil of political culture, and through dense understory and canopy layers of party system and political environment before emerging into clear view of research and analysis. The questions at

bar then appear: in what system do the parties of Hungary interact, and what environmental factors shape that interaction?

The literature concerning party systems is vast, comprising seemingly endless reserves of political theory and observational studies. Featuring prominently in this canon, Giovanni Sartori's *Party and Party Systems* comprehensively details the foundations of parties, the systems they come to form, and the modes of interaction therein. As described by Sartori, two *classes*⁷ of party system are expressed in the case of Hungary: predominant party and polarized pluralism.

The first of these classifications manifests itself in successive elections where Fidesz-KDNP, among a plurality of parties, has won an absolute majority of seats (Sartori 2005: 173)⁸—a supermajority even; and, recent legal changes (notably the passage of a new “Basic Law,” revisions to the electoral law, and new statutes governing media) have arguably moved toward systematizing the party's predominance.

The second classification is displayed in the existence of several distinctive characteristics, including the presence of an anti-system party, bilateral oppositions, a centrally positioned (if not ideologically centrist) party or parties, ideological distance, centrifugal over centripetal drives of competition, ideological patterning, irresponsible or semi-responsible oppositions (in accordance with the likely expectation of governing), and “politics of outbidding” (Sartori 2005: 116 – 128). Some of those characteristics are readily apparent in Hungary. As discussed in more detail below, Jobbik represents a somewhat anti-system presence. Fidesz-KDNP exemplifies a centrally positioned majority with bilateral oppositions, that is, oppositions on its ideological ‘left’ (in the form of MSZP) and ‘right’ (in the form of Jobbik). With the political center thus occupied, the main competitive centers are closer to other ideological poles, suggesting a potential for centrifugal patterns of competition. And, the avowedly ‘radical’ nature of Jobbik's approach to politics suggests a degree of irresponsibility—expectation of governance notwithstanding. However, the limited or qualified presence of some of those features in Hungary precludes an unambiguous classification of polarized pluralism.

⁷ Classification being distinct from “typology,” as Sartori writes, in that “a classification is an ordering based on mutually exclusive classes that are established by principle, or criterion, chosen for that classification. A typology is a more complex matter: It is an ordering of ‘attribute compounds’, i.e., an ordering resulting from more than one criterion” (Sartori 2005: 110).

⁸ For a more detailed description, see Sartori 2005: 171 – 192.

Ideological distance—connoting deep cleavages and widespread system dissatisfaction—and ideological patterning—representing political competition primarily on the grounds of fundamental ideological conceptions—are largely absent. Thus, Hungary’s party system stands between two of the classifications elaborated by Sartori.

Such ambiguity is unsurprising given the post-Soviet history of Hungary’s political system. Shifting dynamics of political competition have characterized the two and a half decades of democratic experience. Following Hungary’s democratic transition in 1989-1990, six parties in three groupings occupied the political space (Körösey 1999): the **liberal** parties—SZDSZ (*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége*, or Alliance of Free Democrats) and Fidesz—the **Christian-Nationalist** parties—MDF (*Magyar Demokrata Fórum*, or Hungarian Democratic Forum), KDNP, and FKGP (*Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt*, or the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party)—and the **Socialist/Left** party—MSZP.

The high electoral volatility of the election cycles in the 1990s, characterized by somewhat erratic multi-party competition, eventually yielded to political consolidation into a bipolar model. While preserving its original anti-communist stance, Fidesz transformed from a liberal party to a Christian-oriented conservative party (Fowler 2004). It steadily absorbed or incorporated the various right-wing parties, thereby impelling similar left-wing consolidation. The three national election cycles from 1998 to 2006 (particularly 2002 and 2006) were dominated by bipolar competition between Fidesz-KDNP and MSZP.

A series of political, economic, and cultural shocks from 2006 to 2010 decimated the stability of the two-party model, however. Numerous political scandals drastically undermined the MSZP government and party, most notably a recording of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in Balatonőszöd saying (among other noteworthy admissions and utterances) that MSZP had lied to win the 2006 election, which provoked protests and civil unrest throughout the country. (As one of the groups leading protests against the Socialist government Jobbik truly emerged as a significant political presence.) Hungary along with the rest of Europe stagnated economically as a result of the 2008-2009 global economic recession. According to data from the European Commission Hungary’s economy (as indicated by gross domestic product) shrunk by 6.8 percent from 2008 to 2009. Furthermore, ensuing economic performance has floundered at anemic rates between -2 and 2 percent. And, unemployment rose from pre-recession levels around 7.5 percent to between 10 and 11 percent.

In addition to those political and economic strains several incidents agitated latent but longstanding tensions in Hungarian society. Foremost among these were successive clashes between the Roma and ethnic Hungarians. In 2006 a Hungarian driver accidentally hit a young Roma girl while passing through Olaszliszka, a village in eastern Hungary. When the man got out to help the girl, he was attacked and murdered by a group of Roma men as his two daughters sat in the car. The Roma girl was uninjured.

In the outrage following the incident, notable media sources exhibited their ideological postures: the popular far-right website, *kuruc.info*, announced it as ‘Another victim of Gypsy terrorism’ (“*Újabb áldozatot szedett a cigányterror*”) (*kuruc.info*, 2006, translated by author). The mainstream conservative newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* was more muted in its response, but similarly declared the need for responsive policy based on the recognition of ‘Gypsy crime’ as well as openness about ‘Roma-related facts and figures’⁹ (MNO, ‘*Jobbik: Olaszliszka...*’, 2006, translated by author). In contrast to those two declarations of ostensible ‘Gypsy crime,’ the largest left-wing newspaper, *Népszabadság*, conspicuously quoted the President of the National Gypsy/Roma Council (referred to in Hungarian as “*Országos Cigány Önkormányzat*” or “*Országos Roma Önkormányzat*”) as saying, ‘*This is not Roma crime, what happened in Olaszliszka, but crime*’ (“*Nem romaügy, ami Olaszliszskán történt, hanem bűnügy*”) (Bódisz, 2006, translated by author, emphasis in original).¹⁰

Numerous incidents followed that seminal tragedy in Olaszliszka. In August 2007 the *Magyar Gárda* (or Hungarian Guard) was founded—a paramilitary organization aligned with the far-right and committed to acting as a volunteer community police force. They are best known for performing torchlight processions through areas with significant Roma populations, ostensibly as a deterrent to any would-be criminals. In January 2009, Miskolc Police chief Albert Pásztor made public statements about robberies over the two preceding months purportedly committed by Roma. He was quoted saying, “We can conclude that the robberies perpetrated in public areas are committed by Gypsy persons. Hungarians seem to rob banks or patrol stations,

⁹ The quote in full: “E program alapvető eleme kell hogy legyen a cigánybűnözés létezésének elismerésén alapuló válságkezelés, a többségi társadalom kendőzetlen tájékoztatása romaügyekben a tények és adatok elhallgatása helyett, valamint a cigányság rádöbbenése arra, hogy Magyarország törvényei rájuk is vonatkoznak” (MNO, 2006)

¹⁰ For more on notable incidents involving the Hungarian Roma in the media, and their political effect, see: Róna and Karácsony 2010, and Vidra and Fox 2014.

but all other robberies are committed by Gypsies” (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2009). Less than a month later, in February 2009, a celebrated Romanian-Hungarian handball player named Marian Cozma was murdered by a group of Roma men in a discotheque. And, in that same month, ethnic Hungarians in the village of Tatárszentgyörgy murdered a Roma man and his son. These events undeniably aroused Hungarian-Roma friction and benefitted Jobbik ahead of its breakthrough electoral performance in the European Parliament election of 2009.

Relations between the dominant ethnic Hungarian and the minority ethnic Roma populations likely represent one of the few significant *cleavages* in Hungary’s body politic. First conceptualized by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1990¹¹), cleavages are intense and enduring divisions between groups. Simon Bornschieer (2009) neatly summarizes the conceptualization of cleavage structures thus:

...A political division must comprise three elements to constitute a cleavage: (1) A social-structural element, such as class, religious denomination, status, or education, (2) an element of *collective identity* of this social group, and (3) an *organizational manifestation* in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social groups concerned. A cleavage structure is thus necessarily a “compounded divide”, according to Bartolini (2005b) and Deegan-Krause (2006, 2007), encompassing interests, normative or attitudinal outlooks, and a strong organization base.

Hungarian-Roma relations readily fit this “compounded divide” definition of cleavage. Arguably, it stands in stark relief due to the absence of other significant cleavages, “explained by the failure of the critical junctures that have been decisive in Western Europe to leave their imprint, compounded by the period of socialist rule” (Bornschieer 2009: 9).

Jobbik has capitalized on this existent yet unaddressed cleavage, which was to some extent politically taboo in the Soviet period and for some years after the country’s democratic transition; Jobbik has branded itself as a party forthrightly attending to pressing matters, often in contravention of ‘politically correct’ proscriptions, going so far as to label their 2014 election program ‘Name [the problem], Solve [the problem]’ (“*Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk.*”) (Jobbik.hu, 2014). Jobbik youth focus group participants uniformly lauded this approach.

¹¹ Originally described in a 1967 volume entitled *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.

In her striking examination of parties in post-communist societies, Maria Spirova writes, “The presence of “new issues” in society or the *persistence of old issues that are not being resolved by the established parties* are often seen as conducive to high electoral volatility. In particular, disruption of political and economic life, such as high unemployment, inflation, corruption, environmental problems and foreign policy crises, are among the factors likely to support new parties” (Spirova 2007: 29, emphasis added). Unsurprisingly then, Hungary’s 2009-2010 cycle turned out to be a series of *critical elections*, to use V.O. Key’s term, involving a political realignment—massive gains for Fidesz-KDNP, tremendous losses for MSZP, and the advent of two new political parties in Jobbik and *Lehet Más a Politika* (Politics Can Be Different, or LMP).

2.3 PARTIES IN PROFILE

Before proceeding to investigate the youth party groups, it is advisable to profile the parent organizations that support them. As two of the most prominent parties in Hungary, Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik have attracted the attention of much academic research and analysis. Since its transformation into a conservative, center-right party (see Fowler 2004) as well as its 2005 merger with KDNP, Fidesz-KDNP has been one of—and recently *the*—chief political parties in Hungary. Understandably therefore, Fidesz-KDNP has attracted much interest (Kiss 2002, Fowler 2004, Hanley 2004, van Biezen 2005: 166 – 167, Fowler et. al. 2007, Vachudova 2008, Bozóki 2008, Bozóki 2011).

Jobbik garnered nearly 15 percent of the vote in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, thereby winning three of Hungary’s twenty-two seats. In just over five years since that stunning emergence onto the political scene, Jobbik too has aroused much attention, but for its representation of the contemporary phenomenon of radical, populist, and/or extremist political parties. The manifold dimensions of Jobbik described and assessed by scholars include its electoral success, stance on Roma issues, historical motivations and roots, and place in a wider European phenomenon of ascendant right-wing extremism (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009, Halasz 2009, Minkenberg 2010, Bíró-Nagy and Róna 2011, Bíró-Nagy *et. al.* 2012, Leaning *et. al.* 2014).

A reasonable starting point is the classification of these two parties. Notwithstanding its liberal origins, Fidesz-KDNP poses no great difficulty; it is a conservative center-right party with Christian ideological underpinnings. Its governmental experience, moreover, grounds it in a pragmatic, governing-oriented posture.

On the other hand, classification of Jobbik presents some complications, not necessarily in itself, but because just the question of defining the far-right has garnered significant scholarly attention (Muddle 2007: 11-12, Kitschelt 2007: 1178-1181). Following Róna and Karácsony (2010), for expediency this paper bypasses that definitional debate, choosing instead to regard “far-right,” “extreme right,” “radical right,” and any other like formulations as synonymous. A common and germane facet of such a classification is the trait of anti-system disposition. Quite clearly Jobbik represents staunch opposition to established parties like Fidesz-KDNP. Its wide-ranging condemnation of the post-Soviet system as beset by unacceptable continuity of leadership and by pervasive corruption doubtlessly positions it as a firm anti-establishment party. But, past party actions—particularly the close association with the Hungarian Guard—support the classification of Jobbik as an anti-system party as well.

The extent of Jobbik’s anti-system stance is unclear; heretofore it has been a party mostly of *expressive* functions (i.e., not wielding significant governmental authority), but has acquired considerable *instrumental* functions at some local governmental levels, and in their ability to agenda-set and thereby apply political pressure to the other parties.¹² Moreover, the party leadership has on several occasions declared Jobbik’s ‘readiness to govern.’¹³ The party exists in a state of tension between anti-system disposition and operation within that system. Until this tension is alleviated, as the theoretical conception of Sartori suggests (2005: 124-125, 127-128), the system is endangered to some degree.

Anti-system attitude, however, is immaterial without fulfilling the criterion of relevance (Sartori 2005: 108-109). While Jobbik lacks coalition potential—not on the basis of electoral clout, but of firm opposition to the ‘mainstream’ parties—the size of its following (20 percent of the vote in the 2014 parliamentary elections) engenders a degree of “blackmail potential” (Sartori 2005: 108-109, 306-307) in that it represents another pole of political support and

¹² See Róna and Karácsony 2010, and Bíró-Nagy and Róna 2011.

¹³ For example: MTI, ‘Jobbik to overthrow...’, 2014; MTI, ‘Jobbik only credible alternative...’, 2014; MTI, ‘Jobbik preparing for surprise victory...’, 2014.

counters traditional centripetal party competition between the centrist parties. Jobbik is simply too large to ignore.

Where and how do these parties stand now?

2.3.1 Fidesz-KDNP

The current (2014 to present) and preceding (2010 to 2014) Fidesz-KDNP governments were swept into and returned to office with supermajorities. Following their first electoral success, they moved decidedly to consolidate their gains with a revised electoral law, a media law favoring the state and syndicates aligned with Fidesz-KDNP, and new regulations on judges' retirement and other measures that ultimately resulted in a 'two-thirds majority on the Constitutional Court' (Hungary Around the Clock, 'Fidesz to have two-thirds majority on Constitutional Court,' 2014). Two recent by-election losses in Veszprém and Tapolca have downgraded the government's position to just a very large majority (which may nonetheless prove a difficult governing position; see Scheppele, 'Hungary Without Two Thirds,' 2015.) Despite those defeats and a related slide in popularity associated with a few prominent unpopular taxation policies, Fidesz-KDNP remains the most supported and strongest electoral party.

Sound economic policy—particularly in the wake of the economic recession—formed the nucleus of the party's electoral appeal. Much like other European right-wing parties that won elections following the recession, Fidesz-KDNP chiefly assumed the mandate of balancing the national budget, decreasing debt, and returning the state to solvency. (Uniquely, however, the party also adopted a moral charge to conduct government cleanly and frankly following the opacity, corruption, and scandal of the preceding MSZP government.) To be sure, the government has used its massive parliamentary weight to push through a raft of policies—including new constitutional law—to support Hungary's economy. Among these is an aggressive succession of laws aimed at the banking industry, including forced compensation for borrowers of foreign currency (also commonly referred to as 'foreign exchange' or 'forex') preceding the economic crisis, as well as taxation policies that have urged the withdrawal of foreign banks from Hungary, bringing that sector under more domestic control (and state influence thereby). For example, the state purchased MKB Bank from a German company in 2014 and the partially state-owned Szechenyi Bank recently bid for the Hungarian branch of Austria's Raiffeisen Bank.

Prime Minister Orbán and his government have paired these moves with assertive and defiant rhetoric regarding Hungary's sovereignty: '...we shall not be the servants of Europe, banks or major companies. We are our own masters' (Hungary Around the Clock, 'Orbán says Fidesz won't be servant to EU, banks,' 2013).

Accompanying this program are interrelated policies both strategic—such as the progressive nationalization of energy sector assets—and populist—such as the imposed reduction in public utility fees and the nationalization of private pensions. Perhaps most strikingly, Prime Minister Orbán's program encompassed and inserted itself into a new constitution, Hungary's 'Basic Law.' Provisions in the text require the state to adhere to a set ratio of solvency (*i.e.*, debt reduction until state debt is under 50 percent of GDP, and thereafter passage of no budget that would raise state debt above that level) (Hungary Basic Law. art. 36, § 4 – 6). The text notably empowers parliament to make exceptions to the solvency rules and limits the power of the judiciary to check the legislature in economic matters (Hungary Basic Law. art. 37, § 4).

What underlies this extensive and interconnected economic agenda? State power. It is the unifying characteristic of the Orbán governments' economic program. All of the aforementioned major policies invest the state with more power and control. This accords with a new state organization model advocated by Prime Minister Orbán: in a July 2014 speech in Tusnádfürdő, Romania—widely scrutinized by press and European political observers—he deprecated liberal democracy in favor of illiberal democracy and heralded the coming 'era of the work-based state' (Orbán 2014). Following the model of Singapore, China, India, Russia, and Turkey, Mr. Orbán outlined a program chiefly accordant with the record of his economic policies, but encompassing much more. He alluded several times to a Christian moral underpinning to the state and to the importance of (and crucial inability of liberal democracy to address effectively) ethnic Hungarians abroad and the unity of the Hungarian nation.

Socio-economic primacy notwithstanding, the Orbán governments have paid considerable attention to morality and to ethnicity issues. First, befitting the alliance of Fidesz and the Christian Democrats, the government's moralizing legislation has generally corresponded to a certain Christian ethic. Indeed, Mr. Orbán has equated his new state organization model—otherwise referred to as 'illiberal democracy'—with 'Christian democracy'

(MTI, ‘PM says Hungary needs Christian democracy...,’ 2014).¹⁴ What might be called ‘traditional family values’—such as an exclusively heterosexual definition of marriage, opposition to abortion, and encouragement of conventional gender roles—forms the core of this political Christianity feature, with branches extending into the arts¹⁵, education¹⁶, European politics¹⁷, and foreign policy¹⁸. Second, Fidesz-KDNP has prioritized ethnic Hungarians abroad, arguably matching their rhetorical stances by extending citizenship and voting rights to foreign populations (coincidentally resulting in overwhelming electoral support for Fidesz-KDNP by ‘non-resident Hungarians’), as well as some financial aid and conspicuous demonstrations of support, such as flying the Szekler flag (the flag of a predominantly Hungarian region of Transylvania, in Romania) from the parliament as a show of solidarity to ethnic Hungarians in Romania and in opposition to the Romanian government’s ban on displaying said flag.

Stances toward Hungarians ‘beyond the borders’ forms one aspect of a rather noteworthy foreign policy pursued by the Fidesz-KDNP government. The most remarked upon facet: the turn eastward. That is, Mr. Orbán’s government has several times declared and (perhaps less so) substantively demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the EU and its inclination for closer relations with Russia. His policies on banking, utility fees, and other economic concerns have rankled other European leaders and EU officials. While always stressing that Hungary is part of the West, Mr. Orbán has cultivated stronger ties to Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia—including hosting President Putin at a summit in Budapest (his first visit to an EU country since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine) where the two leaders negotiated a new natural gas trade deal.

Renewed openness to Russia, however, encompasses non-economic connotations as well. While some hopefully supposed Prime Minister Orbán’s talk of ‘illiberal democracy’ a fairly harmless *brutum fulmen*, some of his government’s actions accord with the term. Having characterized the Putin regime as a state organization model, one may plausibly suggest that

¹⁴ In the same address (to a meeting of KDNP’s leadership), Orbán reportedly said without any hint of irony that, ‘if someone does not accept a liberal ideology then they are advocates of a dictatorship and mentioned in the same breath as China or Russia’—this umbrage despite previously identifying China and Russia as models.

¹⁵ For example: MTI, ‘Budapest mayor says Christian performances needed,’ 2014.

¹⁶ For example: Szécsi, ‘Orbán’s office offers up HUF 500 million for “religious and moral education,” 2014.

¹⁷ For example: MTI, ‘Christian Democrats criticize EC rejection of pro-life initiative,’ 2014.

¹⁸ For example: MTI, ‘Orbán asks European Council to protect Christians in Iraq,’ 2014.

relations with Russia are part of a much broader rightward shift by Mr. Orbán and his government. A recent conflict with Ökotárs—a civil society grant distribution organization that works with grant-making foundations from Norway and the rest of the European Economic Area—and associated rhetoric regarding foreign influence on domestic politics¹⁹ provoked widespread comparisons to Mr. Putin’s moves against civil society and other ‘foreign agents.’ Most striking among the Orbán government’s increasingly right-wing enactments are a striking set that correspond to and were perhaps inspired by Jobbik, including policies on corporate taxation, education, media, and the new Basic Law (see Appendix II, from Bíró-Nagy *et al.* 2012). Most recently, Mr. Orbán has promulgated anti-immigration rhetoric and policies—in speeches and comments at EU sessions²⁰ and in tabling a ‘national consultation on immigration and terrorism.’²¹ In the political context, this move tacking further to the right may be reasonably construed as an attempt to regain support that has been lost to Jobbik.

Regardless of similarities and areas of accord, Fidesz-KDNP has publicly ruled out cooperation with Jobbik; cabinet chief János Lázár with sardonic phlegm declared in response to a question on such cooperation that the government had no plans “to work together with the arrow-cross or with the communists” (Hungary Matters, ‘Lázár rules out cooperation...,’ 2015). To the extent that Fidesz-KDNP has shifted rightward ideologically, it is likely the result of both independent motivation and pressure from the rising popularity of Jobbik—a consideration that will have only grown weightier as Jobbik continues to expand.²²

2.3.2 Jobbik

Jobbik entered parliament after the 2010 elections as a noteworthy minority, a new party holding 47 seats (out of 386); currently, after the 2014 elections, they hold similar proportion in the resized parliament: 24 seats (out of 199). As a relatively new party, and one with no experience in government, Jobbik’s legislative record is far smaller than its parliamentary fellows. Nonetheless, Jobbik has garnered outsized attention largely because of its ‘radical’

¹⁹ For example: MTI, ‘Deputy PM suspects opposition behind criticism of gov’t,’ 2014.

²⁰ See Index.hu, ‘Orbán: sosem voltunk multikulturális társadalom,’ 2015.

²¹ See Kormany.hu, ‘Nemzeti Konzultáció a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról,’ 2015.

²² For further findings of Jobbik’s expansion and its effect on Fidesz, see Szabó *et al.* Forthcoming, 2015.

policy orientation and resultant proposals—which are regularly presented in detailed party manifestos, a rather rare practice among Hungary’s political parties. Within its comprehensive program Jobbik’s foremost policy areas are public security, Roma affairs, and the EU. Therein, the party advocates the creation of community police forces (reflecting support for the Hungarian Guard), the acknowledgement and resultant policy posture of the existence of ‘gypsy crime,’ and a referendum on Hungary’s continued EU membership. These generally represent the sectors on which Jobbik has the most political capital.

In the socio-economic sphere Jobbik too positively regards the system of Putin’s Russia. Advocating state control of strategic sectors (particularly energy) and protectionist policies (necessarily involving withdrawal from the EU) for Hungarian business and agriculture, their economic policies possess a noticeable leftist character. The state activism promoted and enacted by Fidesz-KDNP generally accords with Jobbik’s inclination. Indeed, Jobbik favors rather more vigorous state intervention—a wide-ranging program of subsidies, an aggressive initiative to revitalize Hungarian manufacturing (which, they contend, the EU has decimated since Hungary’s accession), and crucially the eradication of rampant corruption.

This last concentration represents a highly salient point for Jobbik, and major distinguishing point from Fidesz-KDNP (as well as MSZP). Untainted by governmental experience and thus the ‘failures’ of post-communist Hungary, Jobbik has a natural political advantage on the issue of corruption. Public procurement and state agencies are mired in a slough of corruption mirrored by the corruption of the mainstream parties. Despite the consistent rejection of corruption investigation proposals, Jobbik continues to agenda-set the issue and tout it as a stark contrast between itself and the other major parties; it represents perhaps the foremost moral charge adopted by the party.

Anti-corruption forms one facet of Jobbik’s rather colorful public appearance. Since its formation the party has been cast as extremist and racist, as a group giving voice to abhorrent anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views. Associations with the Hungarian Guard, statements regarding criminality within (and sometimes declared as ‘inherent to’) the Roma community, and public disputes with the Jewish community (including conflicts regarding the memorialization of the Horthy regime and even the veracity of the Holocaust [Hungary Matters, ‘Jobbik lawmaker under investigation for Holocaust denial,’ 2015])—Jobbik has seemingly done little to allay concerns regarding its extremism. Yet the party’s media strategy preceding the 2014 elections

centered on a softer image. Apparently without comic intent, party leader Gábor Vona and several other politicians were pictured cradling cats—presumably a visual representation of Jobbik’s softer side. The supposition that this campaign was restricted to image and corresponded not at all to a softer ideological and programmatic stance was confirmed when a recording of MP Tamás Sneider was uncovered (Hungary Today, ‘Jobbik MP’s Leaked Recording Exposes Party’s Strategy,’ 2015). The deputy parliamentary leader was recorded detailing his connections to the extremist group “*Betyársereg*” and confirming the party’s strategic moderation in public relations to attract more voters while still retaining its radical stances.

Somewhat surprisingly given its strident condemnation of the scandals of ‘mainstream parties,’ Jobbik is far from unscathed in this regard. Above and beyond revelations about Jobbik’s public relations softening, rumors of neo-Nazi connections, and disclosures of offensive and impolitic statements about Roma and Jewish peoples, above all else stands the ongoing espionage case of Béla Kovács. The Jobbik MEP and influential foreign policy expert is currently the subject of a procedure exploring the revocation of his diplomatic immunity on the basis that he spied for Russia. The incident exposes Jobbik considerably since further accusations allege that Mr. Kovács was an agent for channeling Russian government funds to Jobbik. If legal discovery finds evidence of such an arrangement, Jobbik would doubtlessly be significantly discredited.

The Kovács case throws a dubious shade over Jobbik’s foreign policy, which (similar to Fidesz-KDNP) supports cultivating closer ties with Russia as part of a general reorientation. The party website lists first its proposal to “abandon the existing unilateral Euro-Atlanticism and build closer relations with the Arab states of North Africa and the Middle East, Iran as well as the economically emerging countries of Africa” (Jobbik.com, ‘Policies’). And furthermore, it identifies three key strategic relationships: Germany, Russia, and Turkey (Jobbik.com, ‘Policies’). Openness to Russia appears common to the vast majority of Europe’s far-right parties; openness to the Islamic world is distinct to Jobbik. Former Jobbik MP Tamás Hegedűs attributed the special connection with Turkey to shared Turanian heritage (Feffer, ‘Jobbik: Looking East,’ 2014).

Jobbik’s extensive and detailed policy profile remains practically theoretical as long as Fidesz-KDNP predominates. Convincingly ardent disapproval of Fidesz-KDNP corruption

precludes Jobbik cooperation with the Orbán government or indeed any of the ‘status quo parties.’ Mr. Vona’s priority instead seems to be broadening public appeal, developing Jobbik into a “people’s party.” Just after the 2014 municipal election, Mr. Vona was reported saying that “he trusted that in the 2018 general election voters would have a choice between Fidesz and Jobbik. He said that Fidesz’s ‘two-thirds majority will not last forever,’ and so Jobbik would start preparing for government” (MTI, ‘Orbán: “Third win”...,’ 2014).

3. METHODOLOGY

The main questions addressed in this paper are: what typifies the process of political socialization of youth Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik members; what ideological dimensions are articulated and prioritized in these separate groups; how do they compare; and additionally, what do the answers to these questions portend for Hungary's wider political system?

This study applied qualitative methods to the first three questions, adding greater depth of understanding to the existent body of data in this field. Three focus groups were conducted with youth party groups of Fidesz-KDNP (Fidelitas) and Jobbik (*Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat*, or Jobbik IT), including ones with Miskolc and Budapest Jobbik IT members and one with Debrecen Fidelitas members, as well as a supplementary interview with a Miskolc councilor and Jobbik IT leader. The focus groups were of the traditional field variety, that is, conducted in-person, directed by an engaged moderator (myself) and with the assistance of a translator. (The same translator was employed for each focus group, thereby eliminating any communicative incongruences from group to group.)

The interviews were semi-structured and employed a “funnel-based” method, beginning with general questions about participants' introduction to politics and party affiliation and moving toward more particularized questions (though phrased in such a way to evoke thorough responses). The project questions (outlined in Appendix I) were conceived following a preliminary study of Hungarian politics and on the basis of the selected analytical frames (*i.e.*, political socialization theory and Arend Lijphart's dimensions of ideology), and revised and finalized after consultation with Dr. Zoltan Balazs, Dr. Eamonn Butler, and Dr. Dániel Róna.

The focus groups each lasted an hour and a half to two hours, included six or seven participants aged eighteen to thirty, and were documented with field notes and audio recording. Deferring to the preference of organization leaders and participants that helped arrange the focus groups, the sessions were conducted at youth group offices. Since these environments were familiar to participants and therefore presumably more comfortable than a location chosen by the researcher, it is likely that respondents felt a greater degree of ease in discussing politics. Furthermore, the questions were not posed in a strict, regimented order, but rather addressed or posed in a more organic fashion, permitting the discussion to develop naturally and expand or contract on certain points in accordance with the inclinations of participants.

Participants were gathered from targeted populations (members of party youth groups) on a voluntary, first-come, first-served basis. Their involvement included a guarantee of anonymity and an honorarium of 3,000 forints (approximately 8 GBP). Groups were segmented, consisting of representatives from one youth group per interview. This arrangement intended to limit the extent to which participants felt uncomfortable or restricted by an environment where their views would be exposed to criticism. However, aside from homogeneity of party affiliation and age range (the control characteristics), no stipulations were applied to screen participants. Multiple interviews with different groups of common party affiliation were conducted to enhance the reliability of gathered data.

The project intended to conduct at least one additional interview (with *Iffúsági Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség*, or IKSZ—the youth group of KDNP), but encountered insurmountable difficulties in recruiting participants. Naturally, the project would have benefited from the participation of IKSZ members, but their abstention is ultimately inconsequential. At the same time, it should be noted that recruitment was a challenge throughout the research phase. While Jobbik groups were reasonably responsive to interview requests, Fidesz-KDNP groups were rather more hesitant. The interview with Debrecen Fidelitas members was granted only after an introduction (and, it would seem, endorsement) by a respected party supporter. On a wholly speculative note, I imagine that youth Fidesz-KDNP members are discouraged from interacting with researchers, journalists, and other such inquirers both by party leadership—which presumably would like to limit public exposure to its politicians and promoted political activity—and by youth members themselves—who presumably do not wish to endanger their future with the party by uttering an errant or disagreeable quote. As concerns the latter, again, participants were given a contractual guarantee of anonymity that I have scrupulously observed.

Qualitative data obtained from focus groups is considered alongside quantitative data from Andrea Szabo's (ed.) study of "Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students," (2013), and other existent quantitative data sets, and analyzed for policy orientations and indications of ideological dimensions as formulated by Arend Lijphart (1990).

The availability of time and various resources limited the scope of this study. A more organic sampling method—rather than relying on the introduction and recruitment assistance of youth party leaders—would be an improvement, though perhaps not significantly. More focus

groups, ranging over the entire field of political parties (as well as unaffiliated youth voters) and with more geographical diversity would likely yield more thorough results. Additionally, a study that incorporated methodical behavioral observation of focus group participants would represent a valuable contribution to the field, as it would represent a reliable means of explaining the palpably different behavioral approaches to political affairs between party youth groups.

While linguistic barriers presented some challenges, being a young foreign researcher entailed several benefits, including a relatable feeling that often accompanies interaction between persons of similar ages, the reassurance that participants will likely never see me again, and the encouragement of discursive and explanatory responses. Overall, the mingled challenges and benefits of the project's conduct produced conditions favorable to the aforementioned investigative questions—the research and analytical methodologies were in auspicious accord.

4. THEORIES AND FRAMES OF ANALYSIS

This project concerns itself with the political socialization, predominant ideologies, and consequences for the party system of Hungary's right-wing youth. Accordingly, this chapter reviews the pertinent literature for these three facets of inquiry, unfolding the theories and frames of analysis that are used to interpret focus group and interview data. As it concerns the introduction of persons to politics—the very root of political cognition, as it were—political socialization comes first. Then, the subsequent section addresses dimensions of ideology—the product of political socialization. Finally, the last section concentrates on the last link in this chain of development: wider political effect, specifically in respect of the party system.

4.1 YOUTH POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN HUNGARY

Political socialization is the endless process whereby persons acquire attitudes, beliefs, and values that pertain to their political environment. It is a broad field, concerned with the most influential periods of socialization—whether early-life socialization is more important (Hooghe & Stolle 2003) or later (Almond & Verba 1963)—the agents of socialization (Beck 1977, Szabó 1988), the emergent modes of socialization (Sapiro 2004), socialization behind the Iron Curtain (Volgyes 1975, Szabó 1991), the role of political party activism (Hooghe & Stolle 2005, Pacheco 2008), and the impact of socialization on contemporary and future of politics (Putnam 2000, Hooghe 2004). Since this broad field is broadly applied in this study—that is, the research investigates the general contours of respondents' political socialization—and particularly since Erin Saltman (2014) has already conducted a vast and comprehensive examination of youth political socialization in Hungary (upon which the socialization inquiries of this study rely for reference and comparison), this section briefly describes agents of modern political socialization, the development of political socialization in Hungary, and the defining characteristics of this process in contemporary Hungary.

First, agents and agency represent the foremost pillar of political socialization theory. The sources of a person's political cognition and continuing acquisition thereof are manifold: family, friends and acquaintances, education, mass media (which includes internet and social media outlets), religion, political parties, and, it may well be argued, broad cultural milieus. These

agents are the instruments of socialization; their influence drives affected persons to or from certain political opinions, shaping inclinations and dispositions. Depending on which agent or agents form the primary socializers, a person's resultant political cognition may differ significantly. Thus, the presence and power of socializing agents comprise the most essential aspects of political socialization, the crucial points of reference for critical analysis.

Second, in Hungary a stark divide in socialization patterns exists in the transition from the communist to democratic regimes. Under the communist Kádár regime, political socialization was regulated and often superintended by the government. Through state media, regimented political education, party institutions and youth adjuncts (like the *Úttörőmozgalom*, the Pioneer Movement, and the *Magyar Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség*, the Hungarian Communist Youth League), and other instruments, the communist regime mobilized practically every public agent of socialization to instill the desired political cognition (Volgyes 1975). Nevertheless, as mentioned in the section on Hungarian political culture, the family remained autonomous. This private sphere formed a haven from the ideological inculcation of state instruments. Resultantly, family possessed a heightened primacy in socialization, which endures to some extent.

Following the transition to a democratic system state implements were demobilized and new and diverse modes of socialization emerged. Media pluralized and became philosophically diverse; ideological education decreased; religion regained some influence, though it remains less significant than many other countries in the post-Soviet space; new political parties appealed to and mobilized youth voters (including Fidesz, whose name still points to its origin as the *Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*, the Alliance of Young Democrats); and, public spheres revived as independent, pluralistic socialization areas.

Third, the history and development of socialization in Hungary has created distinct patterns that endure in the current political environment. Among these, two are particularly germane to this study: party-driven socialization and mobilization, and the existence of subcultures. Firstly, the need to attract and mobilize supporters within a somewhat apathetic political populace impelled parties to become active in the socialization process. Youth groups are the pivotal manifestation of this practice. And indeed, their success in generating membership contrasts sharply with the trend in Western democracies of decreasing youth participation and party subscription (Hooghe & Stolle 2005). Secondly, the liberalization of the

public space, even in the years immediately preceding the transition from communism, fostered political pluralism. The diversity resulted in the formation of “subcultures,” or distinct, self-identifying groups within Hungary’s overarching sociopolitical culture. Ascribing ‘culture’ to these subsets denotes the varied and rich components that comprise each subculture—news media, music, art, religious attitudes, and so on.

Importantly, Hungary’s far-right subculture is flourishing at present. Its strident nationalist tones—represented prominently in *nemzeti rock* (‘national rock’) and online spaces like kuruc.info and alfahir.hu—has attracted considerable scholarly attention (Róna and Karácsony 2010, and Saltman 2014: 166 – 173). The prominence of this subculture is manifest in the responses of focus group participants.

Taken together, these facets of political socialization are one focus of this study’s interviews with youth party members. Following Saltman (2014), the study differentiates between the principal socializers of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths.

4.2 AREND LIJPHART’S DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGY

To discern the ideological characteristics of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youth groups this study applies Arend Lijphart’s (1990²³) *dimensions of ideology* as an analytical frame. While Lijphart explored these dimensions over the entirety of a political system they are equally applicable to sectional analyses. Different parties, different demographics, and different social groups—these political units emphasize their posture on different ideological dimensions in varying degrees. Lijphart’s dimensions are appropriately understood not as a simple dichotomous classification of ‘present’ or ‘not present,’ but a qualitative frame of detailed evaluation that merely begins with establishing the presence or absence of a dimension.

Lijphart identified seven dimensions observed in democratic systems (in order of importance): (1) socio-economic, (2) religious, (3) cultural-ethnic, (4) urban-rural, (5) regime support, (6) foreign policy, and (7) post-materialism.

(1) *Socio-economic*

Counted as the most important and the sole omnipresent dimension,

²³ Originally described in a 1981 volume entitled *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive Elections*.

Lijphart models socio-economic ideology as a composite of four factors: “(1) governmental versus private ownership of the means of production, (2) a strong versus a weak governmental role in economic planning, (3) support of versus opposition to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor, and (4) the expansion of versus resistance to governmental social welfare programs” (1990: 256). The nexus of positions on these spectrums characterizes socio-economic ideology.

(2) *Religious*

This dimension concerns “attitudes and policies towards religion and religious values” (1990: 259). It necessarily weighs the presence of religion(s) and religious values, the polarity and/or pluralism thereof, and the ultimate importance of these circumstances. The area of ‘religious values,’ appropriately construed, encompasses many public matters especially prominent social policies—marriage, abortion, ‘family values,’ and so on.

(3) *Cultural-ethnic*

Assessing the extent to which ethnocultural statuses and divisions shape and drive, cultural-ethnic ideological dimensions are most prevalent and predominant in starkly heterogeneous societies. Therein, it likely affects preferences for governmental systems, as a mode of framing ethnocultural interactions.

(4) *Urban-rural*

The matter of differences between urban and rural areas of the state: encompassing “divergent industrial versus agrarian objective interests” as well as dissimilar lifestyle patterns. Additionally, though absent from Lijphart’s description, this dimension contains regional divisions and resultantly different party representations thereof and postures thereto.

(5) *Regime support*

The dimension that occurs when a significant (or “relevant,” in Sartori’s work) political presence exists that opposes the democratic regime or advocates its substantial alteration.

(6) *Foreign policy*

Here Lijphart's theory dates itself by evaluating ideological posture toward the socialist/communist bloc (most prominently represented by the Soviet Union) or, on the other hand, toward the free market democracies (most prominently represented by the United States) (1990: 263-264). Nevertheless, in many democracies foreign policy attitudes persist as a germane ideological dimension, particularly in the post-Soviet space. In a country like Hungary, orientation toward between Western liberal democracies and associated institutions like the EU often stands opposed to orientation toward undemocratic (though perhaps economically efficacious) regimes in, for example, Russia, China, and Turkey.

(7) *Post-materialism*

As formulated by Ronald Inglehart, a cluster of values and attitudes supporting individual autonomy constitutes post-materialism—the antithesis of *materialism*, or that more traditional prioritization of physical and economic conditions.²⁴

Of the seven dimensions which are present among Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths? How are they manifest and of what importance are they?

4.3 SHIFTING POLITICAL DYNAMICS: REALIGNMENT VERSUS DEALIGNMENT

Separate groups within a society articulating different ideological dimensions or significantly divergent perspectives on a given dimension are the basis of cleavage structures. At the intersection of scholarship on party systems and cleavage structures—namely, the way in which the latter changes the former—Scott Flanagan and Russell Dalton argue that many contemporary party systems are subject to forces of realignment and dealignment. The former shifts party allegiances and results from the forces of segmental (i.e. religious, ethnic, and

²⁴ Szabo *et al.* (2013) reconnoiter this dimension in their survey of youth political activity in Hungary (which this project frequently references), inviting participants to select two supremely important of eight listed values, which represented standards of materialism ('war against crime, war against the rise in prices, economic growth, and order in the country') and post-materialism ('more power to influence government and public affairs, thoughts are worth more than money, more beautiful cities, and less impersonal society').

regional divisions) and economic cleavages; the latter depreciates the functionality or power of political parties, following from post-industrial social developments (such as greater facility of mass communication).

Realignments are often prompted or hastened by mobilization of previously un- or under-politicized constituencies through the formation of new parties with a “posture of principle opposition based on extreme, non-negotiable policy demands” (Flanagan and Dalton, 1990: 234). Governing oriented parties—that is, parties actively, realistically seeking governmental power, rather than anti-system or protest parties—are typically affected by the fluctuating influence of appealing to marginal voters. In time, write Flanagan and Dalton, the perceived and actual party differentiation diminishes, in turn obsolescing party alignments, producing greater volatility in voting behavior, and often inducing further realignment or else dealignment.

In the case of Hungary, the 2009-2010 election cycle and subsequent developments arouse questions about realignment. That cycle inaugurated Fidesz-KDNP predominance and Jobbik presence as a political force. Yet it is difficult to say whether the 2009-2010 climacteric ushered in a new political alignment or instead created a temporary de-alignment that has yet to reform. The 2014 election cycle suggests the former,

	Hungarian Parliamentary Election²⁵ (April 2014) (National Election Office, 2014)			
Party or election alliance	Fidesz-KDNP	Összefogás (an alliance consisting of MSZP and four other left-wing parties)	Jobbik	LMP
Percentage of popular vote	45.04%	25.67%	20.30%	5.36%
Number of parliamentary seats (out of 199)	133 (96 constituencies, 37 list seats) ²⁶	38 (10 constituencies, 28 list seats) ²⁷	23 (23 list seats) ²⁸	5 (5 list seats)

²⁵ Hungary’s national parliamentary elections operate on a mixed, two-ballot system, consisting of single-member constituencies and compensatory national party lists.

²⁶ By-election losses in Veszprém and Tapolca constituencies reduced Fidesz-KDNP to 131 seats.

²⁷ By-election victory in Veszprém raised the leftist opposition to 39 seats.

²⁸ By-election victory in Tapolca raised Jobbik to 24 seats.

	European Parliamentary Election (May 2014) (National Election Office, 2014)					
Party	Fidesz-KDNP	Jobbik	MSZP	Demokratikus Koalíció	Együtt 2014	LMP
Percentage of popular vote	51.48%	14.67%	10.9%	9.75%	7.25%	5.04%
Number of parliamentary seats (out of 21)	12	3	2	2	1	1

	Hungarian Municipal Elections (October 2014) (National Election Office, 2014)		
Party	Fidesz-KDNP	Jobbik	MSZP
Number of municipal mayors	624	14	31
Number of councilors	3,495	469	521
County assemblies controlled (out of 419)	245	81	56
Number of votes	4,569,612	1,248,231	609,362
Percentage of votes	62.09%	17.07%	8.33%

But prominent uncertainties as to the future of Hungary's foremost parties, as well as a more involved question of Hungary's cleavage structures (or lack thereof), cast doubt on the sustainability of the preexisting or any new political alignment.

Naturally, the circumstances and disposition of the electorate generates the stability or shift in a country's political alignment. In Hungary, more so than elsewhere in Europe, the youth demographic represents a particularly salient segment of voters, both for its heightened activity and for its role in democratic consolidation/stability (or backsliding/instability). Within this population, political youth groups and especially party-sponsored groups, given the resources inherently engendered, are the chief apparatuses of youth participation. Both their contemporary influence and crucial importance in conditioning emergent and maturing generations of voters make youth groups a reliable indicator of political system trends.

PART TWO

Research Results

5. FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

This chapter exhibits the findings of interviews conducted for this project. It arranges the findings in accordance with the analytical frames detailed in Chapter 4: (1) political socialization of youth group members, and (2) dimensions of ideology. To support the comparative reading of data and analysis while still clearly differentiating between the two populations, the chapter is organized thematically with separate subdivisions describing the findings from Fidesz-KDNP and from Jobbik.

The youth political group Fidelitas was founded in 1996, making it the oldest of the three youth organizations associated with Fidesz-KDNP (the other two: Fidesz IT established in 2005, and IKSZ established in 2001). Its membership is open to people between the ages of 14 and 35 and, according to its website, embraces those who feel ‘responsible for small and large community connection, preservation and transfer, for the protection of the environment, for the notion of Christianity-based solidarity, for the idea of market economy based on fair competition, and for the thousand years of European heritage bequeathed to the united Hungarian nation’ (Fidelitas, ‘Rólunk,’ 2015, translated by author). The project findings exhibited in this chapter are based on responses to discursive questioning and open discussion with seven members of the Debrecen Fidelitas group.

Jobbik’s national youth organization, Jobbik IT, was officially founded in 2011 (though youth presence had been a predominant characteristic of the party beforehand) and has since expanded widely. Its website professes the great ‘beauty, history, and cultural and spiritual treasures’ of Hungary, endorses the ‘pure patriotism of national rock, folk traditions, and national holidays,’ and charges its membership with the ‘fulfillment of the country’s potential as God commanded’ (Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat, ‘Mi a célunk?’, 2015, translated by author). The project findings exhibited in this chapter are based on responses to discursive questioning and open discussion with six members of the Miskolc Jobbik IT group and seven members of the Budapest Jobbik IT group.

5.1 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The foundational political socialization of Hungary's politically active right-wing youth is essential to an accurate understanding of their overall political posture. This section details the different and similar conditions of political socialization experienced and still influencing Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youth.

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

Youth Fidesz-KDNP members have a rather traditional political socialization: family is often the first and typically persists as the paramount socializing agent. Several respondents described a feeling of being born into Fidesz-KDNP—their parents having been party members or elected officials even before their birth. Introduction to politics, and even to the political youth groups often came by virtue of this familial connection. To the extent that friends or peers were an influence, they often reinforced Fidesz-KDNP support and even family-centric socialization; respondents commonly explained that 'family friends' were a key part of their enrollment in Fidesz-KDNP's youth cohort. Religion—indicated as influential by many participants—also serves in the office of supporting family socialization; that is, Christian faith and the more rare incidence of regular church attendance were mentioned in the context of their provision of time and space for family. Thus, this study affirms Saltman's (2014) finding that families are the predominant actors of political socialization.

In their consumption of media, respondents intimated general preference for online news sources, like *index.hu* and *origo.hu*. Of the more traditional outlets, the most popular were the *Magyar Nemzet* newspaper and 'Hír-TV' channel—both part of Lajos Simicska's media consortium and perceived as center-right in their political orientation (or Fidesz-KDNP-aligned, notwithstanding recent conflicts between Mr. Simicska and Prime Minister Orbán). Interestingly, the participants that touted broad media consumption habits nevertheless maintained that doing so was a means of gauging popular perception among the opposition; they reconnoiter other news sources with an arguably justified though nonetheless partisan paradigm. However diverse the news sources they frequent, preconceived notions about the political alignments of sources—domestic or foreign—likely precludes anything but a reinforcing socialization effect.

The absence of one socializing element was striking: only one participant mentioned the leaked tape-recording of Prime Minister Gyurcsány in 2006. Undoubtedly, allusions to the corruption of MSZP encompassed this incident (among others), but the absence of this event in participants' description of their own political history reveals that it is a less puissant climacteric for the Fidesz-KDNP youth than for Jobbik youth. It is not untoward to surmise that, whereas the scandal incited anti-establishment and perhaps anti-system sentiments for Jobbik supporters, the leaked tape redoubled merely anti-MSZP sentiments among Fidesz-KDNP supporters, leaving their views about the political system largely unaffected.

Hence the general image of Fidesz-KDNP youth member socialization emerges. Family is the chief agent, attended by reinforcing agents like peers and religion; media consumption is construed by members' perception so that it has scarcely any effect beyond further corroboration of previously established political cognition; and crucially, no unifying formative political event seems apparent. Fidesz-KDNP youth frequently share demographic and background traits, but neither the Gyurcsány government scandals and resultant protests, nor any other event (such as Viktor Orbán's 1989 speech in Heroes' Square was for their parents' generation) unites them and serves a crystalizing moment in their political socialization.

Jobbik Youth

With remarkable consistency the Jobbik youth members experienced a unifying process of political socialization. Despite maturing in households of every preexisting political stripe, the respondents uniformly affiliated with Jobbik after a combination of internet activity and influence by friends. The upheavals of 2006 were a common introduction to political affairs; for many the tumult surrounding those scandals acquainted them with the burgeoning Jobbik party. Popular far-right portals like kuruc.info and alfahir.hu supplied forums of intense discourse and virtual political socialization. Combined with the fostering influence of friends with prior affiliation, online information impelled respondents to acquaint themselves with and eventually join Jobbik or Jobbik IT.

After joining Jobbik, if not before, political inclination and party allegiance is nurtured through the community of Hungary's far-right subculture. Youth party camps and festivals, organized group excursions and 'days out,' and other manner of party group-driven entertainment consolidate new members' subscription to the party. During the Budapest Jobbik

IT focus group one participant's phone suddenly growled deep guitar tones and a rasping, laryngeal scrape—"it's *nemzeti rock*," he said. The ardently nationalistic, and arguably racist music genre/movement is perhaps the most notable facet of Hungary's far-right subculture. Bands like *Kárpátia* and festivals like EFOTT²⁹ and SZIN³⁰ (all mentioned by focus group participants) manifest a cultural perspective wholly agreeable to Jobbik's posture.

In a curious reversal, Jobbik youth commonly *socialize* their parents rather than *being socialized by* their parents. Most participants recounted their path to Jobbik membership as one independent of or contrary to parental influence; subsequently most of them persuaded their parents (and in some cases other family members) to support Jobbik—presumably not as a result of a major ideological shift, but rather, many respondents noted, as a mere matter of their parents learning of the party's existence. This pattern, which Saltman (2014: 283) likewise observed, seems a peculiar and crucial inversion of the more traditional variety of political socialization—the one that predominates among the Fidesz-KDNP youth, for instance.

In sum, the combined influence of friends and far-right subculture—encompassing multiple agents in itself—is the most formative element in the political socialization of Jobbik youth. They are typically united by their experience of the 2006 scandals and protests, and insulated from countervailing socializers or influences by their immersion in the far-right subculture. And, according to their testimony, Jobbik youth frequently affects their family's political affiliations rather than the other way around.

5.2 DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGY

This section reconnoiters the product of political socialization: the ideological positions that Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youth come to occupy. The sum of their ideology exists in the dimensions they do and do not express, the order of priority given to those that they do, and the descriptions that characterize and circumscribe each.

²⁹ An abbreviation of "Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Országos Turisztikai Találkozója" ('University and College National Tourism Meeting'). It is a summer festival featuring several concerts and routinely attracting tens of thousands of Hungarian students.

³⁰ An abbreviation of "Szegedi Ifjúsági Napok" (Szeged Youth Days), another large summer festival, hosted in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged.

5.2.1 Socio-economic

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

As with the party's policies and politicians generally, the socio-economic dimension evidently forms the core of youth Fidesz-KDNP supporters' ideology. Issues of economic conditions and development—and concomitant facets such as welfare programs—dominated the focus group conversation.

Even in the infancy of their political awareness, interviewees attested, they perceived superior economic policies from Fidesz-KDNP. One described growing up in a place run by MSZP leadership; while other, nearby districts (led by right-wing mayors and councils) experienced economic growth and success, his floundered. Attributing this disparity to the quality of leadership, he felt drawn toward the political right and to Fidesz-KDNP.

The youth members' views and supported policies preclude unqualified classification on the traditional 'left-right' (i.e., greater state control of the economy versus lesser control). Support for habitual rightist policies like consumption- rather than income-based taxation are somewhat curiously paired with interventionist policies—'*structural reforms of higher education...according to the needs of the Hungarian economy,*'ⁱ governmental action to revitalize and support industries (such as the sugar industry in the Borsod county town of Szerencs), and tighter control over vital sectors, like the 'food industry' and 'banking system.'

These macroeconomic stances on taxation and targeted intervention are interwoven with social conservatism. Youth supporters of Fidesz-KDNP are disproportionately likely to 'blame the poor for their predicament' (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 52, 69), leading them to emphasize an approach to taxation that '*motivates people to go back to work.*'ⁱⁱ By a factor of 1.6, youth voters who agree that "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping and to take care of the children" are more likely Fidesz-KDNP supporters (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 55). These socially conservative attitudes underpin several aspects of youth voters' opinions on fiscal policy.

Collectively, these socio-economic principles found voice in the recently inaugurated 'Basic Law,' or constitution. Fidelitas members noted approvingly a provision proscribing local councils and governments running deficits and accumulating debt (which contains a clause allowing the federal government to make exceptions) (Hungary Basic Law. art. 34) as well as

new constitutional empowerment to ‘*exercise more control over the markets,*’ allowing the government to ‘*protect the country from those threats that were posed by the unregulated, uncontrolled markets.*’ⁱⁱⁱ

Jobbik Youth

Jobbik youth supporters stress agreement with a central motivating principle of the party: radicalism. The rule of the ‘status quo parties’—the blanket term that respondents used to refer to Fidesz-KDNP, MSZP, and the other parties that have existed and persisted since the regime transformation—combined with affecting external jolts from abroad (particularly the 2008 economic recession) has pushed Hungary into a critical state where, the Jobbik members say, only drastic, only ‘radical’ strategies can provide effective solutions. ‘*There are cultural, ethnic, and social problems combined,*’ insisted one, not least among them the ‘*great and growing extent of deprivation and impoverishment among the society. The political leadership is not interested in solving these problems, since they help the political class stay in power.*’^{iv} But ineffectual, ‘status quo’ leadership will not suffice in the contemporary economic environment, particularly with the conditions of Hungary: “*We are still paying debt... This is around 10 percent of the Hungarian GDP. At the same time, Hungary is taxing at the highest rate in Europe; it’s around 55 percent at the moment. At the same time the social system is crashing, so we pay the highest tax and we get the lowest service from the state.*”^v The perception of besieging, multi-faceted crises defines and shapes the Jobbik youth’s policy positions.

Through their socio-economic statements, Jobbik youth members articulated a pronounced class divide. Couched more in terms of power and interest representation than in traditional Marxist construction—though allusions to the victims of the economic crisis sometimes smacked of ‘capitalist exploitation’ rhetoric—the respondents intimated a degree of *state capture* effected by shadowy interest groups through the mainstream parties and their corrupted leaders. This drive to power is typified in Fidesz’s long march across the ideological spectrum, which respondents depicted as a Machiavellian strategic move. Even actions ostensibly intended to ameliorate economic conditions have been twisted to serve Fidesz-KDNP’s maintenance of power; in the new constitution, for example, it is written, “*that the debt*

*of Hungary should be under 60 percent*³¹ [of GDP]. *Otherwise, we are in a special age [sic] when they can use special laws; this doesn't have a place in a constitution.*^{vi}

By contrast, the Jobbik youth affirmed the party's populist *bona fides*; '*Jobbik is a party that concentrates on the problems of everyday folks. The other parties are only concerned with the interests of the upper classes.*'^{vii} Jobbik appears more sympathetic with the poor and economically struggling, placing the onus for their difficulties largely on macroeconomic conditions and concomitant mismanagement by the political leadership. Respondents stressed the importance of supporting Hungary's economy—and its society by extension—by strong agriculture policies. Party leader Vona has often stressed Hungary's agricultural past and enduring potential: "We have all the conditions to be the strongest agricultural power in Europe. We felt that Hungary's population of 10 million can feed 30 million in Europe. But in the EU no one wants to buy our products. At the same time, we lost all our eastern markets, which were our leading export recipients in the 1980s" (RT.com, 'Вступление Венгрии в ЕС...', 2013, translated by author). Furthermore, respondents promoted increased regulation of transnational corporations (or 'TNCs') obliging them to '*buy their inputs from Hungarian small businesses instead of importing everything, so that the Hungarian economy—these small- and middle-sized businesses, could benefit more from these TNCs' activities here in Hungary.*'^{viii}

Cumulatively, the Jobbik youth appear concerned with a rise in poverty, though not to the point of advocating major redistributive processes; they support private ownership, but seem amenable to government influence or intervention in key industries, and thus a modicum of economic planning; and they express mixed support for the current welfare system, not criticizing its intent or scope but identifying inefficiencies and corruptions (notably in the Roma community).

5.2.2 Religious

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

Respondents esteemed the new constitution for avowing implicitly—and sometimes explicitly—Christian religious values. Articles declare that in the Hungarian state "the foetus

³¹ Actually, the figure is 50 percent ("half of the Gross Domestic Product"); see: Hungary Basic Law. art. 36, § 4 - 6.

shall be protected from the moment of conception” (Hungary Basic Law. art. II), the “commitment to have children” shall be encouraged (Hungary Basic Law. art. L, § 2), and “the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman” shall be defended (Hungary Basic Law. art. L, § 1)—which one participant made special mention of as a morally superior stance.

Fidelitas members ascribed the majority of moral policies of Fidesz-KDNP to the representatives of KDNP; whereas Fidesz is economically oriented and focused, “*KDNP tries to explain the moral things; it’s more important for them than the economy.*”^{xix} Another concurred, “*They have a solid moral compass through Christianity, which is not politically motivated, but is based on the biblical truth.*”^x Accordingly, this leads Fidesz-KDNP to pursue ideologically Christian policies; among these, issues of ‘family values’ are most prominent. The participants expanded on one resultant policy; “*For example, the shops are closed...will be closed on Sundays.*”³² *This is a day for family to spend time together, go to church, to eat, or something else.*”^{xi} Another participant offered parallel moral and economic justifications for the law, saying that members of his congregation were unable to attend church because they were compelled to go to work; even though many businesses (like the one his family owns) are not profitable on Sundays, company policy often required opening. Happily, according to the respondents, the new law corrects this situation.

Responses from Fidesz-KDNP supporters on religious matters simultaneously reinforce implicitly the findings of Saltman (2014)—maintaining the primacy of familial socialization (and enduring importance of family in youth political perspective)—and of Szabó *et al.* (2013: 54)—concluding, “The strongest explanatory variable responsible for [Fidesz-KDNP] voters was self-declared religious affiliation.” Like the party to which they belong, the interviewed youth members reflect a marriage between economic and religious emphases, with the former taking the palm of primacy. Though it is not as significant as socio-economic, religious dimensions are present and considerable for youth Fidesz-KDNP supporters.

Jobbik Youth

³² The law on shop closures on Sundays was approved on 16 December 2014 (see MTI, ‘Parliament approves Sunday closure for shops’, 2014), implemented on 15 March 2015, and subsequently expanded (Hungary Matters, ‘Lawmakers widen Sunday shopping restrictions’, 2015).

Christian values are a central aspect of Jobbik youth members' identification with their party. Christian practice is not. Only one respondent claimed regular church attendance. This seemingly incongruous subscription to Christian morality and heritage and simultaneous non-participation in ritual Christian worship follows from two conditions: religious suppression in communist Hungary and the nature of Christianity's ideological importance to the Jobbik youth. To the first, one explained, *'it's really important to understand that for almost half a century it was almost forbidden to practice your religion in this country.'*^{xii} The enduring effect of the Soviet era seems a plausible explanation; like elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, the youth were raised where church attendance was rare, often purposefully avoided. This convention remains common: Christianity is observed, but unpracticed. The character of Jobbik's Christian identity reflects this habit. That is, the *heritage*, the Hungarian Christian legacy is of supreme importance:

'It represents a nostalgic view of history—Great Hungary, which was powerful and Christian. These two things are interconnected. Their main idols, St. Stephen³³ and St. Ladislaus³⁴, are the biggest heroes of the Hungarian state... It basically represents strength, greatness and strength of the past; we want to turn back to the greatness of the country before the World Wars.'^{xiii}

Thus, it seems that for the interviewed Jobbik youth members Christian identity is more a function of national culture and elusively irredentist attitudes than of religious adherence.

Jobbik's sincere Christian disposition stands in stark dissimilarity to the feigned Christianity of Fidesz-KDNP, according to respondents. *'The fake Christian identity of Fidesz with the Christian Democrats is inauthentic because, in the 1990s when Fidesz was more liberal, they were anti-religious, they were criticizing Christians, they were more secular.'*^{xiv},³⁵ Practices like erecting crosses throughout the country around Christmas (which one focus group participant noted as particularly affecting), on the other hand, demonstrates Jobbik's genuine

³³ St. Stephen, or Stephen I, founded the Kingdom of Hungary and reigned as its first king (after a roughly 180-year period of rule by 'Grand Princes') from 1000 to 1038 C.E.

³⁴ St. Ladislaus, or Ladislaus I, reigned as King of Hungary from 1077 to 1095 C.E. and is popularly extolled for his territorial expansion of Hungary and for his chivalric deportment.

³⁵ The respondent here cited the a phrase "térdre csuhások," said by Viktor Orbán in the early 1990s to clerics, telling them to kneel and pray in a derogatory manner.

support for Christianity. This perception of the authenticity is a recurring source of political contrast for the Jobbik youth.

5.2.3 Cultural-ethnic

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

Hungarian politics doubtlessly encompass a cultural-ethnic dimension. Youth Fidesz-KDNP members appear rather underwhelmed by this feature, however. Two topics, it may fairly be said, comprise this dimension in Hungary: ethnic Hungarians abroad (particularly in the neighboring countries) and the Roma. On the first, respondents expressed a distant respect for the gravity of the issue. *‘I am not concerned personally with this question, but I know a lot of people for whom it is really important because they have families or relatives on the other side of the border. I know this and accept that it’s really important.’*^{xv} Several participants, apparently without a personal affinity for the issue either, addressed it from a political perspective: *‘the results of the elections abroad, those Hungarian who vote abroad³⁶, they show they appreciate the efforts by Fidesz as they won around 95 percent of votes abroad³⁷.’*^{xvi} Another noted the hypocrisy of the Socialists: *‘the 2004 referendum on dual citizenship would have given Hungarians abroad Hungarian citizenship. But the Socialist-Liberal coalition campaigned for a ‘no’ vote, and eventually the no’s had it. Now the Socialists changed their minds; they flip-flopped.’*^{xvii} Support for such measures and the provision of support to Hungarians abroad was voiced, but almost as an afterthought. On the second, the topic of Roma populations in Hungary, participants only went so far as to mention it in the context of Jobbik: *‘trying to blame one ethnicity for most of the problems.’*^{xviii}

³⁶ Late in 2011 the Fidesz-KDNP government used in two-thirds majority to alter the electoral procedure law, extending political rights to non-resident Hungarians. The current law on electoral procedure is available at: http://valasztas.hu/en/ovi/241/241_1_10.html

³⁷ Results from the 2014 national parliamentary elections denote overwhelming support for Fidesz-KDNP by non-resident Hungarians. Of the 128,429 votes cast abroad, Fidesz-KDNP received 122,638, or 95.49 percent (Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014). These votes garnered Fidesz-KDNP one additional seat, giving the party its constitutional two-thirds majority (Muddle, ‘The 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections...’, 2014).

While Szabó *et al.* (2013: 55) found that some ethnicity-neutral policy orientations negatively correlated with Fidesz-KDNP support³⁸ and positive associations existed regarding the party's stance on ethnic Hungarians abroad, responses of participants in this project suggest lesser salience for youth party members. Alongside given answers, avoidance of the topic of Roma affairs seems consistent with a socio-economic view of the topic, rather in the mode of Soviet times when employment represented the foremost concern of 'Roma policy.' (However, the perceived toxicity of addressing Roma issues to a foreigner offers a plausible, perhaps even likely alternative explanation for respondents' hesitancy to speak on the topic. Studies conducted by Hungarians [Róna & Karácsony: 40, and Szabó *et al.* 2013: 55] have found anti-Roma attitudes and correspondingly high salience for Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik supporters.) Ethnic Hungarians abroad similarly exemplifies a political topic, according to interview subjects, instead of an ideological charge. Despite the significance of the cultural-ethnic dimension across the Hungarian political system it appears a less stimulating one for the youth of Fidesz-KDNP.

Jobbik Youth

The interviewed Jobbik youth supporters were at pains to stress that they are not a one-issue party; they are concerned with other problems beside those relating to or emanating from the Roma community. Yet the responses from Jobbik groups in both Miskolc and Budapest reveal the paramount importance of cultural-ethnic ideology in youth voter subscription.

As previously mentioned, the subjects of ethnic Hungarians abroad and of Roma affairs dwarf all other manifestations of this dimension in Hungary's political discourse. For interviewed members of Budapest's Jobbik youth, problems with the Roma community predominate. Several participants indicated that Jobbik's concentration on 'gypsy crime' ("cigánybűnözés") attracted them to the party. Problems with the Roma community, respondents said, are multifaceted and burdened by an oppressive air of political correctness:

'They don't talk about it but everybody knows the problems with those people. For example, in the village there is a street where these people live; they steal occasionally, and we know it was them; they are takers, they are a parasitic race.'

³⁸ For example, "those who believe in desegregated education, that is, an education system that does not relegate Roma children to separate classes or schools, are about 30% less likely to vote for Fidesz than someone from the general youth population" (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 55).

They say we stigmatize them, but in reality they stigmatize themselves; they don't want to learn, work, and so on.^{xix}

In the eyes of the youth party members, the Roma's corrupt leaders and representatives³⁹ compound the problems of their community—which are presumably regarded as somewhat inherent by virtue of their '*racial characteristic of criminality and taking.*' These leaders promote a sense of entitlement to state welfare, which has resulted in the present circumstances where '*Hungarians finance their whole community.*'^{xx} Respondents said this arrangement unacceptable, particularly when Roma communities are responsible for crimes like the 2009 murder of the professional handball player Marian Cozma. Unlike the other parties, Jobbik took action in response to such incidents—'*the Magyar Gárda organized a demonstration in memory of Marian Cozma and against gypsy crime.*'^{xxi}

Curiously, Miskolc members only referenced the 'Roma' (notably using that word instead of "*cigány*" or 'gypsy') in the context of Ferenc Gyurcsány supporting the political candidacy of Albert Pásztor, the former Miskolc police chief whom he had famously upbraided during his term as Prime Minister for his use of the phrase 'gypsy crime.' Silence on Roma issues, however, is somewhat suspect; the larger Roma population in and around Miskolc supports the presumption that Roma issues are of greater consequence there. Miskolc participants seemed alarmed by the treatment of Jobbik by foreign/international press, that is, their perception that the party has been monolithically cast as racist, ultra-nationalist, and extreme. Given the centrality of Roma-related issues in Jobbik's political rise to prominence and profile, this taciturnity from Miskolc respondents suggests either a disparity between party leaders and their youth members or a hesitancy by members to discuss the importance of Roma issues with a foreign interviewer. Seemingly in place of a more blunt discussion the participants obliquely referenced Hungary's fight against crime and for public security, and the challenging presence of double standards in these struggles.

The interviewed Miskolc councilor/Jobbik IT leader was marginally more forthcoming with his opinions and resultant political positions. After contextualizing Roma issues in great

³⁹ Recriminations of corruption have also come from within the Roma community, as is the case with recent exchanges of allegations between the Roma Civic Bloc and the National Roma Self-Government (Hungary Matters, 'Local Roma leaders...' 2015).

detail, as well as asserting that the media has devoted excessive attention thereto, the councilor explained his and Jobbik's position,

['Gypsy crime'] in Jobbik's terminology, these are those types of crimes that are mostly committed by the Roma, so not that the Roma are disproportionately represented among the criminals, but certain types of crimes are more likely to be committed by the Roma. ... For example, iron theft and human trafficking and other types of crime prominent in the smaller villages. ... The roots of the current situation of the Hungarian Roma population are partly historical. Since the beginning of the Roma presence in the Carpathian Basin, they have been a poor, outcast, deprived group of society. They are often poorly educated. This wasn't a big problem in the socialist era when there was a factory in every town, and they were mustering these people to work in industry, but after the regime change these people got laid off. They couldn't find jobs anymore. They are unskilled; their family models are unconventional; there are now two or more generations where the children haven't seen their parents working. These socio-cultural and economic questions are the root of the problem. ... There are no easy solutions. Some things are more conventional: creating unskilled jobs, just for the sake of putting these people back to work who don't remember what working is like. Others are radical propositions: children of these families, if they stay with their families, will learn the same patterns of living. That's why we propose that the younger children should be relocated to institutions where they are educated and transformed to be able to be a part of the society, to which they cannot presently adapt.^{xxii}

Forced sequestration of Roma children does indeed represent a radical proposal. Given their audaciousness, it is difficult to comprehend any surprise at the attention such policies receive.

Yet for Miskolc members of Jobbik youth ethnic Hungarians abroad ostensibly represents a more important policy set. One expressed vehement disapproval for Fidesz-KDNP's past actions on the matter, citing the party's support for Romania's EU accession without granting autonomy to the majority Hungarian communities in parts of Transylvania. Such a record leads the respondents to doubt Fidesz-KDNP's capacity to accomplish objectives supporting ethnic Hungarians. For instance, *'I agree with the words and ideas that are written in the new*

constitution, but don't think that Fidesz can make these things happen. The so-called unification of the Hungarian people in and out of the state's borders—Fidesz is not the party that can make such things happen.^{xxiii}

Despite the annoyance of Jobbik's youth members at the attention given to its Roma policies, their articulated views clearly demonstrate the heavy weight of the cultural-ethnic ideological dimension in their party subscription and political perspective. This study's data accord with previous research, which found that anti-Gypsyism was the best predictor of Jobbik support and that "someone who agrees with the statement 'Crime is in the blood of the Roma people' is on average three times more likely to be a Jobbik supporter than are students in general" (Szabó *et al.*: 2013: 52). The press coverage of Jobbik's positions regarding the Roma may be unjust in its excessive apportionment; its issue-ownership of Roma policies (see Róna & Karácsony 2010, and Bíró-Nagy & Róna 2013) offers some justification for this 'outsized' coverage, however.

5.2.4 Urban-rural

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

The sole intimation of urban-rural divisions arose with discussion of ethnic Hungarians abroad. Although Budapest residents are generally less concerned with this matter, according to a respondent originally from Budapest but now residing in Debrecen, in places closer to the borders it is more important. Fidesz-KDNP is more popular in rural areas and cities outside Budapest, but neither the responses of focus group participants nor the electoral performances of the party suggest an urban-rural ideological dimension of any considerable magnitude.

Jobbik Youth

None of the Jobbik respondents' comments were overtly suggestive of the urban-rural ideological dimension. If anything, the economic emphasis on Hungary's agricultural sector implies rural partiality, but hardly enough to constitute the presence of an ideological dimension. Although the preponderance of Jobbik's electoral support heretofore came from towns of small and average size, and from northeastern Hungary (notably where there are larger Roma populations), this does not correspond to an urban-rural or regional ideological division.

Forthcoming research on youth political support (Szabó *et al.* Forthcoming, 2015), moreover, suggests that even the electoral division is fading as Jobbik support grows across the country.

5.2.5 Regime support

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

Unsurprisingly, scarcely any traces of regime opposition appeared in the responses of Fidelitas members. One respondent's view on corruption—which was echoed by others in the focus group—reveals a particularly interesting facet of regime support, namely, that corruption matters, but in respect of degree rather than mere existence. *'Corruption is a thing that is unavoidable, but on the Left it was too much. They went over the line.'*^{xxiv} More forgiving of scandal, more sympathetic to the means employed to address speedily exigencies of government—such an outlook typifies an un-romanticized and somewhat resigned view of democratic governance (perhaps unproductively for the cause of Hungary's democratic consolidation). The boundary between tolerable and excessive corruption is vague, however, and might stand in a different position if other parties were in power.

If supporting of any change in the regime, the participants seemed implicitly to validate the systematic predominance of Fidesz-KDNP by their regard for the party's moral superiority on one hand, and Jobbik and MSZP's philosophical and political inferiority on the other. The other parties, however, are a secondary concern, according to one. The main challengers of Fidesz-KDNP are rather the *'fake civil societies and associations with left-wing support both from inside and outside the country.'*^{xxv} Indeed, the likelihood of foreign support for opposition parties and political forces⁴⁰ rankled the interview participants and, they generally asserted, delegitimized Fidesz-KDNP's foremost political adversaries. Such a perspective seems implicitly supportive of the 'illiberal democracy' model articulated and advocated by Prime Minister Orbán in speeches and statements in 2014.

⁴⁰ Respondents referenced accusations of foreign (western) financing of MSZP, the allegations that Gordon Bajnai's Együtt party received support from the Soros Foundation and the Washington-based think-tank Center for American Progress (MNO.hu, 'Az Együtt és Bajnai kusza pénzügyei', 2015), and the ongoing scandal concerning Jobbik MEP Béla Kovács's Russian connections and charged service as an intermediary between Jobbik and Putin's regime.

Jobbik Youth

Perception of excessive corruption and indefensible regime continuity induce a mild degree of regime opposition from the Jobbik youth. “*Still, after 25 years in the [post-Soviet] system, Jobbik is the only party, or almost the only party that was not involved in this changing process...connected with high corruption in the new leader caste, which is not so new since they were leaders already in the 1980s, so Jobbik is the only big party that is clean from this period.*”^{xxvi} (Respondents in Miskolc and Budapest named LMP as the only other uncorrupted parliamentary party, and warmly remarked that they would be a good left-wing opposition in a system devoid of the odious existences of MSZP and Fidesz-KDNP.) Fidesz-KDNP corruption is so commonplace, said one, that it acquired the faces and names of Mr. 10 or 20 or 30 percent. My translator explained,

“When there are public contracts, the state or the city is buying services, building infrastructure—there’s a competition and one company wins, and they get paid. These processes are corrupted. The deciding politicians are called ‘Mr. 30 percent’ because the company that wins has to pay that exact value [of the contract] to the politicians... One of the biggest of these was Lajos Kósa, who was the first person who got publically labeled with this.”

Ultimately, the ‘status quo parties’—as participants repeatedly branded Fidesz-KDNP and MSZP—are beset by corruption and seized of purposeful or negligent torpor. ‘*And, if [Fidesz-KDNP] hadn’t rewritten the election laws, they wouldn’t have a two-thirds majority now!*’^{41, xxvii} The resultant degree of regime disillusionment results in a tincture of resigned forbearance—“Jobbik IT functions as a political organization that accepts the democratic system we live in, and strives to achieve change within the constraints provided by democracy. Democracy is not the best system, but currently there is no better alternative” (Szabó *et al.*: 2013: 12). This attitude buttresses Jobbik members’ *radical* approach to politics. The conviction of necessary radicalism pervades the answers of respondents and accords with a desire for systemic overhaul, if not outright transformation.

5.2.6 Foreign policy

⁴¹ At the time of the focus group, Fidesz-KDNP had not yet lost the Veszprém by-election, and thus their two-thirds parliamentary majority.

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

The foreign policy outlook expressed by focus group participants is cynical of, though still primarily oriented toward the European Union. *“I think that Hungary stepped into the European Union with the old constitution and we spent enough time to see the dark side. For example, sometime the Union tried to influence the Hungarian economy or the higher education or something else. With the new constitution, the government tried to protect their rules, to rule the country.”*^{xxviii} This general comment proffers a solid representative snapshot of the perspective expounded by respondents.

More specific remarks were supportive of government actions that asserted its sovereign prerogatives, critical of past governments’ management of relations with Brussels, and vague and tepid in their allusions to other international partners. Said one participant, *‘it’s important that Hungary declared it is a GMO-free [genetically modified organism] country in the Basic Law*⁴². *Now, as the EU and US are negotiating a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement, there might be conflicts about that, so it’s important that it is written into our constitution.*^{xxix}

Fidesz-KDNP defends the interests of the Hungarian state and economy by such measures, one Fidelitas member averred, while *‘the left-wing are selling out the country to foreign interests.*^{xxx} Pressed on this point, the participant alleged that the Socialists had either attempted to enrich themselves and their supporters, or negligently eschewed lobbying efforts that might have saved businesses like the sugar industry in Szerencs. The sometimes deleterious effect of heavy EU influence leads the interviewed youth members to support trade diversification by incorporating economic ties to Russia; *‘both are enormous markets, so we cannot give up on either.*^{xxxi} The emphasis on sovereign decision-making nonetheless supports continued EU membership: *‘the global economic market is multi-polar. ... The real balance is with our role as a EU member state because the EU has its own laws and values that we have to respect and harmonize with our laws. The area of balancing is our own decision, economic decision in which we have to find the middle path between being too independent, which might hurt the EU values or laws, and being too dependent.*^{xxxii}

Jobbik Youth

⁴² Hungary Basic Law. art. XX, § 2.

Participants by and large positioned themselves on a spectrum somewhere between slight and intense anti-EU stances. Vociferously vituperative words were reserved for Fidesz-KDNP stewardship of EU relations, allowing as it did the passage of European legislation permitting foreigners to purchase Hungarian lands. Yet more moderate voices registered their views in softer tones; one respondent maintained that other parties err in their focus on western or eastern relations. “*They don’t recognize that Hungary is at the meeting point of cultures, and it always has been in history. We are between Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. We can connect them all, and we handle this by connecting them all in balance.*”^{xxxiii} Even this measured stance seems to imply that EU membership somewhat repudiates Hungary’s historical legacy as an interregional bridge. Whether this is the case to the extent of advocating withdrawal from the EU is unclear, though a reasonably plausible inference.

5.2.7 Post-materialism

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

The pervasive economic tenor of the focus group responses is highly suggestive of materialistic values rather than post-materialistic. Szabó *et al.* (2013: 29) found that university-enrolled supporters of Fidesz-KDNP expressed mostly materialistic or mixed values. This project finds no evidence to revise significantly that conclusion, except to suggest the probable predominance of materialism in supporters who articulate mixed values.

Jobbik Youth

Jobbik youth respondents’ views are wholly consistent with materialistic values. Ideological and policy concentrations on public security and crime, economic growth, and domestic security saturate their political opinions and discourse. Public security especially represented a key issue for several respondents and policy focus for the Miskolc Jobbik councilor interviewed. He endorsed the creation of a community police service similar to Switzerland’s cantonal police program. This policy appears common to Jobbik politicians; Jobbik mayoral candidate for Budapest notably supported the creation of a “Budapest Guard tasked with combatting trade at illegal markets, metal theft crimes and the beggars’ mafia to protect citizens and assets more efficiently” (MTI, ‘Jobbik mayoral candidate...,’ 2014). This proposal is

connotative of the *Magyar Gárda* in many respects, particularly its proposed duty of preventing metal theft, which the Miskolc councilor cited (as quoted above) as exemplary of a ‘gypsy crime.’ In any case, the public security policy emphasis of Jobbik accords with a broader materialistic values set. Thus, this study affirms previous findings (Szabó *et al.* 2013: 29) that materialistic values are overwhelmingly ubiquitous among Jobbik youth constituency.

5.3 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS

In addition to the responses directly related to their political socialization and their policy positions and ideological perspectives, participants expanded on a couple points of disagreement with the party and displayed some elucidating characteristics of their political paradigm. While not fitting neatly into descriptions of their socialization or ideology, this information nevertheless proffers a great deal of context that enhances, enriches the rest of their testimony. This section therefore unfolds these additional findings from the interviews.

Fidesz-KDNP Youth

The question of disagreement with party policy or leaders naturally evokes more hesitancy and misgiving than others—members worry about giving offense and thereby imperiling their future; of course, the anonymity of participants is crucial in precluding any such retribution—so it is slightly surprising to get any answers at all. Nonetheless, two fiscal policies raised the hackles of the Debrecen Fidelitas members: the road toll system and the proposed internet tax.

First, late in 2014 the government proposed and subsequently enacted a reconfiguration of the road toll system based on county borders, supplementing the preexisting national system. The national system requires the purchase of vignette to validate use of toll roads throughout the country; the fee for an annual vignette is 42,980 HUF (approximately 100 GBP), 4,780 HUF (approximately 11 GBP) for a monthly vignette, and 2,975 HUF (approximately 7 GBP) for a ten-day vignette (Nemzeti Útdíjfizetési Szolgáltató Zrt. 2015). The regional system allows motorists to purchase annual vignettes for individual counties for 5,000 HUF (approximately 12 GBP). In itself this addition is hardly objection; however, the legislation also reclassified some arterial roads in Budapest for tolls. Residents and even local Fidesz-KDNP politicians criticized

this stipulation for the burden it places on Budapest motorists. Despite criticism from opposition parties and popular disapproval, the government has retained the policy.

Second, the government also attempted to introduce a tax on internet usage in the proposal for the 2015 budget. Initially, the proposal established a rate of 150 HUF per gigabyte of data used (approximately 0.35 GBP per gigabyte). But clamorous opposition and mass demonstration appeared in response to the plan; a march through central Budapest on October 28th (one week after the proposal was revealed) attracted roughly 100,000 people. In an attempt to mollify protesters without scrapping the tax, Fidesz-KDNP offered an amendment to cap the tax at 700 HUF (approximately 1.65 GBP) per month for residential subscribers and 5,000 HUF (approximately 12 GBP) for businesses. Unsatisfied by the modification, protests continued until the government discarded the policy.

Respondents uniformly declared opposition to the internet tax and the road toll modifications. Persisting in the face of demonstrable majority opposition was mistaken and blemished the government's economic program. The broad disapproval of these policies—as this project reveals, even among party members—has likely contributed to recent the recent dips in support for Fidesz-KDNP. Consecutive surveys by Hungarian polling companies Medián and IPSOS have found diminishing levels of support for Fidesz-KDNP and rising Jobbik support over the last half-year.⁴³

Critically, the continued slide of Fidesz-KDNP support likely cost the party two parliamentary seats in crucial by-elections in Veszprém—where independent leftist candidate Zoltán Kész won and thereby eliminated Fidesz-KDNP's two-thirds parliamentary majority—and Tapolca—where Jobbik's Lajos Rig narrowly prevailed. (The latter is particularly remarkable given the intensity of Fidesz-KDNP campaigning—including several personal appearances by Prime Minister Orbán—which notably contained an unsubtle promise of 2.3 billion forints [almost 5.6 million GBP] in funding for the local hospital [Szécsi, 'Gov't promises billions for Tapolca hospital days before local by-election,' 2015].) That youth party members readily identified the two taxation policies as areas of disagreement reveals the ubiquity of disapproval over these matters. Such miscalculations can ill be afforded when faced with a

⁴³ See MTI. 'IPSOS: Fidesz support falls 5 percent...' 2014; MTI. 'Fidesz support down 12 points...' 2014; Hungary Matters. 'Jobbik at all-time high...' 2015; Hungary Matters. 'Jobbik rides high in Ipsos poll,' 2015; and, Hungary Matters, 'Medián poll shows support for Fidesz is at two-year low,' 2015.

strong party like Jobbik, untainted by the difficulties and inevitable disappointments of governing.

Jobbik Youth

Two key additional findings emerged from the discussion of Jobbik focus groups: one, the habit of framing their views in contrast to the ‘status quo parties,’ though not surprising, is remarkably pervasive; two, the party’s recent public relations softening and related appeals to new voters has stirred some disagreement and anxiety about staying true to the principled radicalism of the party.

First, the responses of Jobbik youth were rather illuminating in respect of their contrarian posture. Participants oftentimes cast their views in the contrast of purported Fidesz-KDNP views. The pattern ranged across the tableau of political affairs; policy: Jobbik focuses on the common man while Fidesz-KDNP serve the elite; procedural: Jobbik has an official platform for every election while Fidesz-KDNP barely ever has one and when they do it only amounts to one word: “*folytatjuk*” (‘continue,’ meaning keep going with the same agenda); rhetorical: Jobbik proudly touts its motto as ‘Name [the problem], Solve [the problem]’ (“*Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk.*”) whereas Fidesz-KDNP engages in the hackneyed, counterproductive politically correct discourse of previous eras; organizational: Jobbik youth submit to a lengthy vetting and trial process for group membership and thereafter participate in frequent and meaningful political work in addition to their social prerogatives within the organization whereas Fidesz-KDNP youth join quickly and dither apathetically as they wait for their membership to be rewarded with a cushy job. Portraying their political orientation in these terms of opposition appears common for Jobbik youth. They seem eager to highlight their sincerity as compared with the mainstream parties, which they termed ‘political whores’ (“*politikai kurvák*”).

For this brazen stance, respondents said, they have been victims of personal pressure. Threats against parents’ job security, discrimination and censure within academic environs, and subtle forms of coercion number among the forms of intolerance reported by the Jobbik youth. Nevertheless, they declared that identifying and accentuating their distinction from the ‘status quo parties’ is important both politically and personally.

Second, participants notably disagreed, or at least mentioned as a valid topic of intra-party conflict, one particular facet of Jobbik’s policies: its recent public relations strategy for the

2014 elections and beyond. In what seems a rhetorical softening of party posture, Jobbik's campaign ads for 2014 featured saccharine slogans rendered in traditional Hungarian embroidery such as an acrostic spelling out 'JOBBIK' and containing the words 'wealth, home, faith, security, justice, and community' ("jólét, otthon, bizalom, biztonság, igazság, közösség") (see Image 1) and a bit of wordplay with Jobbik's longstanding motto 'For a better future – for better salaries' ("Szebb jövőt - szebb jövedelmet"). Respondents alluded to and weighed in on a conflict as to whether these slogans and the whole public relations campaign were excessively and deceptively moderate in tone. Most appreciated the need to appeal to more moderate voters, but wanted to ensure that the party did not retreat from its policies of radicalism.



Image 1 - A Jobbik campaign ad for the 2014 municipal elections, featuring an acrostic spelling out the party name and declaring the priorities of 'wealth, home, faith, security, justice, and community.' (Taken from the 'Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom' Facebook page, <https://www.facebook.com/JobbikMagyarorszagertMozgalom/posts/10152697262616405>, translated by author).

Subsequent to the conduct of focus groups with Jobbik youth members, a recording purportedly featuring Jobbik MP and deputy speaker in parliament Tamás Sneider at a private meeting in Szekszárd in the fall of 2014 detailing the party's strategy of rhetorically softening while retaining the same policy positions (Hungary Today, 'Jobbik MP's Leaked Recording Exposes Party's Strategy,' 2015). Practically *in flagrante delicto*, Sneider is also heard on the tape confirming a surreptitious alliance between Jobbik and the radical group 'the Outlaws'

Army' (*Betyársereg*) and speculating on the ancestry of Prime Minister Orbán, specifically that he is of gypsy extraction through his mother. Incidents such as this and as the spy scandal of Jobbik MEP Béla Kovács have somewhat inexplicably failed to arrest Jobbik's rising popularity and its continued support by youth members.

6. ASSESSING HUNGARY'S RIGHT-WING YOUTH GROUPS

Interviews with the youth branches of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik exposed illuminating tints of the otherwise expected dimensions of their members' views. This chapter posits some key points of assessment arising from the interviews and attendant research, and argues that the political conditions resulting from the juxtaposed positions of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths supports the conclusion that a political/party system shift has occurred and is presently being consolidated.

First, this study affirms Saltman's (2014) holding that political socialization shapes youth members' political ideologies and perspectives, and that within that process of socialization a key difference exists between most young Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik members: family predominantly forms Fidesz-KDNP youth political paradigms, encourages party support and membership; and, news consumption subsequently consolidates these positions. For Jobbik youth, friends and right-wing subculture drive socialization—including news consumption from portals like *kuruc.info* and *alfahir.hu*, and other overtly political activities, but also encompassing ancillary influences like *nemzeti rock* that buttress nationalistic political narratives generally concurrent with Jobbik policies and associated with Jobbik's image. The common occurrence of converting parents to Jobbik support reinforces, consolidates far-right allegiance. This inverted pattern is a crucial distinction between Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youth.

Second, the key difference between the two groups is a result of differing emphasis; socio-economic and cultural ethnic dimensions of ideology are present and significant, but Fidesz-KDNP's respondents stress economics whereas Jobbik's accentuate cultural-ethnic issues. Policy stances in these areas are often similar or even the same (again, see Appendix II), so prioritization is ultimately the key distinction. Permitting more policy disagreement than this might otherwise suggest, still it must be said: the ideological space between Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths is not great.

Third, while socio-economic and cultural-ethnic dimensions stand at the forefront, dimensions of regime support and foreign policy were also considerable. Both represent important secondary dimensions—not majorly affecting, though not justly discounted either. Participants of both groups intimated support for some alterations to the regime—in either an 'illiberal' shift or 'radicalization.' The intent and even form of these alterations linger on the

border separating regime support from advocating a significant systemic overhaul, with Fidesz-KDNP youth closer to the side of system retention and Jobbik youth edged more toward transformation.

The separation seems largely consequent of general thoughts on and perception of existent corruption; Jobbik respondents cast the issue in the mold of an irreconcilable difference with the ‘status quo parties’ while Fidesz-KDNP respondents portray the phenomenon as all-encompassing, unavoidable, and a distinction of degrees (a fair few degrees too far in the case of the most recent Socialist government). Yet, again, the distance between the two does not appear so vast in their resultant views of regime alteration. The contextual frame of democratic disillusionment explains this relative proximity: Hungary’s right-wing youth are dissatisfied with the workings of post-Soviet democracy; while they support their party, concerning support for the system in which that party acts they demur.

Fourth, though somewhat obscure, a curious relationship has emerged between youth members’ socio-economic and foreign policy. Endorsement of either state intervention in or state control of key economic sectors and concomitant economic policies accords with a shift in foreign policy posture—away from the EU and somewhat closer to Russia. The responses of participants from both parties—doubtlessly slanted by the situation of addressing a researcher from the United States—delicately affirmed support of these policies. This does not indicate a desire for foreign policy *realignment* from the West to Russia, however, but rather for *de-alignment*.

To the extent that journalists and scholars have editorialized on popular support for the ‘turn *toward* Russia’, they have erred. (This paper does not aim to address the elite political side of Russian-oriented foreign policy of Prime Minister Orbán’s government or of Jobbik, though journalistic and scholastic censure or skepticism thereof is arguably warranted, particularly as overt Russian-orientation, as the following Medián polls demonstrate, is not favored by either party’s constituencies.) The turn is away from alignment and toward nationalistic neutrality. Related polls by Medián in 2012 and 2014 go some way toward exposing this. In the case of Fidesz-KDNP voters: over 75 percent support the continuation of Hungary’s EU membership (Medián, ‘Egy szabadságharc frontvonalai,’ 2012) and simultaneously more than half support Russian construction of the Paks2 nuclear energy facility (Medián, ‘Paksi bővítés,’ 2014); Jobbik voters: over 40 percent support EU membership and only a quarter support Russian work on

Paks2. When asked to choose between closer ties with the United States or with Russia, neither option received a majority from Fidesz-KDNP or Jobbik supporters; 40 percent against 39 percent of Fidesz-KDNP voters favored the United States; 48 percent against 27 percent of Jobbik voters favored the U.S. (Érdekes, 'A magyarok többsége Amerikát választaná és nem Oroszországot,' 2015).

Taken alongside responses of participants in this study, in this author's opinion, these data indicate opposition to positioning Hungary squarely in any one camp or sphere of influence. Fidesz-KDNP voters and youth party members favor balancing engagements (primarily economically) with the West, Russia, and other regions; Jobbik's general and youth constituencies support a neutralizing withdrawal, a nationalistic disengagement from the West without falling under Russian influence. These are two different twists on foreign policy posture based on the common desire for neutrality and strong national sovereignty (an orientation consistent with a political cultural history of foreign domination and influence). Positive dispositions toward Russia stem from sympathetic views of the state-organization model of Putin's Russia. The make-up of Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths' socio-economic ideologies incline them to such a system, stressing state control of strategic economic sectors and the superseding importance of protecting national interests from fluctuations and machinations of the market. Non-economic characteristics are appealing too, including 'illiberal democracy,' more autocratic leadership, and the suppression of so-called 'foreign agents' supposedly functioning under the guise of a benign civil society organization. This consequence of respondents' socio-economic and foreign policy ideologies (and their stance within the milieu of Hungarian political culture) is an important and partially shared undercurrent to Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths' ideologies, though should not be interpreted in either case to connote support for exchanging European for Russian influence.

Fifth, the two right-wing youth parties examined herein are acting as agents of consolidation, securing a shift in the dynamic of the Hungarian political system. Developing seriously since 2006, the causal chain hangs on a few key events: the Gyurcsány scandal generates massive unrest and spurs nascent populist movements, including a right-wing party created by a group of Budapest students—Jobbik; the 2009-2010 election cycle witnesses the arrival of Jobbik to political prominence and the inauguration of a supermajority Fidesz-KDNP government; legal changes enacted by the government (chiefly the new Basic Law, changes to

the electoral law, and a new media law) alter the political-electoral system and enshrine some distinctly right-wing stances and outlooks; and, the 2014 election cycle fortified the related trends of Fidesz-KDNP predominance, of left-wing debilitation, and of pronounced political competition between Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik.

While their ideological traits generally do not divide them enough to provide durable bases for political conflict and competition, the parties have nonetheless established means of consolidating their competition and the broader array of the political system. Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik have the strongest party youth organizations. They serve as socializing spaces and tools of mass mobilization with the principal effect being the encouragement of party loyalty.

Preexisting views of post-transition failed governance, or of poor Roma policy, or of several other areas of public policy coalesce with the influence of friends, online portals, nationalistic music, and environmental factors to draw young people into a sphere of socialization of abnormal ideological consistency; the more common plurality of socializing influences is almost wholly subverted by the effect of far-right subculture. Retained within this socializing space, youths new to politics have their views challenged and shaped, reinforced, and expanded. The ideological and policy orientations that result generally align with the party that supports several components of the socializing space—Jobbik. The party gains distinct benefits from encouraging this far-right subculture: the mobilization of supportive youth activism, the likelihood of attracting new voters (both young and old), and the cultivation of a portion of the electorate that will likely support the party long into the future.

Fidesz-KDNP too has youth engagement, indeed a numerically larger set of organizations, members, and activities. Yet the socialization areas they create appear smaller, less comprehensive in the scope of ideology and policy preference formation; family generally retains the palm of supreme influence for socialization of youth Fidesz-KDNP supporters. Nevertheless, the end of instilling party allegiance in a large youth cohort is still achieved.

Notwithstanding differences in the *modi operandi* of the two socialization spaces, the effect remains the same: two ideologically adjacent and even overlapping political socialization spaces maintained by opposing political parties. Accordingly, youth supporters feel greater separation on the basis of party loyalties and policy emphases than on policy positions and ideological orientations. While significant in creating somewhat differing perspectives on issues and events, these different formation areas do not produce anything on the scale of a *cleavage*,

and result in pointed divergence only in disparately stressed matters like corruption and Roma policies. Fairly, the ‘radicalism’ of Jobbik that attracted or appealed to most respondents may represent a posture for governance and public affairs that equates to more abiding division from the pragmatism generally endorsed by the youth of Fidesz-KDNP, but close examination of the policies advocated by each are not radically different on most issues.

The condition that results from the separate socialization spaces simulates a cleavage where nothing quite so stark exists. Party allegiance fills the void and adopts the character of a stable division. In turn, this bolsters the political/party system realignment that finds a significant pole of political competition between the Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik.

Cui bono? To whose benefit is this development? Hungary’s right-wing, irrespective of party, gains an advantage over the enfeebled left-wing. As Jobbik continues its electoral success and appeals to a broader electorate with its public relations softening, as Fidesz-KDNP persists in a status of political predominance (almost indubitably until 2018 at least), and as both parties buttress their position with strong youth groups the result is an ascendant center of political competition between the two parties, and a correspondingly descendent level of competitive intensity between Fidesz-KDNP and Hungary’s various left-wing parties. The strength of the right-wing youth groups and their parent parties juxtaposed with a floundering left—epitomized by MSZP, which is merely surviving at present—supports the party system realignment inaugurated by the past two election cycles. This shift, which Hungary’s right-wing youth evinces and will likely perpetuate, creates a new political dynamic. The principle of *aurea mediocritus* finds its focus at the dominant center of political competition further to the ideological right, where the choice is between ‘right’ and ‘far-right.’ For Hungary’s democratic future, this arguably represents an ill turn. The continued political activity of the right-wing youth will determine whether this be so.

7. CONCLUSION

This dissertation applied two analytical frames to an examination of the foremost political youth groups in Hungary, and advanced an argument regarding the ultimate effect of the revealed conditions.

Testimony regarding their introduction to politics showed that a decisive contrast exists between Fidesz-KDNP and Jobbik youths. Young Fidesz-KDNP members come from relatively homogenous political backgrounds—families with preexisting connections to or support of Fidesz and/or KDNP. As products of family-driven socialization, their maturing political awareness cleaves to the familiar and lauded presence of Fidesz-KDNP. By comparison, Jobbik youth socialization is much more dynamic; coming from families of various of political backgrounds, they break out of familial and other, more traditional modes of socialization, and instead drift or drive into the far-right subculture. Therein, the youth find a community that either encourages them to join Jobbik or validates already making that decision. Though by different means, the product of these socialization processes appears quite similar: the encouragement of steadfast party loyalty, and matching opposition to other parties.

The effect of socialization on political allegiance is crucial to the interpretation, propounded by this dissertation, of the separate youth groups' ideological dimensions, which otherwise are often curiously similar. Notable difference exists between the two groups in the ideological dimensions that they emphasize and in their views of corruption and political efficacy, but that scarcely accounts for their stark division, and indeed, their occasionally vehement antagonism. Instead, *it is their previous and ongoing socialization that drives both their similar ideology formations and their opposing party allegiances*. Although this project afforded many discoveries, chiefly those examined in the preceding chapter (6), this is the key finding.

While this dissertation carefully described the unique sociopolitical climate herein, Hungary nonetheless represents an important case within the wider context of a pervasive political phenomenon in Europe. International events and developments have impacted European countries like Hungary adversely in recent years. The detrimental effects of such incidents and crises, though rarely in the power of one politician or government to control, naturally provokes electorates to support the divestiture of standing governments; however, the recent trend has included movements apart and away from the mainstream of politics altogether. In the space of a

few years, Hungary's populist far-right grew from marginal significance to a consistent fifth of the electorate. This staggering emergence is mirrored in several other European countries.

A common, nearly ubiquitous trait of successful far-right movements is the attraction and mobilization of youth constituencies at a time when the political participation of that demographic is otherwise dwindling. Reaching out to young, often unemployed citizens—frequently seized by feelings of alienation and disfranchisement from government—far-right parties secure for themselves a political future by cultivating enduring political allegiance and ideological alignment in an emergent voting cohort.

The effect of far-right success can and has occasionally provoked or contributed to the rightward drift of centrist parties. Sometimes more by their own volition—as seems the case of Fidesz-KDNP—and sometimes by pressure from their political flank, center-right parties of Europe have appealed to more conservative elements within the electorates of their countries. In turn, this alters the presiding political dynamic. As this project has shown and argued, apart from help to drive this shift, right-wing youth politics are helping to consolidate it. The outcome of these interrelated developments, the result of continued maturation and socialization of Hungary's and the rest of Europe's political youth will have determinative effects on the condition of liberal democracy, for better or worse.

Appendix I – Focus Group Interview Questions Outline

The following is a list of topics explored in focus group interview sessions and associated questions. The sequence of questions varied, posed by the researcher so as to accord with conversational flow and phrased in an open-ended way so as to elicit detailed answers from participants.

General

- Where do you get your news? Television? Internet? Newspapers? Friends (word-of-mouth)?
 - o [Expand on this, as a way of easing into discussion of politics]
 - o What is your opinion of the news sources you use (or know of)?
 - Do you get news that generally agrees with your views or challenges them, or both?
 - o How frequently do you get news from the sources you use?
- What are the most important issues to you?
 - o What is the most important reason you support the party [Jobbik or Fidesz]?
- Is your district represented by the party you support (either at the national or local level)?
 - o [I.E. – have you seen the practical results of your preferred party exercising governmental power? If so, has this changed your perception in any way?]
 - o Do you see a difference in the local members of the party and the general/national leadership and/or members?
- How did you first come to support the party? What brought you into contact with it?
 - o How did you come to *join* the party?
 - o What do you think is the character of people that generally join/support the party?
 - o What do you think explains the success of the party?
 - o If your party didn't exist, what party would you vote for? [Second preferred party?]
- Did you vote in the most recent elections (the municipal elections in October 2014)? Did you vote in the most recent national elections (April 2014)? Did you vote in the most recent E.U. parliamentary elections (May 2014)?

Economic Matters

- What do you think of the present state of the Hungarian economy? Good or bad? Developed or Underdeveloped? Improving or Declining?
- What economic policies would you prefer to be implemented **{party preference question}**
 - o What aspects of the party's economic platform are most appealing to you? Why? **{party preference question}**
- Do you have any opinion of specific economic issues within Hungary?
 - o Hungarian ownership of domestic banks
 - o Foreigners owning land in Hungary
 - o Tax and budget issues (perhaps the recently proposed and subsequently withdrawn internet tax?)

Social Issue Matters

- What social issues do you consider most important? **{party preference question}**
- What aspects of the party's social issues platform are most appealing to you? Why? **{party preference question}**
- What do you think of the current state of affairs in Hungary regarding the relationship between religion and state? That is, should the state/government encourage religious participation/affiliation among its citizens?
 - o What do you think of the party's stance on this issue? **{party preference question}** If so, how important would you say it is?
 - o Do you consider yourself religious? If so, how do you practice it, and how frequently?
- What do you think of the current state of affairs in Hungary regarding homosexuality? For example, do you support the new Basic Law's definition of marriage as 'between a man and a woman'? Alternatively, should the state attempt to discourage homosexuality
 - o Are your opinions on this matter part of the reason you support the party? **{party preference question}** If so, how important would you say it is?
- What do you think of the current state of affairs in Hungary regarding criminality? Is there a deficiency of order and stability in Hungary? If so, is there an identifiable cause, such as a group of people or a social phenomenon [such as, for example, a non-religious societal morality, or some such condition or trend]?
 - o Are your opinions on this matter part of the reason you support the party? **{party preference question}** If so, how important would you say it is?

EU and International Matters

- Do you have any opinion of Hungary's neighboring states? Its relations with Russia? Its relations with the U.S.?
- What do you think of Hungary's membership in the E.U.?
- What do you think of the party's stance on Hungary's E.U. membership **{party preference question}**
 - o What aspects of the party's stance toward the E.U. are most appealing to you? Why? **{party preference question}**

Other Matters

- Would you say you are drawn generally to the party, or perhaps that there are specific party leaders that you like, or perhaps something else that elicits your support?
 - o How important are the leaders of the party to your support thereof?
- What are some of the most important distinctions, in your opinion, between [the party you support] and the other large political parties in Hungary? **{party preference question}**
- What do you think of the current state of affairs in Hungary regarding immigration, that is, immigrants, refugees, and so on? Do you think Hungary is allowing too many immigrants into the country?
 - o Do you think Hungary is suffering from an emigration problem? That is, are conditions in Hungary in such a state that people are going abroad to work and/or live? If so, what do you think are the cause(s) of this phenomenon?

- Are your opinions on this matter part of the reason you support the party? {**party preference question**} If so, how important would you say it is?
- Do you think that there is corruption in Hungary's politics? If so, how pervasive, how commonplace do you think this corruption is? Are certain parties or governmental departments particularly corrupt? If so, which ones? Do you think members of [the party you support] are corrupt?
 - What evidence has led you to think as you do about the state of corruption in Hungarian politics?
 - Are your opinions on this matter part of the reason you support the party? {**party preference question**} If so, how important would you say it is?

Appendix II – Table of Jobbik policies implemented by the first Fidesz-KDNP government (from Bíró-Nagy *et al.* 2012)

Quotations from Jobbik's 2010 election program	Measures implemented by the Fidesz-KDNP government since 2010
"The multinationals' contribution to tax revenues is negligible, they use accounting tricks to make profits disappear and take them out of the country."	The Orbán government has imposed a special tax on the telecommunications branch, energy providers and retail chains. These sectors are mainly in the hands of foreign companies, usually multinationals.
"We will abolish compulsory private pensions and lead the pension system back towards a state arrangement, in which individual account-holding would nevertheless remain. We will enable free choice of pension fund and abolish obligatory membership of private pension funds."	<i>Fidesz</i> has nationalized savings paid into private pension funds. Unlike <i>Jobbik</i> 's proposal, however moving to the state system is not optional.
"In contrast to the wild excesses of neoliberal education policy <i>Jobbik</i> advocated awarding marks and where necessary repeating the school year."	<i>Fidesz</i> and the <i>KDNP</i> have reintroduced the awarding of marks and repeating a school year into the education system.
"The principle should be made clear that the Holy Crown and the Hungarian State as well as the Holy Crown and the Nation (consisting of members of various nationalities and religions) are identical. The Holy Crown signifies the Hungarian State in official texts and legal regulations."	The reference to the Holy Crown has been made part of the Constitution: "We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and the Holy Crown, which embody the constitutional state continuity of Hungary and the unity of the Nation."
" <i>Jobbik</i> will pass a media law creating new value-oriented media with public status. The criteria for such media will be [the contribution they make] to building a national identity and to communicating knowledge and balanced information of all kinds; in place of the current practice, which takes years, we will facilitate the rapid imposition of penalties on individual media organizations."	<i>Fidesz</i> has passed a new media law for which it even changed the constitution to ensure its approval. The law says that the Orbán-government will put all Hungarian media organs under the surveyance [<i>sic</i>] of government-appointed monitors. The preamble to this bill contains the same 'value-oriented' arguments as those advanced by <i>Jobbik</i> . The draft law grants the media watchdog comprehensive options for imposing sanctions.
"We would make it obligatory in at least one of the upper years of primary schools for the children to go on a school trip to the Hungarian territories seized from us."	A government initiative has been launched that allows all pupils attending public educational institutions to receive state funding for at least one trip to an area of a neighbouring country inhabited by Hungarians. The basis for this is the draft decision approved by parliament in October [2012].
"We will anchor Hungary's Christian roots in the constitution."	The reference to Christianity has also been included in the constitution: "We are proud that our King, St. Stephan, placed the Hungarian state on a firm foundation a thousand years ago and made our homeland part of a Christian Europe." "We recognise the role of Christianity as the guardian of the Nation."

<p>“We will remove the Károlyi-Statue from Kossuth square immediately. We favor the re-building of the Regnum-Marianum Church, which was blown up as a result of an arbitrary decree issued by Stalin and Rakos. Roosevelt Square will be given the only name worthy of it, that of Count István Széchenyi!”</p> <p>“The names of public places associated with negative historical figures of epochs will be abolished and their statues brought to appropriate places.”</p> <p>“In memory of Miklós Horthy, Albert Wass, Pál Teleki, Ottokár Prohászka, Cecile Tormay, Béla Hamvas and our other great figures who have been unworthily forgotten. Together with civil society we will launch a nationwide program to erect statues in public places.”</p>	<p>In March 2012 the Károlyi statue was removed from Kossuth Square. The <i>Fidesz</i> majority in the Budapest city parliament changed the name of Roosevelt Square to Széchenyi Square. The application for the change submitted by <i>Fidesz</i> and the <i>KDNP</i> to the city administration states: “No public square, no public institution may bear the name of a person involved in the foundation, setting up or maintenance of a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20th century, not a name that is an expression of or the name of an organisation that directly refers to or recalls a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20th century.”</p> <p>One square has been named after Albert Wass.</p>
--	---

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, P.A. (1977). The Role of Agents in Political Socialization. In *Handbook of Political Socialization Theory and Research* (pp. 115-142). New York: The Free Press.
- Biezen, I. (2005). On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 147-174.
- Bornschieer, S. (2009). Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies. *Living Reviews in Democracy*, 1, 1-13.
- Bozóki, A. (2008). Consolidation or Second Revolution? The Emergence of the New Right in Hungary. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24(2), 191-231.
- Bozóki, A. (2011). Occupy the State: The Orban Regime in Hungary. *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 19(2), 649-663.
- Bustikova, L., & Kitschelt, H. (2009). The radical right in post-communist Europe. Comparative perspectives on legacies and party competition. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 42, 459-483.
- Bíró-Nagy, A., Boros, T., & Varga, Á. (2012). Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary. *International Policy Analysis*. Retrieved January 1, 2014, from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09566.pdf>
- Bíró-Nagy, A., & Róna, D. (2013). Rational Radicalism. Jobbik's Road to the Hungarian Parliament 2003-2010. In *Alternative Politics? The Rise of New Political Parties in Central Europe* (pp. 149-184). Bratislava: Institute for Political Affairs.
- Bódis, A. (2006, October 17). Archívum - Olaszliszka, a megbélyegzett falu. Retrieved January 16, 2015, from <http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421067-231568>
- Capoccia, G. (2002). Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14(1), 9-35.
- Érdekes, A. (2015, January 7). A magyarok többsége Amerikát választaná és nem Oroszországot. Retrieved April 16, 2015 from <http://444.hu/2015/01/07/a-magyarok-tobbsege-amerikat-valasztana-es-nem-oroszorszagot/>.
- European statistics. (2014, January 1). Retrieved January 14, 2015, from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/help/new-eurostat-website>
- Feffer, J. (2014, April 30). Jobbik: Looking East. Retrieved March 17, 2015, from <http://www.johnfeffer.com/jobbik-looking-east>
- Fidelitas - az Új Nemzedék (2015). 'Rólunk.' Retrieved April 3, 2015 from <http://fidelitas.hu/rolunk/>.
- Flanagan, S., & Dalton, R. (1990). Models of Change. In *The Western European Party System* (pp. 232-246). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fowler, B. (2004). Concentrated orange: Fidesz and the remaking of the Hungarian centre-right, 1994–2002. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20(3), 80-114.
- Fowler, B., Hanley, S., Szezerbiak, A., & Haughton, T. (2007). Explaining the Success of Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis. *Sussex European Institute Working Paper*, 94.
- Halasz, K. (2009). The Rise Of The Radical Right In Europe And The Case Of Hungary: 'Gypsy Crime' Defines National Identity? *Development*, 52(4), 490-494.
- Hanley, S. (2004). Getting the right right: Redefining the centre-right in post-communist Europe. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20(3), 9-27.
- Hooghe, M. (2004). Political Socialization and the Future of Politics. *Acta Politica*, 39, 331-341.

- Hooghe, M., & Stolle, D. (2003). Age Matters: Life cycles and cohort differences in the socialization effect of voluntary participation. *European Political Science*, 3(2), 49-56.
- Hooghe, M., & Stolle, D. (2005). Youth Organization within Political Parties: Political recruitment and the transformation of party systems. In *Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice in Europe* (pp. 43-51). Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Horowitz, J. (2010). *The Post-Communist Generation in the Former Eastern Bloc*. Washington: Pew Research Center Publications.
- Hungary Around the Clock. (2013, September 30). Orbán says Fidesz won't be servant to EU, banks. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20130930/orban-says-fidesz-wont-be-servants-to-eu-banks/>.
- Hungary Around the Clock. (2014, May 19). Budapest mayor says Christian performances needed. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140519/budapest-mayor-says-christian-performances-needed/>.
- Hungary Around the Clock. (2014, September 24). Fidesz to have two-thirds majority on Constitutional Court. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140924/fidesz-to-have-two-thirds-majority-on-constitutional-court/>.
- Hungary Around the Clock. (2015, May 16). Fidesz turns its sights on Jobbik. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20140516/fidesz-turns-its-sights-on-jobbik/>
- Hungary Basic Law. art. L, § 1-2.
- Hungary Basic Law. art. II.
- Hungary Basic Law. art. 36, § 4 - 6.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, February 11). Jobbik at all-time high as new poll finds support for Fidesz continuing to slide. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20150211/jobbik-at-all-time-high-as-new-poll-finds-support-for-fidesz-continuing-to-slide/>
- Hungary Matters. (2015, March 17). Jobbik rides high in Ipsos poll. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150317/jobbik-rides-high-in-ipsos-poll/>.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, March 17). Lawmakers widen Sunday shopping restrictions. Retrieved April 3, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20150317/lawmakers-widen-sunday-shopping-restrictions/>.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, April 3). Lázár rules out cooperation with Jobbik at weekly press briefing. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150403/lazar-rules-out-cooperation-with-jobbik-at-weekly-press-briefing/>.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, April 9). Medián poll shows support for Fidesz is at two-year low. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150409/median-poll-shows-support-for-fidesz-is-at-two-year-low/>.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, April 10). Jobbik lawmaker under investigation for Holocaust denial. Retrieved April 19, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150410/jobbik-lawmaker-under-investigation-for-holocaust-denial/>.
- Hungary Matters. (2015, April 10). Local Roma leaders says national Roma Self-gov't committed fraud. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150410/local-roma-leader-says-national-roma-self-govt-committed-fraud/>.

- Hungary Today. (2015, March 12). Jobbik MP's Leaked Recording Exposes Party's Strategy. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://hungarytoday.hu/cikk/jobbik-mps-leaked-recording-exposes-partys-strategy-58649>.
- Hyman H. (1959). *Political Socialization: A study in the psychology of political behavior*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Index.hu. (2015, May 19). Orbán: sosem voltunk multikulturális társadalom. Retrieved May 24, 2015 from http://index.hu/kulfold/eurologus/2015/05/19/orban_sosem_voltunk_multikulturalis_tarsadalom/.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). From Class-based to Values-based Politics. In *The Western European Party System* (pp. 266 - 284). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). The Nature of Value Change. In *The Western European Party System* (pp. 247 - 252). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat (2015). 'Mi a célunk?' Retrieved April 4, 2015 from <http://jobbikit.hu/mi-a-celunk>.
- Jobbik.com. (2015, February 21). Policies. Retrieved April 19, 2015 from <http://jobbik.com/policies>.
- Jobbik.hu - Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk. - Választási program 2014. (2014, February 15). Retrieved February 17, 2015, from <http://jobbik.hu/hireink/kimondjuk-megoldjuk-valasztasi-program-2014>
- Keil, A. (2011, September 5). *European Values and Youth in Hungary: Mobility, tolerance, post-materialist values and participation of Hungarian youth in a comparative perspective*. Paper presented at UACES 41st Annual Conference: Citizenship and Rights panel, Cambridge. DOI: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1101/keil_a.pdf
- Kiss, C. (2002). From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young Democrats in Post-Communist Hungary. *East European Politics & Societies*, 16(3), 739-763.
- Kitschelt, H. (2007). Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. *West European Politics*, 30(5), 1176-1206.
- Kormany.hu. (2015, May 5). Nemzeti Konzultáció a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról. Retrieved May 24, 2015, from http://www.kormany.hu/download/7/e2/50000/nemzeti_konzultacio_bevandorlas_2015.pdf.
- Kuli, A. (2014, May 25). Hungary's ruling party scores majority in European Parliament vote as far-right eclipses divided left. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20140525/hungarys-ruling-party-scores-majority-in-european-parliament-vote-as-far-right-eclipses-divided-left/>
- Kuruc.info - Cigány csürhe lincselte halálra egy pedagógust. (2006, October 16). Retrieved January 16, 2015, from <https://kuruc.info/r/2/6487/>
- Körösényi, A. (1999). *Government and Politics in Hungary*. Budapest: Akaprint.
- Kürti, L. (2012). Twenty Years After: Rock Music and National Rock in Hungary. *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, 1(1), 93-130.
- Leaning, J., Bhabha, J., Fuller, A., Matache, M., Snayerson, B., & Bronsther, C. (2014). *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*. Boston: Harvard University Press.

- Lijphart, A. (1990). Dimensions of Ideology in European Party Systems. In *The Western European Party System* (pp. 253 - 265). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lipset, S., & Rokkan, S. (1990). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In *The Western European Party System* (pp. 91 - 138). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Medián. (2012, March 12). Egy szabadságharc frontvonalai: A közvélemény az IMF-tárgyalásokról és az EU-ról. Retrieved April 16, 2015 from <http://median.hu/object.90dcfe43-2f4b-448d-adb4-6bb74fdf1129.ivy>.
- Medián. (2014, February 13). Paksi bővítés: Súlyos fenntartások. Retrieved April 16, 2015 from <http://median.hu/object.57f2f4fe-d1cd-4a70-9496-3b4de41e3126.ivy>.
- MNO - Jobbik: Olaszliszka után új romapolitika kell. (2006, October 16). *Magyar Nemzet*. Retrieved February 16, 2015, from <http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-utan-uj-romapolitika-kell-473660>
- MNO - Az Együtt és Bajnai kusza pénzügyei. (2015, January 31). *Magyar Nemzet*. Retrieved April 7, 2015, from http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/az-egyutt-es-bajnai-kusza-penzugyei-1270531
- MTI. (2014, January 18). Jobbik to overthrow past 24 years, says Vona. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20140118/jobbik-to-overthrow-past-24-years-says-vona/>
- MTI. (2014, March 24). Jobbik preparing for surprise victory in election, says Vona. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20140324/jobbik-preparing-for-surprise-victory-in-election-says-vona/>
- MTI. (2014, March 27). Jobbik only credible alternative to ruling parties, says Vona. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20140327/jobbik-only-credible-alternative-to-ruling-parties-says-vona/>
- MTI. (2014, May 28). Christian Democrats criticize EC rejection of pro-life initiative. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140528/christian-democrats-criticize-ec-rejection-of-pro-life-initiative/>.
- MTI. (2014, August 12). Orbán asks European Council to protect Christians in Iraq. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140812/orban-asks-european-council-to-protect-christians-in-iraq/>.
- MTI. (2014, September 27). Jobbik mayoral candidate suggests creating Budapest Guard to combat 'beggars' mafia.' Retrieved April 2, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140927/jobbik-mayoral-candidate-suggests-creating-budapest-guard-to-combat-beggars-mafia/>.
- MTI. (2014, September 27). PM says Hungary needs Christian democracy, not liberal democracy. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20140927/pm-says-hungary-needs-christian-democratic-governance-not-liberal-democracy/>.
- MTI. (2014, October 13). Orbán: "Third win" in the bag amid low turnout. Retrieved April 19, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20141013/orban-third-win-in-the-bag-amid-low-turnout/>.
- MTI. (2014, November 9). Deputy PM suspects opposition behind foreign criticism of gov't. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20141109/deputy-pm-suspects-opposition-behind-foreign-criticism-of-govt/>.
- MTI. (2014, November 23). IPSOS: Fidesz support falls 5 percent in a month. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20141123/ipsos-fidesz-support-falls-5-percent-in-a-month/>.

- MTI. (2014, December 11). Fidesz support down 12 points in November, latest poll shows. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20141211/fidesz-support-down-12-points-in-november-latest-poll-shows/>.
- MTI. (2014, December 16). Parliament approves Sunday closure for shops. Retrieved April 3, 2015, from <http://www.politics.hu/20141216/parliament-approves-sunday-closure-for-shops/>.
- Magyar Helsinki Bizottság - Joint NGO statement on the racist statements of Miskolc police chief. (2009, February 3). Retrieved January 16, 2015, from <http://helsinki.hu/en/joint-ngo-statement-on-the-racist-statements-of-miskolc-police-chief>
- Minkenberg, M. (2010). *Historical legacies and the radical right in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe*. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag.
- Minkenberg, M. (2011). *The Radical Right in Europe*. Guetersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Muddle, C. (2014, April 14). The 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections, or how to craft a constitutional majority. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved April 6, 2015, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-majority/>.
- National Election Office. (2014, April 28). 2014 Parliamentary Elections. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from http://valasztas.hu/en/ogyv2014/416/416_0_index.html
- National Election Office. (2014, June 3). 2014 Elections to the European Parliament. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from http://valasztas.hu/en/ep2014/422/422_0_index.html
- Nemzeti Útdíjfizetési Szolgáltató Zrt. (2015). Pricing 2015. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from <http://www.toll-charge.hu/Toll-tariffs/Pricing-2015/>.
- Orbán, V. (2014, July 29). The era of the work-based state is approaching (a speech in Tusnádfürdő, Romania at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp). Retrieved April 1, 2015, from <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-era-of-the-work-based-state-is-approaching>.
- Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014. április. 6. (2014, April 28). Retrieved April 6, 2015, from <http://valasztas.hu/dyn/pv14/szavossz/hu/orszlist.html>.
- Pacheco, J.S. (2008). Political Socialization in Context: The effect of political competition on youth voter turnout. *Political Behavior*, 30, 415-436.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Róna, D., & Karácsony, G. (2010). The Secret of Jobbik. The Determinants of the Rise of the Hungarian Extreme Right. *Review of Political Science (Politikatudományi Szemle)*, (1), 31-63.
- RT.com. (2013, August 20). Вступление Венгрии в ЕС поставило под вопрос будущее сельского хозяйства в стране. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from <http://russian.rt.com/article/14237>.
- Saltman, E. (2014). *Turning Right: A Case Study on Contemporary Socialization of the Hungarian Youth* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (UCL), London.
- Sapiro, V. (2004). Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a new generation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7, 1-23.
- Sartori, G. (2005). *Parties and Party Systems: A framework for analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Scheppele, K. (2015, March 17). Hungary Without Two Thirds. *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 18, 2015 from http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/hungary-without-two-thirds/?_r=0.
- Sitter, N. (2011). 'The Hungarian Party System in 2010.' *Centre for European and Asian Studies*, 6(1), 1-11. Retrieved March 9, 2015, from http://www.academia.edu/5485729/The_Hungarian_Party_System_in_2010
- Spirova, M. (2007). *Political parties in post-communist societies: Formation, persistence, and change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Standard Eurobarometer 72. (2014, November 1). Retrieved April 1, 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm.
- Standard Eurobarometer 82. (2009, September 1). Retrieved April 1, 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_en.htm.
- Szabó, A., Oross, D., Róna, D., & Keil, A. (2013). *Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students*. Prague: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
- Szabó, A., Oross, D., Róna, D., & Keil, A. (forthcoming, 2015). *Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students*. Prague: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
- Szabó, M. (1988). New Factors in Political Socialization of Youth in Hungary: The alternative social movements and subcultures. *PRAXIS International*, 8(1), 26-33.
- Szabó, M. (1991). Political Socialization in Hungary. In *Politics and the European Younger Generation*. Oldenburg: BIS.
- Szécsi, Z. (2014, November 18). Orbán's office offers up HUF 500 million for "religious and moral education." Retrieved April 18, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20141118/orbans-office-gives-out-huf-500-million-for-religious-and-moral-education/>.
- Szécsi, Z. (2015, April 6). Gov't promises billions for Tapolca hospital days before local by-election. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from <http://www.politics.hu/20150406/govt-promises-billions-for-tapolca-hospital-days-before-local-by-election/>.
- Vachudova, M. (2008). Centre--Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe. *Party Politics*, 14(4), 387-405.
- Vidra, Z., & Fox, J. (2014). Mainstreaming of Racist Anti-Roma Discourses in the Media in Hungary. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 12(4), 437-455.
- Volgyes, I. (1975). *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe*. London: Praeger Publishers.

ⁱ Original response: Most is például meghoztak pár olyan nehéz döntést, ami a népszerűségüket visszavetette, de ha hosszú távon gondolkozik az ember, rájön, hogy ez jó lesz az országnak. (...) Hát például ami engem is elég keményen érintett, az új felsőoktatási politika. Tehát ott is inkább azokat a szakokat próbálják támogatni, amiből hiány van az országban. Ugye a közgázt is eléggé megnyirbálták, az az én szakomnak se tett jót, mert én gazdaságinformatikára járok, és nagyon sok közgázos jött át hozzánk, ezért nagyon megugrott a ponthatár. Igen, igen, viszont ez kell az országnak, mert azokat a szakokat támogatják, amiből hiány van. Mind az informatika, mind a mérnöki, és ugye a közgázt vetették egy elég jó szinten vissza, de ugye tudjuk, hogy ebből eléggé sok van az országban... és a szakképzést is támogatják.”

ⁱⁱ Original response: “Visszatérve az előzőre... tehát inkább a Fidesznek a fő benyomása az élénkítés, tehát fiskális politikát alkalmaz úgymond, próbálja élénkíteni a gazdaságot, és próbálja arra ösztönözni az embereket, hogy a munka az egy olyan dolog, amire építhetjük a jövőnket. Tehát igen, ahogy [ő] is elmondta, ott is benne volt, hogy inkább a termékekre veti ki az adót, nem a jövedelemre, tehát ezzel is inspirálja az embereket, hogy elmenjenek úgymond dolgozni, amivel szerintem tehát hosszú távon gondolkozik, nem csak a következő lépést nézi, ez nagyon jó a gazdaságpolitikában.”

ⁱⁱⁱ Original response: “az alkotmányban, tehát azt gondolom, hogy az alkotmányt szóról-szóra nem ismerem, mert nem jogi hallgató vagyok, hanem ahogy nézem, több ellenőrzési jogot adtak maguknak, mind a cégekkel szemben, mind a piaccal szemben, mivel tehát ami korábban ez nem volt teljesen kifejlődve, hogy hogy lehet a lehető legönközpontúbban egy gazdaságot kialakítani, addig ma akár tetszik, akár nem, a lehető legkapzsibb világban élünk, és ebből kifolyólag egy bizonyos védelmi vonalat önmagunkon belül kell húzni.”

^{iv} Original response: “Amúgy szerintem a legfontosabb mindenképpen a társadalmi problémáknak a megoldása, amik nagyon sok esetben etnikai és kulturális vonatkozásúak is. Szerintem annak a belátásán sok múlhat, illetve az, hogy mikor tudunk elkezdni azzal egyáltalán kezdeni valamit, hogy egy etnikai bombán ülünk... önmagában az a tény a legfontosabb ebben, hogy az eltartottak és az eltartók aránya kezd eltolódni, és hogy ezzel a mindenkori hatalom nem kezd semmit, mert minél több az eltartott, minél több a „mélyigénytelen”, annál olcsóbb a szavazatvásárlás.”

^v Answer given in English.

^{vi} Answer given in English.

^{vii} Original response: “Én sokszor úgy gondoltam, hogy a Jobbik az egyetlen olyan fórum Magyarországon, aki az emberekkel, a mindennapi emberekkel, azokkal, akik reggel felkelnek, elmennek dolgozni, nevelik a gyerekeiket, velük akar foglalkozni, az ő életüket akarja megoldani, míg az elmúlt több mint 70 év politikai helyzete csak egy felső réteget szolgált ki, és volt egy alsó társadalom, akik meg tapostak...”

^{viii} Original response: “...Gondolok itt például arra, hogy a nagyobb multinacionális vállalatok, a termelő multinacionális vállalatokról beszélek, telepedjenek meg, mint itt helyben a Bosch vagy most a Takata, viszont már a beszállítói köröket helyben a magyar kis- és középvállalkozók adják hozzá, ezzel is a termelési láncot kicsit bővítve, aztán a későbbiekben majd lépünk ezen túl.”

^{ix} Answer given in English.

^x Original response: “Pontosan, tehát amit az előbb elmondtak, hogy mondjam... mióta összeolvadt a KDNP-vel ugye a Fidesz, azóta inkább arra hajaz a többi országgal szemben, hogy az alap értékrendek azok legyenek, amik a Bibliában vannak lefektetve. Tehát konzervatívabb

egy kicsit, nem megy el annyira se a baloldali irányba, se a liberalista irányba, hanem ad egy fix értékrendet, amit követ maga az ország.”

^{xi} Answer given in English.

^{xii} Original response: “Én úgy gondolom, hogy ez egy ilyen nagyon furcsa dolog Magyarországon, merthogy 50 év úgy telt el, hogy magát a keresztény vallást nem lehetett gyakorolni Magyarországon, csak nagyon titokban, nagyon visszaszorított.”

^{xiii} Original response: “...Egyrészt ez egy visszafordulás a középkor felé, amikor nagy volt Magyarország, a régi Magyarországhoz, ami alapvetően egy keresztény ország volt, tehát nekünk nem hiába példaképeink Szent István, Szent László főleg, illetve hát ugye a többi nagy ilyen keresztény, illetve leginkább katolikus, de azért később azért református vezetők... Tehát alapvetően, mivel Magyarország itt, Közép-Európában keresztény ország volt, ez ugye egy megtartó erő volt 1945-ig, még a legnehezebb időszakokban is. És azt szeretnénk, ami 1945 előtt volt...”

^{xiv} Original response: “Az, hogy mennyire keresztény vagy nem keresztény a Fidesz... ugye most a Kereszténydemokrata Néppárttal van együtt, ami mondjuk azt, hogy egy zombi párt... nagyon érdekes, hogy most mekkora keresztények, míg a kilencvenes évek elején a ‘térdre csuhások’...”

^{xv} Original response: “Fontosnak fontos, én inkább olyan szemszögből... számomra személyes érintettség nincs, tehát pusztán rokonok nincsenek a határon túl, viszont nagyon sok ismerősnek maradt, és ennyiben érzékelem ezt a különbséget, illetve tehát a másik, amit nagyon fontosnak látok ezzel kapcsolatban, hogy én ugye Budapesten nevelkedtem fel, ott viszonylag ez kevésbé volt fontos. Itt, ahogy Debrecenbe lejöttem, és tényleg azt láttam, hogy nagyon sok embernek, nagyon sok ismerősömnek van a határon túl ismerőse [rokona], számukra viszont jóval fontosabb lett ez a kérdéskör.”

^{xvi} Original response: “szerintem ez elég fontos a határon túliak számára, és a 2014-es országgyűlési választáson, ha jól tudom, Romániában a határon túli magyarok 95%-a a jelenlegi kormánypártra voksolt, az 250 000 szavazatot jelent kb., ami szintén szerintem jól tükrözi azt, hogy az ő részükről is.”

^{xvii} Original response: “Azért én a határon túli dologhoz azt hozzátenném, hogy az MSZP-kormány alatt volt egy népszavazás erről, és a „nem” mellett kampányoltak, hogy ne kapjanak kettős állampolgárságot, most meg teljesen más képet mutatnak, most már szeretnék az ő szavazatukat, elég álságos dolog, kétszínű az ő szempontjukból.”

^{xviii} Original response: “Erkölcsei okok tekintetében ugye én elég nagy javulást látok a Fideszben is, mióta a KDNP-vel összeolvadt, úgymond. Ennek nagyon örülök, a másik pedig, hogy igazából erkölcsileg ez a legmagasabb szinten álló párt, mert hogy ha megnézzük a többi, a Jobbik is most... nem akarok ebbe nagyon belemenni, de ott is inkább egy-egy adott népcsoportra próbálják ráterelni a problémát, mikor hogy itt szerintem más okok vannak...”

^{xix} Here ensued a lengthy discussion that I reproduce in full for clarity:

Speaker 1: “Érdekes, mert hogy ugye azt mondják, hogy amikor a cigánybűnözést felhozzák, ez van Magyarországon, létezik ez a dolog, ezt eddig nagyon sokan nem mondták ki, de mindenki tudta. Én is úgy nőttem föl, tudtuk, hogy a falu végén van egy utca, ahova senki be se teszi a lábát, mert hogyha biciklivel keresztülmegyek rajta, akkor a biciklimet, a cipőmet, mindent elvesznek. És tudtuk, hogy kik azok az emberek..., de az emberek erről nem beszéltek. Hogyha elloptak valamit, maximum még a szomszéd tudta... mindenki tudta, hogy ki volt. És akkor a Jobbik ezt felhozta, hogy ezt nem kell túrni, nem lehet egy olyan társadalomban élni, ahol egy élősködő típusú faj is van az ember mellett, mert egyszerűen kihasználják azt, hogy ők kapnak egy támogatást. És azt mondják, hogy ugye mi bélyegezzük meg őket, közben meg ők eleve meg vannak bélyegezve, tehát ők eleve úgy nőnek fel, hogy öneki jár a segély, öneki nem kell elmenni dolgozni, öneki elég a 4 általános vagy a 2, mert kap támogatást, és ezzel meg vannak bélyegezve, ők most meg vannak bélyegezve, és a Jobbik azt szeretné, hogyha nem ez lenne...”

Speaker 2: “Nem akarnak beilleszkedni a többségi társadalomba.”

Speaker 3: “És egyébként most a Jobbik pont azt akarja, hogy az építők közé minél többet és a rombolókat... tehát az építők és rombolók elválasztása. Tehát ez egy nagyon, abszolút megvalósítható dolog, több példa is van rá már az országban, ahol Jobbikos vezetés van, hogy ezt igenis meg lehet oldani. Keményen, karakánan, de alapvetően nem erőszakosan, hanem tény: munkára nevelni az embereket, mert aki nem dolgozik, ne is egyék alapon... tehát ez nagyon régóta igazságos mondás...”

Speaker 1: Most vannak megbélyegezve, most vannak egy olyan státuszban tartva, és szándékosan vannak ebben a státuszban tartva, hogy a magyar emberek tartják el őket, és ez az ellentét így éleződik közöttük.

Speaker 4: „(főleg a liberális) média tehet róla hogy idáig fajult a helyzet, meg a cigány vezetés...”

Speaker 2: „Tehát azok, akik elvileg szószólóik, ők a legnagyobb korrupctak az országban, már csak egy részük, persze, de alapvetően korrupct a vezetésük...”

^{xx} See conversation above (endnote xxvi)

^{xxi} Original response: “...Aztán 2009 elején volt egy haláleset, amikor is egy híres román kézilabdázót megkéseltek, Marian Cozmának hívták őt. És ezzel szemben volt egy tüntetés Budapesten, amit a Magyar Gárda és a Jobbik szervezett...”

^{xxii} Original response in full: “Igen, itt kapcsolnám igazából valahol össze, hogy ugye ez a fajta magyarázat ez alapvetően nyilván egyfajta rasszizmust sugall. Amit mi mondunk, hogy ez egy kriminológiai gyűjtőfogalom, tehát olyan bűncselekményeknek az elkövetését foglalja magába, amit döntő többségében cigányok követnek el... És akkor ilyen dolgokra gondolok én mint, bár nem tudom, hogy Michaelnek mennyire fog ez átjönni, mint a színesfém-tolvajlás, az uzsoráztatás, az úgynevezett csicskáztatás... És akkor ugye, tehát alapvetően maga a cigányokkal kapcsolatos... mondjuk közbiztonsági problémák azok nagyjából ehhez tudnám kötni, tehát azt nem tudom, és nyilván nagyon nagy ostobaság lenne azt mondani, hogy mondjuk, amit ugye próbáltatok arra utalni, hogy a bűnözők többsége cigány..., ez abszolút, hogy ha erre irányult a kérdés, akkor ez határozottan... Igazából, hogy miért alakulhatott ki, én azt abban

látom, hogy a rendszerváltás környékén ugye ők voltak azok a... tehát az ő köreikben volt a legtöbb olyan ember, aki alacsony iskolázottsággal rendelkezett, és alapvetően, ahogy megszűntek a gyárak, üzemek, ugye akik felvették ezeket a munkaerőket, azok ugye hát bezártak, és ugye szélnek eresztették őket. Az elsődleges probléma az itt kezdődött, és a 25 év alatt pedig ez csak tovább eszkalálódott, és most már úgy nőnek fel generációk, hogy fogalmuk sincs arról, hogy mondjuk milyen egy... az alapvető kulturális normák, hogy esetleg egy normális családmódot nem látnak a gyerekek, hogy ugye apa, anya elmegy dolgozni, és igazából ők is csak azt látják, ami otthon van, és ezt találják követendő példának, és igazából mi ebben látjuk a problémának a gyökerét... Hát ugye, ahogy mondtam, ez egy elég komplex probléma, és erre nem lehet egyértelműen egy nagyon egyszerű választ adni, és ugye most már, amit mondtam előtte, hogy a maga a probléma is most már elég radikális, illetve eléggé nagy méreteket és drasztikus méreteket ölt. Ezért nem feltétlenül csak egy dologra fűztük fel a mi programunkban ennek az egész problémának a megoldását. Egyrészt a Hét vezér-tervben benne van, hogy... a különböző szakértőink megnézték, hogy mely bányákat, mely üzemeket lehetne, lenne érdemes újra üzembe állítani, ami ezeket az alacsony képzettségű embereket is ellátná munkával, és emellett... tehát ez az egyik, hogy kell munkalehetőséget adni ezeknek az embereknek. A másik része pedig, de alapvetően itt sem lehet egyértelműen csak a cigányságról beszélni... nyilván mi... tehát az építő és a romboló dolgok, amit mi az irányelvünknek vallunk. Vannak olyanok, akik a társadalomból totálisan kiilleszkedtek, őket próbálnánk meg ez által visszaterelni, illetve sok helyen, amit mondtam, hogy a gyerek az veszélyeztetve van, és olyan helyzetekben, olyan esetekben, amikor tényleg rendkívül súlyos egy családon belül a helyzet, onnan mi kiemelnénk a gyerekeket, és egy olyan speciális nevelőintézményben foglalkoztatnánk – akár papokkal – akik egyrészt adnak nekik egyrészt egy erkölcsi tartást, másrészt pedig olyan nevelők foglalkoznának velük, akik... és azért kellene ez a bentlakásos rendszer, mert abból a közegből alapvetően, és ez egy radikális megoldás, csak így tudjuk kiszakítani, mert hogyha azt látjuk, hogy hazajár, akkor alapvetően az otthon tapasztalt dolgok folyamatosan vissza fogják őt rántani ahelyett, hogy egyébként fejlődne, és a társadalom számára egy hasznos, értékes ember legyen. Ehhez egyrészt ugye nyilván kell, hogy odabent erkölcsileg is kapjon nevelést, illetve, hogy olyan versenyképes szakmához jusson ott, amivel el tud indulni az életben.”

^{xxiii} Original response: “Magával a tartalmával sem gondolom, hogy nagyobb problémák lennének, szerintem a tartalma önmagában rendben van, csak nem érzem úgy, hogy ezt, például a magyarság összetartozására vonatkozó és hasonló részeket a Fidesz meg tudná tölteni tartalommal.”

^{xxiv} Original response: “...nincs olyan, hogy nincs korrupció, csak azt szoktam mondani, hogy arányokat másképp találják el. Tehát nem mondom, hogy a másik fél feltétlenül rossz, csak az arányok nincsenek eltalálva.”

^{xxv} Original response: “Jelenleg szerintem a kormánynak a legnagyobb ellenfele nem a politikai ellenfelek, hanem az olyan álcivil szervezetek, akiket baloldaliak támogatnak Magyarországról illetve külföldről is sajnos, illetve az olyan média... orgánusok, amelyek ugye támadják a kormányt, szerintem most jelenleg ez a legnagyobb politikai ellenfél sajnos...”

^{xxvi} Answer given in English.

^{xxvii} Original response: “És nagyon fontos még annyit hozzátenni ehhez az egészhez, hogy ha nem módosították volna ennyire a választási rendszert is, akkor nem lenne kétharmada most a Fidesznek.”

^{xxviii} Answer given in English.

^{xxix} Original response: “Még annyit hozzátennék, hogy az alkotmányba beleraktak egy olyat, hogy a Magyarország GMO-mentesítését biztosították teljesen, úgyhogy alaptörvényben rögzítve van, és most az Unió próbálja Amerikával együtt ezt a szabadkereskedelmi egyezményt összehozni, ott meg az amerikai GMO-dolgokat... lesz még egy kis tárgyalás szerintem, ami ütközhet a magyar érdekekkel meg a magyar alaptörvénnyel.”

^{xxx} Original response: “Én még azt tenném hozzá, hogy nagyon kontrasztos és jól észrevehető, hogy a jobboldal, mondjuk a Fidesz, ellentétben a baloldallal a nemzeti érdekeket, értékeket, illetve a nemzet gazdaságát erősíti és védelmezi, míg a baloldal nyolcéves két ciklusa alatt azt láthattuk, hogy nem is azt mondom, hogy kiárusítják, az lehet, hogy erős szó, de abszolút nem kompetensen védik ezeket az értékeket és érdekeket, és inkább a külföldi érdekeknek próbálnak megfelelni.”

^{xxxi} Original response: “Maga az amerikai piac meg az orosz piac is hatalmas, azért az rengeteget jelenthet a magyar gazdaságnak... elég csak a gázra gondolni.”

^{xxxii} Original response: “Úgy gondolom, hogy világgazdasági szinten egy elég sokpólusú érdekszféra-ütközés figyelhető meg: az amerikai érdekek, Oroszország érdekei, Kína érdekei és az Európai Unió mint gazdasági egység érdekei ütköznek. Mi ugye tagjai vagyunk az Európai Uniónak és vannak bizonyos jogaink és kötelezettségeink, amiknek ugye meg kell felelni, a magyar gazdaságot harmonizálni kell, ugyanakkor nekünk, mint egy kis, világgazdasági szempontból nem túlságosan jelentékeny államnak nagyon jó az, hogy ha együtt tudunk működni mondjuk Oroszországgal is, Amerikával is. Ugyanakkor gondolom, hogy fontos az is, hogy ezt egy olyan kötéltáncsal, egy olyan egyensúlyozással, hogy ne sérüljön egyik világgazdaságot tekintve nagyobb felek oldalán ne sérüljön az érdek, tehát ne menjünk túl egy olyan mértéken egy gazdasági kollaboráció tekintetében, amely a másik fél érdekeit sérti, és ez nem egy könnyű művelet vagy feladat szerintem.”

^{xxxiii} Answer given in English.