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School of Social and Political Sciences

The Desecuritisation of Immigration in

Scotland: An Analysis of Discourse and Practice

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Abstract

By applying Lene Hansen's theoretical framework for desecuritisation to a joint analysis of Scottish discourse and practice, this research aims to address why more welcoming attitudes towards immigration exist in Scotland than in the rest of the United Kingdom. A discourse analysis of key speeches and publications demonstrates a move by Scottish elites to desecuritise immigration by both rearticulating it as positive socio-economic phenomenon and by positioning immigrants as allies in the struggle for prosperity in the face of a repressive Westminster establishment. A subsequent analysis of Scottish governmentality and practice demonstrates how a unique approach to integration undermines securitarian UK policy by prioritising multiculturalism and encouraging positive agency on behalf of refugees and asylum seekers. By discussing the different influences on desecuritisation as highlighted uniquely by these two analyses, this research posits important theoretical considerations about desecuritisation and the approaches of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools of security studies. Furthermore, based on links to be made between immigration framing and recent major political developments nationally and internationally, this paper addresses the potential impact that desecuritisation may have for the political futures of Scotland and the UK.

1. Introduction

Discourse surrounding immigration control has characterised a significant proportion

of debate in British politics in recent years, not least as part of conversations relating

to Britain's pending exit from the European Union. Political parties emphasising the

need to control immigration have generally found greater electoral success in this

time. And, despite the far-right United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) faltering

in recent local and national elections, the Conservative Party has sought to consolidate

its power at the expense of left-of-centre actors by explicitly *securitising* the issue of

immigration.[1] Although empirical justification for the securitisation of migration has

been characterised by ambivalence, academics have pinpointed noticeable frames or

'lenses' that suitably characterise the type of immigration discourse familiar to

followers of UK current affairs.[2] Based on quantitative evidence from prominent

independent social research institutions, it can be understood that the *realist* frame,

preoccupied with the perceived threat of migrants, has dominated recent discourse on

migration in the UK as a whole.[3] Looking at similar evidence based on opinions in

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[1] Robert Booth and Peter Walker (2017), 'Paul Nuttall suffers crushing defeat as Ukip vote collapses', *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/ukip-vote-collapse-puts-paul-nuttall-leadership-in-danger> [accessed 16 July]; and Alex Flynn (2013), 'Bongo Bongo' and reconfiguring the 'other'', *Anthropology Today*, 29 (5), p 1.
[2] Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002), 'The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies', *Alternatives*, 27, pp. 23-24.
[3] Scott Blinder and William Allen (2016), 'UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern', *The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*: *Briefings*, *http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/ [Accessed 16 July 2017]; and* The National Centre for Social Research *(2017),* 'Immigration', *British Social Attitudes*, 34, pp. 1-30.

Scotland, it is difficult to come to a similar conclusion on the strength of realist perspectives of migration north of the border.[4] Although the relatively recent large-scale survey conducted by the Oxford Migration Observatory suggests that there is still widespread popular support in Scotland for the idea of reducing immigration, the same data also indicates significantly more welcoming attitudes than that which exists in the rest of the UK.[5]

Whilst success of realist immigration framing is indicative of both expanding security practice and securitarian immigration rhetoric in the United Kingdom, contrasting Scottish attitudes appear to reflect more inclusive rhetoric, policies and institutions which have been posited as more progressive than that operating elsewhere in the UK.[6] The development of the Scottish government's 'New Scots' initiative and the collaborative work of the Scottish Refugee Council, for instance, provide two prominent examples of this differing Scottish approach.[7] Within the wider context of UK politics, researchers and journalists have sought to analyse the differences in attitudes towards immigration between these constituent parts of the UK, understanding their significance when considering past, present and future political events. Because of the centrality of migration highlighted as a determinant of

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[4] The Migration Observatory (2014), 'Scottish Public Opinion', *The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford: Reports*, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/scottish-public-opinion/ [Accessed 16 July 2017].
[5] The Migration Observatory, 'Scottish Public Opinion'.
[6] Mari Lehva and Gaia Croston (2016), 'Scotland's Immigration Phenomenon and Insights into Integration', *People Know How*, http://peopleknowhow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MigrantIntegration_Briefing.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], pp. 1-4.
[7] Alison Strang et al (2017), ''New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland's Communities: 2014 – 2017 Final Report', *Scottish Government Publications*, http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00515713.pdf [Accessed 16 July 2017].

voting intention for the European Union referendum, one can confidently infer that this difference in attitudes is a significant factor in determining Scotland's contrasting ballot in comparison to that of England, Wales and, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland.[8] A difference in attitudes towards immigration has in the past been linked strongly, too, with the campaign for Scottish independence from the UK.[9]

Building on these observations, this paper employs qualitative research methods to observe the extent to which a process of *desecuritisation* might be said to have taken place in Scotland with respect to the issue of immigration, and what implications this might have for the future of Scottish and UK politics. Furthermore, this paper will contribute to a broadening of the theoretical understanding of the process of desecuritisation and how best to analyse it. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two will provide a fuller description of the concepts of framing, securitisation and desecuritisation - which fundamentally inform the paper's framework of methodological analysis as set forth in chapter three. Chapter four, which incorporates a Copenhagen School-style security analysis, and chapter five, which incorporates a Paris School-style security analysis, explain respectively how elite discourse as well as unique immigration and integration practice influence the existence of more welcoming attitudes to immigration existing in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. The final chapter provides a final summary and critical overview of this study, while positing suggestions for where related future research might best be directed.

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[8] The National Centre for Social Research, 'Immigration', p 3.
[9] Teresa Piacentini (2016), 'Refugee Solidarity in the Everyday', *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture*, 64, pp. 56-61; and The Migration Observatory (2014), 'Scottish Public Opinion'.

2. Theory

2.1. Framing

Frames can be said to set the parameters and the points of reference for audiences to interpret, categorise and evaluate complex or ambiguous events or topics.[1] Realist and liberal frames are posited commonly as the dominant competing perspectives within discourse surrounding migration. The realist frame can be linked with the four axes of argumentation identified by Ceyhan and Tsoukala as socioeconomic, securitarian, identitarian and political.[2] The socioeconomic axis associates migration with unemployment, the rise of informal economy, the crisis of the welfare state, and urban environment deterioration. The securitarian axis links migration to the loss of a control narrative that associates the issues of sovereignty, borders, and both internal and external security. The identitarian axis considers migrants as a threat to the host societies' national identity and demographic equilibrium. Lastly, the political axis relates to anti-immigrant, racist, and xenophobic discourses that are often expected to facilitate the obtaining of political benefits. The liberal frame, on the other hand, prescribes less focus on the securitisation of migrants, and shifts interest from the state to the individual - stressing the need to protect the human rights of migrants whilst also respecting the potential economic contribution that groups may make to society.[3] This paper links desecuritisation - whose conceptual origins are explored in

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[1] Georgios Karyotis and Dimitris Skleparis (2013), 'QUI BONO? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration', *Griffith Law Review*, 22 (3), p 684.

[2] Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 'The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies', p 24.

[3] Sandra Lavenex (2002), 'Migration and the EU's new eastern border: Between Realism and Liberalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8 (1), pp. 26-27; and

further detail later in this section - to the promotion of this liberal frame, scrutinising also the ways in which different styles of liberal framing have varying impact on the commodification of the migrant subject.

2.2. Securitisation

The two primary research chapters in this paper incorporate both a discourse analysis of official Scottish political elite speeches and documents, and an analysis of governmental practice that relates to immigration. These analyses act as primary means of investigating the construction of unique popular framing of the issue of immigration in Scotland in comparison to the rest of the UK. More specifically, this paper investigates to what extent it can be said that a recognisable process of desecuritisation has taken place with respect to the framing of immigration in Scotland. Both research chapters are informed by and look to contribute further to specific non-traditional security theories that have been the focus of significant International Relations research over the past few decades. The first research chapter draws its approach from *securitisation* theory as commonly linked with the Copenhagen School of security studies and formatively developed by Buzan and Waever in the 1980s and 1990s.[4] The second research chapter, on the other hand, draws from securitisation ideas associated more with the Paris School academics such

Karyotis and Skleparis, 'Migrant Mobilisation During the Economic Crisis: Identity Formation and Dilemmas', in M. Tsilimpounidi and A. Walsh (eds.) *Remapping the Crisis: A Guide to Athens* (Ropley, Hampshire: Zero Books, 2014).
[4] Rita Floyd and Stuart Croft (2011), 'European Non-Traditional Security Theory: From Theory to Practice', *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 3(2) p 153.

as Foucault, Bigo and Balzacq.[5] This paper incorporates Lene Hansen's theoretical framework for desecuritisation in both analyses, despite its stronger links with the Copenhagen School's approach.[6]

By establishing security primarily as a social construction based on subjective framing, the Copenhagen School developed the formative basis for the extension of non-traditional security theory, which incorporated work including that of the Paris School. The Paris School's entry-point in to this academic sub-field came in the form of critical commentary of the robustness and applicability of Buzan and Waever's securitisation theory. Balzacq, for instance, argued that a preoccupation with security as a self-referential practice has rendered securitisation analysts blind to the existence of 'brute threats'.[7] More generally, however, the Paris School – from its formative beginnings in the form of Didier Bigo's work – has sought to highlight how Buzan and Waever's overwhelming focus on securitisation as a 'speech act' has neglected alternative yet crucial processes that routinely prioritise issues such as immigration as security problems.[8] Specifically, the likes of Bigo and Balzacq channel Foucaldian ideas by investigating the culture of security more deeply, highlighting how the international spread of professional and routine security practice has directly increased investment in immigration control as an issue of high importance in a range

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[5] Phillipe Bourbeau (2014), 'Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 43 (1), p 190.
[6] Lene Hansen (2012), 'Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it', *Review of International Studies*, 38 (3), pp. 525-546.
[7] Floyd and Croft, 'European Non-Traditional Security Theory: From Theory to Practice', p 162.
[8] Floyd and Croft, p 153.

of different countries.[9] According to this line of thought, the *logic of routine* is commonly neglected in favour of a *logic of exception* that focuses on how issues are prioritised in the security realm as a result of extreme framing by political elites.[10] Thus, what should be considered at least as important is the way in which Western logics of management, control and surveillance have increasingly encouraged a hyper-securitising culture that exists within and between governments (in entities such as the European Union, for instance). These ideas contribute to Bigo's identification of how governments have institutionalised structural unease in 'risk societies', and have also led commentators such as Floyd and Croft to place these ideas under the heading of *insecuritisation theory*.[11]

This paper seeks to cater to the persisting need to synthesise these different non-traditional security theories in one study. Bourbeau, for instance, describes securitisation as a gradual and fluctuating process with periods where the threats can have more or less urgency or likelihood – citing studies that demonstrate the joint impact of exceptionalist security discourses and routinised practices[12]. These exceptionalist security discourses, formed by elite speech acts, are investigated in the Copenhagen School as the chief source of the securitisation of an issue such as immigration.[13] The Paris School approach encourages, alternatively, a shift of focus

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[9] Didier Bigo (2002), 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives*, 27, pp. 63-92; and Thierry Balzacq (2008), 'The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies'*, Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46 (1), pp. 75-100.
[10] Bourbeau, 'Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process', p 190.
[11] Bigo, 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', p 65; and Floyd and Croft, pp. 152-179.
[12] Bourbeau', pp. 191-195.
[13] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 33-34

towards micro processes and bottom-up analysis. Some studies however, highlight the difficulty of explaining causality in securitisation. To take one piece of anecdotal evidence concerning immigration and asylum control workers – service workers' self-identification as liberal and just public servants could conflict with some of the tasks they are required to do, such as identifying 'over-stayers' and arranging for their deportation.[14] So, although it is important to consider the wider culture of a risk society and the routine micro-processes of securitisation that have increasingly characterised immigration policy, the importance of popular and elite framing in affecting wider popular attitudes is also well worth investigating.

The narrative of immigration staff described above may well demonstrate the need to investigate more specifically how immigration is framed in Scotland, and how this might influence practical experiences surrounding integration. It is also important to note that although Scotland's immigration policy is not devolved, important distinctions exist in relation to the operation of important services, such as those incorporating refugee and asylum seeker integration.[15] Furthermore, and relatedly, attention should be given the actions of 'private' and charitable networks, such as the Scottish Refugee Council, often operating in conjunction with official government policy. Analysis of discourse and practice in this style will form one of this paper's most significant specific theoretical contributions by adding to knowledge of the specific factors which characterise the unique process of desecuritisation.

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[14] Alison Bowes et al (2009), 'Asylum policy and asylum experiences: interactions in a Scottish context', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32 (1), p 26.
[15] Lehva and Croston, 'Scotland's Immigration Phenomenon and Insights into Integration', p 2.

2.3. Desecuritisation

Desecuritisation was coined in early Copenhagen School literature as a conceptual twin to securitisation, used to describe the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal political bargaining sphere. It is also described in Waever and Buzan's work as the 'preferred long-range option'.[16] Although from a consequentialist ethics perspective, neither securitisation or politicisation is inherently positive or negative, strong evidence has been found for the damaging repercussions of aggressive migration security strategies.[17] As well as being problematic for the survival of many migrants fleeing to escape conflict, poverty or persecution, these strategies have also been highlighted as often delegitimising the authority of the securitising state and specific securitising elites. Securitising actors, in over-committing to promises to control immigration, suffer from belief in the skewed notion that blocking mass migration flows is, firstly, possible, and that this serves as an effective solution to resolving security issues - particularly that of domestic crime, as its linkage with immigration is broadly understood to be tenuous.[18]

Discussing the merits of desecuritisation might also lead to a discussion of the relationship between immigration and the economy. Generally, conclusions are hard to come to on such a complex relationship but economic perspectives do tend to reflect liberal confidence in free movement and free trade. Focusing on a UK

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[16] Hansen, 'Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it', pp. 525-546.
[17] Karyotis and Skleparis, 'QUI BONO? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration', p 701.
[18] Karyotis and Skleparis, 'QUI BONO? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration', pp. 683-701.

perspective, arguments against strong immigration controls might take into account demographic concerns and the potential benefit working-age incomers might have on decreasing the dependant proportion of the entire population.[19] This appears to be a more pressing concern specifically from a Scottish economic perspective, as reflected in the direction of policy and political rhetoric in the past decade. Although it is not the concern of this paper to dissect the full range of factors determining whether desecuritisation is an effective direction for Scotland or the UK as a whole, it is obvious from the evidence above that desecuritisation is a process worth developing more knowledge on. Furthermore, based on the issue linkages made earlier between Scotland's unique attitudes towards immigration and the political consequences concerning the country's own future and the future of the UK, this paper looks to develop a fuller understanding of how, specifically, a process of desecuritisation can be identified.

The question as to how exactly desecuritisation should be analysed as a process is currently characterised by ambiguity – more so than in relation to its conceptual twin, securitisation. Lene Hansen has developed one of the fullest theoretical frameworks for describing desecuritisation, describing four key examples of how the process can occur in practice – with some based on different ontological perspectives.[20] The idea of desecuritisation through *stabalisation* is informed by the event of détente in the Cold War, implying a 'rather slow move out of an explicit security discourse, which in turn facilitates a less militaristic, less violent and hence

[19] Jean-Christophe Dumont and Thomas Liebig (2014), 'Is Migration Good for the Economy?', *OECD Migration Policy Debates*, https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf [Accessed 16 July 2017].
[20] Hansen, pp. 525-546.

more genuinely political form of engagement.' *Replacement* theorises desecuritisation as the combination of one issue moving out of security while another is simultaneously securitised, appearing to support the proposition that security is a fundamental part of political discourse. Hansen defines the process of *rearticulation* as occurring possibly on two different levels. At 'level one', rearticulation refers to fundamental transformations of the public sphere - including a move out of the friend-enemy distinction. At 'level two', rearticulation suggests a direct form of political engagement that proposes there is no conflict looming in the background, and the issue is rearticulated rather than just replaced. Hansen identifies silencing as a final example of desecuritisation, when an issue disappears or fails to register in security discourse - implying more specifically an exclusionary process. Hansen uses Mackenzie's study of the lack of support and funding given to female actors in post-war societies as a result of their secondary framing as victims, domestic workers and followers next to male actors' framing as determinant combatants.

It should be of interest to determine how these models fit a description of the framing of immigration in Scotland. It may be the case that – as Hansen highlights as possible – this specific case must combine more than one of these forms of desecuritisation; or, alternatively, if it challenges the framework as a whole.[21] Regardless, this paper's conjoined analyses, as linked previously to the Copenhagen and Paris Schools, should offer a novel outlook on the general applicability of these forms. Hansen is most closely associated with the Copenhagen School, and although her work demonstrates unique and critical elements of its own, it will be of particular interest to see if a Paris School security practice analysis theoretically supplements

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[21] Hansen, p 539.

her framework in a useful way. As will be discussed in more detail in the discourse analysis, framing from Scottish political elite, on the surface, reflects a desire to rearticulate immigration to accommodate a more liberal understanding of events. Upon deeper analysis of this discourse and an analysis of national governance and practice in respective empirical chapters, it will be discussed if these desecuritisation forms are evidenced consistently across these different 'arenas', or if the case of Scottish discourse and practice reflects a type of non-symbiotic action taken towards the issue of immigration. In the past, it has been proposed that Scottish political elite rhetoric reflects, in some form, a self-serving interest to differentiate its identity from that of the UK's Westminster government.[22] In order to gain a better measure of how accurate this type of commentary is, it remains necessary to carry out the kind of research which is laid out in more detail in the next section.

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[22] Verena Wisthaler (2016), 'Immigration and Collective Identity in Minority Nations: A longitudinal comparison of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leicester), p 263.

3. Methodology

This paper's research comprises a single case study of national rhetoric and practice in Scotland in the given timeframe of 2014 to 2017. Gerring defines a qualitative case study as 'as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units'.[1] The unit of focus to be identified in this study would be the liberal or desecuritised immigration frame, and this paper seeks to scrutinise the significance and manner of construction of this frame over a period of time via robust qualitative discourse and policy/practice analyses. For both discourse and practice analysis, data is analysed in temporal context with relation to significant political events surrounding the 2014 Scottish independence campaign; the European refugee crisis of 2015; and a period including the UK 2016 European Union referendum and 2017 general election. The consideration of temporal context is particularly important to the type of discourse analysis carried out in this paper. The choice of timeframe reflects the continuing relevance of the events identified, and addresses the gap in similar studies that have been done to investigate political rhetoric and practice in Scotland in recent years.

Data collected for the discourse analysis consists of speeches and official statements originating from official Scottish government or key Scottish National Party (SNP) sources. As immigration policy is not a devolved issue for the Scottish government, the issue tends to make up less of the rhetoric amongst ministers of Scottish parliament (MSPs) than that amongst politicians based in Westminster

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[1] John Gerring (2004), 'What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?', *The American Political Science Review*, 98 (2), p 342.

(MPs). One can, however, expect the salience of immigration as a political issue in elite Scottish discourse to heighten in the context of the political events highlighted above. This paper's focus on elite framing is supported by literature emphasising the correlation between politicians' influence, their access to discourse and the role of routinized media processes in prioritising elite political perspectives.[2] Furthermore, In the area of migration in particular, high levels of institutionalisation and the 'relatively weak level of civil society engagement' mean that political and security elites are best placed to shape public attitudes and determine policy outcomes 'in a relatively autonomous way'.[3] This paper seeks to take a disciplined approach to the discourse analysis akin to the one formalised by Nigel Fairclough - focusing on the linguistic features of the text; the process relating to the production of its meaning; and the wider social practices that affect, and are influenced by, the produced discourse. In doing this, one gains an adequate measure of the influence and power of the speech acts in question.[4]

One of the weaknesses to consider in a discourse analysis of desecuritisation is that which relates to the measuring of audience acceptance of desecuritisation moves. Previous studies argue effectively that continuous support for a party or politician in a

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[2] Teun A. van Dijk (1993), 'Principles of critical discourse analysis', *Discourse and Society* 4 (2), pp. 249-283; Kevin M. Carragee and Wim Roefs (2004), 'The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research', *Journal of Communication*, 54 (2), pp. 214-233; and Anthony M. Messina (2014), 'Securitising Immigration in the Age of Terror', *World Politics*, 66 (3), p 543.

[3] Karyotis and Skleparis, ''QUI BONO? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration', p 686.

[4] Egle Michailovaite (2016), 'Securitisation of European values in Russia' (unpublished masters thesis, the University of Glasgow); and Norman Fairclough (2015), 'Critical Discourse Analysis', *Baltic Practice*, https://balticpractice.hse.ru/data/2015/04/13/1094925608/Critical%20discourse%20analysis_THEORY_FAIRCLOUGH.pdf [Accessed 16 July 2017].

democratic nation demonstrates that the frames they popularise are accepted by citizens.[5] This narrative would appear to suit the Scottish case study, which features an SNP government that has received widespread support in the past decade. Studies like Salter's have shown, however, the danger of envisioning the audience singularly as 'the public'. Writers like Salter propose that securitisation moves can succeed sequentially by convincing different audiences made up of specific groups such as bureaucratic and technocratic professionals.[6] Balzacq's contribution to the audience question develops the need for an explicit analysis of practice, as he describes how 'securitization sometimes occurs and produces social and political consequences without the explicit assent of an audience'.[7] This paper's analysis of practice through government and independent association policy and review sources seeks to supplement the Copenhagen School-style discourse analysis in accounting for these different issues of methodological validity. More generally, this case study cannot account for illustrating every causal variable that influences desecuritisation in Scotland. Nonetheless, by observing the referenced data over the time period highlighted, this paper should give an appropriate measure of the strength of prominent theoretical frameworks established by the likes of Balzacq and Hansen.

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[5] Michailovaite, 'Securitisation of European values in Russia'
[6] Mark Salter (2008), 'Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority', *Journal of International Relations and Development,* 11, pp. 321-349.
[7] Thierry Balzacq (2008) 'The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 46 (1), p 76.

4. Discourse Analysis

4.1. Introduction

This first empirical research chapter centres on a discourse analysis of elite Scottish rhetoric surrounding the issue of immigration. Prior to this analysis and discussion, however, this section reviews prominent and relevant literature relating to immigration discourse in the UK as a whole. This overview provides the necessary context in which to properly identify desecuritisation processes taking place as a result of unique Scotland discourse.

4.2. Immigration Discourse in the UK

Realist framing has found great success in positioning immigration as a political and security topic of high salience in the UK. Studies have looked to trace the origins, influence and specific characteristics of this dominant discourse - and Mulvey's study, which partly adopts a Cophenhagen School (CS) approach, offers one useful reference for pinpointing its formative developments. In his study of New Labour rhetoric and policy between 1997 and 2010, Mulvey explains how pursuing more extensive immigration control policies on behalf of the government led inherently to stricter, yet still ambivalent, categorisation of immigrants as well as increased expectation of results with regards to these control measures. Mulvey's findings explain how language used to justify this management of immigration helped to develop a securitised frame as well as a self-perpetuating cycle of securitising

policies.[1] This relates closely with the idea of a developing risk society and its

connection to immigration securitisation as described popularly by Bigo and others.[2]

These ideas also demonstrate the important role of realist immigration frames in

cementing the altered role of government from the perspective of many British

citizens. Referring to Ulrich Bech's *Risk Society*, Ibrahim and Howarth describe how

many citizens now perceive the government's main role as one of protection from a

widening range of perceived threats, as opposed to that of the provision of crucial

social goods and services.[3]

      When the Conservative government came into power in 2010, framing of

immigration became even more reflective of securitised, realist ideas. Thus, it is not

surprising that in this period of political transition, it became more common to ascribe

criminality to the migrant. In Ibrahim and Howarth's study, notable references are

made to the identification of migrants as a 'swarm' by Prime Minister David Cameron

in 2015 and as 'marauders' by Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond in 2016.[4] This

elite Conservative rhetoric reflects a clear understanding of citizenship as exclusive to

a perceived indigenous British population and under threat from a foreign, subversive

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[1] Gareth Mulvey (2010), 'When Policy Creates Politics: the Problematizing of Immigration and the Consequences for Refugee Integration in the UK', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 23 (1), pp. 437-462.

[2] Didier Bigo (2002), 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives*, 27, p 65; and Rita Floyd and Stuart Croft (2011), 'European Non-Traditional Security Theory: From Theory to Practice', *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 3 (2), pp. 152-179.

[3] Yasmin Ibrahim & Anita Howarth (2017), 'Communicating the 'migrant' other as risk: space, EU and expanding borders', *Journal of Risk Research*, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13669877.2017.1313765 [Accessed 16 August 2017], p 3.

[4] Ibrahim and Howarth, 'Communicating the 'migrant' other as risk: space, EU and expanding borders', p 15.

'other'. It follows that the expected role of government is shifting and there will be continuing erosion of ideas related to the social contract and the understanding of how that concept serves as the primary means of constituting citizenship of the state.[5]

This trend of 'othering' has been identified by academics from a broad range of social-scientific disciplines. The anthropologist Flynn pinpoints problems of discrimination taking place in the context of social class as well as in the context of race, ethnicity and citizenship.[6] For instance, one can view the July 2013 tour of Theresa May's Home Office-commissioned vans in ethnically diverse areas in London, featuring the slogan 'go home or face arrest', and recent Department for Work and Pensions crackdowns on the rights of disabled citizens, as jointly representing the widespread scale of efforts to narrow perceptions of who constitutes a fit-and-proper UK citizen.[7] Fully observing the scale of this politics of alterity – itself characterised by a hyper-securitising realist discourse - allows for better understanding of how popular perceptions of a diverse range of migrants - each crossing borders for unique and complex reasons - have been conflated to accommodate a singular point of view - one which encourages a general paranoia to surround the notion of immigration.[8] Kirkwood, Goodman et al have focused specifically on how immigrants and asylum seekers have been victim to conflating perceptions and matching securitisation – and how this has contributed to a 'culture of

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[5] Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002), 'The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies', *Alternatives*, 27, p 36.
[6] Alex Flynn (2013), 'Bongo Bongo' and reconfiguring the 'other'', *Anthropology Today*, 29 (5), pp. 1-2.
[7] Flynn, ''Bongo Bongo' and reconfiguring the 'other'', pp. 1-2.
[8] Ibrahim and Howarth, p 4; and Steve Kirkwood et al, 'Who Counts as an Asylum-Seeker or Refugee?' in Steve Kirkwood et al (eds), *The Language of Asylum* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 92-93.

disbelief' with regards to the legitimacy of the plights of asylum seekers coming to the UK. [9]

As a result of this growing indiscriminate bias against immigration, it has been more characteristic of classically 'progressive' political parties to delineate arguments relating to immigration in a way that accentuates the positive (mainly socio-economic) potential of migration whilst acknowledging concern of possible negative impacts. In his study of UK party leader speeches in the build-up to the 2015 general election, Paterson finds that the immigration rhetoric of then Labour leader Ed Miliband, despite its early positive basis, became increasingly accommodating of negative and restrictive securitarian and socio-economic contexts.[10] Paterson notices similar trends with regards to then Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg's own speeches.[11] Notwithstanding these more explicit acts of concession to insecurity over immigration, recent attempts of leftist and centrist politicians to desecuritise immigration discourse - by accommodating pre-existing realist immigration axes - can be generally viewed as serving only to entrench the negative security frame. Although this influence on discourse reflects a more nuanced rhetorical trend, it can also be linked to the shifting to the right of the political centre ground - and the desire

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[9] Kirkwood et al, 'Who Counts as an Asylum-Seeker or Refugee?', p 94.
[10] Ian Paterson (2014), 'Any room at the inn? Migration and the securitising moves of political and religious elites in the UK' (unpublished masters thesis, The University of Glasgow), pp. 28-30.
[11] Paterson, 'Any room at the inn? Migration and the securitising moves of political and religious elites in the UK', pp. 30-32.

of leftist and centrist politicians to show empathy with a population that has been, over time, taught to directly connect the issue of immigration to security.[12]

In terms of Hansen's theory of desecuritisation, one might posit this recent UK discourse as an example of how strategies involving a *rearticulation* of the issue of immigration at 'level two', by communicating normally in popular discourse and retaining a language of security, ultimately prove unsuccessful. What might instead be necessary for rearticulation to work is for it to function primarily on 'level one' – promoting a liberal frame via a fundamental transformation of the friend-enemy distinction.[13] Recent analysis of the spread of xenophobic attitudes and British exceptionalism in the UK in the aftermath of Brexit suggests this represents an ambitious idea.[14] Alternatively, politicians might attempt to marginalise the issue of immigration via *replacement* with another perceived security threat, *silencing* or encouraging *stabalisation*.[15] The complexity of factors influencing the latter two of these strategies, specifically, illustrates the difficulty in analysing desecuritising moves by political elites. When considering the ambiguity inherent in observing the stabalisation or silencing of an issue, it becomes clear that directly associating specific speech acts with the process of desecuritisation represents a difficult task.

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[12] Mulvey, p 452; Paterson, p 25; and Georgios Karyotis and Dimitris Skleparis (2013), 'QUI BONO? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration', *Griffith Law Review*, 22 (3), p 700.
[13] Lene Hansen (2012), 'Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it', *Review of International Studies*, 38, pp. 542-543.
[14] Piotr Cap, *The Language of Fear* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), pp. 67-79
[15] Hansen, 'Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it', p 529.

Taking a broader approach to a CS discourse analysis is necessary when judging the extent of desecuritisation. Consideration must be made of the context in which speech acts are delivered as well to the content of the speech itself. The general diversity of desecuritising processes as highlighted by Hansen, however, also demonstrates the need for a holistic approach which leaves room for an analysis of wider governmentality and practice. The following section represents one half of this holistic approach, drawing on a discourse analysis of key documents and speeches from official Scottish government sources and Scottish political elites in order to more closely investigate the puzzle introduced in this paper; that of liberal Scottish toward immigration in the context of entrenched realist framing in the UK as a whole.

4.3. Scottish Immigration Discourse Analysis

This section consists of a discourse analysis of speeches and publications in order to discern the key characteristics of Scottish political elite rhetoric surrounding immigration. In order to give clearer consideration to temporal contexts, the analysis is split to accommodate three successive chronological periods. Firstly, discourse surrounding immigration in the build-up to the 2015 Scottish independence referendum is analysed. This is followed by a similar analysis of speeches and publications originating from the period in 2015 and 2016 characterised the so-called 'migrant crisis'. The third set of sources are looked at more closely in the context of the 2016 European Union referendum and the 2017 general election in the UK. As stated previously, commitment to this chronological approach reflects the relevance of these recent events to academic study, whilst taking a sectional approach to the study

of the periods highlighted also allows for a more measured consideration of appropriate political contexts.

2014 and the Scottish Independence Referendum

The 2014 Scottish independence campaign presented a relatively unique opportunity for the Scottish government to address immigration - an issue not nationally devolved under Westminster legislation - as a key policy issue. The Scottish government white paper, entitled *Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland*, represents a key source for an analysis of immigration discourse in this period.[16] In this text, there is extensive discussion of immigration provided mainly as a key 'Home Affairs' policy area alongside those of 'Justice' and 'Security'. Within this section, and in relation to other key policy areas - such as the economy, education, employment and democratic institution – the Scottish government takes a decidedly welcoming stance to immigration. As extensive referencing within other policy categories might suggest, the argument for a more liberal immigration system is made principally around a socio-economic axis. The Scottish government makes clear that a unique Scottish system is required because of the country's contrasting demographic and economic needs in relation to the rest of the UK.[17]

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[16] The Scottish Government, *Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland* (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, 2013)

[17] The Scottish Government, *Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,* p 268.

Despite attention given to the issue of policing and border control - mainly that of air and sea ports – there is no noticeable association of regular migration with criminality.

This contrasts with the traditional UK migration discourse cited previously, which retains strong links to traditional security narratives with respect to the subject of immigration. Another unique element of discourse in this text relates to arguments made for immigration on more identifiably socio-cultural and normative grounds. For instance, there is a direct approach to establish ethnic diversity as a crucial apparatus to constructing a strong national and local community. Amongst a question-and-answer section, the Scottish government posits the question: 'Will increased immigration break down community cohesion?'. The answer it provides is: 'No. Scotland is already a welcoming society that is stronger for being a culturally rich and diverse nation and will continue to be so'.[18] This progressive rhetoric reflects that found in studies of past Scottish political elite discourse on immigration. It can be observed that, as Scotland's elected representatives, the SNP have in the past two decades used multiculturalism to inform key ideas surrounding national identity and potential immigration policy. The SNP has looked to draw from the approach of the Canadian government in this respect, which has over the years shifted multiculturalism from being a policy towards minorities to becoming the basic feature of a shared identity.[19]

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[18] The Scottish Government, p 493.
[19] Verena Wisthaler (2016), 'Immigration and Collective Identity in Minority Nations: A longitudinal comparison of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leicester), p 229.

It is also interesting, however, that there may be a strong correlation between the SNP's promotion of multiculturalism and a possible core strategy of constructing counter-narratives to those presciently associated with politicians at Westminster.[20] *Scotland's Future* provides examples of the Scottish government's attempts to use multiculturalism to differentiate itself from Westminster: 'It is… difficult to conceive of a Scottish government that would ever adopt the crude "go home" approach tried by the current Westminster Government.'[21] Other sources from the period provide more coverage of 'damaging' socio-economic Westminster policies when discussing immigration. In his 2014 speech to Institute for International and European Affairs in Dublin, then SNP Spokesperson for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Angus Robertson, also stated: "Sadly politics at a UK level is massively influenced by the anti-immigration, Europhobic agenda of UKIP and large swathes of the Tory Party."[22]

Within the context of Hansen's theories of desecuritisation through rearticualtion and replacement, it might be the case that the Scottish government has attempted to shift attention from the perceived threat of migrants through its establishing of Westminster and its political authority as the primary other threatening the security and interests of the Scottish people. The argument against the Scottish basing of the Trident nuclear weapons programme, given key focus in the independence campaign and articulated comprehensively in *Scotland's Future*, can be

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[20] Wisthaler, 'Immigration and Collective Identity in Minority Nations: A longitudinal comparison of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales', p 228.
[21] The Scottish Government, p 256.
[22] Angus Robertson, 'Speech at Institute for International and European Affairs in Dublin' (Dublin, Ireland, 20 January 2014), *UKPOL*, http://www.ukpol.co.uk/angus-robertson-2014-speech-in-dublin/ [Accessed 16 August 2017].

viewed as another important example of threat-framing of the Westminster establishment.[23]

<u>The 2015 'Migrant Crisis'</u>

In Europe in 2015, in the midst of the period commonly termed as the 'migrant crisis', which saw 'more than a million migrants and refugees' cross into the region, Scottish politicians saw it fit to address the issue of immigration and asylum in a range of settings.[24] At a humanitarian summit in Edinburgh, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon took the opportunity to stress the importance of language and discourse when reflecting on global conflict and displacement:

Let me be very clear that that is exactly what this is – a refugee crisis.

Language and terminology matters - it is important that this we do not describe this as a migration crisis. Immigration and asylum are not the same things.

In my view, it is treating them as if they are that is making it so difficult for David Cameron to show the leadership that he must. Instead of this being

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[23] The Scottish Government, p 232.

[24] BBC, 'Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts', *BBC News*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34131911 [Accessed 16 August 2017].

about a humanitarian response to a refugee crisis, it has become part of a

vexed, troubled and often pejorative debate on immigration.[25]

The speech includes recommendations for the then prime minister, David Cameron, to

pursue a more liberal asylum policy and allow Scotland to take a significant role in

accepting refugees on behalf of the UK. As is indicated by this speech, and by the

government white paper preceding the independence referendum, the Scottish

government attempts to make clear that there is no threat to societal security posed by

a liberalised asylum policy. By not subjecting to immigration and asylum to

conflation, and adopting a definitively progressive humanitarian stance, it could

appear that the Scottish government consciously looks to avoid demonising migration

in general.

However, when speaking of immigration more generally, it can be observed

that the Scottish government maintains some of the securitarian language evidenced

in recent studies of UK elite discourse. In its 2015 manifesto, the SNP states the

following: 'Diversity is one of Scotland's great strengths. Effective immigration

controls are important, but we must also remember that those who have come to

Scotland from other countries make a significant contribution to our economy and our

society'.[26] This excerpt again promotes a liberal frame in economic and even cultural

terms. Yet, ambivalent mention of the importance of 'controls', as Paterson and others

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[25] Nicola Sturgeon, 'Speech at Humanitarian Summit' (Edinburgh: Humanitarian Summit, 4 Spetember 2015), *Gov.Scot*, https://news.gov.scot/speeches-and-briefings/first-minister-humanitarian-summit [Accessed 16 August 2017].
[26] Scottish National Party, *Manifesto 2015*, http://votesnp.com/docs/manifesto.pdf [Accessed 16 August 2017], p 9.

have pointed out, can conversely demonstrate the influence of – and can, indeed, encourage - the ubiquitous connection between immigration and security risk.[27]

The 2016 European Union Referendum and 2017 General Election

The European Union referendum campaign and its subsequent result sparked a turbulent time for politics in the UK. The prospect of redefining borders provided further salience to the issue of immigration, which became a central feature of political discourse at that time. During events preceding and succeeding the referendum, the aggressive anti-immigration policy rhetoric of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) appealed to large swathes of the British population; giving further incentive to the incumbent Conservative government to advertise their own strong attitudes towards controlling immigration.[28] Prior to the referendum, in the general election of 2015, the SNP's more progressive platforming seemed to be rewarded as the party was elected in all but three Scottish seats.[29]

Following the referendum result, Sturgeon made sure to reiterate Scotland's outlook as its widely-backed representative, solidifying the country's links with its overseas (EU) citizens: 'Scotland is your home, you are welcome and your contribution to our economy, our society and our culture is valued'.[30] The ethical and

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[27] Floyd and Croft, 'European Non-Traditional Security Theory: From Theory to Practice', p 161.

[28] Cap, pp. 67-79.

[29] BBC, 'Election 2015: Results', *BBC News*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results [Accessed 16 August 2017].

[30] Libby Brooks and Severin Carrell (2016), 'Nicola Sturgeon acts to reassure EU nationals living in Scotland', *The Guardian*,

normative frame, alongside the common liberal socio-economic frame, was focused on as the first minister reiterated her call for David Cameron and his potential successors to give "an immediate guarantee that the existing rights of the 173,000 EU nationals in Scotland will be protected".[31]

In her 2017 speech to the SNP Spring Conference, Sturgeon again evokes kinship with foreign citizens, claiming that "It's time to stand against the demonisation of migrants… and to stand up for those who choose to join us in building a better Scotland".[32] Positioned next to these points is the continuing framing of a Tory Westminster cabinet as the main threat to unique Scottish interests. It can thus be observed that migrants play a respected allying role in the formation of a friend-enemy distinction that demonstrates the need to establish independence from a self-interested and "increasingly right wing, Brexit obsessed" Conservative government.[33] A less direct articulation of the migrant role in this friend-enemy distinction is observable in the SNP's 2017 manifesto, which nonetheless stresses that 'a strong team of SNP MPs at Westminster will make sure that when it comes to their humanitarian and moral obligations, the UK government will not be let off the hook'

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/nicola-sturgeon-acts-to-reassure-eu-nationals-scotland [Accessed 16 August 2017].

[31] Brooks and Carrell, 'Nicola Sturgeon acts to reassure EU nationals living in Scotland'.

[32] Nicola Sturgeon, 'Address to SNP Spring Conference 2017' (Speech, Aberdeen, March 2017), *SNP.org*,
https://www.snp.org/nicola_sturgeon_s_address_to_snp_spring_conference_2017 [Accessed 16 August 2017].

[33] Sturgeon, 'Address to SNP Spring Conference 2017'.

and that these SNP MPs 'will demand that the UK government follows the lead of the Scottish Government'.[34]

4.4. Conclusion

The sources analysed above demonstrate the clear attempts made by the Scottish government and the SNP to rearticulate immigration as a positive phenomenon. This immigration discourse primarily centres around socio-economic arguments. Yet, in emphasising the cultural value of immigration, notable humanitarian and normative stances are also taken by Scottish elites between 2014 and 2017. Like past studies of Scottish elite discourse have shown, multiculturalism represents a core ideal in the conception of national identity and in the nation-building project of the most powerful party in Scotland, the SNP. This established core ideal is utilised by Scottish elites to create normative distance between Scottish citizens and those who uphold the Westminster establishment. So, in incorporating liberal assertions with respect to immigration and shifting primary security attention to the alleged threat of Westminster, Scottish elite discourse is characterised at least somewhat by processes theorised in Hansen's desecuritisation framework as rearticulation and replacement.

It can nonetheless be viewed that Scottish moves to desecuritise immigration fall victim to some failed attempts to effectively depart from a realist linguistic framework. Maintained rhetorical commitment to ambiguously-contrived immigration

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[34] Scottish National Party, *Manifesto 2017*, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/thesnp/pages/9544/attachments/original/1496320559/Manifesto_06_01_17.pdf?1496320559 [Accessed 16 August 2017], p 46.

control strategies, for instance, might represent, and further entrench, the relevance of securitarian concerns to immigration discourse. It is worth considering also the consequences of direct or indirect framing of immigration within the friend-enemy distinction reworked by Scottish elites. One might suggest, for instance, if association of migrants as allies in the fight for independence from the established 'other' of Westminster serves in any way to create more hostility and distrust towards migrants among those not convinced of the independence movement or the sometimes overt antagonising of Westminster.

This type of linguistic analysis illustrates the possible difficulties associated with strategies to desecuritise issues by rearticulation and replacement on level two. In order to help remove some of the ambiguities related to the processes highlighted above, it will remain necessary to trace the future nature of elite framing and public attitudes in reference to shifting political contexts in Scotland and in the UK. In terms of this paper's focus, the prospect of independence for Scotland probably brings with it the best opportunity to view how desecuritising strategies might shift - or not shift – alongside devolved security practice in the context of new political realities. Such longitudinal observation should give a stronger indication as to the impact of elite discourse on wider attitudes and practice relating to immigration. In the meantime, in the following chapter, this paper looks for clarity amongst some of these persistent ambiguities by explicitly focusing on how recent Scottish governmentality and practice, as opposed to discourse, might encourage or discourage the desecuritisation of immigration in the country.

5. Governmentality and Practice Analysis

5.1. Introduction

This chapter approaches the Scottish desecuritisation question by investigating the pragmatic effects of unique Scottish policy and practice in relation to immigration. To provide necessary context, this chapter begins with an analysis of immigration and security practice characteristic of the wider UK approach. Within this contextual foreground, it is illustrated how tools and programmes that facilitate immigration, asylum, integration and counter-terrorism policies serve to directly shape politics and discourse surrounding immigration in the UK. This style of analysis, as has been discussed in the first chapter of the paper, reflects that of the Paris School approach to security studies. The logic of routine - identified by Bourbeau as neglected in popular analyses of discourse-shifting speech acts – thus informs an understanding of the symbiotic relationship that exists between the self-perpetuating cycle of securitising policies in the UK and the micro-level processes that underpin it.[1] After establishing the context of governmentality and practice in the UK, this chapter analyses unique Scottish immigration and integration policy, with focus on how different programmes and tools both represent and influence the framing of immigration in the country.

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[1] Phillipe Bourbeau (2014), 'Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 43 (1), p 190; and Gareth Mulvey (2010), 'When Policy Creates Politics: the Problematizing of Immigration and the Consequences for Refugee Integration in the UK', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 23 (1), p 456.

5.2. Immigration-Securitising Practice in the UK

The policies of the Conservative government that came into power in 2010 have reflected to a large extent the strength of the realist immigration frame as identified from the party's discourse in the previous chapter of this paper.[2] However, as Mulvey and others have shown, this aggressive trend of security practice can be clearly linked back to the policies of the New Labour government that was elected in 1998.[3] The Labour government believed that there existed a majority anti-immigration sentiment among the public which, if not assuaged, threatened the legitimacy of their overall migration regime, particularly the development of economic migration routes.[4] Labour remained committed to economic liberalism despite consideration of the alleged widespread unease surrounding immigration, and the result of taking a tough stance led the government to focus on 'the least wanted migrants' – asylum seekers.[5] Efforts to extend controls over immigration led to further scrutiny of the legitimacy of the plights of asylum seekers, establishing a policy and rhetoric continuum within which illegality and criminality were presented as fundamental thematic touchstones.[6]

More specific links can also be made about the impact of tools and programmes within the realm of UK security at this time. A focus on numerical

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[2] Jon Burnett (2016), 'Entitlement and belonging: social restructuring and multicultural Britain', *Race and Class*, 58 (2), p 38.
[3] Mulvey, 'When Policy Creates Politics: the Problematizing of Immigration and the Consequences for Refugee Integration in the UK', p 437; and Gail Lewis and Sarah Neal (2007), 'Introduction: Contemporary political contexts, changing terrains and revisited discourses', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (3), p 424.
[4] Mulvey, p 449.
[5] Mulvey, p 449.
[6] Mulvey, p 450; and Lewis and Neal, 'Introduction: Contemporary political contexts, changing terrains and revisited discourses', p 436-437.

targets, for instance, represented the central marker for success in immigration policy whilst representing, too, the general importance of management and administration in this developing risk society.[7] This statistical focus partly manifested itself in the introduction of a points-based immigration system in the UK between 2008 and 2010 - thought of by some prior to its introduction as a solution to a previous framework which was characterised as ineffective, ad-hoc and 'clearly racist'.[8] However, evidence suggests that the new immigration framework has been exercised to further discriminate against certain groups of migrants based partly on unfounded economic claims, thus serving to contribute to a more restrictive and 'hostile environment' for foreign citizens in the UK.[9] Trust in the tools of security, management and control has also informed the development of the government's current counter-terrorism approach, which can be viewed alongside the immigration nexus when considering factors which connect securitisation to the politics of alterity. As indicated by recent Counter Terrorism Strategy legislation, the extension of surveillance and intervention tools and programmes plays a central role in the government's plan to tackle this domestic security phenomenon. As well as being viewed to aid them to *Pursue* suspect individuals, expanding surveillance constitutes a fundamental strategic focal point with respect to the government's *Prevent* strategy aimed at stemming radicalism.[10] A strategy of pre-emptive action - supported by modern surveillance

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[7] Will Somerville, *Immigration Under New Labour* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007), p 75.

[8] R. E. Wright (2008), 'The Economics of New Immigration to Scotland', *Hume Occasional Paper*, 77, pp. 30-31.

[9] Stephen Drinkwater and Catherine Robinson (2013), 'Welfare participation by immigrants in the UK', *International Journal of Manpower*, 34 (2), pp. 109-110; and Burnett, 'Entitlement and belonging: social restructuring and multicultural Britain', p 38.

[10] Valentina Bartolucci and Joshua Skoczylis, 'The Practice of Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom and its Sociopolitical Effects', in S.N. Romaniuk et al (eds.), *The*

technology, extensive database apparatus and inscribed yet ambiguous emphasis on the importance of 'Britishness' in countering radicalism - has helped stimulate the spread of formal interventions which are overwhelmingly targeted at Muslim communities. In placing significant focus on security and control as opposed to social cohesion within communities, this approach has been criticised as failing to effectively tackle the root issues that militant radicalism stems from, whilst strengthening the narrative that directly connects violent criminality with groups not as commonly associated with a characteristically undefined profile of Britishness.[11]

Criminality also constitutes a prime focus of the recent 2016 Immigration Act. Some of the significant outcomes of the act were to further restrict immigration and encourage deportation of 'illegal' migrants – partly through the expansion of responsibilities for immigration checks by landlords and employers.[12] The UK's counterterrorism and anti-immigration protocols have both been criticised as wasteful, as have its asylum policies. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees (APPGR) and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration (APPGM), as well as forwarding humanitarian concerns, have highlighted the problem of the exorbitant rate of spending required to maintain the current scale of asylum seeker detention in the UK - which 'has become too focused on utilising detention for administrative convenience rather than speedy, high quality decision making'.[13] This observation

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Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p 340.

[11]Bartolucci and Skoczylis, 'The Practice of Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom and its Sociopolitical Effects', pp. 346-348.

[12] Burnett, p 40.

[13] All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees & the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration (2015), 'The Report of the Inquiry into the Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom',

demonstrates how security protocols and administrative management have become

entrenched in the UK's approach to immigration and asylum, and how security

practice in the country has become – like Balzacq identified within the European

Union – an example of the use of 'means that justify the end'.[14] The APPGR posited

the Swedish approach to detention as a far more humane and productive example of

how detention of asylum seekers might be facilitated. The panel pointed out that

although they expected to receive around 100,000 asylum applications in 2015,

Sweden at that time had no plans to expand its use of detention.[15] Furthermore, the

panel was encouraged by the focus on accommodation as opposed to detention,

especially in light of how increasing numbers of UK immigration removal centres

were being designed as category B prisons. It was pointed out that staff did not wear

uniforms and remained safe through focusing on detainees as individuals and building

good relationships, rather than through discipline.[16] It is clear that the Swedish

example of detention represents an example of an asylum framework which not only

reflects the character of a less securitised national immigration discourse but also

dictates less inclination to rely on and develop security and punitive apparatus when

dealing with issues such as migration.

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https://detentioninquiry.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/immigration-detention-inquiry-report.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], p 10.

[14] Thierry Balzacq (2008), 'The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46 (1), p 78.

[15] All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, 'The Report of the Inquiry into the Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom', pp 28-29.

[16] All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, pp 28-29.

It is also clear from this analysis and the ones prior that UK practice, in contrast, does not encourage a desecuritised image of immigration and asylum. One can even place crackdowns on social welfare alongside immigration, asylum and counterterrorism practice when considering the ever-increasing investment in security as a solution to a breadth of social and cultural problems in the UK. Because this trend can be viewed as stimulating a politics of alterity, one might link the themes of securitisation and austerity together when considering how focus on security spending over other aspects of governmental provision has reinforced socio-economic problems and, indeed, led these issues to be framed contrastingly as stemming from the subversive abuse of British citizenship by specific groups of people – including migrants and welfare claimants. [17] However, this narrative, synonymous with conservative and realist political framing, has not held as strong a conceptual grip in Scotland as in other parts of the UK. Considering the observations of the practical impact of governmentality and practice in the UK on the framing of issues such as immigration, it remains relevant to conduct a similar analysis in the Scottish context. By juxtaposing the following Scotland-focused analysis with that of the previous chapter's, the reader may expand their knowledge of the depth of processes influencing the immigration-security nexus in Scotland and the UK whilst gleaning further implications of the specific utility of the Paris School approach.

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[17] Burnett, p 41; and Alex Flynn (2013), 'Bongo Bongo' and reconfiguring the 'other'', *Anthropology Today*, 29 (5), pp. 1-2.

5.3. Immigration-Desecuritising Practice in Scotland

Reservation of legislation under Westminster rule would suggest the Scottish government would have little impact on routine practice with respect to immigration. Indeed, attempts made over a decade ago by the Scottish government to exercise authority and set forth a more liberal immigration agenda generated mixed results. The 2004 Fresh Talent Initiative introduced by the then Labour-Liberal coalition majority in Scottish Parliament represented an overwhelming focus on the socio-economic benefits of immigration.[18] Based on the same demographic and economic assertions highlighted throughout more recent elite Scottish discourse in the previous chapter, the Fresh Talent Initiative followed through with two main aims between 2005 and 2007. Firstly, the initiative aimed to increase Scotland's share of those applying for UK work permits into line with its proportion of the UK population. As requests for negotiated legislative protocol on this specific process was flatly rejected, this first aim was pursued via a strategy of advertisement, with primacy being placed on the work of newly-integrated bodies such as VisitScotland. Fulfilment of the Initiative's second priority represented a more radical policy success, as it granted visas which enabled students from Scottish education institutions to remain in Scotland for two years to work.[19] The visa scheme was subsumed within that of the UK's immigration policies in 2008 before it was then abolished altogether by

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[18] Peter Skilling (2007), 'New Scots: The Fresh Talent Initiative and Post-Devolution Immigration Policy', *Scottish Affairs*, 61, pp. 101-118.

[19] Skilling, 'New Scots: The Fresh Talent Initiative and Post-Devolution Immigration Policy', p 116.

Westminster in 2012, and the Scottish government continues to advocate strongly for its return.[20]

The joint success, for a time, of the Fresh Talent Initiative's schemes and the phenomenon of more liberal attitudes north of the border may implicate the establishment of a Scottish society and economy that, to a fairly large extent, grew to trust and rely on the benefits brought from foreign immigrant labour.[21] One may still scrutinise, however, the impact of this policy's emphasis on - and possible institutionalisation of - the socio-economic benefits of immigration. As Skilling points out, the explicit calls to attract mainly skilled workers to Scotland might be viewed as transgressing the fundamental liberal proscription on treating people as means rather than ends.[22]

Although the term 'New Scots' was first coined by the Scottish government in conjunction with the Fresh Talent Initiative, the term is now used as a primary title for a set of immigration and integration policies that focus more on assisting refugees and asylum seekers.[23] The current incarnation of New Scots was launched in 2013 and was followed by the announcement of its flagship programme – the Holistic

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[20] The Scottish Government (2016), 'Post Study Work Steering Group Report of Final Recommendations', *Scottish Government Publications,* http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00494988.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], pp. 1-2.

[21] The Migration Observatory (2014), 'Scottish Public Opinion', *The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford: Reports*, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/scottish-public-opinion/ [Accessed 16 July 2017], section 3.2.2
[22] Skilling, p 107.
[23] Skilling, p 102.

Integration Service.[24] It is important to remember that legislation on asylum and immigration - as well as equality and human rights - are matters for Westminster. Yet, the agencies which deliver services to asylum seekers in Scotland - including housing, education, health and social services - are controlled by the Scottish Parliament and Executive. Refugee settlement and integration are also devolved matters.[25]

The Holistic Integration Service represents concerted attempt to exercise the full extent of Scotland's subnational and private entrepreneurial potential. The Service builds on and formalises an approach to integration that was already in functional existence prior to the 2013 launch of New Scots - as research by Bowes, Ferguson and Sims illustrates.[26] In comparison to the rest of the UK, the Scottish integration strategy has been characterised by closer cooperation with third sector groups and increased flexibility in a managerial and administrative sense. This flexibility is exemplified by the way the system is informed from micro-level interactions, with agency even being encouraged amongst asylum seekers and refugees themselves.[27] The 2017 report on the New Scots strategy demonstrated the direct impact that the Holistic Integration Service had on assisting refugees in integrating into Scottish communities. Led by Scottish Refugee Council, the Service combined advice and advocacy (Scottish Refugee Council) with additional referral programmes including:

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[24] The Scottish Government (2017), 'New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland's Communities, 2014–2017 Final Report', *Scottish Government Publications* http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00515713.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017].
[25] Alison Bowes et al (2009), 'Asylum policy and asylum experiences: interactions in a Scottish context', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32 (1), p 28.

[26] Bowes et al, 'Asylum policy and asylum experiences: interactions in a Scottish context', pp. 23-43.
[27] The Scottish Government, 'New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland's Communities, 2014–2017 Final Report', pp. 41-43.

enhanced support (British Red Cross); ESOL courses (Glasgow Clyde College and Workers Educational Association Scotland); and employability support (Bridges Programmes).[28] The achievements of this strategy demonstrate the potential for shifting negative perceptions of asylum seekers and refugees – including those related to apparent socio-economic threats posed by these groups. Focus on employability, as well as more general efforts to grant agency to asylum seekers and refugees, help popularly develop positive societal roles for these groups whilst helping to tackle the shame felt by many refugees at not being able to 'free' themselves from benefits through taking part in work and education.[29] The potential for these groups to become more synonymous with positive societal roles has also been explored in anecdotal accounts relating to the impact of refugee integration on schooling and housing in Glasgow. In schools, refugee children were said to have brought increased numbers to school previously experiencing falling roles, but also greater motivation towards and enjoyment of education, which had rubbed off on some of the local children. Similarly, links have been made with integration strategies and benefits to the social housing sector, as previously derelict areas were subject to refurbishment and employment was also created to accommodate for related developments.[30]

The success of Scotland's approach to refugee integration has been linked to statistics that show growing numbers of people staying in Scotland after being granted refugee status as well as increasing numbers of refugees travelling from England to

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[28] [28] The Scottish Government, 'New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland's Communities, 2014–2017 Final Report', p 42.

[29] Alison Strang et al (2016), 'Rights, Resilience and Refugee Integration in Scotland', *Scottish Refugee Council Publication*, http://www.scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/1143/Final_Integration_Report_Executive_Summary_June_2016.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], p 6.

[30] Bowes et al, p 32.

Scotland.[31] Furthermore, the achievements of the New Scots policies have been directly referenced in the APPGR's recent report, which recommends that - as part of wider UK shift in integration policy - a support system drawing explicitly on lessons and best practice from the Holistic Integration Service be set up for newly recognised refugees.[32] This reference demonstrates how unique Scottish practice, underpinned significantly by the actions and experiences of individuals who operate and use grassroots services, helps influence elite policy recommendations. Considering previous discussion of the practical influence of UK security practice on the wider framing of immigration and asylum, it follows that Scottish integration processes might contrastingly influence a desecuritising shift by influencing policy and framing in a similar way.

5.4. Conclusion

In his seminal study of EU governance and practice, Balzacq highlighted how security tools, including that of data-sharing, facilitated and developed the securitization of immigration. This analysis, meanwhile, has shown how Scottish practice has had a direct impact in promoting a more liberal framing of immigration and particularly asylum. The early focus of the Scottish government provided impetus for its society, and specifically its economy and business enterprises, to trust and invest in a system

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[31] Mari Lehva and Gaia Croston (2016), 'Scotland's Immigration Phenomenon and Insights into Integration', *People Know How*, http://peopleknowhow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MigrantIntegration_Briefing.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], p 2.

[32] All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees (2017), 'Refugees Welcome? The Experience of New Refugees in the UK', https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0004/0316/APPG_on_Refugees_-_Refugees_Welcome_report.pdf [accessed 20 August 2017], p 6.

that took advantage of liberal immigration. The Scottish government's subsequent immigration and integration focus was, however, the humanitarian, as opposed to socio-economic, frame; and tighter cooperation with third sector groups had a significant impact in humanising migrant and asylum seeking subjects commonly portrayed as commodities to be selectively desired or feared. As is clear from the observations made of UK detention policies, immigration legislation and counterterror strategies - wider UK practice in many ways promotes this latter, realist-oriented framing of refugees and migrants. By contrast, there exist prominent examples of Scottish practice undermining the policies and processes which promote this framing.

The result of this chapter's analysis has been to adapt the Paris School theory of how practice influences securitisation by demonstrating the ways in which Scottish integration programmes and tools have promoted a more inclusive stance towards immigration. As the evidence suggests, there are forces to consider out with that of elite discourse when measuring the stimulants for, and the extent of, (de)securitisation. In the concluding section of this paper, theoretical implications are considered whilst evidence of these forces is observed in the context of Lene Hansen's theoretical framework of desecuritisation. Via this process, there will be an attempt to synthesise some of the key concepts that relate the Paris and Copenhagen schools - thus establishing a more coherent understanding of the desecuritisation process both as it applies in Scotland and as it may apply elsewhere.

6. Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to address the puzzle that relates to the existence of more welcoming attitudes towards immigration in Scotland in comparison to that of the rest of the UK. In the UK, outside of Scotland, there has been a general acceptance of immigration as a security issue in socioeconomic, state, identitarian and political terms. Drawing from the ideas of the Copenhagen School of security studies, one can posit framing by political elites as the crucial determinant of the success of realist immigration discourse in the UK. The first of two empirical research chapters in this paper demonstrated how - in contrast to politicians south of the border - the Scottish government and its elite representatives have helped to promote a liberal immigration frame. This line of elite Scottish discourse has mainly rearticulated the issue of immigration in socio-economic terms, stressing the importance of the phenomenon for Scotland's future prosperity.

An analysis of Scottish elite political discourse also demonstrates a move to rearticulate the friend-enemy distinction between 'indigenous' citizens and migrants which has been established in elite UK political discourse, and position migrants as allies and counterparts in the struggle to escape repressive Westminster policies. Thus, through this discourse, political actors such as Nicola Sturgeon have replaced migrants as a threatening 'other' by instead establishing Westminster as the key threat to Scottish interests. A humanitarian tone also underpins a significant amount of elite Scottish discourse surrounding immigration, and it is sometimes used to create normative distance between an outward-looking Scottish citizenry and an allegedly inward-looking Westminster establishment.

Descriptions of rearticulation and replacement relate directly to Hansen's theoretical framework for desecuritisation; a framework which is also relevant when considering the governmentality and practice analysis undertaken in the second empirical research chapter of this paper. This specific analysis demonstrated how Scottish practice often undermined a UK approach to immigration that was characterised by heavily securitised and often discriminatory immigration, integration and counterterror policies. The Fresh Talent Initiative, despite its mixed success, was a strong indicator of the devolved Scottish parliament's potential to institutionalise liberal immigration frames and rearticulate immigration as a positive socio-economic phenomenon. With the launch of the 2013 New Scots strategy, however, a focus on humanitarian principles then came to characterise Scottish practice with regards to migrants and integration. This strategy saw the Scottish government navigate around restrictions of subnational powers to formally adopt a flexible, cooperative and cohesive approach with the delivery of its Holistic Integration Service for refugees and asylum seekers. Organisation of this holistic approach was informed by experiences of public, private and volunteer service operators at ground level – a contrast from traditionally policy-driven UK practice - and even provided agency and authority on behalf of refugees and asylum seekers themselves. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees, in their plans for significant reform of the way that the UK deals with asylum seekers and refugees, recommended that prospective UK integration strategies directly draw ideas for best practice from the approach of the Scottish Holistic Integration Service. This offers an extreme example of practice influencing policy.

Yet, the Paris School understanding of routine practices and their impact on the securitisation of migration also becomes relevant when considering the impact of more micro-level integration processes currently taking place in Scotland. For instance, it can be observed that unique Scottish practice in this realm has been encouraging positive roles for refugees and strongly promoting multicultural engagement within communities. In doing this, there is potential for a removal of the conceptions of migrants as a threat to socio-economic, state, identitarian and political security. Indeed, one might scrutinise the impact even of positive socio-economic framing, so prevalent in elite Scottish rhetoric, as not doing enough to remove conceptions of migrants as commodities that are to be selectively desired or disregarded. For immigration to become more effectively desecuritised, it may be necessary to encourage what Hansen describes as a rearticulation of the subject on 'level one', resulting in a more fundamental transformation of the public sphere and the removal of the friend-enemy distinction.

Overall, however, this paper suggests that there are clear links to be made between the rearticulation and replacement of immigration, on a rhetorical and practical level, and the wider acceptance of the liberal frame in Scotland when compared to the rest of the UK. These links can be made via an understanding of Hansen's theoretical framework of desecuritisation - the supplementing of which constituted one of this paper's key theoretical contributions. This paper also evidenced the utility of Hansen's theoretical framework when set to Copenhagen and Paris School-style security analyses. Furthermore, the joint analytical utility of these two schools of thought was demonstrated through the observation of varying and

interacting influences on desecuritisation as originating from specific discourses and practices.

Further research would supplement this paper's attempts to answer questions surrounding key concepts such as desecuritisation and the importance of related processes such as elite framing, routine practice and governmentality. Longitudinal analyses of the Scottish case, for instance, will allow for observation of how desecuritisation moves shift in nature and in influence when presented with new political realities - such as those relating to Brexit or, more speculatively, Scottish independence. Large-n quantitative analyses of Scottish opinion towards immigration and integration, accommodated for regional variation that respects the impact of varying diversity in communities, could specifically clarify implications highlighted in this paper's analysis of unique practice involving the New Scots strategy and the Holistic Integration Service.

As political issue linkages noted in the introduction to this paper make clear, the framing of immigration remains a crucial subject to dissect further. Evidence suggested that more widespread liberal immigration frame acceptance in Scotland than in the rest of the UK contributed significantly to highly asymmetric regional voting patterns in the European Union referendum. One can only predict further implications of this difference in framing for the political future of Scotland and the United Kingdom, with complex Brexit negotiations and subsequent independence referendums possibly beckoning.

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