

Mitev, Ilian Mitkov (2014) An investigation into the effects of interstate rivalry on poverty in non-OECD states between 1981-1999. [Undergraduate Degree]

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School of Social and Political Sciences

An Investigation into the Effects of Interstate Rivalry on

Poverty in Non-OECD States between 1981 and 1999

1104172

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

M.A. (Honours) in Philosophy and Politics

University of Glasgow

March 2014

10,936 Words

Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between interstate rivals and state building in the form of poverty reduction. Previous research on state building has focused on the relationship between external rivalries and the extraction of resources or the increase of economic production. This study seeks to expand on the body of research by examining the impact of external (interstate) rivals on poverty reduction. First, it begins by explaining Tilly's (1992) bellicose model of war and state building, and investigates how it can be adapted to non-OECD states, engaging with current literature in the process. Then it considers some objections to the application of this model to the non-OECD states and the direction of the relationship of the model, concluding the literature review by explaining the causal mechanisms expected to result in poverty reduction. The study then runs a number of comparative statistical regressions on a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset, measuring poverty, rivalry and control variables tri-annually from 103 non-OECD states between 1981 and 1999. The results of these tests support the general hypothesis that interstate rivalry reduces poverty, regardless of regime type. The causal mechanisms are then demonstrated by examining the crucial case study of Bangladesh during the Indo-Bangladesh rivalry, supporting the proposed causal mechanisms and the proposed direction of the relationship. The thesis then concludes by discussing moral considerations, policy advice, limitations of the study and future research directions.

Keywords: rivalry, poverty, state-building, non-OECD states, Bangladesh case study

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Introduction

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between interstate rivals and state building in the form of poverty reduction. Previous research on state building has focused on the relationship between external rivalries and the extraction of resources (Thies, 2004; Thies, 2005; Thies, 2006; Thies, 2007; Lu and Thies, 2012) or the increase of economic production (Kang & Valeriano, 2014). This study seeks to expand the domain of research on state building by examining further factors of domestic politics which are affected by external threat. It will examine the impact of external (interstate) rivals on poverty reduction, which is expected to result from increased economic growth and domestic class bargaining. The fundamental argument holds that states entangled in an interstate rivalry are more likely to do everything in their power not to fall behind their enemies in military and economic terms. The military expansion normally related with this type of relationship encourages infrastructural and economic growth in developing states. This gives more opportunities for people living under the poverty line in the form of more job openings available for them and a better social standing, allowing for more effective bargaining for the redistribution of wealth. It is argued that ruling elites would be more likely to make concessions to their populace, under the shock and threat of external rivals, in order to keep domestic stability and encourage economic growth. Thus, concluding that poverty reduction can be achieved through state building under the pressure of external rivals.

Of course no theory is without objections or limitations. This study also discusses two types of problems with the general theory and provides possible answers to them. One type concerns the application of the model outside of Europe. It has been argued that current states outside of Europe operate in a system with different norms, funding options and priorities which are not considered by the Eurocentric state-building theories. Thus, it is held that the state-building process is substantially different and it is not reasonable to expect the same results. The second limitation concerns the direction of the relationship, as it is not completely clear whether states in a rivalry reduce poverty, or if it is the case that states with less poverty have more means to sustain a rivalry. Both of these are addressed in this dissertation.

This thesis reviews the current, largely theoretical and regionally based, literature. Drawing on previous research, this study tests two hypotheses on a global scale. The main hypothesis holds that the presence of external rivals significantly and positively affects poverty reduction. A second hypothesis tests the same relationship, whilst controlling for the presence of democracy, expecting to find a stronger positive relationship between the two. Established measurements of enduring rivalry (Klein, Goertz & Diehl, 2006) and strategic rivalry (Thomson, 2001) are utilised, and are accompanied by control variables explaining variation in poverty (Alvi & Senbeta, 2012). Political and economic determinants of poverty are examined using several pooled, cross-sectional time-series analyses, which are consistent with previous theoretical, qualitative and quantitative applications. The quantitative evidence from this study adds to existing findings regarding other factors of state building. In addition, a critical case study tracing the effects of the Indo-Bangladeshi enduring rivalry, demonstrates how the causal mechanisms behind the hypotheses work, as well as providing some evidence for the directionality of the relationship.

The empirical analysis in this study results in interesting findings of the effect of external rivals on state building, measured in terms of poverty reduction, in a sample of 103 non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members observed tri-annually between 1981 and 1999. The findings are consistent with the broader predatory theory proposition that state building in the rest of the world resembles the European experience. The study found a statistically significant positive relationship between interstate rivalry and poverty reduction. Although the current literature expected to find a stronger relationship in the presence of democracy, the results only partially supported that. Despite this, the study not only confirms the initial hypothesis, it also suggests further mechanisms and further research into the relationship. Before expanding on these in the conclusion, a chapter on moral considerations regarding policy advice is also included.

Literature Review

This chapter examines the available literature on war, rivalry, state-building and poverty reduction. It will begin by explaining Tilly's (1992) bellicose model of war and state building. This will be followed by explaining how it can be adapted to non-OECD states, describing in the process how it is different from the currently available literature. Then it will consider some objections to the application of this model to the non-OECD states and the direction of the relationship of the model. Lastly, it will conclude by explaining the causal mechanisms that would result in poverty reduction and defining the two hypotheses that are tested in the next two chapters.

Theoretical groundings: understanding Tilly's model


There are a number of different models in the state-building literature. This paper focuses on the predatory state-building theory and more specifically on Tilly's (1992) model. Tilly has been widely recognised as the founder of modern day bellicose state building theory (Ertman, 1997: 14-15; Rasler & Thompson, 2012: 237-239), meaning that the majority of modern day theories are a response to his model (Rasler & Thompson, 2012: 241-242).


Tilly (1985: 182; Thies, 2004: 54) considers state building as a result of warmaking (interstate war), statemaking (intrastate war), protection and extraction of resources, where protection refers to neutralising the rivals of one's clients and power base. He (Tilly, 1992: 96-99) concludes that ruling elites in Europe between 990-1992 engaged in interstate and intrastate war in order to eliminate any claims to the state's monopoly of violence, legitimacy or control over its territory.

Wars need resources, which the state extracts from society in the form of taxes. But these extraction needs constantly rose (ibid.: 103-107). In order to continue extracting from society at a higher rate than their enemies, states engaged in controlling and maximizing the means of production.

As production needs rose, social classes were placed in a position, where they could bargain for adjudication, since production and therefore extraction are both dependent on the citizens' cooperation and their continued increased economic output.

Armies also need to be fed and equipped, so a need for controlling the distribution of goods rose in order to assure effective running of the state's activities. (ibid.:96-99/117-120). Subsequently, under the pressure of its citizens, the structures used for distribution are drawn into redistributing goods in order to battle economic inequalities (ibid.). Therefore, as Figure 1 shows, Tilly's (1992: 97) model concludes that all state action eventually leads to distribution.





Although all processes led European States to develop welfare systems redistributing goods to society in order minimize extreme inequalities, not all states did it the same way and not all states responded in the same fashion to their citizens' demands. Tilly (1992: 98-99) introduces a typology of states depending on the ease of capital availability, which explains how states deal with the bargaining dynamic. High-coercion states have less easily available capital and are therefore more likely to

coerce society into submission, with meeting as little of their demands as possible. High-capital availability states, on the other hand, consider it better and more profitable to gradually extract resources from society, with less coercion and more accommodation for their demands. (ibid.). If Tilly's typology is correct, then one can expect more redistribution and therefore more poverty reduction in high-capital states in comparison to high-coercion ones.

As described, Tilly's model offers a parsimonious and elegant account of state building (Ertman, 1997:14-15), but whether the model is adequate or supported is a wholly different question. Drawing on a set of qualitative and quantitative works, the next sections aim to adapt and expand Tilly's model, while tackling some objections raised towards it.

Adapting and expanding the model

While Tilly's (1992) model focuses on war as the main catalyst of state building, other theorists have recently started expanding on the idea. Stubbs (2005: 18-20) argues that both war and the threat of war act as catalysts for political, economic and social development of states in Southeast Asia. He points out that a war fought in a state's territory has a demolishing effect on the state itself (ibid.). Therefore, the outcomes of war may be non-uniform depending on the location of the battlefield (ibid.). On the other hand, Stubbs (ibid.) concludes that the threat of war has mostly constructive outcomes.

Centeno (2002:266-269) broadly replicates these findings for Latin America. According to him, war has not acted as a catalyst for economic and political progress. Instead, he argues that the intensity of war and the duration of war are more important that the presence of war itself, concluding that limited wars create limited states. Alternatively, he also argues that the preparation for war has a widely positive effect on society (ibid.).

Using these observations, Thies (2004:57-65) operationalises the threat of war in terms of interstate rivalry. Due to the longevity of enduring rivalries and the response to threat perception in strategic rivalries, he argues that they are of the right intensity and duration to produce the best results (Thies, 2004: 62-63). Using these operationalisations he runs a series of quantitative tests, concluding that rivalry has a positive effect on state building, measured in terms of extractive capability, in the post-colonial developing world (Thies, 2004), Latin America (Thies, 2005), Central America (Thies, 2006), Sub-Saharan Africa (Thies, 2007) and the Middle East (Lu & Thies, 2012).). Further supporting Centeno's (2002) and Stubbs' (2005) models, these studies find that war itself generally has a negative effect on political development and extraction (Thies, 2005; Thies, 2006; Sobek & Thies, 2010; Lu & Thies, 2012). Considering these findings, this study uses interstate rivalry as the independent variable.

Whilst substituting war with rivalry has become an established method of testing Tilly's model, there are still a number of state-building activities from this model that have not been tested. It is widely recognised that the majority of quantitative studies adapting the model test the relationship between war, or the threat of war, and extraction (Rasler and Thompson, 2012: 241-254; Centeno, 2002: 116-126; Thies, 2004: 62; Thies, 2005: 455). A new wave of studies published in the last five years have examined the effects of interstate rivalry on economic growth (Kang & Valeriano, 2014), as well as the effects of war on both economic growth and extraction (Sobek & Thies, 2010:270), thus expanding the available empirical knowledge on Tilly's model.

Evaluating these, among other factors, Rasler and Thompson (2012: 251-254) conclude that not a lot is known about the effects that the threat of war has on inequality and redistribution as part of the state-building process. This study explores precisely this previously unexplored relationship. By doing this, the author hopes to contribute to the accumulating quantitative knowledge supporting the full model hypothesised by Tilly (1992) and expanded by Thies (2004). As argued above, the presence of interstate rivalry is expected to result in the redistribution of goods, with the goal of tackling inequality. The author of this thesis was unable to find a direct way of measuring the redistribution process, therefore this study focuses on the results of redistribution on reducing inequality

The Gini index measurement is widely used for measuring inequality (Besley and Burgess, 2003: 10-12). As will be explained later in the Methods section of this thesis, there was a lack of data concerning the Gini index. On the other hand, Besley and Burgess (2003: 10-12) find that poverty falls by 67% when there is a reduction of one standard deviation in inequality, which is why this study utilises absolute poverty (henceforth poverty) measures as a proxy for inequality. Although far from ideal, poverty can provide an insight into the behaviour of inequality reduction.

This study observes only non-OECD states because poverty has mostly been eradicated in high income OECD countries. Since the majority of non-OECD states are outside Europe (Appendix A), the adequacy of adapting Tilly's model for the rest of the world is discussed in the next subsection.

Objections towards the model

Tilly's model is widely accepted, but there are also a number of objections to it, especially about applying the model outside of Europe (Rasler & Thompson, 2012: 244-246). As discussed earlier, this study has already solved one problem concerning the intensity of war by focusing on the threat of war as opposed to war itself. In addition to that, there are three other objections to applying Tilly's model to the developing world that will be discussed in this section. This will be followed by a discussion on the general contention of the direction of this relationship.

Firstly, Rasler and Thompson (ibid.) argue that due to the current availability of external sponsors, developing states are less likely to extract resources internally and therefore the statebuilding model as whole does not work. Although intuitive, this is factually incorrect as Thies (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; Lu & Thies, 2012) finds strong evidence that interstate rivalry has a positive effect on resource extraction in these states. Furthermore, external aid has been shown to have a positive effect on poverty reduction in the majority of cases (Stubbs, 2005: 148-152; Alvi & Sembeta, 2012). This means that even if taxation does not increase during a rivalry, aid received as a result of the rivalry will still have a positive effect on poverty reduction, thus supporting the general hypothesis that rivalry indirectly reduces poverty.

Secondly, it has been argued that international norms have changed since 1945, resulting in the abolition of conquest in world politics (Rasler & Thompson, 2012: 244-246). Herbst (2000: 21-28/221-226) notes this to be the case in Africa, where borders are rarely challenged. He argues that African leaders will react differently than expected by Tilly, due to the lack of stimulus from the threat of losing their state. Ayoob (1995: 173-177) disagrees that international norms are this deterministic, pointing towards the breakdown of the USSR and Yugoslavia as evidence. This is further supported by the events in Ukraine and Crimea during the past year. In addition, Stubbs (2005: 18-20) theorises that external conflict can lead to the breakdown of economic and social life, ultimately resulting in internal strife and the overthrowing of the ruling elite (Stubbs, 2005: 18-20). Thus, even if there is no conquest, it is unlikely that the ruling elite lack the stimulus to engage in traditional state-building as a response to external rivals, considering the rivals could still easily contribute to the ruling elite losing power.

Lastly, Herbst (2000: 21-28/221-226) also concludes that internal strife is more relevant than external rivalries in the decision making process, because of the lack of conquest. As discussed in the previous paragraph, external rivals can lead to civil wars or worse, which counters Herbst's arguments. In addition, Ayoob (1995: 23-28) observes that the majority of external rivals start rivalries in order to exasperate internal tensions by encouraging secessionism or instability (Ayoob, 1995:47-51/53/55-56). He concludes that, in order to prevent secessionism, states need to ensure they are more powerful than their competing neighbours. This further suggests that external rivals pose the same serious threat to third world countries as they did to European states, even if conquest is eradicated. Therefore, there is not sufficient evidence suggesting that developing countries go through a wholly different processes than their European peers.

While developing countries might experience state-building in much the same way as early European states that does not justify the direction of the relationship. While the quantitative methodology used by this study can locate correlation and statistical relations between variables, it is not direction sensitive. Therefore, one limitation to this model could be that the direction is as a matter of fact inverse, meaning that it is not interstate rivalry that reduces poverty, but rather that states with less poverty are more likely to have the means to sustain a rivalry and are therefore more likely to engage in a rivalry. This might be an intuitive argument, but Bremer (1992: 336-338) establishes that less economically advanced states are more likely to go to war that more economically advanced states. As the majority of war and conflict is between rivals (Thompson, 2001; Diehl & Goetz, 2000), it can be concluded that most probably less economically advanced states are also more likely to become rivals rendering this objection unjustified.

Nonetheless, although the majority of war is between less economically developed states, there have been no studies drawing that same conclusion for rivals. Therefore it would be prudent to be cautious and control for wealthier states initiating rivalries. In order to control for this limitation and avoid misconstruing the direction of the relationship, this study takes two precautions. Firstly, it studies non-OECD states, the majority of which are in the low income group of states most of the measured years, as shown in Table 1. Secondly, in order to demonstrate the directionality of the relationship, after the statistical part of the thesis, an exploratory crucial case study, tracing the causal mechanisms and processes resulting in state building and poverty reduction in Bangladesh during its rivalry with India, is conducted. While this one case study would not enable us to generalise about the whole population, it should be enough to bring faith in the causal mechanisms and warrant further research.

Causal mechanisms and the hypotheses

Having concluded that the initially proposed model is adequate, this study proposes two causal mechanisms that would affect poverty reduction in non-OECD states. Figure 1 showed the two ways that the threat of war can act as a catalyst for the redistribution of wealth. The first is indirectly, through economic and infrastructural growth, and the second is directly reducing poverty, by putting the populace at a strong bargaining position where it can demand for the redistribution of wealth.

Expanding on the first mechanism of economic growth, the threat of war acts as a catalyst for political, economic and social development of the state (Stubbs, 2005:18-19). Once in a rivalry, each side enters in "an extreme competition with each other" (Vasquez, 1993: 75-76), which involves doing everything possible, even burning oneself, in order to be relatively ahead of the other state (Valeriano, 2013: 13-14). When faced with a severe threat and engaged in a process of rivalry, states tend to find ways to enhance their power through any means possible: usually through military buildups and alliance seeking (Kang and Valeriano, 2014; Valeriano, 2013: 72-90). Whilst trying to enhance their power, states in rivalry increase their military spending (Sample, Valeriano & Kang, 2013: 117-119). Apart from formal alliances, Stubbs (2005: 148-152) has also suggested that finding patrons that supply aid might accelerate the economic and military growth. This is supported by Rudolff, Scott and Blew (2013: /417-418), who observe that the USA allocates larger amounts of aid to the neighbours and rivals of their own rivals.

Whilst the military spending seems to have an adverse effect on economic income (Sample et al, 2013: 131-133), Kang and Valeriano (2014) find that rivalry has a net positive effect on economic growth in developing countries and the international system as a whole. These findings

loosely coincide with Stubbs' (2005:125-152) observation that the Vietnam War had a positive effect on the East Asian states by providing them with an opportunity to develop economies supplying the war effort.

Stubbs' (2005: 125-152) also suggests a mechanism of how this happened. According to him, the presence of the Vietnam War resulted in a number of favourable factors for economic growth. For example, it helped Thailand build an army, as well as bringing the American Army into the region. The armies themselves needed provisions, thus providing a good environment for the aligned states to encourage industries that would supply the army with what it needed, including infrastructure expansion in order to increase army mobility. The labour market quickly absorbed all possible labour and all states in the region boasted full employment (Stubbs, 2005: 148-150), resulting in a reduction in poverty and a gradual redistribution of wealth in society. These observations are consistent with Goudie and Ladd's (1999: 192-193), and Besley and Burgess' (2003: 7-9) findings that economic growth largely reduces poverty. Therefore, one of the ways that rivalries are expected to reduce poverty is through economic growth and job creation.

Of course states need money in order to invest, and that is usually provided by extraction of resources from society. As mentioned above, Thies (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; Lu & Thies, 2012) has found that extraction capability increases during a rivalry. As rivalry is a competition, one would expect that the involved states would compete in extraction of resources in order to fund larger and more effective armies. This means that they would also have to increase their production means, which is observed by Kang and Valeriano (2014).

Goudie and Ladd (1999: 192-193) conclude that states with high inequality rates are likely to perform poorer than more equal states in terms of economic growth. States should therefore be willing to make concessions to their population, if that results in better economic performance. Thus, it is not unreasonable that the ruling elites would be willing to concede wealth redistribution demands from the populace in order to secure more extraction cooperation and higher economic growth rates, while avoiding internal unrest. This process ultimately results in direct poverty reduction.

To summarise, since interstate rivalries generate economic growth and a willingness for the ruling class to concede redistribution demands, both of which are related to poverty reduction, this article hypothesises that:

Hypothesis 1: Due to the fierce competition between rivals, involvement in interstate rivalries will have a positive effect on absolute poverty reduction through economic growth and wealth redistribution.

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Tilly (1992: 98-99) expects differences in wealth redistribution bargaining success depending on the accessibility of capital to the state. After examining the majority of European states, Ertman (1997: 317-323) questions this expectation by concluding that regime type and representative chamber stength explains variations in outcome better than availability of capital.

This conclusion is supported by Ayoob's (1995: 167-170) argument that the ruling elite in a state has three ways of dealing with internal demands by dissident ethnic groups: annihilation, assimilation or balancing their demands. Although states tend to use a combination of the three, Ayoob (ibid.) expects that states that balance the demands are more democratic and therefore experience a stronger state building process. Through the lens of predatory theory, this explains Kosack's (2003) findings that democratic regimes are better at reducing poverty. These democratic regimes are dependent on their whole population to be re-elected and to stay in power. Therefore, in order to stay in power, the elites must be willing satisfy the majority of the population and are therefore more likely to accept redistribution bargaining demands, resulting in poverty reduction.

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Lastly, Centeno (239-245) argues that conscripted armies, which are also a sign of better centralization of power within the state, are part of the reason why states can successfully democratise. Thus, this leads the author to conclude that democratic states are not only more willing to bargain with their populace, but they are also more likely to be states with a longer experience of state building, due to their higher degrees of centralisation. It is therefore hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 2: Interstate rivalry in the presence of democracy is more likely to reduce absolute poverty within a democratic state.

The next section of this dissertation explains the methods used in testing these hypotheses. The section after explains the results of the tests.

Methods

Design

In testing the hypotheses, the study utilises a cross-sectional time-series design. A comparative statistical analysis was conducted. The sample group tested includes all non-OECD countries available in the World Bank PovCal dataset. The following variables and datasets were used.

Dependent Variables: Measurements of Poverty

Poverty was defined by three different variables – *poverty headcount index, poverty gap index* and *squared poverty gap index* - all of which were taken from the World Bank PovCal Dataset. The *poverty headcount index* represents the proportion of people living in a household with income per person under the poverty line (Alvi & Senbeta, 2012:960); the *poverty gap index* measures the mean income of all people living under the poverty line, thus measuring the average income needed to bring people living under the poverty line out of poverty (ibid.); the *squared poverty gap index* measurement gives more weight to the people farthest away from the poverty line, thus being more sensitive to changes in the livelihood of the most disadvantaged section of the people living under the poverty line (ibid.). All of the above variables measure absolute poverty. The poverty line for this research was set at \$1.25 per day, per purchasing power of the 2005 US dollar.

Whilst these are the best measurements for poverty, each of them can be inadequate at measuring changes in poverty levels under certain contexts. This is why, in order to observe all possible forms of chance in poverty levels, this study uses all three variables. Alvi & Senbeta (2012: 960-961) point out that the *headcount index* can at times be misleading with regards to the sum of people living under poverty. Furthermore, they argue that the *headcount index* does not detect any improvements in the living standards of the people already living in poverty (ibid.), which is why the

poverty gap index is included in this study. The *poverty gap index* ignores the percentage of people living in poverty, but measures the improvement in their purchasing power. The *squared poverty gap index* does the same, but due it being a squared function, it adds more weight to the people living under the most deprived circumstances (ibid.). Since the three variables do not measure the same type of poverty, results might diverge, thus helping us draw different conclusions (Alvi & Sengeta, 2012: 960-961).

Independent Variables: Measurements of Rivalry

Following the established tradition in the literature (Kang and Valeriano, 2014; Lu and Thies, 2012: 244-245; Thies, 2004: 63-64; Thies, 2005: 455-457; Thies, 2007: 721-723; Valeriano, 2013: 93), two different measurement of rivalry were tested. The measurements are enduring rivalry and strategic rivalry. Valeriano (2013: 93) notes that this brings extra validity to the study, because it means that the relationship being tested is experienced regardless of the methodology used in defining what a rivalry is.

The first measurement was the operationalisation initially proposed by Diehl and Goertz (2000) and later updated by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). According to Diehl and Goertz (2000: 4), enduring rivalry is "a relationship between two states in which both use, with some regularity, military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate foreign policy in military terms". Thies (2004: 62) points out that this definition has three dimensions to it. It is firstly spatially consistent, since it is states involved in dyadic disputes. Secondly, the disputes are expected to persist over extended periods of time. Lastly, it is a militarised competition since the states use a wide combination of military force and threat of military force in order to resolve the issue or issues they are competing over. Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) operationalised two types of rivalries – enduring and proto. Both are measured with regard to Military Interstate Disputes (MIDs), where enduring rivalries are operationalised between two states when they have experienced six or more MIDs within twenty years (ibid.:335-340; Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 44-45).

Proto rivalries are operationalised only after four MIDs or if their disputes do not last twenty years (ibid.). For this reason, Thies (2004: 723) concludes that proto rivalries "fail to approach the severity or duration of an enduring rivalry", thus being likely that "they will not have as strong or significant an effect on the state's extractive capacity". This study expects proto rivalries to have a similar effect on poverty reduction.

The second measurement of rivalry was Thompson's (2001) alternative strategic rivalry measurement. According to conceptualisation (ibid.: 560), strategic rivals need to see each other "as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) enemies". Thompson (ibid.: 567) examines the foreign policy histories of states, using the decisions and activities taken by the states to determine the decision makers' perceptions of threat and thus define rivalries. Like Thies (2004: 63), this thesis considers the perception of threat to be enough to stimulate poverty reduction actions within the state, therefore strategic rivalries should also provide an adequate measure.

Lu and Thies (2012:244) argue that the two operationalisations use sufficiently different in terms of methodology used for measuring external rivalries. This is clearly seen by the disparities in their measurements of rival dyads and timings (Thompson, 2001: 570-573; Thies, 2007: 722). Therefore, by testing both, this study aims to confirm the robustness of its results. Should both measurements of rivalry have similar effects on the three dependent variables respectively, the results of this study would be strongly supported.

Lastly, since the dependent variables are reported tri-annually, this study codes the presence of an enduring, proto and strategic rivalry as 1 for a given state year, if there was one or more enduring, proto or strategic rivalries for the majority of the three years previously and including the measured year. Otherwise, the state year is coded as 0.

Control Variables: Aid, Finance, GDP, Age Dependency Ration, Trade Openness and Democracy

Control variables are the standard ones used for testing poverty (Datt & Revallion, 1992; Revallion & Chen, 1997; Besley and Burgess, 2003; Perry et al., 2006), plus the ones introduced by Alvi and Senbeta's (2012: 962). Gini measures are excluded from the model, due to lack of data. The Gini index had a non-null value in only 78 out of 721 (10.82%) state years reported by PovCal (Appendix D). The control variables are taken from the following datasets (Appendix C):

- World Development Indicators (WDI) Dataset, World Bank Aid, Finance, GDP, Age Dependent Ratio, Imports and Exports
- 2. Polity IV Dataset democ variable

A new variable named Trade openness was calculated using the "Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)" and "Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)" variable provided by the WDI dataset. Trade openness for a given state year equals the sum of imports and exports of the country for that year. The average of trade openness over the three year period of the dependent variables is reported. All other control variables are also reported as averages of the tri-annual period.

Data and sample group

The sample data was an unbalanced cross sectional time-series dataset compiled from the WDI, PovCal, Polity IV and the two rivalry datasets. The state-year data was defined by the availability of information in PovCal. The dataset had 132 states observed between 1981 and 1999, out of which 30 were removed. Chile, Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey were excluded due to being OECD. The West Bank and Gaza and Montenegro due to not being classified as a state in the Klein and colleagues (2006) database. Another 10 were omitted due to lack of information on the dependent variable (Appendix B). The resulting dataset included 102 non-OECD state panels. Each of the 102 states was observed tri-annually starting 1981 and finishing in 1999, resulting in a maximum of 7 observations per panel. Some states had less observations per panel due to the states not existing throughout the whole duration of the period. The dataset included 660 state-year entries. Only 503 were tested in the full model due to missing values.

OECD states were excluded in order to avoid high income, or developed, states from the sample group. The income group of the rest of the states was calculated according to the World Bank income group classification (World Bank, 2015). Low income states are defined as states whose GDP per capita average over the three year measurement period used by this study is under \$1045; lower-middle income states have an average GDP per capita between \$1045 and \$4125; upper-middle income states - between \$4125 and \$12746; and lastly high income states - over \$12746. As shown in Table 1, 51.52% of the sample group state-years fall within the low income group, 34.70% fall within the lower-middle income group and only 5.45% fall within the upper-middle income group. As expected, there were no high income state years tested. 8.33% of the sample group had missing data.

Income Group:	Count (% of Total):	
Low income	340 (51.52%)	
Lower-middle income	228 (34.70%)	
Upper-middle income	36 (5.45%)	
Higher income	0 (0.00%)	
Not available	55 (8.33%)	
Total	660 (100%)	

Table 1: Distribution of sample states between income groups.

Statistical analysis

As recommended by Beck & Katz (1995: 644-645; Thies, 2004: 65; Kang & Valeriano, 2014), a Prais-Winsten Regression with Panel-Corrected Standardised Errors (PCSE) and AR(1)-type autcorrelation test with a common correlation coefficient across all panels was conducted. This

approach avoids autocorrelation and heteroscedastic errors when testing time-series panel data. The test was run using version 0.1 of the panelAR (panelAR, 2014) package in R, version x64 3.1.1. Please find below the two models ran in testing the hypotheses:

<u>Hypothesis 1</u>: log(Poverty) ~ Rivalry + Foreign Aid + log(GDP Average) + Finance + Age Dependency + Openness

<u>Hypothesis 2</u>: log(Poverty) ~ Rivalry + Foreign Aid + log(GDP Average) + Finance + Age Dependency + Openness + Democ


Each of these models was run six times in order to calculate all possible unique combinations between the two sets of independent variables (represented as Rivalry) and the three dependent variables (represented as Poverty).

Results

This research aims to investigate whether there is a positive relationship between interstate rivalry and poverty reduction. It also investigates whether the presence and degree of democracy affects this relationship. In Table 2 and Figure 2 it is possible to see the distribution of rivalry and non-rivalry state years in the sample group by type of rivalry.

State years		Types of Rivalry			
		Proto	Enduring	Strategic	
Rivalry	Count:	189	196	265	
	% of Total:	28.64%	29.70%	40.15%	
No Rivalry	Count:	471	464	395	
	% of Total:	71.36%	70.30%	59.85%	
Total	Count:	660	660	660	
	% of Total:	100%	100%	100%	

Table 2: Breakdown of rivalry and non-rivalry state years by type of rivalry



The rivalry-poverty model

Table 3 presents the results for the model testing the relationships between rivalry and poverty. The relationships were tested by running a Prais-Winsten Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and an AR(1) autocorrelation with a common correlation coefficient across all panels. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the results of testing proto and enduring rivalries against the three dependent variables – *poverty headcount index, poverty gap index* and the *squared poverty gap index* respectively. Columns (2), (4) and (6) report the results of testing strategic rivalries against the dependent variables in the same order as (1), (3) and (5) (Table 3).

As expected, enduring rivalry has a negative and statistically significant effect on all three dependent variables. This indicates that enduring rivalries have a positive role in reducing poverty. Column (1) shows that enduring rivalries have the weakest negative correlation with *poverty headcount index* (-0.0457) and column (5) that the strongest negative relationship is between enduring rivalries and the *squared poverty gap index* (-0.2841). This suggests that enduring rivalries are more effective at reducing poverty for the poorest people living under the poverty line and are less effective at reducing poverty for the people living closer to the poverty line.

Whilst enduring rivalries have a negative and significant effect at reducing poverty, proto rivalries have negative but non-significant effect on all three dependent variables. Since no significant relationship was found, Thies' (2004:63) argument, that proto rivalries lack the severity and duration of threat needed to elicit the same type of state-building response as enduring rivalries, is supported.

Strategic rivalries also have a negative relationship, but are not significant in the conventional sense of the term. Columns (2), (4) and (6) display the results of strategic rivalries' effect on poverty, which is negative and there is a clear trend (p<0.1), but is not statistically significant. This difference can be explained due to the lack of military aspect of strategic rivalries. As the measurement considers foreign policy (Thompson, 2001), as opposed to military confrontation, it is likely that it might not

always have the same effect towards stimulating a strong enough infrastructural and defensive buildup associated with job creation and poverty reduction.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Dep. Variables	Poverty head	overty headcount		Poverty Gap		Squared Poverty Gap	
Proto rivalry	-0.1144		-0.1103		-0.1002		
	(0.0803)		(0.0915)		(0.1025)		
Enduring rivalry	-0.0457***		-0.1585**		-0.2841*		
	(0.0093)		(0.0607)		(0.1161)		
Strategic rivalry		-0.1769.		-0.2066.		-0.2583.	
		(0.0923)		(0.1107)		(0.1385)	
Aid	-0.0042	-0.0045	-0.0024	-0.0027	-0.0006	-0.0013	
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0043)	(0.0040)	(0.0036)	(0.0042)	
Log GDP per capita	-0.8192***	-0.8203***	-0.9055***	-0.9102***	-0.9796***	-0.9363***	
	(0.0041)	(0.0961)	(0.1069)	(0.1121)	(0.1091)	(0.1230)	
Finance	0.0698*	0.0862.	0.0609	0.0793	0.0170	0.0510	
	(0.0041)	(0.0442)	(0.0520)	(0.0618)	(0.0839)	(0.0794)	
Age dependency	0.0220**	0.0221**	0.0251**	0.0248**	0.0272**	0.0265**	
ratio	(0.0041)	(0.0071)	(0.0078)	(0.0078)	(0.0084)	(0.0088)	
Trade openness	0.0005	0.0004	0.0004	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002	
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	
Constant	6.6280***	6.6441***	5.9530***	5.9924***	5.5714***	5.3707***	
	(0.4722)	(0.5175)	(0.6533)	(0.7411)	(0.8428)	(0.9421)	
N of observations	525	525	525	525	525	525	
N of panels	91	91	91	91	91	91	
R-Squared	0.6849	0.6999	0.4809	0.4795	0.3535	0.3265	
Wald X^2 (d.f.)	259.0509 (7)	143.373	206.2395	717.8889 (6)	139.8357	135.2609	
		(6)	(7)		(7)	(6)	
$Prob > X^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	

Table 3: Effects of Rivalry on Poverty 1981-1999

Prais-Winsten Regression with AR(1) Correction and Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

Standard errors in parentheses.

Signifiance codes: `***`p<0.001 ; `**`p<0.01 `*`p<0.05 ; `.`p<0.1

Consistent with Alvi and Senbeta's (2012: 965) findings, trade openness has no significant effect in all six tests, but unlike their study, whilst aid has a negative effect on poverty in Table 3 the effect is not significant. Furthermore, Finance has a significant effect only in (1) when controlling for

the effects of proto and enduring rivalry on the *poverty headcount index*, as opposed to having a significant effect on all three dependent variables (ibid.). Age dependency ratio also deviates from their findings. It is has a significant positive effect on poverty in all six tests, whilst it has no significant effect in Alvi and Senbeta's (ibid.) study.

Lastly, GDP per capita has a negative and significant effect on the *poverty headcount index*, the *poverty gap index* and the *squared poverty gap index* regardless of independent variable. This strongly supports the author's thesis that rivalry indirectly reduces poverty through eliciting economic growth. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the wider literature both on poverty (Alvi and Senbeta, 2012: 965-969) and state building (Kang & Valeriano, 2014; Thies and Sobek, 2010: 280-285).

In conclusion, apart from Finance and Aid, most factors acted in the way they were expected to. Enduring rivalries and GDP per capita have a negative and significant effect on poverty. Strategic rivalries also have a negative relationship, but are not significant in the conventional definition of the term. These results are not sufficient to falsify Hypothesis 1. Therefore, the author has confidence that interstate military rivalry helps with the reduction of poverty in non-OECD states by promoting economic growth.

The model controlling for democracy

Table 4 summarises the results for the model testing the relationships between rivalry and poverty whilst controlling for democracy. A Prais-Winsten Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and an AR(1) autocorrelation with a common correlation coefficient across all panels was conducted again. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the results of testing proto and enduring rivalries against the three dependent variable and columns (2), (4) and (6) report the results of testing strategic rivalries against the dependent variables (Table 4).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables	Poverty headcount		Poverty Gap		Squared Poverty Gap	
Proto rivalry	-0.1275		-0.1339		-0.1182	
	(0.0901)		(0.1081)		(0.1194)	
Enduring rivalry	-0.0608**		-0.1799**		-0.3063**	
	(0.0200)		(0.0619)		(0.1130)	
Strategic Rivalry		-0.1472*		-0.1870*		-0.2343*
		(0.0650)		(0.0894)		(0.1180)
Democracy score	0.0273	0.0228	0.0372*	0.0284	0.0436*	0.0327.
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0181)	(0.0174)	(0.0203)	(0.0194)
Aid	-0.0037	-0. 0039	-0.0021	-0.0022	-0.0006	-0.0008
	(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)
Log GDP per capita	-0.8437***	-0.8407***	-0.9404***	-0.9420***	-0.9796***	-0.9823***
	(0.0956)	(0.0985)	(0.1019)	(0.1088)	(0.1091)	(0.1171)
Finance	0.0643	0.0799	0.0477	0.0692	0.0170	0.0396
	(0.0496)	(0.0543)	(0.0687)	(0.0728)	(0.0839)	(0.0900)
	(0.0450)		(0.0087)		(0.0055)	
Age dependency	0.0214**	0.0212**	0.0253***	0.0244**	0.0272**	0.0260**
ratio	(0.0071)	(0.0074)	(0.0075)	(0.0081)	(0.0084)	(0.0090)
Trade openness	0.0005	0.0004	0.0005	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Constant	6.8094***	6.8069***	6.1157***	6.1815***	5.5714***	5.6552***
	(0.5342)	(0.5994)	(0.6547)	(0.7939)	(0.8428)	(1.0062)
N of observations	503	503	503	503	503	503
N of panels	87	87	87	87	87	87
R-Squared	0.6974	0.6999	0.4967	0.4912	0.3535	0.3386
Wald X^2 (d.f.)	272.7779 (8)	368.6462	222.8616	217.3805 (7)	217.9492	156.5219
		(7)	(8)		(8)	(7)
$Prob > X^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

 Table 4: Effect of Rivalry on Poverty while controlling for democracy 1981-1999


 Prais-Winsten Regression with AR(1) Correction and Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

Standard errors in parentheses.


Signifiance codes: '***'p<0.001 ; '**'p<0.01 '*'p<0.05 ; '.'p<0.1

Hypothesis 2 predicts that the presence of democracy will enhance the poverty reducing effects of rivalry, therefore the results from Table 4 should be much the same as the ones from Table 3, with the only difference being that the effects of the independent variables are stronger. This is partially supported by the results.

As in the first set of tests, enduring rivalries have a negative and significant effect on poverty. Furthermore, just like the first set of tests enduring rivalries have the weakest effect on the poverty headcount index (-0.0608) and the strongest effect on the squared poverty index (-0.3063). When controlling for democracy, the effects of enduring rivalries on poverty is stronger. As seen in Figure 3, enduring rivalries' coefficients are larger by -0.0151 for the *poverty headcount index*; by -0.0214 for the *poverty gap index*; and by -0.0222 for the *squared poverty gap index* when the model controls for democracy. This suggests, that the presence of democracy may increase the poverty reduction effect of enduring rivalries.



Proto rivalries have negative and non-significant results again. Although the results are nonsignificant, it should be noted that, when controlling for democracy, the coefficients are smaller in comparison to the coefficients when democracy is not taken into consideration. This is contradictory to Hypothesis 2. Strategic rivalries deviate crucially from the author's predictions. The results in Table 4 are significant for all three dependent variable, as opposed to non-significant in the first sets of tests in Table 3. Furthermore, the effect of strategic rivalries on all three dependent variables is weaker than in the first set of tests, when the presence of democracy was not controlled for. This can be seen in Figure 4. Strategic rivalries' coefficients are larger by -0.0297 for the *poverty headcount index*; by - 0.0196 for the *poverty gap index*; and by -0.024 for the *squared poverty gap index* when the model does not control for democracy in the first set of tests.



What is particularly interesting is the distribution of the effect of strategic rivalries on the three dependent variables. Like enduring rivalries in both tests and strategic rivalries in the first set of tests, the factor has the strongest negative effect on the *squared poverty gap index* (-0.2343) and the weakest on the *poverty headcount index* (-0.1472). This means that, regardless of the operationalization of rivalry, rivalry works in the same way in reducing poverty. That is, by

disproportionately improving the living standards of the people living at the poorest end of the poverty spectrum when compared to the ones closer to the poverty line.

Moving onto the democracy score, the factor is significant only in two columns (3 and 5) and is nearly significant (p<0.1) in column (6) (Table 4). Contradictory to Alvi and Senbeta's (2012: 965) findings, the coefficients of the democracy score itself in all tests, including the non-significant ones, are positive. This hints towards the conclusion that democracy has a direct negative effect on poverty reduction, since higher measurements on democracy are positively and sometimes statistically related to higher measurements of poverty. This broadly contradicts previous research (ibid.) and Hypothesis 2 of this study.

The rest of the factors have the same effects as the previous set of tests. GDP per capita has a negative and significant effect, whilst Age dependency ratio has a positive and significant effect. The only difference is Finance, which is non-significant in all columns of Table 4.

In conclusion, Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. Controlling for democracy resulted in a stronger effect of enduring rivalry on all three dependent variables when compared to the initial set of tests. On the other hand, strategic rivalries had a weaker effect on the dependent variables when compared to the previous results, but their effect changed from non-significant in the first set of tests, to significant in the second set. Contrary to expectations, democracy was mostly non-significant, but more importantly democracy had a positive effect on the dependent variables in all cases – even the significant ones.

Bangladesh: A Crucial Case Study

Having conducted a macro-investigation concluding that there is a positive statistically significant relationship between enduring interstate rivalry and poverty reduction in both hypotheses, this chapter will now demonstrate how the causal mechanisms behind the theory work, by examining an explanatory case study. The aim of the case study is not theory building, but rather investigating these causal mechanisms as explained in the literature review of this dissertation by providing an example of how the interstate rivalry stimulated state building process reduces poverty. In addition, this chapter will also aim produce evidence that poverty reduction comes after the beginning of intestate rivalry in the considered case, thus answering some of the concerns expressed earlier about the direction of the relationship or the type of states that sustain enduring rivalries. It will do this by considering the crucial case of Bangladesh, from its independence in 1972 until 1999, through its enduring rivalry with India which started in 1976 (Klein, Goertz & Diehl, 2006).

Before continuing onto discussing the Bangladesh case, the next section will firstly go over the general causal expectations introduced by the thesis once again. Then, it will move onto discussing all of the factors identified as being involved in the causal mechanism and poverty reduction. Lastly, this chapter will conclude by summarizing the effects of these factors on poverty reduction.

Overview of the expected causal mechanisms

Having defined the structure of this chapter, this first section summarizes the expected causal mechanisms investigated in the case study. The threat of war introduced by an enduring rivalry is expected to catalyse political, economic and social development within the state (Stubbs, 2005: 18-19). This is expected to result in the state competing on all possible grounds with their rival (Vasquez, 1993: 75-76), which includes exhibiting behaviours aimed at increasing the state's power. Such

behaviours include military buildups through increased military spending, alliance and aid seeking, as well as actively pursuing policies aimed at economic growth (Sample, Valeriano & Kang, 2013: 117-119; Kang and Valeriano, 2014; Valeriano, 2013: 72-90; Stubbs, 2005: 148-152). Although, increased military spending seems to have an adverse effect on economic income (Sample et al, 2013: 131-133), it can have a positive effect on developing segments of the economy supporting the war effort by providing job opportunities for low-skilled labour (Stubbs, 2005:125-152), resulting in a reduction of poverty and a gradual redistribution of wealth in society.

In order to affectively supply the funds needed for maintaining a competitive army, a state in a rivalry is expected to extract more resources from society in the form of tax (Thies, 2004). This in turn puts more pressure on sustained and competitive economic growth, as tax ratio and army funding are dependent on it (Kang and Valeriano, 2014). Economic growth is directly dependent on the populace of the state, as it is more likely to happen in politically stable states with less economic inequality (Goudie and Ladd, 1999: 192-193). Therefore, due to the threat of war and the need to sustain a competitive military through tax revenue in a growing economy, a state entangled in an interstate rivalry is expected to be more willing to concede wealth redistribution demands by the populace of the state, which in turn directly reduces poverty.

Threat perception and state-building stimulus

Having recapped the causal mechanisms, this section will chronologically examine the threat perception and state-building stimuli of the case study. There are both military and non-military factors causing escalated threat perception in Bangladesh towards India. The non-military causes will be examined first, followed by an investigation into the military reasons leading to increased threat perception. It will then be argued that although they are exceptionally mild, there is evidence that both have stimulated, if only to a limited degree, the state building processes.

The first presence of threat perception appeared straight after Bangladeshi Independence, in the years leading up to the first military encounter. Afroze (1994: 210-218) observes that there was an escalated public threat perception towards India, not shared by the ruling elite in the first four years of independence. None the less, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace signed by the two states has been widely criticised and seen as a way of India to dominate Bangladesh, while limiting its economic, defence and foreign policy sovereignty (ibid.). These non-military causes of threat perception have only been exasperated by the Farakka Barrage scandal, where India has been repeatedly blamed for intentionally disregarding previous treaties and unilaterally withdrawing water from the Ganga River. There is evidence that this caused draught in South-western Bangladesh, thus damaging agricultural yields (ibid.: 223-225). In addition, the disputes over maritime and land border demarcation have further heightened the mistrust towards India, resulting in the perception of an "expansionist India" aiming to dominate Bangladesh (ibid.: 229-242/).


These non-military causes for threat perception are not enough to elicit the stimulus needed for a military response and actions leading to extreme competition which would ultimately reduce poverty, but together with poor economic decisions, they contributed to Mujib's assassination and regime change in 1975 (Islam, 1985: 202-203; Baxter & Rahman, 1991: 43-44). The Mujib regime lacked threat perception towards India (ibid.: 210-214), which resulted in reducing military spending and starting their own internal para-military group (Baxter & Rahmen, 1991: 43-45/49). Together with this, the bad clientalist economic policies implemented by Mujib (Islam, 1985: 202-203) resulted in widespread criticism of the regime and the coup ousting the Alawi League from power. This was directly linked to the rise of the Zia regime, whose foreign and domestic policy directly resulted in the military clashes leading to the beginning of the Indo-Bangladeshi enduring rivalry (Afroze, 1994: 257-259).

The first recorder Military Interstate Dispute (MID) is in 1976 and the whole rivalry until 1999 experienced only nine MIDs, none of which had more than 25 battle deaths (Bennett & Stam, 2000). The six MID threshold needed for the relationship to classify as an enduring rivalry was reached only in 1986, with no one year experiencing more than 1 MID. This lack of intensity and severity is not ideal for the theory proposed in this paper, as it might not be enough to facilitate a strong military and infrastructural response. In addition, threat perception, although high, is still somewhat curtailed by the fact that Bangladeshi territory is recognised and guaranteed by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace signed by both sides. This removes the probability of conquest and in general decreases the severity of the issue, as expected by Herbst (2000: 21-28/221-226). On the other hand, there is evidence that India harboured, trained and supported Bangladeshi militants in their territory. The militants have repeatedly attempted to overthrow the government by military insurgency and destabilization of the regimes (Ghosh, 1995: 243; Majumdar, 2014: 332). Although, less severe than conquest, this has sustained the threat perception and mistrust towards India as it is a directly violation of the Friendship Treaty. Furthermore, it has caused repeated military disputes (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005), which has been enough to keep the rivalry going, establish a military response by the Bangladeshi government and sustain the competitions.

As expected by Ayoob (1995: 23-28) and argued by this theory, the lack of conquest has reduced the intensity of the stimulus, but has not been the only relevant factor. As a result of all of this, the Hasina administration in 1997 refused to renew the Friendship and Cooperation treaty with India, as it was perceived as an icon of Indian domination (Majumdar, 2014: 330). Furthermore, the threat perception seems to have left a longstanding mark, as the foreign policy towards India was one of the crucial topics in the first democratised elections of in 1991 (Ghosh, 1995: 245-247). Overall the combination of military and non-military threats should be enough to elicit the long term state-building stimulus needed to reduce poverty, although the intensity and severity of the threats might not be a very strong stimulus. The lack of intense stimulus is what makes the case crucial, as it is more likely that it would not have the same strong effect on poverty reduction.

Defence expenditure, military buildups and tax revenue growth

Having concluded that the threat perception in Bangladesh and military actions from India should be enough to warrant a military reaction, this section will investigate the military expenditure of Bangladesh, as well as the tax ratio, which should be partially used to fund the military response.



Source: Statistical Appendix, World Bank (1979; 1987; 1995)

After the military had been heavily disadvantaged and ignored under the Alawi League, Baxter and Rahman (1991: 43-49/53-55) note that, upon taking control of Bangladesh, General Zia immediately increased defence and administrative spending. They also observe a similar process of increasing military spending when General Ershad came into power (ibid.: 53-55), concluding that this is an attempt to stabilise the state and gather support for their own regimes. Data compiled from the World Bank (1979; 1987; 1995) country study publications confirms these observations. Using the Gibler, Rider, and Hutchinson (2005: 137-138) military buildup measure, which defines a military buildup as an eight percent spending increase over three years, this study observes military buildups between 1973-1977, 1981-1983 and 1985-1989. During those periods there has been constant spending increases of over eight percent per year (Table 5; Figure 5). Furthermore, the defence expenditure rose to 21.16% of the overall current expenditure in 1975 and never fell under 16.14% until 1992, which is a much higher percentage than the biggest military expenditure during the Mujib regime of 12.56% in 1974.


	Current Defence	Current Defence	Current Defence
	Expenditure (Million	Expenditure	Expenditure (% of
Year	Taka)ª	Annual Increase %	GDP)
1972	203		6.97%
1973	421	107.39%	9.51%
1974	710	68.65%	12.56%
1975	1447	103.80%	21.16%
1976	1702	17.62%	20.72%
1977	2001	17.57%	19.31%
1978	1756	-12.24%	16.67%
1979	NA	NA	NA
1980	2740	NA	18.49%
1981	3480	27.01%	18.86%
1982	4180	20.11%	19.47%
1983	4910	17.46%	19.62%
1984	4930	0.41%	16.83%
1985	5960	20.89%	17.42%
1986	8290	39.09%	20.96%
1987	9340	12.67%	19.75%
1988	11390	21.95%	18.46%
1989	12790	12.29%	18.98%
1990	11800	-7.74%	16.14%
1991	13010	10.25%	16.47%
1992	14940	14.83%	17.56%

Table 5: Current Defence Expenditure Trends of Bangladesh 1972-1992

a. Data taken from the statistical appendix of the World Bank (1979; 1987; 1995) publications.

Knowing that there have been multiple military buildups raises the question of where the resources for these came from. While both Zia and Ershad increased their administration spending, alongside their military one, data shows that the tax ratio was stable around 6.7%-8.9% during the

period (Baxter and Rahman, 1991: 43-49/53-55; World Bank, 1979: 7;World Bank, 1987: 17; World Bank, 1995: 202). While that may be the case, Figure 6 clearly shows a steady increase in tax revenue which coincides with the steady increase in the military expenditures. The lack of tax ratio increase could be explained by the ineffectiveness of the regimes to extract tax revenue, due to their attempt at keeping power and stabilising the populace (Quadir, 2010: 199-209). Alternatively, it could also be due to the lack of intensity of military action between the two states. None the less, there is a clear pattern of constantly growing tax revenue, which suggests potential economic growth.



Source: Statistical Appendix, World Bank (1979; 1987; 1995) and International Monetary Fund (1999; 2002).

Economic growth, alliance and aid seeking


Having established that there have been military buildups and rising tax revenue, without the tax ratio necessarily rising, this study will now examine how that is possible. Considering Kang and Valeriano's (2014) findings, one expected way of the tax revenue rising without the tax ratio rising, is if the country's economy had grown as a whole. A second proposal is that there had been external aid received by the state (2005: 148-152). This section will examine both of these, while also examining other forms of aid and their effect on the economy.

After the Mujib regime had been overthrown due to foreign policy and economic failures, Zia and Ershad both changed their foreign and domestic policies towards building a stronger economy and state (Ghosh, 1995:242-245). In addition to increased military spending, both leaders allocated a large amount of capital towards the agriculture, transport, power and natural resources sectors (Baxter & Rahman, 1991: 53-55). Although this has been widely considered as a move to legitimise and stabilise their regimes (ibid.: 45-48/53-55; Quadir, 2010: 199-205), Afroze (1994, 273-287/294-300) argues that this is partially explained by the regimes trying to gain a relative advantage over India.

Once in power, General Zia firstly removed socialism as constitutionally binding and introduced Islam values as a core part of it (Bhardwaj, 2008: 271-272). These actions were aimed at distancing himself from the economic failures of his predecessor, as well as striving to distance himself from India and the USSR, while improving on relations with the Middle East, China and the West, and attracting aid from them (ibid.; Ghosh, 1995:242-243; Afroze, 1994: 278-281). Furthermore, he continuously defied India by aiming to multilaterally solve Indo-Bangladeshi disputes on the international forum, resulting in following a distinct foreign policy clashing with the Friendship Treaty (ibid: 273-274). By realigning themselves with two of India's rivals – Pakistan since 1947 and China since 1950 (Klein, Goertz & Diehl, 2006) – for both economic and military support it is clear that both General Zia, and General Ershad who followed in his footsteps, were seeking relative power gains and security against India in addition to internal regime security (ibid: 273-287;288-298).

The foreign policy pursued by General Zia and General Ershad resulted in receiving a large sums of international aid (Afroze, 1994: 287-292), but the relationships they started had even more profound effects on the internal economic policies. They have firstly contributed to the pressure on the two regimes to liberalise their economy in order to be attractive to the donors and has exerted even more pressure on the democratic regimes of the 1990s to liberalise, by threatening to cut the aid unless they liberalize (Quadir, 2010: 199-208; Afroze, 1994: 285-287;). The trend started in the 1980s

with liberalisation and state investment in growing sectors, led to trade liberalisation and emphasis on a trade foreign policy by both democratic regimes in the 1990s (Bhardwaj, 2008:273-274). While there was a gradual economic growth during the military regimes, the government experienced sustained and healthy economic growth during the democratic regimes of the 1990s (Figure 7), which has been partially attributed to the aid and trade relationships started in the 1980s in defiance of India (Riaz, 2010: 248-251).



Source: Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP data." Version 6

Poverty reduction and conclusion


To summarise, this case study has so far found evidence that the stimulus provided from the enduring rivalry between India and Bangladesh, has resulted in Bangladesh seeking to gain relative power advantages over India, while keeping internal stability threatened by insurgency groups aided by India. The ruling elite of Bangladesh has employed a number of strategies to do that, which include military buildups, investment in agriculture, industry, transport and power sectors for economic growth, as well as foreign support and aid seeking. This in turn has resulted in a gradual economic growth from 1975 onwards, peaking in the 1990s. On the other hand, this has not produced a substantial tax ratio increase, which suggests that the process might not be as linear as expected. Before concluding, this section will examine the poverty trends which have resulted from these policies.

Because of the nature of the data, the poverty headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices were not measured or calculated prior to 1981 by the World Bank PovCal dataset. This means that there is no easily available data on poverty measurement between 1975 and 1981. The only poverty measurements available is the proxy measurement of calorie intake. The World Bank (1987: xxxiv-xxv/137) has found that calorie intake has deteriorated in the period between 1974 and 1982. While this is contradictory to the general hypothesis offered in this dissertation it can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, this decline could be due to the lingering effects of the bad Mujib administration before the beginning of the rivalry (Islam, 1985: 202-203). Considering the country was aiming to rebuild itself after a devastating civil war and an economically ineffective government, it is not unreasonable that the effects of restructuring and new administration would take a few years to become effective again. Alternatively, the lack of conflict intensity during the first few years of the rivalry, might explain why the state invested less capital in processes associated with poverty reduction. Lastly, some of these results could be blamed on the draught experience by Bangladesh in the years leading up to 1982 (Afroze, 1994: 223-225). This is a credible explanation, considering there has been increased state expenditure on both administration and agricultural development during the period (Baxter and Rahman, 1991: 43-49/53-55).

While poverty statistics in the late 1970s are not fully supportive of the hypothesis, they are not as contradictory during the early 1980s. Between 1982 and 1986, the World Bank (1987: xxxiv-xxv) notes that, while there has been little improvement in poverty, there has been no decline in it as well. They note that there has been increased availability of food ready for people living under poverty, thus resulting in better living standards. The data provided by PovCal confirms these findings, showing a very shy decrease in poverty between 1981 and 1987 on two of the three poverty

measurements (Figure 8). As expressed in Figure 8, there is an increase in poverty estimates on all three measurements between 1987 and 1990, just before a major and steady reduction is registered in during the rest 1990s. The increase in poverty between 1987 and 1990 can again by explained by unexpected and extreme weather throughout the 1980s affecting agricultural produce (Hewitt, 1992:38-40).

While the 1980s are somewhat uncertain, the dramatic decrease of poverty during the 1990s is undeniable. The liberalisation resulting from external and internal pressure has been widely associated with the decline in poverty levels (Quadir, 2000: 205-208). Furthermore, the quickening of the pace of poverty reduction and liberalisation demonstrate clearly the effect that democratisation has on the way that elites respond no populace and aid donor pressure by being more accommodating and resulting in more effective poverty reduction.



Source: PovCal dataset, World Bank

Overall, there has been a decrease in all three variables during the course of the rivalry. The most noticeable is the headcount variable, where there has been approximately 18% of a decline over the eighteen years. The Poverty Gap Index and the Squared Poverty Gap Index have both reduced slightly by 2% and 1% respectively. This clearly shows firstly, that even modest non-intense interstate

rivalry still results in policies that reduce poverty in the long run. Secondly, the degree, and timing, of poverty and poverty reduction displays clearly that in the Bangladesh case study interstate rivalry preceded poverty reduction, further suggesting the direction of the relationship and challenging the objection discussed in the literature review.

Moral Considerations

Before concluding this thesis, a brief but essential note on moral considerations is vital and necessary. Both the quantitative research and the case study support the initial hypothesis that interstate rivalry reduces poverty in non-OECD states. While that is the case, it is important to consider the ramifications before advising this as a favourable policy in battling poverty.

Kang and Valeriano (2014), while not advising interstate rivalry as a viable policy for economic growth, conclude their normative considerations section with the following sentence – "While most wars occur in the process of rivalry (Thompson 2001; Diehl and Goertz, 200), not all rivals go to war and not all wars of rivalry are devastating". This thesis agrees with the general statement, but does not believe the risk of war outweighs the potential benefits. Apart from exploring the direction of the relationship, the Bangladesh case study provides a valuable example of how interstate rivalry can lead to internal instability, regime change, leader assassinations and military insurgencies, amongst other devastating effects. Considering that the rivalry was a low intensity and low severity one, it is still clear that counter-actions from the rival state, even non-military ones like unilaterally withdrawing water from the Farakka Barrage, can have serious effects in further deteriorating the living standards of people in poverty.

Therefore, this study advises against starting external rivalries in order to reduce poverty. The risks of losing lives and further deteriorating the lives of people already in poverty is not worth the potential gains in poverty reduction, which might materialise only after a long process, as shown in the Bangladesh case.

Conclusion

This thesis concludes that interstate rivals stimulate the ruling elite of non-OECD states to engage in a state-building process, which increases military spending and tax revenue, while contributing to economic growth and ultimately resulting in poverty reduction both indirectly and directly. By doing this, it contributes to the limited knowledge of the consequences of rivalry on statebuilding and introduces a brand new consideration on how it effects the populace of a given state from a humanitarian point of view.

Although this thesis contributes a new and original finding to the academic community, as any other new research it still has a long way to go. Both the novelty and the scope of this research are its limitations, but they also provide guidance on how it can be expanded in order to become an integral part of the state-building literature.

The first limitation of this study, which is easier to overcome is the limitation of scope. Due to time constraints and data availability, this dissertation tests the relationship between interstate rivalry, state-building and poverty reduction during a very limited temporal period. Eighteen years between 1981 and 1999 is far too limiting to allow drawing overarching conclusions. The necessary next step in improving on this, would be to update the rivalry datasets to include rivalries after the year 2000, so that the hypotheses can be tested for longer temporal periods, utilising all the available poverty data.

The second limitation is the simplicity of the model. By being a novel research, this thesis limits its theoretical extent purely due to the lack of other literature in the relevant field. For example, Thies (2004) notes that internal rivals have an effect on extraction, but there is no research examining the effects of these types of rivals on economic growth. Thus, while such analysis would have resulted in a more complex and encompassing poverty reduction thesis, it currently cannot be done before the effects of internal rivals on economic growth have been tested and established.

Furthermore, although the statistical data is conclusive and the case study shows that the direction of the relationship is as initially expected, it is difficult to generalise this relationship towards the whole sample just by examining one case study. More case studies are needed in order to fully confirm the hypotheses. In the same time, the theory can benefit from extra studies, as they provide insight into new research. For example, the Bangladesh case study raises two interesting questions. Firstly, considering that the low intensity and severity of the rivalry potentially changed the causal mechanisms involved in state-building and poverty reduction, does that mean that Centeno's (2002: 266-269) conclusion that "limited wars, result in limited states" should also be expanded to include "limited rivalries, result in limited states"? Secondly, it is relevant to consider why it took such a long period of time before the Bangladeshi state became effective at reducing poverty. Considering the rivalry started in 1976, it is surprising that the state was unable to meaningfully reduce poverty before the 1990s. More research can be conducted in establishing whether this delay was due to the inherent properties of state building or the inherent properties of poverty reduction.

Lastly, in terms of policy advice, this thesis would not advice on pursuing a policy of external rivalry genesis with the goal of poverty reduction. On the other hand, being informed that external rivalries do have an effect on poverty in low and middle income states, it is possible that it would motivate further research in understanding why states engage in rivalries in the first place. Is it the case that any form of competitive behaviour would result in the ruling elite taking actions that ultimately reduce poverty? And does the ruling elite use external rivalry as a diversion and solution to problem with poverty, when they do exist?

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Appendices

Appendix A: Sample states

Sub-Saharan Africa (41)	Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
	Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of
	Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
	Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
	Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
	Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
	South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia;
East Asia and Pacific	Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea,
(10)	Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam;
Europe and Central	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Asia (16)	Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Republic of Moldova,
	Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
	Ukraine;
Latin America and the	Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Caribbean (18)	Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama,
	Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, Venezuela;
Middle East and North	Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Marroco, Syrian Arab Republic,
Africa (9)	Tunisia, Republic of Yemen;
South Asia (7)	Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;

Appendix B: Excluded states

OECD States	Chile, Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, Slovak
	Republic, Slovenia and Turkey
Missing Values States	Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
	Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras,
	Colombia, Uruguay
Not Part of the State System	The West Bank and Gaza, Montenegro

Appendix C: Variable Definitions

Variable short name	Variable definition	Source
Aid	Net official development assistance and	World Development
	official aid received (constant 2011 US\$)	Indicators, World Bank
Finance	Domestic credit to private sector (% of	World Development
	GDP)	Indicators, World Bank
GDP	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$)	World Development
		Indicators, World Bank
Age Dependent Ratio	Age dependency ratio (% of working-age	World Development
	population)	Indicators, World Bank
Imports	Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	World Development
		Indicators, World Bank
Exports	Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	World Development
		Indicators, World Bank
Democ	Institutionalized Democracy	Polity IV

Appendix D: Dataset

country	Voor	headcou nt	povGa	povGap 2	populatio	avrgGdpP	avrgAgeDe	avrgFinan	avrgAi d	0000000	democAvr	protoavr	enduringav	strategicRivalryAv
country	year 198	ш	р	2	n	1886.827	р	ce	u	openess	g	g	rg	rg
Albania	1	0.45	0.05	0.01	2.8	5	75.9203	NA	NA	90.3227	0	0	0	1
	198					1901.668				119.048				
Albania	4	0.21	0.03	0.01	3	4	72.2623	NA	NA	6	0	0	0	1
	198	0.11	0.00	0	2.25	1874.445	(0.1050			0.6.0000	0	0	0	
Albania	7 199	0.11	0.02	0	3.25	4	68.4278	NA	NA	96.2392	0	0	0	1
Albania	199	0.84	0.09	0.02	3.45	1812.195 3	64.9525	NA	0.4102	112.324 6	1	0	0	0
Albania	199	0.04	0.09	0.02	5.45	1196.538	04.9525	INA.	37.382	212.534	1	0	0	0
Albania	3	0.78	0.09	0.02	3.42	0	63.0432	NA	2	1	5	1	0	0
	199					1536.389				144.836				
Albania	6	0.2	0.02	0.01	3.34	3	61.9291	3.6979	7.6180	7	5	1	0	0
	199					1737.098			10.361	141.661				
Albania	9	0.54	0.09	0.03	3.32	2	60.4810	3.9228	7	7	6	1	0	0
	198	• • • •		0.00	2 0.4	2627.600		51 0000	0.4400	194.156	0	0	_	
Algeria	1	3.09	0.25	0.03	20.1	2	98.1943	51.0222	0.4103	0	0	0	1	1
Algeria	198 4	2.42	0.16	0.01	22.15	2738.811 4	97.2074	64.5753	0.2449	166.843 4	0	0	1	1
Algena	198	2.42	0.10	0.01	22.13	2733.500	97.2074	04.3733	0.2449	119.037	0	0	1	1
Algeria	7	4.34	0.45	0.06	24.23	6	94.8848	68.5248	0.3005	4	0	0	0	1
8	199					2560.563	,			133.645	-			-
Algeria	0	5.78	0.87	0.19	26.24	8	90.5826	62.4946	0.3830	6	1	0	0	1
	199					2408.803				146.829				
Algeria	3	7.02	1.34	0.4	28.16	4	84.6669	20.0539	0.6571	5	0	0	0	1
	199					2310.516				157.480				
Algeria	6	7.38	1.5	0.5	29.85	6	76.9882	5.6845	0.7165	6	1	0	0	1
Algeria	199 9	7.86	1.62	0.54	31.28	2413.578 4	67.6722	4.6198	0.5818	147.831	1	0	0	1
Algena	199	7.80	1.02	0.54	51.28	4	07.0722	4.0198	0.3616	309.915	1	0	0	1
Armenia	3	27.5	8.48	3.65	3.37	730.7119	58.2777	24.4104	4.0569	8	7	1	0	1
	199								15.727	277.773		-		-
Armenia	6	17.5	4.68	1.83	3.17	663.8806	60.6889	7.9882	9	2	4	1	0	1
	199								10.167	220.950				
Armenia	9	16.76	3.78	1.39	3.09	799.2888	58.5616	7.3897	1	6	4	1	0	1
	199			0.00		1272.569	(2) 0 7 2 2	10.00/5	0 4040	361.084			0	
Azerbaijan	3	11.83	2.77	0.89	7.5	2	62.9732	10.2047	0.6010	5	2	1	0	1
Azerbaijan	199 6	22.45	6.27	2.45	7.76	683.2556	62.8624	1.8953	3.8428	209.826 9	0	1	0	1
Azerbaijan	0 199	22.43	0.27	2.43	1.70	003.2330	02.0024	1.0733	3.0428	9 229.141	0	1	0	1
Azerbaijan	9	11.07	2.3	0.72	7.98	740.7322	60.6331	2.8319	3.7011	0	0	1	0	1
· · Juii		11.07		02			29.0001	2.0017		5	5	1	0	1

Bangladesh	198 1	68.12	21.58	9.2	84.76	245.9496	92.2496	6.0238	6.7493	65.0539		0	0	1	0
Bangladesh	198 4	67.98	21.42	9.02	91.8	249.3405	90.8022	9.5754	6.3462	58.2035		0	0	1	0
Bangladesh	198 7	67.8	21.75	9.1	99.48	259.0974	88.5490	13.4253	6.3656	53.6272		0	0	1	0
C	199													-	
Bangladesh	0 199	68.7	22.82	9.84	107.39	263.7490	85.6268	16.0554	6.4998	56.9893		0	0	1	0
Bangladesh	3 199	62.91	20.34	8.59	114.9	279.2532	81.9168	15.2533	5.2018	61.9454		6	0	1	0
Bangladesh	6 199	60.91	19.93	8.33	122.4	299.2350	77.5240	19.5832	3.7386	80.8529		6	0	1	0
Bangladesh	9 199	60.35	19.61	8.15	129.97	326.4850 2095.690	72.7083	23.1899	2.4839	93.4702 338.390		6	0	1	0
Belarus	3	0.02	0	0	10.24	1	51.7657	NA	NA	6		7	0	0	0
Belarus	199 6	0.83	0.21	0.07	10.16	1592.791 5	51.8857	10.0464	NA	355.868 2		4	0	0	0
Belarus	199 9	0.38	0.08	0.03	10.04	1881.939 1	49.3926	11.2432	NA	369.309 1		0	0	0	0
	198					1987.127				252.699					
Belize	1 198	12.54	6	4.19	0.15	5 1922.757	104.2173	22.2268	9.1952	3 365.222	NA		0	0	0
Belize	4 198	18.72	7.69	5.07	0.16	5 1919.081	99.1198	29.5202	7.3339 10.160	0 346.478	NA		0	0	1
Belize	7 199	17.45	7.53	4.99	0.17	0 2376.437	94.5770	27.1959	9	9 381.024	NA		0	0	1
Belize	0	11.83	5.75	4.05	0.19	6	91.4423	31.9100	7.9234	4	NA		0	0	1
D.1'	199	0.00	1.96	2 5 1	0.2	3026.271	00 57 47	25.0675	EDEEC	318.669	NT A		0	0	1
Belize	3 199	9.09	4.86	3.51	0.2	2 3106.547	90.5747	35.8675	5.2556	6 299.664	NA		0	0	1
Belize	6 199	9.66	4.61	2.99	0.21	7 3158.153	89.1465	35.7861	4.0114	2 340.466	NA		1	0	0
Belize	9 198	12.21	5.52	3.54	0.23	4	84.0263	43.1197	3.7323	0 167.566	NA		1	0	0
Benin	1	54.71	19.42	8.96	3.82	452.8107	95.4389	26.1989	6.5750	2		0	0	0	0
Benin	198 4	56.73	20.55	9.64	4.16	461.1393	96.3432	29.1682	7.1701	153.710 7		0	0	0	0
Benin	198 7	57.3	20.88	9.83	4.55	475.4141	97.1166	28.7315	9.3878	155.810 8		0	0	0	0
Benin	199 0	57.61	21.06	9.94	5	451.4103	97.5176	23.0906	14.029 7	129.907 4		1	0	0	0
2 cmm	199	57.01	21.00	<i></i>	5	.01.1100	27.0170	23.0700	14.298	163.467		-	0	v	0
Benin	3 199	56.51	20.42	9.56	5.58	461.1700	95.9958	12.5243	4 13.993	3 184.718		6	0	0	0
Benin	6	55.25	19.71	9.14	6.18	468.0106	94.1654	8.1196	2	4		6	0	0	0

	100									100 400					
Denta	199	51.42	17.00	7.02	674	405 0925	02 0052	7 (250	0.0005	182.496		<i>(</i>	0	0	0
Benin	9	51.43	17.66	7.93	6.74	495.0825	93.9053	7.6259	8.9285	5		6	0	0	0
D1 /	198	16.07	17.00	0.14	0.40	242 7071	00 (115	NT 4	7.0422	114.826		0	0	0	0
Bhutan	1	46.87	17.28	8.14	0.42	342.7971	82.6115	NA	7.8433	5		0	0	0	0
DI I	198	11.02	1 < 1 7	- 16	0.46	207 2201	05 1000	2 5015	11.091	177.286		0	0	0	0
Bhutan	4	44.93	16.17	7.46	0.46	387.3391	85.1098	2.7915	5	3		0	0	0	0
	198	10.00		6.00	- -				19.584	197.821		<u>_</u>		0	0
Bhutan	7	43.23	15.23	6.89	0.5	466.6372	86.6582	2.5863	8	3		0	0	0	0
	199								15.857	200.687					
Bhutan	0	39.17	13.06	5.63	0.54	596.3455	86.8417	3.7792	9	4		0	0	0	0
	199								27.044	235.833					
Bhutan	3	37.55	12.23	5.16	0.52	675.3470	88.4732	6.2490	2	4		0	0	0	0
	199								25.460	230.509					
Bhutan	6	32.2	9.64	3.76	0.51	802.0098	89.4148	7.6116	4	7		0	0	0	0
	199								18.743	246.354					
Bhutan	9	28.06	7.77	2.82	0.55	913.3081	85.4179	9.6017	7	0		0	0	0	0
	198					1048.853				144.603					
Bolivia	1	2.88	0.27	0.04	5.5	1	85.7022	17.2118	3.2896	6		0	0	0	1
	198									160.298					
Bolivia	4	5.03	0.63	0.11	5.9	910.4981	84.4014	19.5066	3.0271	8		8	0	0	1
	198									132.546					
Bolivia	7	3.99	0.44	0.07	6.33	813.7394	82.7556	15.7552	6.8833	8		9	0	0	1
	199								10.855	134.264					
Bolivia	0	4.03	0.45	0.07	6.79	818.2193	81.1343	20.6252	7	2		9	0	0	1
	199								10.731	145.023					
Bolivia	3	8.51	3.46	2.27	7.29	858.3176	80.7729	36.8210	9	0		9	0	0	1
	199								10.695	148.455					
Bolivia	6	15.2	7.69	5.21	7.81	906.3660	80.7700	50.2917	0	1		9	0	0	1
	199									146.919					
Bolivia	9	23.32	14.08	10.4	8.32	963.1832	79.6830	62.2591	7.9247	1		9	0	0	1
Bosnia and	199														
Herzegovina	3	0.3	0.11	0.05	3.88	NA	42.9531	NA	NA	NA		0	1	0	1
Bosnia and	199								43.375	301.226					
Herzegovina	6	0.3	0.11	0.05	3.49	884.6954	42.0976	NA	6	9		0	1	0	1
Bosnia and	199					2002.484			22.455	348.118					
Herzegovina	9	0.29	0.1	0.04	3.75	4	43.3570	55.3710	1	2	NA		0	0	1
0	198					1829.737			10.395	360.109					
Botswana	1	47.7	21.08	11.76	1.03	6	96.2694	13.0156	6	9		6	0	0	0
Dotomana	198		21.00	111/0	1100	2267.925	,	1010100	0	367.258		0	0	Ū.	Ŭ
Botswana	4	38.84	15.66	8.08	1.15	7	95.8225	12.5242	9.2806	7		6	0	0	0
Dotomana	198	20101	10.00	0.00	1110	2648.915	<i><i>y0</i>10<u>2</u>20</i>	1210212	.2000	358.554		0	U	Ū.	Ŭ
Botswana	7	34.59	13.29	6.58	1.26	3	94.7107	8.2593	8.7320	2		6	1	0	0
Dotswalla	, 199	54.57	13.27	0.50	1.20	3537.276	94.7107	0.2575	0.7520	324.659		0	1	0	0
Botswana	0	29.62	10.41	4.73	1.38	5	91.7423	7.6765	5.2056	324.037 8		7	0	0	0
Dotowalia	199	27.02	10.71	т.15	1.50	3885.945	71.7423	1.0705	5.2050	275.517		,	U	0	0
Botswana	3	30.87	10.9	4.96	1.51	5	86.4124	13.5916	2.9337	8		7	0	0	0
Douswalla	5	50.07	10.7	4.70	1.51	5	00.4124	15.5710	2.7551	0		,	0	v	0

						4064.491								
otswana		25.39	8.75	4.03	1.62		79.9622	11.9912	1.8791		7	0	0	0
otswana		27.5	9.78	4.75	1.72		73.8432	11.9049	1.9407	5	8	0	0	0
											_			
razil	-	13.64	5.45	3.33	124.61	_	73.2273	45.4727	0.0597	55.8778	2	0	0	1
					100.04		-1 1100	17 1000				0	0	
razıl		15.5	6	3.55	133.36		71.1198	45.4888	0.0705	57.7863	2	0	0	1
•1		10.64		2.24	1 4 1 5 5		60 0 (50	41.0510	0.0744	50 1 (70	-	0	0	0
razıl		13.64	5.5	3.36	141.77	-	69.2659	41.8518	0.0764	50.1670		0	0	0
.1		16.00	6.00	2.51	140.65	4147.850	<i></i>	00 20 12	0.0400	46 1224	0	0	0	0
razil		16.23	6.23	3.51	149.65	2079 595	66.9066	89.3943	0.0482	46.1334	8	0	0	0
•1		15.07	671	4.10	157.01		(2 7222	07.0100	0.00/7	55 4426	0	0	0	0
razil		15.87	6./1	4.18	157.01		63.7323	87.9129	0.0067	55.4436	8	0	0	0
		11.01	1.00	2.24	164.20		50 0907	51 4464	0.0204	40 (202	0	0	0	0
razii		11.21	4.80	3.24	164.39		59.9897	51.4464	0.0384	49.0393	8	0	0	0
		0.97	4 1 4	266	172.01		56 1977	24.0254	0.0207	51 0222	0	0	0	0
razii		9.87	4.14	2.00	172.01		30.18/7	54.0554	0.0287		0	0	0	0
ulaania		0.05	0.05	0.05	0 00		51 4601	NTA	NT A		0	0	0	0
ulgaria		0.05	0.05	0.05	8.89		31.4091	NA	INA		0	0	0	0
ulaania		0.05	0.05	0.05	8.06		50 1206	NTA	NT A		0	0	0	0
ulgaria		0.05	0.05	0.05	8.90		30.1290	NA	INA		0	0	0	0
nlaomio		0.05	0.04	0.04	8 07		40 2027	NIA	NIA		0	1	0	0
ulgalla		0.05	0.04	0.04	0.97		49.2937	NA	INA		0	1	0	0
nlaomio		0.06	0.06	0.06	8 72		50.0020	NIA	NIA		2	0	0	0
ulgaria		0.00	0.00	0.06	8.72		30.0939	NA	INA		3	0	0	0
nlaaria		0.19	0.19	0.19	9 17		50 1206	74 7051	NIA		0	0	0	0
ulgana		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.47	-	50.1290	74.7031	INA		0	0	0	0
ulgorio		0.23	0.12	0.12	8 36		40 2742	50 2112	NΛ		8	0	0	0
ulgalla		0.23	0.15	0.12	8.50		49.2742	50.5112	INA		0	0	0	0
ulaaria		10	0.48	0.2	8 21		18 3870	0 750/	NΛ		8	0	0	0
ulgalla		1.9	0.40	0.2	0.21	7	40.3079	2.7394			0	0	0	0
urkina Faso		7/ 93	38 30	23.22	6 99	248 7784	95 1337	14 7054		110.455	2	1	0	1
urkina 1°aso		74.95	30.39	23.22	0.99	240.7704	95.1557	14.7054		116 006	2	1	0	1
urkina Faso		7/ 88	38 33	23 17	7 53	260 3473	98 2273	12 6350			0	1	0	1
urkina 1 aso		74.00	50.55	23.17	1.55	200.5475	70.2275	12.0350	_		0	1	0	1
urkina Faso		71 97	35 47	20.83	8 14	272 0097	100 6103	13 9065			0	1	0	1
urkina i uso		/1.//	55.47	20.05	0.14	272.0077	100.0105	15.7005	-		0	1	0	1
urkina Faso		72 27	35 75	21.06	8 81	275 7573	101 9811	16 0866	10.500	105.547	0	0	0	0
untinu i uso		12.21	55.75	21.00	0.01	210.1010	101.9011	10.0000	17 682	1	0	Ū	0	0
urkina Faso		70.61	34.2	19.82	9 55	282,0053	101 8482	11 0547		91 7953	0	0	0	0
urkina i uso		70.01	54.2	17.02	7.55	202.0055	101.0402	11.0547			0	0	0	0
urkina Faso		70.6	32.42	18.12	10.37	289.8747	100.6546	6.9078			0	0	0	0
unana i uso		70.0	52.72	10.12	10.57	207.0747	100.0540	0.2070			0	0	v	0
urkina Faso		63.87	25.99	13.34	11.28	332,2505	99.1225	10.8929			0	0	0	0
	/	00.07		10.04	11.20	332.2303	,, <u>.</u> J	10.0727	-	/	0	0	v	Ū
	otswana otswana razil razil razil razil razil razil ulgaria ulgaria ulgaria ulgaria ulgaria ulgaria ulgaria uu	199 otswana 9 razil 1 razil 4 razil 4 razil 7 razil 7 razil 199 razil 7 razil 0 razil 199 razil 3 razil 3 razil 3 razil 9 razil 9 ulgaria 198 ulgaria 198 ulgaria 7 ulgaria 199 ulgaria 199 ulgaria 6 199 199 ulgaria 6 199 199 ulgaria 6 199 198 urkina Faso 1 198 199 ulgaria 9 urkina Faso 1 198 198 urkina Faso 7 199 199 urkina Faso 7	otswana 6 25.39 199 27.5 198 1 razil 1 13.64 198 1 razil 4 15.5 198 1 3.64 199 1 3.64 199 1 3.64 razil 7 13.64 199 1 3.64 razil 0 16.23 razil 0 16.23 razil 9 9.87 razil 1 0.05 razil 9 9.87 ulgaria 1 0.05 ulgaria 1 0.05 ulgaria 7 0.05 ulgaria 0 0.06 199 199 0.06 199 0.06 199 ulgaria 9 1.9 ulgaria 9 1.9 urkina Faso 1 74.93 urkina Faso 7 71.97 urki	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 199 27.5 9.78 razil 1 13.64 5.45 198 198 15.5 6 razil 7 13.64 5.5 razil 7 13.64 5.5 razil 0 16.23 6.23 199 7 13.64 5.5 razil 0 16.23 6.23 199 7 13.64 5.5 razil 0 16.23 6.23 199 7 1.21 4.86 199 11.21 4.86 199 10.05 0.05 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 ulgaria 7 0.05 0.04 199 199 0.18 0.18 ulgaria 9 1.9 0.48 199 1.9 0.48 199 ulgaria 9 1.9 0.48 199 1.9	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 199 27.5 9.78 4.75 198 13.64 5.45 3.33 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 199 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 199 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 199 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 199 razil 1 0.05 0.05 0.05 razil 199 11.21 4.86 3.24 199 12 4.05 0.05 0.05 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 0.05 ulgaria 7 0.05 0.04 0.04 199 199 199 199 1121 ulgaria 9 0.18 0.18 0.18 ulgar	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 198 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 198 1 5.5 6 3.55 133.36 198 1 5.5 6 3.55 133.36 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 razil 6 11.21 4.86 3.24 164.39 razil 9 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 0.05 8.89 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 ulgaria 7 0.05 0.04 0.04 8.97 ulgaria 9 0.9 0.13 0.12 8.36 urkina Faso </td <td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 199 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 198 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 razil 3 15.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 razil 6 11.21 4.86 3.24 164.39 9 razil 199 266.448 172.01 7 7 razil 9 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 algaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 2 2437.45 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 2 257.333 ulgaria 1 0.06</td> <td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 4523.191 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 69.2659 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 3978.585 66.9066 razil 199 . 6 11.21 4.86 3.24 164.9 9 99.9897 razil 9 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 199 . 0.05 0.05 8.89 2 51.4691 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 5 50.1296 ulgaria 199 . 0.06<td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4888 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 69.2659 41.8518 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.9066 89.3943 razil 19 </td><td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 198 15.5 6 3.55 1.33.6 7 71.1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 199 173.73 199 173</td><td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 309.374 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 1.907 5 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 7 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 57.878 razil 198 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4588 0.0705 57.863 razil 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.006 89.3943 0.0482 46.133 razil 199 4407.850 6 63.732 87.9129 0.006 5.4436 razil 199 449.633 4417.850 6 0.038 49.639 razil 19 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.0354 0.0287 51.9326<td>of swana 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.991 1.8791 4 7 oswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.904 1.907 5 8 razil 1 1.3.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.472 0.0597 57.863 2 razil 14 15.5 6 3.55 133.66 7 71.1198 45.488 0.0705 57.7863 2 razil 7 1.6.43 5.5 3.51 14.05 6.92.659 41.8518 0.0764 5.1670 7 razil 7 1.6.23 6.23 3.51 14.045 6.9066 89.3943 0.0482 46.1334 8 razil 9 1.5.7 6.12 414 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.035 0.028 5 50.126 NA NA 50.50 <td< td=""><td>orswama 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 7 0.0 orswama 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 44 7 1.949 1.940 1.940 5 8 0 razil 1 1.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 55.8778 2 0 razil 19 7 1.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4147.850 6.9.2659 41.8518 0.0705 55.436 8 0 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1.41 6.90.66 89.3943 0.482 46.1334 8 0 0 razil 1 3 1.8.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 6.172.1 7 5.1376 2.1333 87.9129 0.0667 5.4436 8 0 razil 19 <</td><td>obsevana obsevana obsevana</td></td<></td></td></td>	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 199 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 198 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 razil 3 15.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 razil 6 11.21 4.86 3.24 164.39 9 razil 199 266.448 172.01 7 7 razil 9 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 algaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 2 2437.45 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 2 257.333 ulgaria 1 0.06	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 4523.191 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 69.2659 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 3978.585 66.9066 razil 199 . 6 11.21 4.86 3.24 164.9 9 99.9897 razil 9 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 199 . 0.05 0.05 8.89 2 51.4691 ulgaria 1 0.05 0.05 8.96 5 50.1296 ulgaria 199 . 0.06 <td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4888 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 69.2659 41.8518 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.9066 89.3943 razil 19 </td> <td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 198 15.5 6 3.55 1.33.6 7 71.1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 199 173.73 199 173</td> <td>otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 309.374 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 1.907 5 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 7 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 57.878 razil 198 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4588 0.0705 57.863 razil 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.006 89.3943 0.0482 46.133 razil 199 4407.850 6 63.732 87.9129 0.006 5.4436 razil 199 449.633 4417.850 6 0.038 49.639 razil 19 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.0354 0.0287 51.9326<td>of swana 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.991 1.8791 4 7 oswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.904 1.907 5 8 razil 1 1.3.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.472 0.0597 57.863 2 razil 14 15.5 6 3.55 133.66 7 71.1198 45.488 0.0705 57.7863 2 razil 7 1.6.43 5.5 3.51 14.05 6.92.659 41.8518 0.0764 5.1670 7 razil 7 1.6.23 6.23 3.51 14.045 6.9066 89.3943 0.0482 46.1334 8 razil 9 1.5.7 6.12 414 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.035 0.028 5 50.126 NA NA 50.50 <td< td=""><td>orswama 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 7 0.0 orswama 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 44 7 1.949 1.940 1.940 5 8 0 razil 1 1.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 55.8778 2 0 razil 19 7 1.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4147.850 6.9.2659 41.8518 0.0705 55.436 8 0 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1.41 6.90.66 89.3943 0.482 46.1334 8 0 0 razil 1 3 1.8.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 6.172.1 7 5.1376 2.1333 87.9129 0.0667 5.4436 8 0 razil 19 <</td><td>obsevana obsevana obsevana</td></td<></td></td>	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 razil 4 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4888 razil 7 13.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4 69.2659 41.8518 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.9066 89.3943 razil 19	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 407 152.191 198 15.5 6 3.55 1.33.6 7 71.1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 198 173.61.97 1198 45.4888 0.0705 199 173.73 199 173	otswana 6 25.39 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 309.374 otswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.9049 1.907 5 razil 1 13.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 7 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 57.878 razil 198 15.5 6 3.55 133.36 7 71.1198 45.4588 0.0705 57.863 razil 199 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1 66.006 89.3943 0.0482 46.133 razil 199 4407.850 6 63.732 87.9129 0.006 5.4436 razil 199 449.633 4417.850 6 0.038 49.639 razil 19 9.87 4.14 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.0354 0.0287 51.9326 <td>of swana 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.991 1.8791 4 7 oswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.904 1.907 5 8 razil 1 1.3.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.472 0.0597 57.863 2 razil 14 15.5 6 3.55 133.66 7 71.1198 45.488 0.0705 57.7863 2 razil 7 1.6.43 5.5 3.51 14.05 6.92.659 41.8518 0.0764 5.1670 7 razil 7 1.6.23 6.23 3.51 14.045 6.9066 89.3943 0.0482 46.1334 8 razil 9 1.5.7 6.12 414 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.035 0.028 5 50.126 NA NA 50.50 <td< td=""><td>orswama 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 7 0.0 orswama 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 44 7 1.949 1.940 1.940 5 8 0 razil 1 1.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 55.8778 2 0 razil 19 7 1.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4147.850 6.9.2659 41.8518 0.0705 55.436 8 0 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1.41 6.90.66 89.3943 0.482 46.1334 8 0 0 razil 1 3 1.8.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 6.172.1 7 5.1376 2.1333 87.9129 0.0667 5.4436 8 0 razil 19 <</td><td>obsevana obsevana obsevana</td></td<></td>	of swana 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.991 1.8791 4 7 oswana 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 4 73.8432 11.904 1.907 5 8 razil 1 1.3.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.472 0.0597 57.863 2 razil 14 15.5 6 3.55 133.66 7 71.1198 45.488 0.0705 57.7863 2 razil 7 1.6.43 5.5 3.51 14.05 6.92.659 41.8518 0.0764 5.1670 7 razil 7 1.6.23 6.23 3.51 14.045 6.9066 89.3943 0.0482 46.1334 8 razil 9 1.5.7 6.12 414 2.66 172.01 7 56.1877 34.035 0.028 5 50.126 NA NA 50.50 <td< td=""><td>orswama 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 7 0.0 orswama 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 44 7 1.949 1.940 1.940 5 8 0 razil 1 1.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 55.8778 2 0 razil 19 7 1.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4147.850 6.9.2659 41.8518 0.0705 55.436 8 0 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1.41 6.90.66 89.3943 0.482 46.1334 8 0 0 razil 1 3 1.8.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 6.172.1 7 5.1376 2.1333 87.9129 0.0667 5.4436 8 0 razil 19 <</td><td>obsevana obsevana obsevana</td></td<>	orswama 6 25.9 8.75 4.03 1.62 3 79.9622 11.9912 1.8791 4 7 0.0 orswama 9 27.5 9.78 4.75 1.72 44 7 1.949 1.940 1.940 5 8 0 razil 1 1.64 5.45 3.33 124.61 2 73.2273 45.4727 0.0597 55.8778 2 0 razil 19 7 1.64 5.5 3.36 141.77 4147.850 6.9.2659 41.8518 0.0705 55.436 8 0 razil 0 16.23 6.23 3.51 149.65 1.41 6.90.66 89.3943 0.482 46.1334 8 0 0 razil 1 3 1.8.87 6.71 4.18 157.01 7 6.172.1 7 5.1376 2.1333 87.9129 0.0667 5.4436 8 0 razil 19 <	obsevana obsevana

Dumundi	198 1	86.12	42.52	24.65	4.24	198.7130	91.1125	8.0264	12.427 0	100.167 3		0	0	0	0
Burundi	198	80.12	42.32	24.03	4.24	198./130	91.1125	8.0204	13.140	د 105.969		0	0	0	0
Burundi	4	88	45.1	26.8	4.62	200.5903	93.3590	6.4196	4	1		0	0	0	0
Durundi	198 7	84.77	40.83	23.28	5.11	214.8401	97.4882	4.1232	15.381 3	101.335 9		0	0	0	0
Burundi	199	04.77	40.85	25.20	5.11	214.0401	97.4002	4.1252	20.412	9 106.881		0	0	0	0
Burundi	0	84.64	40.68	23.16	5.61	218.7727	101.8623	7.1921	5	4		0	0	0	0
D	199	05 40	40.95	25.2	6	215 (275	106 1151	11 0226	24.818	113.191		0	0	0	0
Burundi	3 199	85.48	42.85	25.3	6	215.6375	106.1151	11.8336	7 25.339	7 100.531		0	0	0	0
Burundi	6	88.82	49.8	32.27	6.29	174.1967	109.2734	13.7451	5	9		0	1	0	0
	199											_			
Burundi	9 198	86.17	46.48	29.64	6.55	155.4412	110.1009	13.5990	7.6799	75.2552		1	1	0	0
Cambodia	198	82.51	38.33	20.85	6.76	NA	77.9151	NA	NA	NA	NA		0	1	1
	198														
Cambodia	4	76.09	31.61	15.8	7.5	NA	80.0994	NA	NA	NA	NA		0	1	1
Cambodia	198 7	68.93	25.65	11.77	8.27	NA	84.5529	NA	NA	NA	NA		0	1	0
Camboula	199	00.95	25.05	11.//	0.27	INA	04.3329	INA	INA	11A	INA		0	1	0
Cambodia	0	62.57	21.26	9.07	9.06	NA	88.3570	NA	NA	NA		1	0	1	0
Country 1's	199	47.90	12.5	5.04	10.00	241 7921	05 0001	2 2720	NT A	40 7042		2	0	1	0
Cambodia	3 199	47.89	13.5	5.04	10.08	241.7821	95.9081	2.3720	NA 14.236	48.7243 211.396		2	0	1	0
Cambodia	6	41.8	10.93	3.82	11.09	262.1787	99.0858	3.8461	9	3		3	0	1	0
	199									248.731					
Cambodia	9	39.54	10.18	3.5	11.96	289.6865	88.8536	5.8559	9.6536	0		2	0	1	0
Cameroon	198 1	29.45	7.19	2.29	9.2	1034.680 8	93.6317	28.8038	4.2181	154.618 3		0	0	0	1
	198	27110		2.22	2.2	1200.624	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	2010020		186.298		0	Ū.	Ŭ	•
Cameroon	4	23.13	5.4	1.69	10.07	3	95.9500	29.1219	2.4500	6		0	1	0	1
Cameroon	198 7	21.69	4.88	1.48	11.03	1317.587 3	97.8496	24.2552	1.8898	148.350 7		0	1	0	1
Cameroon	199	21.09	4.00	1.40	11.05	1082.610	97.0490	24.2332	1.0070	107.967		0	1	0	1
Cameroon	0	35.11	9.63	3.42	12.07	2	99.0039	25.2812	3.5072	5		0	1	0	1
9	199	45.05	1.5		10.17	0.66.0.600	00 2005	1 < 1001	5 1050	105.246				0	
Cameroon	3 199	45.87	15	6.26	13.17	866.3680	99.3005	16.4031	5.1079	5 121.166		1	1	0	1
Cameroon	6	47.43	15.86	6.75	14.32	792.2502	98.4874	8.4428	6.1004	0		1	1	0	1
	199									117.591					
Cameroon	9	31.95	9.03	3.44	15.51	842.1683	96.4405	7.2455	5.0556	4		1	1	0	1
Cape Verde	198 1	16.72	4.34	1.53	0.3	515.4746	104.7707	12.8918	39.657 9	176.215 0		2	0	0	0
Supe , orde	198	10.72	1.5 1	1.00	0.5	212.1710	101.7707	12.0710	42.653	305.026		-		Ŭ	Ŭ
Cape Verde	4	19.01	5.23	1.95	0.32	566.8595	100.8611	14.1646	5	1		2	0	0	0

	198								46.475	278.706				
Cape Verde	7	20.03	5.64	2.15	0.34	636.6214	98.7389	19.4042	6	4	2	0	0	0
	199								31.931	243.591				
Cape Verde	0	19.82	5.55	2.1	0.35	704.2558	100.9263	17.5101	0	0	2	0	0	0
	199								29.221	225.200				
Cape Verde	3	22.66	6.74	2.7	0.38	757.4970	101.1122	21.6230	6	3	8	0	0	0
	199					1036.341			25.582	224.569				
Cape Verde	6	21.82	6.38	2.51	0.41	1	98.2780	25.7467	0	0	8	0	0	0
a w 1	199	a 1 0 a	< 2 0	0.51	0.42	1358.381	00.0407	25.2420	23.697	248.829	0	0	0	0
Cape Verde	9	21.82	6.38	2.51	0.43	2	93.3687	35.2428	8	8	8	0	0	0
Central African	198	70 70	5166	39.07	2.24	440 5504	96 4401	12.4513	13.418 7	182.311 0	0	0	0	0
Republic Central African	1 198	78.28	51.66	39.07	2.34	440.5594	86.4401	12.4313	15.763	176.063	0	0	0	0
Republic	4	78.47	51.87	39.27	2.56	412.8210	86.2686	11.8716	13.703	2	0	0	0	0
Central African	4 198	/0.4/	51.07	39.27	2.30	412.6210	00.2000	11.8/10	13.193	146.848	0	0	0	0
Republic	7	79.57	53.12	40.46	2.74	412.6038	87.2037	8.4678	13.193	140.848	0	0	0	0
Central African	199	19.51	55.12	40.40	2.74	412.0038	87.2037	8.4078	16.570	132.508	0	0	0	0
Republic	0	80.62	54.33	41.62	2.91	388.1042	89.3892	7.3782	10.570	152.508 7	0	0	0	0
Central African	199	00.02	54.55	41.02	2.71	500.1042	07.3072	1.5762	13.030	126.927	0	0	0	0
Republic	3	82.39	56.27	43.53	3.13	343.2102	89.4492	5.2266	8	0	2	0	0	0
Central African	199	02.57	50.27	45.55	5.15	545.2102	07.4472	5.2200	17.533	145.978	2	0	0	0
Republic	6	76.26	47.73	35.17	3.35	339.4956	87.9802	4.2085	2	3	5	0	0	0
Central African	199	70.20	11.15	55.17	5.55	337.1750	07.9002	1.2005	11.475	150.080	5	0	Ŭ	0
Republic	9	67.6	37.24	25.3	3.57	347.8120	86.7712	4.6091	6	4	5	0	0	0
	198								-	135.988	-		Ť	-
Chad	1	78.87	39.15	23.36	4.61	332.6250	94.4133	16.0532	6.2154	6	0	1	0	1
	198								10.168	102.088				
Chad	4	72.48	33.36	18.93	4.95	358.4012	97.4809	10.8688	2	0	0	1	0	1
	198								16.689	143.885				
Chad	7	70.36	31.65	17.68	5.41	412.7230	100.1699	18.4968	0	3	0	1	0	1
	199								17.795	131.700				
Chad	0	67.68	29.62	16.23	5.95	428.0300	102.2560	6.6492	0	5	0	1	0	1
	199								14.084	114.901				
Chad	3	72.95	33.75	19.21	6.54	416.1242	104.0393	5.6903	6	4	0	1	0	1
	199								17.648	153.294				
Chad	6	71.39	32.47	18.27	7.22	385.5327	105.6022	3.7062	5	9	0	0	0	0
	199								12.463	147.880				
Chad	9	70.81	32.01	17.94	8	391.2937	106.8839	3.3756	9	0	1	1	0	0
CT 1 1	198	o / o -	a a 4 a	•			<0.01 0 -		0.00.57		0	0		
China*	1	84.27	39.45	21.9	993.91	218.8339	68.0137	53.2790	0.0965	NA	0	0	1	1
CI :	198	60.40	05.54	10.14	1 02 6 02	272 5055	<i>c</i> 1 11 11	50 5000	0.0057	46.0001	0	0		
China*	4	69.43	25.56	12.16	1,036.83	273.6065	61.1141	58.7320	0.2857	46.9281	0	0	1	1
Chine *	198	52.05	10.40	0 <1	1 00 4 02	270 71 62	56 40 40	74 1001	0 20 42	(0.071)	0	0	1	1
China*	7	53.95	18.48	8.61	1,084.03	370.7163	56.4249	74.1031	0.3943	68.9716	0	0	1	1
China*	199 0	60.73	20.96	9.48	1,135.19	452.0673	54.3742	79.9305	0.5966	72.6857	0	0	1	1
Ciiiia*	U	00.75	20.90	9.48	1,155.19	432.0073	34.3742	19.9305	0.3900	12.0831	U	0	1	1

	100													
China*	199 3 199	54.85	18.08	7.96	1,178.44	564.7818	53.7878	91.4491	0.6486	90.7898 118.084	0	0	1	1
China*	6 199	37.39	11.07	4.44	1,217.55	777.3219	53.0893	87.2949	0.4533	6 113.372	0	1	1	1
China*	9 198	36	11.21	4.69	1,252.73	978.8004	50.7237	105.0974	0.2277 32.172	121.613	0	0	1	1
Comoros	1 198	40.62	17.52	9.87	0.32	666.9355	93.4305	NA	1 36.399	0 207.590	0	0	0	0
Comoros	4 198	38.14	16.12	8.94	0.35	701.6232	95.1558	13.5379	3 32.596	5 182.734	0	0	0	0
Comoros	7 199	39.04	16.62	9.27	0.38	702.4239	95.8020	10.4415	0 21.663	7 165.326	0	0	0	0
Comoros	0 199	40.29	17.34	9.75	0.41	676.1053	94.3417	14.6142	8 20.581	1 175.791	2	0	0	0
Comoros	3 199	40.95	17.72	10	0.44	648.3890	91.2054	16.1713	6 18.470	8 191.356	5	0	0	0
Comoros	6 199	45.19	20.25	11.71	0.48	610.1170	87.0400	12.7974	3 14.082	1 156.403	3	0	0	0
Comoros	9 198	45.36	20.35	11.78	0.52	599.5790	82.6838	12.2276	0	0	4	0	0	0
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1 198	48.34	18.53	9.13	27.06	614.1333	90.4663	2.7544	3.0189	86.8035 111.761	0	0	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	4 198	49.07	18.96	9.4	29.24	594.3663	91.3058	1.9992	3.1508	6 156.731	0	0	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	7 199	49.32	19.1	9.5	31.74	597.0496	92.2849	2.2094	6.4523	0 162.357	0	0	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0 199	58.11	24.57	13.1	34.91	550.6293	93.4432	2.0617	8.6543	8	0	0	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	3 199	78.45	41.22	25.7	39.26	382.8834	95.1453	0.9545	3.6832	99.1445 155.041	0	1	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	6 199	82.95	46.28	30.06	43.12	287.4195	96.6446	1.0600	3.9471	5 137.607	0	1	1	1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	9 198	87.71	52.75	36	45.89	245.6390 1514.441	97.1497	NA	2.6851	0 350.298	0	1	1	0
Congo, Rep.	1 198	54.05	22.78	12.08	1.85	9 2129.667	94.2142	16.9348	6.1104	3 340.735	0	0	1	0
Congo, Rep.	4 198	42.18	15.58	7.39	2.02	4 1967.113	93.8413	18.7742	4.9327	3 286.651	0	0	1	0
Congo, Rep.	7 199	50.1	20.26	10.38	2.2	1 1838.072	92.6007	26.4921	4.9993	0 235.213	0	0	1	0
Congo, Rep.	0 199	51.43	21.09	10.94	2.38	8 1790.102	90.8213	15.5555	6.1172	7 201.001	0	0	1	0
Congo, Rep.	3 199	53.3	22.29	11.74	2.58	2 1628.528	88.4781	13.4796	6.0606 21.186	4 389.456	5	0	1	0
Congo, Rep.	6	56	24.08	12.98	2.8	2	86.0658	7.7859	8	4	6	1	1	0

<i>a</i>	199			1100	2.04	1574.804		0.400 .	0.00	416.054		0	<u>^</u>	
Congo, Rep.	9 198	59.74	26.7	14.83	3.04	6 3229.347	84.1432	9.4995	9.6970	0 218.857	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica	198	11.4	4.3	2.2	2.41	3229.347 7	73.5021	26.9527	1.7125	218.857	10	1	0	1
Costa Rica	198	11.4	4.5	2.2	2.41	2825.608	75.5021	20.9527	1.7125	206.063	10	1	0	1
Costa Rica	4	7.86	3.12	1.7	2.63	4	70.0763	17.1729	5.1964	0	10	1	0	1
	198					2933.718				167.232				
Costa Rica	7	7.25	3.83	2.8	2.85	2	69.0149	14.8964	4.6780	4	10	1	0	1
	199					3136.681				191.783				
Costa Rica	0	8.45	4.78	3.71	3.08	8	69.0474	12.7411	3.3154	0	10	1	0	1
Conto Dino	199 3	6.90	4 15	2.26	2 21	3383.934 1	69 0555	12.5841	1.7495	223.755 7	10	1	0	1
Costa Rica	5 199	6.89	4.15	3.36	3.31	3656.624	68.0555	12.3841	1.7495	236.715	10	1	0	1
Costa Rica	6	7.02	3.78	2.9	3.57	0 3030.024	65.4584	12.6279	0.2886	230.713	10	1	0	0
Costa Rica	199	7.02	5.70	2.)	5.57	3957.857	05.4504	12.027)	0.2000	280.540	10	1	0	0
Costa Rica	9	5.43	2.6	1.94	3.84	7	61.5048	17.7682	0.0028	200.540	10	1	0	0
	198					1617.485				225.905		-	Ť	-
Côte d'Ivoire	1	5.01	1.38	0.65	8.63	4	92.1925	40.9781	1.8549	4	0	0	0	0
	198					1354.414				225.533				
Côte d'Ivoire	4	8.18	2.27	1.02	9.77	0	92.1559	39.9302	2.1347	4	0	0	0	0
	198					1243.832				211.900				
Côte d'Ivoire	7	8.68	1.35	0.31	10.93	6	91.4925	35.2845	2.1796	1	0	0	0	0
CA. 117 1	199	10.04	. = 2			1159.788				178.268	0	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	0	18.26	4.73	1.72	12.12	5	90.2103	36.5669	5.5773	3	0	0	0	0
	199	26 17	0.16	2 20	12.20	1049.578	07 5257	22 2410	7 4092	172.371	0	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	3 199	26.47	8.16	3.39	13.38	8 1032.596	87.5357	32.2419	7.4982 13.941	4 219.558	0	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	6	23.39	6.19	2.31	14.63	1032.390	84.5367	17.9176	13.941	219.558	0	0	0	0
	199	23.39	0.19	2.31	14.05	1120.854	04.5507	17.9170	4	219.506	0	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	9	28.96	8.59	3.48	15.8	6	82.4426	15.6876	5.3037	217.500	0	0	0	0
	199													
Croatia	3	0.02	0.02	0.02	4.64	NA	46.2869	NA	NA	NA	1	1	0	1
	199					6934.091				131.494				
Croatia	6	0.01	0.01	0.01	4.49	6	46.9404	25.3774	0.4015	9	0	1	0	1
~ .	199					7735.989				208.277				
Croatia	9	0.19	0.19	0.19	4.55	5	47.9504	32.7625	0.1790	4	0	1	0	1
Diihanti	198 1	24.2	7.26	3.12	0.38	NA	95.4630	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	1 198	24.2	7.26	3.12	0.38	NA	95.4630	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	4	20.55	5.9	2.47	0.41	NA	91.9718	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Djibbuu	198	20.55	5.7	2.47	0.41	1171)1.)/10	1111	11/1	1171	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	7	24.24	7.27	3.13	0.49	NA	90.2736	55.3955	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
_ j	199					1242.474	,			132.272	-	÷	Ť	
Djibouti	0	24.86	7.51	3.24	0.59	2	90.7421	50.3651	NA	1	0	0	0	0
	199					1093.457			24.067	361.441				
Djibouti	3	24.37	7.32	3.15	0.64	9	89.1499	41.3076	8	8	0	0	0	0

	199								21.586	277.225					
Djibouti	6	23.76	7.09	3.04	0.68	941.8855	86.0113	41.8347	4	1		0	1	0	0
	199								15.237	268.727					
Djibouti	9	22.43	6.59	2.8	0.71	858.4741	82.8907	39.3641	1	5		1	1	0	0
	198					2128.753				141.576					
Dominican Republic	1	16.49	6.01	3.11	5.96	3	83.9519	31.2194	1.6153	9	NA		0	0	0
	198					2205.719				127.348					
Dominican Republic	4	15.9	5.76	2.97	6.38	1	79.9956	34.0788	1.6115	5	NA		0	0	0
	198					2187.751				186.067					
Dominican Republic	7	14.28	4.62	2.17	6.81	0	76.8672	30.2255	2.7583	6	NA		1	0	0
	199					2286.128				230.280					
Dominican Republic	0	12.37	3.34	1.29	7.25	2	74.3723	29.0623	2.0301	9	NA		1	0	0
	199					2325.086				243.032					
Dominican Republic	3	4.5	1.41	0.77	7.69	4	72.5520	17.8909	0.4376	5	NA		1	0	0
	199					2580.138				226.709					
Dominican Republic	6	4.69	1.72	1.06	8.12	5	70.8197	19.5333	0.5935	4	NA		0	0	0
	199					3018.800				235.687					
Dominican Republic	9	4.98	1.75	1.01	8.53	3	68.5146	23.9994	0.6251	8	NA		0	0	0
	198					2638.245				101.019					
Ecuador	1	12.3	4.8	2.52	8.11	2	84.8454	15.3534	0.3446	9		9	0	1	1
	198					2600.315									
Ecuador	4	13.36	5.3	2.82	8.74	4	81.2054	18.3921	0.4968	96.3473		9	0	1	1
	198					2606.090				106.558					
Ecuador	7	12.86	5.06	2.68	9.42	1	77.7597	16.1369	1.2048	6		8	0	1	1
	199					2638.235				132.370					
Ecuador	0	14.34	6.31	3.86	10.12	4	74.8090	9.6089	1.2813	2		9	0	1	1
	199					2692.606				133.174					
Ecuador	3	14.8	7.14	4.78	10.84	8	72.0162	11.4112	1.3948	4		9	0	1	1
	199					2738.030				133.904					
Ecuador	6	12.88	5.96	3.93	11.56	8	69.4209	21.6224	0.9813	7		9	0	1	1
	199					2750.841				137.613					
Ecuador	9	16.19	7.31	4.49	12.29	5	67.1336	22.7879	0.6755	5		9	0	1	1
	198									233.621					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1	13.71	2.31	0.6	45.95	635.1542	81.2174	18.8439	7.2207	0		0	1	1	1
	198									189.042					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	4	10.11	1.56	0.39	49.19	738.2950	80.1481	28.0702	5.9598	1		0	1	1	1
	198									128.606					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	7	8.01	1.17	0.29	52.78	801.8371	79.7456	31.0263	5.0671	8		0	0	1	1
	199									155.485					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0	4.46	0.6	0.14	56.34	851.4563	79.7433	26.7066	7.6432	3		0	0	1	1
	199									178.849					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	3	3.84	0.51	0.13	59.31	891.7251	78.2159	22.7813	9.7322	0		0	1	0	1
	199									147.822					
Egypt, Arab Rep.	6	2.46	0.34	0.09	62.12	958.2692	75.2362	32.3906	3.9299	2		0	1	0	1
	199		0.21	0.12	. . .	1059.735	51 (200	100000		124.027		0		6	
Egypt, Arab Rep.	9	2.18	0.36	0.12	65.1	3	71.6398	46.0835	2.2004	4		0	1	0	1

	198					2188.711				201.785				
El Salvador	1	13.64	9.28	9.28	4.73	1762.620	96.2877	32.9195	3.1686	7	2	0	1	1
El Salvador	198 4	15.02	9.76	9.75	4.94	1762.620	94.8738	32.7681	7.5537	155.936 2	5	0	1	1
Li Salvadoi	198	15.02	9.70	9.15	4.94	1744.988	94.0750	52.7081	1.3331	151.019	5	0	1	1
El Salvador	7	15.33	9.86	9.86	5.13	9	91.9408	31.9874	9.8461	3	6	0	1	1
	199					1778.221				124.808				
El Salvador	0	14.79	8.88	7.67	5.34	9	87.5568	25.2630	9.3174	4	6	0	1	1
	199					1962.057				149.721				
El Salvador	3	13.43	6.53	4.56	5.6	4	83.3307	19.6439	6.1470	2	7	0	1	1
	199			• • •		2246.069	00.0101			169.576	-		0	0
El Salvador	6	11.54	4.71	2.85	5.81	5	80.3194	34.2332	3.3044	197.526	7	0	0	0
El Calvadan	199 9	13.73	7 00	5.94	5.93	2442.211	79.0051	41 0771	1 9564	187.536 5	7	0	0	0
El Salvador	9 198	15.75	7.82	5.94	5.95	0	78.9951	41.9771	1.8564	3	/	0	0	0
Ethiopia	198	69.12	24.23	10.94	36.09	158.2671	93.3850	10.0139	3.3459	19.4136	0	0	1	1
Lunopia	198	07.12	24.23	10.74	50.07	150.2071	75.5650	10.0157	5.5457	17.4150	0	0	1	1
Ethiopia	4	66.35	23.12	10.43	39.49	157.3083	95.4199	9.7069	3.6640	58.0310	0	0	1	1
1	198													
Ethiopia	7	61.52	20.83	9.25	43.48	142.3600	96.9443	10.5420	6.6600	53.6118	0	0	1	1
	199													
Ethiopia	0	62.09	21.69	9.87	48.04	146.5100	97.6202	12.6368	7.8747	48.6215	0	0	1	1
	199								10.558					
Ethiopia	3	67.33	25.42	12.24	53.36	122.4830	98.2303	10.0194	0	43.9175	1	0	1	1
Ethionic	199	5666	18.57	8.15	58.82	120 1905	09 7106	10 1269	12.215 2	71 5925	2	0	1	1
Ethiopia	6 199	56.66	18.57	8.15	38.82	130.1895	98.7106	10.4268	2	71.5835 100.869	3	0	1	1
Ethiopia	9	54.57	15.74	6.25	64.16	134.3505	98.7541	21.0814	7.9117	5	3	0	0	1
Lunopia	198	54.57	15.74	0.25	04.10	2977.888	J0.7541	21.0014	/./11/	296.927	5	0	0	1
Fiji	1	75.4	41.02	26.96	0.65	0	71.9194	20.3227	3.1219	7	9	0	0	0
5	198					2695.090				272.238				
Fiji	4	69.4	35.88	22.87	0.7	3	71.8856	23.8870	2.8956	6	9	0	0	0
	198					2624.439				257.598				
Fiji	7	63.54	31.44	19.5	0.72	3	71.8271	26.2101	3.0369	4	6	0	0	0
T ¹¹¹	199	50.05	20.10	17 11	0.72	2745.583	71.0422	20 2025	4 1 4 2 0	357.967	2	0	0	0
Fiji	0 199	58.85	28.18	17.11	0.73	9 2894.923	71.0433	30.3025	4.1439	1 336.474	2	0	0	0
Fiji	3	49.51	22.3	12.98	0.75	2094.923	68.5185	38.9982	3.8284	550.474	6	0	0	0
1 iji	199	49.51	22.3	12.90	0.75	3121.724	08.5185	30.9902	5.8284	355.705	0	0	0	0
Fiji	6	40.41	17.14	9.51	0.78	6	65.6450	39.8569	2.2870	3	6	0	0	0
5	199					3193.805				361.031				
Fiji	9	36.57	15.08	8.18	0.81	0	64.2441	29.6273	2.1060	4	6	0	0	0
	198					7826.022				296.298				
Gabon	1	2.45	0.48	0.17	0.74	8	82.6858	17.0661	1.3450	4	0	0	0	0
<u>.</u>	198			0.4.6	0.5	7789.867		1 4 100-		305.422	0		0	<i>.</i>
Gabon	4	2.27	0.44	0.16	0.8	5	85.5425	16.4899	2.0589	1	0	0	0	0

	198					7052.010				297.663				
Gabon	7	7.09	1.49	0.5	0.87	2	87.8240	26.1602	2.3867	5	0	0	0	0
Calari	199	2.05	0.75	0.26	0.05	6890.791	90 5121	15 0400	2.0246	242.413	0	0	0	0
Gabon	0	3.85	0.75	0.26	0.95	2	89.5131	15.0498	2.9246	1	0	0	0	0
Calari	199	4.05	0.0	0.27	1.02	7110.649	00 5204	11.0645	2 24 40	243.746	0	0	0	0
Gabon	3	4.05	0.8	0.27	1.03	4	90.5204	11.9645	2.3449	8	0	0	0	0
Cahan	199	3.43	0.67	0.23	1.11	7234.045 0	90.3503	7.0890	3.6005	290.732	0	0	0	0
Gabon	6 199	3.43	0.67	0.25	1.11	7322.090	90.5505	7.0890	5.0005	3 292.242	0	0	0	0
Gabon	199 9	4.65	0.92	0.31	1.2	7322.090 6	88.5726	9.8079	1.0427	292.242 5	0	0	0	0
Gaboli	198	4.05	0.92	0.51	1.2	0	88.3720	9.8079	23.442	315.267	0	0	0	0
Gambia, The	198	62.24	31.09	19.01	0.63	447.0616	92.4772	23.1359	23.442	515.207 6	8	0	0	0
Gambia, The	198	02.24	51.07	17.01	0.05	++7.0010	72.4772	23.1357	23.743	332.857	0	0	0	0
Gambia, The	4	61.59	30.59	18.62	0.7	450.2156	96.1283	23.6261	23.743	2	7	0	0	0
Gambia, The	198	01.57	50.57	10.02	0.7	450.2150	70.1205	23.0201	35.905	309.208	1	0	0	0
Gambia, The	7	64.78	33.13	20.61	0.8	430.1188	96.9586	17.1330	8	9	7	0	0	0
Guillolu, The	199	01.70	55.15	20.01	0.0	120.1100	20.2200	17.1550	33.625	360.641	,	0	0	0
Gambia, The	0	64.59	32.97	20.49	0.92	424.1091	95.7189	11.2784	1	8	7	0	0	0
	199			,					14.010	196.176		-	-	-
Gambia, The	3	64.64	33.02	20.52	1.01	423.4287	96.3351	4.7937	7	0	8	0	0	0
	199									160.147				
Gambia, The	6	66.6	34.64	21.82	1.1	407.0353	97.2101	4.9454	6.5618	3	0	0	0	0
	199									154.601				
Gambia, The	9	58.37	28.64	17.37	1.19	417.2937	95.6869	5.9203	4.7168	8	0	0	0	0
	199					1259.846				279.436				
Georgia	3	4.73	0.83	0.2	4.91	8	52.8134	NA	1.5014	8	5	1	0	0
	199									280.428				
Georgia	6	4.72	0.83	0.2	4.62	737.6400	54.6406	4.7089	8.5113	1	6	1	0	0
	199									168.471				
Georgia	9	17.19	5.86	3.05	4.45	956.5995	53.8476	6.0579	6.8082	3	6	1	0	0
	198													
Ghana	1	47.02	16.3	7.64	11.12	406.1320	93.4648	2.2863	3.9778	50.0940	4	0	1	1
	198													
Ghana	4	56.24	20.85	10.28	12.31	335.1755	91.8341	1.8513	3.6749	36.6799	0	0	1	1
C1	198		1 - 00	0.44	10.10		00.000 -			106.803	0	0		
Ghana	7	50.59	17.99	8.61	13.48	349.5516	89.8997	3.2969	6.3613	6	0	0	1	1
CI	199	50.46	17.00	0.44	14.62	272 4717	07.0400	4 6075	11.662	126.059	0	0	1	1
Ghana	0	50.46	17.88	8.44	14.63	372.4717	87.8608	4.6375	3	6	0	0	1	1
Classe	199	49.10	17.20	0.00	15.01	200 7020	86.000	4 4701	11.317	145.151	1	0	1	1
Ghana	3	48.19	17.39	8.29	15.91	390.7030	86.0226	4.4791	9	101 (10	1	0	1	1
Chana	199	43.15	15.79	7.64	17 17	106 2207	84.0720	5 4420	10.017 3	191.649 2	2	0	0	1
Ghana	6 199	43.15	15.79	/.04	17.17	406.2207	84.0729	5.4429	3	247.706	2	0	0	1
Ghana	199 9	37.86	13.76	6.6	18.38	431.0796	81.5802	10.0387	8.3070	247.706 5	3	0	0	0
Gilalla	198	57.00	15.70	0.0	10.30	431.0790 2029.787	01.5002	10.0387	0.5070	134.996	5	U	U	0
Guatemala	198	33.84	14.61	8.17	7.18	2029.787	93.6257	16.0034	0.9245	134.990	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	1	55.04	17.01	0.17	/.10	5	15.0257	10.0054	0.7243	5	U	0	U	0

Guatemala	198 4	37.63	16.77	9.63	7.73	1820.121 8	94.9028	19.0995	0.7635	89.1749	0	0	0	1
Guatemala	198	57.05	10.77	7.05	1.15	1694.351	74.7020	17.0775	0.7055	07.1747	0	0	0	1
Guatemala	7	38.64	17.36	10.04	8.3	6	95.4455	16.8176	2.0896	93.7192	3	0	0	1
Guatemala	199 0	27.53	12.52	7.44	8.89	1743.636 6	95.2179	15.3365	2.9804	123.690 9	4	0	0	1
	199					1822.437				128.661				
Guatemala	3 199	23.22	9.69	5.37	9.53	4 1922.326	94.8739	13.4379	1.9627	4 127.453	4	0	0	1
Guatemala	6	18.98	7.04	3.5	10.21	8	94.3720	17.7489	1.4579	3	5	1	0	0
	199	12.01	1.00	0.41	10.04	2030.492	02 4457	10.02/0	1 4450	132.336	0	1	0	0
Guatemala	9 198	13.91	4.86	2.41	10.94	4	93.4457	19.9360	1.4459	2	8	1	0	0
Guinea	1	91.81	62.16	47.33	4.57	NA	81.5784	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Guinea	198 4	93.04	64.15	49.34	4.93	NA	84.1507	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Guinea	198	93.04	04.15	49.34	4.95	NA	04.1307	INA	10.509	121.499	0	0	0	0
Guinea	7	93.73	65.34	50.57	5.36	277.6396	86.8073	NA	2	4	0	0	0	0
Guinea	199 0	93.28	64.57	49.77	6.02	286.3832	89.0525	NA	12.983 7	183.343 7	0	0	0	0
Guineu	199	<i>y</i> 3.20			0.02	200.3032			13.439	166.466	0		Ŭ	0
Guinea	3 199	73.59	41.61	28.34	7.14	272.4011	90.5178	3.7572	1 10.073	7 137.799	0	0	0	0
Guinea	199 6	63.01	28.27	15.83	8.09	266.5721	91.0459	4.7274	10.073	137.799	1	0	0	0
	199									138.298				
Guinea	9 198	59.91	24.97	13.3	8.6	280.9257	90.8005	4.0880	9.2557 47.435	8 150.239	1	1	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	1	46.34	24.69	16.9	0.83	426.9021	86.7313	NA	7	9	0	0	0	0
Calana Diana	198	45 20	04.11	16.40	0.80	442 0007	05 0207	NT 4	38.897	152.070	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	4 198	45.38	24.11	16.49	0.89	443.8987	95.9207	NA	6 52.002	9 154.861	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	7	45.59	24.24	16.58	0.95	454.0652	99.0170	18.0807	5	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	199 0	42.23	22.24	15.16	1.02	479.4697	92.8125	18.8488	58.878 3	165.659 8	0	0	0	1
Guinea-Dissau	199	72.23	22.27	15.10	1.02	+77.+077	72.0125	10.0400	46.686	144.374	0	0	0	1
Guinea-Bissau	3	65.33	28.99	16.16	1.09	506.5509	90.6691	11.7924	7	3	0	0	0	1
Guinea-Bissau	199 6	50.2	19.65	10.14	1.17	531.1324	91.1435	9.8865	66.778 2	139.934 4	5	0	0	0
	199								41.249	178.864				
Guinea-Bissau	9 198	60.2	24.59	13.08	1.25	471.4639	89.1351	8.1759	5	1 465.193	2	0	0	0
Guyana	198	7.5	1.73	0.54	0.78	897.7432	86.2372	18.6228	9.0727	403.193	1	0	1	1
	198									328.839	0			
Guyana	4 198	7.55	1.75	0.54	0.76	753.3797	79.9302	32.6112	7.6304	6 379.816	0	0	1	1
Guyana	7	8.45	2.06	0.68	0.74	744.7167	72.9929	35.2954	8.2234	3	0	0	1	1

C		199	0.52	2.00	0.00	0.72	704 0422	(((200	24 4004	28.923	414.001	0	0	1	1
Guya	na	0 199	8.53	2.09	0.69	0.73	704.0433	66.6308	34.4224	7 38.125	5 768.908	0	0	1	1
Guya	na	3	6.91	1.53	0.46	0.72	782.9211	64.6245	20.8754	30.123	2	4	0	1	1
		199								17.932	647.546				
Guya	na	6	8.2	2.4	0.97	0.73	965.7037	65.5995	30.6359	6	7	6	0	1	1
G		199				o - 4	1079.858	< 7 000 0	50 5 0 40	22.440	614.039		0		
Guya	na	9 198	8.75	2.79	1.2	0.74	5	65.9982	53.7949	7	2	6	0	1	1
Haiti		198	66.31	36.13	24.21	5.82	NA	82.2808	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
man		198	00.51	50.15	27.21	5.02	1171	02.2000	1111	14/1	1171	0	0	0	0
Haiti		4	66.43	36.22	24.28	6.24	NA	84.3002	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
		198													
Haiti		7	68.33	37.79	25.53	6.68	NA	86.8262	NA	NA	NA	0	1	0	0
		199	60.40					00.00.00						0	0
Haiti		0	68.49	37.93	25.64	7.11	NA	88.6842	NA	NA	NA 121.007	2	1	0	0
Haiti		199 3	64.74	35.05	23.35	7.54	NA	88.8725	10.4378	NA	121.097 4	0	1	0	0
Han		199	04.74	55.05	25.55	7.54	n A	88.8725	10.4378	INA	109.205	0	1	0	0
Haiti		6	63.71	34.03	22.56	7.99	NA	86.8516	11.8079	NA	6	7	0	0	0
		199									115.364				
Haiti		9	62.53	33.04	21.8	8.43	499.6939	82.6762	14.7624	NA	0	5	0	0	0
		198													
India ³	*	1	59.77	19.54	8.47	715.1	291.3187	75.1903	20.5482	1.0088	44.0383	8	0	1	1
T. 1.	$\mathbf{\Psi}$	198	55 50	17 14	7 1	76175	217 5500	72 7265	22.9964	0.0004	41 1050	0	0	1	1
India	*	4 198	55.52	17.14	7.1	764.75	317.5599	73.7265	22.8864	0.8024	41.1050	8	0	1	1
India	*	7	54.68	16.33	6.53	816.32	343.1925	72.3953	24.8138	0.6885	37.0543	8	1	1	1
mana		199	51.00	10.55	0.55	010.02	515.1725	12.5755	21.0150	0.0000	57.0515	0	1	1	1
India	*	0	51.36	14.64	5.64	868.9	389.5249	71.1248	25.1527	0.5601	43.4037	8	1	1	1
		199													
India	*	3	49.74	13.7	5.14	921.1	412.3389	69.3104	23.7017	0.7903	54.1232	8	1	1	1
T 1' .	ч-	199	17.04	10 (0	1.67	072 15	460.0550	(7.0170	22 7972	0.5522	(2 7570	0	0	1	1
India	*	6 199	47.24	12.69	4.67	973.15	469.9559	67.0178	22.7872	0.5532	63.7570	9	0	1	1
India	*	9	45.4	11.96	4.33	1,025.02	534.0919	64.5294	23.8012	0.3629	69.9085	9	0	1	1
mana		198	-5.+	11.90	4.55	1,025.02	554.0717	04.5274	25.0012	0.302)	160.568	,	0	1	1
Indon	nesia*	1	70.84	26	12.24	148.87	555.6109	80.6995	9.8315	1.2344	4	0	0	0	0
		198									151.229				
Indon	nesia*	4	62.84	21.36	9.57	159.1	614.2991	77.1080	15.3957	0.9012	0	0	1	0	0
	•	198	60.1.6	22.14	10.11	1 60 0 4	(70.005.4	70.0104	22 7000	1 1 2 1 0	128.955	0		0	0
Indon	iesia*	7	68.16	23.14	10.11	169.04	678.9254	73.0134	22.7888	1.1240	6 120 621	0	1	0	0
Indon	esia*	199 0	54.27	15.62	6.01	178.63	785.9172	68.6857	37.0286	1.7935	139.621 8	0	1	0	0
muon	10514	199	54.27	15.02	0.01	170.05	105.9112	00.0007	57.0200	1.7955	153.272	0	1	0	U
Indon	nesia*	3	54.4	15.68	6.03	188.02	949.0978	64.6894	47.2521	1.5099	4	0	0	0	0

	199					1128.036				158.100				
Indonesia*	6	43.38	11.44	4.13	197.1	0	60.7986	53.6424	0.6822	4	0	0	0	0
	199					1113.983				215.124				
Indonesia*	9	47.7	12.52	4.56	205.95	9	56.6958	44.8932	1.1394	0	2	0	0	0
T TI ' D	198	2.52	0.75	0.00	40.44	2204.025	07 5 100	20 2000	0.01.42	123.518	0	1	1	1
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1	3.53	0.75	0.26	40.44	3 2176.546	87.5428	28.3988	0.0143	2 103.649	0	1	1	1
Iran, Islamic Rep.	198 4	2.45	0.5	0.18	45.67	21/0.540	91.2527	20.6257	0.0112	103.649	0	1	1	1
iran, islanne Kep.	198	2.45	0.5	0.16	45.07	1898.982	91.2327	20.0257	0.0112	5	0	1	1	1
Iran, Islamic Rep.	7	4.76	1.08	0.4	51.38	7	94.5784	22.2934	0.0252	54.5453	0	1	1	1
nun, istanio repi	199		1100	0.1.	01100	1668.702	1.0701		0.0202	0 110 100	0	-	-	-
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0	3.85	0.97	0.42	56.36	8	95.1711	23.7626	0.0806	86.4981	0	1	1	1
· ·	199					2007.093				132.955				
Iran, Islamic Rep.	3	1.7	0.38	0.16	58.98	4	92.0306	23.8089	0.2364	7	0	1	1	1
	199					2011.523				114.017				
Iran, Islamic Rep.	6	1.48	0.26	0.08	61.44	9	84.1734	18.4436	0.1843	0	0	1	1	1
	199					2137.153								
Iran, Islamic Rep.	9	1.6	0.28	0.09	64.86	6	72.3558	18.9839	0.1682	98.2932	4	1	1	1
T	198	10.07	2.4	0.71	14.05	1492.243	102 7006	NT A	NT A	NT A	0	1	1	1
Iraq	1 198	12.87	2.4	0.71	14.05	0 1381.294	103.7006	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
Iraq	4	9.24	1.62	0.47	15.2	1361.294	101.9935	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
IIaq	198	9.24	1.02	0.47	15.2	1302.779	101.9955	NA	INA	INA	0	1	1	1
Iraq	7	12.9	2.41	0.72	16.3	0	100.5383	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
muq	199	12.0	2	0.72	1010	1519.630	100100000			1.1.1	0	-	-	-
Iraq	0	13.44	2.56	0.76	17.52	0	99.5927	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
1	199													
Iraq	3	13.01	2.44	0.72	19.12	889.9972	96.1636	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
	199					1137.053								
Iraq	6	12.43	2.3	0.68	21.02	9	91.6422	NA	NA	NA	0	1	1	1
-	199					1767.214	004650				0			
Iraq	9	11.13	2	0.58	23.09	2	88.1659	NA	NA	NA 205 5 42	0	1	1	1
Iomaiaa	198 1	3.35	0.96	0.51	2.16	NA	88.6525	22.8178	5.3706	305.543 0	10	0	0	0
Jamaica	198	5.55	0.90	0.51	2.10	NA	88.0323	22.8178	5.5700	282.595	10	0	0	0
Jamaica	4	3.38	0.97	0.51	2.28	NA	82.3407	31.4590	6.4445	282.393 6	10	0	0	0
Jamaica	198	5.50	0.77	0.51	2.20	1471	02.5407	51.4570	0.1115	309.153	10	0	0	0
Jamaica	7	3.92	1.1	0.56	2.35	NA	77.9803	25.8836	7.3415	8	10	0	0	0
	199									287.367				
Jamaica	0	1.27	0.1	0.01	2.39	NA	74.5731	32.9776	6.1574	9	10	0	0	0
	199									330.115				
Jamaica	3	3.82	1.06	0.55	2.44	NA	71.9690	25.0891	3.3659	6	10	0	0	0
	199									319.148				
Jamaica	6	1.76	0.49	0.27	2.51	NA	69.9378	22.7669	1.7587	0	9	0	0	0
Temester	199	1.22	0.26	0.10	0.57	NT A	(0.1011	22 7515	0.2007	00.0001	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	9	1.33	0.36	0.18	2.57	NA	68.1811	22.7515	0.3086	90.9921	9	0	0	0

	199					2549.548				233.971				
Kazakhstan	3	4.21	0.47	0.07	16.33	7	59.4736	49.3048	0.0657	2	1	0	0	1
	199					2009.586				237.977				
Kazakhstan	6	4.98	0.92	0.28	15.58	2	58.4304	13.3367	0.3901	7	1	0	0	1
	199					2078.888				220.142				
Kazakhstan	9	6.27	1.32	0.44	14.93	4	55.2489	6.5899	0.9140	9	1	0	0	1
	198									187.061	-	÷	-	-
Kenya	1	37.34	14.78	7.81	16.9	534.1452	112.7577	28.7190	6.0502	2	0	1	1	1
Renya	198	57.54	14.70	7.01	10.7	554.1452	112.7577	20.7170	0.0502	171.182	0	1	1	1
Varia		40.21	16.27	0.01	19.04	512.2202	112 5405	20.0626	7.1696		0	1	1	0
Kenya	4	40.31	16.37	8.81	18.94	512.2202	112.5405	29.9636	/.1090	3	0	1	1	0
	198									158.889			_	
Kenya	7	37.73	14.98	7.94	21.14	518.4987	111.2893	30.2451	6.9246	6	0	1	1	1
	199								12.645	160.152				
Kenya	0	35.88	14.02	7.34	23.45	550.5918	108.3903	31.6271	3	3	0	1	1	1
-	199								13.328	181.387				
Kenya	3	33.96	12.64	6.34	25.84	525.7016	102.8653	32.5986	6	1	0	0	1	1
	199								-	200.324	-		-	-
Kenya	6	29.62	9.19	3.84	28.19	513.7017	96.5180	30.2631	7.7974	0	0	0	1	1
Kenya		29.02	9.19	5.64	20.19	515.7017	90.5180	50.2051	1.1914		0	0	1	1
17	199	24.74	11.60	5.04	20.40	511.0722	01 2170	20 1707	2 0500	151.146	2	0	0	0
Kenya	9	34.74	11.62	5.26	30.48	511.0732	91.3179	28.1797	2.9598	6	2	0	0	0
	198													
Lao PDR	1	86.37	39.57	21.19	3.32	NA	91.7112	NA	NA	NA	0	0	1	0
	198													
Lao PDR	4	79.99	32.4	15.9	3.58	239.2556	92.7069	NA	2.0476	9.1057	0	0	1	0
	198													
Lao PDR	7	72.35	26.04	11.73	3.89	244.2780	92.0214	NA	3.1909	45.2335	0	0	1	0
LuoTDR	199	12.35	20.04	11.75	5.07	244.2700	72.0214	1011	16.635	125.502	0	0	1	0
Lao PDR	0	65.22	21.35	8.96	4.24	247.1251	01 4162	1.0103		125.502	0	0	0	0
LaoPDK		03.22	21.55	8.90	4.24	247.1231	91.4163	1.0105	4	124.041	0	0	0	0
	199		1.5.00	- 00					14.359	134.941	0	0	2	0
Lao PDR	3	53.27	15.38	5.89	4.63	272.1668	91.7370	4.8494	8	9	0	0	0	0
	199								16.362	189.120				
Lao PDR	6	47.56	13.73	5.4	4.99	307.8692	92.0873	9.0083	7	9	0	0	0	0
	199								20.666	229.485				
Lao PDR	9	43.12	12.12	4.72	5.3	346.2979	91.0161	11.3446	2	0	0	0	0	0
	198								13.501	413.113				
Lesotho	1	59.1	30.94	20	1.34	435.2450	93.8705	9.2411	4	6	0	0	0	0
2000000	198	0,11	2017 1	20	1101	10012100	2010700	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	14.533	512.170	Ũ	Ũ	0	Ŭ
Lesotho	4	58.11	30.21	19.44	1.44	425.9957	94.3947	14.4136	3	6	0	0	0	0
Lesouio		56.11	30.21	19.44	1.44	423.3337	74.3747	14.4150	-		0	0	0	0
T (1	198	57.01	20.54	10.04	1.50	142 2050	04 6066	15 6505	16.433	455.486	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	7	57.21	29.56	18.94	1.52	443.3959	94.6866	15.6525	6	4	0	0	0	0
	199								15.654	463.041				
Lesotho	0	61.31	34.3	23.16	1.6	492.1818	93.6881	16.5772	4	1	0	0	0	0
	199								13.035	468.256				
Lesotho	3	67.03	39.31	27.21	1.69	541.0097	90.3282	19.1685	9	4	3	0	0	0
	199									449.060				
Lesotho	6	55.96	32.05	22.39	1.78	582.0577	86.6740	21.9502	9.7203	7	8	0	0	0

T.	a a tha	199 9	57.24	31.26	21.16	1.04	614.9533	85.1422	20.0012	5.4093	503.614	2	0	0	0
Le	esotho	9 198	57.24	31.20	21.10	1.84	014.9333	83.1422	20.0012	5.4093 10.410	8 419.497	3	0	0	0
Li	beria	1	20.28	5.92	2.39	1.96	636.6090	90.6845	13.1031	3	2	0	0	0	0
		198								14.624	353.413				
Li	beria	4	27.47	8.62	3.75	2.16	533.1035	92.2536	8.8386	4	1	0	0	0	0
т ; і	beria	198 7	30.03	9.6	4.26	2.2	487.1384	93.0061	9.1585	11.362 7	201.485 0	0	0	0	0
LI	UCIIa	199	50.05	9.0	4.20	2.2	407.1304	95.0001	9.1585	/	0	0	0	0	0
Li	beria	0	87.19	45.1	27.53	2.1	336.8863	92.6565	11.5404	8.9223	NA	0	0	0	0
		199													
Li	beria	3	98.68	75.95	60.62	2.01	108.6848	91.1953	30.9302	NA	NA	0	1	0	0
т.:	hania	199	99.28	01 25	69.01	2.2	50 2000	00 0005	NT A	NT A	NT A	1	1	0	0
LI	beria	6 199	99.20	81.35	68.21	2.2	52.3288	88.8885	NA	NA 26.447	NA 187.134	1	1	0	0
Li	beria	9	92.82	54.58	36.06	2.74	121.2619	86.9651	6.4312	20.447	107.134	3	1	0	0
		198	/							-	122.364	-	-	-	÷
Ma	adagascar	1	92.78	66.44	51.43	8.98	397.5730	98.7356	17.3644	5.4206	6	0	0	0	0
		198													
Ma	adagascar	4	85.04	57.52	43.61	9.71	341.1122	96.5314	16.9999	5.8622	91.1872	0	0	0	0
м	adagagaar	198 7	77.8	48	34.79	10.56	328.1052	94.4371	18.8765	10.111 9	99.5156	0	0	0	0
IVI	adagascar	199	//.0	40	54.79	10.50	526.1052	94.4371	18.8703	13.805	124.747	0	0	0	0
M	adagascar	0	69.06	36.87	24.43	11.55	327.1446	93.2972	15.4143	2	2	0	0	0	0
	e	199								13.992	125.782				
Ma	adagascar	3	67.07	30.59	17.54	12.64	294.0285	92.1109	16.7465	6	2	8	0	0	0
		199			10.00	12.00					153.973	0	0	0	
Ma	adagascar	6 199	71.64	32.89	18.88	13.88	277.7113	91.7897	11.9532	9.7996 15.656	8 159.299	9	0	0	0
M	adagascar	199 9	82.37	44.31	28.01	15.26	278.3665	93.3244	9.0528	15.050	139.299	7	0	0	0
1010	uduguseur	198	02.57	44.51	20.01	15.20	270.5005	75.5244	2.0520	12.844	184.831	7	0	0	0
Ma	alawi	1	84.68	48.04	31.48	6.4	226.4551	98.7737	18.4562	8	8	0	0	0	1
		198								12.196	155.212				
Ma	alawi	4	83.83	46.92	30.48	6.96	215.5758	100.2397	16.2275	6	0	0	0	0	1
	, ·	198	06.02	50.57	22.74	0.15	200 4170	00.0702	0.0226	17.413	155.312	0	0	0	
Ma	alawi	7 199	86.83	50.57	33.74	8.15	208.4178	98.9693	9.8336	4 27.548	1 166.365	0	0	0	1
M	alawi	0	88	52.28	35.35	9.45	189.1575	95.1921	9.5547	27.548	100.305	0	0	0	1
		199	00	02.20	00100	2110	10)11070	,,,,,,,	210011	27.572	166.593	Ū	0	Ũ	
Ma	alawi	3	86.42	50	33.22	9.8	195.6909	92.3547	11.8799	9	2	0	0	0	1
		199								31.790	224.537				
Ma	alawi	6	83.89	47	30.55	10.15	202.0719	91.5196	7.8553	7	3	6	0	0	0
М	alawi	199 9	80.83	42.8	26.83	11.01	223.0898	93.7651	6.4530	21.431 5	197.133	6	0	0	0
1016	aiawi	9 198	00.05	42.0	20.03	11.01	223.0898	75.7031	0.4550	5	321.872	U	U	U	0
M	alaysia	1	3.83	0.79	0.28	14.18	4	74.3422	48.8209	0.5811	6	5	1	0	0
	-														

	198					2599.201				320.495					
Malaysia	4		0.66	0.23	15.33	4	72.7932	68.1088	0.7131	6		5	1	0	0
	198		0.04	0.00	165	2599.837	51 5010	01.00.10	0.000	320.038		-		0	0
Malaysia	7		0.36	0.09	16.7	8	71.7018	91.9342	0.9006	4		5	1	0	0
N 1 ·	199		0.00	0.05	10.01	2972.905	60 4154	02.0420	0 <000	406.202		~	0	0	0
Malaysia	0		0.22	0.05	18.21	6	69.4154	83.8429	0.6009	8		5	0	0	0
Malazzala	199		0.1	0.01	10.7	3576.092	(7.2507	06 2500	0.3777	467.864 2		-	0	0	0
Malaysia	3 199		0.1	0.01	19.7	5 4356.884	67.3587	96.2500	0.5777	ے 553.786		5	0	0	0
Malaysia	199		0.08	0.01	21.26	4550.884	65.0043	125.0885	0.0847	555.780 0		4	0	0	0
wiałaysia	199		0.08	0.01	21.20	4618.565	05.0045	125.0885	0.0647	612.728		4	0	0	0
Malaysia	9		0.24	0.05	22.9	010.505	61.6416	155.3478	0.0793	2		4	0	0	0
ivialay sia	198		0.24	0.05	22.9	0	01.0410	155.5470	0.0775	734.038		7	0	0	0
Maldives	1		17.88	12.1	0.16	NA	90.7976	10.1356	NA	9	NA		0	0	0
ivialar ves	198		17.00	12.1	0.10	1171	20.1210	10.1550	1 12 1	818.870	1111		0	0	0
Maldives	4		17.29	11.67	0.18	NA	91.2612	27.9172	NA	4	NA		0	0	0
11111111100	198		1/12/	11107	0110	1.1.1	,112012	200102	11.708	413.205			0	0	0
Maldives	7		16.79	11.3	0.2	NA	93.9928	17.3783	7	6	NA		0	0	0
	199								14.590	465.777					
Maldives	0	29.87	15.62	10.45	0.22	NA	97.9033	11.5307	8	9	NA		0	0	0
	199	1							13.394	467.978					
Maldives	3	29.11	15.16	10.12	0.23	NA	99.5904	9.8992	9	2	NA		0	0	0
	199)							10.736	491.610					
Maldives	6	26.63	13.7	9.07	0.25	NA	96.8718	13.2613	7	5	NA		0	0	0
	199)								508.321					
Maldives	9		10.58	6.92	0.27	NA	89.0510	18.3875	5.2555	2	NA		0	0	0
	198								14.187	125.765					
Mali	1		51.2	35.3	6.87	367.5330	88.0308	21.8874	8	6		0	1	0	1
	198								19.368	142.367					
Mali	4		51.75	35.82	7.28	330.4644	91.0808	18.2348	8	7		0	1	0	1
	198								23.714	162.975					
Mali	7		54.69	38.68	7.61	306.8315	95.2036	15.9331	8	0		0	1	0	1
	199		50.65	26.60	7.04	207.05(1	100 1 100	10 7005	21.289	151.191		0	0	0	0
Mali	0		52.65	36.69	7.96	327.2561	100.1400	12.7025	15.922	8		0	0	0	0
Mal	199		50 49	26.50	9 5 4	225 5007	101 4206	10 1002	15.822 4	148.179		6	0	0	0
Mali	3 199		52.48	36.52	8.54	335.5907	101.4306	12.4883	22.218	8 179.009		6	0	0	0
Mali	199		47.52	31.62	9.22	334.1214	100.0034	10.8377	22.218	179.009		7	0	0	0
Iviali	199		47.52	51.02	9.22	554.1214	100.0034	10.8577	15.115	187.546		/	0	0	0
Mali	9		34.84	20.59	9.98	365.5489	98.8590	16.3140	15.115	3		6	0	0	0
Ivian	198		54.04	20.37	7.70	1070.160	70.0570	10.5140	28.491	316.464		0	0	0	0
Mauritania	170		16.14	9.3	1.58	1070.100	93.0527	30.7372	20.471	510.404		0	1	0	0
Waarrama	198		10.14	2.5	1.50	1006.194	95.0521	50.1512	25.494	365.532		0	1	0	0
Mauritania	4		18.51	10.82	1.72	2	92.3012	32.4203	23.474	6		0	1	0	0
	198		10.01	10.02	1.72	2	2.0012	22200	29.227	391.837		0	-	÷	0
Mauritania	7		17.99	10.49	1.87	986.0873	91.8020	29.8175	5	2		0	1	0	0
									2	-		-	-	-	-

	199								24.157	326.243				
Mauritania	0	43.14	16.77	8.91	2.02	978.3491	91.4373	31.2436	7	6	0	0	0	1
	199								19.524	194.788				
Mauritania	3	42.79	14.44	6.66	2.2	692.1886	90.4769	27.4306	3	7	0	0	0	1
	199								19.103	277.578				
Mauritania	6	23.4	7.06	3.1	2.4	569.5092	88.8441	NA	1	3	0	0	0	1
	199								16.084	257.162				
Mauritania	9	20.72	5.61	2.1	2.63	557.3104	86.7240	NA	0	6	0	0	0	0
	198					1962.810				308.301				
Mauritius	1	12.57	2.56	0.83	0.98	2	64.6168	22.6029	3.6447	4	9	0	0	0
	198					2038.029				290.241				
Mauritius	4	9.8	1.9	0.61	1.01	6	59.5789	22.5797	3.9177	6	10	0	0	0
	198					2409.900				348.902				
Mauritius	7	3.94	0.72	0.24	1.03	7	55.1545	28.3100	3.2599	1	10	0	0	0
	199					2885.768				406.126				
Mauritius	0	1.91	0.36	0.14	1.06	1	51.7212	32.4918	2.9550	1	10	0	0	0
	199					3287.516				372.729		-	-	Ť
Mauritius	3	1.08	0.23	0.1	1.1	3	49.6693	37.9931	1.5140	8	10	0	0	0
mainia	199	1.00	0.25	0.1		3652.030	19.0095	51.7751	1.5110	369.780	10	0	0	0
Mauritius	6	0.68	0.16	0.07	1.13	9052.050	48.5552	45.2672	0.4727	30).100 7	10	0	0	0
Widdiffius	199	0.00	0.10	0.07	1.15	4116.955	40.5552	43.2072	0.7727	391.355	10	0	0	0
Mauritius	9	0.44	0.11	0.06	1.18	-110. <i>)55</i>	47.5479	54.2117	0.9789	8	10	0	0	0
waumuus	199	0.44	0.11	0.00	1.10	1085.094	47.5479	54.2117	0.9789	196.808	10	0	0	0
Moldova Dan	3	10.6	2.88	1.23	3.71		56.6965	5.5728	NA	190.808	6	1	0	0
Moldova, Rep.		10.0	2.00	1.25	5.71	6	30.0903	5.5728	INA		6	1	0	0
Mallana Dar	199	21.00	6.4	2.96	2 (7	641 4107	55 2966	6 0500	NT A	318.846	7	0	0	0
Moldova, Rep.	6	21.06	6.4	2.86	3.67	641.4127	55.2866	6.0508	NA	4	7	0	0	0
	199	25.67	11.47	- 1 -	0.65	506 1001	50.0004	11,0000	10565	372.146	-	0	0	0
Moldova, Rep.	9	35.67	11.47	5.17	3.65	596.4294	52.9924	11.0800	4.8765	1	7	0	0	0
	198	10.00		0.00		1106.634	00.05.44			153.671	0			
Morocco	1	12.23	2.71	0.82	20.27	0	88.9761	16.3495	5.1671	1	0	1	1	1
	198					1164.914				172.663				
Morocco	4	10.29	2.11	0.59	21.78	4	85.6241	17.5520	3.5615	7	0	1	1	1
	198					1267.733				164.330				
Morocco	7	8.68	1.6	0.42	23.26	9	82.6684	18.2859	3.6266	5	0	1	0	1
	199					1405.209				160.227				
Morocco	0	5	0.77	0.19	24.67	9	79.4077	17.5664	2.8472	1	0	0	0	1
	199					1437.746				155.639				
Morocco	3	5.83	0.97	0.26	26	6	76.2736	23.2018	3.6189	1	0	0	0	1
	199					1500.441				151.468				
Morocco	6	4.88	0.79	0.21	27.24	3	72.4048	27.1247	1.6936	4	0	0	0	1
	199					1578.768				161.750				
Morocco	9	6.73	1.12	0.3	28.37	5	66.9370	44.7995	1.4737	4	0	0	0	1
	198													
Mozambique	1	77.51	38.23	22.8	12.44	208.3158	88.1618	NA	4.3388	73.9252	0	0	0	1
	198										-	-	-	-
Mozambique	4	89.28	52.54	35.09	13.2	165.3725	89.5600	NA	6.6005	85.9143	0	1	0	1
	•				10.2		22.0000		2.3000		0	-	Ť	-

	198		10.1						15.176		0		0	
Mozambique	7	86.54	48.4	31.25	13.37	150.1622	93.4385	NA	7	66.9030	0	1	0	1
Magamhiana	199	82.32	43.07	26.63	13.57	183.6321	98.5717	17.8250	42.101 7	136.483	0	0	0	1
Mozambique	0 199	82.32	43.07	26.63	13.57	185.0521	98.5717	17.8250		162 229	0	0	0	1
Mozambiquo	199	82.82	12 65	27.12	14.89	183.8263	05 7297	11 6000	61.865 4	162.238 3	0	0	0	0
Mozambique	5 199	82.82	43.65	27.12	14.89	183.8203	95.7387	14.6888	47.033	د 162.956	0	0	0	0
Mozambique	199 6	80.59	41.16	25.05	16.46	191.2710	89.6945	10.8276	47.033	102.930	5	0	0	0
Mozamolque	199	00.39	41.10	25.05	10.40	191.2710	89.0945	10.8270	23.446	121.652	5	0	0	0
Mozambique	9	77.08	37.79	22.4	17.8	225.8042	88.0720	13.1262	23.440	121.052	5	0	0	0
Mozamolque	199	77.00	51.17	22.4	17.0	2873.024	00.0720	15.1202	1	279.788	5	0	0	0
Namibia	0	50.04	25.35	15.4	1.42	2073.024 6	91.0453	18.9174	2.5382	5	6	0	0	0
Tulliolu	199	50.01	20.00	10.1	1.12	2967.331	71.0155	10.9171	2.0002	281.916	0	Ū	0	0
Namibia	3	49.14	24.59	14.79	1.56	2,011001	86.0469	29.0754	4.8566	6	6	0	0	0
1 (unitoru	199	.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	2.1.07	1	1100	2896.202	0010102	2710701		282.261	0	0	0	Ŭ
Namibia	6	45.48	20.75	11.66	1.71	6	83.0917	41.0780	4.3298	7	6	0	0	0
	199					2952.083				279.559				
Namibia	9	42.61	17.66	9.19	1.86	8	79.6213	41.0121	4.4261	6	6	0	0	0
	198													
Nepal	1	80.83	33.63	16.95	14.72	191.6765	80.9870	8.0614	7.7199	90.5435	1	0	0	0
-	198													
Nepal	4	78.15	31.14	15.23	15.78	196.3903	81.7353	8.4045	7.8703	92.0466	2	0	0	0
	198								10.333					
Nepal	7	77.57	31.16	15.42	16.89	212.2136	82.9262	10.2952	1	96.2137	2	0	0	0
	199								12.478					
Nepal	0	74.22	29.03	14.18	18.11	228.7610	84.1261	12.5478	2	99.3687	3	0	0	0
	199								11.297	123.560				
Nepal	3	73.1	28.76	14.17	19.55	245.5671	83.2534	13.7818	1	0	5	0	0	0
	199									168.380				
Nepal	6	67.97	25.56	12.24	21.12	266.1045	81.2300	21.5264	9.7463	4	5	0	0	0
	199									173.312				
Nepal	9	58.65	21.16	9.84	22.69	281.2449	79.7052	27.1414	7.7677	1	6	0	0	0
	198					1371.760		10 11 70		201.779	0			
Nicaragua	1	12.14	3.31	1.31	3.34	9	99.4292	49.6158	8.3663	3	0	1	1	1
х т'	198	01.00	7.16	2.22	2.62	1350.215	100 0002	22 (000	1 5000	137.320	0	1	1	1
Nicaragua	4	21.98	7.15	3.22	3.62	1100.292	100.0803	33.6009	4.5826	8	0	1	1	1
Niconocura	198 7	22.14	11.04	5.85	2 00	1199.282	00 6262	15 1019	4 5507	05 7214	1	1	1	1
Nicaragua	199	32.14	11.84	5.85	3.88	0	99.6362	15.1918	4.5507 24.435	95.7314 245.270	1	1	1	1
Nicoragua	199	33.07	12.29	6.12	4.14	964.8229	97.5403	20.9116	24.433 6	243.270 6	3	1	1	1
Nicaragua	199	55.07	12.29	0.12	4.14	904.0229	97.5405	20.9110	48.727	213.131	5	1	1	1
Nicaragua	3	24.83	8.4	3.89	4.45	892.8286	94.3104	22.1877	40.727	213.131 6	6	1	1	1
Incaragua	199	24.05	0.4	5.07	т.т.	072.0200	74.5104	22.1077	19.372	131.603	0	1	1	1
Nicaragua	6	17.64	5.24	2.25	4.76	911.4387	89.9391	15.2399	19.572	131.003	7	1	1	0
1 nouruguu	199	17.04	5.27	2.23	т. / О	/11.10/	07.7071	10.2000	12.644	177.556	,	1	-	v
Nicaragua	9	13.49	3.43	1.32	5.02	995.1922	84.3278	20.3061	3	9	8	1	1	0
	-	10.19	0.10	1.02	0.02		0	20.0001	5	-	Ũ		•	5

		100									100 100				
Niger		198 1	47.47	14.95	6.55	6	410.9982	98.2881	17.1926	8.0655	188.480 0	0	0	0	0
INIGEI		198	4/.4/	14.95	0.55	0	410.9962	90.2001	17.1920	11.425	154.683	0	0	0	0
Niger		4	68.01	26.24	13.04	6.52	350.9840	99.2123	17.1093	8	10 11000	0	0	0	0
e		198								17.905	140.203				
Niger		7	64.67	24.08	11.7	7.09	313.0724	100.1646	16.3811	6	4	0	0	0	0
		199		05.10	10.04		214.0145	100 5444	10 (700	15.392	118.199	0	0	0	0
Niger		0 199	66.33	25.13	12.34	7.75	314.0147	100.5444	13.6799	5 17.652	6 101.112	0	0	0	0
Niger		3	75.75	33.95	18.86	8.55	279.9111	100.3791	11.1551	17.032	101.112 6	7	0	0	0
inger		199	10.10	55.75	10.00	0.55	279.9111	100.5771	11.1001	17.361	130.287	,	Ū	0	0
Niger		6	74.27	36.1	21.32	9.5	266.3957	100.2648	5.6557	8	6	5	0	0	0
		199								13.975	124.699				
Niger		9	65.59	30.23	17.31	10.6	270.2999	100.8757	3.7239	4	1	2	0	0	0
Nicorio		198	17 77	18.36	0.16	75 72	702 7267	97 9509	10 7471	0.0500	140.743 0	Q	0	0	1
Nigeria		1 198	47.77	18.30	9.16	75.73	793.7267	87.8598	12.7471	0.0590	0	8	0	0	1
Nigeria		4	57.55	24.12	12.9	81.78	641.6349	90.2333	17.0261	0.1069	88.3946	5	1	0	1
0		198													
Nigeria		7	58.95	26.16	14.85	88.41	567.4396	91.7991	16.6324	0.2422	91.2635	0	1	0	1
		199									148.734				
Nigeria		0	57.58	27.17	16.4	95.62	548.2293	91.6556	10.2982	0.9958	0	0	1	0	1
Nigeria		199 3	63.15	31.34	19.53	103.14	562.9518	90.4170	11.7157	1.3879	184.017 4	0	1	0	1
Ivigenia		199	05.15	51.54	19.55	105.14	502.9518	90.4170	11./15/	1.5679	159.767	0	1	0	1
Nigeria		6	68.65	32.16	18.8	111.17	542.7471	88.6706	11.3649	0.8610	7	0	1	0	1
e		199									198.879				
Nigeria		9	69.98	32.94	19.35	119.83	544.6593	87.0171	12.4029	0.6455	6	2	1	0	1
D.1.'.		198	71.65	27.00	10.00	00.70	202.05.42	00 7511	24.0066	2 5 5 9 9	105.366	0	0	1	
Pakistan	1	1 198	71.65	27.08	12.92	82.73	393.9543	88.7511	24.0866	3.5588	6 100.302	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	1	4	68.66	25.36	11.96	91.64	437.1996	88.2523	25.0991	2.3918	100.302	0	0	1	1
i ukistuli		198	00.00	20.00	11.90	91.01	137.1770	00.2525	23.0771	2.5710	102.043	0	Ū	1	1
Pakistan	l	7	66.46	23.93	11.08	101.28	475.3051	88.6536	28.4039	2.4547	3	0	0	1	1
		199									109.796				
Pakistan	1	0	64.17	22.85	10.59	111.09	517.0113	89.8108	25.1463	3.1535	2	8	0	1	1
Pakistan		199 3	61.42	19.82	8.46	120.34	552.3083	90.2781	23.4971	2.3935	112.189 9	8	0	1	1
Pakistali	l	199	01.42	19.62	0.40	120.34	552.5085	90.2781	25.4971	2.3933	9 109.789	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	1	6	48.14	11.7	3.91	130.08	576.8792	89.2017	24.3024	2.0254	9	8	0	1	1
		199									103.184				
Pakistan	1	9	29.62	6.38	2.05	140.58	581.3967	86.1834	25.0782	1.4528	0	5	0	1	1
P		198	0.00	1.00	0.05	2.0.1	3442.338	01 0102	(1.0053	1 1072	368.469	0	0	0	C C
Panama		1 198	9.92	4.08	2.86	2.04	9 3520.945	81.8183	61.3953	1.1973	6 411.933	0	0	0	0
Panama		198	14.52	8.33	6.69	2.18	3520.945 3	77.6969	55.1916	1.1396	411.955 6	0	0	0	0
i anailla		-	17.32	0.55	0.09	2.10	5	11.0709	55.1710	1.1570	0	0	U	U	0

		100					0500.017				205.025				
		198	10.01		10.05		3523.217			4 000 7	395.025	0	0	0	0
Panama		7	19.96	13.1	10.87	2.33	5	73.5383	53.0920	1.0095	9	0	0	0	0
		199					2965.914				448.318				
Panama		0	23.49	15.61	12.79	2.49	5	69.5946	49.3034	0.9578	3	5	0	0	0
		199					3463.701				575.605				
Panama		3	17.36	11.59	9.58	2.65	5	66.1623	57.4121	1.8033	5	8	0	0	0
		199					3634.691				559.156				
Panama		6	15.22	9.85	8.04	2.81	5	63.4208	73.1491	0.4989	6	9	0	0	0
		199					3959.057				470.371				
Panama		9	12.66	8.2	6.76	2.99	9	61.4477	86.0500	0.2696	0	9	0	0	0
		198		•			-			13.226	284.558	-		-	-
Papua New	Guinea	1	71.07	36.43	22.41	3.3	836.4635	90.1964	16.1397	4	201.550	4	0	0	0
I apua New	Guinea	198	/1.0/	50.45	22.71	5.5	050.4055	J0.1704	10.1577	13.493	279.566	-	0	0	0
D N	C		(5.02	21.24	10.22	2.59	701 4250	20 7006	20 7292	13.493	279.300	4	1	0	0
Papua New	Guinea	4	65.02	31.24	18.33	3.58	781.4350	89.7006	20.7282		-	4	1	0	0
	<i>a</i> .	198			44.00					10.550	282.328				0
Papua New	Guinea	7	59.19	26.77	14.99	3.87	788.7622	86.7505	24.7829	0	0	4	1	0	0
		199								11.276	278.139				
Papua New	Guinea	0	54.52	23.48	12.64	4.16	765.3036	81.8790	27.7288	7	2	4	1	0	0
		199									277.561				
Papua New	Guinea	3	45.15	17.52	8.65	4.48	879.1112	78.1953	21.3725	9.6002	1	4	0	0	0
-		199					1004.741				305.846				
Papua New	Guinea	6	35.79	12.28	5.43	4.84	6	76.0657	14.7287	7.6435	0	4	1	0	0
1		199									318.075				
Papua New	Guinea	9	31.73	10.21	4.26	5.24	909.4238	74.9870	18.3889	8.1781	7	4	0	0	0
I upuu I tew	Guinea	198	51.75	10.21	4.20	5.24	1302.838	74.9070	10.5007	0.1701	,	-	0	Ū	0
Doroguou		1)0	0.75	0.24	0.14	3.29	1302.030	86.2768	19.9439	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Paraguay		198	0.75	0.24	0.14	5.29	1278.701	80.2708	19.9439	INA	NA	0	0	0	0
D			0.75	0.04	0.14	2.6		04 4007	10 (121	NT 4	NT 4	0	0	0	0
Paraguay		4	0.75	0.24	0.14	3.6	5	84.4227	18.6131	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
_		198					1306.952								
Paraguay		7	1.05	0.27	0.16	3.92	0	83.6348	13.4154	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
		199					1441.269								
Paraguay		0	1.05	0.27	0.16	4.25	1	83.4460	14.1727	NA	NA	2	0	0	0
		199					1490.552				292.240				
Paraguay		3	7.3	3.04	1.78	4.58	5	82.7038	20.0055	NA	6	6	0	0	0
		199					1594.568				344.178				
Paraguay		6	10.67	4.57	2.66	4.91	2	80.6408	25.5431	1.3283	7	7	0	0	0
0,		199					1600.347				282.728				
Paraguay		9	9.35	3.63	2.02	5.24	8	76.9146	28.1064	1.0416	1	7	0	0	0
Turuguuj		198	1.00	0.00	2102	0.12	2633.775	, 01/110	2011001	110.110	-	,	Ū	Ū.	Ũ
Peru		170	11.66	3.14	1.27	17.77	2035.775	83.6333	14.8811	1.2006	93.3817	6	0	1	1
i ciu		198	11.00	5.14	1.27	17.77	2441.242	05.0555	14.0011	1.2000	25.5017	0	0	1	1
Dama			12.65	2.02	1.57	10.09		80 2605	22 2607	1 4571	65 5677	7	0	1	1
Peru		4	13.65	3.82	1.57	19.08	5	80.3605	22.3697	1.4571	65.5677	7	0	1	1
D		198	0.1.4	2.20	0.00	20.45	2513.288	77 1540	160450	1 5001	55 (202	-	0		
Peru		7	9.14	2.29	0.89	20.42	8	77.1540	16.3413	1.7331	57.6282	7	0	1	1
_		199					2110.890					_			
Peru		0	15.89	4.5	1.8	21.77	1	74.1932	13.4617	1.5879	63.7055	7	0	1	1

Peru	199 3	12.62	3.18	1.1	23.08	1896.525 8	71.0730	10.9486	1.5998	85.0027		4	0	1	1
reiu		12.02	5.16	1.1	25.08	° 2203.584	/1.0/50	10.9460	1.3998	85.0027		4	0	1	1
Peru	6	3.41	0.63	0.17	24.37	0	68.0150	17.8112	0.7254	93.6070		3	0	1	1
_	199					2329.392				100.638					
Peru	9	15.8	6.18	3.38	25.61	1102.506	65.3610	28.2483	0.8567	6 151 246		3	0	1	1
Philippines	198 1	34.68	10.18	3.94	48.72	1102.506 5	86.2912	31.8321	0.9929	151.246 7		0	1	1	0
1 imppines	198	51.00	10.10	5.71	10.72	1081.645	00.2712	51.0521	0.7727	, 144.988		0	1	1	0
Philippines	4	36.86	11.16	4.45	52.87	3	83.5386	31.6007	1.1649	4		0	1	1	0
DI '1' '	198	07.17	11.10			015 00 65	01.0400	160005	0.0540	147.475					0
Philippines	7 199	37.17	11.18	4.4	57.33	915.8065	81.2498	16.9825	2.3548	2 174.512		4	1	1	0
Philippines	0	33.85	9.91	3.8	61.95	988.0322	79.4391	17.5829	2.3838	174.512 6		8	0	1	0
	199					,				196.509		-	-	-	-
Philippines	3	30.28	8.54	3.17	66.52	958.9318	77.3951	21.6338	2.7307	4		8	0	1	0
DL 11 a starte	199	20.22	9.70	2.25	71 10	007 1012	75 1764	29 5250	1 0720	244.298		0	0	1	0
Philippines	6 199	30.23	8.79	3.35	71.18	997.1013 1041.177	75.1764	38.5350	1.2738	0 301.822		8	0	1	0
Philippines	9	24.74	6.45	2.21	76.02	6	73.0468	46.0989	0.7503	0		8	1	1	0
11	198					3709.029									
Romania	1	0.36	0.29	0.29	22.42	7	61.0614	NA	NA	NA		0	0	0	0
Domonio	198 4	0.32	0.29	0.29	22.66	4063.007	55.9026	NA	NA	NA		0	0	0	0
Romania	4 198	0.52	0.29	0.29	22.00	4325.828	55.9020	NA	NA	NA		0	0	0	0
Romania	7	0.29	0.29	0.28	22.95	6	51.2742	NA	NA	NA		0	0	0	0
	199					4065.698									
Romania	0	0.29	0.27	0.26	23.2	9	51.7456	NA	NA	42.9071		3	0	0	0
Romania	199 3	2.16	0.62	0.38	22.76	3194.147 4	50.6196	NA	NA	154.129 1		5	0	0	0
Romania	199	2.10	0.02	0.50	22.70	3478.908	50.0170	1171	1171	177.406		5	0	0	0
Romania	6	2.98	0.76	0.4	22.62	0	48.3130	11.4912	NA	4		6	1	0	0
D	199	• • • •		0.45	aa 15	3329.644		0.00.00		179.555		0	_	0	0
Romania	9 198	2.89	0.56	0.17	22.47	7	47.5731	9.3268	NA	6		8	1	0	0
Russian Federation	198	1.07	0.26	0.13	139.94	NA	46.8125	NA	NA	NA	NA		1	1	1
	198												-	-	-
Russian Federation	4	0.74	0.2	0.11	142.75	NA	47.4200	NA	NA	NA	NA		1	1	1
Description Followsting	198	0.54	0.16	0.1	145.01	NT A	40 2201	NI A	NT A	NT A	NT A		1	1	1
Russian Federation	7 199	0.54	0.16	0.1	145.91	NA 5784.287	48.3281	NA	NA	NA	NA		1	1	1
Russian Federation	0	0.65	0.11	0.06	148.29	1	49.3151	NA	NA	79.0213	NA		1	1	1
	199					4731.592				205.532					
Russian Federation	3	1.5	0.1	0.01	148.52	8	50.3543	11.7946	NA	2		5	1	1	0
Russian Federation	199 6	2.81	0.4	0.08	147.74	3541.816 3	50.0500	9.9490	NA	154.060 6		4	1	1	0
Russiali reuelatioli	0	2.01	0.4	0.08	14/./4	3	50.0500	7.7490	11/1	0		4	1	1	U

	199					3415.758				172.423				
Russian Federation	9 198	2.72	0.65	0.24	146.31	8	46.7100	13.1386	NA 12.130	7 116.196	4	1	1	0
Rwanda	1	58.18	16.94	6.41	5.31	273.4635	101.5092	5.4193	7	3	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	198 4	63.26	19.67	7.85	5.87	275.4714	104.9537	6.1514	10.288 4	100.339 5	0	0	0	0
Kwanua	198	03.20	19.07	7.85	5.87	275.4714	104.9337	0.1314	10.699	5	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	7	67.69	23.92	10.9	6.74	260.9546	108.6714	7.8431	8	90.0000	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	199 0	68.86	27.15	13.91	7.21	246.5328	109.7105	8.3827	10.348 9	67.3348	0	0	0	0
	199								18.090					
Rwanda	3 199	75.57	34.22	19.36	6.07	262.6904	98.3325	5.7080	7 60.810	74.8824 134.297	0	1	0	0
Rwanda	6	76.66	37.05	21.93	5.93	183.1135	84.7320	8.3679	3	134.297	0	1	0	0
	199								16.979					
Rwanda	9	79.05	41	25.33	7.85	215.9458	92.8949	8.9250	8	93.0094	0	1	0	0
São Tomé and	198 1	21.99	5.43	1.79	0.1	NA	108.3808	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
Principe São Tomé and	198	21.99	5.45	1.79	0.1	NA	108.3808	NA	NA	INA	NA	0	0	0
Principe	4	25.1	6.62	2.33	0.1	NA	107.8308	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
São Tomé and	198	25.1	0.02	2.55	0.1	1171	107.0500	1471	1 12 1	1111	1474	0	0	0
Principe	7	26.49	7.18	2.59	0.11	NA	108.1169	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
São Tomé and	199													
Principe	0	26.2	7.06	2.54	0.12	NA	109.8463	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
São Tomé and	199													
Principe	3	30.08	8.66	3.31	0.13	NA	110.3755	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
São Tomé and	199													
Principe	6	28.93	8.18	3.07	0.13	NA	107.0622	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
São Tomé and	199													
Principe	9	28.93	8.18	3.07	0.14	NA	98.2799	NA	NA	NA 208.149	NA	0	0	0
Sanagal	198 1	62.89	32	20.02	5.72	731.8169	97.4617	35.9448	10.066 2	208.149 0	2	0	0	0
Senegal	198	02.89	32	20.02	5.72	/31.8109	97.4017	55.9448	2 11.919	242.747	2	0	0	0
Senegal	4	64.07	32.92	20.74	6.25	723.5739	100.2851	33.7335	4	242.747	2	0	0	0
Sellegar	198	01.07	52.72	20.71	0.20	123.3137	100.2001	55.7555	12.793	174.476	-	0	0	Ŭ
Senegal	7	65.22	33.84	21.45	6.85	714.6187	101.2960	27.8200	1	3	2	0	0	0
e	199								14.127	164.852				
Senegal	0	64.99	33.65	21.31	7.51	696.7051	100.7854	27.9199	8	7	2	0	0	1
	199								10.612	156.737				
Senegal	3	58.02	25.23	14.31	8.23	665.3404	98.9071	25.9909	8	5	2	0	0	1
	199								14.105	198.763				
Senegal	6	51.97	18.33	8.55	8.94	644.3466	96.5938	15.6777	8	1	2	0	0	1
C	199	45.00	15.04	(72)	0.62	(74 1702	04 72 42	15 2205	0.0525	185.936	~	0	0	0
Senegal	9 198	45.99	15.24	6.73	9.62	674.1783	94.7243	15.3286	9.9535	5	2	0	0	0
Serbia	198	0.4	0.21	0.21	7.41	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	0	0	0
Seroiu	1	U.T	0.21	0.21	/1	1 1 1 1	1 12 1	1111	1 12 1	1 12 1	1	0	0	0

	198													
Serbia	198 4 198	0.34	0.2	0.19	7.49	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	0	0	0
Serbia	7 199	0.29	0.18	0.18	7.56	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	0	0	0
Serbia	0 199	0.29	0.18	0.18	7.59	NA	50.8306	NA	NA	NA	1	0	0	0
Serbia	3 199	0.33	0.19	0.19	7.7	NA 2390.992	50.9849	NA	NA	NA	0	1	0	1
Serbia	6 199	0.33	0.19	0.19	7.71	6 2573.498	50.7910	NA	NA	65.2973 127.193	0	1	0	1
Serbia	9 198	0.3	0.19	0.18	7.54	5	50.1533	24.6550	1.6211	1 170.825	0	1	0	1
Sierra Leone	1 198	59.09	42.12	35.16	3.26	423.4375	88.4806	7.2011	6.2812	8	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	4 198	62.28	44.44	37.07	3.49	428.0259	91.0269	6.0723	6.2102 12.544	97.8248 113.511	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	7 199	60.55	43.18	36.03	3.8	394.1284	92.0037	3.7522	3 10.518	9 153.395 2	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone	0 199 3	62.36 64.96	43.82 41.31	36.31 32.4	4.04 3.99	362.7721 329.8211	91.3435 89.2264	3.8572 3.3359	4 21.606 5	3 177.596 8	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 0
Sierra Leone	199 6	66.05	37.61	27.33	3.99	295.1326	86.3757	2.7705	26.763 4	8 149.784 8	2	1	0	0
Sierra Leone	199 9	69.02	35.29	23.16	4.03	271.8119	84.1742	2.6806	14.090 7	97.3599	0	1	0	0
South Africa	198 1	17.15	3.76	1.07	28.25	5314.487 2	80.6308	58.3145	NA	182.425 2	° 7	1	0	1
South Africa	198 4	18.86	4.45	1.36	30.51	5216.975 1	78.7559	66.4381	NA	148.185 7	7	1	0	1
South Africa	198 7	21.23	5.47	1.81	32.93	4935.308 0	76.5550	73.1928	NA	156.933 9	7	1	0	1
South Africa	199 0	21.4	5.55	1.85	35.2	4930.446 3	73.9248	78.0287	NA	142.788 8	7	0	0	1
South Africa	199 3	24.3	6.92	2.52	37.47	4564.262 1	69.8967	105.3057	0.2117	118.166 8	8	0	0	1
South Africa	199 6	21.78	5.56	1.85	40	4577.506	65.0064	117.8204	0.2460	134.753 3	9	0	0	0
South Africa	199 9	25.65	7.8	3.06	42.92	4609.623 8	59.9951	122.9430	0.3825	146.271 8 242.477	9	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	198 1 198	22.98	5.19	1.73	14.85	545.7758	67.3926	19.3091	9.1812	243.477 1 204.921	6	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	198 4 198	20.79	4.54	1.48	15.6	601.0924	65.4861	20.0010	8.4878	204.921 7 183.913	6	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	7	18.63	3.81	1.2	16.37	655.3736	63.4416	20.4103	7.8640	4	6	1	0	0

a	199			0.01	1= 00	60 4 61 0 0	<1 0 0		0.0470	195.174				0	
Sri Lanka	0	15	2.73	0.81	17.02	684.6139	61.0275	20.5321	9.0468	1 217.547		6	1	0	0
Sri Lanka	199 3	16.78	3.17	0.91	17.65	762.8271	58.2890	9.2371	7.6633	217.547		6	1	0	0
SII Laika	199	10.78	5.17	0.91	17.05	/02.02/1	38.2890	9.2371	7.0055	239.939		0	1	0	0
Sri Lanka	6	16.67	3.09	0.85	18.34	862.8666	55.1282	23.9734	4.3384	8		6	0	0	0
	199									237.384					
Sri Lanka	9	14.31	2.69	0.77	19.06	965.5832	51.5234	29.1407	2.2170	0		6	0	0	0
	198					2653.673				463.389					
St. Lucia	1	22.85	7.99	3.96	0.12	9	95.7466	45.4570	5.4876	9	NA		0	0	0
a - 1	198		~ ~ ~	• • • •	0.10	2582.630		10 1==0		392.156			<u>.</u>	0	0
St. Lucia	4	22.96	8.03	3.99	0.12	4	89.5439	48.4778	4.3717	7	NA		0	0	0
C4 Lucio	198 7	24.83	0 02	4.42	0.12	2980.217	94.0145	47.5042	4 5 1 2 0	448.844	NA		0	0	0
St. Lucia	199	24.83	8.83	4.42	0.13	8 3836.047	84.0145	47.3042	4.5129	2 521.558	NA		0	0	0
St. Lucia	0	24.99	8.9	4.46	0.14	1	79.7326	56.6587	5.4619	521.558 5	NA		0	0	0
St. Edela	199	27.77	0.7	4.40	0.14	4689.088	17.1520	50.0507	5.4017	438.854	11/1		0	0	0
St. Lucia	3	21.59	7.46	3.68	0.14	3	77.0125	55.6503	5.8209	4	NA		0	0	0
	199					4962.883				404.772					
St. Lucia	6	20.45	6.99	3.43	0.15	7	74.3152	64.7092	7.6782	6	NA		0	0	0
	199					5265.217				370.292					
St. Lucia	9	19.36	6.55	3.2	0.16	3	69.9440	72.4141	3.1369	5	NA		0	0	0
	198														
Sudan	1	44.97	15.76	7.46	14.94	472.0801	99.5948	12.9801	8.0252	96.3107		0	1	1	1
0.1	198	10.65	17.00	0.74	1656	175 0006	00.0000	10 0107	0 7070	01 1175		0		1	1
Sudan	4 198	49.65	17.99	8.74	16.56	475.0906	98.8009	12.8187	8.7272	91.1175		0	1	1	1
Sudan	7	47.33	16.87	8.09	18.14	428.7936	97.0498	10.3425	6.6116	47.2471		7	0	1	1
Sudan	199	47.55	10.07	0.09	10.14	428.7950	97.0498	10.5425	0.0110	4/.24/1		/	0	1	1
Sudan	0	50.78	18.55	9.07	20.01	455.7390	94.6449	5.7218	6.2601	37.2604		3	0	1	1
	199														
Sudan	3	45.01	15.78	7.47	22.75	471.1482	92.2262	3.8851	7.7024	46.2077		0	1	1	1
	199														
Sudan	6	42.66	14.7	6.86	25.26	484.8969	90.2072	2.2788	2.5928	52.5888		0	1	1	1
a 1	199		10.00			- 10 0100		1 00 50				0			
Sudan	9	37.17	12.28	5.53	27.09	542.9132	88.5386	1.9053	1.8543	64.4481		0	1	1	1
Suriname	198 1	17.75	6.96	3.66	0.37	3959.318 1	79.7682	28.8691	11.365 6	391.846 0		2	0	1	0
Sumane	198	17.75	0.90	5.00	0.57	3648.074	79.7082	28.8091	0	313.704		2	0	1	0
Suriname	4	17.82	6.99	3.68	0.37	1	70.9906	35.0032	4.0042	6		0	0	1	0
b di indino	198	17102	0.77	2100	0.07	3118.244	1017700	0010002		198.646		0	Ũ		Ũ
Suriname	7	18.99	7.56	4.03	0.39	4	65.8027	39.9222	1.6716	2		1	0	1	0
	199					3075.825				205.712					
Suriname	0	19.1	7.62	4.06	0.41	8	62.2234	40.3509	9.1405	3		2	0	1	0
~ .	199					3038.451			15.018	185.044					
Suriname	3	16.96	6.58	3.43	0.42	9	60.6674	34.2751	1	4		6	0	1	0

	199					2893.960			11 267	153.504				
Suriname	199 6	16.23	6.23	3.22	0.44	2893.960 0	59.7883	9.3237	11.267 8	155.504	6	0	1	0
Sumane	199	10.25	0.23	5.22	0.44	2995.711	59.1885	9.5251	0	204.447	0	0	1	0
Suriname	9	15.54	5.9	3.02	0.46	2775.711	58.1027	17.6733	6.2732	1	6	0	1	0
Summerie	198	1010	0.17	0.02	0.10	1202.035	001102/	1,10,00	0.2702	531.783	0	0	-	Ŭ
Swaziland	1	89.13	61.37	46.98	0.62	8	106.2443	24.7968	NA	3	0	0	0	0
	198					1299.408				478.850				
Swaziland	4	89.26	61.58	47.19	0.68	9	107.0984	23.0434	NA	4	0	0	0	0
	198					1430.886				462.013				
Swaziland	7	86.01	56.77	42.32	0.77	5	106.0715	17.7769	NA	4	0	0	0	0
	199					1776.916				456.046				
Swaziland	0	79.72	48.98	34.92	0.86	8	103.7575	17.3168	4.5693	2	0	0	0	0
	199					2014.600				397.000				
Swaziland	3	79.48	48.72	34.67	0.93	9	103.0516	18.7686	4.0897	2	0	0	0	0
	199					2092.532				410.294				
Swaziland	6	64.76	33.71	21.36	0.98	6	101.2904	15.8300	3.0898	1	0	0	0	0
0 11 1	199	46.01	10.20	0.0	1.05	2164.871	05 1050	10 5155	1 0000	435.719	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	9	46.81	18.36	9.2	1.05	6	95.1852	13.5155	1.8090	6	0	0	0	0
Comion Anah Danuhlia	198	5 75	0.78	0.18	9.28	1234.819 9	106 7905	57665	15.075 9	160.630	0	1	1	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1 198	5.75	0.78	0.18	9.28	9 1245.198	106.7895	5.7665	9	8 117.549	0	1	1	1
Syrian Arab Republic	4	3.54	0.44	0.1	10.31	1245.198	106.4303	7.7790	5.1281	117.349 6	0	1	1	1
Synaii Arab Kepublic	198	5.54	0.44	0.1	10.51	1135.634	100.4303	1.1190	5.1201	117.698	0	1	1	1
Syrian Arab Republic	7	5.78	0.79	0.18	11.37	3	104.6847	7.6100	5.3061	117.098 6	0	1	1	1
Synan Mao Republic	, 199	5.70	0.77	0.10	11.57	1124.346	104.0047	7.0100	5.5001	154.330	0	1	1	1
Syrian Arab Republic	0	6.2	0.86	0.2	12.45	2	101.3634	7.2127	3.5022	9	0	1	1	1
o yman muo nepuone	199	0.2	0.00	0.2	12.10	1252.398	101.5051	,.212,	5.5022	189.136	0	1	1	-
Syrian Arab Republic	3	5.87	0.8	0.18	13.56	2	95.4787	9.6367	2.5722	5	0	1	1	1
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	199					1406.578				217.345				
Syrian Arab Republic	6	5.46	0.74	0.16	14.75	2	88.5945	10.3793	3.9567	3	0	1	1	1
	199					1422.405				191.956				
Syrian Arab Republic	9	4.63	0.6	0.13	16	1	82.4979	9.4079	1.3255	2	0	0	1	1
	199									157.848				
Tajikistan	3	21.94	6.01	2.5	5.62	493.6440	91.8693	NA	1.1061	5	0	0	0	0
	199									391.809				
Tajikistan	6	72.05	26.91	13.22	5.86	248.4726	92.7888	NA	7.0794	9	0	1	0	0
m •••• •	199	50.00	15.4	6.00	6.00	010 5050	00.0044	15 0075	11.211	421.638			0	0
Tajikistan	9	50.08	15.4	6.83	6.09	213.5873	90.3966	15.3275	2	3	1	1	0	0
Tonzonio	198	62.39	23.2	11.4	19.28	NA	96.6625	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
Tanzania	198	02.39	23.2	11.4	19.20	NA	90.0023	NA	INA	INA	0	0	0	1
Tanzania	4	67.03	25.95	13.09	21.18	NA	96.5245	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
Talizallia	198	07.03	23.93	15.09	21.10	NA	90.5245	INA	INA	INA	0	0	0	1
Tanzania	7	68.92	27.16	13.85	23.22	NA	96.0516	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
i unzulliu	, 199	00.72	27.10	15.05	23.22	1.12.1	20.0510	1.12.1	23.477	1 1/ 1	0	0	U U	1
Tanzania	0	69.52	27.56	14.11	25.48	293.0980	95.3044	9.8484	23.477	50.0758	0	0	0	1
	-				0				-			-	-	

	199								25.260	161.387				
Tanzania	3	74.99	31.99	17.2	28.16	289.7164	94.0630	11.5239	7	3	0	0	0	1
	199								17.536	181.702				
Tanzania	6	79.47	36.74	20.82	30.78	281.0309	92.6844	6.4827	0	0	1	1	0	0
	199								11.215	114.709				
Tanzania	9	82.63	39.89	23.14	33.18	291.7554	91.5804	3.8635	8	2	2	1	0	0
	198									160.317				
Thailand	1	21.96	5.52	1.84	48.32	884.3683	75.7652	41.9996	1.3095	5	3	0	1	1
	198									143.002				
Thailand	4	21.12	5.03	1.6	51.09	981.8684	68.3122	51.5194	1.0876	1	3	0	1	1
	198					1098.789				155.554				
Thailand	7	17.94	3.73	1.05	53.99	0	60.9268	58.2370	1.0792	1	3	0	1	1
	199					1433.874				215.602				
Thailand	0	11.55	2.36	0.75	56.58	9	54.7853	73.1397	0.9277	8	4	0	1	0
	199					1814.213				236.584				
Thailand	3	6.11	1.08	0.31	58.07	5	51.1763	99.6422	0.6285	0	6	0	1	0
11111110	199	0111	1100	0101	20107	2258.375	0111700	<i>,,,</i> ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	0.0200	257.793	Ũ	Ŭ		Ũ
Thailand	6	2.86	0.48	0.13	59.56	5	48.8058	138.2541	0.4592	237.775	9	0	1	0
Thanand	199	2.00	0.40	0.15	57.50	2175.641	40.0050	150.25+1	0.4372	300.495	,	0	1	0
Thailand	9	3.61	0.55	0.13	61.62	5	45.9466	151.1799	0.6401	300.475	9	0	1	0
Thanand	198	5.01	0.55	0.15	01.02	5	45.5400	131.1777	0.0401	332.847	,	0	1	0
Togo	198	39.58	12.71	5.28	2.81	504.0208	97.3118	27.4725	9.2101	552.047	0	0	1	1
Togo	198	39.38	12.71	5.28	2.81	304.0208	97.3116	21.4725	13.688	305.624	0	0	1	1
Togo		17 51	16.07	7 75	2 14	439.1460	08 0640	24 2921	15.088	303.024 4	0	0	1	1
Togo	4 198	47.51	16.97	7.75	3.14	439.1400	98.0649	24.3831	4 14.037	4 297.306	0	0	1	1
Ŧ		40.00	12.22	0.00	2.47	100 10 00	07.0470	00 7000			0	0	1	1
Togo	7	48.89	17.77	8.23	3.47	429.4968	97.9478	23.7983	5	7	0	0	1	1
T	199	40.1	17.01	7.05	2 70	122 6526	07 1 4 4 2	02 1700	15.586	263.572	0	0	1	1
Togo	0	48.1	17.31	7.95	3.79	432.6536	97.1643	23.1780	0	2	0	0	1	1
T	199	(2.02	26.02	14.07	1.00	252 2500	0.4 0700	0 < 1000	11.324	194.541		0		
Togo	3	62.93	26.93	14.27	4.08	372.3589	96.3782	26.4829	2	0	1	0	1	1
_	199								13.104	212.071				
Togo	6	51.28	19.18	9.11	4.39	379.1811	94.7791	19.2214	3	9	1	0	0	1
	199									214.657				
Togo	9	48.12	17.32	7.96	4.74	432.8680	91.4663	16.7467	7.1188	9	1	0	0	0
	198					1820.716				257.997				
Tunisia	1	9.71	2.21	0.78	6.56	6	83.0141	48.1142	2.9554	1	0	1	0	0
	198					1870.797				238.724				
Tunisia	4	8.88	1.99	0.7	7.04	5	80.0145	59.6539	2.4515	7	0	1	0	0
	198					1942.617				208.363				
Tunisia	7	9.31	2.2	0.81	7.68	3	77.3748	63.4020	2.5102	5	0	0	0	0
	199					1962.211				269.844				
Tunisia	0	5.86	1.37	0.54	8.15	4	74.5772	55.1504	3.1640	0	0	0	0	0
	199					2151.156				260.097				
Tunisia	3	6.22	1.34	0.47	8.66	3	70.5002	62.3693	2.4119	1	0	0	0	0
	199					2274.772				272.239				
Tunisia	6	5.64	1.12	0.36	9.09	7	65.3396	66.4042	0.6075	2	1	0	0	0

m · ·	199	2.12	0.57	0.10	0.46	2554.529	50 6745	50 4417	0.0465	238.385		0	0	0
Tunisia	9 199	3.13	0.57	0.18	9.46	0 1790.533	59.6745	59.4417	0.9465	3 316.899	1	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	3	63.53	25.82	13.47	3.99	2	79.2587	9.0104	0.9710	8	0	0	0	0
Turkineinstan	199	05.55	23.02	15.17	5.77	1273.350	17.2501	2.0101	0.9710	488.427	0	0	Ŭ	0
Turkmenistan	6	41.82	15.11	7.3	4.27	2	77.3960	2.6236	1.0721	8	0	0	0	0
	199					1208.275				354.335				
Turkmenistan	9	24.33	6.78	2.62	4.45	5	72.3377	1.4669	0.9591	2	0	0	0	0
TT 1	198	(7.00	22.16	10.17	10.02	NT 4	100 1704	2 (705	7 0070	120.545	4	0	1	0
Uganda	1 198	67.32	32.16	19.17	12.93	NA	100.1794	3.6785	7.2073	4	4	0	1	0
Uganda	198	70.43	34.59	20.99	14.18	200.5152	100.5575	2.9313	5.6256	75.2221	4	0	1	0
Oganda	198	70.43	54.57	20.77	14.10	200.5152	100.5575	2.7515	5.0250	75.2221	-	0	1	0
Uganda	7	73.74	37.36	23.12	15.74	181.1430	101.1106	3.1525	4.9732	83.0856	0	0	1	1
6	199								10.555					
Uganda	0	70.74	33.49	19.72	17.53	192.4941	102.1007	NA	9	78.0072	0	0	1	1
	199								21.884					
Uganda	3	70.06	29.99	16.16	19.43	204.5807	103.8358	4.2135	9	90.6942	0	1	1	1
TL	199	(2.01	22.0	11 5 4	21.41	000 1070	105 0417	4 7 4 9 9	14.990	05 9490	0	1	1	1
Uganda	6 199	63.01	23.9	11.54	21.41	233.1270	105.8417	4.7482	0 11.026	95.8480 100.227	0	1	1	1
Uganda	9	59.43	23.85	12.34	23.51	259.3178	107.4219	5.6015	11.020	2	0	1	1	1
Ogundu	199	57.45	25.05	12.34	25.51	2149.943	107.4219	5.0015	2	148.100	0	1	1	1
Ukraine	3	0.56	0.18	0.12	52.18	5	51.1883	2.0339	NA	1	6	1	0	0
	199					1293.094				265.030				
Ukraine	6	1.93	0.63	0.42	51.06	6	50.9077	2.4952	NA	3	7	1	0	0
	199					1130.058				272.242				
Ukraine	9	2.03	0.46	0.21	49.67	0	47.7297	6.2891	NA	8	7	0	0	0
Vanamuala DD	198	2 07	0.34	0.05	15 55	6470.741	70 1510	40 5254	0.0174	149.992 0	9	0	1	1
Venezuela, RB	1 198	3.27	0.54	0.05	15.55	7 5599.277	78.4548	49.5354	0.0174	123.248	9	0	1	1
Venezuela, RB	4	3.84	0.45	0.08	16.87	5599.277 6	75.2419	56.1403	0.0183	123.248	9	1	1	1
, enebuena, reb	198	5101	0110	0.00	10107	5444.753	,012119	0011100	010100	127.056	-		-	-
Venezuela, RB	7	3.13	0.28	0.03	18.28	3	73.3713	54.6156	0.0299	8	9	1	1	1
	199					5360.957				162.644				
Venezuela, RB	0	5.67	3.21	2.61	19.74	7	72.1713	36.1407	0.1185	4	9	1	1	1
	199	5 00	2.0	0.1.4	21.16	5760.543	70.0500	26.2260	0.0500	166.981	0			
Venezuela, RB	3 199	5.88	2.9	2.14	21.16	8 5510-296	70.0600	26.3268	0.0620	5	8	1	1	1
Venezuela, RB	199 6	9.54	4.26	2.92	22.56	5519.286 3	67.1636	11.7994	0.0547	159.927	8	1	1	1
venezueia, KD	199	9.54	4.20	2.92	22.50	5489.487	07.1050	11.7994	0.0547	136.914	0	1	1	1
Venezuela, RB	9	11.41	5.14	3.52	23.95	8	64.1506	14.1396	0.0347	7	8	1	1	1
,	198					2					~	-		-
Vietnam	1	89.11	48.61	30.12	54.72	NA	85.9805	NA	NA	NA	0	0	1	1
	198													
Vietnam	4	84.78	42.33	24.64	57.69	262.9544	82.6786	NA	NA	NA	0	0	1	1

	100													
Vietnam	198 7 199	79.72	36.53	20.01	61.75	269.2360	79.5105	NA	NA	44.0173 158.170	0	0	1	1
Vietnam	0	75.03	32.07	16.71	66.02	290.7159	76.6719	NA	2.4734	7	0	0	1	1
	199									206.736				
Vietnam	3	63.76	23.58	11.02	69.64	334.4507	74.2110	15.0932	3.4710	1	0	0	1	1
Vietnam	199 6	85.5	42.73	24.81	73.16	410.3788	70.9169	18.5774	4.5392	244.900 2	0	1	1	1
Viculalli	199	65.5	42.75	24.01	75.10	410.3788	70.9109	18.3774	4.5592	294.133	0	1	1	1
Vietnam	9	48.77	14.84	5.89	76.6	487.7998	65.5103	22.7198	4.4147	1	0	1	1	1
	198													
Yemen, Rep.	1	11.43	2.62	0.97	8.22	NA	108.3122	NA	NA	NA	0	1	0	1
Vaman Dan	198	8.77	1.04	0.72	0.29	NT A	112 0125	NI A	NTA	NA	0	0	0	1
Yemen, Rep.	4 198	8.77	1.94	0.72	9.28	NA	112.0125	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
Yemen, Rep.	7	11.46	2.62	0.97	10.41	NA	116.4002	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
, ī	199													
Yemen, Rep.	0	11.94	2.75	1.02	11.79	666.4682	120.2194	5.2198	8.0164	29.3684	0	0	0	1
VD.	199	11.50	2.65	0.00	12 72	(94.0721	110 7440	4 9 1 5 1	5 0444	132.437	1	0	0	1
Yemen, Rep.	3 199	11.56	2.65	0.98	13.73	684.0721	119.7449	4.8151	5.0444	8 191.966	1	0	0	1
Yemen, Rep.	6	11.1	2.53	0.94	15.58	704.8562	115.8959	3.9407	4.3862	9	1	1	0	1
, ī	199									227.091				
Yemen, Rep.	9	11.31	2.51	0.91	17.04	742.0509	110.4795	4.8281	6.2928	5	1	1	0	1
A 11	198	52.05	25.12	07.04	6.04	015 4040	100 4020	17 5006		238.439	0			
Zambia	1 198	53.85	35.12	27.84	6.04	815.4343	100.4920	17.5986	7.9255	4 196.875	0	1	1	1
Zambia	4	58.13	37.96	30.06	6.64	746.6759	99.0471	20.6567	8.4437	190.875	0	1	1	1
Lunion	198	00110	0,100	20100	0101	/ 1010/07	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	2010207	23.768	234.815	Ũ		-	-
Zambia	7	59.27	38.74	30.67	7.24	696.3746	97.0668	9.6764	0	6	0	1	1	1
	199								13.438	192.570				
Zambia	0	60.29	39.43	31.22	7.84	689.6527	95.3997	9.8894	0 31.334	l 220.186	0	0	1	1
Zambia	199 3	65.27	35.56	23.72	8.42	642.6469	94.1353	6.0235	51.554 7	230.186 8	6	0	1	0
Zamola	199	05.27	55.50	23.12	0.42	042.040)	74.1555	0.0235	31.933	199.698	0	0	1	0
Zambia	6	62.07	29.49	17.59	9.07	590.1196	93.4426	7.3532	2	9	5	0	0	0
	199								14.921	174.290				
Zambia	9	58.39	27.59	16.53	9.84	602.1557	93.4258	6.8351	4	7	3	0	0	0