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Abstract

By the end 2016 China had opened over 500 Confucius Institutes and over 1000 Confucius Classrooms in 140 countries. Beginning only in 2004, the pace and spread of this initiative has been remarkable; to the extent that China's numbers now rival the largest players in the field, namely the British Council and the Alliance Française. Like their international counterparts, Confucius Institutes disseminate language and culture as a way of communicating with foreign audiences. However, their organizational and operational structures are unique; Confucius Institutes embed themselves in partnership agreements, usually with educational institutions in host countries. Over the past ten years a substantial body of literature has emerged analysing these institutes' activities, audiences, goals, and challenges. Yet studies have largely utilised diplomacy frameworks rooted in twentieth century politics, which fail to address the intricacies of these distinctive partnership agreements and their potential impacts. Through empirical case study analysis, this dissertation investigates the partnership structures of Confucius Institutes in Scotland, in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of how this 21st century form of Chinese public diplomacy works. In utilising the currently evolving framework of new public diplomacy for analysis, findings indicate that the soft power potential of these institutes may be underestimated at present. Joint partnership structures are inciting a networked, dialogic, and collaborative form of diplomacy. Thus it is argued that a more contemporary and relationally orientated public diplomacy framework is needed to better understand and study these institutes. Confucius Institutes' soft power derives as much from the communicative processes of their diplomacy, as the actual products they are attempting to deliver.

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List of Abbreviations:

PD	Public diplomacy
CI	Confucius Institute
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
UoE	University of Edinburgh
CIFS	Confucius Institute for Scotland
UoG	University of Glasgow
UOGCI	University of Glasgow Confucius Institute
CISS	Confucius Institute for Scotland's Schools
HW	Heriot Watt University
TUFE	Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
CCH	Confucius Classroom Hubs
SCILT	Scotland's National Centre for Languages
SCIBC	Scottish Confucius Institute for Business and Communication

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The need for governments to interact with foreign publics is not a new concept; all major powers now engage in multifaceted public diplomacy efforts, alongside more traditional elitist modes of diplomacy. From the globalization of countries' media outlets, to the export of national sports, or to prominent politicians having social media pages; public diplomacy as 'a way to inform, influence and engage' civic audiences is recognised as key tool in developing an international environment receptive to a country's own aims and ambitions (Snow 2009, p. 6). However, in the 21st century there is an increased call for states to turn to what is becoming known as 'new public diplomacy' (Melissen 2005; 2011). In reaction to globalizing, multi-directional, and multi-modal communication trends, global publics are demonstrating a resistance to being spoken at, instead demanding an environment in which they can engage (Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault 2013). That is a diplomacy which interacts with its audience; promoting dialogue and discussion, and facilitating sustainable, longer-term relationships (Melissen 2011). Whilst traditional modes of public diplomacy relied on hierarchal, state-centric, and linear communication tactics (e.g. mass media dissemination), this newer public diplomacy privileges networked, relational, and dialogic approaches, whereby both state and non-state actors are utilised in engaging or joint narratives (Snow 2009).

Previous actions have demonstrated that China are acutely aware of the importance of national image management in the international sphere (Ramo 2007). Over the past 10 years China have invested heavily in the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy as a means to explain themselves in the new 21st century political orders they are becoming increasingly integrated in (Zhang 2016; Melissen 2005; Myers 2016). Today Chinese leaders assign unequivocal importance to 'soft power in China's international political strategy' (Li 2009, p.1). Both Hu and Xi have launched their own campaigns in this arena; with Hu introducing the concept into politics at the 2007 National Party Congress, and later Xi stressing soft power's central importance to reaching 'the Two Centenary Goals and realize the Chinese Dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' (Edney 2016; Xi 2014, p.178). Soft power has become a key phrase amongst Chinese leadership, media, and scholarship, with China now 'pumping an estimated $7 to $10 billion per year into its overseas publicity work' (Shambaugh 2013, p.207).

China's Confucius Institute (CI) programme is one of the tangible manifestations of this soft power pursuit. The largest and most systematic of China's public diplomacy efforts, CIs now operate globally and claim to reach audiences in the millions (Yang 2010; Hanban Annual Report 2016). Employing cultural outposts as a way to engage international publics is not a new phenomenon. The two biggest, the Alliance Française and the British Council have been in operation respectively since 1883 and 1934 (Alliance Française n.d; British Council n.d). These national outposts all project culture, and 'perform' nation to garner influence (Paschalidis 2009). However, where China's cultural outposts differ is in their distinct operational and organisational approaches. The Confucius Institutes are not stand-alone institutes, but have largely embedded themselves in partnership agreements within their host countries, and are thus far unique in this aspect.

This dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of how this unique style of public diplomacy is working, and what impacts such an approach may have. It is argued that the evolving field of new public diplomacy is a more sufficient framework through which to analyse and understand Confucius Institutes. This new public diplomacy is rooted in 21st century political and communication realities; recognizing 'the power of connections and identif[ying] the nature of these relationships as a key unit of analysis for public diplomacy' (Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault 2013, p.1). Key concepts from this framework are applied to an analysis of Confucius Institutes in Scotland, to reveal that in China's case the medium is as much the message; with the institutes' power both relying on, and deriving from, the successes of joint partnership agreements. This introduction provides firstly a brief historical overview of China's modern public diplomacy, secondly explains the structural organization of the Confucius Institute initiative in the PRC, before thirdly detailing the dissertation's proceeding formation.

1.1 From Opening Up (改革开放) to The China Dream (中国梦)

Since 1978 and Deng Xiaoping's reforms and opening (改革开放), China's international diplomacy has undergone rapid change. It would be incorrect to claim that the country had no understanding of diplomatic outreach before this time; as Xi Jinping himself points out, China had been engaging in trade and commerce relations overseas since the 2nd century BC (2014, p.285). Even during Mao's more recent closed off

regime the country recognised the importance of relations outside its territorial borders, and remained particularly astute to the potential power of foreign media and influence (Creemers 2015, p.306). However, Deng's economic reforms necessitated the beginning of China's development towards a more modern foreign diplomacy. Through 'opening up', and the later 'going out' (走出去) policy, China became increasingly integrated into a world in which their economic successes were dependent on their interactions and associations with foreign states. Strengthening these 'connections with the rest of the world' became a 'strong feature of its economic and foreign policies' (Flew & Hartig 2014, p.6). As early as 1979 the then head of the Central Propaganda Department, Hu Yaobang, pressed that all publications available internationally 'should be made acceptable to overseas readers' (Tsai 2016, p.2).

The 1990s are largely recognised as a turning point for China's diplomatic relations with the world's public (Zhao 2015; Zhu 2013; Scott 2015; d'Hooghe 2015). This turn was incited in part reaction to the reputation damage caused by the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and in part reaction to the country's increasingly rapid economic growth, which had moved it from to periphery of global politics much closer to the centre (Rawnsley 2009, p.287). The CCP had become increasingly aware of the important correlation between national image and power; seeing the former as vital to developing an international environment receptive to China's economic and political ambitions (Shambaugh 2013, p.4). By the 2000s, with leadership's desire to 'construct a great power identity for China', the PRC and CCP started to pursue aggressive public diplomacy efforts with annual increases in spending on propaganda (Brown 2016, p.21; Brady 2008, p.156). Today China continues to pursue this great power identity, but in reaction to an international community calling on the country to be an 'accountable' power, twine this with a narrative of a 'peacefully rising and responsible power' (Zoellick 2005; Zhu 2013, p.9).

Despite incredibly resounding successes economically, China's efforts to construct this great and peaceful identity have not been straightforward. As Tuke (2011, p.202) summarises;

> much of what China has learnt has been done the hard way with an extensive profile of blunders, including the years of self-imposed closure during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the Tiananmen affair in 1989, management of the outbreak of SARS in 2003

and a series of product safety scandals, most recently involving tainted milk powder.

Amongst Western powers China has also encountered rebuke in relation to human rights and authoritarian ideologies (Rawnsley 2009, p. 283). Today their image pursuit is further hampered by the rising 'China Threat' rhetoric (Breslin 2013; Shambaugh 2013). As China enhances its military power and exercises its growing economic might, the world debates whether it will become a status quo or revisionist power; an amenable player of current systems, or a challenger of previous global norms (Shambaugh 2013; Zhang 2015).

Nowhere is China's urge to be understood 'correctly' as explicit as in the discourse employed by the CCP to explain themselves post-2000. Both internal and external speculation surrounding their rise has re-shaped and re-directed this discourse numerous times (Pu & Zhang 2007, p.63; Shambaugh 2013, p.26). Deng's opening up may have incited a new era of international integration, but it was during Hu Jintao's period that this 'careful public diplomacy language' started to be deployed (Scott 2015, p. 249). Jia Qingguo (2006, p. 493) refers to this as the start of China's evolving 'policy of reassurance'; a policy that wanted the world to understand China's foreign goals as primarily 'to maintain world peace and promote common development' (ibid, p. 494). Beginning in 2003, 'peaceful rise'（中国和平崛起）was employed to describe China's upward economic trajectory (Suettinger 2004). This was soon dropped; the use of 'rise' continued to incite speculation rather than reassurance (Scott 2015, p.256). In 2004 'peaceful development'（中国和平发展）replaced 'peaceful rise'; this new term aimed to direct attention away from the external effects of China's behaviour, to how China's efforts would affect their internal environment (ibid). Although never officially dropped, when Hu Jintao rose to power in 2004, 'harmony' was injected into the rhetoric, to again underline these peaceful intensions (Brady 2008, p.58-59). Under Hu, China's narrative focused on building an internally 'harmonious society' (和谐社会), alongside an external 'harmonious world' (和谐世界) (Zheng & Tok 2007; Tsai 2016, p.2). Whilst the idea of harmony still prevails in White Papers and foreign policies, today under Xi Jinping far more emphasis is placed on the 'China Dream' (中国梦). Xi returns focus to the domestic with this, regularly citing it in combination with 'the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' (Xi 2014, p.178). This dream reflects both 'China's commitment to peaceful development,' as well as an aspiration 'to make

China a great power and to play a greater role in the world' (Xi 2014; Zhang 2015, p.229).

Whilst what this 'dream' may entail for current world orders is still unclear, this rapidly shifting rhetoric demonstrates a cognisant urgency on behalf of the PRC and CCP to manage the international environment they're increasingly integrated in. And China's recent investment- both theoretically and pragmatically- in soft power, is a significant manifestation of this awareness. As a potential solution to address the disjuncture between China's heightening economic and military strength, but faltering influence and image, China's soft power focus has manifested itself physically through many forms (Flew & Hartig 2014, p.9). From the development of English, Arabic, Russian, Spanish and French media channels (CCTV International), to the expansion of Xinhua and China Daily (with now over 1000 correspondents worldwide in 180 bureaus), to event hosting at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, to the significant hike in international student and scholar exchange programmes; China have been aggressive in their soft power pursuit, now spending more than any other country in Asia on outreach programmes (Beck 2013; Li 2013; Zhang 2016; Maggs 2014; Sun 2010; Rawnsley 2012). And their Confucius Institute project, 'is arguably China's most systematically planned soft power policy' yet (Yang 2010 p.235).

1.2 The Confucius Institute Project (孔子学院)

Starting with a pilot project in Uzbekistan 2004, before officially opening the first institute in South Korea later that year, the Confucius Institute programme has expanded faster than even government expectations had predicted (Zhao & Huang 2010). Bypassing initial targets to reach 100 institutes by 2010, the number already stood at 330 by the end of 2009, with current figures as of the end of 2016 at 513 (Hanban 2016). New targets aim to establish 1000 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms worldwide by 2020 (Shambaugh 2013; Siow 2011). Starr (2009, p.66) writes that this speed has marked a 'new phase in China's political self-confidence: it [is] joining a first-world club after a century of semi-colonial status and 50 years of third world membership.' Whilst India have tentatively begun opening cultural institutes, alongside South Korea and Japan, their numbers are nowhere near the figures of those from old colonial powers; the largest being France's Alliance Française (later

joined by the Institut Français), The UK's British Council, and Germany's Goethe-Institut. The Confucius Institute's numbers had surpassed all bar France's by the end of 2016 (Hanban 2016). Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the wide spread of these institutes today.

Table 1: Worldwide spread of Confucius Institutes

Area	Number of Institutes	Number of classrooms
Asia	115	100
Africa	48	27
America	161	554
Europe	171	293
Oceania	18	99

(Source: Hanban 2016, p.14)

Table 2: Countries with highest concentration of Confucius Institutes

Country	Number of Institutes	Number of classrooms
USA	110	501
UK	29	148
South Korea	23	13
Germany	19	4
Russia	17	5
France	17	3

(Source: Hanban 2016, p. 14)

According to China the primary mission of these institutes is to provide 'scope for people all over the world to learn about Chinese language and culture' (Hanban, a, n.d). In doing this they become a crucial 'bridge, reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China and the rest of the world' (ibid). Official explanations of the programme also emphasise its role in China's wider foreign policy mission to 'reassure the world that their intensions are benign' (Hanban, a, n.d; Paradise 2009, p.647). As Sir Timothy O'Shea of Edinburgh University says, these institutes are a 'key player in explaining China's new role' to the rest of the world (ctd. in Yang 2010p. 238). Thus the CIs work on two interdependent levels. Firstly, as a way of disseminating language learning and cultivating appreciation for Chinese culture, and secondly as 'part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds' (Paradise 2009, p.649). CIs are essentially 'performing the nation', or performing a preferred version of it, through the dissemination of selected Chinese language and culture (Paschalidis 2009, p.287).

But whilst such performances are present in every nations' cultural outposts, Confucius Institute's diverge from that of other models in their organisational and

operational structures. The Goethe-Institute, Institut Français, and The British Council (to name a few) are all stand-alone entities abroad. Although they receive government grants, they function as private or charitable organizations (Paschalidis 2009). Confucius Institutes are structured and organized very differently (Hartig 2016 a, p.2). Although an essential part of China's public diplomacy, the CI programme does not fall directly under the larger government or state propaganda offices (Shambaugh 2013, p.223; Hartig 2016 a, p.85). Rather the programme was initiated under the Office of Chinese Language Council International, also known as Hanban (中国国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室; 汉办). This Council claims to be non-government and non-profit, but are affiliated with China's Ministry of Education, and run under Director General Xu Lin, a vice-minister level official of the State Council (Hanban a, n.d). And are thus are inherently governmental or quasi-governmental. The line between Party and State in China is notoriously blurred, but it is necessary to recognise here that 'the Chinese political system is dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has, in one way or another, control over all other political institutions, including the state' (Hartig 2016 a, p.84). Given that all of China's public diplomacy endeavours are instigated by the State, or if not, are under state control, the CI programme is an inherently state-centric endeavour, and thus must be understood as a product of the Party-State in general (d'Hooghe 2005, p.103). As can be seen in appendix D, the CI headquarters are governed by their own council (consisting of a Chair and Vice Chairs), a board of directors (ten of which are international representatives), and divides its activities across multiple offices, all reporting to the Confucius Institutes headquarters in Beijing.

There are currently three different styles of Confucius Institutes: those operated solely by Hanban, those run under a joint venture partnership, or those entirely local run but with a licence from Hanban headquarters (Starr 2009; Hartig 2012; Yang 2010). The most common of these is the second; usually operating within foreign educational institutions, and engaging in joint venture partnerships with Chinese counterparts (Starr 2009). In these joint ventures Hanban provides a start-up donation (numbers vary widely between partnerships), followed by an annual contribution (usually although not always matched by the hosts), followed by a recurring annual opportunity for institutes to apply for extra funding to cover new projects and initiatives (Hanban, b, n.d). Some scholars have highlighted the huge budget Hanban is dedicating to this public

diplomacy endeavour (Siow 2011), but in a comparative context their expenditure figures are much less than that of the UK or Germany.[1] Hanban advocates this joint venture approach as financially beneficial; for Chinese partners are given a way to improve their 'academic performance and level of internationalisation,' whilst foreign hosts are given a 'safeguard in funding [and] instructors' (Chen ctd. in Starr 2009, p.69). However, motivations for hosting these institutes vary widely, and are inevitably tied up in the educational, political, and economic policies of their host nations.

1.3 Dissertation Formulation & Structure

Being at just over ten years old, a substantial body of English-language literature has now built up concerned with China's Confucius institutes. This appeared in correlation with their rise post-2004, and focuses on the activities, aims, and impacts of this version of China's public diplomacy (see Starr 2009 or Paradise 2009). These works largely explain what these institutes are doing and why, and utilise frameworks (chiefly propaganda, soft power, or older concepts in public diplomacy) that overlook the very aspect which differentiates these institutes from their equivalents in other countries; their relational structures. Falk Hartig, one of the leading writers on Confucius Institutes, observes in his work two weaknesses in past approaches to CI scholarship. The first being confusion surrounding the 'conceptual framework' by which to understand this diplomacy. The second, a 'lack of in-depth knowledge about Confucius Institutes', leading to overly simplistic assumptions that these institutes are either mere cultural exchange platforms, or at the other end of the scale, blatant propaganda (Hartig 2016 a, p. 9).

This dissertation attempts to breach these weaknesses by first arguing that the small, but evolving, field of new public diplomacy provides a better framework through which to study and understand the potential effects and impacts of Confucius Institutes. Given that the majority of CIs are established on relational foundations (partnerships between Chinese institutions and their foreign hosts), it is crucial that we begin to recognise the nature and impact of these relationships, as much as previous public diplomacy frameworks have acknowledged the nature and impact of the actual products

[1] According to 2016 annual reports by each of these respective national institutes, the British Council spent just over £1 billion during the 2015-2016 financial year, the Goethe Institute had a £1.07 billion annual budget, whilst Hanban's total 2016 expenditures stood at just over $314 million dollars (British Council 2016; EUNIC 2016; Hanban 2016).

CIs are disseminating (language and culture). To demonstrate that the soft power of CIs may lie in as much the intangible processes of communication, as the more tangible products being communicated, this framework is applied to analysis of a geographic area of CIs not yet studied; Confucius Institutes in Scotland. An empirical approach of scrutinising diplomacy frameworks, before applying case study analysis, aims to negate both of Hartig's points, and provide a detailed, more 'in-depth knowledge' of how this branch of Chinese public diplomacy works in the 21st century (Hartig 2016a, p. 9).

The study below is structured predominantly in two halves. The first half asserts the appropriateness of new public diplomacy as a framework. Here chapter two provides a brief overview of the theoretical foundations out of which new public diplomacy has evolved. Then, using this as a frame of reference, a literature review demonstrates the limitations of previous approaches to CI theory and scholarship. The second half proceeds to apply the relational framework of new public diplomacy to case-study analysis. In this half, chapter three briefly explains the methodological approaches used to extract data from Scottish CIs, before moving onto case-study findings in chapter four. Chapter five explicitly applies key concepts from new public diplomacy to these findings, considering how this framework reveals both strengths and weaknesses in China's approach. Finally, chapter six summarises the empirical study, before reflecting on how a better understanding of China's work here can contribute to the development of a clearer, and more empirically informed, theoretical framework through which to understand public diplomacy at large in the 21st century.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks & Literature Review

In order to recognise the necessity for the development of a 'newer' framework of public diplomacy, it is essential to understand the wider field of soft power, and the 'older' diplomacy it is growing out of. These theoretical frameworks (soft power, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and new public diplomacy) have all 'emergence[d] as tools of national self-promotion', primarily concerned with ideas of state influence and power; and are thus intricately connected (Ang, Isar & Marr 2015, p. 366). But each has evolved out of their own relative political climate, and need to be understood within these contexts. After outlining this larger frame of reference, a brief literature review considers the achievements and shortcomings of previous CI scholarship in utilising these frameworks.

2.1 Soft power (软实力)

In the 1950s Dahl famously provided a succinct definition of what power meant in international relations: power is defined as the ability of A to make B do something, something it wouldn't have done before A's influence (Dahl 1957). Historically, influential power had been understood through a fairly realist framework in IR, largely measured through a country's economic or military strength. However, with the end of the Cold War and the ascent of neorealism and neoliberalism, came political scientist Joseph Nye's identification of a 'great power shift', and his theorisation of a 'softer' form of power (Nye 1990, p.155; Chitty 2017, p.14-15; Zamorano 2016). Nye coined 'soft power' in the late 1980s, and continuing to evolve the concept through the early 2000s, explained it as the 'ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments'; it focused on co-opting relations rather than coercing them (Nye 2004). Nye (2013) saw this power as cultivated through three sources; a nation's culture; 'in places where it is attractive to others', political values; 'when it lives up to them at home and abroad', and foreign policies; 'when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority'. Thus Nye placed soft power in opposition to traditional hard power, but not instead of. Rather it should be understood as something that runs alongside its harder counterparts, and ideally complements it (Ang, Isar & Marr 2015, p. 367).

In more recent years scholarship has re-examined Nye's three criteria of attraction, and argued that not all resources are needed by a country to cultivate soft power. As Naren Chitty (2017, p. 25) writes,

> a country's policies may be detested in a second country while its cultural exports may be found delectable. Soft power capital generated by various kinds of exports collect in different equity accounts, deficits in one sector will not necessarily affect the soft power equity in another.

This development is key in understanding how and why this field continues to hold such resonance in Chinese politics and scholarship. China's domestic politics may stunt the country's soft power potential in some democratic nations, but the notion of different 'equity' accounts doesn't obliterate the possibility of soft power being cultivated through other sources (i.e. culture).

Nye may have been the first person to integrate this idea of power into the field IR, but understandings pertaining to the importance of power, national image, and influence have been around for centuries. As Melissen (2005, p. 3) writes, 'references to the nation and its image go back as far as the Bible, and international relations in ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance, were familiar with diplomatic activity aimed at foreign publics'. More recently others have recognised Nye's ideas as extensions of Bourdieu's; Bourdieu may have not been concerned with international relations, but his understanding in the importance of symbolic power and social capital as intangible resources, reverberate with Nye's ideas of 'soft' State power (Zamarno 2016; Adler-Nissen 2013; Pouliot & Mérand 2013). Nye's focus on countries utilising their intangible resources to garner influence and attraction; whether this be through values, cultural products, or politics, is best seen as 'the postmodern variant of power over opinion' (Melissen 2005, p.4). Today the concept has been adapted and stretched to such an extent that it is becoming ineffectual as an analytical framework. Whilst some highlight the concept as definitionaly confusing (Snow 2009; Gilboa 2008, p.62), others stress how it has become a fashionable caveat; a catch-all term for any sort of power considered not hard (Rawnsley 2012; Breslin 2010; 2011).

2.2 Public and cultural diplomacy (公共外交 & 文化外交)

Public diplomacy is largely recognised as one of the key instruments for soft power, but like soft power it also suffers from conceptual confusion and convolution:

‘public diplomacy is regarded as one of the most salient political communication issues of our times…[yet] there is no consensus [on] how public diplomacy should be defined or what it entails’ (Hartig 2016, p. 34). Whilst some use the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy interchangeably, public diplomacy is best understood as the process, whilst soft power the product of this process. PD is both an ‘instrument to activate soft power’ and a ‘facilitator of soft power’ (Rawnsley 2012, p.123; Melissen 2005, p.4). Cao Wei demonstrates this relationship well, by revising Nye’s original model:



Fig. 1. ‘Nye’s relation between public diplomacy and soft power.’ Source: Wei 2016, p.412.



Fig. 2. ‘The Right Relation between Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’. Source: Wei 2016, p.413

Here Wei demonstrates that a product cannot be considered a power resource before it has acquired a receptive audience, through means of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is often labelled as the modern relative of propaganda and nation branding, given its association with state actors (Hartig 2010). There is no real consensus on this front; whilst some see the two as more one-directional than public diplomacy, others see ‘public diplomacy [as] the umbrella term and can include, international broadcasting, cyber PD, diaspora PD, public relations, cultural diplomacy, exchanges, and branding’ (Melisen 2005, p.16-17; Gilboa 2008, p.62). Either way, the two are entwined in objective; to generate soft power and manage the ‘international environment through engagement with public’ (Sevin 2017, p. 66). Cultural diplomacy falls as a subset under this larger umbrella of public diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007; Ang, Isar & Mar 2015). The field specifically refers to the exchange of artistic or cultural products, information, or ideas (Cummings 2003). Cultural diplomacy holds particular prominence in China; with culture currently being seen as China’s strongest (and least controversial) asset for building soft power (Xi 2014, p.178-180).

Whilst this wider framework of public diplomacy is crucial to acquiring an understanding of how a state can garner influence (soft power), thus far PD theory has

been limited to exploring the information (the product or idea) that is disseminated, rather than the actual methods of this dissemination (the processes). This is because the field grew out of a similar context to soft power (twentieth century American politics), and thus assumed an adversarial orientation (Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault 2013, p.3). Twentieth century USA was largely defined by a series of wars, and thus public diplomacy became simply 'one more tool or weapon with which to defeat the enemy' (ibid). Coinciding with the emergence of mass media, information was privileged over processes, and a relational emphasis was neglected (ibid).

2.3 A Newer Public Diplomacy

In what Hartig calls the 'most important addition to the field', new public diplomacy has evolved out of a gradual recognition that today's audiences are becoming increasingly resistant to the traditionally linear modes older public diplomacy favoured. New public diplomacy is not a completely new paradigm, nor as Melissen (2005, p.12) points out does it 'suddenly achieve all the things the former public diplomacy couldn't'. Rather, it provides 'alternative strategies' (Carter 2015, p.480).

Largely understood as emerging after 9/11, new public diplomacy recognizes that 'contemporary challenges in the global communication sphere [have] little in common with the Cold War experience' that Nye and older PD scholars were writing out of (Potter 2002; Melissen 2013, p.440). Traditional public diplomacy thus far had been characterized by linear models of information flow, and relied heavily on the mass media. Work was primarily hierarchal, state-centred, and limited in its interactions with the public (Hartig 2016). This newer PD field is responding to current communication environments, largely cultivated by the rise of the internet and social media. As Castells (2009, xviii) points out, we now live in a highly-networked society: 'a system of horizontal communication networks organised around the Internet, and wireless communication has introduced a multiplicity of communication patterns at the source of a fundamental cultural transformation'. Thus foreign publics are increasingly rejecting their classification as passive receivers of material, but demand an environment in which they can engage and question. As Snow (2009, p.8) writes, 'in the 21st century it is not enough. Global publics will not allow themselves just be talked to, but are demanding fuller participation in dialogue and feedback.'

Melissen (2005, p.12-13) highlights that new public diplomacy centres around nurturing a 'network environment' rather than a 'state-centric model'; it 'moves away from - to put it crudely - peddling information…[and] towards engaging with foreign audiences'. The fundamental difference here is emphasis is put on the 'communicative process' as much as the products being delivered (Melissen 2011, p.1). Thus relationships are understood as a key unit of analysis, and assessed through their capacity to foster networks, dialogue, and collaboration. Relational strategies become not just 'a public diplomacy add-on but a core imperative' (Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault 2013, p.1.)

Although the ascent of this newer diplomacy has not provided much conceptual clarity to the PD debate, it is helping scholars and practitioners alike understand that we now live in a polylateral world, in which the state remains highly relevant, but where power is far less hierarchal, linear approaches are outdated, and multiple actors are required (Melissen 2011, p.3; Cull 2009; Rawnsley 2012; Hocking 2005). In analysing Scotland's CIs this study applies three of new public diplomacy's key characteristics to assessment; collaboration, networks, and dialogue.

2.4 Literature Review

Here focus is on previous scholarship that has exclusively sought to understand and analyse the CI initiative. It is important to note that emphasis is on English-language based scholarship, and a wealth of information by Chinese writers has been omitted, but deserves further study. This previous scholarship has largely fallen into three camps; that concerned with how these institutes contribute to China's soft power; that which brands these cultural outposts as updated embodiments of Chinese propaganda; and that which categorises the CI initiative as public or cultural diplomacy. Each of these categories are looked at in turn below to assess their achievements and shortcomings, and highlight why a new public diplomacy approach to analysis is needed.

Over the past ten years, the concept of soft power seems to be the most commonly adopted framework for understanding and analysing Confucius Institutes. James Paradise, one of the first to write exclusively on CIs, concentrates on how these institutes 'increase China's soft power', with the ambition of 'help[ing] it project an image of itself as a benign country' (2009, p.647). Paradise argues that whilst the

primary aim of these institutes is to increase language learning and cultural appreciation, this cannot be seen as separate to a 'broader soft power projection' in which 'China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes' (p.448-649). The piece is very much an introduction to CIs; whereby primary research questions centre around what these institutes are doing and why, and concludes that 'only time will tell' if these efforts will amount to soft power or not (p.664). Given that Paradise's article was amongst the first to emerge on CIs this introductory stance is understandable, but his approach to these institutes - as potential soft power cultivators - is no longer unique, and has some vital deficiencies.

More recently, Lahtinen (2015), Zhou & Luk (2016), and Lo & Pan (2016) have adopted similar soft power approaches as a means of CI analysis. All come to very similar conclusions; that CIs soft power potential is weak; arguing that Confucius Institutes 'seem not to be as powerful ingredients in soft power as the Chinese Communist Party intended' (Lahtinen p.200). 'At best [they] serve to arouse foreigners interest in Chinese language and culture', but can hardly 'bring about broader intended outcomes of deepening friendly relationship with other nations, promoting the development of multiculturalism and creating a harmonious world' (Lo & Pan 2016, p.527-528). Whilst these, and Paradise's work, crucially acknowledge how the CI initiative is interpolated into China's larger foreign policy strategies, this soft power approach has two major limitations. Firstly, as Hartig (2010, p.6) writes, it is 'somewhat misleading' to understand these institutes as soft power. Incorrectly branding them as such inhibits a nuanced reading of how these diplomatic processes are functioning to garner power amongst their audiences. Secondly, these texts all cite opinion polls as evidence that China's soft power approaches are failing to gain traction. Data from the most cited of these polls (Pew's Global Opinion Polls) can be seen in appendix B. The trends indeed signify that China's international image has been declining in recent years, but using quantitative data in studies pertaining to such intangible fields can be dangerous. There is very little information we can glean from these polls; they don't hold information regarding which type of diplomacy initiative is working and which is not, nor is it reasonable to consider that these polls are surveying people likely to encounter the work of Confucius Institutes. Nor can they differentiate between the different 'equity accounts' of soft power (Chitty 2017, p. 25). This evidence tells us next to nothing about the potential impact of the CI programme.

Another stream of CI scholarship takes this soft power approach, but distinguishes itself in terms of methodology. Whilst the former relied on the general surveying of institutes' activities (with information gathered from secondary sources), these collect primary data through interviews and participant observation. Through conducting a qualitative study at an Australian CI, Rui Yang (2010) highlights how previous approaches have failed to link the CIs with China's more domestic aims in internationalising their in higher education. By taking this stance, Yang is able to demonstrate the multiple purposes (both domestic and international) of the CI initiative. Anita Wheeler (2013), and Jennifer Hubbert (2014) also adopt this case-study methodology in their articles on CIs as soft power. Whilst the former uses a CI at the University of Nairobi, the latter focuses on a US Confucius Classroom. These three empirical approaches together offer a chance to view 'the operation of soft power in practice, not just in intensions' (Hubbert 2014, p.343), and all give far more nuanced readings of the reception of China's diplomacy. They also highlight that whilst China's overall soft power ambition may be universal, CI approaches vary substantially across geographic locations, and thus sweeping generalisations about the project can be largely misinformed. However, in continuing to use the more generalist framework of soft power, these works continue to focus on the informational frameworks of Confucius Institutes, and fail to consider how the CIs unique relational structures can contribute to this power analysis.

The second camp of scholarship concerned with CI analysis classify these institutes as extended versions of Chinese propaganda. According to Brady (2008, p.165), 'exporting Chinese language and culture' is 'part of China's foreign propaganda work in recent years'. Brady warns that 'many cash-strapped universities welcome the extra funding and resources that the Confucius Institutes can offer, without realizing the potential cost to freedom of speech and association' (ibid). Jocelyn Chey, a former diplomat for Australia, also warns of the propaganda nature of these institutes. Chey (2007) writes that 'the Confucius Institutes, insofar as they support culture and community outreach, are most valuable', but

> if the program engages in university teaching or research, academic colleagues should beware of potential bias. The institutes' close links with the Chinese government and party, at best, could result in the dumbing down of research and, at worst, produce propaganda.

This field highlights and problematizes the centrality of the Chinese state in the CI initiative, far more than other areas of literature do. Whilst all cultural outposts 'sanitize' their culture in their performance of nation, the issue here stems from a clash of political ideologies, particularly in relation to academic freedom and authoritarian vs. democratic systems of rule (Paschalidis 2009). Chey's concerns are echoed in the most prominent and critical of these works; Sahlins' (2015) *Confucius Institutes, Academic Malware*. Sahlins highlights issues with censorship, human rights violations, and academic integrity as reasons for host universities not to engage with this branch of Chinese 'propaganda'. He (2015, p.2) further accuses CIs of being 'hostages to university fortunes' in that a host university's willingness to engage with the programme may affect their numbers of high fee-paying Chinese international students. Paradise (2009, p.569) more aptly refers to this concern as the 'Trojan horse' theory.

Whilst these accusations warrant serious consideration if Confucius Institutes are to continue their rapid development, this area of scholarship tends to lack any real case study analysis, relying more on reports from hosts that have closed institutes, or opinions of academics who object to hosting institutes at their places of work (see Sahlins 2015 or *China File* 2014). Ironically, in looking at how these institutes integrate themselves into foreign host systems, this field could provide a better understanding of how CIs function as relational entities. However, in their pursuit to prove the 'Trojan horse' theory, scholarship is largely based on opinion over evidence, and negates analysis of the CIs as diplomatic products. Thus, it is not a useful approach for inciting a more nuanced understanding of how China's PD is functioning in the 21st century.

The final scholarship camp looked at here concerns literature which engages with the Confucius Institutes through public or cultural diplomacy frameworks. Whilst soft power focused articles do mention the importance of these concepts in cultivating influence, the following scholarship finally starts to draw focus to the communication tactics employed as a means of conducting public (or cultural) diplomacy. In this field is Confucius Institutes' most prominent writer: Falk Hartig. Hartig is the only scholar as of yet to produce a full book-length study on the CI programme (*China's Public Diplomacy; The rise of the Confucius Institute*, 2016). In this work Hartig provides qualitative case study analysis of CI activities and audiences, and more than any other writer concentrates on the structures of these institutes. Through this text, and a course of published articles (2010; 2012a; 2012b; 2015), the 'joint venture structures' of German, Australian, and South African CIs are investigated, and the term 'strategic

stakeholder engagement' is coined to recognise the collaborative nature of these CIs organization. Hartig draws comparisons across countries, and crucially highlights that this 'strategic stakeholder' approach to diplomacy is at the basis of all CI work (2012; 2012; 2015; 2016). In a joint study with Terry Flew (2014), Hartig probes this stakeholder approach further in analysing Australian CIs through a 'network perspective'. This analysis crucially reveals that CI diplomacy needs to understood as 'less centralized and more networked than comparable cultural diplomacy institutes' (Flew & Hartig 2014, pp. 27-32).

Whilst Hartig doesn't explicitly label these institutes as examples of new public diplomacy, R.S. Zaharna, a scholar writing largely on 21st century diplomacy and 'new' public diplomacy strategies, does. Zaharna (2014, p.10) recognises that, 'relational structures and relational dynamics are the pivotal features of the Confucius Institutes', and 'understanding the relational dynamics is key to understanding the growth, sustainability, and collaborative benefits' of a CI. Both Zaharna and Hartig stress that further attention needs to be paid to CI structures and communication approaches, if we are to fully understand the potential impacts of this mode of public diplomacy. As Zaharna (2014, p.26) concludes, the world has a lot to learn from China who have developed their diplomacy structures in a 'millennial' environment, and thus engage with newer versions of public diplomacy. Both Zaharna (2009) and Hartig (2016) highlight that power is in process as much as product, and call for a case-study approach to develop this emergent understanding of how China is cultivating such power. This call holds resonance in the wider field of public diplomacy scholarship. Prominent scholars here are advocating for greater empirical analysis, in order to build up a body of work capable of sustaining a theoretical framework robust enough to integrate public diplomacy into the wider field of IR (Gilboa 2008; Clarke 2014; Albro 2015; Scott-Smith 2008).

Thus it is in this area that this dissertation situates itself. In providing case-study analysis of previously unstudied institutes in Scotland, this dissertation intends to address the call for more empirically informed public diplomacy analysis. In asserting that these institutes are best understood through new public diplomacy frameworks, this study also aims extend the currently a small field (at present solely occupied by Hartig, Flew, and Zaharna) that recognises CIs relational processes as key units of analysis in 21st century PD.

Chapter 3: Methods

This dissertation utilizes predominantly qualitative methods in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the relational networks and structures these cultural institutes imbed themselves in. This nuance cannot be gleaned from quantitative approaches, for the impacts and implications of relational structures cannot be easily measured through figures. As Zaharna (2012, p.10) writes; 'quantitative research methods may not be the best approach…what is needed, not only for public diplomacy but for social sciences in general, are more relationally-based research and evaluation methods.' Given the intangible nature of the field, measuring impacts quantitatively is an unrevealing, and arguably an impossible, endeavour. Thus here a qualitative, empirical approach is taken in research, in order to glean a rich and detailed understanding of how China's Confucius Institutes are functioning in the 21st century, and their potential impact. First, the field of new public diplomacy has been proposed as a more adequate framework through which to understand China's efforts. Next, this study will proceed to demonstrate this by applying said framework to case-study analysis of Scottish Confucius Institutes.

Scotland's Confucius Institutes have been selected for two reasons. Firstly, due to Scotland's openness to work with this branch of Chinese diplomacy. Focusing on a geographical area that is eagerly engaging in China, is more likely to provide a wealth of data on how these institutes are managing to imbed themselves within host structures and build relationships out of this. Secondly, by focusing on an area, rather than comparing institutes across national boundaries, it is possible to deduce how these institutes not only interact with their key partners, but also with each other. This empirical approach is also largely adopted in response to a call by previous scholarship to develop a larger body of case-study analysis; to develop theoretical understanding through observing practice (Gilboa 2008; Hartig 2016; Zaharna 2014).

Data from these Scottish institutes has been collected in a variety of ways. Analysis has pulled on policy documents, online advertising, media reports, and published annual reports (the last of which had to be requested directly from the CIs). However, in order to get detailed information pertaining to the structure, partners, and network reach of these institutes, interviews were requested with Scottish CIs. A purposive sampling approach was adopted, by pre-selecting interview subjects based on their position within their relative CI; interviews were requested with directors or

senior administrative staff of the four largest Scottish institutes. As Byrman (2016, p.420) writes, 'purposive sampling places the investigation's research questions at the forefront of sampling considerations.' This purposive approach was necessary, for the study demands interviewees who can provide data on the overall operation of these institutes, rather than on more niche classroom realities or audience reception. This approach can also be understood as elite purposive sampling or stakeholder purposive sampling, which 'involves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or administering the program or service being evaluated' (Palys 2008, p.697-8).

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in their relative institutes, between June-July 2017, and took a semi-structured style. Each institute were asked similar questions, in order to 'ensure cross-case comparability', but given the semi-structured approach, clarification and follow-up questions were adapted during the interview (Bryman 2016, p. 469). Questions were open-ended and designed to ensure participants could structure their answers in ways that suited them. This also allowed scope to observe the hierarchy by which participants chose to shape and answer the questions, often highlighting which networks or partnerships were deemed most important to the relative institute. Each interview lasted roughly one hour, and all findings have been anonymised; interviewees will be referenced below as i1, i2 etc. Further detail on the date and time of these interviews can be found in appendix A.

A constructivist approach is taken in the analysis, in assuming that the 'fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material'; thus 'instead of seeing culture as an external reality that acts on and constrains people, it [should] be taken to be an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction' (Wendt 1995, p.71; Bryman 2016, p.30) The work of Confucius Institutes, and all public diplomacy in general, is based on the belief that national narratives can be reconstructed and reconfigured to suit national interests. Thus, arguably to put weight and belief in the very concepts of soft power and public diplomacy is to accept a constructivist understanding of international relations. As Caitlin Bryne (2012) writes, 'the relationship between PD and constructivism has magnetic qualities. Through their respective channels both challenge the primacy of material structures and attach value to the ideational. Both deal in currencies of identity, ideals, culture, values and norms.' China's soft power and public diplomacy relies on a belief that the strategies and instruments used in this form of communication will be

able to shape or influence the social structures and social impressions the foreign public have of China, without changing China's domestic material realities.

Given the qualitative nature of this study certain limitations will apply. Firstly, this approach to data collection relies heavily on the cooperation of CIs, and all results gleaned were reliant on the readiness of Scottish CIs to divulge information in interviews. The lack of scholarship on, and online presence of, these Scottish institutes, means that findings below are almost wholly reliant on the primary data collected; information provided in interviews and requested annual reports. Secondly, findings pertaining to activities, structure, and diplomacy tactics in Scottish Confucius Institutes should not be assumed to be relevant elsewhere. The partnership structures of these institutes result in localization, and despite all functioning under the central umbrella of Hanban, each institute will have localized activities, agreements, contracts, and thus different impacts, networks, and reach. These case studies can however be used as a base for comparative analysis, and the interview themes can be replicated to provide a degree of external reliability.

Chapter 4: Scotland's Confucius Institutes

4.1 Sino-Scottish Engagement

When Heriot-Watt University opened Scotland's latest CI in 2014, it was reported that Scotland now had the 'most Confucius Institutes per head of population in the world' (Scottish Government 2014). To understand why CIs are thriving in Scotland is to understand how Scotland see them as contributing to their own national interests; CIs do not operate in a vacuum, but both respond to and with a nation's larger engagement goals with China. Since their governmental devolvement from the UK, Scotland have been seeking their own diplomatic relations with China, in a bid to 'develop a long-term relationship…based on shared values, partnership and trust' (Scottish Government 2012). Their first China Plan was published in 2006, followed by a series of visits to China in 2011 by then First Minister Alex Salmond (ibid). In 2012 the China Plan was replaced by the current high-level, five-year China strategy (ibid). And in 2015 a Cultural Memorandum of Understanding was signed between current First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, and Luo Shugang, Chinese Minister of Culture (Scottish Government, a, n.d). The Scottish CIs been interpolated into these wider strategies of engagement, and are seen as crucial tools in strengthening this relationship.

Scotland's current China Strategy has four major priorities; focusing on increasing trade, expanding education links, developing Sino-Scottish research collaboration, and promoting Scotland's tourism, creativity and sports (Scottish Government 2012, p. 4). The Confucius Institutes are seen as an important tool for Scotland in achieving these priorities. As observed in the case studies of the following section, Scotland's CIs continually work to expand education links (point 2), and provide the crucial stages and spaces needed to host cultural exchanges (point 4). The strategy document acknowledges this, writing that through CIs and other international agreements, 'our universities have been proactively engaging for a number of years and have established effective long-term relationships and partnerships', with Scotland promising to 'encourage and support' this at a governmental level (Scottish Government 2012, p. 47).

Scottish university systems are also largely compatible with these institutes. Their administrative structures demand CIs to be absorbed into an academic school or department, but allow them to act as independent bodies financially (i2-i3). Other European university structures are not so compatible; the University of Lyon in France

financially hosted an institute without officially embedding it into their university. This eventually led to its closure in September of 2013 for 'deontological and pedagogical reasons' (Corre & Sepulchre 2016, p.137).

The Scottish Parliament also have a cross-party group on China which invests in Sino-Scottish relations through work with 'organisations and authorities to increase culture, educational and economic exchange between the two countries' (Scottish Parliament, n.d). The group engages with many organisations throughout Scotland; all Scottish CIs are listed as members, along with various universities, colleges and high schools, The China Britain Business Council Scotland, local councils, the Scotland China Education Network, and private businesses (ibid).

Scotland's CIs are also deemed conducive to point one of this China Strategy; increasing trade. Recently released export statistics for 2014 show that Scotland's business and trade with China is experiencing an upward trajectory, with China surpassing Singapore for the first time as Scotland's top export destination in Asia (Scottish Parliament 2016). In terms of investment, a 2014 report found that China 'did not even rank in the top ten origins for FDI into Scotland' (Ernst & Young 2015). Yet by 2016, China had entered into the top five of FDI investors (Scottish Government 2017). Whilst CIs may primarily advocate educational and cultural exchange, such work is not disconnected from Scotland's economic goals. As Judith McClure (2013), founder and convenor of the Scotland China Education Network writes,

> There can be no doubt that Scottish efforts to understand the core drivers of China's policy and business methods need to be underpinned by a workforce with a better education in China, some of whom have specialist knowledge and understanding of the country and skills in the language.

Scottish CIs and universities are currently at the forefront of providing this specialist knowledge. Although there is still a lot of potential room for business and trade growth, these figures indicate that Scotland's multifaceted strategy of engagement with China, which the Confucius Institutes are deemed part of, may already be seeing some return. To this end, Scotland currently hosts five CIs, with the first being opened at The

University of Edinburgh in 2006, and the latest at Heriot-Watt University in 2014.[2] The four largest institutes are looked at in more detail below.

[2] The opening dates of the institutes may appear differently in other literature given that agreements are negotiated a couple of years before the institutes are officially opened. Dates here are based on the information given in interviews (i1-i4).

4.2 Confucius Institute for Scotland, Edinburgh

Table 3: The Confucius Institute of Scotland - key staff members]

Staff Member	Position	Employer
Prof. Natashcha Gentz	Director	UoE
Prof. Congrong Dai	Co-Director	Fudan University, Shanghai & Hanban
Teachers	2 language teachers, 6 student volunteers	Fudan University, Shanghai
Frances Christensen	General Manager	UoE
Jie Chen	Business Development Manager	UoE
Xin Zhang	Administrative Assistant	UoE

(Source: i1-i4)

Based at the University of Edinburgh, the Confucius Institute for Scotland is housed in its own buildings on the campus, referred to as the 'Confucius Institute Campus' (i2). When discussions began in 2005, this was one of the UK's first CIs, and at the time Scotland's only institute. Thus its prestigious name should not be taken as indication for a hierarchy over other Scottish CIs, but rather a result of pragmatics and timing. The decision to introduce a CI at Edinburgh University started when, the then Chinese Minister of Education, Zhou Ji visited the city in Autumn 2005, after which discussions began between senior representatives of the Scottish and Chinese governments (i2). The institute was then founded in 2006, before being officially opened in 2007 (CIFS 2016). Today the institute has racked up various accolades from Hanban, with director general Xu Lin, claiming that 'of the many institutes supported by Hanban, the Confucius Institute for Scotland has shown itself to be an Institute of ambition which has led to significant impact in its first decade' (CIFS 2016). The institute enjoys significantly closer ties to Hanban than others, given that the Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Edinburgh University, Sir Timothy O'Shea, sits as a council member for Confucius Institute Headquarters (i2). It also enjoys a particular continuity, being the only Scottish institute to retain the same director since its inception; Professor Natashacha Gentz (i2).

The institute is partnered with Fudan University in Shanghai. In this partnership, the host (UoE) provides staff (see table 3), space (the Confucius Campus), and some funding (i2). As the Chinese partner, Fudan sends staff; namely a co-director and language teachers (both qualified and volunteers) (i2). Hanban is responsible for providing further funding, and sometimes also resources, i.e. books (i2). Each year the institute also applies for project funding from Hanban: 'for example, if we do a

conference, we apply for the conference with Hanban. And then Hanban gives 50% and we have to find 50% .... in other institutes that's mixed' (i2). Today the institute falls within Edinburgh University's School of Languages, Literatures and Cultures but, in terms of budget, administration, and executive decisions, it was stressed that the CI is autonomous: 'the administration goes through them. But we're completely independent from them so any decision that we make has nothing to do with them' (i2).

In terms of engagement within the university, the institute stressed that it keeps distance from credit-bearing courses, and does not engage in any research: 'here its only knowledge exchange and transfer' (i2). The institute does offer credit if students were to take their language courses, 'but this credit has not yet been redeemed by students at the University of Edinburgh. They prefer to take Mandarin courses within their department' (i2). And whilst language volunteers (from Fudan) are allowed to engage in oral Mandarin lessons within the School of Modern Languages, 'their engagement is strictly limited' (i2). Accordingly the majority of the institute's students are from local public or local businesses (i2). The institute does however work closely with the UoE's international office, and offers support for the 150+ Chinese universities the international office now has memorandums of understanding with (i2).

Initially the institute focused on the standard language and event provision that most CIs adhere to, but today see their goal more as 'to facilitate engagement between Scotland and China' in a larger sense (CIFS 2016). More specifically the institute seeks to 'develop effective Sino-Scottish business links', and 'to be a major point of reference for Sino-Scottish relations in education, business, and culture' (ibid). In order to facilitate these links and engagement, today a major focus of the institute is on 'bring[ing] onto the Confucius Campus key long term partners' (ibid). This emphasis on outreach and engagement has led an impressive network of partnerships: ranging from businesses (Edinburgh airport, local councils, SkyScanner), to education partners, (Royal Zoological Society of Scotland, public schools, and Confucius Classrooms) to cultural organizations (large Scottish festivals, Beijing Film School, National Museum of Scotland, and Historic Environment Scotland) (CIFS 2016). When asked about the future direction of the institute, the focus was again on enhancing these partnerships: 'we have the language courses and cultural programme well established. And we want to expand more in the business area… and working with large cultural institutions in Scotland, to help with big productions' (i2). This business engagement is also intended to increase revenue for the institute: for businesses 'we charge higher fees for the

courses, and then provide services like translation, and briefings…we already have 12 clients here…who are taking language courses and trips to China' (i2).

The institute defines this work as creating 'networks of knowledge', which are further enhanced by inviting world leading scholars to the institute for lectures, and hosting a monthly business lecture series (i2; CIFS 2016). The institute additionally highlighted their engagement with various high-level panels in Scotland and beyond: we sit on 'quite a lot of boards here in Scotland… anything that has to do with China. Like the Scotland China Business Forum, Scotland China Education Network, the British Council meetings, and the Parliament meetings' (i2). Thus, the Confucius Institute for Scotland have multifunctional aims and a multidirectional focus, but are heavily invested in partnership sustainability and network reach.

4.3 The Confucius Institute of the University of Glasgow

Table 4: Glasgow Confucius Institute - key staff members

Staff Member	Position	Employer
Prof. Li Li	Chinese co-director	Nankai University & Hanban
Miss Duo Long	Deputy Director	UoG
Laura Moran	Centre Administrator	UoG
Teachers	2 language teachers, 5 student volunteers	Hanban

(source: i1-i4)

The second institute to open in Scotland, this CI launched in 2011 in collaboration with the University of Nankai, Tianjin. Their UoG partnership was founded on already 'long-standing research collaborations between the two universities' (UOGCI 2016). Whilst this collaboration was previously limited to departmental research, the establishment of a Confucius Institute linked the two as whole universities (i1). Whilst the CI stressed that it is not directly involved in these ongoing research collaborations, they do help facilitate the wider partnership on an operational level (i1). For instance, as part of this partnership the CI helped facilitate the founding of a joint graduate school between the two, as well as a 3+1 undergraduate teaching programme now run between Nankai and Glasgow (UOGCI 2016).

Today their CI partnership agreement is based on the UoG providing a director, accompanying administrative staff, classrooms for language teaching, and office space (i1). Whilst Nankai provides teaching staff as well as a co-director, Hanban funds any remaining operational costs, and usually provides the texts and literature needed for language training (i1). This partnership agreement runs on a five-year contract, and the parameters are tweaked slightly 'depending on which year you're in' (i1). Course fees for language lessons and quality control falls under UoG's remit, and thus are kept in line with university-wide standards:

> obviously Hanban trains all of the teachers, and then we do additional training to help them…just to get them used to a more Western teaching environment…we'll observe the classes and give them feedback from all students…and then try and implement that going forward (i1).

UoG hosts a much smaller operation than UoE, in terms of both staff, events, classes, and logistical size. For instance, the current co-director also conducts language classes, and the institute is housed within one of the university's already-established buildings (i1). This CI sees their current goals, 'as playing a crucial role in connecting

local institutions with Chinese partners, growing and deepening our relationship with colleagues at Nankai, and ensuring that the institute is a resource for the whole community' (UOGCI 2016). Despite this goal of 'connecting' local to China, in interviews the CI stressed that their 'main thing is language teaching' (i1). This teaching is however starting to branch out into the local community: a pilot programme in 2015, in line with their aim to, 'offer Chinese courses to further education students', took Mandarin lessons into a local college (UOGCI 2016). The CI also offers cultural classes, cultural events, and business services (UOGCI 2016). Whilst the institute do not run credit-bearing courses, they do offer support for Mandarin classes running under the School of Modern Languages and Cultures (i1). This CI also stressed that they 'don't do any research', but do help with organizing guest lecturers in line with the university's Scottish Centre for China Research (i1; UOGCI 2016).

Like Edinburgh, the institute has started to focus on business links and partnerships, but these are very much in their primary stages; 'we do work with businesses…especially if they approach us. We have some language training for them, and business etiquette…but a lot of this is already covered by the China Britain Business Council' (i1). As Edinburgh's CI has shown, there is a market for these services, but Glasgow is a much younger institute and appears yet to realise their full potential in this area. Further, as demonstrated in table 4, this institute is currently without a (host) director, and staffing issues appear to be holding them in a transition phase; whereby they are neither significantly branching out into business, language, or culture partnerships. When asked about future plans for the CI interviewees confirmed this transient state: saying they may specialise, 'but this depends on the direction the new director - when the position is filled - will take it. But I think at our core we'll always have the language teaching' (i1). Thus the CI at the UoG has similar aims and ambitions in establishing a portfolio of sustainable partnerships, but the infancy of the institute, combined with staffing issues, is holding it in a transient state at present. They are however continuing to widen audiences for Chinese language and culture learning within their local Scottish communities.

4.4 Confucius Institute for Scotland's Schools, Glasgow

Table 5: CISS - key staff members

Staff Member	Position	Employer
Fhiona Fisher	Director	University of Strathclyde
Li Tian	Chinese Director	Tianjin Municipal Education Commission & Hanban
Fan Lin	Depute Director	University of Strathclyde
Teachers	2 language teachers	Hanban
All other positions	Administrative Assistant, Senior Administrator, Modern Apprentice, Project Coordinator, 2 x Professional Development Officer, Depute Director,	University of Strathclyde

(source: i1-i4)

The Confucius Institute for Scotland's Schools (CISS), based at The University of Strathclyde, was the third institute to be established in Scotland. Opening in 2012, it is founded on a very different partnership structure to Scotland's other institutes. CISS is the product of a collaboration between Scottish Government, Hanban, and Tianjin Municipal Education Commission. The host university is not a key member in the partnership, but rather the 3-way structure grew out of a prolonged period of engagement between government bodies in Scotland and China (i3). In 2007/08 a government improvement and support agency, Learning and Teaching Scotland (LTS), began to establish Confucius Classrooms in Scottish schools (i3). But a merger that happened between LTS and HMI (the inspectorate), resulted in those employed under what had now been re-branded, Education Scotland, becoming civil servants, and thus part of the Scottish government. This created difficulty; Scottish government cannot accept money from foreign governments, and thus Hanban's funding for Scottish Confucius Classrooms became problematic (i3). It was initially proposed that they would be subsumed by Glasgow or Edinburgh's CIs, 'but Hanban were not happy with that…as that would have ostensibly have closed one institute' (i3). So instead the classroom scheme was incorporated into Scotland's National Centre for Languages (SCILT), at the University of Strathclyde, and became the Confucius Institute for Scotland's Schools.

Despite this new location within a higher education body, the 'institute's remit is specifically to work with schools - and local authorities - not with the host university' (i3). And thus this institute does not have as larger impact on its host as others do in

Scotland (i3). Although there is some student and staff outreach; largely in the form of free Mandarin classes, and the free provision of advice, cultural classes, and business etiquette for faculty members who visit China on business or research (i3). So, whilst the university (or SCILT) contributes space to this institute and facilitates staff contracts, they are free from financial commitment; all costs are covered between Hanban and Scottish government (i3). Rather than a stakeholder, the University of Strathclyde are considered a key partner in CISS' larger network (i3).

Whilst on-campus impact is not large, CISS' outreach activities and partnerships are the largest of any CI in Scotland. Their primary focus is on managing Scotland's Confucius Classroom Hubs (CCH), which are run in conjunction with local authorities (appendix C lists all 21 of these local authority partners). Although these hubs are located within state schools, being 'hubs', rather than just 'classrooms' means they are designed to provide language and culture classes not only for their school, but also for all schools and pupils interested within their relative local authority area: a 'Confucius hub is supposed to share the resources across the local authority's learning community' (i3). The activities in these hubs vary substantially. Whilst all focus on language and culture, levels and themes are adapted to suit the age and ability of the young learners (i3). Outreach activities include extracurricular 'China Clubs', parent programmes, and language lessons delivered by older 'alumni' students, to younger ones (i3; SCILT 2017). These local authority hubs are all partnered with a school in Tianjin, China. A list of these partnerships can also be seen in appendix C. These partner schools provide exchange teachers, seconded over to run activities in their relevant Scottish CCHs (i3). Hanban further provides two volunteer teachers from Tianjin Normal University to run activities at CISS' Strathclyde hub (i3).

The CISS office is best understood as the nucleus through which information is disseminated to these 21 local authority hubs. But, it is more crucially, the hub through which projects, advice, help, and collaborations are facilitated. A large focus of their work is in providing the training needed for Chinese teachers being seconded to these classroom hubs (i3). Along with a comprehensive training programme, CISS have also developed self-evaluation documents to encourage self-improvement amongst CCHs (i3; SCILT 2017). This drive to improve quality is compulsory given CCHs location in state schools. As such these CCHs must be interpolated into the government's wider education strategies for Scotland, namely the National Improvement Framework,

national language policies, and the education targets of the Scottish Government (SCILT 2017).

CISS also place large emphasis on business partnerships; facilitating various industry-related activities, and acquiring a business partner for each CCH (SCILT 2017). These partners are termed ‘Chinese Language Business Champions’, and work closely with their relevant CCH to deliver joint projects (i3). Walkers’ Shortbread was given as an example business champion. Partnered with Elgin Academy in Moray, Walkers have delivered speeches on the importance of learning Chinese to the Elgin students, and in return ‘the young people in the school went up and taught the staff the Mandarin that they’d been learning. They did business etiquette classes for them, and they helped them develop things for the Chinese market’ (i3). CISS also run a series of business brunches within schools, which focus on the importance of languages for employability skills. Run by invited local businesses, they are intended to show youngsters ‘the opportunities that languages can give them’ (i3). The events have previously partnered with Historic Environment Scotland, tourist board Visit Scotland, luxury hotel chains, Glamis Castle, Scone Palace, and various Scottish companies specialising in textiles, food, and drink (SCILT 2017).

Alongside these business partnerships, CISS have been establishing links with education bodies in Scotland, including the University Council for Modern Languages Scotland, the Scottish Council of Deans of Education, and the Scotland China Education Network (SCEN). The latter is heavily involved in the workings of CCHs; SCEN organizes annual conferences on teaching Chinese, runs a Chinese teacher club, and offers advisory support on various educational issues (SCILT 2017). Running alongside these are then wider community partnerships with Edinburgh Zoo, Scottish Opera, Scottish Schools Football Association, and the Royal Junior Conservatoire (i3). CISS is currently in discussions regarding opening Confucius Classrooms in conjunction with these organizations next year, providing more specialized learning opportunities (i3). CISS places these collaborations as key to their outlook: new partnerships will ‘figure highly in 2017/18’ with particular focus on ‘working with National Museums Scotland to further their educational outreach programme’ (SCILT 2017). The institute also plans to widen their focus on parental and carer engagement: ‘we plan to add a session to our menu for parent councils and to pilot a parent/carer Mandarin Business Brunch to inform parents about the relevance of Mandarin’ (ibid).

This unique structure of managing Confucius Classrooms as hubs, under a larger umbrella of a Confucius Institute, considerably widens Hanban's network reach, without the need to invest significantly in physical infrastructure. It is hard to underestimate the reach of CISS; figure 3 below visibly demonstrates some of the networks incited by utilising hubs instead of classrooms. But this figure is purely illustrative, as it only allocates a couple of outreach schools to each CCH, and neglects to illustrate networks incited through links with education bodies (i.e. SCEN), other CIs, or networks between the schools themselves (who sometimes bypass the central hub) (i3). The effect would be an unwieldy diagram, but truly representative of the far-reaching nature of CISS' work in Scotland.



Fig. 3: Illustrative Diagram of the Network Structures at CISS**.** Source: i3; SCILT 2017

4.5 Scottish Confucius Institute for Business and Communication, Edinburgh

Table 6: SCIBC- key staff members

Staff Member	Position	Employer
Prof. Ian Baxter	Director	HW University
Xiuying Wen	Co-Director	Tianjin University of Finance & Economics, & Hanban
Dr Isabel Liu Hui	Deputy Director	HW University
Teachers	2 teachers + 2 volunteer teachers	Hanban

(source: i1-i4)

The last institute looked at is Scotland's latest CI. Only opened in 2014, the Scottish Confucius Institute for Business and Communication (SCIBC) is based at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh. The institute follows the conventional partnership structures seen in most, and is founded on a whole university partnership with Tianjin University of Finance and Economics. The partnership works as per Hanban's official recommendations, with Hanban providing an initial set-up grant, which was 'used for refurbishment', and then providing an annual grant for operational costs (i4). This grant is matched by the host, but 'some of that is real money, some it is in kind' (i4). Like other institute's SCIBC then apply to Hanban annually for any extra activity or programme funding, with 'an expectation that there will be some clear support from the Heriot-Watt side as well' (i4). Heriot-Watt provide the director and deputy director, whilst their partner, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics (TUFE) seconds teachers, volunteer teachers, and a co-director (i4). The institute is currently integrated into Heriot-Watt's School of Social Sciences, but as seen before in other CIs, stress that they are cross-university, and largely operate separately from this school (i4). Currently the CI states its main aims as to, 'promote the understanding of Chinese business and language in Scotland, strengthen HWU's Chinese language delivery [and arrange] additional courses and events to improve communication and foster business links with China' (SCIBC 2015).

This CI has attempted to specialise in communication and business. Whilst the communication specialism was borne from the host's well-established and highly-ranked department of translation, at present any specialised activities are yet to come to fruition (i4). The business specialism was instigated in the recognition that Hanban 'wanted a business centred institute in Scotland', but this specialism is also yet to be wholly realised (i4). What SCIBC do have is a small, but growing, set of language

classes and cultural events for the university's students and staff, and are currently piloting a programme of public lessons (SCIBC 2015; i4).

Unlike other Scottish institutes, they are involved in credit-bearing teaching across the university: 'we've embedded our Hanban teachers into academic departments, so they actually deliver on three courses, both undergraduate and postgrad. level' (i4). And whilst the institute claim that they do not currently engage in any research, under their new director (whose specialities include tourism and heritage), the CI is looking to begin China-related heritage and tourism research in Scotland (i4). As such the CI is currently pursing arrangements for the deputy head of the tourism department at TUFE to visit HW, to start 'academic collaborations' (i4). The CI also works closely with the university's China office as part of HW's wider China strategy, especially in terms of recruitment and offering to support Chinese students (i4). SCIBC is further trying to strengthen this cross-university partnership by facilitating staff exchanges; particularly with staff working in student services (i4). Next year the institute plans to host registry and administrative staff from TUFE for training, whilst their HW equivalents travel to Tianjin for 'training weeks' (i4).

Like all other Scottish CIs, SCIBC see one of their major goals as 'cementing partnerships' in the wider business community (i4). The institute has begun work here; signing an agreement with the Asia Scotland Institute, who run high-level business workshops and briefings (i4). In this agreement, the CI provides funding support (through Hanban) for the Asia Scotland Institute to run a programme of China-related business briefings (i4). One interviewee mentioned that this partnership was ideal for it didn't 'tread on the toes' of other Scottish institutes (i4). Given Scotland's receptiveness to the CI programme, overlap will be at times inevitable. The institute also highlighted their plans to start working with delegations; offering facilities at Heriot-Watt for larger meetings and conferences. This focus has been combined with a push to work closely with the graduate business school at Heriot-Watt. Based at Panmure House in Edinburgh (famous for being economist's Adam Smith's home), it was felt that working with the school to 'run activities out of there', would help boost the prestige of the CIs business focus (i4).

This CI is still very much in its infancy stages, and even more so considering that this year is the first in which it's had a 'substantive operational leader' from the host university (i4). Now leadership structures have been clarified, it looks as though the CI will begin realising its specialities, and progress into the networked and

collaborative models seen in the other institutes. This CI does involve itself in academic teaching, and is indicating signs of some future investment into academic research. Whilst the CI claim that they are yet witness any criticism for this (i4), it will be interesting to see if this is met with resistance as the CI grows.

Chapter 5: Analysis

The analysis below shifts focus from the products used by Scottish CIs, to the relational processes through which these products are disseminated. Three concepts deemed essential to new public diplomacy are utilised; collaboration, networks, and dialogue.

5.1 Collaboration

Cowan and Aresnault (2008, p.10) argue that collaboration is a 'form of engagement that scholars and practitioners of [older] public diplomacy overlook', but one that is essential to PD's effectiveness in the 21st century. Of the four Scottish CIs observed here, collaboration is at the very root of their organisational and operational structures. Whilst the CIs may be initiated and overseen by Hanban, each is founded on a collaborative partnership structure. The University of Edinburgh has collaborated with Fudan University to create the Confucius Institute for Scotland, whilst respectively to create the other institutes, Glasgow University has partnered with Nankai University; Strathclyde with Tianjin Education Commission; and Heriot-Watt with Tianjin University Economics and Finance.

Further, these collaborative partnerships are realized not just through organizational administration, but more fundamentally through their everyday operational structures. Employment is divided amongst stakeholders (as can be seen in tables 3-6), management is conducted by both a Chinese director (employed by the Chinese partner), and a Scottish director (employed by the host partner), and the institutes' operations are co-financed. The annual summary report for CISS highlights this joint investment that underscores the collaborative nature of these institutes: CISS is,

> financed jointly by Scottish Government and Hanban, Confucius Institute Headquarters and administered through Education Scotland. CISS receives £754,000 per annum from Scottish Government to fund staff costs, university levy, projects, flights, hub costs and Hanban teacher costs. Approximately £625,000 is received from Hanban to cover the cost of hubs, Hanban teachers, GTCs teacher salaries and projects. Hanban also covers the in-country costs of all trips to China for pupils, teachers and headteachers (SCILT 2017).

CISS represents a more complex collaboration given its three-way partnership between Hanban, Tianjin Education Commission, and the Scottish Government, but the significant investment by both local and Chinese stakeholders is resonant at every institute. The three other institutes observed here follow more conventional CI models; emphasising the hosts' major investment as in-kind rather than financially (e.g. classroom space, administrative staff) (i1; i2; i4). These collaborative structures have several affects.

The most tangible is their capacity to facilitate educational exchanges between students and staff from the stakeholder institutions. For example, through their collaboration with the UoG's CI, Nankai University students are given the opportunity to complete their Masters in teaching as 'language volunteers' at the University of Glasgow (i1). Whilst UoG students can apply for annual scholarships to study at the University of Nankai (UOGCI 2016). Similar scholarships and opportunities for teacher placement were emphasised by interviewees at all Scottish institutes (i2; i3; i4). Thus, here it is the processes on which these institutes are built that facilitate influential relationship-building, rather than the tangible products (language or cultural events). Collaboration between stakeholders provides 'important platforms for direct interpersonal communication and sustained, long-term relationship-building' (Zaharna 2014, p.15).

This collaborative approach also helps China diversify its diplomacy; adapting and appealing to relative local conditions. Mass-media approaches to diplomacy are unable to achieve this, instead opting for large-scale dissemination to garner influence. But CIs are designed to 'adopt flexible teaching patterns and adapt to suit local conditions' (Beijing Review n.d). In collaborating with local hosts, Scottish CIs have adapted the scope of their activities significantly. Heriot-Watt's CI has chosen to specialise in communication and business, in order to align themselves with the prominent schools of communication and business at their host institute (i4). And CISS mentioned in interviews that their training programme for seconded teachers focuses heavily on developing culturally-appropriate and age-appropriate materials (i3). Thus, through this collaborative approach Hanban have also cultivated an environment in which invested stakeholders are helping to improve and diversify China's diplomacy. As Hartig (2016a, p.3) writes, this is 'strategically very smart'.

Hartig (ibid) further highlights how this collaborative approach brings a degree of prestige to CIs. Operating in a geographical area receptive to the Trojan Horse and

China Threat theories, like most CIs, Scottish ones have not escaped criticism. Campaigns in Scotland have largely been spearheaded by the activist group, Free Tibet, who argue that the institutes are 'fronts for Beijing propaganda' and compromise academic freedom on issues such as Tibet, Taiwan, and the idea of One China (Leask 2015; SecEd 2015). However, in embedding CIs into established and respected hosts in Scotland (universities), the CI programme are able to cultivate a degree of trust. The three institutes partnered with universities, all reported that the language classes they deliver are quality controlled by the host institute, whilst Confucius Classroom Hubs operating out of CISS further conform to meet Scottish government education frameworks and goals (i1-i4). And all, bar one, also stressed the need to keep these institutes separate to their university's ongoing academia and research, purposefully navigating themselves away from Trojan Horse accusations (i1; i2; i3). Hence this collaborative approach gives a degree of credibility to a Chinese initiative, argued by some to be a contemporary version of Chinese propaganda (Brady 2008). These collaborations also display a show of 'willingness [from China] to engage and cooperate with foreigners in its public diplomacy' (Hartig 2016a, p.3). This, combined with the credibility formed from host university reputations, appears at present to be protecting Scottish CIs from damaging criticism; allowing them to continue to establish relationships in Scotland's wider business, education, and cultural communities. As Cowan and Arsenault (2008, p.11) highlight, this 'focus on relationship building…is what can and should separate [new] public diplomacy from propaganda, lobbying, and public relations.'

This collaborative approach to diplomacy has the potential to incite images of openness, facilitate relational exchanges, enhance credibility, and help diversify activities for local audiences. Collaboration as a process of diplomacy thus needs to be considered as a key tool for cultivating Chinese soft power. Here power is derived from the relational processes of collaborations, rather than the tangible products (language and cultural artefacts) disseminated.

5.2 Networks

According to Zaharna (2007; 2014) a network approach is crucial to maintaining growth and sustainability in PD, and is achieved through three basic elements; network structure, network synergy, and network strategy. Network structure

refers to the 'organizational structures for message exchange,' network synergy, to how energy is multiplied in the structures, and network strategy 'rests on how networks use and exchange information, rather than simply disseminate it' (2007 p.219-220). In assessing Scottish CIs against these elements, it becomes clear that networks are central to these institutes' operations.

In terms of network structure, the collaborative partnership model discussed above is at the root of all CI communication. Whilst a partnership comes together under the guidance of Hanban to create a Confucius Institute (e.g. Edinburgh University enters communications with Hanban in 2005, before partnering with Fudan University to make the Scottish Confucius Institute in 2007), processes for message exchange are not so linear (i2). In the process of Hanban initiating links between the hosts and their partners, communications become decentralised. Whilst Hanban remain 'responsible for circulating and exchanging information', the CI (now made up of the host body and Chinese partner) have the autonomy to decide how to enhance an understanding of China in their relative organization (Flew & Hartig 2014, p. 9). As Chief Executive of Hanban, Xu Lin, points out 'each institute has full control over its own management, as long as it remains in line with China's foreign policy' (Xu 2014). Thus, although Hanban instigates and overseas this model, a large part of the organization and implementation is decentralized once a partnership is established. Message exchange is relayed to these CI audiences through partnerships that 'co-create credibility, identity and master narratives', rather than allow linear dissemination from Hanban (Zaharna 2007, p.220). In Scotland, this decentralization can be explicitly observed in the varying specialisations adopted by some institutes (e.g. SCIBC), and the adaptation of others to suit their local situation and larger aims (e.g. CISS) (i1-14).

Communication is further decentralized through the internal networks CIs devise amongst themselves (without the aid of Hanban). In interviews, all four CIs highlighted cross-institute work, as well as an annual meeting for Scottish Confucius Institutes, which is used to discuss future projects and plans (i1-i4). To the same end, there is also an annual conference for all UK CIs, and SCIBC further highlighted that internal associations are being established for CIs with specialisations (i4). SCIBC engage with a business CI association which is pan-European, and meet annually to discuss work and potential collaborations (i4). Zaharna argues that each of these layers of decentralized communication adds to the 'robustness of the network' (2014, p.17). If one layer of these internal networks, established through decentralized

communication, were to dissolve, the nature of the relational links created would likely sustain the overall network.

In terms of network synergy, the largest evidence to this end in Scotland is in the institutes' focus on incorporating external partners into their work, and thus again add to the 'relational links spread across several levels' (Zaharna 2014, p.15). Although all Scottish CIs retain the conventional programme of language teaching and cultural activities, they are also heavily invested in branching out into local community and business partnerships. To take CISS as an example; this CI has cemented business partners for each of their CCHs, work with many local and national community partners, are integrated into larger education networks, and have even initiated an 'alumni' scheme whereby older students of the institute visit primary schools to cultivate interest in language learning (i3). Figure 3 gives an illustrative view of the reach of some of their networks.

Their external networking has not only extended their reach and thus 'robustness', but has also again added a diversity to Hanban's work. For example, CISS have been working closely with The Royal Zoological Society of Scotland to deliver the 'Beyond the Panda' programme in Scottish schools. This combines Mandarin learning with activities about giant pandas and conservation work (SCILT 2017). Elsewhere, the Confucius Institute for Scotland have 12 long-term business clients, the UoG's CI is branching out into further education teaching arrangements, whilst SCIBC has just cemented a partnership with the Asia Scotland Institute (i1-14). The portfolio of these Scottish CI partnerships is substantial, with each expanding their network reach and structure far beyond their university premises. Energy multiples through these increasingly varied network structures, as 'partnerships in networks form bonds of trust and thus become more likely to cooperate in future endeavours' (Cowan & Aresnault 2008, p.23). This large partnership portfolio, cultivates a sense of trust and legitimacy, with network structures again 'enable[ing] members to co-create a master narrative and shared identity' (Zaharna 2014, p.12). Narratives created in partnerships become Sino-Scottish, rather than just Chinese, and a sense of joint identity is cultivated. When students learn about pandas at a CISS classroom hub, they are not simply hearing China's story, but a story of Sino-Scottish collaboration, whereby we must 'work together' to protect these Chinese pandas, now in Scottish zoos (i3). Thus the network structures of these CIs cultivate relational power and influence on many levels.

5.3 Dialogue

Schneider (2009, p.265) argues that 'two-way engagement' is needed in best PD practice. Cowan & Arsenault (2008, p.10) agree; 'for a number of years, commentators and professionals have noted that effective public diplomacy requires…moving from monologue to dialogue'. It is hard to argue that these Scottish CIs do not engage in dialogue, given their focus on networks and partnerships. Dialogue is facilitated on multiple levels; in everyday language and culture activities students are able to interact with China dialogically in a classroom setting. Whilst on a grander scale dialogue is being continually being facilitated between CI stakeholders, their partners, and across their relational networks in major Scottish cultural organizations, businesses, and local authorities (i1-i4).

Having both a Chinese director and a Scottish director at each institute also enhances dialogue and communication between the main stakeholders in each institute. Interviews highlighted that Chinese directors send weekly reports back to Hanban on activities and outputs, whilst host directors tend to feedback into their relative university or hosting structure (i4). Utilising this management structure composed of one 'expert' in China-based communication, and another an 'expert' in the institutional structures of the host, allows dialogue to flow between both stakeholders with greater ease. Each institute also has a board of directors, made up of key figures from the institutes' main stakeholders. Whilst Hanban may set guidelines, these boards meet annually (either in China or Scotland) to discuss all operational realities of their institute, set budgets, and review goals for the coming year (i1-i4). Thus the CIs approach to dialogue emphasises both dialogic relations with its audiences, and between its key stakeholders. This is very much the opposite of a mass-media approach to PD.

However, it is important to recognise the parameters of this dialogue. Philosopher Martin Buber (1947, p.19) famously coined three types of dialogue:

> There is genuine dialogue- no matter whether spoken or silent- where each of the participants really has in mind the other in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them. There is technical dialogue, which is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding. And there is monologue disguised as dialogue.

CI dialogue definitively falls into the second of these categories. Whilst the network structures and partnership collaborations of Scottish CIs move this public diplomacy

away from linear monologue towards dialogue, this dialogue is neither altruistic nor completely free of political pressures. Dialogue in PD is conducted to achieve an objective; here to enhance the effectiveness of China's soft power. And as previous studies of CIs have highlighted, despite a supposed autonomy being given to CIs, their activities are restricted by limitations imposed by the Chinese State (Flew & Hartig, 2014, p.13). In interviews the Scottish CIs emphasised that they do not feel restricted. However, one interviewee summed up the dialogic parameters of their institute well:

> [the CI] conforms to the values and freedoms of a UK University. And there is no expectation that I've come across from Hanban or anyone else in the Chinese government that I've spoken to that it would be otherwise…however, am I going to deliberately start a lecture series on Tibet? No probably not (i4).

Thus, this is dialogue within Chinese parameters. Whilst networked and collaborative structures pave the way for a more dialogic PD, this is currently hampered by ideological restrictions imposed by the Chinese state. In pursuit of their objective Hanban restricts dialogue in some areas; with CIs appearing to self-censor where possible to appease Hanban and their Chinese partners. However, as the next section will discuss, paradoxically this 'restricted' dialogues approach could be constraining soft power potential at present.

5.4 Hindrances

Through using new public diplomacy as a tool for analysis, it has become clear that China's CI initiative does adopt 'newer', more collaborative, networked, and dialogic approaches to public diplomacy. However, this framework also highlights limitations to their approach. Interviews highlighted several practical and ideological issues which currently impede the PD potential of these institutes.

The first of these prevents the internal network synergy that Zaharna (2014) argues is essential to enhancing the robustness of institutes. Every interviewee problematized the frequent turnover of Chinese staff on secondment; whilst directors tend to stay for two or more years in Scotland, teachers (both qualified and volunteer) can be on as little as a 1-year visa (i1-i4). The entire collaborative structure of these institutes relies on the synergies of these cross-cultural staff working together, and such

frequent turnovers can impact ongoing programmes, classes, activities, and the overall effectiveness of the team. One Scottish CI highlighted the 'loss of knowledge' that happens at the end of each academic year as Chinese secondments return home (i4). The UoG's CI has also run into recruitment issues on the host's side, with their struggle to find a director leaving the CI short of managerial direction (i1). Whilst visa complications may continue to hamper solutions here, Hartig (2016 b, p.669) attributes this to China's narrow focus on getting their message out, rather than on longer term goals. This emphasis on quantity over quality is explicitly demonstrated in an interview with Hanbans's Xu Lin: 'while some believe that quality comes first, I believe that quantity comes first, with the number [of CIs] adding up to form a large-scale effect' (Xu 2014). Given that all Scottish CIs here highlighted fundamental staffing issues as a concern, a lack of focus on operational quality could compromise the cooperative willingness of the many local stakeholders and partners who have invested into this CI programme in Scotland.

Whilst this is more a practical limitation, CIs also encounter larger ideological issues, which stem from the political principles of the Chinese state. In the West opinions pertaining to human rights, freedom of speech, and academic integrity are most commonly cited as hindrances to developing a truly 'dialogic' relationship with China (Hartig & Flew 2014; Rana 2017; Shambaugh 2015) Self-imposed censorship was highlighted by Scottish CIs, with issues deemed contentious in China actively avoided. Interviewees cited these as Tibet, Taiwan, Falun Gong, and Tiananmen Square (i2-i4). Many scholars warn that without China adapting domestically, their diplomacy will always lack a credibility in the West (Zhang 2016; Shambaugh 2013). Flew and Hartig (2014, p. 13) more directly assert that the 'political constitution' of China bears 'on the content of CIs and thereby also the credibility of the whole network.'

China recognises that these disparities in political ideology remain one of their biggest challenges: 'it can be tricky for us to introduce Chinese culture to countries that hold different values to us…we seek opportunities to work with those countries with sensitivity and based on common ground we have with each other' (Xu 2014). To this end the Scottish institutes focus on the less contentious subjects of business or language-learning, and largely advocate a disconnect between research or academia, and the CIs work (i1-13). This appears to be working at present in Scotland, with all four institutes annually expanding their relational networks and partnerships in their local Scottish communities.

Despite these networked and collaborative approaches inciting decentralized and wide-reaching communication in China's CI diplomacy, it is important to recognize that such diplomacy continues to function within Chines parameters. D'hooge (2005, p.102) writes that, 'the limits of China's public diplomacy are defined by the fact that diplomacy is a highly centralized and state-controlled affair.' These Scottish CIs appear to be sitting in a rather vicarious position; both advocating decentralized communication structures, whilst being acutely aware of an overarching discipline installed by Hanban. This appears to be new public diplomacy with distinctly Chinese characteristics. But the extent to which these Chinese characteristics will constrain China's diplomacy is not yet visible in Scotland. If this relational approach to public diplomacy, which places focus on human interaction over product-pushing, is working in Scotland; it should be cultivating sustainable connections between Chinese and Scottish individuals, businesses, and organizations, that have the potential to ascend political disjuncture that could arise in the future.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to extend the currently small body of work concerned with the relational processes of China's public diplomacy. It is argued that in order to better understand and assess Confucius Institutes a new approach to diplomacy analysis is needed; an approach which responds to 21st century communication trends and political landscapes. With the rise of the internet, communication networks have become globalized, multi-directional, and multi-modal. And in this polylateral world previous hubs of power and knowledge are being decentralized. In response audiences are becoming resistant to previous models of public diplomacy, which largely relied on state-centric, linear, and mass-media communication tactics. The small, but evolving field of new public diplomacy recognises that PD strategies today need to focus on relational structures, with processes deemed as influential as actual product. Given the unique organisational and operational structures of Confucius Institutes, it is argued that this relational framework is a better tool through which to understand and analyse the potential impact of China's work, and in turn their larger soft power pursuit.

To illustrate this, Scottish Confucius Institutes have been used as case studies. Findings indicate that the soft power potential of these institutes may be underestimated at present. In Scotland, joint-partnership structures are inciting large and networked engagement, resulting in collaborative and self-perpetuating relationships. These relationships invoke decentralized power structures, and in turn provoke credible, and dialogic joint-narratives. In adopting these relational tactics associated with a 'newer' public diplomacy, Scottish CIs have reached large and varied audiences, ranging from the Scottish business community to primary school children, and are increasingly embedding themselves in Scottish politics, education, and culture. These networks are now spreading with little to no engagement needed from Hanban.

The nature of these relationships needs to be considered as a key unit of public diplomacy analysis, for they hold influential power. Confucius Institutes are not just engaging in language and culture dissemination, but embodying a relational perspective on power. As Zaharna (2014, p.25) writes 'the CI initiative does not rely on the inherent appeal of the Chinese language or culture…The CI's appeal emerges through the network communication approach that generates a relational structure and relational

dynamic.' Their soft power potential lies in both intangible processes, and tangible products.

But it would be wrong to claim that China's CI initiative is a gleaning example of new public diplomacy. As much as this analytical framework has revealed the nuances of power in CIs relational structures, it has also highlighted problems. CIs may be striving to explain China's harmonious intensions to the world through 'relational structures and relational dynamics', but problems with quality and ideological disparities could hamper China's efforts (Zaharna 2014, p.10). China's authoritarian regime constrains the parameters to which these CIs can truly be considered as decentralized in power. Whilst some argue that CIs work will always 'hit a wall' under these conditions, there is no indication that China's regime will change in the near future (Hartig 2016 b). In fact, if very recent events are anything to go by - the CCP's 2018 goal of eliminating VPNs, or their 2017 demand that Cambridge University Press censor politically sensitive articles- China appears be centralizing rather than decentralizing their authoritarian power structures (Hass 2017; Sullivan 2017). Whilst it is impossible for any country to completely negate negative perceptions, how China chooses to manage these perceptions over the coming years will be more fundamental to reception in international environments (Cowan and Aresnault 2008). The CI programme has the potential to provide the perfect platform for China to manage a more dialogic conversation here.

We are very much in the early days of the Confucius Institute programme, and thus are unable to gage whether this approach is cultivating the soft power China hopes for. In the words of one interviewee, 'this is still an experiment, and I'm not sure Hanban even know how it will end' (i2). Only time will tell if China manages to transform this very new relational diplomacy into longer-term effective soft power. The potential is there, but certain pitfalls may derail the CI programme yet. And if Hanban decide to start pursing the 'research hubs' they've been discussing, there will be a need to re-analyse and re-evaluate (Siow 2011). However, it is worth following China's CI diplomacy pursuit closely, for its gains (or losses), success (or failure), will contribute significantly to the development of a clearer, substantial, and more empirically informed theoretical framework through which to understand and measure public diplomacy in the 21st century. China's efforts here have overtaken traditional theories, and as Melissen writes, 'lessons from public diplomacy as it unfolds in East Asia and

other cultural settings can only enrich an academic debate' currently saturated by Western experiences (Melissen 2011, p.11).

Appendices

Appendix A

Interviews:
I-1, Scotland 22 Jun. 2017
I-2, Scotland 29 Jun. 2017
I-3, Scotland 4 Jul. 2017
I-4, Scotland 19 Jul. 2017

Appendix B

Global opinions of China, 2014-2016



(Source: Pew Global)

UK opinions of China, 2005-2016



(Source: Pew Global)

Appendix C

Confucius Classroom Hub (local authority partner):	School based in:	Chinese Partner School:
Perth and Kinross Council	Perth High School	Tianjin High School affiliated with Beijing Normal University
West Lothian Council	James Young High School	Tianjin No. 41 High School
East Dunbartonshire Council	St Ninian's High School	Tianjin No. 42 High School
City of Glasgow	Hillhead High School	Tianjin High School affiliated with Nankai University
North Lanarkshire Council	Our Lady’s High School	Tianjin High School
Fife Council	Queen Anne High School	Tianjin No. 2 High School
East Renfrewshire Council	St Ninian’s High School	Tianjin No. 45 High School
City of Edinburgh	Leith Academy	Tianjin No. 1 High School
Falkirk Council	Larbert High School	Tianjin Chonghua High School
South Lanarkshire Council	Hamilton Grammar School	Tianjin No. 3 High School
Shetland Islands Council	Sandwick Junior High School	Tianjin No. 102 High School
Highland Council	Kingussie High School	Tianjin Wuqing Yangcun No.1 High School
Stirling Council	Stirling High School	Tianjin No. 54 High School
Midlothian Council	Lasswade High School	Tianjin No. 25 High School
City of Glasgow	Jordanhill School	Tianjin Weishanlu High School

South Ayrshire Council	Queen Margaret Academy	Tianjin No. 20 High School
North Ayrshire Council	Greenwood Academy	Tianjin No. 2 Nankai High School
East Ayrshire Council	Grange Academy	Tianjin Xinhua High School
The Moray Council	Elgin Academy	Tianjin Hangu No. 1 High School
Angus Council	Carnoustie High School	Tianjin Tanggu No. 1 High School
Aberdeenshire Council	Ellon Academy	Tianjin Dagang No. 1 High School
Aberdeen City Council	Oldmachar Academy	Tianjin Haihe High School

(Source: SCILT 2017)

Appendix D

The organizational structure under the CI programme in China under Hanban



(Source: Hanban, n.d, a)

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