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Identifying The Relationship Between Corruption Prevention, Integrity and Education in Hungary

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Contents

Abstract

The shift from the punishment to the prevention of corruption has become a focus of both academic and policy attention in recent years. The concept of integrity has provided a foundation for this preventative shift, postulating that societies that can both agree upon and act in coherence with a common set of values and norms can more effectively control corruption. The purpose of this study is to introduce the Corruption Prevention Programme, a programme that establishes the Hungarian government's recent efforts to prevent corruption through an integrity approach. This study is specifically focused on the inclusion of anti-corruption education for youth within the Corruption Prevention Programme, and seeks to ascertain why anti-corruption education has been included. Using the theory of generalised trust, this study will determine the theoretical relationship between corruption prevention, integrity and anti-corruption education. This study will then analyse how Hungary has used education to prevent corruption and rebuild integrity, using Transparency International's National Integrity System as a framework. Through the use of qualitative research methods, this study will further explore the rational behind Hungary's decision to include anti-corruption curriculum into the Corruption Prevention Programme. This study will conclude with several policy recommendations regarding the inclusion of anti-corruption curriculum based on the Hungarian experience.

Keywords: anti-corruption curriculum, generalised trust, integrity, corruption prevention, Hungary, Corruption Prevention Programme, National Integrity System

Abbreviations

Hungarian Government

MPAJ – Ministry of Public Administration and Justice
SAO – State Audit Office

Hungarian Political Parties

LMP – Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different)
MSZP - Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)
KDNP - Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (The Christian Democratic People's Party)

International Organisations

OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
TI – Transparency International
TI-H – Transparency International Hungary
UN – United Nations
UNCAC – United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

Tables

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Epigraph

"Better is the poor man who walks in his integrity than a rich man who is crooked in his ways" *(Proverbs 28:6, ESV)*

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Research Background

1.0.1 Corruption, Prevention and Education

Corruption is a term that is commonly used but widely debated in the literature. Generally speaking, it refers to an abuse of some sort of power, but different scholars have sought to impart their own interpretation of the phenomenon to the wider public. This dissertation is not concerned with a discussion of such interpretations, for although interesting, enough ink has been dedicated already.[1] Therefore, this dissertation will employ the most commonly used definition of corruption, which states that corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (www.transparency.org). This abuse can take on several different forms, such as grand corruption, petty corruption or political corruption. As noted by Transparency International (TI), grand corruption includes acts committed at a high level of government, which distort policies or the functions of the state (www.transparency.org). Petty corruption, on the other hand, refers to the everyday abuse of entrusted power by mid-to-low level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens (www.transparency.org). Political corruption is similar to grand corruption, except that it is publicly elected political officials, rather than high-level public officials, who misuse their office for their own benefit. When speaking about corruption, this dissertation is concerned with all three types, the rationale being that all three forms of corruption have a negative impact on the ability of the state and its citizens to function freely.

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[1] See for example Heywood, P. (2015) "The Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption" for the most recent discussion on the various definitions of corruption.

In his work on the impact of corruption on democracy, Warren (2004) advanced that corruption limits the very essence of democracy; that is, the ability of the public to influence decision-making (p. 328). Through corrupt acts, the rules and norms of public office are departed from for reasons of private gain, thus putting the public good second to the ambitions of a collective few. This leads to an erosion of trust between the public and their representatives, and like a cancer spreads, undermining the entire system. As people lose trust, a vicious circle is created, with more distrust leading to more corruption.

Given the pervasiveness of corruption, no country has been immune to its impacts, and it is therefore not surprising that anti-corruption measures and practices have become commonplace in both the literature and the vocabulary of state actors. Most want to be seen as "tough on corruption", which has lead to a plethora of anti-corruption strategies, laws, institutions, pacts and declarations. The international community has been active in this regard, with efforts resulting in (amongst others) the United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption (UNCAC); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention; and the Council of Europe's Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). Organisations with a specific mandate to eradicate corruption, like Transparency International (TI) have appeared, bringing along with them the Corruption Perceptions Index, the National Integrity System and the Global Corruption Report, all of which seek to shed light onto the phenomenon of corruption and offer tools for its control.

In the academic literature, the causes and remedies of corruption are discussed at length. Perhaps the most well-known corruption theory, coined by Robert Klitgaard in the late 1980s, defines the occurrence of corruption as 'corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability' (Klitgaard: 1988). This theory stipulates that corruption occurs when an individual or a group of individuals are given a monopoly over a resource and the ability to act with discretion in terms of the resource's allocation, with no accountability mechanisms in place to limit their power (Klitgaard 1988: 75). The response to this abuse of power has been to create strong, stable institutions that limit the monopoly of power and discretion of public officials through the use of accountability mechanisms. This has included establishing measures that eliminate the incentives for engaging in corruption by criminalizing various forms of corrupt activities, such as bribery of foreign and domestic public officials. The focus of these legislative measures is on the control of corruption through punishment, by making the costs outweigh the benefits. While these measures are incredibly important, and should not be dismissed from the anti-corruption toolkit, they alone have not eliminated corruption.

Therefore, the question remains – how can a state effectively address corruption? Warren (2004) found that the conception of corruption, based out of Klitgaard's model, has focused on rule-based approaches to controlling corruption (p. 331). In focusing on the rules, the importance of integrity and professionalism within institutions has been ignored, leading to the potential crippling of democracy, as public trust in democratic institutions declines (Warren 2004: 331). Warren has not been alone in suggesting a different approach to corruption control. Academics and practitioners alike are now

proposing the addition of 'preventative' measures to the existing punishment approach. Doig (2012) has justified this shift by noting the obvious: prevention is better than the cure, as it is more effective to prevent than to respond to an existing problem (p. 3). Graycar and Penzler (2013) have also stipulated that preventative measures need to complement the punishment approach. Tracing the development of anti-corruption legislation and institutions, they emphasised that in order for the punishment mechanisms to be effective, preventative mechanisms, such as a commitment to high standards by public officials, are required to control corruption (Graycar and Penzler 2013: 56).

In response to this shift, international organisations are imploring states to create an integrity system approach to control corruption. The integrity system approach combines both rule-based and values-based mechanisms to control corruption. The OECD has advocated that integrity through a complementary system of rules and values fosters resistance to corruption and is essential in maintaining public confidence in government and its decisions (OECD 2009: 9). Likewise, Jeremy Pope, a founder of TI's National Integrity System, maintained that

> Monitoring corruption cannot be left only to the public prosecutors and to the forces of law and order […] Although corruption can never be completely monitored, it can be controlled through a combination of ethical codes, decisive legal prosecutions against offenders, organisational change, and institution reform (Pope, as cited in Doig and McIvor 2003: 319)

He further noted that an integrity system approach is not a one-time cure, but rather an increase in the honesty and integrity of the government as a whole (Pope, as cited in Doig and McIvor 2003: 319). A key concept for the control of corruption therefore is the need to create a culture that emphasises integrity and ethics as the common behaviour in public

and private dealings. At an organisational level, codes of conduct can be established and ethics training provided to educate the staff on the key attributes of honesty and integrity. In a country, changing the culture is a larger task, as it looks at changing the social, political and economic culture, but the tools used are similar. Changing the culture of a country towards an integrity mind-set requires a concerted effort to equip citizens with the tools to act with integrity in the face of ethical dilemmas. This can be done through education, such as curriculum reform, professional training and awareness campaigns. The effort to change the culture through education provides a unique opportunity to introduce a prevention (values-based) approach to the punishment (rules-based) approach.

Education about corruption can take on several different forms, each aimed at a different target. Such measures can include ethics training for public servants, awareness campaigns about corruption for the public, and education programmes for children and youth. Each represents an interesting field of inquiry, although the focus of this dissertation is on education programmes for the children and youth. In recent years, advocacy for education about corruption for youth has become a part of the anti-corruption rhetoric, finding support at the international level, including the UN and TI. Broadly speaking, these IOs have identified anti-corruption education as a key tool for equipping the younger generation with the integrity mind-set. Article 13 of UNCAC has implored signatories to undertake "public education programmes, including school and university curricula" that contribute to the non-tolerance of corruption (UNCAC, Article 13c). Likewise, in Strategy 2015, TI identified education as one of the tools to facilitate

the empowerment of people against corruption, noting the need to encourage educational bodies to include anti-corruption education in educational materials, courses and syllabi (Transparency International 2011: 17). The rationale behind this rhetoric is that youth's engagement in every aspect of society (as students, citizens, customers and employees) makes them extremely vulnerable to corruption (www.u4.no). This vulnerability is not necessarily a negative thing, as youth's natural openness towards change and new ideas makes them the ideal group to equip with the tools and knowledge needed to control corruption. As argued in the 2013 "Expert Answer" report published by U4 and TI, the younger segment of any population "are an integral element for the success of a cultural change in attitudes and behaviours towards corruption and in the shaping of the values, since they represent the future of their countries" (www.u4.no). Thus, education for young people can be considered a useful tool in equipping the youngest of society with the values required to effectively prevent corruption.

1.0.2 Case Study: Hungary

The case study for this dissertation is Hungary, where corruption is considered widespread, resulting in low levels of social trust and support for the market economy and liberal democracy. TI-Hungary's 2011 National Integrity Study revealed that when compared with other European countries, Hungarians express very low levels of trust in their government, political parties, Parliament, trade unions and media (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 29). The study further elaborated that although Hungarians view acts of corruption and rule-breaking as morally wrong, the perception that one cannot get ahead by running a clean and fair business has resulted in a general tolerance

towards rule-breaking (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 29). The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer report ("the Report) from TI further supported these findings, stating that 61 per cent of Hungarians perceive corruption to be on the rise in their country (Transparency International 2013a).[2] According to the Report, the political and business sectors are not trusted to act in the interests of the public and corruption is perceived to be widespread within national and regional public institutions (Transparency International 2013a). In terms of reporting corruption, the majority of people responded that they would not be willing, because they felt that it would not make a difference. TI concluded that this demonstrates a lack of confidence in the state's existing laws and enforcement. Nevertheless, the report also highlighted that a majority of respondents (71 per cent) in Hungary believe that ordinary people could be effective in the fight against corruption (Transparency International 2013a). The various perception indices regarding levels of trust and corruption demonstrate that corruption continues to be a problem plaguing Hungarian society. While corruption is considered morally wrong, the belief that refraining from corruption will negatively impact one's ability to succeed in the economy impedes the average citizen's appetite to control it.

The current Hungarian government has introduced major anti-corruption reforms, signing a declaration on 18 November 2011 that promised joint and efficient government action against corruption. With this declaration, "signatories made a personal moral commitment to strengthen the ability of the state to resist corruption" (www.corruptionprevention.gov.hu). This involved the adoption of Government Decision

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[2] According to the Report, 33 per cent of Hungarians perceive corruption to have increased a lot, while 28 per cent consider corruption to have increased a little (Transparency International 2013a).

No. 1104/2012 (herein referred to as 'the Corruption Prevention Programme'), which set out twenty-two aims to address corruption within the bureaucratic sector and society as a whole. The majority of these measures are aimed at reforming the state, and emphasise the need for more transparency in decision-making and public sector integrity. Of particular interest to this study is measure eighteen, which requires the introduction of education about corruption into the school curriculum. As indicated in the Corruption Prevention Programme,

> In the field of public education, it is necessary to make sure that certain values and pieces of knowledge in connection with acts of corruption and the forms of behaviour and countermeasures that can be taken against such acts are included in the National Core Curriculum (Government Decision No. 1104/2012)

As a whole, the Corruption Prevention Programme has demonstrated a shift in focus from a legal framework that punishes corruption to an integrity-based prevention framework that educates the public, politicians and public servants on what corruption is, why it is wrong, and how to prevent it. It is thought that by coupling this prevention framework with the legal framework, Hungary will be better equipped to control corruption.

In post-communist countries, where experience with democratic government is only 25 years old, the culture change needs to be widespread. This means addressing all elements of society. Hungary presents a unique case study, as it is shifting away from an exclusive punishment approach, looking towards changing the societal, economic and political culture of the country.

1.1 Research Focus

As evidenced above, installing an integrity system approach into the governance process has become a widely accepted best practice in the fight against corruption. International organisations such as the UN and TI have advocated the pursuit of integrity within both government and society. A theoretical assumption that will be further expanded on in chapter 2 postulates that once government reform results in rebuilding society's trust, corruption prevention will be more effective. While much academic attention has been given to the development of integrity, ethics and norms within government institutions, little has been said regarding its development within society through public education. At the same time, organisations like the UN and TI advocate for the inclusion of curricula about corruption into the school systems, with TI including public education programmes as an indicator of integrity in their National Integrity System.

In spite of this, very little research has been devoted to the policy development and implementation process surrounding such a tool. This lack of research highlights five important questions. First, does education against corruption fit within a country's wider integrity framework? Second, where does education against corruption fit? Third, why does education against corruption fit within an integrity system? Fourth, within the curriculum itself, where should education against corruption be placed? Fifth, how effective is education against corruption in achieving its goal of cultivating citizens to act with integrity and prevent corruption within society?

A critical engagement with all five of these questions is beyond the scope of this research project. Given the newness of this field within the social sciences literature, it is therefore the intention of this dissertation to focus on the first three questions. **An overall research aim thus emerges: using Hungary as a case study, determine whether anti-corruption education fits within an integrity system, where it fits, and why.**

The specific research objectives of this study are as follows:

1. Determine the theoretical relationship between corruption prevention, integrity and anti-corruption education through a review of the literature.
2. Using Transparency International's National Integrity System as a framework, analyse how Hungary is using education to prevent corruption and rebuild integrity.
3. Explore the rational behind Hungary's decision to include anti-corruption curriculum into the Corruption Prevention Programme, based out of interviews with policymakers, politicians and members of civil society.
4. Provide policy recommendations regarding the inclusion of anti-corruption curriculum based on Hungary's experience.

1.2 Research Significance

Although the widely ratified UNCAC identifies the role of school curricula in equipping members of civil society, few countries have taken steps to include anti-corruption curriculum into their wider integrity frameworks. For those countries that have taken such steps, little exists in the academic literature surrounding the policy development process. The lack of academic discussion regarding such a policy therefore demonstrates a critical need to study the policy development process of anti-corruption curriculum.

1.3 Dissertation Layout

Chapter 2 contains an examination of the various theories related to generalised trust and corruption prevention, before introducing the concept of integrity. Following this is a review of the existing literature on anti-corruption education development. A discussion is then held regarding the purpose of integrity systems, followed by an overview of Hungary's shift towards the integrity approach to fighting corruption. The result of the review of the literature will be the identification of the gaps this study will fill.

Chapter 3, in order to fulfil the third research objective of evaluating the corruption theories and associated best practices for prevention, provides a comprehensive consideration of the chosen research methods and explains how they are to be implemented.

Chapter 4 contains a description, analysis and synthesis of the case study, whereas Chapter 5 contains a description, analysis and synthesis of the elite interview findings. The results of both these chapters are discussed in relation to Chapter 2 and in reference to contextual information in order to meet the third research objective and, in response to the overall research aim, to better understand the significance of anti-corruption education in a wider integrity approach to corruption prevention.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions that may be drawn from the work of the preceding chapters and makes recommendations in line with the fourth research objective. Chapter

6 concludes by noting the limitations of the study and suggesting areas for further research.

1.4 Research Constraints

It is important to set out the research parameters of this discussion. This dissertation will not analyse the content of the curriculum from a pedagogical point of view, nor will it analyse the appropriateness of the content for the various learners in terms of their cognitive abilities. While interesting questions, these areas of analysis are of a pedagogical nature, whereas this dissertation is anchored in the discipline of political science.

Additionally, questions regarding corruption within the school system within Hungary will be purposely avoided, as they are beyond the scope of this particular area of inquiry. Finally, this dissertation will not answer questions related to the effectiveness of the anti-corruption education in achieving its goal of cultivating citizens to act with integrity and prevent corruption within society. Given the recent implementation of the curriculum, it is unrealistic to expect any major impact at this time.

1.5 Summary

This chapter set out the research direction of this dissertation. Focusing on Hungary as the main point of analysis, the importance of education in the fight against corruption was established. The following chapter contains a review of the literature relevant to the

discussion at hand and will further explore the research gap this dissertation intends to

fill.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This chapter addresses the first research objective and seeks to determine the relationship between corruption prevention, integrity and anti-corruption education. Section 2.1 introduces the relevant theories, with a specific emphasis on the concepts of generalised trust, historical legacies and corruption prevention. Section 2.2 introduces the definition of integrity, whereas section 2.3 analyses the relationship between anti-corruption education, integrity and generalised trust. Section 2.4 on the National Integrity System draws these concepts together, thereby demonstrating the relationship, before highlighting the gap that this dissertation will fill.

2.1 Theory

2.1.1 Defining Trust and Identifying its Origins

The notion of rebuilding trust underpins the prevention approach. At its most basic formation, trust involves the belief that others, so far as they can, will look out for the interests of others and refrain from taking advantage of them (Newton 1999: 171) As perfect information about how a society functions is unavailable, the decision whether or not to trust someone is based on clues collected from previous social interactions (Rothstein 2013: 1020). Markova (2004) has suggested that trust develops through what individuals conceive, create and maintain to be the social reality in terms of the actions of others (p. 3). Gunnarson (2008) defined this type of trust as *generalised trust*, in which people who are not personally known to one another trust each other (2008: 2). As Offe (2004) pointed out, generalised trust prevails if people operate on the assumption that

most of the time, most people can be relied upon not to deceive or take unfair advantage of each other (p. 93). Furthermore, generalised trust exists when people show a measure of respect for the rules and laws that are meant to limit abuses by society (Offe 2004: 93).

Trust matters in the context of corruption prevention because low levels of generalised trust in society have been noted to increase levels of corruption. For Persson et al. (2013), corruption occurs because of a collective action problem; that is, people engage in corrupt acts because they have adopted the mentality of "everybody else is doing it" (p. 9). Although individually, everyone understands that eradicating corruption would be beneficial for all, they still engage in corrupt activities because they have no reason to believe that others will refrain (Persson et al. 2013: 9). Rothstein (2013) has added the institutional component to this argument, noting that corrupt institutions lead to the inference that most people within the society cannot be trusted either (p. 1020). He compared this to the prisoner's dilemma, arguing that it makes no sense to do any social good unless one trust that others will also contribute to the social good (Rothstein 2013: 1011-1012). When applied to corruption, this can be understood as 'not wanting to be the only non-corrupt policeman in the room'.

As generalised trust is crucial in preventing corruption, it is necessary to understand how generalised trust is created. Gunnarson (2008) disclosed that there are two ways of understanding how generalised trust is created; the first known as the 'bottom up' approach and the second known as the 'top down' approach (p. 2). According to Putnam (1993), social trust is built from the bottom up, in which an individual's engagement in

voluntary organisations teaches them how to cooperate and trust one another, eventually leading to trust in the government as a whole. Putnam (2002) argued elsewhere that collective action dilemmas can be resolved through social interaction between different members of society, as such interactions can encourage people to act in a trustworthy way when they might not otherwise be inclined to (p. 5). However, as Stolle (2003) has demonstrated, there is no empirical proof of this function (p. 23). Furthermore, he contended that the problem of the research to date is that even in cases where individuals do join voluntary groups and increases in their levels of social trust are identified, the possibility exists that people self select into such groups, depending on their pre-existing levels of trust. In other words, people who already exhibit higher levels of generalised trust are more easily drawn into voluntary associations in the first place, as opposed to those who generally trust less, thereby making it difficult to identify a correlation (Stolle 2003: 24). Thus, a different explanation for the creation of generalised trust is required. Gunnarson held that generalised trust is constructed from the top down; that is, institutions and their actions play a crucial role in creating and maintaining trust. Braithwaite supported this claim, arguing that strong institutions breed trust, whereas weak institutions breed distrust (Braithwaite as cited in Gunnarson 2008: 4). Likewise, Rothstein maintained that how society works as a whole is derived from how people perceive the actions of public officials. Therefore, if public officials are viewed to be corrupt and untrustworthy, the inference of an individual about his society as a whole will be that most people cannot be trusted either (Rothstein 2013: 1020).

The idea that generalised trust is created from the top down is further supported through the empirical experiment conducted by Rothstein (2011), who sought to determine whether or not a relationship exists between generalised trust and institutions. In the experiment, a sample of students from a low corruption, high trust society (Sweden) and a sample of students from a high corruption, low trust society (Romania) were given the same scenario about potential corrupt acts in a foreign country. These students were asked to assume that they were on vacation when they were confronted by an individual who was willing to pay a bribe to receive faster services and/or a public official who was willing to receive a bribe in exchange for the provision of faster services. Rothstein noted through this experiment that the level of distrust experienced by both sets of students was similar. The experiment showed that if one encountered a situation in which they experienced dishonesty from a public institution, their level of trust towards the public officials and society as a whole was negatively affected. The results of this experiment therefore support the notion that public institutions play a crucial role in rebuilding generalised trust within society.

2.1.2 Historical Legacies and Trust

Before analysing how generalised trust can be rebuilt within a society, it is important to address a further explanation for lack of trust in society. This explanation is based on the argument that there is a relationship between a legacy of foreign domination within a country and a perceived lack of legitimacy amongst citizens towards government institutions (Gunnarson 2008: 98). This school of thought has emerged from Putnam's (1993) work on Italy, in which he traced the differences in governance between the north

and the south to understand the legacy of the Mafia's dominance in the south. He reasoned that in Italy's south, a legacy of highly centralised and strictly autocratic social and political arrangements rendered the people as subjects, rather than citizens (Putnam 1993: 123; 136). Putnam further explained that following the Norman rule, from 1504 until 1860, southern Italy was ruled by foreign monarchies, who promoted mutual distrust amongst their subjects in an effort to "maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation" (Putnam 1993: 136). In the north, however, a long-standing tradition of communal republicanism left a legacy of high-level participation in government affairs by the people, who were viewed as citizens, rather than as subjects (Putnam 1993: 124-125; 136). The contrasts between these two regions are thought to explain the differences in generalised trust.

Putnam's theory of path dependency resulting from an analysis of Italy's experience has caused much debate within the literature. Levi (1996) expressed a scathing criticism, noting that "past events may circumscribe contemporary choices, but they neither determine nor predict the decisions at all crossroads since the initial starting point" (p. 46). In response to this criticism, Putnam has contended that it is necessary to make a distinction between short-term and long-term institutional influences on social capital (Putnam, as cited in Stolle 2003: 22). In other words, Putnam is not arguing that states with a legacy of foreign occupation are doomed to path dependency. Instead, as Stolle (2003) articulated, generalised trust is influenced both by historical legacies and experiences, as well as present day social and political institutions (p. 22). With this in

mind, it is useful to consider whether Putnam's theory holds weight when applied to Hungary.

A reading of Kontler's (2009) <u>A History of Hungary</u> highlighted two themes common to Hungary since the 16th century: occupation and compromise. From the Turkish occupation at the end of the 16th century, to the construction of the socialist state in the 20th century, Hungary's relationship between state and society has oscillated between full occupation and compromise with foreign powers. Five hundred years after its founding, Hungary's territory was split into three, in what Kontler referred to as "occupation by stages" (Kontler 2009: 149). The Hapsburgs annexed "Royal Hungary", the northern part of the kingdom to secure the wealth left behind by the defeated King Louis II and most likely, to provide a buffer against the expanding Ottoman Empire (Kontler 2009: 149). The eastern part of the former Kingdom of Hungary became the independent Principality of Transylvania. The rest of Hungary came under Ottoman rule, and would remain so for the following 150 years. Under the Ottomans, Hungary was reorganised administratively and a new system of taxation devised for the peasantry, with the most valuable resources of revenue retained by the imperial Turkish treasury (Kontler 2009: 155). Not surprisingly, cooperation on behalf of the Hungarian subjects with the Turkish occupiers was minimal, and the locals despised the occupiers (Kontler 2009: 155). This period of Hungary's occupation by the Ottoman Empire denotes the most intensive form of occupation.

Following the War of Liberation in the late 1600s, in which the Hapsburg Empire freed Hungary from the Ottomans, Hungary was subject to the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor. Kontler's work has suggested that there was an ebb and flow during the Hapsburgs' rule in which Hungary moved between more and less independence based on compromises with the occupier. The reign of the Hapsburgs between the 17th and 19th centuries could not be characterised as a reign of suppression or terror, for whilst Hungary was not independent, its people were not completely without a voice. Through its ancient constitution, the Golden Bull, Hungary retained the ability to call its own diet and cast a vote on matters related to its governance. Furthermore, throughout this period, several attempts at reform were made, including the 1790-1791 Compromise, in which Hungary was described as a "free and independent kingdom, to be governed by its own laws only" and the 31 April Laws of 1848, in which Hungary was made a hereditary constitutional monarchy with an independent administration (Kontler 2009: 229, 259). These attempts however never fully took root, leaving Hungary under the rule of the Hapsburg Empire until the Dual Compromise of 1867.

The argument cannot be made that Hungary was occupied in the same sense during the Communist era as it had been during the Ottoman occupation. Instead, Hungary's Communist years bear similarity to the centuries under Hapsburg rule, in which Hungary had relative freedom to govern by its own means, albeit within the confines of a system imposed by a foreign power. This argument can be firmly supported by the existence of Hungary's "goulash communism" under Kadar's reign. What can be said about this era is the fact that compromise between government and society was key. As Kontler noted,

"whoever refrained from openly defying or criticizing the party line had a decent measure of liberty in his or her private pursuits and relationships" (Kontler 2009: 452). This era represented the most expansive compromise the country had faced in its history, and the impact on trust is noticeable.

When the history of Hungary is retold, it begs the question as to whether or not such foreign dominance has had an impact on the current social contract between the government and the citizens. In other words, is low generalised trust a characteristic of modern day Hungary? Korosenyi illuminated the 'subject' mentality of the people of Hungary, pointing to the legacy of occupation and Communism as the main culprits (Korosenyi 1999: 14, 15). He found that characteristics of pessimism and lack of political will are legacies of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and supported his claim based on scholarly analysis of writings describing the Hungarian character from this period, as well as modern research methods that have revealed high levels of individuality, a weakness of solidarity and political cynicism (Korosenyi 1999: 16). The legacy of the Communist period is the dual value system, which gave an incentive for the population not to adhere to the official rules of the law and the state, but rather for their violation and evasion (Korosenyi 1999: 13). Korosenyi further asserted that the dual value system has not only involved breaches of norms and corruption, but also political cynicism and alienation from the political community (Korosenyi 1999: 14). These legacies have resulted in a subject political culture, in which Hungary's citizens feel a very high level of alienation from the whole of the state, from both the input institutions (politicians) to the output institutions (bureaucracy) (Korosenyi 1999: 14).

The levels of generalised trust within present-day Hungary support Korosenyi's depiction of the national mentality. In 2009, the Hungarian think-tank TARKI found that Hungarians, along with their Eastern and Southern European neighbours, exhibit the lowest levels of generalised trust in Europe (TARKI 2009: 17). The results of the 2010 World Values Survey, which were based on TARKI's findings, indicated, "Hungarians do not trust in each other…their confidence and trust typically does not extend beyond family circles" (as quoted in Transparency International Hungary 2011: 29). In 2013, the Quality of Government Institute conducted a survey, which sought to capture the quality of government across Europe. With a hypothesis that levels of trust and perceived governance quality were closely linked, the researchers asked, "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people in your area?" (Charron 2013: 116). Of the twenty-five countries surveyed, Hungary placed fifth in terms of lowest levels of social trust, with less than 30% of Hungarians indicating that they felt that others could be trusted (Charron 2013: 116).

Therefore, based on a review of Hungary's history occupation and compromise, coupled with an exploration of existing levels of generalised trust in the country, it is fair to conclude that Putnam's theory has significance for Hungary. Low levels of generalised trust have impacted levels of corruption in the country (which were discussed in the introductory chapter), thereby rendering the need for reforms to address corruption and rebuild trust.

2.1.3 Preventing Corruption, Rebuilding Trust

As previously noted, rebuilding trust is a core theme of corruption prevention. A tension however appears when discussing how quickly this trust can be rebuilt after it has been destroyed in an effort to prevent corruption. Johnston (2011) is an advocate for gradual reforms that can slowly and carefully rebuild generalised trust. Johnston has based his work around the caution of "do no harm and build trust", meaning that effective corruption prevention efforts need to combine well-thought out measures with broader efforts to build generalised trust, win support and develop credibility (Johnston 2011: 2). He foresaw such reforms as slow, long term efforts, aimed at preventing corruption by encouraging citizens to trust their government institutions (Johnston 2011: 2). Such advocacy does not mean that corruption in the short-term is ignored; Johnston clearly stated that short-term measures to control corruption are necessary and worthwhile (2011: 3). Rather, he called for the integration of such measures into broader efforts to build trust, with an emphasis on gaining credibility for both the reforms and the creation of effective governance (Johnston 2011: 3).

Others (Klitgaard 2012; Rothstein 2007; Diamond 2007) have also advocated for the need to rebuild trust in society, although differ in their prescription from Johnston. Klitgaard prescribed fast, effective action in an effort to rebuild generalised trust. He postulated, "leaders need to focus on short-run measures that signal to cynical audiences that things are different. A few big fish must be fried, both bribe givers and bribe-takers – and including people from within the ruling party" (Klitgaard 2012: 4). Likewise, Rothstein (2007) has promoted the 'big bang approach' to eradicate corruption from

society. Based on a review of Sweden's efforts to eliminate corruption in the 1880s, Rothstein noted, "not a few, but almost all major political, social and economic institutions were changed during a relatively short period of time" (Rothstein 2007: 23). The main premise of his 'big bang approach' is that the small, incremental changes advocated for by Johnston are ineffective, as the corrupt actors eradicated from one institution will simply seep over into the other non-reformed institutions. Rothstein has instead suggested that corruption eradication take place as if it were a 'big bang', meaning that all institutions are simultaneously overhauled. The intended purpose of this approach is that the agents involved in the powerful corrupt networks will come to realise that "everywhere they turn, there is a new game in town" (Rothstein 2007: 24). Diamond has further insisted on revolutionary action against corruption. He made the case that correcting endemic corruption cannot be done simply with a technical fix or a political push; its entrenchment into the norms and expectations of political and social life requires "revolutionary change in institutions" (Diamond 2007: 119 – 120). It is thus assumed that through such revolutionary action, politicians, businessmen and citizens alike will get the clear message that corruption is 'on its way out'.

Evidently, a discrepancy within the literature exists in terms of how to best approach rebuilding generalised trust within society. Although the case for fast, effective action appears to receive more support, it is Johnston's approach to medium and long-term efforts that is employed in this dissertation. The issue at play with the so-called 'big bang' approach is that it can easily turn into a witch-hunt, with political leaders using it to undermine their adversaries or eliminate competition. It is acknowledged that in

situations in which political leaders use the approach against their own, they demonstrate that they refuse to tolerate corruption within their own circle of support. In turn, this can begin to build trust between the citizenry and the institutions of governance, as the public realises that the government is acting against corrupt actors. The level of risk associated with this approach however is too high, especially in societies with an entrenched legacy of low generalised trust between the government and its citizens. In other words, eliminating corruption requires concerted efforts to demonstrate not only action against corruption but also the government's worthiness to be trusted by its citizens.

Johnston's approach, on the other hand, does not eliminate the use of quick, effective action against corruption in certain sectors nor does it undermine the need for revolutionary action. Indeed, as noted above, there is room within his framework to effect immediate attention and resources to removing a corrupt actor or section of society. Where Johnston's commitment to medium and long-term action against corruption is most attractive lies in his emphasis on strengthening the institutions within society to withstand corruption and enhancing the participation of society to hold these institutions to account (Johnston 2005: 198-99). Nodding towards Hong Kong's efforts against corruption, Johnston emphasised that

> thirty years of effort by Hong Kong's ICAC […] have produced a situation in which seven in ten citizens are willing to report corruption, but getting to that point required a long process of linking reforms to language, social relationships and traditional values (Chan, as cited in Johnston 2005: 197).

As the Hong Kong example demonstrates, strengthening institutions and enhancing society's participation to hold institutions to account did not occur simply because corrupt officials were publicly removed from power. Rather, in order to take root in

society, these measures required continuous, concerted attention and efforts over a long period of time. Gunnarson (2008) has furthered the case for the relationship between generalised trust and corruption, by reiterating the role of institutions. She stated that government institutions could build trust by establishing and respecting bureaucratic arrangements that rewards the competence and honesty of civil servants (Gunnarson 2008: 5). In other words, in order to address the collective action problem and therefore prevent corruption, it is imperative that government institutions begin by rebuilding their own integrity.

2.2 Defining Integrity

The previous discussion of the literature has identified that generalised trust is created when institutions act in a manner worthy of being trusted. The existence of such institutions is crucial in preventing corruption, but in cases where such trust is lacking, reform is best pursued over the long term. What is missing from the above discussion however is the type of mannerisms in which institutions should act. To understand this, this literature review will now turn to a discussion on integrity. Integrity is understood by Huberts as the quality of acting in accordance or harmony with relevant moral values, norms and rules (Huberts 2014: 44-45). To him, values relate to the beliefs or qualities that impact a person's judgement about what is good or right, whereas norms answer the question of "what is the correct thing to do" (Huberts 2014: 5). Pulay's (2014) definition of integrity follows along the same line of reasoning as Huberts, except that he applied his definition directly to institutions. Integrity, in the sense of organisational management, means that an organisation has "a positive, sound set of values that are in

line with social expectations and it works in accordance with these values" (Pulay 2014: 2). Both definitions are advanced by international organisations such as TI and the OECD. TI has defined integrity as "behaviours and actions consistent with a set of moral or ethical principles and standards, embraced by individuals as well as institutions that create a barrier to corruption" (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 10). The OECD has defined integrity as the "application of generally accepted values and norms in daily practice" (2009: 9), whereas public integrity means "the application of generally accepted public values and norms in the daily practice of public sector organisations" (OECD 2009: 9).

When outlining the mannerisms an institution must exhibit to rebuild generalised trust in society, the following conclusions from the above definitions can be drawn. First, integrity contains a moral component – meaning that there is an underlying notion of what is good and what is bad. Second, integrity requires public agreement on what is considered good and what is considered bad. As Huberts noted, this agreement is not undermined by cultural relativism. He said, "in these cases, these publics are the 'relevant' referees, as long as the behaviour is not contradictory to applicable international moral standards" (Huberts 2014: 56). Third, integrity involves everyday practice; it is not a one-time ordeal, but rather is integrated into the everyday actions of individuals.

Offe's (2004) work on corruption demonstrates how closely linked the relationship between integrity, corruption prevention and generalised trust is. He harkens back to

Rothstein's prisoner's dilemma, noting that in a society where corruption is considered a normal facet of everyday life, individuals will feel discouraged against attempting to resist or overcome corruption (Offe 2004: 92). Offe reasoned that in order to escape this trap, "people must be able to invoke standards of fairness and similar moral norms that are inherent in – and can be invoked as being part of – their cultural tradition" (Offe 2004: 92). Offer has further insisted that

> people must bring an 'ethical project', that is, the right configuration of motives, beliefs and conceptions of legitimate interest to bear on the problem. In the absence of such an ethical project, formal controls are neither likely to be adopted, nor can they be fully relied upon to do the job once adopted (Offe 2004: 94).

Offe's argument closely aligns with the process outlined above in terms of cultivating integrity. The 'ethical project' that Offe has referred to is the foundation of integrity, as it involves a discussion and agreement regarding what the values, norms and rules – the integrity – will look like within the given society. Such a discussion can take place across many realms of society; this dissertation will now look at how the tool of education can be utilised in this regard.

2.3 Anti-Corruption Education

The main focus of this dissertation is on the relationship between generalised trust, anti-corruption education and integrity. It is therefore necessary to look at the existing literature on the topic of anti-corruption education to determine if such a relationship exists. Little has been written regarding the relationship between anti-corruption education and broader efforts to prevent corruption through integrity. The majority of the literature that does exist has been developed by international organisations, particularly

TI, although the UNDP has also contributed to the discussion. This existing 'grey literature' has sought to highlight best practices regarding the implementation of anti-corruption training, curriculum and awareness campaigns throughout the world. The focus has been on providing information and tools to support the development of education against corruption. [3] While informative, most of these studies are beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is concerned solely with establishing the relationship between anti-corruption education and the integrity system. One study from the grey literature will be discussed below, however, as it emphasises the value of including anti-corruption content into the national curriculum.

In 2013, TI dedicated the Global Corruption Report to education, covering the topic of corruption and education from various angles, including anti-corruption education. Of particular interest for this discussion was Hockenos' chapter in which he provided an overview of the types of methods used to introduce the concepts of anti-corruption, integrity and transparency into the classroom. The first method he identified was the curriculum approach, the second method aimed at teaching the teachers, whereas the third method was characterized as in-classroom training. [4] In terms of the curriculum approach, Hockenos demonstrated that Chile, Palestine and Mexico have all taken steps to incorporate anti-corruption concepts into their national curriculum. Quoting one practitioner from Mexico, Hockenos held "If one can, it makes sense to change the

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[3] See for example: Teaching Integrity to Youth: Examples from 11 Countries (TI: 2004) and Fighting Corruption in the Education Sector: Methods, Tools and Good Practices" (UNDP 2011).

[4] The curriculum approach entails the introduction of the concepts of anti-corruption, integrity and transparency into grade school and high school course work (p. 342). The teacher training approach assumes that because teachers are the most attune to what will speak to their students, equipping them with the tools of anti-corruption education, will lead to implementation in the classroom (pp. 343-345). The in class method approach involves anti-corruption activists providing anti-corruption presentations and workshops to students in a way that is understandable and engaging for students (pp. 345-347).

system itself, so that it can work for you year and year out" (Hockenos 2013:342). Throughout the rest of the report, Hockenos argued that integrating anti-corruption concepts into the national curriculum is the least effective approach, as governments' are not always receptive to including good governance and civic culture concepts in the curriculum (pp. 342-343). In Eastern Europe especially, he maintained that a lack of government engagement with civic society has made it difficult for anti-corruption practitioners to change the curriculum. While it is recognized that there can be difficulty in changing the curriculum at the national level, this approach cannot be discounted in the context of Hungary, since anti-corruption curriculum has been included into the National Core Curriculum.

In the same publication, Lindroth and Burai both advanced the argument that anti-corruption curriculum can be included at the national level, as part of a wider integrity approach to corruption prevention. Lindroth's (2013) work on anti-corruption education reform in Afghanistan demonstrated that including anti-corruption into the curriculum has been possible. He traced the process of decision-making between Afghanistan's anti-corruption agency and Ministry of Education in regards to implementing anti-corruption education. He noted that through a high degree of collaboration between the two agencies and the commitment to the value of such curriculum, Afghanistan can serve as an example of introducing anti-corruption concepts into the wider national curriculum.

Of particular interest to this dissertation is Burai's chapter in the Global Corruption Report. Based on the results of a survey conducted by TI-Hungary and the Hungarian

think tank Kutatopont in 2011, Burai noted that although Hungarian youth consider integrity to be an important trait, they see it as unrewarding (Burai 2013: 372). She further stated that one of the key lessons drawn from the results was that the social and financial insecurity faced by Hungarian youth may "trump the personalized principles [they] are brought up with and create an attitude of ambivalence towards corruption" (Burai 2013: 372-373). As a result of this situation, Burai disclosed that TI-Hungary has recommended that anti-corruption and ethics training be integrated into the national curriculum (Burai 2013: 375). The schools are seen as a suitable institution in which to teach integrity, and teachers, students, integrity and education experts should be involved in developing and implementing such training (Burai 2013: 375). It is interesting to note that at the time of this report's publication, the government had already mandated that education about corruption be included into the National Core Curriculum. Thus the question arises as to the extent to which the wider society was involved in developing the curriculum about anti-corruption.

Although the literature on this topic is limited, one study is of particular relevance to this dissertation. Conducted by a Swedish researcher in the early 2000s, this study sought to answer the following questions: first, whether trust can be enhanced by state action; and second, whether it is possible to change students' values through civic education at a grassroots level (Gunnarson 2008: 137). The case study for this research was Palermo, Italy, a city with a long history of mafia control and low levels of trust in public institutions. A series of reforms from the 1980s onwards by the city were focused on restoring trust in the public institutions through various reforms, including the public

schools (Gunnarson 2008: 76). Gunnarson's area of interest was the Anti-Mafia Programme, which was implemented into Italy's national curriculum in 1993. The fundamental aim of the program has been, amongst others, to increase the focus on civics education and respect for the law (Gunnarson 2008: 93). While Gunnarson's study was not concerned with anti-corruption concepts per se, the study's emphasis on the role of public institutions in building social trust is of particular interest to this dissertation.

Gunnarson's focus on the public school system was driven by several underlying principles. First, Gunnarson noted that research has demonstrated that generalised trust is transferred across generations, is established early on in life and stable over time, and is dependent on education and socio-economic status (Gunnarson 2008: 137). The relationship between education and establishing generalised trust is therefore quite strong (Gunnarson 2008: 138). Second, Gunnarson argued that it is highly plausible that there is a tangible impact of the school system on a student's values, since the school plays a central role in the everyday life of young citizens (2008: 138). In spite of this however, Gunnarson contended that there has been very little research regarding the role of the school as a builder of generalised trust, as the research is generally concerned with rebuilding trust amongst adults (2008: 138). It was therefore the focus of her study to determine the role of the public school in formulating values of generalised trust within young citizens.

Using a panel study, Gunnarson and her research team conducted a study of seven schools in and outside Palermo over a three-year period.[5] Treating generalised trust as the dependent variable, Gunnarson sought to determine how different aspects of the schools' context influenced the levels of students' generalised trust. These aspects included the openness of school structures, the fairness of the institutions, the caring school environment, peer interaction, the openness of the classroom climate, and the schools' curriculum (Gunnarson 2008: 146-147). Broadly speaking, Gunnarson found that over the course of the two survey periods, the levels of trust among students in different schools increased (2008: 151). Based on these findings, Gunnarson argued that the results of the study support institutional explanations for the development of generalised trust within the school system.[6]

Gunnarson's study focused specifically on the role of civic education in an area with a long history of mafia control. It was not concerned with anti-corruption education or corruption prevention specifically. Nevertheless, the broader implications of the study, that is, whether or not education plays a role in building generalised trust in society, has a bearing on this particular discussion. When analysed in relation to the role of anti-corruption education, several claims can be made. First, as schools are the first public institutions that citizens have access to, the role of the school in creating social trust is

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[5] A total of 246 students participated in both surveys, the first of which was conducted in November 2002 and the second of which was conducted between February and March 2005 (Gunnarson 2008: 143).
[6] It is interesting to note that Gunnarson's results showed that it might be possible to develop generalised trust within a shorter time frame than previously thought (2008: 158). In other words, Gunnarson put forth the argument that trust may not take centuries to develop, but rather two or three years. However, while Gunnarson's results demonstrated that generalised trust increased over the three year period under study, it is not clear whether it was the impact of the three years specifically or rather the results of on-going student engagement in the civic education curriculum, which as noted above, has been mandatory in the national curriculum since 1993. Therefore, while Gunnarson's conclusion in terms of short-term change is interesting, more research would be required before it could be accepted as fact.

paramount. Second, as Gunnarson explained, there is strong empirical evidence that shows that generalised trust is established early on in life. Therefore, keeping in mind the arguments previously outlined regarding institutional integrity and generalised trust, one could conclude that there is an existing relationship between education, the creation of generalised trust, and the prevention of corruption within a society. Not only are schools necessary for setting the example, they are also key in transmitting knowledge about the agreement society has come to in terms of what values and norms are important. Therefore, it is worthwhile to use education as a public institution in which integrity and trust can be cultivated.

2.4 Controlling Corruption: The Integrity System

The previous section of this chapter has focused on responding to the first research objective of this dissertation. Through a review of the theories regarding corruption, it outlined the theoretical relationship between generalised trust, corruption prevention and integrity. Having demonstrated this link, the role of education in rebuilding generalised trust was explored. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to understanding how education can be applied to integrity in practice. This is linked to the second research objective, which aims to highlight the components of TI's National Integrity System to identify the role of anti-corruption education in rebuilding generalised trust and preventing corruption.

Since the 1990s, international organisations have advised in favour of implementing integrity systems to prevent corruption. The purpose of these systems has been to move

away from the emphasis on punishment towards an emphasis on prevention by encouraging all elements of a state (government, business and society) to both define and act with integrity. The advocacy of such integrity systems has gained considerable traction, with states now developing and implementing their national versions. Hungary is no exception, which therefore makes an analysis of the integrity system an important part of this study.

The purpose of an integrity system approach to corruption control is premised on the notion that fighting corruption cannot be successfully achieved through prosecution alone. Johnston, in a report written for the OECD, indicated that integrity systems are concerned with the institutionalisation and assessment of integrity (OECD 2007: 2). To Johnston, the goal of an integrity system is to "establish a system and culture in which honest, effective government is expected" (OECD 2007: 3). In their assessment of eighteen different National Integrity Systems, Doig and McIvor (2003) supported the integrity approach, applauding it on the grounds that it involves the integration of the social, political and economic landscape of society. To them, the integrity approach to corruption is valuable because it "provides a holistic and comprehensive approach within which to address key reform issues by governments" (2003: 329). This is because an integrity approach focuses on rebuilding all institutions in a way that exhibits the agreed upon values and norms of the society as a whole. This in turn demonstrates to the citizenry that public institutions can be trusted and in doing so, reduces the levels of corruption in society.

Pope coined the term *National Integrity System* to describe a network of interrelated pillars aimed at sustaining and promoting anti-corruption reform and public integrity (Head 2012: 9). Introduced in the 1990s, the National Integrity System's focus on integrity has signified a new and positive message that corruption can be eliminated if integrity is the main operating principle for all relevant aspects of public life (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 14). The underlying assumption of the National Integrity System is that because corruption manifests itself across sectors, a systematic approach is needed to tackle the systemic problem (Transparency International 2011b).

To respond to the systemic problem of corruption, the National Integrity System addresses thirteen different institutions (pillars), which are thought to make up the integrity of the country. These pillars include the government sector, the public sector and the non-government sector. Table 1 contains a listing of the thirteen pillars:

Table 1 - Pillars of the National Integrity System

Government Sector	Public Sector	Non-Government Sector
Legislative	Public Administration	Media
Executive	Law Enforcement Bodies	Civil Society
Judiciary	Electoral Management Body	Political Parties
	Ombudsman	Business
	Supreme Audit Institution	
	Anti-Corruption Agencies	

Across these pillars, three dimensions are assessed: capacity; internal governance systems and procedures; and the role of these pillars within the overall integrity system. [7] In terms

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[7] The corresponding national chapter of TI most often carries out the assessment of a country's integrity system. Anti-corruption and governance experts from a variety of sectors within the country form the advisory group for the assessment, making the process a multi-stakeholder consultation activity. The purpose of the multi-stakeholder engagement is to guide the assessment, and individual researcher(s) are brought on board to conduct the research and fieldwork necessary to draft the National Integrity System

of **capacity**, the focus is on the legal status of the pillar and the resources it has at its disposal to effectively carry out its mandate. An assessment of the **internal governance systems and procedures** is concerned with the extent to which provisions for transparency, accountability and integrity exist within the pillar. An assessment of the pillar's **role** within the overall integrity system looks at the extent to which the institution fulfils its role in promoting integrity, and is measured by one to three indicators specific to each pillar (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 11). Both the formal framework of each pillar, as well as actual practice are appraised, with an emphasis on highlighting discrepancies between formal policies and the reality in practice (Transparency International 2011b). The evaluation of these pillars takes into consideration the political-institutional, socio-political and socio-economic realities of the society at hand, with an emphasis on providing a review that understands the context within which the society operates (Transparency International 2011b).

The National Integrity System's focus on pillars is in alignment with the theoretical argument discussed above that corruption can be prevented when institutions are seen as trustworthy. The emphasis on integrity within these institutions supports the argument that top down change can lead to increased levels of generalised trust and decreased levels of corruption within society. Although the emphasis of the National Integrity System is on a systematic approach to corruption prevention across all relevant sectors of society, this dissertation is primarily concerned with the public administration pillar. The reasons for this are as follows: first, the focus of the Hungarian government's corruption

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country report. The primary goal of the assessment activity is to identify problem areas in need of further attention, as well as highlight best practices within a country's integrity system (Transparency International 2011b).

prevention programme is the public administration; and second, there is a strong relationship between anti-corruption education and the public administration, which helps answer the main research question of this dissertation.

TI has defined the public administration as "administrative bodies that deliver goods and services by and for the government" (Transparency International 2011c). It includes all public institutions, as well as members of the civil service. As mentioned above, an integrity assessment of the public administration is concerned with aspects related to the capacity, governance and role of the institutions that fall under the public sector domain. As this dissertation is primarily concerned with the role of education within an integrity system, the capacity and governance aspects are beyond the scope of this analysis. When looking at the role of the public administration in the National Integrity System assessment, public education has primary placement. Table 2 contains the key questions considered during the assessment of the public administration's role in public education.

Table 2 - Role of Public Education in the Public Administration Pillar

Dimension	Scoring Questions

Role – Public Education	1. To what extent does the public sector inform and educate the public on its role in fighting corruption?
	   a. Are there specific programmes run by the public sector to educate the public on corruption?
	   b. How much prominence do these programmes have?
	   c. How successful are they?
	   d. Is there high-level support for these programmes?
	   e. Does an average citizen know where and how to complain about corrupt practices?

Source: Annex 3 – NIS Indicators and Foundations (*Transparency International 2011c*)

As can be clearly seen in Table 2, the public administration pillar of a National Integrity System has a role in providing education to the public about corruption and its impact.

The NIS is not prescriptive about where education is to be placed, but it does assign the role of anti-corruption education primarily to the public administration pillar. Of particular interest to this dissertation are the following three questions regarding the role of the public administration in administering anti-corruption education:

1. Are there specific programmes run by the public sector educate the public on corruption?
2. How much prominence do these programmes haves?
3. Is there high-level support for these programmes?

In Chapter 4, these three assessment questions will be engaged more thoroughly to address the second research objective of this study.

It is necessary to note that two additional pillars of the National Integrity System are tasked with an education role. In the pillar known as "Anti-corruption Agencies", one of the key roles is education, and the pillar is assessed based on the extent to which the agency engages in educational activities regarding fighting corruption. Likewise, the civil society pillar is assessed in terms of its ability to hold the government accountable, with one of the guiding questions inquiring on how widespread civil society's efforts are regarding public education campaigns (Transparency International 2011c). Several conclusions can be drawn from this. First and foremost, education about corruption is primarily placed within the public administration pillar, a claim that can be deduced by simply noticing the emphasis placed on assessing the robustness of a public education program. The same emphasis on assessment is not apparent in the other two pillars, and there is no specific reference to public education (i.e. for schoolchildren) in these pillars. Rather, these pillars are tasked with the broader mandate of educating society.

Nevertheless, placing education about corruption into both the Anti-Corruption Agency pillar and the Civil Society pillar of the National Integrity System suggests that education is a crucial aspect of preventing corruption within society. Furthermore, it can be concluded that there is a necessity for collaboration across these pillars in the realm of education to ensure that all aspects of society are reached. As this dissertation is only focused on anti-corruption education for children, however, this discussion will be limited to that of the public administration's pillar.

2.4.1 The National Integrity System and Hungary

In 2011, the Hungarian chapter of TI conducted a National Integrity System study (herein "the study") on Hungary. In terms of the public administration pillar, TI-Hungary applied a score of 58 points, justified by the fact that while there were laws and provisions in place, not all aspects were covered and/or some provisions contained loopholes (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 11). The study advised the Hungarian government to (amongst others) establish a code of conduct for public servants, regulate the acceptance of gifts and improve public education on the importance of fighting corruption (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 22).[8] Hungary scored poorly on the existence of integrity mechanisms in law and in practice, with a score of 50 for both (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 105-6). A major reason for such low scores was due to the lack of a Code of Conduct for the public servants (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 105-6). Importantly, under the public education indicator, Hungary received a score of 50; with the study noting that "there is no general program

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[8] The study also advised the government to enhance whistleblower protection, resolve the issue of post-public employment, and enhance the consultation process with stakeholders, including civil society (Transparency International Hungary: 22)

on educating the public about corruption" (Transparency International Hungary 2011: 107). The low scores and the timing of the study's release are of particular interest to this dissertation for the following reason: as of 2011, reform was needed in regards to enhancing the integrity of the public institutions, including a need for public education about corruption. While the study repeatedly noted that reform was underway in the public administration, it was unable to provide conclusive evidence regarding the results or impacts of the reform. Four years later, it is now possible to revisit this, particularly in terms of Public Education, to identify and discuss the government's efforts to enhance integrity and rebuild generalised trust.

2.5 Summary

The above discussion has responded to the first research objective of this dissertation. By exploring the theories related to corruption and its causes, this literature review has adopted the theory that corruption occurs because of a lack of trust within society. The role of institutions in preventing corruption over the long term has been highlighted, demonstrating the need for institutional reform in societies with low levels of social trust. By examining the literature surrounding anti-corruption education, the relationship between education, corruption prevention and institutional integrity has been identified. The theory and concept relating to TI's National Integrity System has been introduced, which will be utilised more thoroughly in the following chapters to respond to the second research objective. Out of this review it has been determined that more research is required in terms of the rationale behind Hungary's inclusion of anti-corruption education into its' integrity system. The following chapter will outline how this gap is to be filled.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

3.0 Introduction

The overall research objective of this dissertation is to use Hungary as a case study to determine whether anti-corruption education fits within an integrity system, where it fits, and why. This aim is supported empirically through the use of in-depth elite interviews with Hungarian policymakers, politicians and civil society representatives. These interviews seek to establish the rationale behind the inclusion of anti-corruption education into the wider Corruption Prevention Programme. This chapter will begin by detailing the research strategy, which involves the case study approach and elite interviews. The second section of this chapter explains how the data was collected, touching on topics such as sample size and interview questions. The third section depicts how the data will be analysed, whereas the fourth section highlights the areas in which the research was constrained and steps taken to rectify this. The fifth section discusses this issue of ethics, followed by a conclusion of the chapter in section six.

3.1 Research Strategy

3.1.1 Case Study

The first research strategy this study employs is the case study. Creswell (2009) characterised case studies as a type of in-depth inquiry into a program, event, process or individual(s). He argued that case studies are bound by time and activity, with researchers collecting detailed information via a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Creswell 2009: 13). By employing the case study approach, this

dissertation examines the contemporary phenomenon of including education about corruption within the wider real life context of the corruption prevention programme. It seeks to determine why education was chosen and how education fits within an integrity approach, relying on evidence gathered from the literature and elite interviews. The study is guided by the theory of generalised trust, which as previously discussed highlights the linkage between education and corruption control.

3.1.2 Elite Interviews

Elite interviews have been chosen as a complement to the case study approach. The use of elite interviews specifically responds to research objective three, which aims to understand the decision to include education as a tool within the corruption prevention programme through a series of interviews with policymakers, politicians, and members of civil society. Elite interviews are aimed at a certain segment of a particular population, namely the 'elite'. Determining who is an 'elite' is an issue up for debate in the literature, as "there is no clear-cut definition of the term 'elite' and given its broad understanding across the social sciences, scholars have tended to adopt different approaches" (Harvey 2011: 432). In other words, identifying and defining the 'elites' is rather dependent upon the research at hand. Harvey clarified the parameters around which one can be considered an elite, advancing that elites are different from non-elites insofar as they are able to exert influence through social networks, social capital and strategic positions within social structures (Harvey 2011: 433). This dissertation has utilised these parameters, identifying the elites as individuals who have the position and knowledge within the Hungarian

context to influence the creation and implementation of the Corruption Prevention Programme.

One of the main factors in choosing elite interviews as the research method is the fact that the elites have a knowledge monopoly over specific information that the researcher is interested in. Therefore, it is important that the interviews enable the researcher to access this specific knowledge. To do so, both Aberbach and Rockman (2002) and Berry (2002) recommended using open-ended questions. As Berry (2002) maintained, open-ended questions have "the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer what's relevant and what's important rather than being restricted by the researcher's preconceived notions about what is important" (p. 681). Aberbach and Rockman (2002) have cautioned that open-ended questions can have a negative impact on the analytical rigour of the data, primarily in terms of what one can do in the data analysis (p. 674). It is not, however, impossible to analyse the results of open-ended interviews in a rigorous way. The process by which the results of this research strategy are analysed is identified below in section 3.1.3.

3.1.3 Content Analysis through a Thematic Framework

In order to interpret the data collected through elite interviews, the thematic analysis approach has been employed in this dissertation. The thematic analysis process relies on coding to identify common themes within the data (Franzosi 2004: 187). Saldana (2009) defined codes as words or short phrases that symbolically assign a summative attribute to a portion of language-based data (p. 3). Bryman (2012) recommended undertaking

coding in two steps: initial coding and selective coding (p. 569). Initial coding, he noted, involves a detailed analysis of the text, often resulting in a code at the end of every line, whereas selective coding takes place after initial coding, and emphasises the most common codes that seem to be the most revealing about the data (Bryman 2012: 569). The purpose of this two-step process is to ensure an in-depth exploration and examination of the data through the coding process. Through the coding method, themes and subthemes within the data become apparent, thus enabling the researcher to analyse the data through the thematic method.

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Identifying the Sample

In order to determine the sample size for the elite interviews, purposive sampling was used. This type of sampling is defined as one in which a researcher acts with strategic purpose when identifying the sample size (Bryman 2012: 418). The sampling method this dissertation utilised was a priori and sequential. In a priori sampling, the criterion for selecting participants is established at the outset and does not evolve throughout the course of the research (Bryman 2012: 418). In a sequential sampling approach, the sample is treated as an evolving body, in which interviewees are identified and added to the sample throughout the course of the research (Bryman 2012: 418). At the outset of this dissertation, two main criteria for the sampling were defined. First, the interviewee needed to be a Hungarian politician, bureaucrat or member of Hungary's civil society; second, the interviewee was required to have knowledge related to the development and implementation of the corruption prevention policy. Throughout the course of the

research, these criteria have remained constant, guiding the identification of the cases. Initially, several cases that fit the criteria were identified and as the research has been conducted, new cases have been identified and added to the sample. Through a review of the government's anti-corruption website (www.corruptionprevention.hu), the researcher was able to determine some individuals involved in creating the policy. The researcher also reviewed both the academic and the grey literature regarding corruption in Hungary, which identified further cases. Finally, a case fitting the criteria was identified via an email sent to the Hungarian contact of the Open Government Partnership (www.opengovernmentpartnship.org).

The method of snowball sampling, in which the initial sample of people relevant to the research questions helped identify subsequent cases, was also used in this study. The following factors determined the use of this method: first, the nature of the elite interviews, as previously discussed, makes the researcher somewhat reliant on the interviewees as the 'experts' in the field of research. Although such elites are highly visible, it is not always clear who is involved in what area of policy, and therefore the researcher must utilise these interviewees to identify other elites of interest. Secondly, as a foreigner to the Hungarian political culture, the researcher relied on several gatekeepers who were closely involved with the Hungarian government to identify potential cases. In two cases, the initial interviewees identified via the generic purposive sampling approach were unavailable for an interview. In both cases, these individuals identified other potential interviewees. In turn, due to unavailability and lack of subject matter expertise,

these potential interviewees suggested others. The third interviewees who were identified were the ones interviewed.

In another situation, the initial interviewee identified turned out to be one of the two public officials responsible for writing and implementing the anti-corruption component of the curriculum. He in turn played a key role in identifying two additional interviewees: the second public official involved in creating the curriculum and the politician responsible for approving the curriculum at the ministerial level. It is also worth noting that via several gatekeepers, the researcher was put in contact with the Hungarian MSZP and LMP politicians interviewed for this study.

3.2.2 Developing the Interview Guide

When conducting semi-structured elite interviews, it is recommended that researchers make use of an interview guide to help keep the interviews on point (Berry 2002: 681). In keeping with this advice, an interview guide was developed, which laid out questions along key themes. These themes were as follows: knowledge regarding the implementation of the wider Corruption Prevention Programme (government decision 1104/2012 I.V. 6) and knowledge regarding the inclusion of section 18 on education into the programme. The guide was a living document, meaning that it was adapted to fit the interview at hand as well as new information uncovered in the course of on-going research and previous interviews. While some researchers have frowned upon this approach, arguing that it distorts the results (Aberbach and Rockman 2002), others have advanced that it makes sense to formulate the questions differently for each interviewee,

based on the differences in background and addition of new knowledge (Mikecz 2012: 488). Care was taken to ensure that the general themes of the interview guide remained constant, so as to ensure rigour in the data results. Annex A contains a table of the interview guides used in each interview.

3.2.3 Conducting the Interviews

The interviews were conducted over the course of five months (November 2014 – March 2015) in Budapest, Hungary. With the exception of one interview, all interviews were face-to-face. The outlier interview was conducted over Skype as the interviewee lived and worked in Paris. Of the interviews conducted face-to-face, all except one were conducted in the interviewees' offices, with the exception conducted in a quiet pub. The shortest interview lasted 23 minutes, whereas the longest lasted 1 hour 45 minutes. All interviews were recorded and the researcher experienced no hesitation on the part of the interviewees over a recording. The use of the recording device has enabled a fulsome transcript for each interview, thus aiding in a rigorous thematic analysis. Consent was received for all the interviews. Seven of the eight interviews were conducted in English, while the eighth interview was conducted with the help of a Hungarian translator. Table 3 shows a breakdown of the cases interviewed within each of the identified categories. One case from each organisation was interviewed.

Table 3 - Interview Sample

	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Civil Society Representatives
Organisations Represented	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) "Politics can be Different Party"	Ministry of Public Administration and Justice	ELTE University
	Magyar Szocilista Párt	National Protective	OECD

(MSZP) "Hungarian Socialist Party"	Service
Fidesz-KDNP	State Audit Office

3.3 Framework for Data Analysis

Following the recommendations for conducting thematic analysis outlined in the research strategy, the data collected through the elite interviews were analysed in the following way. First, each interview has been pre-coded, a process by which the relevant sections of the content are briefly summarised to highlight the main points. Initial and then selective coding followed this, with the aim to group the codes identified in the initial coding stage into more robust codes. The results of the selective coding stage enabled the researcher to determine sub-themes within each of the interviews, which could then be grouped under larger themes. The key themes identified were as follows: restoring trust, rebuilding integrity; international pressure; long-term societal changes; and education, integrity and corruption prevention. See Annex B for a full list of the codes identified throughout the course of the analysis.

3.4 Limitations and Potential Problems

As mentioned above, open-ended questions were employed to ensure that the respondents had the flexibility to discuss their specific areas of expertise regarding the anti-corruption programme. While this resulted in a rich collection of data, it has also meant that data does not, at times, strictly follow the Interview Questionnaire. A further weakness identified in the use of elite interviewing was the tendency for the interviewees to dominate the interview. Researcher inexperience played a role in this, as there were times

when the researcher allowed the interviewees to freely discuss their views without being able to steer the interview closer to the Interview Questionnaire. Nevertheless, the researcher tried to remain cognizant of this weakness, aiming to ensure that the general themes of each interview were covered. In total, the limitations expressed above have influenced the choice of data analysis technique chosen in this dissertation. By grouping responses along common themes, rather than along common questions, the researcher has sought to synthesise the data into a coherent analysis.

It is also important to note issues related to the language component of this dissertation. There is both an English and a Hungarian version of Hungary's governmental anti-corruption website. As a result, the main material for this research was accessible in English. In order to ensure that the English version aligned with the original Hungarian sources however, the researcher conducted a comparative translation of the original Hungarian source into English. It was concluded that the English translations on the English version of the website were in line with the original Hungarian documents. The researcher is confident in their command of Hungarian and the accuracy of the comparison.

3.5 Ethics

The elite interviews have been carried out in accordance with the University of Glasgow's guidelines. Prior to commencing the research, approval was obtained from the College of Social Science's Ethics Committee. Before each interview was conducted, interviewees were informed of their right to leave an interview at any time. All

interviewees provided informed consent and agreed to the interview being digitally recorded. Although not specifically required by the interviewees, care was taken to keep each transcript anonymous and a system of assigning a numerical identification tag was used. Personal details were protected by password and the results will be destroyed after a final degree mark has been agreed upon by the University of Glasgow and Corvinus University of Budapest.

3.6 Summary

This chapter has set out the research strategies employed in this dissertation, namely the case study and elite interviews. The case study method was chosen to ensure a clear understanding regarding the inclusion of the anti-corruption curriculum into the Corruption Prevention Programme. Similarly, the elite interview method was chosen as a tool through which the researcher could access the individuals involved in creating and implementing the anti-corruption curriculum, so as to determine the rationale behind its inclusion. The research sample was diverse and the research questions used were open-ended, resulting in a vibrant collection of data. In order to analyse and synthesise this data, the identification of common themes via the thematic analysis approach was determined to be the most effective approach to understanding why education was included. Chapter 4 will now develop the case study, whereas Chapter 5 will discuss the results of the elite interviews.

Chapter 4: Case Study

4.0 Introduction

In Chapter 2, the purpose and structure of the National Integrity System was introduced, which attached the role of public education to the public administration pillar. The purpose of this framework is to provide a background against which Hungary's example of including education into its anti-corruption programme can be analysed. This chapter will begin by outlining the recent reforms taken by the government to address corruption. This will be followed by a discussion on the development and implementation process of the anti-corruption curriculum, which as previously noted, was a commitment in Hungary's Corruption Prevention Programme. This chapter will conclude with an analysis and synthesis of Hungary's anti-corruption curriculum policy against the three applicable assessment questions outlined in TI's National Integrity System.

4.1 Description

4.1.1 Integrity Policy Development Process

Developing and implementing anti-corruption measures is not a new phenomenon in Hungary, as measures have been developed and put in place since the beginning of 2000.[9] For the purposes of this research, the focus is on anti-corruption policies relevant to the current government in power. These reforms have taken into account the need for a preventative approach to corruption that emphasizes values-based integrity, and include the Twinning Light Project, the Magyar Zoltan Programme and the Corruption Prevention Programme.

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[9] See Batory (2010) for an extensive overview of the anti-corruption measures put in place since 2000 in Hungary.

In cooperation with the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) of the Netherlands, Hungary's State Audit Office (SAO) launched the Twinning Light Project in 2007. The project's rationale was to share best practices between old and new EU member states, and in the case of Hungary, was initiated out of a desire to activate the SAO in the fight against corruption (personal interview, 23 January 2015). The SAO in Hungary was interested in applying the integrity programme developed by the SAI in the Netherlands, which consisted of a compulsory assessment that analysed the corruption risks and corresponding integrity controls of public organisations to determine the organisation's ability to resist corruption (personal interview, 23 January 2015). Hungary's SAO adapted this approach and in 2009, launched a project entitled "mapping corruption risks-advocating an integrity-based culture of public administration" (i.e. the Integrity Project). Since its launch, the Integrity Project's main aim has been to cultivate a culture of integrity in the public institutions by strengthening their organisational integrity (SAO 2014). Although modelled after the Dutch project, Hungary's Integrity Project has diverged in two areas. First, as the SAO official pointed out, the

> *target group was not [only] the public administration but the whole public sphere of the Hungarian economy...which means the health institutions, the hospitals, the schools, the universities and so on...all public organisations were involved in this integrity approach because...we thought that we need an integrity culture not within the public administration [only] but in the public sphere as a whole* (personal interview, 23 January 2015).

The second difference was that the SAO conducted the assessments on behalf of the public organisations because they feared that a lack of expertise and knowledge within the public organisations would prevent the integrity assessments from providing fulsome results (personal interview, 23 January 2015). As noted in the 2014 survey results, the Integrity Project has enabled the SAO to "highlight strengths and weaknesses that can

serve as a basis for improving organisational integrity and for taking the necessary positive measures to prevent corruption in the future" (SAO 2014: 7). The implementation period of the Integrity Project was completed in 2012 and is now in the sustainability period, which is expected to last until 2017.

Although the SAO is an independent body of the government, the results of the Integrity Project have had a strong bearing on the government's decision to implement several other programs aimed at corruption prevention. The first program was the Public Administration Reform Programme, otherwise known as the Magyar Zoltan programme, which aims to create a 'good state'. The Magyar Zoltan programme defines the 'good state' as a state that "serves the needs of individuals, communities and businesses…within the boundaries of the common good" (MPAJ 2012: 6). Since it was introduced, the Magyar Zoltan programme has been revised, with the newest version (12.0) containing more anti-corruption initiatives than the first. An exploration of these measures, although interesting, is beyond the scope of this particular analysis. What is important to note is the notion of the 'good state' that was introduced within the Magyar Zoltan programme, as this played a key role in the creation and implementation of the Corruption Prevention Programme, to which this dissertation now turns.

In November 2011, the Hungarian government initiated a third anti-corruption reform package. Inspired by the results of the SAO's Integrity Project and the Magyar Zoltan programme, this package was signed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Public Administration and Justice Tibor Navracsics, President of the SAO Laszlo

Domokos, President of the Supreme Court Andras Baka and Chief Prosecutor Peter Polt (www.corruptionprevention.gov.hu). Although cooperation had previously existed between the Minister of the MPAJ and the SAO, such widespread cooperation was new to the government. As one public official noted, *"the real new thing is that this agreement was not only an agreement between Domokos and Navracscics, but [two other] persons signed this agreement"* (personal interview, 23 January 2015). With their signatures, these high level public officials "made a personal moral commitment to strengthen resistance to corruption within their institutions and to develop the most up-to-date means in pursuing this cause" (www.corruptionprevention.gov.hu).

In response to the joint declaration, the Hungarian government introduced the "Prevention of Corruption and a review of the Development of Public Administration" programme. This programme built upon the idea of a "good state" as introduced in the Magyar Zoltan programme; according to one public official involved in developing the programme, *"the good governance was known in Hungary but the good state was more or less an innovation [so] we build the good state, and in the good state this is no corruption"* (personal interview, 16 January 2015). As a government decision, this programme was circulated to the relevant ministries of the Hungarian government for comment and revision. It is important to note that this programme did not require approval by the Parliament, as it was a public administration program. It was formally accepted by the government in April 2012 with the passing of government resolution number 1104/2012 (I.V. 6), entitled "on governmental actions against corruption and the adoption of the Corruption Prevention Programme of the Public Administration" (herein

referred to as the "Corruption Prevention Programme"). The central focus of the Corruption Prevention Programme has been to strengthen the integrity of the public administration organs and government officials, as well as strengthen the ability of government officials to resist corruption by focusing on integrity and prevention (www.corruptionprevention.gov.hu). Within the Corruption Prevention Programme, twenty-two initiatives are identified and include the assignment of the responsible ministry and deadline. The majority of these initiatives are focused on fostering public sector integrity through various avenues such as establishing a Code of Ethics for public officials, creating the position of Integrity Advisors, providing integrity training for public officials and reviewing the lobbying and whistle-blower legislation.[10] What is of paramount interest for this research is measure eighteen, which as previously mentioned in Chapter 1, requires the inclusion of certain values and knowledge in connection with acts of corruption into the National Core Curriculum.

4.1.2 Public Education

The development and implementation process of the anti-corruption component of the National Core Curriculum is an interesting tale. During the development of the Corruption Prevention Programme, the Hungarian National Core Curriculum was also under revision, as the government was working towards centralising teaching and revising the content of the curriculum in Hungary (personal interview, 13 January 2015). Although a discussion of this process is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that one of the government's goals was to make it obligatory for

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[10] For an administrative review of the Corruption Prevention Programme and the Magyar Zoltan Programme, please see the OECD's "Hungary: Towards a Strategic State Approach" (2015).

students to take either ethics or religious courses (personal interview, 13 January 2015).

The general consensus from the interviewees is that the revision of the National Core

Curriculum, coupled with the introduction of the Corruption Prevention Programme,

represented a "historical opportunity" to include anti-corruption education into the

curriculum (personal interview, 16 January 2015). Seizing the historical moment, the

MPAJ included anti-corruption education as section 18, and assigned responsibility to the

Ministry of National Resources (now the Ministry of Human Capacities) for its drafting

and implementation. The draft Corruption Prevention Programme was circulated to the

relevant ministries for commentary and feedback, including the Ministry of National

Resources, who approved their commitment outlined in section 18. However, although

the Ministry of National Resources had been assigned responsibility for the anti-

corruption curriculum, it was a public official with the MPAJ who initiated its

development. After joining the ministry in the spring of 2012, this public official heard

that the government was updating the National Core Curriculum and that anti-corruption

education was meant to be included. According to him,

> *I asked my colleague about it…and I asked him, "have you tried to reach these colleagues [in the Ministry of National Resources] and say this was important and so on" and he said "no, no", and I said "Ok, let's try it!" And so we tried to contact them and they said "well, guys, this is the last version, we are trying to finalise the National Core Curriculum, so if you an send us a draft version or you can complement the current version we will see what we can do (personal interview, 13 January 2015).*

The colleague mentioned above supports this version of events. He noted that *"[the*

individual found] the actual opportunity to make [a] suggest[ion] in the last moment of

the process" (personal interview, 16 January 2015). Based on the results of that

conversation, these two public officials drafted the anti-corruption content for the ethics

component of the National Core Curriculum. The Ministry of National Resources, as well as the Secretaries of State of the Ministry of Education and Public Administration and Justice, approved the content (personal interview 13 January 2015). Reflecting on this process, the second public official involved noted

"On the one hand, it was a good story because we [were] able to place the topic of anti-corruption and corruption [in]to the curriculum of the ethics but on the other hand it was a sad story because the National Core Curriculum was [...] developed in a consultation process. [...] A lot of highly respected teachers and other experts work[ed] on it and in the last moment before the government adopt[ed] the core curriculum we two officials, two lawyers, write some element to the core curriculum" (personal interview, 16 January 2015).

It is worth noting that in spite of the last minute development of the anti-corruption content, members of civil society were invited for comment. As the State Secretary pointed out,

From time to time, we organised round table discussions with NGOs where we presented the progress we have made. Of course there was a certain dynamism in these round table discussions, because depending on their political affiliation, some of these NGOs withdrew from the meeting in a demonstrative manner and then they returned again. So this was an important colour and these two [public officials][...] also presented their draft National Core Curriculum to the NGOs as well (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

When pressed to expand upon the government's response to NGO comments regarding the anti-corruption comment, the political official stated,

They only mentioned that there were international examples included in the National Core Curriculum and they proposed that they should use examples that are as close to the Hungarian setting as possible. So they said examples, case studies were important, but they should be from the Hungarian environment, or as close to the Hungarian environment as possible. Of course it is important from a teaching perspective that examples and case studies from far away countries will not be as effective as case studies from Hungary (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

As a result of their efforts, anti-corruption topics are now included in the ethics curriculum for grades 11 and 12, which strives to impart students with the "knowledge of

the social phenomena of corruption, the application of skills and the ability of individual and collective behaviour against it" (Ethics Curriculum, National Core Curriculum).[11]

Before analysing and synthesising the results against the National Integrity System, it is worth considering the interview responses from two politicians of opposing political parties. The LMP interviewee, in response to the question about what she knew about the new anti-corruption curriculum, stated: "*Nothing*". When she was informed that such curriculum existed, she responded: "*Well I don't think it is in the school. Is it in the school? Maybe they have a minimal one hour something?*" (personal interview, 14 November 2014). Referring to the Corruption Prevention Programme as a whole, the MSZP politician noted, "*from what I have seen this is a government decision, which means that it was launched and decided just by the government, so it was not, it never comes to the Parliament for discussion. It doesn't have it. Because the same in our governments, it is not a change…this is the governments decision*" (personal interview, 2 February 2015). He was similarly unaware of the anti-corruption curriculum.

4.3 Analysis and Synthesis

Taken together, Chapter 2 outlined the relationship between top down generalised trust, integrity, and public organisations, demonstrating that public organisations that act with integrity can rebuild generalised trust within the wider society, as citizens begin to see the government working in their best interests. As Gunnarson's (2008) study noted, education is the first public institution citizens have access to. Similarly, it was argued by

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[11] I would like to thank Dr. Peter Klotz for providing both the draft content of the Ethics Curriculum and assisting in the translation process from Hungarian to English (personal communication, 25 July 2014).

Burai (2013) that public schools are a suitable institution in which to teach integrity. When seeking to rebuild trust through a top down approach, the public school system is therefore a crucial institution, which is demonstrated by its inclusion in the public administration pillar of the National Integrity System. This dissertation is now well placed to return to the assessment questions related to public education laid out in Chapter 2 and discuss how Hungary has applied public education within the wider integrity context. To reiterate, the applicable questions include:

1. Are there specific programmes run by the public sector to educate the public on corruption?
2. How much prominence do these programmes have?
3. Is there high-level support for these programmes?

The answer to the first question has been clearly demonstrated above. A specific programme is in place in Hungary to educate the public on corruption. This programme is managed by the public schools, which as noted in Gunnarson's study, is considered a public institution.

The answer to the second question is perhaps less obvious. First of all, it can be concluded that civil society was involved in commenting on the content in the national core curriculum, which suggests that there was a certain level of attention paid to its inclusion. Additionally, as Hockenos, Lindroth and Burai all noted, including anti-corruption education into the national core curriculum is ideal, as it means that all students have access to the lessons. The fact that Hungary's anti-corruption education has been included into ethics however does undermine its prominence. As mentioned above, the new curriculum in Hungary invites students to study either ethics *or* religion. The

religious curriculum does not include a specific reference to anti-corruption, which means that students who choose to study religion will not be exposed to corruption-related topics. Furthermore, the fact that anti-corruption content currently exists only for students in grades 11 and 12 begs the question as to its prominence. Whether or not it will be taught in different grades remains to be seen.

The final assessment question looks at the level of high-level support for the public education programme. As discussed above, high-ranking officials declared their commitment to implementing a corruption prevention programme that sought to encourage the growth of integrity within Hungary's public institutions. This commitment included the role of the public institutions in providing education about corruption. The actual content was approved by the relevant State Secretaries, which would suggest that high-level support exists. There are however several flaws to this conclusion. First of all, the development process of the anti-corruption curriculum begs the question of how much support actually exists. In spite of being assigned the role of developing the anti-corruption curriculum, the Ministry of National Resources failed to assign the relevant experts and resources to the development of the curriculum. Instead, developing the anti-corruption curriculum was left to the last minute and was done by two lawyers interested in anti-corruption and ethics. Second, the high level support for the curriculum appears to be limited to the government in power. When asked about their views on Hungary's new anti-corruption curriculum content, both respondents from the MSZP and LMP parties indicated that they had no prior knowledge. While their support for the Corruption Prevention Programme as a whole was unnecessary as per Hungary's government

structure, the fact that they were unaware of its existence is rather worrisome, as it suggests that the curriculum content could be reliant on the government of the day. Thus, although high level support does exist in terms of a commitment to the inclusion of anti-corruption education, the actual development and implementation process raises the question about how entrenched this support truly is.

4.4 Summary

This chapter has responded to the second research objective of this dissertation, by analysing section 18 of Hungary's Corruption Prevention Programme against TI's National Integrity System, thus demonstrating how Hungary is using education to prevent corruption and rebuild integrity. The remainder of this dissertation will now focus on answering the final component of the main research question: why did the Hungarian government include anti-corruption education as a measure in their Corruption Prevention Programme?

Chapter 5: Elite Interview Findings

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will present the results of the elite interviews that were conducted in Budapest between November 2014 and March 2015 with Hungarian politicians, policymakers and members of civil society. These results will then be synthesized within the realms of Chapter 2, in an effort to close the research gap identified by this dissertation; that is, the rationale for including anti-corruption education into Hungary's corruption prevention strategy.

5.1 Description and Analysis of Findings

5.1.1 Restoring Trust, Building Integrity

As Chapter 4 demonstrated, Hungary's government has taken steps to develop and implement an anti-corruption programme aimed at cultivating integrity within the public sector. The following will now touch on several themes that came up during the elite interviews. These themes seek to explain why the government implemented a programme aimed at preventing corruption and include the need to rebuild trust, the role of integrity, and international obligations.

The first theme that emerged was voter pressure to rebuild trust between the government and Hungarian society. A State Secretary for the incumbent government said: *"one of the most important reasons was that in 2010, voters had this as a very important expectation. There was a need to rebuild trust and confidence in government and state organisations"* (personal interview, 2 February 2015). A public official involved in implementing the

Corruption Prevention Programme echoed this statement, noting *"that's one of the most important reasons why they had voted the current party [...] Fidesz proposed to the people to take programme focusing on accountability and fighting corruption"* (personal interview, 8 January 2015). He further elaborated on the government's response to the people's demands for accountability. He noted that initially, the government pursued a prosecution agenda, meaning that they sought to identify and prosecute those from the previous regime who had been engaging in corrupt acts. This agenda however was over communicated with little results (*"And people have waited for the results but after one year this communication activity was [...] much quieter because the results failed."* (personal interview, 8 January 2015)) To respond to this failing, the government began to focus on corruption prevention (*"and finally, this was not a success story and that's why the government to do something different [...] and they said 'ok, we should focus not only on prosecution but also on preventing corruption' and have finally adopted this government decision 1104"* (personal interview, 8 January 2015)). A public official at the SAO also commented on the ineffectiveness of the prosecution approach. He noted that *"of course it has to be a part of the anti-corruption fight but at the same time, to fight individually against corruption is not a very effective way of doing so"* (personal interview, 23 January 2015). Therefore, as these respondents indicated, a new approach was required to respond to corruption, one that emphasised prevention through rebuilding trust.

As indicated in Chapter 2, the Hungarian government implemented a corruption prevention process premised on the concept of integrity. One public official referred to

this method as a 'cleaning process', noting "*the government strategy which was the government decision about the corruption prevention programme of the public administration [...] focused [on] the state. The whole approach or ideology in the good sense was [the] message that the state began their cleaning process on [themselves]*" (personal interview, 16 January 2015). The need to cultivate integrity within the institutions was further supported in the interview with the SAO public official responsible for the Integrity Project. He said,

> *Previously the state and individuals were fighting against corruption and now [it is the] public institutions and managers of the public institutions who [have] a very important role in this, because they have to create an integrity management system and therefore it's a very important and I think a very effective field for fighting against corruption, if you try to prevent corruption at the public organisation level* (personal interview, 23 January 2015).

He was also adamant that integrity has enabled the government to address corruption over the long term, which to him makes for more effective corruption control. He stated, "*I think that it is better if the change is not very quick, because if we measure a very quick change, sometimes it means that it is not really a change but only a picture on the situation, which is changing. But if there is a moderate change then I think it is a real…a real development*" (personal interview 23 January 2015). He further postulated that through an integrity approach organisations would be better prepared to withstand political and other pressure to engage in corruption. He suggested,

> *If the organisation itself has [...] integrity then politicians can do almost nothing against an organisation which tries to follow the integrity rules. Because at the end, they are the civil servants who have to sign the agreements and do the work and [...] therefore it is very important to enhance the integrity level of the public organisations and the civil servants and the public employees* (personal interview 23 January 2015).

Taken together, these responses suggest that the government recognised the need to rebuild trust in public institutions by pursuing a corruption prevention programme. It can also be concluded that the government acknowledged that punishment alone was not effective, deciding instead to pursue a preventative approach. This preventative approach, as indicated above, has focused on cleaning the state, not just by weeding out corrupt actors but also by developing integrity within the institutions.

5.1.2 International Pressure

One element that came up in the interviews that was not identified in the conclusions from Chapter 2 was the impact of international pressure on Hungary to address corruption. In terms of international obligations, an interviewee from the LMP party responded, *"well, it's a kind of … must I think from our European Union membership"* (personal interview, 14 November 2014). An opposition member from MSZP advanced this argument, stating that it was not just international obligations, but rather a desire to be seen as complying with international pressure:

> *Well definitely I think it is the initiative of the government, that "lets do something because we have so much criticism from abroad and inside the country, NGOs and opposition parties, etc." that sometimes the Ambassadors also ask the people and the civil servants, their counterparts or state secretaries, that what is happening and we have this kind of information, what do you do against corruption? […] And it is good to show to the Ambassadors, please read that. We do this* (personal interview, 2 February 2015).

A public official involved in developing the Corruption Prevention Programme from the MPAJ further noted:

> *Of course, there was high pressure in the government to make something with the topic of the corruption. Many ambassadors of the most important western countries […] visit our ministers frequently and there was a need to do something*

about these ideas. Because [...] the good state was a name, for many [...] it was a political phase (personal interview, 16 January 2015)

When questioned about international pressure, the State Secretary did not affirm the response of the opposition members, although he did note that international obligations, freely taken on by Hungary, helped motivate the Corruption Prevention Programme. He argued,

> *Basically Hungary is a member of a number of different IOs and forms of cooperation. In 2010 and 2011, we joined IACA [International Anti Corruption Academy] that is based in Vienna. We also joined the OGP [Open Government Partnership]. And we have an obligation to continuously report on the progress we are making. So we have this annual obligation and incentive to make progress to take steps forward* (personal interview, 10 March 2015).

Although the incumbent State Secretary was reluctant to conclude that international pressure drove the decision to implement a broad preventative program, it is highly likely that such pressures did play a major role in the decision. Nevertheless, as the State Secretary noted, Hungary willingly joined the international organisations that require corruption prevention activities. Therefore, the influence of international pressure on the current Corruption Prevention Programme cannot be said to undermine the willingness of Hungary's government to introduce preventative reforms (as is suggested by the political interviews). Rather, international pressure has both inspired and supported the Hungarian government efforts to address corruption.

5.1.3 Emphasising Long Term, Societal Changes

The second conclusion drawn from Chapter 2 was the importance of a long-term emphasis on eradicating corruption, due to its historical legacy. Throughout the course of the interviews, the relationship between Hungary's history of occupation and corruption

presented itself as an explanation for the current lack of trust between the citizens and the government in Hungary. Four of the interviewees noted the relationship between Hungary's history of occupation, corruption and generalised trust in the current government. To start with, a law professor specialising in anti-corruption from one of Budapest's universities vehemently argued against the notion that culture did not have a role in enduring legacies of corruption. He stated,

> *I think the culture is a very large factor – how has it come that the Slovaks experienced the largest development in their history in the last 25 years, the Poles, the Czechs, just the Hungarians, getting the same pills but producing very different results? How does it come if you exclude the culture and the tradition and mind set of the people and the experience of the people? The experiences of the previous generation determine your activities* (personal interview, 3 December 2014).

He went on to highlight the impact on the history of Hungary's occupation to the relationship between the government and its citizens, suggesting

> *For us it was 150 years but after the Turkish occupation came the Austrian occupation which lasted for almost 200 years then came the Soviet occupation so if you put together the historical facts it was extremely small period of time, one or two years here, five years there, when Hungary was independent. Why is it important? Because it's very much deep in the […] way of thinking in the people, very much affects the average citizen's relationship to authority* (personal interview, 3 December 2014).

This argument was furthered by a public official who noted that *"In Hungary, we have [a] tradition of not trusting the state, because the state is not our own […] it's a way to say that the historical roots, the historical problem, this is our fate"* (personal interview, 28 January 2015). In his interview, the State Secretary spoke to the impact of the recent past on Hungary, noting *"of course, the 40 year Communist past is a major burden for Hungary to dispose of in this regard. And 40 years represents two generations, two*

generations muddled through their lives, knowing that illegitimate action is part of the system" (personal interview, 10 March 2015).

Of the eight interviewees, four described the enduring mentality of 'cheating the occupier'. The State Secretary noted that

> *for centuries, whoever paid their taxes gave their money to foreigners. And a big national hero's were outlaws, robbers on the street [...] like a Hungarian Robin Hood. They were national models and heroes. So tax evasion was a patriotic deed* (personal interview, 10 March 2015).

The law professor interviewed supported this, arguing, *"for centuries [...] cheating the government was not a shame, it was national heroism. You know, if you didn't pay your taxes, you were clever enough to cheat the occupier"* (personal interview, 3 December 2014). He went on to state *"You didn't play a dirty game because the whole setting was a dirty game, and when you find new ways that's your cleverness. And sometimes it's even considered a national heroism"* (personal interview, 3 December 2014). A public official further postulated that if *"it is not your state but the state of the Hapsburgs, Russians, communists, etc. If you cheat, you not only cheat but you fight against the Russians or the Hapsburgs"* (personal interview, 8 January 2015). He further argued that this legacy has carried on into the present day, arguing *"It happens also very often until now, so if you don't have the feeling that it is your state, you cheat a different personality, if the state brings a particular law that harms you, you must cheat to survive – you are practically obliged to cheat"* (personal interview, 8 January 2015). A second public official also noted that the mentality exists in Hungary where *"it's a proud [thing] that I am clever enough that I can do it and I'm brave that I don't pay this and this amount [in] taxes."* (personal interview, 16 January 2015). The fact that the relationship between Hungary's

history and current corruption problem was repeated throughout most of the interviews supports the findings of Chapter 2; that is, that there is a connection between a history of occupation and existing low levels of generalised trust within a country.

5.1.4 Education, Integrity and Corruption Prevention

As outlined in the third research objective of this study, the key reason for conducting elite interviews was to gain an understanding of the rationale behind the inclusion of anti-corruption education into the Corruption Prevention Programme. The results were very interesting and somewhat surprising. Out of the eight interviewed, three had direct knowledge of the rationale behind the inclusion of anti-corruption education. These three respondents consisted of two public officials from the MPAJ who had written the curriculum and one former State Secretary for MPAJ who had approved the curriculum. Three additional respondents were aware that the curriculum had been included into the Corruption Prevention Programme. They gave their opinion regarding the value of anti-corruption education, but were unable to provide any explanation as to why the current government had included it into the Corruption Prevention Programme. Two of the respondents, notably those from LMP and MSZP respectively, had no knowledge of the inclusion of anti-corruption curriculum. The following will now turn to a discussion of the rationale that emerged regarding the inclusion of anti-corruption education.

In order to gain an understanding of the rationale, it was imperative that a political official involved in introducing and approving the anti-corruption curriculum content was interviewed. An interview was therefore conducted with the former State Secretary for

the MPAJ, who had been the political official responsible for approving the content of the curriculum. In the interview, he identified two reasons for the anti-corruption curriculum: the first being moral strengthening and the second belonging to a motivation to explain the impacts of corruption. In terms of moral strengthening, he noted that the government wanted to instil the future generations with the tools to resist corruption. He stated,

> *We would like the generation that is growing up now to have an intrinsic set of values whereby they reject corruption. We believe that only moral strengthening can be the tool that will be able to fend of corruption in the long term* (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

The second theme was just as prominent, in which he argued

> *Our main goal is to demonstrate to young people that corruption is detrimental to the whole country. It may happen that for one person it may represent one unit of illegal gains, on one particular occasion. But that one unit may bring about a hundred or even a thousand units of disadvantage for the whole country* (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

Combined, both themes were mentioned five times over the course of the twenty-five minute interview (see Table 4), thus convincing the researcher that moral strengthening and explaining corruption's detrimental impact on society were indeed the reasons why the government included anti-corruption education into the Corruption Prevention Programme.

Table 4 – Rationale

"I think in practice the two [ethics and religion] might not be so separated. For two years, we have had this option of ethics or religion at schools. And it will take several more years for the system to really become complete. **But I am sure that this is going to strengthen anti-corruption measures and the moral strengthening of the younger generation**." (personal interview, 10 March 2015)
"You know, *demonstration of how detrimental and disadvantageous corruption is for the whole society, that is the main point there.* Because it may be that in the families children hear that "this is the natural part of the system and it is only a matter of course that it works like that". […] So even if parents have become tired and they have accepted as a matter of fact that this is the only way that it can go, we aim in the schools, we have to show the children that this is not true and it can work in a different way." (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

> "[…] Our goal has been to really *clearly point out the societal harm and injury, damage that is done* by this, whereby we hope to **strengthen the moral resistance of the generation that is growing up**." (personal interview, 10 March 2015)

Another question asked of the interviewees was: "Is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary? Why or why not?" The responses to this question varied, depending on the portfolio of the interviewee. In general, there was consensus regarding the need to educate children about corruption, with the main reason being the opportunity to change the culture. The public official from the SAO argued, *"yes, of course because education is […] very important for changing the behaviour of people and to make awareness of them"* (personal interview, 23 January 2015). Likewise, an official from the OECD who has been involved in analysing Hungary's anti-corruption efforts noted

> *I do believe that changing the culture in the society is similarly important. […] Generally what is the crime […] within the public service or public organisations largely depends on the wider culture in the society, so starting from the […] primary education, secondary education [is important]"* (personal interview, 28 January 2015).

Other respondents noted the value of education, but expressed hesitation towards its importance and effectiveness. The MSZP politician stated

> *I think […] it is very important if the young people can get some information and get familiar "what does it mean and how is it corruption", but you know, it's, I think that's not the biggest problem in Hungary. […] It is important but perhaps not the first number one priority* (personal interview, 2 February 2015).

The law professor was even more sceptical about the value of education (*"if they teach them in the school that corruption is bad and on their way home […] the father [bribes] the police office and [convinces] the kid that this is the best for them, then the whole thing doesn't matter at all"* (personal interview, 3 December 2014)). He noted however

that education would only be effective *if* it was coupled with other approaches to fighting corruption. He argued,

> *You have to do separate things together; I don't think that just by training or teaching you can change people, you need institutions, you need punishment, you need transparency* (personal interview, 3 December 2014).

What these responses demonstrate is that education must be part of a wider programme aimed at eradicating corruption. Taken together with the results of Chapter 2, particularly Johnston's argument for long term change, it is possible to reach the conclusion that the changes the government wishes to achieve through the curriculum will take place over the long term, accompanied by wider efforts aimed at preventing corruption and instilling integrity.

5.2 Synthesis

When the results of the elite interviews are synthesised with the conclusions from Chapter 2, a solid understanding of the rationale behind including anti-corruption education into the wider public organisation pillar is built. As the interviews revealed, the two main reasons for including anti-corruption education have been to build up a moral society and to equip Hungary's citizens with the tools needed to prevent corruption.

Through an analysis of Putnam's theory on the relationship between low levels of trust and a legacy of occupation, it was concluded that Hungary is a prime example of this theory in practice. The results of the elite interviews further support this conclusion, as more than half of the interviewees identified the impact of occupation on levels of trust and corruption. As these results show, there is a continuing legacy within Hungary that

views unethical behaviour as necessary behaviour. When the levels of perceived corruption and the lack of trust between government and society in Hungary are taken into account, it is clear why the government would choose to include anti-corruption education within their integrity system approach.

Furthermore, as was discussed, the fundamental purpose of an integrity system is to establish a culture in which honest, effective government is expected. It was argued in Chapter 2 that such a culture can be established through a discussion on what integrity means for the population. Offe (2004) argued that citizens must invoke an ethical project that is comprised of the right motives, beliefs and configurations (p. 94). The end results of this ethical project is an agreement by society regarding the values and norms appropriate for the society – that is, the standards of integrity that society will invoke (Offe 2004: 94). The previous discussion reviewed various interpretations of integrity, identifying several common themes. First, integrity has a moral component; in other words, there is a decision regarding what is good and what is bad. Second, integrity relies on the public's agreement regarding this type of morality. Third, integrity involves everyday practice – it is not a one-time ordeal but is rather integrated into everyday life. It can thus be concluded that it is through the public discussion and decision on what is good and what is bad that we can see how anti-corruption education in Hungary fits within the wider aims of an integrity system. Clearly speaking, anti-corruption education begins the discussion on what is ethical for Hungary and in doing so, equips society with the tools needed to prevent corruption.

5.3 Summary

This chapter has set out the findings of the elite interviews and analysed them in relation to one another. Through a synthesis with the findings of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the third research objective of this dissertation has been completed.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.0 Introduction

The overall aim of this dissertation has been to use Hungary as a case study to examine whether anti-corruption education fits within an integrity system, where it fits, and why. This chapter takes the first three research objectives and reports on the findings for each one. The conclusion ends with research objective four, by providing recommendations from this study and suggestions for further research.

6.1 Summary of Findings and Resulting Conclusions

Research Objective 1: Determine the theoretical relationship between corruption prevention, integrity and anti-corruption education through a review of the literature.

The literature review identified the theoretical relationship between corruption prevention, integrity and anti-corruption education. It was found that a lack of generalised trust in society results in a situation in which the public do not expect the government to act in their best interests, thereby increasing the existence of corruption. Therefore, in order to eradicate corruption, a preventative approach focused on reforming the institutions to rebuild generalised trust was called for. Further, it was argued that corruption eradication is a long-term process, as there is a need to change the culture of society. In the case of Hungary, as was discussed, this is particularly important, as a legacy of occupation has negatively influenced the relationship between the citizen and the state. This led to a discussion on the concept of integrity, which shed light onto the type of behaviour that institutions should exhibit. It was found that through an integrity approach, a discussion on the values fundamental to society could be held. When the

concepts of generalised trust, institutions and integrity were considered in light of the concept of public education, the following conclusion was made**: education is a key tool in restoring generalised trust through public institutions, thereby promoting integrity and preventing corruption.**

Research Objective 2: Using Transparency International's National Integrity System as a framework, analyse how Hungary is using education to prevent corruption and rebuild integrity.

Building on the conclusion drawn from the first research objective, this dissertation sought to contextualise corruption prevention, integrity and public education within the National Integrity System established by Transparency International. This analysis enabled a discussion of three key questions related to Hungary's anti-corruption education. To reiterate, these three questions were as follows:

1. Are there specific programmes run by the public sector to educate the public on corruption?
2. How much prominence do these programmes have?
3. Is there high-level support for these programmes?

In terms of the first question, it was found that through the inclusion of section 18 into the Corruption Prevention Programme, Hungary's public sector identified a specific programme aimed at educating Hungary's youth on corruption. This education has been included in the National Core Curriculum and for the time being, is offered to students studying ethics in grades 11 and 12. In response to the second question, it was argued that although anti-corruption education has been well placed within the National Core Curriculum, thereby ensuring that students across Hungary have access, questions of concern arise in terms of the 'optional' aspect of the curriculum. That is, it was identified

that students in Hungary have a choice between either ethics or religion, with anti-corruption curriculum existing only in the ethics component. Furthermore, it was noted that anti-corruption education currently exists only for students in grades 11 and 12. Through an analysis of the third question, the notion of high-level support for the anti-corruption education programme was discussed. Hungary was commended on the support demonstrated by high-ranking political officials of the incumbent government. Nevertheless, two issues were raised, the first relating to the development and implementation process and the second relating to the level of support across all political parties in Hungary. **The main conclusion that can be drawn from this research objective is that although Hungary has included anti-corruption education into the National Core Curriculum, the prominence of the programme, the flawed development and implementation process, and the lack of broad political support for the programme raise questions about the potential longevity and effectiveness of the anti-corruption education.**

Research Objective 3: Explore the rationale behind Hungary's decision to include anti-corruption curriculum into the integrity policy, based out of interviews with policy makers and civil society members.

The third research objective of this study sought to explain *why* Hungary included anti-corruption education into the National Core Curriculum as part of the overarching Corruption Prevention Programme. To understand the rationale behind the inclusion of anti-corruption education, it was first important to explore the rationale behind the introduction of the Corruption Prevention Programme as a whole. This exploration revealed the recognition by the government that there was a crucial need to restore trust

and rebuild integrity between Hungary's citizens and government in order to prevent corruption. In other words, the government recognised that equipping the public institutions and public servants representing those institutions with values and norms of integrity would eventually lead to higher levels of generalised trust. The second theme that arose throughout the elite interviews was the relationship between Hungary's history and current low levels of generalised trust and corruption perception. This theme supported the argument raised in Chapter 2, that is, that a legacy of corruption and low generalised trust, resulting from a history of foreign occupation, has resulted in a present day situation in which Hungarians do not trust one another nor their government to act in the best interests of the public. These two themes led to a culmination of the wider rationale behind the inclusion of anti-corruption education. Through the interviews with the elites, it was revealed that the government's intention to strengthen the moral resistance and highlight the impacts of corruption on society were the driving factors behind including anti-corruption education. **Thus, the main conclusion that can be drawn from the elite interviews is that the Hungarian government included anti-corruption education because of a desire to change the value system in Hungary by targeting the youth through education on corruption, its detrimental impacts, and the tools required to avoid and prevent it.**

Taken together, the results drawn from the three research objectives enable a conclusion to be made regarding the main research question of this dissertation. **Schools, as the first public institutions students have access to, are a crucial instrument in the fight against corruption through integrity. The school system enables a long-term**

approach to be taken, as citizens are involved with the institution for a majority of their formative years. Anti-corruption education in particular can therefore be utilised to change the culture in a given society through curriculum aimed at engaging students in a discussion about what the values and norms are for their society. This is the main finding of this research.

6.2 Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research

The efforts Hungary has made to include anti-corruption education into the National Core Curriculum are to be commended. Few countries dealing with widespread corruption and low levels of generalised trust have recognised the role of education in preventing corruption, which makes Hungary's efforts a fascinating area of research. By recognising the relationship between integrity, generalised trust, education and corruption prevention, the Hungarian government has put in place a programme which seeks to eradicate corruption and change the culture over the long term. To further enhance the efforts, this dissertation offers several recommendations, in line with the final research objective.

Following the conclusions drawn from the second research objective, Hungary should continue to roll out anti-corruption education to all age groups. Additionally, it is worthwhile for the relevant policymakers to consider making anti-corruption education a mandatory course for all students, not just for those who have chosen to study ethics. Furthermore, all political parties in the Hungarian government should demonstrate their commitment to anti-corruption education. Although it is recognised that such a programme is related to the Hungarian bureaucracy, cross-party recognition and support

of the need to engage young people in the fight against corruption will ensure that such reforms do not pass away with a new government in power. By taking on such recommendations, Hungary will be better placed to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the anti-corruption education programme.

As noted at the outset of this dissertation, several questions related to the topic at hand were beyond the scope of this particular research. These questions looked at the placement of anti-corruption education within the curriculum and the effectiveness of such education in achieving the goal of cultivating citizens to act with integrity and prevent corruption within society. This dissertation did not question Hungary's placement of anti-corruption education into ethics education; however, further research is required to determine where exactly such education is the most useful. Such research looks at the concept of curriculum development and delivery, and is greatly needed in the field of education against corruption research. Likewise, this research did not touch upon the effectiveness of such education. While a nod to this discussion was given through an examination of Gunnarson's work, it is worthwhile to look at other countries that have implemented such education to determine whether the curriculum has had any effect on citizens' levels of generalised trust and notions of integrity and corruption prevention. This research can also return to Hungary to determine whether the anti-corruption curriculum had a substantial influence on the first crop of students exposed to it.

6.3 Summary

This chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising the findings of the first three research objectives. The key findings were: education is a useful tool in restoring

generalised trust, promoting integrity and preventing corruption; the prominence and level of high ranking support for the curriculum should be revisited; and a desire to change the value system and demonstrate the detrimental impacts of corruption drove the rationale to include anti-corruption education as a component of the Corruption Prevention Programme. The section concluded with several recommendations to Hungary's policymakers and the possibilities for further research related to the topic of anti-corruption education, which included analysing the placement of such education within the curriculum and its long-term effectiveness at preventing corruption and rebuilding trust.

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Annex A: Interview Questionnaires

Interviewee: LMP Politician (101)
Date: 14 November 2014

Broad Questions Related to the Corruption Prevention Programme (CPP):
1. The CPP (government Decision No. 1104/2012) is aimed at establishing a clean public life and a Good State. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
2. To what extent was there a discussion within the Parliament regarding the CPP?
3. When the CPP was adopted, was there broad political support or did Fidesz use its 2/3's majority to pass it?
4. If the 2/3's majority was used, what were the opposition parties reasons for not supporting the programme?
5. One of the LMP's platforms is the fight against corruption. Does the LMP have concerns regarding the current CPP? If so, what are these? And why?
6. To your knowledge, which actors have been involved in the policy making process? Did the government involve civil society and corruption prevention experts?
7. How has the CPP been received by Hungarians?
8. To what extent do you see the programme is aimed at creating a corruption prevention culture?

Specific Questions Related to Integrity Education
9. In your view, is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary? Why or why not?
10. Why was integrity education identified as a corruption prevention tool?
11. To what extent was the LMP involved in the consultation process for the integrity education policy?
12. Do you know who else was involved?
13. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand why corruption is wrong? Please explain.
14. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand their role as citizens in holding the government accountable? Please explain.
15. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that corruption impacts their basic human rights?
16. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that their actions can impact the rights of others?

Interviewee: MSZP Politician (102)
Date: 2 February 2015

Broad Questions Related to the Corruption Prevention Programme (CPP):
1. The CPP (government Decision No. 1104/2012) is aimed at establishing a clean public life and a Good State. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
2. To what extent was there a discussion within the Parliament regarding the CPP?
3. When the CPP was adopted, was there broad political support or did Fidesz use its 2/3's majority to pass it?
4. If the 2/3's majority was used, what were the opposition parties reasons for not supporting the programme?
5. Does MSZP have concerns regarding the current CPP? If so, what are these? And why?
6. To your knowledge, which actors have been involved in the policy making process? Did the

government involve civil society and corruption prevention experts?
7. How has the CPP been received by Hungarians?

Specific Questions Related to Integrity Education
8. In your view, is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary? Why or why not?
9. Why was integrity education identified as a corruption prevention tool?
10. To what extent was the MSZP involved in the consultation process for the integrity education policy?
11. Do you know who else was involved?
12. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand why corruption is wrong? Please explain.
13. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand their role as citizens in holding the government accountable? Please explain.
14. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that corruption impacts their basic human rights?
15. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that their actions can impact the rights of others?

Interviewee: Fidesz-KDNP Secretary of State (103)
Date: 10 March 2015

1. The Corruption Prevention Programme is aimed at establishing a clean public life and a Good State. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
2. The emphasis of the CPP is on reforming the Hungarian public administration. Where does education for children fit within this reform package?
3. Why did the government want to include anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary?
    a. Influence of IO?
    b. Cultural / historical aspect?
    c. Role of children in creating a better society?
    d. Integrity across all aspects of society?
4. Previous interviews have mentioned that you approved the curriculum content. Can you tell me about this?

Interviewee: ELTE Professor (201)
Date: 3 December 2014

Broad Questions Related to the Corruption Prevention Programme (CPP):
1. The CPP (government Decision No. 1104/2012) is aimed at establishing a clean public life and a Good State. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
2. To what extent was there a discussion with civil society regarding the CPP? Who was involved in this discussion?
3. Was there support amongst civil society for the adoption of the CPP?
4. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the current CPP?
5. How has the CPP been received by Hungarians?
6. To what extent do you think the programme is aimed at rebuilding trust within society?

Specific Questions Related to Integrity Education:
7. In your view, is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary?

Why or why not?
8. Why was integrity education identified as a corruption prevention tool?
9. To what extent was civil society involved in the consultation process for the integrity education policy?
10. Do you know who else was involved?
11. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand why corruption is wrong? Please explain.
12. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand their role as citizens in holding the government accountable? Please explain.
13. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that corruption impacts their basic human rights?
14. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that their actions can impact the rights of others?

Interviewee: OECD Head of Division: Public Sector Integrity (202)
Date: 28 January 2015

1. To what extent did the OECD provide advice and guidance to Hungary in terms of government decision 1104/2012?
2. From the point of view of the OECD, is this current approach to preventing corruption sustainable?
3. In terms of an Integrity Management Framework, do you think that education for kids is something that should be included in a country's wider framework or is it something completely separate?
4. When you're looking at an integrity management framework, do you think the education fits within the inner context or the outer context?

Interviewees: MPAJ Public Officials (301 & 302)
Dates: 8 January 2015 & 16 January 2015

Broad Questions Related to the Corruption Prevention Programme (CPP):
1. The CPP (government Decision No. 1104/2012) is aimed at establishing a clean public life and a Good State. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
2. To what extent was there a discussion with civil society regarding the CPP? Who was involved in this discussion?
3. Was there support amongst civil society for the adoption of the CPP?
4. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the current CPP?
5. How has the CPP been received by Hungarians?
6. To what extent do you think the programme is aimed at rebuilding trust within society?

Specific Questions Related to Integrity Education
7. In your view, is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary? Why or why not?
8. Why was integrity education identified as a corruption prevention tool?
9. To what extent was civil society involved in the consultation process for the integrity education policy?
10. Who else was involved?
11. How did you determine what content to place into the integrity curriculum?
12. Is it mandatory for all students to take, or optional?
13. Is similar available in the religious curriculum?
14. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand why corruption is wrong? Please

explain.
15. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand their role as citizens in holding the government accountable? Please explain.
16. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that corruption impacts their basic human rights?
17. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that their actions can impact the rights of others?

Interviewee: SAO Public Official (303)
Date: 23 January 2015

Broad Questions Related to the Corruption Prevention Programme (CPP):
1. Please provide an overview of the SAO's work on promoting integrity within the Hungarian public administration.
    a. Why did the Hungarian government initially choose to implement the SAINT project?
    b. In the November 2007 stakeholder meeting, a goal was expressed to establish a baseline standard to prevent and fight corruption in the near future. To what extent has this been successful?
    c. In the Existence of Controls Index, how does the SAO measure effectiveness of controls?
2. To what extent were international organizations involved in the creation of an integrity management system in Hungary? Which international organizations were involved?
3. How do the results of the integrity surveys contribute to the anti-corruption activities and the development of an integrity-driven organizational culture within the public administration?
4. The CPP (government Decision No. 1104/2012, I.V. 6) was based on the results of the SAO's Integrity Project. In your view, why did the government decide to implement a broad programme aimed at preventing corruption?
        a. To what extent have the results of the Integrity Project enabled the SAO to provide corruption prevention advice to the Hungarian government?
5. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the current CPP?
6. How has the CPP been received by Hungarians?
7. To what extent do you think the Programme is aimed at rebuilding trust within society?

Specific Questions Related to Integrity Education
8. In your view, is there a need for anti-corruption education for young people in Hungary? Why or why not?
9. Why was integrity education identified within the CPP?
10. To what extent was civil society involved in the consultation process for the integrity education policy?
11. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand why corruption is wrong? Please explain.
12. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand their role as citizens in holding the government accountable? Please explain.
13. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that corruption impacts their basic human rights?
14. In your view, do young people in Hungary understand that their actions can impact the rights of others?

Annex B: Interview Transcript Codes

Politicians	Codes
101	Programme in reality ineffective Lack of government will to stop corruption EU membership requires stance against corruption Not option to avoid a-c policy Loss of ranking (TI CPI) Corruption turning away investment in HU Lack of integrity / openness in tax administration Parliamentary committee to investigate political influence on public institutions Perception of political influence on tax administration CPP a checklist; nothing happens in reality Corruption scandal No political debate; public administration decision Low political credibility to fight corruption Choice of ethics or religion courses Anti-Corruption education included in religion? Hungarian students need to learn ethics and citizen rights Pressure on families to choose religious schooling
102	Anti-Corruption education valuable, but not #1 priority State level corruption Strengthen whistle-blower protection Strengthen investigative capabilities Investigate all types of corruption Political corruption Business corruption Culture of corruption Daily life Coordinated investigation of corruption Corruption prevention "Explaining why corruption is wrong" Transparency Openness Accessible data for citizens Independent monitoring of procurement Open reporting on cases from law enforcement Openness on investigation and prosecution to build trust Very weak civil society in Hungary Philanthropist spirit lacking Dependent on state funding Lack of culture-wide support for civil society Lack of trust between civil society and citizens Legacy of distrust between civil society and citizens Information flow needed to change mistrust Role of children in rebuilding trust Involvement in voluntary associations to rebuild trust Forced involvement in voluntary associations: negative impact

	Making involvement in civil society pre-requisite for university Citizenship education Lack of choice for families: religious versus ethics CPP meets international obligations CPP a checklist; nothing happens in reality Programme in reality ineffective Training for civil servants – useless Civil servant training a PR exercise for government Roots of corruption in political administration Government needs to rebuild trust to fight corruption Beyond a paper exercise: actual evidence of results needed Long term changes Role of civil society in rebuilding trust Government needs to cultivate trust by emphasising values of public service, not personal enrichment Strong anti-establishment feeling in Hungary Politicians need to build credibility and regain trust Politician lifestyle out of touch with everyday life
103	Need to rebuild trust. International membership obligation. Competitive disadvantage to be corrupt Integrity Rationale for anti-corruption education Prevention is key Moral strengthening to prevent corruption Cultural Legacy

Civil Society	Codes
201	Corruption a hot issue in Eastern Europe Corruption has deep cultural roots in Hungary Different mind-set of Eastern Europeans Historical legacy leading to societal mind-set of cheating the occupier Societal mind-set Historical legacy Rule based approach: insufficient Change the value system Trust theory Rationalising corruption Critical mass needed to change the culture Integrity in action Education, institutions, punishment and transparency General political disillusionment No collective will amongst young people to change Fatalistic mentality of Hungarians Fatalistic mentality impacts willingness to change
202	Anti-corruption education a key component of integrity

Public Officials	Codes
301	Initial approach – punishment
	Failed punishment programme
	New approach – integrity
	MPAJ decision for integrity approach
	Lack of political will to fight political corruption
	Failed punishment programme – lack of engagement
	Societal pressure for reform
	Corruption reform = political weapon
	Relationship between integrity and education
	Education beyond rules based: values based is key
	Government has no jurisdiction over religious education
	Anti-corruption in ethics only
	Anti-corruption education component created at last moment by 2 MPAJ bureaucrats
	MPAJ decision to include anti-corruption curriculum
	Political agreement required and gained
	Ethics education
	Corruption an ethical problem
	Perception that state does not exist for Hungarians
	Hungarians lack knowledge re: keeping the state accountable
	Hungarians need to learn to hold their state accountable
	Not only an ethical problem; also a problem of citizenship
	Emerging trend of holding politicians accountable
	Anti-corruption policy a political tool
	Rationale: no harm done in educating kids about corruption (perception)
	More than just anti-corruption focus: focus is on integrity
	Key element of integrity training: role of a faulty system in sustaining corruption
	Integrity is a long-term process with good results
	Integrity looks at changing the roots of society
	Public education provides a public forum
302	MPAJ responsible for CPP
	Government previously chose not to acknowledge corruption; did not want to increase perception
	Government focus on building a good state with no corruption
	"Good state" initially a political phrase
	Government created plan to put the phrase (good state) into action
	EU funded; Hungarian owned plan
	CPP based on results of SAO integrity project
	CPP focus on creating the good state
	Project a small part of a-c process in Hungary
	Logical place for a-c curriculum not in CPP but in societal reform phase
	Rationale: historical moment to include a-c curriculum
	Politicians perceives teaching ethics to create an honest generation [in the short term]
	2 ethics experts advised on a-c curriculum
	"Tricky" creation and implementation process
	Bottom-up approach to corruption
	Perception of trainees: everyone else is doing it; it's ok

	Corruption part of everyday life Tradition of not trusting the state Long-standing lack of social contract between state and society MPAJ bureaucrats created CPP Ministry of National Resources did not notice A-C education responsibility
303	Corruption important issue in transition countries Integrity Project beginnings SAO will to adopt a-c best practices Risk-based integrity analysis Pilot programme Hungarian adaptation of Dutch model Universal implementation of integrity Government support for universal implementation of integrity Political support for anti-corruption Anti-corruption must be a key political issue Coordination amongst activities necessary Integrity policy influenced CPP Public organisations: a "new scene" to fight corruption Necessity of involving public organisations Internal, coordinated approach Public organisations: "very effective field" Organisations set standard for integrity Risk based integrity analysis in procurement Institutional Integrity Top down trust Integrity protects the organisation against political corruption Definition of integrity: rule based vs. value based SAO definition: balance Government definition: rule based Application of government decree on integrity increasing integrity implementation Integrity changing behaviour of public organisations Long term change more effective Impact of small changes enhancing overall integrity Integrity seen as doable by organisations Preventing corruption: both a desire and a requirement of public managers Aim to measure both risks and levels of control Measure effectiveness of controls Education key to change behaviour Knowledge of section 18 but no input Integrity as a positive approach Implementing values Integrity as an effective approach Integrity as key pillar in anti-corruption programme