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The Maidan protest movement of November 2013 –  
February 2014: a theoretical model of analysis

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## **Introduction**

In Ukraine's domestic context, the Maidan protest movement is a crucial phenomenon with far-reaching consequences; in the global context, it is a local issue that emanated into the "Ukrainian crisis" with a wide international impact. For Ukraine, the Maidan protest is a large-scale turmoil, which involved violent means of claim making and people's death, and triggered a territorial loss of the Crimea, as well as the military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine.

Due to its topicality, the Maidan movement of November 2013 – February 2014 has been conceptualised in contradicting categories within Western, Russian and Ukrainian political discourses. In order to diminish the risk of politicising the protest movement in this research, the dissertation applies a neutral category of "contention" from the theory of contentious politics, which was elaborated by C. Tilly and S. Tarrow. Recognising the available analytical materials and sociological data on the Maidan protest movement, this research suggests an integral approach to exploring the Maidan protests, which would bring together its objective and subjective dimensions.

The dissertation project was designed to examine the Maidan protests as a political phenomenon within Ukraine's political system, as a social movement, and individual political action. Importantly, the dissertation explores the Maidan movement in the context of the preceding organised protest actions in Ukraine. Such research design allows us to address the following research questions: What are the characteristics of the Maidan social movement? What is the role of the Maidan protests in the dynamics of Ukraine's political regime? How were the Maidan protests perceived by its participants and coordinators?

In order to address these questions, the dissertation proposes a theoretical model for analysing the Maidan protest movement, which consists of the four categories: causation, dynamics, social mobilisation and repertoire or claim-making means. For the purpose of testing the model, this research applies the available theoretical and empirical data on the Maidan movement and Ukraine's structural conditions since 1991. The individual dimension of the Maidan protest movement is represented in this

model by the empirical data, which was collected during the in-depth interviews with three coordinators and seven participants of the protests.

The dissertation starts with a literature review that explains the theoretical and methodological approaches to analysing the Maidan protest movement. Then, it proceeds with Chapter 1, which presents the background of the Maidan protests, particularly Ukraine's structural characteristics and protest actions before 2013 – 2014. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the Maidan movement in accordance with the suggested theoretical model; while Chapter 2 examines the causation and dynamics, Chapter 3 explores the social mobilisation and repertoire of the Maidan protests.

## Literature review

This research applies the theory of contentious politics, which was elaborated by C. Tilly and S. Tarrow, to analyse the Maidan protest movement. This theory understands contention as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and b) the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2004: 5). In essence, social actors make their claims through direct action and not with the help of routinised institutional means. This might indicate that the existing institutions cannot effectively respond to the needs and demands of certain social groups.

### *The Maidan protest movement: a framework of analysis*

The theory of contentious politics provides a research toolkit for analysing the causation and dynamics of contentious acts, forms and means of contention, as well as the mobilisation of social actors. The causes of the Maidan movement, as a form of contention, could be examined with the help of M. Beissinger’s theoretical approach, which identifies three levels of contention’s causal mechanisms: structural, conjunctural and endogenous (Beissinger 2011: 26-27). The scholar defines the structural causation as the established political, social and economic conditions, which are confronted by people and determine their choices (Beissinger 2011: 26). The existing structures reflect social and material inequalities that are fixed by the institutions (Klandermans 2009: 14). According to a scholar of social movements B. Klandermans, the key category of structural analysis is the state, because it sets rules of equality, justice and political action by adopting laws and policies, as well as applying repressive measures; therefore, the state is a target of social movements (Klandermans 2009: 15).

The second level of causal mechanisms is conjunctural, and it shows how a specific interplay of events triggers an act of contention (Beissinger 2011: 26). In general, social actors unfold contention in reaction to certain events; however, the effect of the trigger can be possible upon condition that there is a deeper dissatisfaction with structural conditions. Finally, the third level of endogenous mechanisms

shows the correlation between the outcome of previous contentious acts and the actual social mobilisation (Beissinger 2011: 26). In such a way, the analysis of endogenous mechanisms usually links the actual contention with the efficiency of preceding contentious acts.

The process of social mobilisation is crucial for understanding the development of contention. According to Tilly and Tarrow, this process consists of four elements: social appropriation, boundary activation, certification and identity shift (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 34). Social appropriation indicates the transformation of nonpolitical social groups into political actors, who articulate their claims through a collective and public direct action (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 34). In the case of the Maidan protests, a wide range of non-political civic initiatives, including the church, acquired a political role within the Maidan movement by imposing a pressure of demands on the incumbent authorities, as well as elaborating open platforms and strategies of Ukraine's development.

The next two elements of contentious mobilisation, the identity shift and boundary activation, indicate the formation of a single collective identity of a claimant group, which unites individuals with various types of identities (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 34). According to T. Snyder, the Maidan movement brought together people of different ethnic origins, age, social stratum, religions, speaking both Russian and Ukrainian (Snyder 2014). This means that the collective identity of Maidan had a solid consolidating ground, which needs to be examined.

This research analyses the formation of a collective Maidan identity within the cultural approach to social movements, which was described by B. Klandermans. This framework unveils an individual perception and interpretation of the world, specifically of existing living conditions and actual events. Collective identity is the focus of such approach, because it comprises cognitive, emotional and ethical levels of individual perception (Klandermans 2009: 59). As Klandermans states, collective identity represents the "package" of worldviews and meanings, a certain frame for interpreting reality (Klandermans 2009: 76-77). In addition, collective identity is the grounds for social movement's culture, which unites individuals with common social or economic positions generating a shared myth. At the heart of the myth lies the conflict between the social movement members on the one side and

personalised political and economic structures on the other side, which divides reality into basic categories “us” and “them” (Klandermans 2009: 90).

Finally, the last element of contentious mobilisation is certification, which has internal and external dimensions. Internal certification implies that the claiming social groups can entrust the representation of their demands to certain leaders, who coordinate the act of contention on the grounds of their credibility. Another example of internal certification could be the government’s recognition of the claimants’ legitimacy. At the same time, the act of contention can be certified externally through the recognition and support of certain states, as well as international and intergovernmental organisations (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 34).

The dynamics of the Maidan movement is of particular importance, taking into account that it lasted three months and contained several escalating phases. Within the framework of contentious politics, a flow of the protest movement can be perceived as a sequence of contentious episodes (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 36). According to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, a general sequence of contention comprises a process of mobilisation, including formation of a collective identity, and a further trajectory of a social movement’s development (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001: 38). The triggers of the protest movement play a significant role in its dynamics, as they predetermine the further phases of contention. For this reason, the research makes an attempt to comprehend the complex dynamics of the Maidan protest movement.

Apart from internal contentious processes, the theory of contentious politics examines the means of public claim making, which is referred to as a repertoire of contention. A Ukrainian scholar I. Homza explains it as a “combination of experience” related to previous contentious acts and “deterrence”, which implies “the space for action left by the government” (Homza 2014: 56). The change in the two factors of experience and deterrence determine the transformation in the range of means that social actors apply to make their claims (Homza 2014: 56-57). Additionally, contentious means can be innovated in response to insensitiveness of the targeted actors (Homza 2014: 57). In such a way, a repertoire of contention is determined by the efficiency of existing means of direct action.



In summary, the causation, mobilisation, dynamics and repertoire form a framework, which this research applies to analyse the acts of contention in Ukraine, particularly the Maidan protest movement. It is worthy of note that this framework makes an attempt to reflect the correlation between structural and cultural factors of contentious acts, moreover, it is suggested that it is rather the interplay of existing structural conditions and identity awareness that determines the efficiency of a protest movement.

<i>The theoretical framework for analysing the Maidan protest movement</i>	
Causation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) structural mechanisms</li> <li>b) conjunctural mechanisms</li> <li>c) endogenous mechanisms</li> </ul>
Mobilisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) social appropriation</li> <li>b) boundary activation</li> <li>c) certification</li> <li>d) identity shift</li> </ul>
Dynamics	Sequence of protest episodes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) triggers of the protest</li> <li>b) phases of the protest</li> </ul>
Repertoire	Means of public claim making

*Structural origins of the Maidan movement*

As it was discussed above, the grounds of contention lie in political, social and economic environment of a given state. This research focuses on the role of political structures, specifically political regime, in shaping the conditions for contentious acts in Ukraine.

Within the theory of contentious politics, political regimes are built on institutions, which are defined as “established, organised, widely recognised routines, connections, and forms of organisation” (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 48). The institutional design of a political regime determines the features of contentious politics and the structure of political opportunities, which facilitate the actions of political actors and allow democratic or undemocratic changes in the political regime (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 49). Democracy is a characteristic of a political regime that can be measured in accordance with rather clear indicators: 1) breadth and equality of political participation; 2) government’s obligation to consult the citizens on governmental personnel, resources and policy matters; 3) protection of political

participants from arbitrary action by governmental agencies (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 66). The conditions of a genuinely democratic political regime create open opportunities for claim making. Despite using non-institutional means, contention is recognised as a normal phenomenon in a democracy, if the means of claim making remain within the law.

In authoritarian states, the range of acceptable claim making forms is rather limited, thus any contentious actions challenging the existing rules and institutions would impose a threat to the political regime, and, therefore, would be suppressed (Tilly, Tarrow 2007: 60). At the same time, the inefficiency of existing contentious measures and regime's insensitiveness to social claims might lead to the appearance of innovative forms of direct action that aim at transforming the political regime. It is worthy of note that social actors usually elaborate new means of contention under the effect of significant triggers, which crystallise a deeper social discontent with existing structural conditions.

This research will discuss the hybridity of Ukraine's political regime, which, despite several transformations, has retained its genuine features throughout the period of 1991-2014. According to G. Robertson, the distinctive feature of a hybrid regime is the official legality of political competition, which, in practice, is "heavily skewed by the strength of authoritarian institutions and the weakness of independent organisations" (Robertson 2011: 2). Hybrid regimes combine the features of democratic and authoritarian political regimes. While protests remain permitted and legal, as in democracies, the state can apply coercive or administrative measures to suppress contentious actions. Similarly to authoritarian regimes, the opportunities to articulate social demands in hybrid regimes are rather limited, thus, contention can be the only channel for public discontent. In such a way, without the authoritarian coercive capacities to suppress contention and limited democratic channels for people's representation, hybrid regimes are under a high risk of protests.

Taking into account various forms of a hybrid political regime, Robertson states that contentious patterns are determined by three regime's characteristics: organisational ecology, state mobilising strategies and elite competition (Robertson 2011: 24). Organisational ecology indicates the number, nature and development level of existing civic and social movements, as well as the proportion

between state and non-state organisations (Robertson 2011: 24, 26-27). According to Robertson, the declaration of rights in extensive legislative provisions does not necessarily guarantee open opportunities for civic action and opposition, as they might be prevented by additional legal restrictive measures (Robertson 2011: 26-27). For instance, independent organisations can be subject to state monitoring, or the number of people, who are allowed to organise a peaceful assembly, can be limited by the legislation. Apart from this, public actions, particularly oppositional, can be repressed by coercive means (Robertson 2011: 26-27).

The second characteristics of a hybrid regime is the state's mobilising strategies, which implies the extent to which the regime can mobilise itself (Robertson 2011: 26-27). Robertson notices that states with a hybrid political regime usually uphold a façade of plurality, and, therefore, do not have a monopoly over economic resources and civil society (Robertson 2011: 26-27). Finally, elite competition, as the third characteristics of a hybrid political regime, shows the degree of competition among the elites and their mobilising abilities (Robertson 2011: 26-27). Robertson highlights that in hybrid regimes with weak central power the level of elite competition is higher than in regimes with strong central control, and, therefore, there are more opportunities for contention (Robertson 2011: 26-27).

In summary, this research examines the Maidan protest movement in a close interrelation with Ukraine's structural conditions, particularly its hybrid political regime. However, as it was mentioned above, in order to explain the phenomenon of the Maidan protest, it is crucial to link its structural causes with a cultural analysis of the collective Maidan identity, the latter of which will be introduced in the following section.

#### *Cultural analysis of the Maidan movement: research methodology*

The individual perception of the Maidan protest and the shared Maidan identity are the two focal matters of cultural analysis in this research. In order to address these issues, both empirical and theoretical data sources will be used.

The empirical data on the individual dimension of the Maidan movement will be based on the sociological monitoring of the Maidan participants carried out by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at the time of the protests. Additionally, the thesis will refer to the research of O. Onuch, a Ukrainian scholar, who analysed the profile of an average Maidan protestor, his or her motivation of participation and evolution of claims.

Due to the lack of qualitative data on the individual dimension of the Maidan protest movement, this research applies the method of in-depth interviewing, in order to explain, support or contest the collected empirical and theoretical materials. This semi-structured method unveils the motivating factors of people's participation in the protest, their demands and expectations, assessment of political leaders and evaluation of the protest's efficiency. The advantage of in-depth interviewing is that it links various objective factors, for instance, the existing living conditions, political structures and identity, to a specific individual experience.

The qualitative research was designed to have two groups of interview respondents: 1) the participants of the protest movement; 2) coordinators of the protest. The first respondent group contains seven participants of the Maidan protests, who were selected from the residents of Kyiv through the network of researcher's personal contacts, as well as a snowball method. The second group of respondents contains three coordinators of the protest movement. They were found by using a snowball method.

The interviews followed the interview guide, which contained two blocks of questions: 1) the participation or coordination of the Maidan protest; 2) matters of Ukrainian identity. The first block aimed at covering the motivation of participation in the movement, assessment of the protest leaders and evaluation of the protest results. The second block focused on the national identity of the respondents, perception of the regional divisions in Ukraine, opinions on Russian and European mentality and culture. The interviews were recorded and the interview transcripts were produced. The individual interview data were compared and generalised into clusters. The results were processed by using the theoretical framework of the research and correlated with the research questions.

## **Chapter 1. Ukraine before 2014: political structures and acts of contention**

This chapter aims at examining the background of the 2013-2014 Maidan protest movement, particularly the structural conditions, which were shaped in Ukraine throughout 1991 – 2013. The state's economic and social constraints will be discussed briefly, while a focus will be given to the political structures. Ukraine's structural conditions will then be analysed as the environment and causation of contentious acts that took place before 2013. The chapter will also summarise the general features of Ukraine's contention preceding the Maidan protest movement with a special emphasis on the 2004 Orange Revolution.

### *The distinctive features of Ukraine's structural set-up*

After gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine faced a pressing need for a two-fold post-Soviet transition: economic and political. Despite the delay and incompleteness of systemic economic reforms, the European Union and United States recognised Ukraine as a market economy in 2005 – 2006 (Aslund 2009: 5). According to Anders Aslund, a scholar of economic transition in Eastern Europe, by the year of 2000, Ukraine had met the market economy criteria, such as freedom and independence of economic actors from the state command, dominance of enterprises with private ownership, as well as freedom of prices and trade (Aslund 2009: 5-6).

However, the pitfalls of economic reforms had significant consequences for Ukraine's economic prospects, as they resulted in the overall structural weakness of the economy (D'Anieri 2011: 34). One of the distinctive features of Ukraine's economy is the domination of oligarchs, who have a monopolised control over the energy sector, metallurgic, mining and chemical industries – a list that can be added by real estate, banking and machine-building (Aslund 2014: 64). The oligarchs in Ukraine are grouped in clans representing certain Ukrainian regions and competing for influence on politics, which is gained through the presence in governmental bodies, financing Ukrainian political parties and media ownership (D'Anieri 2011: 35). On the one hand, this indicates that Ukraine's state policies have been to a large extent driven by the oligarchic interests; however, on the other hand, the

inherent competition among oligarchic groups provides the basis for structural pluralism in the Ukrainian politics (D'Anieri 2011: 34-36).

Another intrinsic feature of Ukraine's economic and political structures is "endemic" corruption that is pervasive in various spheres of social relations. In 2014, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 142 out of 175 countries according to its Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2014). As for the high public policy level, the corruption in Ukraine has acquired three major forms: unlawful schemes of natural gas trade, theft from the state budget and embezzled state subsidies (Aslund 2014: 66). Despite being publicly condemned, bribery has become a distinctive mechanism of Ukraine's decision-making process.

It is crucial to mention several structural factors that determine the characteristics of Ukraine's economic and political administration and might explain the impediments of the state's development. Firstly, there is a regional division within Ukraine, which can be associated with historical, linguistic or ethnic differences, but is visible through the competition of regional elites for economic and political influence over the state affairs (D' Anieri 2011: 30). On the one hand, the regional factor poses a significant challenge to the elaboration of consensual national policies with a consolidating effect; however, on the other hand, it contributes to the inherent pluralism of Ukraine's political system by providing a natural constraint on a potential concentration of authority (D'Anieri 2011: 30-31). As a result, gaining a nationwide electoral support has become rather difficult for political parties and presidential candidates (D'Anieri 2011: 31). At the same time, the regional factor implies the multitude nature of the Ukrainian parliament and ensures the presence of political opposition (D'Anieri 2011: 31).

The regional factor also explains the challenges of shaping Ukraine's foreign policy. According to the surveys conducted in Ukraine prior to the Maidan protest movement of 2013 – 2014, Western and certain Central regions were more inclined to support Ukraine's integration into the EU, while Southern, Eastern and partially Central regions were more in favour of integration with Russia (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2012). In order to compromise the conflicting external orientations

of the citizens and to gain a nationwide electoral support, Ukrainian politicians elaborated a “multivector” foreign policy that was envisaged to balance between Russia on the one side and the EU on the other side (D’Anieri 2011: 34).

On the contrary to the regional factor, the impact of ideology on Ukraine’s political structures has been rather moderate. With the exception of several political parties, Ukraine’s party spectrum does not have a distinctive left – right division and, therefore, ideology is a rather weak factor of electoral choice, parliamentary and governmental structuring (D’Anieri 2011: 33).

Another significant structural feature of post-Soviet Ukraine is the lack of a unified coercive capacity that can be used by the government (McFaul 2007: 56). Unlike authoritarian regimes, whose consolidation largely depends on state’s coercive unity and efficiency, Ukraine’s intelligence service and interior ministry forces have remained internally divided, and, therefore, incapable of massive repression (McFaul 2007: 56).

In summary, Ukraine’s structural conditions have positive and negative effect on the state and society. On the one hand, the “endemic” corruption and oligarchic nature of Ukraine’s economy and politics undermine the potential for structural reforms. Additionally, Ukraine’s policy making is significantly challenged by the regional factor. At the same time, the structural plurality diminishes a potential authoritarian consolidation, and the lack of integration within coercive bodies constrains a complete authoritarian concentration of power.

#### *The hybridity of Ukraine’s political regime*

This section will discuss three chronological phases of Ukraine’s political regime transformation: 1991 – 2004; 2005 – 2010; 2010 – 2013 (Matsievskiy 2010: 26). The research applies the institutional approach to the category of political regime and defines the latter as formal and informal rules which allow or prohibit certain actions (Matsievskiy 2010: 19). Within this analysis, it is important to assess the openness of opportunity structures at each of the three phases, which will be done on the basis of Tilly’s and Tarrow’s democracy criteria, as well as Robertson’s indicators of hybrid regimes. In order to measure these indicators, the research will refer to the Freedom House categories of democratic

governance, electoral process, judicial framework and independence, civil society and independent media, which are used in the annual study “Nations in Transit” that examines the democratic transition in post-Soviet states (Freedom House). The democratic progress is rated on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the highest level of progress and seven the lowest (Freedom House). The analysis of each transformation phase for the period of 1991 - 2004, 2005 - 2010 and 2010 – 2013 is provided in the Appendix.

Within the typology of democratic and non-democratic political regimes, Ukraine of 1991 – 2004 is described by scholars as a partial delegative democracy, competitive or electoral authoritarian regime (Kuzio 2005: 168). There are two underlying structural features, which explain this assessment. Firstly, the overall politically passive Ukrainian population remained active only during the elections; secondly, the oligarchs’ competition for political power in the parliament and the presence of political opposition prevented the ultimate concentration of the authoritarian rule (Matsievskiy 2010: 19). A complex combination of democratic and authoritarian features within one political regime has been defined by several scholars as regime’s hybridity. According to Carothers, Ukraine’s hybrid political regime of late 1990s – 2002 can be described in the following features: 1) citizens’ interests are underrepresented or ignored; 2) low levels of political participation beyond voting; 3) frequent abuses of the rule of law; 4) election outcomes produce uncertain results and lack of legitimacy; 5) low level of trust towards state institutions; 6) poor performance of the state (Kuzio 2005: 174).

Another significant characteristic of Ukraine’s political regime, which had been formed before 2004 under the presidency of L. Kuchma, but remained present until 2014, is “machine politics” (D’Anieri 2011: 39). This concept was introduced by D’Anieri to define informal means of control over the political process (D’Anieri 2011: 39). In case of Ukraine, this informal practice was exercised through selective law enforcement, control of the economy and government jobs (D’Anieri 2011: 39). Selective law enforcement is a government’s tool, which can be applied against the business of opposition elites or, alternatively, favour enterprises that support the incumbent authorities (D’Anieri 2011: 39). Importantly, the government can also use the law selectively in order to prosecute the



opposition or grant impunity to loyal politicians (D'Anieri 2011: 39). Additionally, selective law enforcement can lead to the closure of opposition media on the grounds of tax or other law violation (D'Anieri 2011: 39).

The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a significant point in the dynamics of Ukraine's political regime. Although the type of political change, which it unfolded, is subject to academic debate, scholars agree on the changes within the political regime that followed the protest campaign. On the one hand, the regime of 2005 – 2010 can be characterised as defective democracy, which implies weak political institutions and the prevalence of informal rules over formal institutions (Matskievskiy 2010: 31). On the other hand, the Orange Revolution had a democratic impulse on Ukraine's political structures - the increased political plurality and competition, enhanced opportunities for free media and civic action (Matsievskiy 2010: 26).

However, the partial change of ruling elites was not followed by systemic structural reforms that were expected by the supporters of the Orange Revolution (Matsievskiy 2010: 26). More importantly, the growing confrontation among the "orange" elites showed the lack of a political will for comprehensive reforms. The Constitutional reform, which was adopted in 2004 during the Orange Revolution and entered into force in 2006, aimed at restraining the president's powers and extending the authority of the government, particularly the Prime Minister, but turned out inefficient (Matskievskiy 2010: 27). The escalated institutional conflict between V. Yuschenko, Ukraine's president at the time, and Prime Minister Y. Timoshenko resulted in the president's decision to dissolve the parliament and call for early parliamentary elections (Matsievskiy 2010: 27). In summary, the phase of 2005 – 2010 can be described as "postrevolutionary crisis", which had a clear implication for Ukraine's political regime: a democratic impulse was not efficiently used to overcome the regime's hybridity (Matskievskiy 2010: 32).

In 2010 – 2013, Ukraine's political regime underwent a gradual transformation towards "electoral authoritarianism" that is characterised by a flawed electoral process, few formal checks on the executive, presidential control over the judicial branch, parliamentary dominance of the Party of

Regions, which was the party of power (Kudelia 2014: 6). The influence of the Party of Regions was increasing as its members were appointed to the Cabinet of Ministers, including the post of Prime Minister, and important governing positions at national and regional levels (Kudelia 2014: 7-8). Importantly, the 2004 Constitutional reform, which envisaged Ukraine's transition to a parliamentary – presidential republic with decreased presidential powers and increased authority of the prime minister, was abolished as illegitimate by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in 2010 after V. Yanukovich took up the presidential post. As a result, the president regained legal grounds for a substantial institutional influence over the political system in the form of a presidential – parliamentary republic that had been in operation before 2006.

The gradual widening of executive and presidential authority supported by the business and industrial groups in the East and South-East of Ukraine marked a trend of superpresidentialism in the political regime (Kudelia 2014: 11). These structural changes served as the mechanisms of authoritarian consolidation that was also facilitated by an attempt to concentrate a considerable part of the state's administrative and economic resources within a close circle of the president's family members and loyal businessmen (Kudelia 2014: 11).

A brief overview of Ukraine's political regime transformation leads to the conclusion that throughout the period of a post-Soviet transition the regime remained inherently hybrid despite several modifications. Several opportunity structures, such as the competition of political and economic elites, legitimate and generally transparent elections, public access to independent media and politically oriented civic activism, prevented Ukraine's political regime from a fully-fledged authoritarian consolidation. Starting from 2010 till 2013 the concentration of political power gradually shifted to the president and executive branch, while a substantial amount of political and economic resources was monopolised by the president's close entourage. This undermined Ukraine's structural plurality of financial and industrial interest groups and their ability to influence the policy making.

The centralisation and personalisation of Ukraine's political regime were added by the accumulated social anticipation of systemic reforms, particularly economic and judicial. Despite the

attempts to impose administrative pressure on the media, the information about the state affairs and authorities was publicly accessible. Importantly, the capacity of regular elections and civic organisations to articulate social demands remained rather limited. While the opportunities of regular elections were constrained by the constitutionally defined term of office and administrative interference, the participation of civil society in the policy making was to a large extent formal.

### *Dynamics of contention in Ukraine*

Ukraine's post-Soviet transition and structural transformations within its political regime penetrated into the lives of Ukrainian citizens and naturally caused their social reaction. The Ukrainian society had articulated its demands by the means of contention prior to the outbreak of the Maidan protest in 2013, although the latter has been the most numerous, long term and violent contentious act. In order to understand the emergence of the Maidan movement and the importance of its outcome, it is crucial to examine the three-month protests in the context of preceding acts of contention.

I. Homza, a Ukrainian scholar, suggests conceptualising the flow of contention in Ukraine in accordance with the phases of its changing repertoire, in other words, public means of claim making. An introduction of innovative contentious means indicates the inefficiency of the accumulated repertoire, but also deterrence and insensitiveness to the claims from the side of the targeted actors. According to the scholar's approach, Ukraine's contention can be seen as an ascending line divided into three chronological phases: 1990 – 1991, 2000 – 2004, and 2013 onwards.

The formation of contentious repertoire started in the last years of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Homza 2014: 58). Throughout 1990 – 1991 the Ukrainian society accumulated the following means of public claim making: a relatively broad social mobilisation, protests on central squares and non-violent demonstrations (Homza 2014: 58). For instance, in 1990, up to three million people participated in a symbolic action of a "human chain" uniting Kyiv and Lviv, a city in the Western Ukraine (Homza 2014: 58). Later that year, the government of the Ukrainian Republic satisfied the claims of the students' hunger strike that demanded the change of the parliament's and government's composition (Homza 2014: 58). It is worthy of note that non-violent claim-making

means were solidified in Ukraine's contentious repertoire due to their efficiency and government's sensitivity to social demands.

This range of claim making means was applied in the early 2000s during a civic campaign targeting the incumbent president of Ukraine L. Kuchma and the existing political regime with authoritarian features, however, the accumulated repertoire turned out rather inefficient. Despite the powerful trigger, such as the murder of the journalist investigator G. Gongadze, the scale of contention remained rather small and the government demonstrated low sensitivity and high deterrence to the protest claims. As a result, the protest was suppressed.

However, the 2004 Orange Revolution modified Ukraine's contentious repertoire towards more efficient claim making methods. The success factors of the 2004 protest were high sensitivity and low deterrence of the public authorities towards the protest claims, but also a wider social mobilisation. The protests started in November 2004 on the Kyiv Independence Square, publicly referred to as Maidan, in response to the fraud results of the presidential elections. While the state authorities claimed the victory of the prime minister in office V. Yanukovich, the alternative vote counting showed that the elections were won by V. Yushenko, a former regime's insider, who later became one of the opposition leaders (Wilson 2005: 1).

The analysis of the Orange Revolution through the framework, which this research suggests for studying the three-month Maidan protest movement, could be fruitful for understanding the formation of Ukraine's contention as a whole. For this reason, the causation, dynamics, mobilisation and repertoire of the 2004 protest movement will be discussed in brief.

The scholar of the Orange Revolution M. Beissinger suggests that the high level of public participation in the protest was determined by the complex causal mechanisms that united various social groups. By causation, the scholar means the interplay of three mechanisms: structural, conjunctural and endogenous (Beissinger 2011: 27). Among structural causes of the Orange Revolution, Beissinger highlights the overall low legitimacy of Kuchma's political power and the fundamental role of the opposition towards the incumbent authorities in consolidating the protestors

(Beissinger 2011: 27, 36). Another crucial structural factor was people's discontent with economic and social conditions, particularly the living standards (Beissinger 2011: 27, 34). To some extent, the Orange Revolution was also facilitated by Ukraine's regional divide, as there was a split in electoral support for V. Yushenko mostly in the Western and Central regions, and V. Yanukovich in the East and South of the country (Beissinger 2011: 27). For the Ukrainian public, these two candidates represented the "competing visions" of Ukraine's further political course (Beissinger 2011: 27).

However, structural issues were actualised due to the conjunctural mechanism of the Orange Revolution. The protests were triggered by the electoral fraud, particularly by the public evidence of the falsified vote counting. For Yushenko's supporters, his presidency was associated with improved structural conditions and widened opportunities; therefore, the victory of V. Yanukovich was perceived by them as the disruption of hopes (Beissinger 2011: 27). Although the attempts to falsify the votes were predictable, for people, the electoral fraud symbolised the essence of the existing political order and structural grievances. In such a way, a specific event was linked to the structural causation.

Finally, the development of the social movement in November 2004 was facilitated by the effect of the endogenous factor, which connected the actual contention with the previous acts of social mobilisation in Ukraine, particularly the protests against L. Kuchma, but also, as Beissinger argues, with successful social campaigns against "electoral authoritarianism" in other countries, for instance Serbia and Georgia (Beissinger 2011: 27).

The accumulation of the three causal mechanisms enabled a rather wide social mobilisation, which, according to the scholar, reached the unprecedented 22 percent of the Ukrainian public throughout the country, but mainly in Kyiv, Central and Western regions (Beissinger 2011: 28-29). It is suggested that to a large extent the protestors' mobilisation followed the logics of "the last straw", which means that the electoral fraud, as a trigger, brought up a deeper discontent embedded in the structural causes of the Orange Revolution (Beissinger 2011: 33). For almost 38 percent of protestors, "an awakening of national consciousness" was a motivating factor of participation; however, it should

be noted that the rhetoric of the Orange Revolution was based on civic nationalism and not ethnic (Beissinger 2011: 34).

The unfolding of the protest was facilitated by several factors, for instance the presence of NGOs and civic movements that organised their members and non-members to express the condemnation of the electoral fraud (Beissinger 2011: 39). Once a certain number of protestors had been mobilised, it expanded through interpersonal connections of family members and acquaintances (Beissinger 2011: 39). The contributing factors of social mobilisation were the increased use of mobile phones and the public access to media that supported the Orange Revolution.

As for the dynamics, the Orange Revolution was a one-phase protest, since the focal demand of the protestors to declare the elections' results illegal was satisfied less than two weeks after the beginning of the protest campaign. The tension of the protests deescalated after the Supreme Court of Ukraine had announced the revote, and in the end of December 2004 V. Yuschenko officially won the presidential elections.

The Orange Revolution also contributed to Ukraine's contentious repertoire. As the protest movement concentrated on the Kyiv Independence Square, a certain number of protesters provided their permanent physical presence by staying in a self-organised Maidan tent camp. Additionally, the opposition leaders, as well as those politicians, civic and cultural activists, who supported the protests, addressed the public from the stage that was arranged on the Maidan. The envisaged role of the stage was to conduct the protest movement; for Ukraine, the Orange Revolution was the first contentious act that contained a performance aspect. Apart from this, the protestors used non-violent demonstrations in front of the governmental buildings (Homza 2014: 58). In general, this range of contentious means proved to be efficient in achieving the claims of the protestors.

Assessing the place of the Orange Revolution in the flow of political activism and contention, M. Beissinger suggested that it signified a "short-term fluctuation in activism" rather than a "long-term developmental shift in societal values and behaviours" (Beissinger 2011: 28). On the one hand, this statement can be accepted, because contentious episodes in Ukraine remained rather rare throughout

2010-2013 despite the increasing authoritarian trend in Ukraine's political regime. There were two major fluctuating points in the flow of contention in this period: the protest campaign of November 2010 against the government's bill on tax reform and the 2012 protests against the bill on the regional language policy initiated by the Party of Regions (Kachkan 2014). However, the level of social mobilisation for these campaigns remained rather limited due to the low topicality of the protest claims: neither tax nor language policies were urgent for the wider Ukrainian public.

On the other hand, Beissinger's analysis of the far-reaching role of the Orange Revolution can be debated taking into consideration the Maidan protest movement of 2013 – 2014. Firstly, the repertoire of the Orange Revolution was used during the Maidan movement. Secondly, the scale of civic activism and organisation at the time of the Maidan protests was comparable to the one in November 2004. According to O. Onuch, the factor of civic activism had a crucial role for the phenomenon of the Maidan movement, particularly its organisation and social mobilisation (2014: 13-15).

In summary, throughout 1990s – 2013 the Ukraine's contentious repertoire was shaped as a range of non-violent claim making means that included rallies, demonstrations in front of the governmental buildings and on the Kyiv Independence Square, occupation of public space. This repertoire remained rather stable, because the targeted authorities generally demonstrated sensitivity and satisfied the social claims. The lack of sensitivity to contentious acts in the early 2000s and in the period of 2010 – 2013 can be partially explained by a relatively low level of social mobilisation during these protest campaigns. The demands of the unsuccessful contentious acts were topical for particular social groups, however, the wider Ukrainian public did not perceive them urgent. The example of the Orange Revolution illustrates that a success factor of a protest movement under the conditions of Ukraine's hybrid political regime is the scale of social mobilisation. Once the claim transcends economic, ethnic, religious, linguistic and other boundaries of various social groups, it becomes common for the wider public and provides the crucial basis for shaping a collective protest identity.

## **Chapter 2. Dynamics and causation of the Maidan movement**

This chapter will analyse the dynamics and causation of the Maidan protest movement in accordance with the suggested theoretical framework. The research paper will start with examining the triggers and phases of the movement, which will be followed by the discussion of its causation, particularly its structural, conjunctural and endogenous mechanisms. The analysis will be based on the factual, theoretical and sociological data on the Maidan protests. Additionally, the research will apply the qualitative data from the in-depth interviews with the Maidan protesters.

By the year of 2013, Ukraine's foreign policy had remained double-vector simultaneously orienting towards Russia and the EU. On the one hand, the Ukraine – Russia ties in the areas of trade, energy and industry have grown into a solid economic relationship over the years. When in 2010 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formed the Customs Union, Ukraine's potential integration into the common customs area with the three states became a matter of public debate (BBC News 2010). At the policy-making level, the Ukrainian government started negotiations on the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement in 2007 – 2008, and in March 2012 the document was initialled by the two sides (Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine). The association, which was expected to be signed on 29 November 2013 at the EU Summit in Vilnius, essentially contained seven parts on the political dialogue and convergence reforms in Ukraine, justice and security reforms, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, economic and financial cooperation (Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine).

However, on 21 November, the Ukraine's government issued a decree that put the preparations for the Association Agreement on hold and called for resuming the dialogue with Russia, as well as the other members of the Customs Union and Commonwealth of Independent States (Rozporyadjennya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrayiny 2013). The reasoning behind the decision to “revive” economic and trade relations between the two sides was formulated in the document as to “guarantee Ukraine's national and economic security”, and strengthen its economic potential (Rozporyadjennya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrayiny 2013). The incumbent president of Ukraine V. Yanukovich explained the suspension of the Association Agreement by “the awareness of heavy losses that Ukraine would suffer”, as well as by



the EU's refusal to compensate Ukraine's losses from the potential trade impediments with Russia and implementation of the Union's economic standards (Argumenty i Fakty 2014).

For the Ukrainian public, whose foreign policy preferences until 2014 had remained divided between the Customs Union, the EU and Ukraine's neutral status, the president's arguments on Ukraine's economic weakness and dependence on Russia were not a novelty. However, since 2010 V. Yanukovich and the Ukrainian government had declared the course towards Ukraine's European integration and the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement. The turn in foreign policy, which was announced one week before the expected date of signing the Agreement, was a rather inconsistent policy-making step that provoked condemnation among the supporters of Ukraine's European integration. The social discontent was heated by the media reports on the negotiations between V. Putin and V. Yanukovich on the 15 billion-dollar loan and lower gas prices that Russia would provide to Ukraine (BBC News 2014).

According to the survey conducted in May 2013, approximately 33 percent of Ukrainian citizens were in favour of the EU orientation in Ukraine's political course (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013). Hypothetically, this part of the Ukrainian society could have been mobilised for the protest against the government's decision to put the Association Agreement on hold. However, in the course of the Maidan protests in November 2013 – February 2014, other claims became more urgent. While in the beginning of December 2013 71 percent of the protesters expressed their demand "to sign the Association Agreement with the EU", in February 2014 it was claimed by 49 per cent of the Maidan protesters (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013, 2014).

Taking into account the scale and outcome of the Maidan protests, as well as its direct and indirect consequences, which have been conceptualised in the Western public and scholarly debate as "the Ukrainian crisis", it is crucial to understand the dynamics of the protest events, discern the triggers and causes of the protest movement.

### *Dynamics of the protest movement: triggers and phases*

This research refers to the four-phase vision of the Maidan protest movement introduced by O. Onuch. In accordance with this approach, the sequence of contentious episodes in November 2013 – February 2014 can be conceptualised in four phases: 1) 21 - 30 November 2013; 2) 30 November 2013 – 16 January 2014; 3) 16 - 19 January 2013; 4) 18 – 22 February 2014. Although the definition of chronological phases might simplify the dynamics of the protest movement, such form of generalisation provides a useful analytical tool for identifying the triggers, escalation and de-escalation trends in the protest.

The first phase of the Maidan protest movement started on 21 November 2013, when the government announced its decision to suspend the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement. In reaction to this, a number of Ukrainian journalists, civic activists and students organised a peaceful small-scale protest on Maidan - Kyiv's central Independence Square (Onuch, Sasse 2014). The protest was entitled after the Twitter hashtag #EuroMaidan, as the protestors actively used social media to engage the public and raise the awareness about the demonstration (Onuch, Sasse 2014). Apart from singular mass rallies, the number of protesters remained rather low in the end of November, and the permanent presence on Maidan was mainly sustained by the activists and students (Onuch, Sasse 2014).

A strong impulse for the spiral of contention was provided by the unprecedented forceful breakup of the protest on Maidan, which was conducted by the police on the night of 30 November and was accompanied by the beating and detention of protestors (Kyiv Post 2013). This trigger unfolded the second phase of the Maidan protest movement that can be characterised by a higher level social mobilisation and the expansion of protest claims. For instance, on 1 December from 500 000 to 800 000 people participated in a mass anti-government rally on Kyiv central streets and squares (Onuch, Sasse 2014).

During the second phase, the protests evolved into a social movement with a permanent camp on Maidan, wide horizontal civic network, and, importantly, regional expansion. While large protests took place in Ukraine's Western and Central regions, small-scale demonstrations were held in certain

Southern and Eastern regions (Onuch, Sasse 2014). People's demands mainly focused on suspending the "repression" and punishing the officials, who were responsible for using violence and keeping the protestors in detention. Essentially, the protest claims put pressure on the incumbent government and president to resign, but were not satisfied at the second phase of the movement.

A further escalation of the Maidan protest movement was marked by its third phase, which unfolded on 16 January 2014, when the parliament of Ukraine adopted a range of laws that imposed restrictions on the right to assembly by "criminalising the protests" (Homza 2014: 57). The protests, which broke out in response to the January laws, marked the trend of radicalisation and increasing use of violent claim-making means. Continuous clashes between the police forces and protestors during this period resulted in the first deaths of the Maidan participants.

In attempts to deescalate the protest movement, Ukraine's Prime Minister M. Azarov resigned in the end of January 2014 and the parliament repealed the anti-protest laws (BBC News 2014). During the peace negotiations between the president and state officials on the one side and the opposition leaders on the other, A. Yatsenyuk was offered a prime minister post as a concession gesture. However, the protestors on Maidan put pressure on the opposition leaders to turn down the offer and continue the protest until the president's resignation.

The third and fourth phases of the protest movement can be characterised by the growing role of the Maidan Self-Defence units, whose main task was to sustain the barricades of the Maidan camp and resist the police's attempts to break up the protests. The escalation of violence in January - February is associated with the participation of the radical nationalist group the "Right Sector" (Pravyi Sector) on the side of the Maidan protestors (Onuch, Sasse 2014, BBC News 2014). Although the group was active during the violent clashes with the police, it remained a minority part of the Maidan movement.

The climax point in the dynamics of the Maidan protests occurred during its fourth phase in the period of 18 – 22 February 2014. During the violent clashes between the police and Maidan protestors the snipers with unidentified origin of command shot the protestors dead near the Maidan barricade

(Hromadske.tv 2014). According to BBC reports, by 21 February, at least 88 people had been killed (BBC News 2014). Having signed a deal with the opposition leaders, which envisaged the pre-term presidential elections and establishment of a parliamentary-presidential republic in accordance with the 2004 Constitutional reform, V. Yanukovich fled the country (BBC News 2014). As the only legitimate national body with the ability to exercise authority, the parliament voted to remove V. Yanukovich from power, brought back the parliamentary-presidential republic, appointed the interim president and prime minister.

In general, the dynamics of the Maidan movement can be seen as four upward phases that unfolded due to specific triggers. The small-scale protests started under the title “Euromaidan” and evolved into a wider social movement targeting the incumbent authorities and existing structural conditions. The gradual escalation and radicalisation of the movement can be explained by the government’s inability to provide a timely response to the protest demands and by the lack of efficiency in protest coordination from the side of the opposition leaders. It can be suggested that these two factors lead to the outbreak of violence and people’s death. However, the dynamics of the Maidan movement can be better understood after the analysis of its causal mechanisms, which is provided in the next section.

<i>Dynamics of the Maidan protest movement</i>	
<i>Phases</i>	<i>Triggers</i>
21 – 30 November 2013	The government’s suspense to sign the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement
30 November 2013 – 16 January 2014	Police brutality against the protestors on Maidan in Kyiv
16 - 19 January 2014	The adoption of restrictive anti-protest laws by the parliament
18 – 22 February 2014	Violent clashes between the police and Maidan protestors

*Causation: structural, conjunctural and endogenous mechanisms*

This research suggests that the causation of the Maidan movement was a complex interplay of structural, conjunctural and endogenous mechanisms. In order to analyse the protest’s causes, it is

crucial to examine the motivation and demands of the protestors. The previous chapter gave an overview of Ukraine's structural conditions since 1991, and this section will focus on specific structural issues that were defined as critical by the majority of protestors. The protest dynamics shows a transformation in the topicality of claims on the protest agenda, however, the discontent with structural conditions is intrinsically present throughout the four phases of the Maidan movement. It will be argued that the actualisation of such structural discontent was enabled by the conjunctural mechanisms.

The focal demand of the Euromaidan protestors in November 2013 to sign the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement implies more than a mere foreign policy choice. The protestors associated the slogan “Ukraine is Europe” with certain structural conditions described as “a better way of life” (Onuch, Sasse 2014). During the in-depth interviews, which were conducted for this research, the participants of the Maidan movement contrasted the existing living conditions in Ukraine and those in Europe. In general, the respondents used the notion of Europe as a reference point for Ukraine, which embodies a set of values, political, economic and social standards. In Europe, according to one of the participants, “everything is genuinely right”, because the social setup and mindset of European people are based on the “real” rule of law, equality before the law and social justice.

This research suggests a list of structural, conjunctural and endogenous causes of the Maidan movement. It will be argued that one of the structural causes of the protests was the deterioration of democracy. After the use of violence and detention against the protestors on 30 November, the reason for joining the protest movement was largely related to the human rights' abuse exercised by the state, but also to the narrowed opportunity structures in Ukraine, which was perceived as the state's attack on democracy (Onuch 2014). In December 2013, approximately 70 percent of the Maidan protestors stated that the government's violent repressions against other protestors were their motivation to join the movement (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology). It is worthy of note that the protestors applied a category of “Yanukovich's regime”, which had a negative connotation and embraced the non-democratic structural features that were associated with the presidency of V. Yanukovich. These

features were described in the in-depth interview with a co-founder of the Maidan Civic Council, a cooperation and coordination initiative, which was in action in December 2013 and brought together various NGOs and civic initiatives.

Firstly, the civic activist assessed the political regime under V. Yanukovych as a “dictatorship”, which implies the full control over administrative resources, ability to influence the outcome of national elections, repressions against a politically engaged part of civil society (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1). Secondly, Ukraine’s system of government was not democratic, because it did not represent people’s interests; instead, under the veil of political pluralism and opposition, there was a “feudal-oligarchic” system, which implied the oligarchs’ control over the political parties in power and opposition (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1). As opposed to this, the coordinator of the Maidan movement stated that the pillar of the new system of government should be a “civic control” over the state (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1).

Another structural cause of the Maidan movement was the decline in legitimacy of public authorities including the president, government, police forces and judiciary. It is worthy of note that the structural problem of a low public trust towards Ukraine’s police forces, courts and judiciary was sharply actualised by the unprecedented use of violence against the protesters on 30 November. The fact that the break up of the protest was carried out under the government’s authority linked the structurally decreased legitimacy of public authorities with the incumbent president and government. According to the co-founder of the Maidan Civic Council, Ukrainian authorities “undermined people’s trust towards the police”, so that “a person feels insecure and unprotected” (Personal interviews: Maidan activist 1).

The next structural cause of the Maidan movement was the accumulated social discontent with corruption, social injustice and lack of civic influence over the state affairs. This should be analysed together with the feeling of social and economic insecurity among the Maidan participants. It is worthy of note that for a half of the protesters, who were present on Maidan throughout December – February, the reason to participate in the protests was an “aspiration to change the life in Ukraine” (Kyiv

International Institute of Sociology 2014). The respondents of in-depth interviews used a category of a “system” to describe the existing political, economic and social conditions. A majority of interviewees expressed a negative assessment of the “system” that preceded the Maidan movement and embodied corruption, weakness of laws and formal norms in decision making, as opposed to the importance of informal norms and personal connections.

However, the actualisation of the structural discontent was enabled by the effect of conjunctural mechanisms. The three triggers of the Maidan movement, which were described in the previous section, linked the accumulated structural grievances with the incumbent government by evoking negative emotions towards the latter. In such a way, the “Yanukovich’s regime” was held responsible for the failure to improve people’s living conditions. The participants of the Euromaidan protests of 21 – 30 November 2013 reacted to the government’s decision to suspend the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement as to the “shifting” or narrowed opportunities (Beissinger 2011: 27). The use of police force against the protesters on 30 November aroused public indignation, because the incident was interpreted as “the beating of children” and government’s direct attack on democratic rights and freedoms. Similarly, the restrictive anti-protest laws, which were adopted on 16 January, were interpreted as the further restriction of democracy in Ukraine.

The emotional aspect of conjunctural mechanism can be illustrated by the research data collected by O. Onuch during the Maidan movement. For instance, the Maidan participants under 30, who joined the protests after 21 November, were motivated by the fact that the Agreement’s suspense would limit their employment opportunities and visa-free traveling within the EU (Onuch 2014: 50). At the same time, for the protestors aged 30 to 55 the crucial factor for participating in the protests was the violation of personal and democratic rights that was exercised by the government in regards the EuroMaidan protestors (Onuch 2014: 50). Additionally, this group of protestors demanded improved economic opportunities and security (Onuch 2014: 50). As for the protestors aged over 55, they were largely motivated to participate in the movement by their concern about Ukraine’s future, particularly the future of the younger generations (Onuch 2014: 50).

The interplay of structural and conjunctural mechanisms can be illustrated by the declaration of claims to the government and opposition, which was adopted by the Maidan Civic Council in December 2013. Firstly, the NGOs and civic initiatives stated that the necessary preconditions for negotiations between the government, opposition and civil society were the release of the protestors, who had been detained since the beginning of the protests, and cease of repressions against the peaceful participants of the Maidan movement (Manifest Predstavnykh Gromadskykh Rukhiv, Organizatsiy ta Initsiatyv Yevromaidanu). Although these demands were crucial, their origin was situational. The central claims of the Maidan Civic Council were structural: the president's and government's resignation, dissolution of the parliament, which would be followed by pre-term parliamentary and presidential elections, signing of the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, adoption of the new constitution establishing a parliamentary republic in Ukraine (Manifest Predstavnykh Gromadskykh Rukhiv, Organizatsiy ta Initsiatyv Yevromaidanu).

In order to understand the causation of the Maidan movement, it is also important to take into account its endogenous mechanisms, which function as the interconnection of actions and reactions within a specific contentious act and across various contentious episodes (Beissinger 2011: 27). In accordance with this approach, the escalation of the Maidan movement had its internal causation. The outbreak of the protests after 30 November was to a large extent caused by the government's response to the EuroMaidan, particularly by the use of police force to put down the act of contention. Similarly, the escalation of the protests after the adoption of anti-protest laws on 16 January was to some extent triggered by the government's attempt to restrict the people's right to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech. In such a way, the government's response to the protests stimulated the spiral of social mobilisation and radicalisation of the Maidan protest movement.

Another dimension of the endogenous mechanism is the interplay between the Maidan movement and preceding contentious acts in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution, for instance, has an ambiguous implication for the Maidan protests. On the one hand, it is a case of the successful claim-



making campaign, which resulted in the satisfaction of protest demands. On the other hand, the participants of the Orange Revolution were to some extent disappointed with its consequences.

Firstly, the political elite, who lead the Revolution and obtained public posts after the change of government, split into conflicting groups and did not implement systemic reforms. According to the research of the Ukrainian public opinion in 2009, which was conducted by S. White and I. McAllister, the Orange Revolution had “damaged” living standards and worsened corruption in the government (White, McAllister 2009: 251). Despite the improvement of civil and political rights, which followed the 2004 protest, the sense of personal security in regards the arbitrary behaviour of the authorities decreased compared to the data that had been collected before the Orange Revolution (White, McAllister 2009: 247).

Among the negative consequences of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian experts pointed out its incompleteness and the failure of its leaders to fulfill the public promises (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2009). While the system of state government in 2005 – 2009 was characterised as “imbalanced”, the state bureaucracy was described as “degraded” and incompetent, and the state authorities were claimed to have lost control over the internal affairs (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2009). As a result, the confidence of Ukrainian citizens in their ability to influence domestic policies and the level of trust towards the state authorities had decreased by 2009 (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2009).

It can be suggested that the public awareness concerning the benefits and pitfalls of the Orange Revolution served as an endogenous mechanism for the Maidan movement. Importantly, the 2004 protest showed that the Ukrainian citizens had the ability to influence the state authorities through a direct action, which was also used in the three-month Maidan protests. At the same time, in contrast to the “incompleteness” of the Orange Revolution, the Maidan protestors of November 2013 – February 2014 expressed an opinion that the Maidan movement was essentially different from the 2004 protest. One of the civic coordinators of the Maidan movement stated: “...People went through the Orange Revolution in 2004, now they are not as naïve, the electorate has become a lot smarter and it is not that

easy to fool them” (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1). The coordinator highlighted that after the Maidan movement Ukrainian citizens would not “swallow” the absence of reforms, as it had happened after the Orange Revolution.

The disappointment with the Orange Revolution can be seen as a stimulating factor for the Maidan protest movement to demand not only the change of the “government’s faces”, but of “the system” as a whole. The co-founder of the Maidan Civic Crisis Centre, which emerged in December 2013, stated that the crucial strategic claim of the Maidan movement was the “new social contract”, which would enable the Ukrainian people to control the government and influence the state affairs (Personal interview: Maidan activist 2). The lessons of the Orange Revolution were added to the grievances, which were associated with the government of 2010 – 2013, and highlighted the need for civic monitoring over the public authorities.

<i>Causation of the Maidan movement</i>	
Structural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Deterioration of democracy</li> <li>b) Decline in legitimacy of public authorities including the president, government, police forces and judiciary</li> <li>c) Accumulated discontent with corruption, social injustice, lack of civic influence over the state affairs</li> <li>d) Social and economic insecurity</li> </ul>
Conjunctural	<p>Emotional link between structural grievances and the three triggers of the Maidan movement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) The government’s suspense to sign the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement ( 21 November 2013)</li> <li>b) Police brutality against the protestors on Maidan in Kyiv ( 30 November 2013)</li> <li>c) The adoption of restrictive anti-protest laws by the parliament (16 January 2014)</li> </ul>
Endogenous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Interdependent actions and reactions of the Maidan protestors and state authorities</li> <li>b) Success and pitfalls of the Orange Revolution</li> </ul>

### **Chapter 3. Social mobilisation and repertoire of the Maidan movement**

This chapter will focus on the social mobilisation of the Maidan movement and means of claim making that were used by the Maidan protestors. The exploration of social mobilisation will be based on four categories, such as social appropriation, identity shift, boundary activation and certification. The novel elements of Ukraine's contentious repertoire, which appeared during the Maidan protests, will be examined in accordance with the dynamics of the movement. The analysis will apply theoretical materials and sociological data on the Maidan movement, as well as in-depth interviews, which were conducted for the purposes of this research.

According to the national survey, 20 percent of Ukraine's population participated in the Maidan movement of 2013-2014 by protesting or providing help to the protestors (BBC Ukraine 2014). The survey highlighted the regional difference in protest involvement: 62, 5 percent of Ukrainians in the Western regions, 19 percent in the Central regions, 2 percent in the South, 3 percent in the East and 3 percent in Donbass region (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2014). Despite the low level of involvement in Southern and Eastern regions, it is worthy of note that the protests occurred in Crimea and such large cities as Odessa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, as well as in smaller towns (Onuch 2014: 10). O. Onuch highlights that the Maidan protests diffused into the regions, where there had been no social protests since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 or with a predominant electoral support for V. Yanukovich and the Party of Regions (Onuch 2014: 10).

The complex dynamics of the Maidan movement and its rather lengthy period of duration imply an uneven or fluctuating character of social mobilisation throughout the protests. As suggested by I. Homza, the movement had a "cascade" mobilisation, because each of the three triggers was followed by a bigger number of protestors (Homza 2014: 57). While the protest, which followed the suspense of the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, was relatively small-scale, the mass rally in Kyiv on 24 November involved approximately 100 000 participants (BBC News 2013). However, by 30 November, the number of protestors in Ukraine's capital had decreased and had been maintained by the activists and students (Onuch, Sasse 2014).

A new spiral of social mobilisation was triggered by the use of police force against the Euromaidan protestors on 30 November. The “march of millions”, which was organised in Kyiv on 8 December, numbered approximately a million people according to the assessments of Ukraine’s opposition at the time (Deutsche Welle 2013). The protests in Ukraine’s capital continued throughout December, but had decreased in number by the end of the month due to the “sense of growing desperation” among the protestors, who expressed their disappointment with the inability of the opposition leaders to represent and achieve people’s demands (Onuch, Sasse 2014). Apart from this, the movement’s de-escalation in the end of December and beginning of January can be partially explained by Ukraine’s holiday season that traditionally starts with the New Year and finishes after the Orthodox Christmas on 7 January.

The next expansion of social mobilisation followed the adoption of anti-protest laws on 16 January 2014. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, this wave of mobilisation had certain radical features, but also it signified the escalation of protests at the regional level. By 27 January, nine regional state administrations had been taken over by protestors, four state administrations had been blocked by people and mass rallies had taken place in six Ukrainian regions (Obozrevatel 2014).

The geographical diffusion of the Maidan movement was characterised by O. Onuch as a novelty factor of Ukraine’s contention. The scholar identified three waves of the movement’s nationwide expansion, the first of which unfolded on 24 November 2013 and took the form of small local self-organised protests that in some cases were coordinated with the help of three opposition parties: BYuT (Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc), UDAR and Svoboda (Freedom) (Onuch 2014: 10). The second wave started after 30 November, as the protest agenda shifted to the matters of human and civic rights, which made the movement equally topical throughout Ukraine despite foreign policy or electoral preferences (Onuch 2014: 10). Finally, the third wave of geographical diffusion took place in the period of 17 January – 18 February 2014 and was characterised by the radicalisation of claim making means (Onuch 2014: 10). As it was mentioned above, the regional means of direct action at this phase

included takeovers of governmental buildings, but also the “Leninopad” campaign, which aimed at demolishing Lenin’s monuments (Onuch 2014: 10).

*Social mobilisation: the formation of a collective political actor*

In accordance to the theoretical framework that is suggested in this research, the first category of social mobilisation analysis is social appropriation, which implies the transformation of non-political social groups into political actors in the course of contention. In order to understand the Maidan mobilisation, it is crucial to distinguish two processes: a longer mobilisation of civic activists and political opposition, and a mass mobilisation of “ordinary citizens” (Onuch 2014: 5). In such a way, the Maidan movement actors can be broadly divided into a self-organised group, which included civic activists, journalists and students, and a group embracing the opposition parties and their supporters (Onuch 2014: 5). According to O. Onuch, the coexistence of these groups can be essentially described as a “conflictual complicated cooperation” and competition (Onuch 2014: 9). The scholar points out that the distinctive feature of the Maidan movement was a prominent role of self-organised actors (Onuch 2014: 9).

This suggestion can be underpinned by the observations of the Maidan civic activist, who co-founded the Maidan Civic Council – a coordination platform that embraced NGOs and civic initiatives. According to him, there was a “gap” between civic activists and the opposition politicians on the Maidan, as the opposition leaders “were afraid” that the Maidan movement would become a real actor in the political negotiations with the incumbent government or external actors (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1). The coordinator explained that the Maidan stage was “inaccessible” for civic activists, who were not approved by the opposition parties, however, this changed with the escalation and expansion of the protest movement (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1). Additionally, the civic activist claimed that the opposition parties had their “agents”, who “penetrated” into self-organised civic groups to collect information (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1).

The coordinator stated that the National Alliance “Maidan”, which was initiated by the opposition leaders and included publicly well known civic and cultural activists, was essentially a

replica of the Maidan Civic Council: "...On the 12<sup>th</sup> [of December] we established the Council, and on the 18<sup>th</sup> ... they announced the National Alliance "Maidan". So this was identical, they nearly copied our declaration. And this is a famous management method: if you need to undermine a process and you have more resources, you just create an identical process" (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1).

The Maidan social mobilisation involved four distinctive groups of actors: civic activists and social movement organisations (SMOs), political elites, "ordinary citizens" and foreign actors (Onuch 2014: 12). The first group embraces civic activists and organisations that emerged during or before the Maidan movement, for instance at the time of the Orange Revolution (Onuch 2014: 12). Such civic initiatives, as Civic Sector (Hromadskyi Sector), Opora, Chesno, Maidan Coordination Committee, Maidan Self-Defence (Samooborona Maidanu), Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor), incorporated both the newly formed and previously active organisations (Onuch 2014: 12).

Apart from civic activists, the first group of actors includes journalists, who together with the former fulfilled the crucial functions of formulating protest demands, facilitating mobilisation through media, social and personal networks, and establishing a connection between the ordinary citizens and politicians (Onuch 2014: 12-14). According to O. Onuch, the boundaries between civic activists and journalists were blurred: not only did the latter provide a twenty-four-hour media coverage of the Maidan protests, but also supported the movement (Onuch 2014: 13). At the same time, civic activists played the journalist role by reporting on the Maidan events in Kyiv and throughout the country. Live coverage was facilitated by Internet television, for instance, Hromadske.TV and Espresso.TV, which gained popularity during the Maidan movement and contributed to the social mobilisation.

Due to a heterogeneous composition, the transformation of Maidan civic activists and organisations into a single political actor was challenged by several factors. Firstly, there was a need for a coordinated integration of activists and initiatives with different background and experience in contentious actions. For instance, among the civic groups there was a minority that advocated for violent means of claim making and nationalist agenda of the movement.

In this context, it is important to mention the Maidan initiatives, which aimed at providing a civic leadership and coordination of the movement. According to the co-founder of the Maidan Civic Council, several civic “analytical teams” emerged after 30 November in order to elaborate the strategy and tactics of the Maidan movement. The activist referred to the Civic Crisis Centre as to the “intellectual backbone” of the movement. As for the previously mentioned Maidan Civic Council, it served as a common space of interaction and coordination among approximately eighty civic organisations. However, despite the attempts to bring together various civic organisations, this group of Maidan actors remained rather fragmented (Onuch 2014: 14-15). The cooperation was impeded by the different approaches to the goals of the movement; while some initiatives concentrated on signing the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, others targeted V. Yanukovich and the incumbent government.

The next group of Maidan actors is political elites that were in power and in opposition at the time of the movement. The features of the political regime under the presidency of V. Yanukovich were mentioned in the previous chapters, however, it is important to point out the two clusters of political and economic elites in power: the personalised and closed network that supported V. Yanukovich, and the members of the party of power, who held public posts or owned a business. By the time of the Maidan protests, these pro-president political and economic elites had gained a substantial control over the state resources. It can be suggested that as a result of this structural setup, the incumbent government became less sensitive to the growing protests and more ready to deal with contention by imposing restrictions on the protest opportunities.

As for the opposition political elite that was mobilised for the Maidan movement, it was mainly represented by Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc (BYuT), UDAR and Svoboda (Freedom), but also included smaller political parties and non-partisan politicians. In her assessment of the opposition as a political actor, O. Onuch highlighted the lack of unity among the three main political parties, the weakness of their leadership performance, low capability to cooperate with civic organisations and the overall

“disorientation” during the Maidan movement (Onuch 2014: 16-17). The leadership of the Maidan movement will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

The third group of Maidan actors comprises “ordinary citizens”, who joined the Maidan movement in the course of mass mobilisation (Onuch 2014: 12). As it was previously mentioned, the primary mobilised group of civic activists and journalists, which emerged in response to the Association Agreement’s suspense and was supported by the opposition politicians, had remained rather limited until 30 November 2013. It can be suggested that the wider Ukrainian public did not perceive the Euromaidan agenda as a solid ground for direct action. The respondents of in-depth interviews, who supported the demands of Euromaidan, but joined the movement after the use of police force against the protesters on 30 November, perceived the suspense of the Association Agreement as an important but ordinary governmental decision: “...when people started to assemble to express their discontent about the failure to sign the Agreement, I did not have a desire to go there, because I considered it as *fait accompli*. Essentially, we would not have changed anything, neither the Yanukovich’s reaction, nor the reaction of our government...so that they would have listened to me and signed the Agreement” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 1). For this reason, changing the government through regular national elections was seen as a potential mechanism to influence Ukraine’s foreign policy.

The Maidan participants, who joined the movement after 30 November, but were skeptical about Ukraine’s course towards the EU membership, did not consider the suspense of the Association Agreement as a viable motivating factor to protest: “...The idea of European integration...I do not think that this will save Ukraine. The fact of the EU accession will not change anything drastically. For me, it was not the cause of the revolution” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 2). According to one of the respondents, the EU does not “need” Ukraine, because the Union has to deal with its internal problems (Personal interview: Maidan protester 3).

The incident of 30 November was a powerful mobilisation trigger, which actualised a basic, but crucial issue of human and civic rights’ violation. The efficiency of this trigger can be explained by its



“cross-cleavage” mechanism that transcends the boundaries of various social groups, such as ethnicity, language, region of origin or residence, economic and social welfare, political affiliation (Onuch 2014: 17). Most importantly, the incident of violence against peaceful students and civic activists evoked a sense of personal involvement in the Maidan events.

During the in-depth interviews, the majority of respondents described their motivation to join the movement as an outrage with the “beating” on the Maidan, “excessive use of police force” against the students and the overall “lawlessness” (“svavillya”) (Personal interviews: Maidan protester 1, 5, 6; Maidan activist 3). Some participants referred to “personal dignity”, and the violation of people’s freedom of thought and speech (Personal interviews: Maidan protester 5). Describing her feelings after the “beating” on 30 November, one of the Maidan participants stated: “...the whole country, I think not only me, woke up with a thought that the revolution of dignity had started. It was a protest for this [“beating”] not to happen again” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 2). An emotionally strong public reaction to the incident can be illustrated with such expressions as: “I could not bear this” and “it was enough” (Personal interviews: Maidan activist 3). The co-founder of the Maidan Civic Crisis Centre explained his motivation to participate in the movement in a phrase: “This was my personal war” (Personal interview: Maidan activist 2)

In order to understand the “cross – cleavage” mechanism of Maidan social mobilisation, it is important to explore the “median” Maidan protestor (Onuch 2014: 17). As the central protest location was the Maidan Square and its surrounding areas, the sociological data on the participants mainly focuses on the median Kyiv protestor. According to O. Onuch, 42 percent of Maidan participants were residents of Ukraine’s regions, excluding the Kyiv region (Onuch 2014: 48). Although the majority of non-Kyiv protesters represented Western and Central regions, approximately one fifth resided in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Onuch 2014: 48). It is worthy of note that as the movement escalated and radicalised in January – February 2014, the number of non-Kyiv protestors gradually increased, while the number of female participants decreased (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014).

Sociologists estimated that the average Maidan protestor was 37 years old, as over a half of Maidan protestors were aged from 30 to 54 years old, approximately one third of participants were 18 – 30 years old and 12 percent were older than 55 (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). Taking into account the complexity of language identity in Ukraine, it is important to point out that both Ukrainian and Russian speakers participated in the Maidan protests. Despite the fact that the number of Russian speakers on the Maidan decreased from one fourth in December 2013 to 15 percent in February 2014, the number of bilingual protestors speaking Russian and Ukrainian had increased to one fourth in February (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). Ukrainian speakers constituted approximately 55 percent of the Maidan protestors in December and around 60 percent in February (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014).

As for the educational background of the Maidan participants, in December 2013, the majority of approximately 63 percent received higher education and 22 percent had a general secondary or specialised education; however, as the protests escalated and radicalised in February 2014, the number of protestors with higher and secondary education became equal and constituted 86 percent in total (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014).

It is important to mention that the Maidan social mobilisation “crossed the cleavage” of party preferences and electoral choice. According to the data collected by O. Onuch in December 2013, approximately 26 percent of respondents had voted for V. Yanukovich or a candidate associated with him, as well as for the Party of Regions during the 2004, 2010 and 2012 elections (Onuch 2014: 49). When describing their motivation to protest, this group of Maidan participants mainly referred to “illegitimate use of militia violence” and “violation of civic rights” (Onuch 2014: 49).

Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of Maidan protestors did not belong to any political party, civic organization or movement (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). While in December 2013 this number reached approximately 92 percent, in February it decreased to 70 percent with a substantial rise of the civic movement members (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). One of the protestors stated: “...when I was there, it was not for someone or in the name of

someone, it was my awareness...I was there for my son not have this...I was outraged by the lawlessness [svavillya] that started...and not some kind of leaders, whom I had to follow” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 4).

Finally, the fourth group of Maidan actors is comprised of foreign actors. As the initial trigger of the Maidan movement was related to the choice of Ukraine’s foreign policy course, both the EU and Russia were involved in the Maidan events (Onuch 2014: 15). While the Kremlin supported the incumbent government and did not recognise the legitimacy of the Maidan protests, it can be suggested that to some extent the EU adopted a mediating role in the internal Ukrainian crisis. On the one hand, the Union publicly supported the protest claims, which were related to democratic rights and freedoms, the rule of law, decent social and economic conditions; on the other hand, the EU aimed at bringing the government and opposition leaders to negotiations in order to de-escalate the social tension in Ukraine. A similar stance was taken by the US. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy C. Ashton visited Kyiv several times during the Maidan protests in order to hold talks with government’s representatives, opposition leaders and civil society activists.

The EU’s mediating role should be mentioned in regards to the deal between V. Yanukovych and the opposition leaders on 21 February 2014 after several dozens of people had been killed on the Maidan. The agreement that was brokered by three EU foreign ministers and Russia’s special envoy provided for the restoration of a parliamentary - presidential republic, a “constitutional reform balancing the powers of president, government and parliament”, early presidential elections and investigation of the acts of violence that had taken place in the course of the Maidan protests (BBC News 2014). Despite the controversial assessments of the agreement and the fact that V. Yanukovych left Ukraine after it had been signed, the deal certified the EU’s mediating involvement in the Maidan movement.

With a reference to Ukrainian political insiders, O. Onuch assesses the attempts of the EU and US to facilitate the internal political crisis at the time of the Maidan movement as “mismanagement” (Onuch 2014: 15). Firstly, in the negotiation process, the Western part mainly focused on elite actors;

therefore, a deal between the government and opposition was perceived as a key stabilising solution to the internal political conflict. Secondly, the EU and US officials believed that the three opposition leaders had a solid leadership control over the Maidan movement and could stop or dissolve the protests.

One of the Maidan civic coordinators shared the insider's information about Victoria Nuland's visit to Kyiv in December 2013, when the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs made an attempt to settle down the internal conflict by holding talks with the political and economic elite in power and the opposition leaders. According to the civic activist, the main goal of the US at that time was to bring the Maidan protests to an end and stabilise the political situation in Ukraine in order to prevent a possible international tension between the West and Russia. The coordinator pointed out that the protest rhetoric of the three opposition leaders during their public speech on the Maidan Square was toned down after the meeting with V. Nuland: "We are going home now, but we will get them [V. Yanukovych and the incumbent government] out through the elections in 2015" (Personal interview: Maidan activist 1).

However, this message was rejected by the Maidan participants, as they did not agree to stop the protest before their demands were satisfied. The case with V. Nuland is illustrative in a way that it shows a somewhat simplified understanding of Ukraine's internal political crisis by the main Western actors that were involved in the Maidan events. As it will be discussed later in this chapter, the three opposition leaders had a rather low credibility level among the Maidan protestors, and, therefore, did not have a full control over the movement.

After exploring the political actors, the analysis of social mobilisation will proceed with internal and external certification of the Maidan movement. While internal certification focuses on the Maidan leadership, its representativeness and credibility, the category of external certification is related to the recognition of the Maidan protests by external actors. This chapter will discuss the three opposition politicians, who are widely referred to as the leaders of the Maidan movement: A. Yatsenyuk, who chaired the parliamentary faction of the "Batkivschyna" ("Motherland") party at the time of the

Maidan protests, the leader of “UDAR” party V. Klychko and O. Tyahnybok, a leader of “Svoboda” (“Freedom”) party.

The involvement of the opposition leaders in the Maidan protests started during the first phase of the movement in November 2013, when they publicly supported the protest claims and were present on the Maidan Square. The three politicians addressed the protestors on regular basis from the Maidan stage. However, unlike the Orange Revolution, the Maidan movement did not aim at putting the opposition politicians or parties to power; they were rather perceived as potential agents of the Maidan protestors, who had public influence and mechanisms to bring the movement to achieving its demands. It is worthy of note that a rather low number of protestors joined the movement in response to the appeals of the opposition leaders: 5,4 percent in December 2013 and 2,8 percent in February 2014 (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). In the course of in-depth interviews, one out of ten respondents stated that he had joined the Maidan protests in response to the appeal of the opposition politician to the Ukrainian public.

Due to a rather spontaneous flow of the Maidan movement and the complex composition of its participants, there was a need for a consolidating and responsible leadership, a “voice” of protestors that would articulate and negotiate protest claims with the incumbent government and other involved actors, and, importantly, a coordinator with a clear strategy and tactics of collective protest actions. According to the co-founder of the Maidan Crisis Centre, in order to become an actor, the Maidan movement needed a solid leadership: “On the Maidan, there was not a single person, who could represent the whole Maidan on the stage, because its composition was very diverse. This is why we needed a collective leadership – a group of people, where each person represents a part of the Maidan, so that together they would represent the whole Maidan” (Personal interview: Maidan activist 2).

It is worthy of note that the project of Maidan civic activists on creating the collective leadership became real in the last days of the protests. The People’s Trust Circle consisted of eleven people representing such groups within the Maidan movement as the Clergy Council of Maidan, Maidan Self-Defense, Medical Service of Maidan, Right Sector, Afghan War veterans, Muslim Council, Maidan

Civic Sector, “Automaidan” (“Car Maidan”) and the moderators of the Maidan stage (RadioSvoboda 2014). As the co-founder of the Maidan Crisis Centre stated, on the day of their public address to the Maidan protestors, the members of People’s Trust Circle declared that the Maidan movement had become an actor (Personal interview: Maidan activist 2).

There are several points of criticism in regards the political leadership of the Maidan movement, which were raised by “ordinary” protestors and civic activists during the in-depth interviews. In general, when asked about the Maidan leadership, the majority of respondents defined the three opposition leaders, but highlighted that the politicians were not the “real leaders” of the movement. The civic activists and the majority of “ordinary” participants expressed an idea that the Maidan movement did not have leaders, as it was driven by a remarkable and unprecedented people’s self-organisation. As for A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klychko and O. Tyahnybok, they were not recognised as potential state leaders. According to one of the Maidan Self-Defense coordinators, the three opposition politicians failed to take up the responsibility of leading the protestors: “...People rebelled and they succeeded. This is it. But people did not know what to do next. This is why we have politicians, leaders...So we asked these three leaders...Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok and Klychko to take up responsibility and be leaders...You are public persons, you work for years to gain authority...[They replied] Yes, we will...But nothing came out of it” (Personal interview: Maidan activist 3).

Another point of criticism in regards the three opposition politicians was their “weakness” in negotiations with the incumbent government and president. The attempts of the three leaders to bargain the release and amnesty for the Maidan protestors, who were kept in detention, were not seen as sufficient by the Maidan participants. It is worthy of note that during the negotiations between V. Yanukovych and the opposition leaders in the end of January 2014, the president offered a post of Prime Minister to A. Yatsenyuk and a post of Vice Prime Minister to V. Klychko upon condition that the three politicians stopped the protests. As this offer was widely condemned by the Maidan protestors, the opposition leaders did not accept it (DailyLviv.Com 2014).

It can be suggested that the weakness of the Maidan political leadership and the overall limited use of political channels by claim makers, as well as the substantial role of the non-institutional civic actors correspond to the nature of Ukraine's hybrid political regime. Due to the narrowed opportunities to challenge the existing regime and inefficiency of institutional means to change the regime, civic channels became the only way to articulate social demands. In such a way, the non-institutional character of the Maidan movement can be partially explained by the structural conditions of the hybrid political regime.

In general, the certification of the opposition politicians as the Maidan leaders was rather problematic. While there was a lack of trust from the side of civic activists, the "ordinary" protestors to some extent felt the "gap" between themselves and the opposition leaders. In the course of in-depth interviews, certain Maidan participants claimed that the opposition politicians "used" and "manipulated" people's outrage against the incumbent government to oust the latter and secure coming to power. As it is suggested by O. Onuch, the complex interaction between the Maidan political leaders and "ordinary" protestors on the one hand and the lack of cooperation between the former and civic activists on the other hand served as a contributing factor for the radicalisation of the movement and introduction of violent claim making means (Onuch 2014: 23).

In addition to the analysis of foreign actors' involvement in the Maidan movement, this chapter will briefly discuss the external certification of the Maidan protests. The EU recognised the movement in its first phase of Euromaidan in the end of November 2013 as an "unprecedented public support in Ukraine for political association and economic integration with the EU" (Fact Sheet EU – Ukraine Relations 2015: 2). After the breakup of the Euromaidan protest on 30 November, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy C. Ashton and Š. Füle, the EU Commissioner on Enlargement, issued a joint statement, in which the Union condemned the "excessive use of force by the police...to disperse peaceful protestors" (Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on Last Night's Events in Ukraine 2013). A similar assessment of the incident was presented by NATO.

The statement of the US Secretary of State J. Kerry from December 2013 shows a rather hard-line stance on the situation in Ukraine: “The United States expresses its disgust with the decision of Ukrainian authorities to meet the peaceful protest in Kyiv’s Maidan Square with riot police, bulldozers, and batons, rather than with respect for democratic rights and human dignity. This response is neither acceptable nor does it befit a democracy” (The New York Times 2013). As opposed to the Western actors, who certified the protests as legitimate, Russia’s State Duma adopted a statement, in which the protests were assessed as “unauthorised demonstrations, blocking of state authorities, takeover of governmental buildings, violence, demolition of historical monuments”, which destabilise the situation in Ukraine and have negative economic and political consequences for its population (Russia’s State Duma 2013).

It is worthy of note that the State Duma called on the Western politicians “to stop putting external pressure on Ukraine” and on the opposition politicians “to cease unlawful acts and solve the problems in strict compliance with the national legislation” (Russia’s State Duma 2013). Russia’s official stance on the unlawful nature of the Maidan protests remained unchanged in the course of the Maidan movement.

The final aspect of the Maidan social mobilisation that will be briefly discussed in this chapter is the collective Maidan identity. As this subject requires a separate solid investigation, this research paper will suggest the general features of the Maidan protest identity based on the collected data. Firstly, it is important to understand the formation of the Maidan identity boundaries, which, as the movement itself, underwent transformation. The appliance of the categories “us” and “them” to the collective identity of the Euromaidan protesters in November 2013 would show that “us” essentially embraces the supporters of Ukraine’s European integration. At the same time, it is crucial to highlight that the concept of “Europe” is an axiological package, which includes such values as the rule of law, social justice, personal and economic security.

At this phase of the movement, the category of “them” consisted of the incumbent government and president V. Yanukovich, who made a decision to suspend the Association Agreement. It can also



be suggested that Russia, as an alternative foreign policy course, and its political leadership was perceived as “them”, however, this assumption requires further research.

The boundary of the collective Maidan identity expanded significantly after the use of police force against the protestors and the cases of protestors’ detention on 30 November. The core values, which shaped the boundaries at this phase, were individual rights and freedoms, particularly personal security and dignity, but also the rule of law. As universal values, they drove a “cross – cleavage” social mobilisation, which was described earlier in this chapter. It is of particular interest to explore that the respondents of in-depth interviews associated these universal principles with such Ukrainian national values as individualism, specifically individual liberty and polyarchy. It can be suggested that the category “us” essentially implied the citizens of Ukraine, who appealed to the government and president, but also more broadly, to the state as a system of public administration and social relations.

In such a way, for the Maidan protestors, the category “them” embodied the incumbent public authorities and officials. At the heart of the division into two opposing categories lied a shared myth about the conflict between the “old system” on the one hand, which was associated with Ukraine’s Soviet past, lawlessness, corruption and defective democracy with authoritarian features, and the “new system” on the other hand, in which the state guarantees the citizens’ rights and freedoms.

In the context of the debate on the nationalist factor in the Maidan movement, it is relevant to explore the features of nationalism in the collective Maidan identity. Prior to this, it should be mentioned that despite the presence of nationalist groups on the Maidan, ethnic nationalist agenda did not become mainstream for the movement, which can be proved by the protest claims and “cross - cleavage” social mobilisation. Recognising the limitations of the in-depth interviews, which were conducted for the purpose of this study, it can be suggested that civic and not ethnic elements were determinant for the Maidan collective identity. This suggestion can be underpinned by the research on the Maidan participants, which was conducted by O. Onuch (Onuch 2014: 20).

During the in-depth interviews, the majority of respondents associated being a Ukrainian with Ukrainian citizenship, which they explained as responsibility, awareness and duty to work for Ukraine

and its development, as well as receiving education in Ukraine. Several Maidan participants understood Ukraine as a home. Some respondents stated that although they could not be considered ethnic Ukrainians, they felt themselves Ukrainian, because they lived in Ukraine. At the same time, several participants indicated that Ukrainian language, history, culture and land were crucial attributes of being a Ukrainian.

According to one of the Maidan protestors, the Maidan movement marked the formation of the Ukrainian nation, because “people stood up for their national dignity”: “We now understand differently what the state means...People are starting to think of themselves not as a part of something, not as Russia’s fragment, but as a sovereign state” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 5). The protestor stated that during the Maidan movement, Ukraine’s national symbols, particularly the flag and anthem, regained their meaning. The historically nationalist slogans, such as “Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the Heroes”, which was used by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1930s and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1940s, also regained their meaning in the course of the Maidan movement: “...Russian-speaking colleagues sincerely greet me [with this slogan], because we know exactly which heroes we mean, which Ukraine we glorify and why” (Personal interview: Maidan protester 5).

The importance of civic elements within the Maidan movement, particularly its claims and collective identity, can be conceptualised by using T. Kuzio’s theoretical approach to democratic transition. According to the scholar, a necessary prerequisite for a stable democracy and market economy is a political nation, as the latter implies a political community of people with shared values and the feeling of belonging to this community (Kuzio 2001: 171). T. Kuzio argues that in post-communist states the transitions to democracy and market economy often start before a political nation is formed, when a political community does not have a sufficient unity and legitimacy, and the citizens are not ready to make sacrifices for their state (Kuzio 2001: 171). In such a way, the scholar claims that a post-communist transition is successful upon condition that a political nation is formed before a democratic and economic transitions take place.

Most importantly, a common national or civic identity provides solidarity across social groups and is a crucial prerequisite for the establishment of social justice and democracy with deliberative decision-making (Kuzio 2001: 171). Apart from this, T. Kuzio argues that in post-communist states, a strong civil society can be developed only within a political nation, because it is based on civic solidarity and not ethnic nationalism (Kuzio 2001: 172).

As for the Maidan movement, it can be suggested that the features of civic solidarity in its social mobilisation and collective identity indicate the emergence of the political nation in Ukraine. In accordance with Kuzio’s approach, the deficiencies of Ukraine’s political and economic transition can be partially explained by the weakness of its civic nation and civil society. It can be suggested that to some extent, the Maidan movement provided an ideology of political and economic reforms in Ukraine, however, this suggestion requires further research.

<i>Social mobilisation for the Maidan movement</i>	
Main actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Civic activists and organisations</li> <li>b) “ordinary” citizens</li> <li>c) political elites (in power and opposition)</li> <li>d) foreign actors (the EU, US, Russia)</li> </ul>
Group boundaries	<p>Before 30 November 2013: support for Ukraine’s European integration course</p> <p>After 30 November 2013: indignation with the violation of individual rights and freedoms by the state</p>
Collective identity	<p>Formation: “cross-cleavage”</p> <p>Core values: individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law</p> <p>Shared myth: a struggle against the “old system” for the “new” system</p> <p>“Us”: citizens of Ukraine “Them”: incumbent authorities</p> <p>Nationalism: prevalence of civic elements over ethnic</p>
Certification	<p>Internal: a formal leadership of the three opposition leaders (A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klychko and O. Tyahnybok) was problematic and weak in practice</p> <p>External:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) the EU and US recognised the legitimacy of the Maidan protests;</li> <li>b) Russia recognised the protests as unlawful.</li> </ul>

*Repertoire of the Maidan movement: a transformation of claim-making means*

The Maidan movement introduced novelty contentious elements, but, most importantly, it incorporated violent means of claim making into Ukraine's protest repertoire. On the first stage in November 2013, the Euromaidan protesters largely adopted those means of claim making, which had been accumulated since 1990s, such as peaceful demonstrations, mass rallies, public addresses and live concerts on the Maidan stage. The choice of the Independence Square, as a main venue of the Maidan protests, can be explained by its symbolic name and the success of previous claim making campaigns on the central Kyiv square, particularly the Orange Revolution.

According to O. Onuch, the initial split between civic activists and political parties was visible in the protest space; for instance, in November, the opposition political parties and their supporters were gathering on the European Square, while civic groups were staying on the Maidan Square (Onuch 2014: 8). The scholar highlights that each of the Maidan civic groups occupied a certain space of the square, for instance, the title "Right Sector" emerged in the course of the Maidan movement to define those self-organised groups, parties and individuals that were located in the right-hand corner of the Maidan Square and were ready to participate in the front line activities, as well as provide security to other protesters (Onuch 2014: 8).

In December 2013, on the second phase of the Maidan movement, the protesters applied another method of direct action from the times of the Orange Revolution – they set up a Maidan camp. However, unlike in 2004, the Maidan camp of 2013 – 2014 was surrounded by barricades, which were guarded by the Maidan Self-Defence. It is worthy of note that the self-organised protest infrastructure within the Maidan camp was referred to as "the city" or "the state within the state", because it had the attributes of self-government, such as a weekly "viche", or a people's assembly on the protest matters, voluntary self-defence units, medical service, catering (Stepnisky 2014). Apart from the protest space on the Maidan Square, the protesters used the buildings in surrounding areas, for instance, the trade union hall, city council and St. Michael's cathedral, to keep themselves warm, stay overnight, hold organised meetings and provide medical aid.

A symbolic meaning of the Maidan viche is related to Ukraine's historical phenomenon of popular assemblies and councils, particularly in the times of Zaporozhian Cossack Sich, which enabled the participation of wider public in decision-making. At the time of the Maidan protests, viches were held on weekly bases on the Maidan Square and implied a public address of the opposition leaders and Maidan civic groups. Such people's assemblies were envisaged as a form of communication with "ordinary" protesters bringing together various Maidan groups, but also as an occasion to formulate common claims and outline further actions. However, according to the co-founder of the Maidan Civic Council, regular viches pointed out the "gap" between the three opposition leaders and Maidan protesters, because the speeches of the politicians could be hissed and hooted, by which the protesters demonstrated their rejection or discontent.

It can be argued that until December 2013, the Maidan claim making means had largely remained within the limits of Ukraine's contentious repertoire. I. Homza assesses Ukraine's contentious tactics of 1990s – 2013 as "rigid", because the means of claim making were not innovated despite the changes in structural environment (Homza 2014: 58). While the accumulated contentious experience allowed for a rather fast social mobilisation, the existing means of direct action were rather inefficient during the protest campaign of November – December 2013. On the one hand, the targeted public authorities demonstrated low sensitivity to the protest claims; on the other hand, they showed deterrence to contention by making attempts to break up the protests and limiting opportunities for direct action by adopting the anti-protest laws of 16 January (Homza 2014: 58).

The proponents of more radical claim making means, such as the above mentioned coalition of right-wing and nationalist groups the Right Sector and radicalised members of the right-wing Svoboda (Freedom) party, were present on the Maidan in December 2013. However, it can be suggested that the introduction of violent contentious repertoire in January occurred due to the interplay of several factors: an increasing deterrence of incumbent authorities, growing discontent among the protesters with unsatisfied claims, disorganisation and lack of cooperation between the opposition parties and

civic groups. The sum of these factors created tension, which broke out in response to the adoption of the anti-protest laws and clashes with police forces.

The violent but innovative means of claim making included Molotov cocktails, a handmade explosive, and burning tires, which were used by the protesters against the police forces. According to O. Onuch, the radicalisation of the protests in January 2014 was accompanied by the increasing references to nationalist slogans and symbols (Onuch, Sasse 2014). Apart from the Right Sector and Svoboda supporters, the frontline actions near the Maidan barricades and governmental buildings were taken by the Maidan Self-Defence units and Afghan veterans (Onuch, Sasse 2014). The innovation of repertoire with violent claim making means has a significant implication for Ukraine's contention: the violent techniques, which proved to be efficient during the Maidan movement, can be reactivated in the future.

## Conclusions

This dissertation aimed at testing a theoretical model for analysing the Maidan protest movement of November 2013 – February 2014, which integrates structural and cultural approaches, and is based on the contentious politics theory. The model is productive in a way that allows us to draw certain conclusions about the Maidan protest movement.

The dynamics of the Maidan movement can be summarised as four upward phases that broke out in reaction to specific situational triggers. It can be suggested that the expansion of the protest movement was caused by the inadequate response of the incumbent government to the protests, particularly the lack of sensitivity to the protest demands and attempts to deter protest actions. The government's reaction to the Maidan protests can partially explain the radicalisation of the movement; another crucial escalation factor was the lack of efficiency in the protest coordination from the side of the opposition leaders.

The causation of the Maidan protests can be seen as a complex interplay of structural, conjunctural and endogenous factors. Despite the transformation of demands on the protest agenda in the course of the Maidan protest movement, people's discontent with the existing structural conditions was present throughout all the four phases. The main structural causes of the Maidan movement include the deterioration of democracy, decline in legitimacy of public authorities, accumulated public discontent with corruption, social injustice, lack of civic influence over the state affairs, social and economic insecurity.

The effect of the listed structural causes was enabled by the mechanism of conjunctural factors, which established the emotional link between the structural grievances and the incumbent government. The four protest triggers, which were, essentially, situational events, were perceived as the government's attempts to narrow down opportunities for improving economic and social conditions, and as the attack on people's democratic rights and freedoms.

The endogenous causation of the Maidan protest movement can be analysed at the internal and external levels. The escalation of the protests was internally driven by the government's actions and

respective reactions of the Maidan protestors. At the same time, the expansion of the protest action stimulated the public authorities to react with deterrence. The external level of analysing the endogenous causes shows the interplay between the Maidan protest movement and preceding protest actions in Ukraine, particularly the Orange Revolution. On the one hand, the 2004 protest served as an example of a successful claim-making campaign. On the other hand, the disappointment with the incompleteness of the Orange Revolution and failure of systemic reforms contributed to people's structural grievances.

Four groups of actors were involved in the Maidan protest movement: civic activists and organisations, 'ordinary' citizens, political elites in power and opposition, and foreign actors, such as the EU, US and Russia. The social mobilisation of the first two groups before 30 November 2013 was largely driven by the support for Ukraine's European integration course, while after this date people joined the protests due to their indignation with the violation of individual rights and freedoms, which was exercised by the state.

The crucial feature of the Maidan collective identity is its "cross-cleavage" formation that united various social groups around the Maidan demands. This research suggests that the core values of the Maidan collective identity were individual rights and freedoms, and the rule of law. The participants of the Maidan movement shared a myth of the struggle against the "old system" for the "new system", at the heart of which lied the division between "us" – the citizens of Ukraine, and "them" – the incumbent authorities. As for the nationalist characteristics of the collective Maidan identity, this dissertation argues that the elements of civic nationalism prevailed over ethnic.

The certification of the Maidan protest movement was analysed at the internal and external levels. The internal certification refers to the formal leadership of the movement, which was represented by the three opposition politicians A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klychko and O. Tyahnybok, but was weak and problematic in practice. Externally, the Maidan movement was certified as legitimate by the EU and US, while Russia recognised the protests unlawful.



The repertoire of the Maidan movement, or the claim-making means that were used by its participants, was largely shaped by the preceding protest acts in Ukraine and included a range of non-violent rallies, demonstrations in front of the governmental buildings, occupation of public space, particularly the Kyiv Independence Square, and setting up a protest camp. However, the escalation of the protests and inefficiency of non-violent repertoire lead to the introduction of novelty violent elements. It can be suggested that the use of violent claim-making means was caused by the increasing deterrence of incumbent authorities, growing discontent among the protesters with unsatisfied claims, disorganisation and lack of cooperation between the opposition parties and civic groups. It is worthy of note that the violent techniques, which were applied during the Maidan protest movement and proved to be efficient, can be incorporated into Ukraine's contentious repertoire and reactivated in the future.

The appliance of the contentious politics theory and structural approach to the Maidan protests allowed us to analyse the movement in the wider context of Ukraine's democratic transition. Due to the use of neutral categories of contention, it was possible to avoid conflicting discourses on the Maidan protest movement. Additionally, this theoretical approach points out the following novelty elements of the Maidan protest phenomenon: continuous contentious cycle, which consists of several escalating phases, "cross-cleavage" social mobilisation, driving role of civic actors, introduction of violent claim-making means.

At the same time, by using the cultural approach, we explored the composition of the collective Maidan identity and suggested the prevalence of the civic nationalist elements over ethnic. Although it is difficult to measure the extent to which the structural and cultural factors determined the Maidan protest movement, our research findings show that the effect of structural discontent on the social mobilisation was enabled by the specific cultural grounds. In such a way, the commonality in individual interpretation of the structural conditions through a shared cultural lens created the necessary basis for a rather wide social mobilisation. The case of the Maidan movement illustrated that both structural and cultural factors are necessary for the social protest to occur.

## Appendix 1 to Chapter 1

<i>Freedom House “Nations in Transit 2004: Ukraine”</i>		
Democratic governance	5,25	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The government’s composition is determined by the balance of powers among three regional oligarchic groups and not by the parliament.</li> <li>2. Despite the formal accountability to the parliament, the government, in practice, is accountable to the president.</li> <li>3. Executive bodies routinely ignore the findings of parliamentary committees.</li> <li>4. Lack of transparency in policy making:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) legal acts issued by the president, parliament and government are difficult to access;</li> <li>b) behind-the-scenes decisions of high officials on the foreign and energy policy matters.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Excessive interference of central authorities in the local government.</li> </ol>
Electoral process	4,25	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Despite the fact that parliamentary elections allowed the opposition party to form a substantial faction, the slim majority of the parliament supports the president.</li> <li>2. Parliamentary and presidential elections in preceding years were generally free but there were elements of administrative interference.</li> <li>3. The parliamentary opposition proposed a law reforming the mixed (proportional – majoritarian) electoral system into a proportional; however, the majority did not support the bill.</li> <li>4. The Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine is heavily dependent on the president, as the latter submits nominees to the parliament.</li> <li>5. Ukraine’s political parties are relatively weak: 6% of Ukrainian citizens belong to parties, while most of 123 registered parties exist only on paper.</li> </ol>
Judicial framework and independence	4,75	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ukrainian constitution provides for a presidential-parliamentary republic based on checks and balances; however, in practice, the role of the president is dominant:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) the president exercises control over the government by appointing the prime minister upon parliament’s consent, and ministers on prime minister’s suggestion; he also has a right to fire the prime minister;</li> <li>b) the president individually appoints the head of Ukraine’s Security Service and a secretary of the National Security Council;</li> <li>c) there is no law on president’s impeachment, while the procedure envisaged by the constitution is cumbersome.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Although the positive role of the constitutional Court has increased, it can be subject to pressure from the presidential administration.</li> </ol>

		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. The Ukraine's Constitution guarantees civil rights and fair competition in business; however, the cases of selective law enforcement and indecent treatment of prisoners show that the constitutional rights can be violated by the state bodies.</li> <li>4. Courts and judges can be subject to external, specifically executive pressure.</li> </ol>
Civil society	3,75	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. There are more than 35 000 NGOs in Ukraine compared to 4 000 in 1995 and 30 000 in 2000.</li> <li>2. Around 5% of Ukrainian citizens are actively engaged in the civil society.</li> <li>3. Around 60% of NGOs are supported by international, mostly Western donors.</li> <li>4. NGOs are engaged in the political process through monitoring the elections, conducting relevant research within think-tanks, providing public advice to several parliamentary committees; however, NGOs cannot influence the policy making process on a permanent basis.</li> <li>5. While NGOs' charitable activities receive media coverage, actions related to human rights protection or policy matters are viewed with suspicion.</li> <li>6. The legal regulation of NGOs' status remains outdated; while the registration procedure is rather complicated, the NGOs' ability to collect income is limited.</li> </ol>
Independent media	5,5	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Ukraine's constitution guarantees the freedom of opinion and speech, and prohibits censorship.</li> <li>2. The media is to a large extent privately owned, however, this often implies a hidden or open ownership of oligarchs, which undermines the objectivity of media content.</li> <li>3. Another factor affecting journalists is the pressure from the presidential administration.</li> <li>4. There are singular mainstream periodicals that can be considered independent and impartial.</li> <li>5. The legal protection of journalists is rather weak and they are commonly subject to violence.</li> <li>6. There are several independent politically oriented web sites that can be accessed by the Ukrainian public.</li> </ol>

## Appendix 2 to Chapter 1

<i>Freedom House “Nations in Transit 2010: Ukraine”</i>		
Democratic governance	5,0	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. National politics remains dependent on various business groups.</li> <li>2. Politicians use democratic rhetoric to manipulate the electorate, but do not follow democratic norms.</li> <li>3. The Constitution of Ukraine is dualistic and its system of checks and balances is inefficient: while the parliament forms the government, the president’s executive powers remain rather wide.</li> <li>4. Despite constant promises and declarations, the government implemented neither administrative nor judiciary reforms.</li> <li>5. The government demonstrates a greater openness to the public; however, the participation of the public in policy making remains imitational and cumbersome.</li> </ol>
Electoral process	3,5	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ukraine’s parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 were held according to the proportional voting system and were largely recognised as free and fair.</li> <li>2. The campaign for 2010 presidential elections was generally free and fair with no substantial foreign or governmental interference. The campaign showed the public skepticism about Ukraine’s political leadership.</li> <li>3. The results of national elections reflect the remaining discrepancies of electoral preferences between Eastern and Southern regions on the one side, and Western and Central on the other.</li> <li>4. The electoral legislation is not codified; the parliament has a tendency to amend the existing electoral laws or adopt new laws before the elections.</li> </ol>
Judicial framework and independence	5,0	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Despite continuous declarations, a systemic judicial reform has not been conducted.</li> <li>2. The main problems of the judicial system are:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) politicisation and external interference;</li> <li>b) corruption and lack of transparency in the court system;;</li> <li>c) inefficiency of court proceedings;</li> <li>d) indecent treatment of suspects and prisoners.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. The level of public trust towards judiciary is very low, because people do not feel protected by the law or equal before the law.</li> </ol>
Civil society	2,75	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Despite the formal rhetoric on importance of the civil society, NGOs function under outdated legislation, are prohibited to generate income and, therefore, are dependent on foreign funding.</li> <li>2. Although certain NGOs are consulted by the government, their role in policy making remains rather limited.</li> <li>3. Despite the double increase in the number of registered NGOs, many of them are not operational or carry out</li> </ol>

		<p>insignificant activities; the strongest NGOs are based in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine.</p> <p>4. Trade unions are incapable of effectively defending their members.</p>
Independent media	3,5	<p>1. Ukraine's media sector is mostly free at the national level, but local and regional media outlets lack independence.</p> <p>2. Most of the country's media is owned by large financial and industrial groups, which explains the bias of media coverage.</p> <p>3. While governmental censorship is not detected, the cases of media corruption intensified during the 2010 presidential election campaign, as major political actors use media to promote their interests and discredit their competitors.</p> <p>4. The ruling and opposition parties have equal access to media during the election campaign; however, certain nationwide channels are biased in news coverage.</p> <p>5. The Internet media has a significant influence; social networks and blogs are also used to transmit the politically oriented information.</p>

### Appendix 3 to Chapter 1

<i>Freedom House "Nations in Transit 2013: Ukraine"</i>		
Democratic governance	5,75	<p>1. The predominance of executive branch over legislative and judicial was established as a result of the following institutional and legal rearrangements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the 2004 Constitutional reform was repealed by the Constitutional court of Ukraine and the presidential-parliamentary republic was reinstated;</li> <li>certain legal changes extended presidential powers compared to the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine.</li> </ol> <p>2. In practice, the parliament has lost its authority to provide checks on the executive branch.</p> <p>3. The president has personalised the high level policy making by appointing his close entourage to such crucial governmental posts as first deputy prime minister, interior and finance ministers, tax service and National Bank chiefs.</p> <p>4. The establishment of the president's personal network within the system of government undermined the balance of interest groups, and decreased the influence of those oligarchs and businessmen from the Eastern Ukraine, who supported V. Yanukovich.</p> <p>5. The three opposition parties gained 40 percent of parliamentary seats as a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, while the party of power can form a slim majority by allying with the Communist party and independent MPs.</p>

Electoral process	4,0	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The 2012 parliamentary elections were held in accordance with the electoral law adopted in 2011 that brought back the mixed (proportional – majoritarian) voting system and created generally favourable legal grounds for the Party of Regions by lifting the voting threshold and banning the formation of electoral blocs.</li> <li>2. The party of power was able to use the administrative resource in order to win in the majoritarian districts; while the Party of Regions gained 30 percent of proportional vote, it obtained 50 percent of majoritarian seats in the parliament.</li> <li>3. Two oppositional leaders Y. Tymoshenko and Y. Lutsenko were not allowed to run for parliamentary seats due to criminal convictions.</li> <li>4. The major shortcomings of the 2012 elections were: the use of administrative resource, lack of transparency in electoral campaigning, party financing and formation of district election commissions, as well as irregularities on the voting day.</li> </ol>
Judicial framework and independence	6,0	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The authorities are making attempts to change the Constitution of Ukraine by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) adopting a law on referendum that allows the president to bypass the parliament in changing the Constitution;</li> <li>b) launching the Constitutional Assembly which is an auxiliary body under the presidency with a task to elaborate amendments to the Constitution.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. A new code of criminal procedure was adopted in 2012 with a generally positive assessment of the international community, but mixed opinions of Ukrainian experts.</li> <li>3. The judicial reform has not been implemented; therefore, the remaining problems are: judges’ vulnerability and dependence, excessively lengthy judicial proceedings, inefficiency of judicial rulings and abuse during pretrial detention.</li> <li>4. The imprisonment of the former prime minister Y. Tymoshenko and interior minister Y. Lutsenko, which resulted from the criminal trials against the two opposition politicians, were largely seen by the international community as politically motivated.</li> </ol>
Civil society	2,75	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The new Law on Civic Associations, which took effect in 2013, facilitated the operation of NGOs by removing some administrative barriers, simplifying the registration process and allowing civic organisations to conduct nonprofit commercial activity.</li> <li>2. The involvement of NGOs in policy making remains to a large extent formal.</li> <li>3. Civic activists report about being subject to psychological pressure of the authorities.</li> <li>4. There are several politically oriented civic campaigns that have an impact on the political process through monitoring elections, as well as the transparency of a</li> </ol>

		high level decision making and politicians' income.
Independent media	4,0	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The state media is politicised and largely serves the interests of senior politicians.</li> <li>2. Although the private sector media remains competitive and diverse, it is subject to increasing political pressure. In 2013, the journalists left the independent TVi channel as a result of the opaque takeover. At the same time, the Ukrainian Media Holding owning 50 broadcast, print and online brands was bought by a businessman associated with the close entourage of V. Yanukovych.</li> <li>3. There is a phenomenon of journalists' self-censorship and bias in favor of the government.</li> <li>4. The number of physical assaults targeting journalists has increased.</li> <li>5. The number of Internet media users is rapidly growing.</li> </ol>

### **Appendix 4 to Chapters 2 and 3**

#### List of the In-depth Interview Respondents

1. Maidan activist from Kyiv. Civic activist.
2. Maidan activist from Kyiv. Civic activist, businessman, lecturer.
3. Maidan activist from Kyiv. Military officer.
  
1. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Medical doctor.
2. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Student.
3. Maidan protester from Kyiv. PR specialist.
4. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Senior manager.
5. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Actor, artist.
6. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Senior manager.
7. Maidan protester from Kyiv. Unemployed.

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