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"The development of the EU's strategic culture and its constructive power: EU-NATO relationship's new course"

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Abstract:

The first official strategic reflection of the EU, the European Security Strategy - 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', underlined how in order to become a global actor the EU needs "*a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention*" (EU, 2003: 11) given the complexity of today's security threats. This dissertation will seek to find out how the strategic culture of the EU has developed since 2003 through a discourse analysis of the main European strategic documents: we aim to assess how the norms have changed since 2003 and which new ones will guide EU's action after the release of the new strategy in 2016. Indeed, if strategic culture is considered as being socially constructed, acts of speech and interactions are the means thorough which it is expressed. If these norms tough are to be successfully implemented, they need to be accepted by EU's international counterparts: if we refer to the security issues, NATO is the main security provider for the European continent. We will therefore analyze NATO's response to the new norms and how they affected EU-NATO's relationship, thus aiming to assess the constructive nature of strategic culture.

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List of Abbreviations:

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CW	Cold War
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
EC	European Commission
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
HR(/VP)	High Representative (Vice President)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TOA	Treaty of Amsterdam
WEU	Western European Union

1. INTRODUCTION

The complexity and interconnectivity of the current security threats and strategic environment is a reality that the European Union (EU) has highlighted in its strategic documents, speeches and statements since 2003 (EU, 2003; EU, 2016; Juncker, 2015, 2016; Mogherini, 2015a, 2015b, 2016c, 2016d). The belief that *"no country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own"* (EU, 2003: 2) is the premise of the most important EU's and NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) documents: the complex nature of these threats is the reason why cooperation at the international level is today fundamental. At the same time, if the EU wants to become a global actor, it needs *"to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention"* as the *"European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World"* (ESS) underlines (EU, 2003: 11).

The release, in June 2016, of the *"European Union Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action - A Stronger Europe"* (EUGS) stimulated discussions about the role that the EU could potentially have in the international arena while at the same time cooperating with the first security provider on the European continent, NATO. As Cornish and Edwards point out, the real challenge for the EU in the current security context is to find the right policies to develop its own strategic culture so to complement, rather than challenge, NATO's role and the sensitiveness of its non-EU members (2005: 820). In addition, given the EU specific institutional structure (28 sovereign member states), the reach of a shared view on a policy that could represent all national cultures is still an issue and, in some scholars' view, it endangers the chance of the EU having a strategic culture at all (Toje, 2005: 9-17). On the contrary, this dissertation focuses on the EU as an organization that is building its own strategic culture and on the vision that it expresses, rather than on the inner workings that produce it: indeed, the resulting strategic culture will represent the EU as a whole, not the single members' preferences, and it will guide its action in the international arena as a single actor, as the other players will perceive it.

Central to the concept of strategic culture, whose development is called by the 2003 ESS, is the belief that it is constituted by social factors, such as ideas, norms, and identities, and that, at the same time, it is influenced by the social interactions that an actor has with other relevant ones (Cornish-Edwards, 2001; Gray, 1999; Klein, 1988; Lock, 2010; McDonagh, 2015; Meyer, 2005; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Zyla, 2011). Our main research question follows from the same ESS' recognition that the EU needs to develop its own strategic culture, and that it has begun doing so with its first security strategy (2003): how has the strategic culture of the EU developed since it was first officially expressed in the 2003 ESS? Secondly, how does this strategic culture construct EU's relationship with NATO? Our aim is twofold: first, we want to assess how the EU's strategic culture has developed by comparing the norms and ideas expressed in the 2003 ESS with the ones that are now characterizing the EUGS; in particular, we want to analyze how the new strategy defines EU's relationship with NATO. Secondly, we aim to determine how this strategic culture constructively influences the relationship between the two actors by evaluating NATO's discursive reaction to the new EU's strategic course. Indeed, the specific 'social' aspect of strategic culture is the reason to look at how the EU approaches other actors when analyzing how its strategic culture develops: in addition, a strategic culture has a meaning only when it is accepted by other actors (Lock, 2010).

Specifically, we will focus on the time period between the 1st November 2014 and the 14th of June 2017: namely, date of the appointment of the new High Representative/ Vice President (HR/VP) who was in charge of drafting the EUGS, and date of the joint EU-NATO Progress Report on their cooperation after the EUGS. In order to reach our aims, we will analyze official speeches and statements of the two actors which focus on the new strategy and the consequences this has on their relationship.

These research questions underline the importance of strategic culture not only as an indicator of the global role that an actor is going to claim and play internationally, but also as a factor that influences the interconnections between the actor and its counterparts. As for what regards the EU, the complexity of today's threats (heavily stressed by both EU and NATO) calls for a major cooperation,

specifically in the security field; the EU utilizes the new strategy as a commitment to that need. Therefore, it is fundamental to analyze it in order to understand which norms and ideas are going to guide EU's action; at the same time, it is necessary to study NATO's response, as it is EU's main counterpart in dealing with security issues.

The next chapter of the dissertation will look into the meaning of strategic culture; specifically, it will lay out the debate about strategic culture being and independent or dependent variable in regards to strategic behavior. This discussion, and Meyer's definition (2005), will help us to understand the rationale between the claim of strategic culture as a context and as socially constructed, and the reason why we need to analyze other actors' response to the EU's strategic culture in order to assess if it has a meaning in the international arena. This chapter will also offer a revised account of the literature review around the nature of the relationship between EU and NATO, thus presenting a useful picture for comparing the strategic culture resulting from the EUGS to the past interactions and for drawing conclusions about their development. The third chapter will illustrate the theoretical framework with which we will approach the concept of strategic culture; constructivism will help us explain the influence that social interactions have upon it and how, at the same time, its success depends on the recognition of other actors. A second section will explain which methodology will be used in order to conduct the research; in this respect, we will justify our decision to use the historical approach (HA) in critical discourse analysis (CDA). In the fourth chapter, we will conduct the discourse analysis of the ESS and the EUGS so to assess the development and the main current features of the EU's strategic culture. The fifth chapter will then focus on how the strategic norms and ideas that result from the EUGS are accepted and integrated by NATO in its speeches and statements and on how they have influenced their relationship. Finally, in our concluding remarks, we will summarize and discuss our findings, addressing our limitations and needs for future research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This first chapter will present the literature review related to the strategic culture definition debate, to how the concept relates to the unique European actor and to the specific relationship between the EU and NATO, the two security providers for the European continent. The first purpose is to propose a brief historic overview of the debate that surrounds the concept of strategic culture and to identify a definition to work with. Secondly, we will discuss how this definition can work together with the specificity of the European actor when compared to more traditional ones, and how the 2003 ESS, first official comprehensive strategic document for the foreign and security policy of the EU, begins to shape a strategic culture. Finally, we will analyze the relationship between the EU and NATO by underlying the features of the two actors and the historic development of their relations from 1991 onwards. This in order to clarify the terms of our research question, to argue the aptness of such a concept for the EU, and to highlight the past relationship of the two actors: indeed, it is fundamental to define the features of strategic culture if we aim to analyze its development in regards to the EU and how it sets the boundaries of its action towards NATO, and also to determine the development of their relationship if we want to understand if/how it is going to change after the EUGS will be implemented.

2.1 Strategic culture: the story so far

Every study on strategic culture, its existence, and development has to first propose a definition in order to delimit the breadth and the features of the research agenda. Despite a growing body of literature focusing on the concept, the debate around what strategic culture refers to does not seem to falter or reach a unanimous conclusion (Lock, 2010; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Schmidt and Zyla, 2011). The term was first coined by Jack Snyder in 1977 in an attempt to clarify the different strategies adopted by the Soviet and US powers during the Cold War, but since then it

evolved following the particular research trends and the political and security environment's developments (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Schmidt and Zyla, 2011); more recently, the concept appeared as a driven element in the debate over the future of a European security policy (Lock, 2010: 688). The resulting different theories have been classified by Alastair Iain Johnston (1995: 36-44), one of the main interpreters of this concept, in three broad generations, a classification that has been evoked later by the work of Edward Lock (2010). If, generally, the literature agrees in saying that different security communities will react discordantly in identical security environments due to divergent cultural differences, and that these communities will tend to reproduce consistently these strategic preferences over time, on the other hand scholars disagree in explaining how strategic culture arises and its relationship with and effect on strategic behavior (Lock, 2010: 688-90). In particular, the works of Colin Gray and Johnston propose the two most influential trends in this literature. On one hand, Johnston (which is considered part of the third generation, following its own classification (Johnston, 1995: 36-44)) focuses on the independent value of strategic culture by distinguishing its role from strategic behavior and by underlying how it only presents policy makers a certain range of available options when acting in a security environment; in doing so he aims to constitute a falsifiable theory, since by comparing the strategic behavior of an actor to its strategic culture, a scholar should be able to identify exactly how and by what extent its actions are driven by its strategic culture (Lock, 2010: 688-90; Meyer, 2005: 6-9). On the contrary, Gray (proponent of the first generation, early 1980's) claims how it is theoretically incorrect to separate notions of strategic culture from strategic behaviors since the players are under the influence of those notions, since they are "encultured"; following this reasoning, strategic culture is seen as a context which affects actors and in which, subsequently, actors are called to deliver policies (Lock, 2010: 688-90). This conception precludes scholars from being able to think about strategic culture/ behavior as a part of a 'cause-effect' mechanism and brings about two major implications: methods should aim to understand strategic behavior and not to explain its causes, and secondly, comparative theory testing can not be applied in this case. Finally, the main proponent of the second generation (mid 1980's) follows Gray's

work: indeed, Klein points out how there is no distinction between an external reality and the knowledge actors have about that same reality and that the context given by the strategic culture is fundamental for actions to have meaning; furthermore, he underlines that this chance of actions having a meaning depends on the existence of social structures (in this way, linking his work to the main tenets of constructivism) (Johnston, 1995: 39-41; Lock, 2010: 695-701). The features on which all three generations agree on describe strategic culture as a 'meta-concept' which defines the set of decisions and policies available to particular actors based on a shared identity: if this is a cause-effect process, with strategic culture being an independent variable or operating as an influencing and influenced context, this issue divides the literature.

As for the current debate around the EU, the work of Gray is considered a landmark by scholars when theorizing about the European security policy; in particular, Meyer, who defines strategic culture

"as comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's pursuit of security and defence goals" (2005: 12),

following indeed the first generation's understanding of strategic culture as a context, is positive about the possible emergence of a coherent European strategic culture (Lock, 2010: 690). This definition will be our reference point throughout the dissertation for two reasons: firstly, it takes into consideration the political/historical context in which the strategic culture is immersed, and in doing so this definition considers it not as an independent variable, but heavily tied to the specificity of its context, a dependent variable; secondly, by underlying the power that ideas, norms, and behaviors have on the set of policy options for actors of a determined community, it acknowledges the fact that the strategic culture is constructed and that it can possibly transform, even if slowly. These two points are fundamental for our analysis

since we think of the EU's strategic culture as a work in progress (the foreign and security policy having begun to develop only in the late 1990'), and we consider the political context, in this case the relationship between EU and NATO, their norms and discourses, as having an influence on how it develops.

2.2 EU's characteristic features and the strategic culture debate

When taking into consideration the strategic culture together with the EU, scholars discuss if this concept can be applied to such a unique international actor and subsequently how necessary it could be to develop it. The debate over the existence of a European strategic culture has particularly developed after the draft of the ESS (2003), the first strategic official document which identifies the features of a common course of action in terms of foreign and security policy. Specifically, it was clear that the creation of the necessary military and civil capabilities would have not been sufficient to implement the policies outlined: a *"shared pool of norms, beliefs, and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy"* which could answer the ESS' call for a *"strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention"* was fundamental in order to drive the EU (EU, 2003: 11) (Meyer, 2005: 3-6).

Due to the specificity of the EU, it is indeed important to underline that having a strategic culture does not necessarily entail the willingness to deliver responses with a military heavy footprint: indeed, (by applying Meyers notion of strategic culture, 2005) if the primarily military actions (or any other specific action) are not taken into consideration when dealing with a possible crisis, it means that those particular actions are not included in the set of available responses for this specific actor, but, at the same time, it does not mean either that this pattern of behavior will be always avoided in the future.

The specific constitution of the EU, with its 28 member states, and the lack of "the necessary military capabilities" may constitute a problem in the forging of a strategic culture (Baun, 2005: 33-7), but, as the majority of scholars and experts underline, this

is not the case: the ESS is a clear proof that the process of developing a strategic culture in the EU has already started, and that specifically, by laying out a clear comprehensive approach to security issues, it goes beyond the particularity of the political context in which it was conceived (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 517).

Furthermore, against the argument proposed by Hyde-Price concerning the lack of a 'state' constitution as a consequence of a major war between the members (war has had in the past an important cohesion value for the foundation of new state actors) and the weakness of the European integration founding myth in giving the EU a shared historical point of reference, Norheim-Martinsen argues that cultural factors do in fact counterbalance the lack of common ones like language, borders and national features, and asserts that, in particular since the adoption of the ESS, a specific strategic culture that looks at security as an EU asset rather than a shared security interest has developed: in this sense, "behaving like europeans" becomes an end in itself, which integrates national strategic cultures (2011: 528-9). Finally, if the strategy is incoherent or lacks consensus between the members, it does not mean that a strategic culture is absent: indeed, Gray underlines how it can be dysfunctional (1999: 65-66; McDonagh, 2015: 631). Specifically, Gray himself draws a line between his earlier and most recent understandings of strategic culture: if initially he thought that it would develop as "an expression of generally successful adaptation to challenge" where every idea and norm should work for every person (in our case for every member state) if it was to survive, later he underlined how this is not necessary (1999: 65-6). He highlights how the 'functionality' of a strategic culture does not have meaning outside of a specific historical context, and that consequently it can be or not be successful depending on the circumstances; he adds also that strategic attitudes can be at the same time functional (at present) and dysfunctional (in the long term), but anyway they will be "culturally inescapable" (Gray, 1999: 65-6).

2.3 ESS' features and content

Since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed on 7 February 1992, and of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the St.Malo declaration in December 1998 (later renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009), the EU has produced two main strategic documents in order to lay out its strategic objectives, preferred course and means of action: the ESS in 2003 and the EUGS in 2016 (Grevi, 2009: 19-59). A great debate regarding the ESS has followed its release, and, after the EUSG, scholars and experts focused on how the content, the structure and process of drafting changed by comparing the two documents.

In particular, the drafting of a strategy became necessary when the fragility of the political unity between the members states manifested pre and during the Iraq war (2003); indeed, until that point a "constructive ambiguity" (as Norheim-Martinsen calls it, 2011) was a defining feature of the ESDP, with national different agendas and aspirations taking the lead in shaping the course of action.

With the ESS, presented by Javier Solana in 2003, the EU for the first time gave written recognition to its aspirations as a security actor and formulated a 'comprehensive approach' as the concept around which the ESDP should evolve: in detail, the EU should aim to integrate all the dimensions of foreign policy, from the ones regarding trade and the military to the issues of cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to armed interventions (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 525-8), and to deliver a "multilateral and multiagency response" (McDonagh, 2015: 632). This new proposed course of action was indeed an answer to the strategy's statement that *"none of the new threats is purely military; nor can be tackled by purely military means […] each requires a mixture of instruments"* (EU, 2003: 7). Therefore, the ESS had the aim to point out which means the EU could employ to fulfill its objectives and to give a premeditated rationale for when the EU could be forced to respond military; the document linked the EU role as a security actor not to the experience of the Cold War (in fact, it did never mention it), but it emphasized the integration process as a

'founding myth' and the EU responsibility towards regional stability as its primary role (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 523-5). The set of common values underlying the European project were tacitly assumed, while the role of promoter of those same values was only underlined when taking in consideration the neighborhood policies; the strategy document steered clear of any military commitment, and it presented the possibility of it only to 'restore order' in connection with failed states (EU, 2003: 7; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 525-8). At the same time though, the ESS called for the development of a strategic culture able to drive the EU towards *"early and robust intervention"* when needed (EU, 2003: 11): the inconsistency in the approach to issues and threats (cooperation and conflict prevention versus robust intervention) showed the difference between national preferences for action and the possibility, as Gray underlined, to have a strategic culture, even if it is, in a certain way, dysfunctional.

2.4 ESS: EU's strategic relationship with NATO

While pointing out objectives and means of the EU action in the security and defence field, at the same time the ESS set the boundaries of its relationship with NATO, the main security provider for the European continent. After having initially long debated on the ESS, the European member states finally agreed on the comprehensive approach and integrated it in their strategic culture, concept that put the EU on a different track compared to NATO: the EU would prefer non-military operations to military-led ones and only in the event of crisis emerging in the neighborhood and beyond it would opt for different means (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 525-8). In this way, the EU abided by its commitment not to diminish NATO's role, nor discriminate non-EU NATO members or duplicate its functions, which were the fundamental preconditions to the ESDP, expressed by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during the 1998 NATO summit (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 525-8; Whitman, 2004: 444).

2.5 EU and NATO relationship: history, features, and differences

Our review of the relationship between the EU and NATO begins with the end of the Cold War (CW), when their distinctive roles changed as a consequence of the end of the bipolar system and both of them had to adjust to the new political and security environment; indeed, during the CW, NATO focused on the Soviet threat to the existence of the Western order and did so by employing military means, while on the contrary the EU directed its efforts into building an institution in order to create a liberal order (Flockhart, 2011: 265-8). When the imminent threat disappeared, the two actors had to structurally readjust and formalize their relations, bearing also in mind that their policies could easily overlap since their objective was/is to provide the EU (and non-EU NATO countries) with greater stability and security. Indeed, it would be impossible to discuss the role and the prospects of both actors separately since their memberships overlap and since each state (if it is part of both EU and NATO) has only one national budget and one set of military capabilities (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 814-5). In addition, the difference in how the two actors answer threats adds an ulterior layer of complexity in their relationship: in response to security challenges, the EU's answer will consist of combined military and civilian assets (with possible economic assistance and foreign aid) and will interest neighborhood regions and possibly other non-EU areas, while NATO will engage militarily, especially in regards to Article 5 scenarios, and it will do so on a regional level (Zyla, 2011: 676-8). Their relationship's history could be divided into three main phases: 1991-1998, 1998-2003, and finally 2003 onwards.

1991-1998:

This first stage was distinguished by NATO's intention to control and contain EU's actions and by the development of an EU-independent security and defence policy; the Pentagon was concerned about the Atlantic Alliance being undermined and, in this sense, it agreed to the elaboration of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO so to monitor the growth of any EU military capability

[1](Touzovskaia, 2006: 236-9). On its part, the EU (with the TEU in 1992) created the CFSP in light of a possible future common defense, but, at the same time, it decided to employ the existing mechanisms to take decisions and implement them in this field by reactivating the Western European Union (WEU) (Touzovskaia, 2006: 236-9). As an intergovernmental European defence mechanism which had been developed as a complement rather than an alternative to NATO, the 'rebirth' of the WEU raised concerns as for what regarded its membership since members differed between EC/EU, WEU, and NATO: with the TEU though the EU clarified the matter by underlying how the EU/WEU relations would be strengthened so to reinforce the European presence within NATO, while, at the same time, the WEU would develop complementarily to NATO, not in competition (Whitman, 2004: 432-5). The Petersberg Declaration (June 1992, issued by the Council of Ministers of the WEU) specified the type of missions that the WEU would engage in, specifically humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management; this commitment was then recognized by the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), a military structure to carry out missions under the WEU direction coordinated with NATO, and a vital tool for the development of the ESDI (Cornish, 1996: 760-2; Whitman, 2004: 432-3): finally, the role of the ESDI was formally agreed upon during the NATO summit in Berlin (1996) under the denomination of (first) Berlin-Plus Agreement (Græger and Haugevik, 2011; Zyla, 2011).

1998-2003:

This second phase was characterized by the willingness of the EU to strengthen its military role, in view of a future independent defence policy, and, on this same page, to foster closer relations with the WEU (Touzovskaia, 2006; Whitman, 2004). A key moment was represented by the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TOA) in 1997 which amended the TEU by formalizing the ESDP, merging the EU with the WEU, and creating the figure of the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP:

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[1] Under the ESDI (cultivated especially under the presidency of George H. Bush), the EU could borrow American military assets in order to lead crisis management missions in its neighborhood, while NATO could be free of some of its non-Article 5 related obligations (Zyla, 2011, 667).

this agreement pleased both the ones who wanted more cooperation in the defense field and the ones who thought it was still too soon, namely the UK (Touzovskaia, 2006: 239; Whitman, 2004: 435). The positions of the governments, in particular France and the UK, realigned with the Saint Malo Declaration (1998), with which the need for new European military capabilities and autonomous action was restated (Whitman, 2004: 435). These purposes were then implemented through the Cologne Declaration and the Helsinki meeting in 1999 when the EU laid out a plan to achieve them: in particular, they stressed the possibility for the EU to act autonomously, where NATO as a whole was not engaged, to conduct EU-led operations in response to international crisis, and to set the 'Headline Goal', a military capability target aimed at the development of a future European force (Whitman, 2004: 437-9).

The consequence of these steps on the relationship between EU and NATO translated in the 2002 joint "EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP" which highlighted the new political relationship, the agreed objectives of their joint action, and their new strategic partnership (Græger and Haugevik, 2011: 745-6; Touzovskaia, 2006: 239-40). The declaration reaffirmed NATO's unique role in the defence of its members, acknowledged the purpose of the ESDP to give the EU members an ulterior tool to carry out its CFSP operations and the mutual reinforcing character of the two crisis management structures, while at the same time underlined the "different nature" of the two organizations: it mentioned both autonomy in decision-making and distinctive interests, namely the EU goal of a political union versus NATO's role of security and stability provider (Duke, 2008: 28-30).

2003 - :

This last phase represented the EU-NATO attempt to finalize their relationship based on the conclusions reached on their objectives and autonomy and to adjust their strategies accordingly.

In this sense, a further agreement was reached in March 2003, the "Berlin Plus Agreements", between NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the EU's HR for the CFSP Javier Solana, and it outlined more accurately the terms of their relationship: NATO assets were available to the EU, as were NATO planning and command

structures in case of EU crisis management operations; consultation and monitoring in case of EU-led operations using NATO assets; new arrangement for the exchange of classified information between the two bodies (Touzovskaia, 2006: 241). The ESS finalized EU's aspirations and highlighted how a division of labour could be in order: indeed, the EU was promoting its international role and the development of its operational capacity, which however was not yet at a level sufficient to achieve the 'Headline Goals' (Whitman, 2004: 445-6). The first concrete output of the 'Berlin Plus' agreements and the ESS was the EU takeover of the till then NATO-led operation in Macedonia at the end of March 2003 (Touzovskaia, 2006: 241); in addition, after the NATO Istanbul summit in 2004, the EU operation Althea replaced the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia, thus underlying the new course of action (Whitman, 2004: 442).

We can conclude that NATO and the EU are on different trajectories and that a specific division of labour can be foreseen in the post ESS framework: the EU is more operational, busy in ESDP 'do-able' missions in the priority area close to its borders, while NATO is increasingly engaging in military diplomacy and with states which traditionally are out of its reach; whether this scenario endures, the main consequence is that now the EU is a core actor in the realm of European security, in this way transcending slightly its characteristic civilian power role (Whitman, 2004: 448-9).

2.6 Conclusion

Concluding, the definition which we adopt in our analysis looks at strategic culture as a context in which actors play and by which, at the same time, they are influenced; the context, namely the relationship of an actor with its surroundings, is fundamental for the shaping of the actor's behavior and for actions and discourses to have meaning. We then apply this concept to the EU thought of as an international independent actor: referring to Gray's stance on it (1999), we argue that the EU is forging a specific strategic culture, which does not need to be fully functional or

receive a full-members approval to exist: its development is under way and the analysis of EU's strategic documents can disclose how it is being constructed.

As for what regards the debate over the EU, the ESS has started the process for the forging of a strategic culture and has called for its development; in particular, in response to the critics over the application of this concept to such a unique international actor, we refer to Gray's statements over the possibility of a strategic culture to be dysfunctional. Finally, the evolution of EU-NATO relationship: the first phase was characterized by NATO's attempt to control and contain a possible independent EU action in the European security realm, and, consequently, by the creation of the ESDI, the EU pillar inside of NATO; in the second phase, the EU tried to formalize an independent security and defence policy (an example is the new figure of the HR), but to maintain at the same time a strategic partnership with NATO; finally, form 2003 onwards, the EU has tried to define more clearly its scope of action by trying at once not to duplicate nor to diminish NATO's role.

In regards to the literature review here presented, this dissertation contributes to it by analyzing the developments after 2003, and in particular how the new strategy sets the boundaries for the EU action in the security realm, thus complementing the historical relationship overview. Furthermore, we apply the strategic culture concept to the European actor. Studies so far conducted have not considered the new strategy has a progression in the making of a strategic culture for the EU: instead, we look at the new strategy and at specific documents and speeches related to its drafting as a step towards the creation of one. Specifically, since strategic culture relates primarily to the security realm, we analyze the EU-NATO relationship by arguing that it influences EU's decision making process, and that, together with NATO's response and acknowledgment of it, it constructs their relationship and consequently defines their set of available strategic options.

3. THEORY and METHODOLOGY

We will now give an overview of the constructivist theory and consequently demonstrate its link with the strategic culture concept, since it is central to our understanding of its creation and development: social interactions have an influence on actors and their behaviors, and they define their set of strategic options. Finally, we will present and justify the methodology chosen to conduct the analysis, discourse historical approach in critical discourse analysis, and we will look at how the data analysis is conducted.

3.1 Theoretical framework of social constructivism

"Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material word shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (Adler, 1997: 322): with this definition, Adler sums up the debate surrounding what constructivism is about and tries to give it clear features.

The main tenet of constructivism is the structural role of ideas. Ideas, and collective knowledge, are indeed considered the "medium and propellant" of social and political action since they define the limits and the admissibility of it: these ideas are not simply an "aggregation of beliefs" of the ones experiencing the world, on the contrary they are a "collective knowledge" which will be reproduced by other human agents and consequently will be embedded in social practices (Adler, 1997: 325-7). These social practices are then fundamental to give actions a meaning since a meaningful behavior is only possible within a social context whose features are intersubjectively accepted by all the other actors (Hopf, 1998: 173): in this sense, human agents do not exist independently from their context. These insights are confirmed being the two main trues about social life by Wendt: human agents have the power to transform or reproduce their society, and society is made up by social relationships, which structure

agents' interactions with each other (1987: 338). Structure (the collective shared ideas which constraint human agents' actions) and agency (the choices of actors) are interdependent and influence each other: they mutually constitute each other. Human agents can influence the structure, but at the same time are restrained by it since every behavior needs to be socially acknowledged as such at a structural level. The agent-structure debate relates with the strategic culture concept where we consider the latter as comprising ideas and norms that are socially transmitted and acknowledged, and as able to develop with time when new patterns of behaviors are promoted and the historical context changes.

If, as Adler underlines, intersubjective meanings are a collective knowledge which constitutes and guides actors, and are socially constructed, by applying the agent-structure problem (Wendt, 1987), it can be consequently said that the particular structure of an actor influences its actions, but, in turn, its social interactions and the meanings/ideas it exchanges will have a repercussion too on its structure. On the same line, if human agents held a transformative capacity over structure, it does not mean that they are free to act independently of social structures: as Fierke underlines, since agents operate in a specific social realm, they must do so in respect of the shared intersubjective meanings if they want their actions to be recognized and given value from the other actors (2000: 338-9). This means that social structures constrain human agents, while also implies that social structures come to exist only because of human agents' repeated practices, which are meaningful only because of the intersubjective system of ideas shared between actors. This is the main concept which strategic culture scholars refer to when they define 'strategic culture' as a "shaping context for behavior" and, at the same time, a "constituent" of it (Gray, 1999: 50).

The insights that the constructivist theory can offer when dealing with strategic culture analysis are directly related to how it considers the relationship between actors and the power that social relations have on actors' behaviors: indeed, this theory, as the strategic culture literature does, highlights the power that social interactions have on the developing of specific set of actions (in our case, on strategic culture), and the

ability of human agents to change the 'structure' that surrounds them, but, at the same time, the limits that the structure places to them where their exchanges and discourses have to be meaningful for other actors to accept and acknowledge them. The focus on the interexchange between actors and on the context confirms the literature argument that strategic culture is not an independent variable and gives us an helpful theoretical interpretation. In addition, constructivism looks at discourses as a key to understand how social interactions influence actors' behavior and as a tool through which identities and norms are expressed, thus supporting our choice of strategic documents and speeches analysis in order to assess EU's strategic culture.

3.1.2 A socially constructed strategic culture

"Strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behavior and itself as a constituent of that behavior (…) one can regard strategic culture as being in good measure socially constructed by both people and institutions, which proceed to behave to some degree culturally" (Gray, 1999: 50)

Gray's delineation of what strategic culture means distinguishes him from the third generation conception of it as an independent variable (namely Johnston, 1995), and reveals the link between his theory and the constructivist emphasis on the role of interaction and ideas in the shaping of reality. Indeed, the term 'culture' comprises, in his work,

"the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray, 1999: 51),

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thus pointing out how everything a community does originates from its particular culture: strategic culture then shapes the behavior of actors, and, at the same time, it is not permanent ("not eternal"). Following this theoretical framework, Cornish and Edwards point out that the development of a strategic culture should be seen as a tool by which the EU starts forging the political circumstances for the creation of concrete capabilities (2001: 601-2): exactly in this sense, the strategic culture is a sort of indicator and a "shaping context" for the set of options that the EU has in terms of security and defence.

3.1.3 The constitution of strategic culture

If Gray's work highlights the link with social constructivism, it does not however specify how strategic culture develops; a clarification in this sense would though be useful since it would allow us not only to know where to look for it, but also to understand its inner workings and its influence.

A step in this direction is taken by Klein (1988), who draws from social constructivism even more than Gray, and fills this important gap. Gray states that strategic behavior is determined by strategic culture and somehow envisions a role for human agents and institutions in the making of strategic culture, but his understanding of it remains mildly deterministic, so there is no room for the coexistence of the two concepts (Gray, 1999; Lock, 2010: 691-2). On the contrary, Klein's view highlights the role of human agency, thus launching again the traditionally constructivist agent-structure dilemma and connecting the politics of identity with the politics of strategy (1988). Moreover, where Gray states that the context (strategic culture) gives meaning to events, Klein goes further by adding how this meaning is only possible because of the existence of social structures, since reality is socially constructed; indeed, when international actors engage, they exchange intersubjective conceptions of meaning that are central to their action and guide it (Lock, 2010: 696). Therefore, the strategic behavior of actors rests upon their strategic culture, which in turn is socially

constructed. In this sense, Lock adds that strategic culture can be seen as "an intersubjective system of symbols that makes possible political action related to strategic affairs" (2010: 697).

This understanding of strategic culture then adopts the notion of "mutual constitution of structures and agents" characteristic of constructivism and answers the question regarding its constitution (Lock, 2010: 698). The main tenet of social constructivism refers to how human agency acts on and transforms social culture with daily practices and interactions: the "constitutive power" of practice, which in turn rests on interaction since the symbols exchanged have to be recognized by the counterpart (human agents then are not entirely free, but depend on an accepted intersubjective system of meanings), and not the formative moment of an actor, fills the gap as to what regards the formation and the changes of strategic culture (Lock, 2010: 699-701).

The social aspect of how strategic culture is formed and influenced is a reason for looking at actors' external practices in order to understand how it develops with time, since clearly it is not unchangeable, and how interactions with a counterpart may alter it; also, as McDonagh puts it, "the content and significance of identities only emerge through social interaction" (2015: 629).

These social practices and interactions shape strategic culture and constraint it at the same time by making possible certain courses of action and not others; they are carried out by the exchange of ideas and language, which then have a role in the shaping of reality and its understanding. The basic idea is that human agents construct their reality "through 'speech acts' which in turn, may, through repetition, be institutionalized into rules and norms" and "provide the meaning for action (Chebakova, 2008: 6-7); this language, these intersubjective meanings that are exchanged have social consequences, so a reflection on it could give great insights on the strategic culture of actors.

3.2 Methodology

This second part of the chapter will lay out the methodology chosen to reach the aims suggested by our research questions: the assessment of how the EU's strategic culture has developed since 2003, with a particular focus on the EU-NATO relationship aspect of it, and of how this strategic culture constructively has influenced the relationship between the two actors by evaluating NATO's discursive reaction to the new EU's strategic course.

In order to choose the right methodology to analyze strategic culture, it is necessary to understand the social mechanisms through which it manifests itself. Norheim-Martinsen refers to Longhurst's distinction between the 'unobservable' and 'observable' components of it (2011: 520); if strategic culture is considered as being the "*socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior that are shared among a broad majority of actors*" (Meyer's definition described in chapter 2) and as being influenced by interactions with other actors (Gray, 1999; Lock, 2010), then discourse is the major vehicle through which it reveals itself since social practices, which shape it, are carried out by the discursive exchange of ideas. Indeed, strategic documents, security strategies, and public related documentation are the instruments with which actors lay out their objectives and means to reach them, thus informing not only their domestic audience, but also external actors/rivals, and shaping their strategic identity (Norheim and Martinsen, 2011: 521). The role of language in constituting and affecting reality is highlighted by the proponents of critical constructivism, like Fierke (2000) and Milliken, who tries to categorize the methods that could serve such a task (1999): in particular, Aydin-Düzgit points at how the analysis of language, discourse analysis, fits with constructivism and with the premises of strategic culture theory. In addition, Cornish and Edwards underline how strategic culture, and the texts that help constitute it, should be looked at as the means that actors use to achieve the political and military capabilities necessary to implement it (2001: 601-2); therefore, the official documentation of political actors can be

considered as the main source through which strategic culture can be studied, and the method that looks at language as a constitutive tool is discourse analysis.

3.2.1 Chosen method: discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is characterized by many approaches, which look at texts and documents in a slightly different way, but at the heart of this method lay three main theoretical claims, as Milliken points out: discourses are acknowledged as being "systems of signification", they are productive, and influenced by the "play of practice" (1999: 229-30). Specifically, discourses construct social realities by giving them meaning since no interactions/discourses signify anything if they are not recognized and accepted by the actors one is dealing with; discourses make some ways of acting towards the world a relevant and accessible option, make certain 'regimes of truth' stand out, and make 'knowledgeable' the practices actors implement towards the subject defined by discourses; finally, discourses are not eternal, and neither are the 'regimes of truth' they define, indeed the "play of practice" makes discourses historically contingent.

Between many versions of discourse analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) implies a dialectical relationship between a specific discourse and a social structure/event and, consequently, recognizes discourses as having a constitutive power over social structures and as being constituted by them at the same time; if this line of reasoning can answer constructivist needs in research, this approach does not take into account the specificity and historicity of the subject (Glynos, Howarth, Norval, and Speed, 2009: 17). On the contrary, we think that this is significant here since we have already acknowledged the transforming quality of strategic culture and the role that historic interactions with specific actors have on it: in the case of the EU, it is fundamental to consider how its role has developed over the last decade and how its relationship with NATO has changed in order to understand the strategic culture that results from the new documentation. Therefore, we opt for a discourse historical

approach in critical discourse analysis so as to have a full picture; this method avoids the deterministic inclination of the CDA in overlooking the subject historical characteristics and the context it is living in: specifically, DHA describes discourses as "context-dependent linguistic practices that are located within fields of social action" (Glynos, Howarth, Norval, and Speed, 2009: 17), thus recalling Gray's definition of strategic culture as "a shaping context for behavior and itself as a constituent of that behavior" (1999: 50).

3.2.2 Document selection

Our focus falls particularly on the 2016 EUGS, but other official documents are taken into consideration, released both from the EU and NATO, in order to have a clear understanding of how the EU's strategic culture reveals itself and of how the strategic discourse is received and made meaningful by the other relevant actor in the security field.

Indeed, strategic documents can be considered as the result of the process of negotiating between the national (European in this case) elites, which have the power to translate societal norms and values regarding the specific field into discourses written in an accessible language (Zyla, 2011: 671-2). As Zyla underlines, EU's and NATO's strategic documents have three roles which make them suitable if we want to analyze the EU's strategic culture and its development: as an outcome of bargaining between multiple members, they express the organization stance on security and defence issues which are agreed on by consensus, and thus have a wide validation; they provide the written basis on which the actors can plan their military and non military operations in the international arena; finally, they determine the path for the development of the inter-organization relationships, and in this way lay out the boundaries of their own action in regards to others (2011: 671-2). Together with the analysis of the 2003 ESS, we take into consideration EU's and NATO's official documents released between the 1st of November 2014 and the 14th of June 2017; since our focus is the EUSG (how it differs from the previous strategy and how it sets

the boundaries for EU's action towards NATO), we consider this time period because the HR/VP who was in charge of the strategy drafting, Federica Mogherini, was appointed on November 2014, and because the joint EU-NATO most recent report on the results such a strategy has had on their relationship has been released in June 2017. Consequently, we analyze twelve EU documents, which include the two strategies (ESS and EUGS), a report released in preparation for the EUGS draft, HR/VP speeches and two speeches from the President of the European Commission on the state of the union; five major NATO documents, three speeches by the NATO Secretary general and two reports; and finally, the two most important joint documents the two organizations signed, a declaration that followed the release of the EUGS and a progress report of one year later, which we consider fundamental in order to determine if the strategic culture expressed in the EU strategies has had any kind of influence on how the two organizations deal with each other. These documents are relevant for two main reasons: the ESS and the EUGS allow us to assess the development of the EU's strategic culture since 2003 and the main ideas that have come to represent it; while the remaining documents can clarify if the relationship between EU and NATO has adjusted and reacted to the new course of action. We included the complete list of the analyzed documents in Appendix A.

3.2.3 Software for analysis and coding methodology

The qualitative data analysis is conducted with the use of the Nvivo software. The use of a software allows us to be more consistent during our analysis and to be more rigorous, thus helping us in trying to avoid part of the bias that is often referred to qualitative analysis (Gibbs, 2002: 12-4). Nvivo consents us to code themes and to test their spread across the documents thus identifying specific patterns. Specifically, coding is "the process of identifying and recording one or more discrete passages of text or other data items (…) that, in some sense, exemplify the same theoretical or descriptive idea" (Gibbs, 2002: 57): indeed, coding allows to highlight passages of a text that exemplify central ideas, and to verify how they are spread throughout the

documents so enabling us to understand their importance by looking at their intensity (how much the writer/speaker insists on reiterating the same concept, not only in the same document, but also in multiple occasions). Once an idea has been coded in the text, the passages that refer to it are connected together in a 'node': with Nvivo, a node is "a way of connecting a theoretical concept or idea with passages of text that in some way exemplify that idea" (Gibbs, 2002: 57). The nodes then group together passages of documents that express the same concept and allow to analyze how much it is diffused and to deduce its significance.

Gibbs points out that coding and the construction of nodes is an "analytical process" and that "the categories or concepts the nodes represent may come from the literature, previous studies and so on" (2002: 59). We identify our coding framework after the review of the literature on strategic culture and, specifically, on the relationship between EU and NATO and the analysis of the ESS: this first coding framework (Appendix C, Table 1, from node 1 to 9) is then considered as a point of reference when focusing on the EUGS to assess how the main ideas that support the EU's course of action have changed between 2003 and 2016. By looking if the nodes are still present in the new document, which ones are not and which ones are new, we can comment on the development of the EU's strategic culture, both broadly speaking and in regards to the EU-NATO relationship. Once the coding framework is updated with the new ideas found in the EUGS (Appendix C, Table 1, nodes 10 and 11), we use it to study the remaining EU documentation in order to understand their consistency and significance. When finally we approach the NATO documentation, the coding framework is once again integrated with new ideas, since the perspective of the documents has changed (Appendix C Table 2, from node 12 to node 16): this last complete coding framework allows us to examine how the two organizations consider each other, which ideas are fundamental for their relationship, which perspectives they share and how their words and future strategies draw from and resemble the 2016 EUGS. A more detailed specification of how each node is identified is included in Appendix B.

As Aydin-Düzgit underlines, the discourse analysis of official EU and NATO documents allows us to first determine how the strategic culture has developed since 2003; then, it helps us evaluate how the main ideas thus identified have influenced and shaped the two actors' relationship since June 2016. We consider fundamental following an historical evaluation of documents: we start with the ESS, proceed with the document "EU in a changing global environment", the EUGS, and from there, chronologically, the speeches and documents that have followed them during 2016 and 2017. In this way, it is more easy to draw inferences on the development of the strategic culture and on the way ideas expressed in the EUGS have influenced the EU relationship with NATO. The following chapter will discuss our findings.

4. ESS and EUGS: strategic culture's development

This fourth chapter is divided into two main sections. First, it will address the analysis of the ESS: we will focus on the main concepts expressed in the 2003 strategy in order to understand how it perceived the world and which kind of strategic course it suggested to deal with it. Secondly, we will turn to the EUGS to determine if the main ideas found in the ESS have either been maintained, have changed or have been discarded by the new strategic path. By analyzing these documents we can indeed recognize the interpretative dispositions of the European actor, the broad conceptions of the environment which ultimately shape the actions that it can consider as a strategic option. Throughout the chapter, we will refer to the findings outlined in Table 1, Appendix C.

4.1 ESS: a complex world calls for a strategic culture

Our study starts with the discourse analysis of the ESS; we indeed consider it as the first document through which the strategic culture began to arise since it was the first attempt to systematically outline a strategy for the EU action through an official document (presented by the HR Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003). We will now outline the strategic role and culture that came to light after coding the main concepts into nine main nodes (see Table 1, Appendix C).

The ESS can be looked at as a tentative strategy since the role that it comes to envision for the EU is not dynamic and autonomous, but always the one of an actor that works alongside other institutional organizations not in a leading position:

"We need to work with others (…) There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with

all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors". (EU, 2003: 11-13)

This focus on the cooperation that the EU is willing to pursue points to a EU which does not envision itself as an independent actor in the international arena, and that does look for reassurance, given the *"today's complex problems"* (EU, 2003: 1), in the cooperation with other international organizations (UN and NATO in particular). This tendency is also highlighted by the total lack of references to the EU as a security provider, independent or not: indeed, even if security is considered as *"a precondition of development"* and *"in a world of global threats, global market and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system"* (EU, 2003: 2,9), no mention of specific measures in the security realm are proposed in the document, if not regarding the cooperation required. This trait will be more evident in the comparison with the EUGS, in which the EU is presented as a security provider firmly throughout the document (30 coded passages). This shortcoming and comparison is even more clear when we take into account that Javier Solana, as Tocci[2] underlines, could only present a security strategy since he was 'only' the HR for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while, on the other hand, Federica Mogherini is today the Vice President of the European Commission and chairs the Commissioner's Group on External Action too and can work on a wider spectrum of policies; this points out how the ESS falls very short of its main and sole task (2016: 2).

This weak role of the EU is reflected throughout the strategy. Two structural and drafting features could already foresee this outcome: first, it is not a very long document (14 pages versus the 56 pages of the EUGS), it only broadly describes the international environment, and does not mention any approach to counter or manage security threats and the strategies the EU should adopt to further its interests; and

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[2] Nathalie Tocci, as a special advisor of the HR/VP Mogherini was in charge of the drafting process of the strategy and now of its implementation (http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/who/sa_en.htm)

secondly, it was forged after high-level seminars between a small group of academics and experts (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 522) as opposed to the public outreach and consultation that the HR/VP Mogherini put into place before and during the drafting of the EUGS (Tocci, 2016: 465-7).

The strategy begins by acknowledging the complexity of the threats that surround the Union. Threats are estimated to be *"complex"* and *"more diverse, less visible and less predictable"* (EU, 2003: 1-3); their scope is global and the dividing line between internal and external aspects of security has disappeared. The global reach of these issues should then foster cooperation in the ESS' view: in particular, since *"no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own"* (EU, 2003: 1) and the intricacy of theses issues, stressed with concern in the document (more so than in the EUGS), the European actor that emerges from this strategic reflection, as underlined above, is an actor that extensively relies on a multilateral system in which it is not a leading member. This semi-commitment to the global security though is linked to the recognition that the EU should and potentially could do more in the security realm and expand its influence:

> *"Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world"*. (EU, 2003: 1)

This statement, which concludes the introduction of the ESS, is associated with the call for a more active, capable and coherent EU: acting more coherently and actively is considered as a precondition for the EU to become one of the leaders in the international arena and to realize its full potential. The awareness about EU's inability to lead, considered being due to the lack of a consistent strategy and of the necessary norms and means to fulfill EU's potential, is consequently followed by the acknowledgment of the need

> *"to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention"* (EU, 2003: 11)

and

"to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate". (EU, 2003: 11)

This consciousness drives the EU to encourage and commit to an *"effective multilateral system"* (EU, 2003: 9) which is seen more as a response to EU's ineffectiveness in delivering fast and adequate countermeasures and so to its insecurity, than as to embrace, boost and corroborate EU's value for the world: this highlights an important difference between the two documents since the EUGS insistently points out and relies on EU's relevance for the world and its role as security provider not only for the EU itself, but indeed for the world. The EU proposed by the ESS is a timid actor, which acknowledges its potential, but knows that it needs the protection of the multilateral system in order to grow: indeed, *"we need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships around the world"* (EU, 2003: 13). The ESS recognizes EU's potential and, in the conclusion, carefully foresees its value for the world:

"The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realize the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world". (EU, 2003: 14)

4.2 EUGS: strategic culture's development

If the ESS was a tentative strategy, the EUGS claims the role of the EU in the world. If the ESS underlined how the EU *"should be ready to share in the responsibility"* (EU, 2003: 1) for a more secure world, the EUGS presents a Union which is indeed ready to fully step up its contribution to the world's security and development by following its values, but also by meaningfully expanding and

strengthening its hard power policies and capabilities. These indeed are the two most important differences between the two documents: a Union that willingly takes the lead because it is positive about its means and abilities, versus a Union that had yet to fully discover its potential; and a Union which now acknowledges the powerful influence that its combined means, soft and hard power, could have in specific arising crisis (the migration one is an example), versus a Union which did not recognize yet how its experience in the implementation of soft power combined with the development of hard power capabilities could strengthen its influence.

As a continuation of the ESS, the EUGS proceeds to call for a more coherent strategy; a need that the HR/VP also underlined in her speech at the European Defence Agency Annual Conference in November 2015:

"We must not act and cannot act without a rational strategy, a vision on what we want to achieve, and how we want to get there". (Mogherini, 2015b: 2)

The answer that the EUGS proposes to this need is called 'principled pragmatism', which embodies both the aims and the means to achieve it and which will be the norm that will guide EU's action, both internally and externally. This concept is explained by the purpose of being able to combine the values on which the EU was founded with a realistic evaluation of the arena in which the EU should act not only to further its interests, but indeed to enhance a better world:

"We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world". (EU, 2016: 16)

As the following passages exemplify, the EUGS, contrary to the ESS (21 versus only 4 coded passages), thoroughly refers to *"the values enshrined in the Treaties"* (EU, 2016: 7) as a point of reference for how the EU should develop its policies:

"We perfectly know what we work for. We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are (...) our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rule-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action" (2016: 13)

"The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to global commons". (2016: 39)

Directly related to these values is the use of soft power, the characteristic European crisis response. In particular, the EU has tried to remain true to these values through soft power, in which, the HR/VP underlines, *"we are definitely the best"* (Mogherini, 2016c: 7) and on which *"the European Union has always prided itself"* (EU, 2016: 4). The soft power that tries to enhance and protect these values has though to be combined with the developing of hard capabilities since the threats of the complex world (terrorism, hybrid threats, energy insecurity, climate change, neighboring countries' instability), of which both documents take note, can not be dealt with only through soft power-related measures. At this particular juncture indeed, the *"idea that Europe is an exclusively 'civilian power' does not do justice to an evolving reality"* (EU, 2016: 4): soft power is not enough. The real value of the EU though stands in its ability to combine soft and hard measures: the HR/VP heavily underlines this unique strong feature of the EU:

"But if there is one world power which has the tools to face complex threats, well, that is the European Union (...) No other world power can mobilize the same variety of foreign policy instruments" (Mogherini, 2015b: 2)

The call for the development of hard capabilities is always matched with references to the values which the EU represents, and here lies, following the line of thought of the HR/VP, its real strength and its contribution to the world: the EU is presented as the

only power that can act at the international level while being able to both respond to crisis and defend the values of its Treaties, and as an active and responsible actor, as opposed to the tentative course of action laid out in the ESS. This *"dual nature"* (EU, 2016: 30) of engagement, in both the realms of development and security, points to the new role of the EU as a responsible security provider: with the EUGS, the EU will take responsibility and be able to influence developments outside its borders:

> *"The EU will step up its contribution to Europe's collective security (…) the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility (…) the EU will be a responsible global stakeholder (…) Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders"*. (EU, 2016: 8-19)

The EU will be a 'responsible' security provider in living up consistently to its values, and by enhancing cooperation with its partners, UN and NATO above all, in order to answer the current complex threats: cooperation here is considered as a responsibility, not anymore as a need as in the ESS. The EU does not need to be protected from the outside world, but it needs to responsibly take part in its security and development, thus being able to enact fully its commitment to the dual engagement which should drive its action; in addition, the credibility and influence of the EU depends on being true to those values. In this sense, the need for a strategic culture is thought of as a security matter, as the HR/VP expresses in her speech at the Warsaw Summit Experts' Forum in July 2016:

> *"So the real investment in the well-being and in the security of our people - and also the well-being and the security of our partners in the world - is actually strengthening the shared vision and the common action that we indicate in the strategy"*. (Mogherini, 2016b: 2)

The role as a security provider inevitably questions EU's relationship with NATO and NATO's role in Europe, since it is the first security provider for the continent. The ESS recognized NATO's critical value for the transatlantic relationship

and the importance of the operational framework offered by arrangements like the Berlin Plus Agreement: at the same time, it did not address the specific role the EU should have or the differences between the two organizations. The EUGS on the contrary, while still agreeing on NATO being *"the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world"* (EU, 2016: 37), starts by saying that

> *"EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two"*. (EU, 2016: 20)

The key word is complementarity. If it was not very clear in the ESS how the relationship should advance in this sense, the EUGS clarifies EU's intent to take into account how its specificity can be guaranteed and especially to always protect its autonomy: the EU is no more an actor that follows and seeks cooperation because it is not ready yet to lead, on the contrary it is an independent actor which autonomously identifies issues and how to deal with them in a practical and principled way. Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail this relationship.

A final difference is the EUGS' stress on the forces that are challenging the European project from inside: this strong call for cooperation and unity between the European members and the emphasis on how the security threats can only be overcome through joined-up policies was totally absent in the ESS, but it is relevant now. The EU of the EUGS is more confident in its ability to *"make a positive difference in the world"* (EU, 2016: 11), but it is also worried about how the current crisis (namely, in the financial and migration sectors) could undermine its work, so it repeatedly underlines the relevance of unity for every strategic action, internal or external, to have meaning and achieve success:

"In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world". (EU, 2016: 8)

Concluding, the ESS, in our research, represents the official start of the development of a strategic culture for the EU; the EUGS on the other side is the first attempt to elaborate it. Two are the norms that seem to emerge: the principled pragmatism and the autonomous, and complementary to NATO, role of the EU.
The EUGS considers the "principled pragmatism" as being the answer to today's complex security environment: the values on which the EU is founded need to direct its action, but, at the same time, action has to follow a realistic evaluation of the specific issue. The immediate 'realistic' outcome is that the EU needs to develop its hard capabilities and combine them with its advanced experience with soft power: this combination is what indeed constitutes EU's global value. On the other side, the principled side of this strategic view is the need of being always considerate of the values the EU represents. These values point directly at the second norm. Indeed, the EU considers its responsibility to act and contribute to the global security, but in order to do so, the EU has to define its relations with the first security provider, NATO. The EU will confirm its global role and its autonomy in decision-making by always referring to its values when cooperating whit NATO and by contributing with its unique experience with soft power: in this sense, the two organizations complement each other and their cooperation is mutually beneficial.

5. NATO-EU: a joint strategic response to a complex world

In this final chapter, we will turn our attention to how the strategic culture expressed in the EUGS has influenced the relations between EU and NATO by analyzing first the Joint Declaration released in July 2016, then HR/VP and NATO Secretary General speeches in which they refer to their counterparts, and finally the joint Progress Report released in June 2017. We will analyze how the two actors constructively define their relationship as a result of the norms the EU has put into place with the EUGS.

● The *'Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'* represents the EU-NATO attempt to more clearly define the boundaries of their cooperation after the EU agreed on its strategic norms. This document followed shortly the EUGS' release and for this reason it is fundamental to understand how/if the newly developed strategic culture has influenced the definition of their cooperation; in addition, this was the first joined document that reacted to a strategic decision from the EU since the Joint Declaration on the ESDP in 2002. The Joint Declaration recalls two main strategic tendencies outlined in the EUGS: the principled pragmatism and the decision-making autonomy and complementarity of the two bodies.

If the EU-NATO relationship after the Berlin Plus Agreements (2003) was based on a certain division of labour with the EU focusing more on do-able mission close to its borders and taking over NATO's missions where the scenario did not fall under NATO's Article 5 (referring to our literature review as a point of reference), with the EUGS the EU claims its international role not only in civil missions, but also in operations that regard Europe's security, and it underlines its autonomous decision-making and the value of its contribution.

"Our citizens demand that we use all ways and means available to address these challenges so as to enhance their security". (EU-NATO, 2016: 1)

This sentence clearly recalls the EUGS' insistence on the need for the EU to rely on both soft and hard power because its strength lies on the combination of means and because the complexity of the global environment requests it, as this document too underlines by saying: *"the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges"* (EU-NATO, 2016: 1). As the EUGS stated, the development of these means has to conform with "*the values enshrined in the Treaties"* (EU, 2016: 7): this position too has influenced the document:

"We are convinced that enhancing our neighbours' and partners' stability in accordance with our values, as enshrined in the UN charter, contributes to our security and to sustainable peace and prosperity". (EU-NATO, 2016: 1)

These first two lines of action are associated with a clear statement about the boundaries between the two bodies:

"This partnership will take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organizations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members". (EU-NATO, 2016: 1)

The international and autonomous role that the EU claimed for itself in the EUGS is reinforced here by underlying how the EU will *"provide security in Europe and beyond"* (EU-NATO, 2016: 1) with NATO, a partner that it considered as *"the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world"* (EU, 2016: 37). The EU's value is confirmed when the document underlines the mutually reinforcing nature of the two organizations, as the EUGS did: a strong Europe equals a stronger NATO and vice-versa.

The influence of two main norms established by the EUGS is evident here: the principled pragmatism (need for hard capabilities, but importance of values) and the decision-making autonomy and complementarity of EU and NATO.

Finally, the analysis of the Joint Declaration is fundamental for our research since it allows us to observe how the socially constructed nature of the strategic culture applies when it comes to the EU. Indeed, the EU's strategic culture and the norms it stands for have come to exist only because of repeated practices and discourses, (as underlined in chapter 3), like speeches and strategic documents; these norms tough need to be recognized at a structural level in order to gain meaning and to be applicable. The EUGS' norms we find referenced to in this document point at how they have been recognized by another actor, NATO, and thus at how they have acquired meaning and can rightfully guide EU's action by laying out the strategic options available to it.

● After the results on NATO's recognition of the EU's strategic culture, we turn our attention to how NATO translated this when referring to the EU in its speeches and statements: this aspect is important because it allows us to evaluate how the new accepted norms of an actor (EU) contribute to the discourses of the other actors (NATO) and thus construct and solidify the boundaries of their relationship.

At the 2015 Munich Security Conference, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg began by pointing out how NATO needs to reinforce its alliances given the complexity of the 21st century framework:

"We need a collective defence where Allied forces are more ready to deploy and better able to reinforce each other. Faster. Sharper. And more mobile".
(Stoltenberg, 2015: 1)

A need that answers the EU's desire to have a more decisive role in the European security realm and the position that the EU takes with the EUGS.

This suggested cooperation route is strengthened by an official statement (NATO, 2016) which reflects on the implementation of the Joint Declaration and which clearly recalls two of the main norms expressed in the EUGS and encourages the development of EU's defence capabilities. It begins by acknowledging the potential that EU and NATO can express together once they cooperate and combine their diverse tools: as the EUGS did, NATO underlines how the two organizations have experience with different kinds of capabilities and how the modern threats can be faced only with a greater mix of measures. In addition, the document stresses the importance of complementarity between the two organizations and the same decision-making autonomy which the EUGS considered as a priority in regards to EU's cooperation with NATO. Finally, the statement recognizes how a stronger EU could benefit the security of Europe and beyond, thus confirming the global value of the EU on which the EUGS insisted.

> *"Together, the two organizations, unique and essential partners, can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to these challenges, make a more efficient use of resources and better provide security in Europe and beyond (…) in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, and complementarity, while respecting the organization's different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity (…) a stronger, more capable and better resourced European defence will contribute to a stronger NATO"* (NATO, 2016: 1-2)

This statement is an example of how two main norms expressed by the EUGS have been recognized, recalled and internalized by NATO: the combination of diverse tools (plus the developing of EU's hard capabilities), and thus a more active role for the EU, and the complementarity between the two organizations have become two shared norms which will guide EU-NATO cooperation in the future.

● Finally, the last document we analyze is the joint '*Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016'*, released in June 2017. The analysis of this official paper is fundamental since it allows us to assess how the two organizations think about their cooperation one year after the EUGS and if the new norms there expressed have had an influence on how their relationship is going to develop: therefore, we can evaluate if the strategic culture has a constructive power.

The document's purpose is to jointly comment on the implementation of the common set of 42 proposals laid out after the strategic lines recommended by the Joint Declaration of July 2016. As in the statement analyzed above, we find here a reference to the complementarity and value of the cooperation and the significance of a stronger EU for Europe's security: both references refer to norms laid out in the EUGS. In addition, the document underlines how the relationship is based on *"our shared values and principles"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 2) thus recalling and confirming the resolutions of the Joint Declaration and EUGS.

The document is very brief (only 4 pages) and comments on various areas in which EU and NATO have cooperated since the agreed-upon set of proposals: this cooperation has developed in relation to hybrid threats, defence industry and research, cyber attacks, but, most importantly, to the building of one single set of forces *"to ensure coherence of output between the NATO Defence Planning Process and the EU Capability Development Plan"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 3) and to the assistance of common partners in building and fostering their resilience and their capacities. In addition, bilateral dialogue and specific meetings have become a *"consolidated practice"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 4) thus strengthening the inter-organizational information sharing.

Similarly to the analysis of the Joint Declaration, the study of this joint Progress Report allows us to assess the constructive nature of the strategic culture: in the first case, the text corroborates the socially constructed nature of the strategic culture, since norms, to have meaning, need to be recognized and accepted by other

actors, as NATO has done for the norms expressed by the EU in the EUGS; in the latter, the analysis of the joint Progress Report allows us to assess how the EU's strategic culture concretely influenced the relationship with NATO by comparing how the norms expressed as a priority in the EUGS have been translated discursively in the joint document. Specifically, the Progress Report refers to how the culture of EU-NATO engagement has changed since the EUGS and to how the set of proposals which the Joint Declaration has inspired after the strategy are becoming now the new "norm" in two passages:

> *"Our joint work undertaken over the past year has delivered substantial results. We have witnessed a change in the culture, quality and dynamics of our engagement"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 2)

> *"The key impact of the common set of proposals and their implementation is that cooperation between the two organizations is now becoming the established norm, a daily practice, fully corresponding to the new level of ambition referred to in the Joint Declaration".* (EU-NATO, 2017: 2)

The document specifically refers to a change in the "culture" of EU-NATO cooperation: this can corroborate our argument about the constructive nature of strategic culture. Indeed, if the EUGS has inspired the Joint Declaration, the latter has set in motion the set of 42 common proposals whose implementation this document is commenting on.

Table 3 (Appendix C) confirms that the EUGS norms are recalled in the joint documentation and in NATO's speeches and statements: if we consider the number of times a node is coded in the EU and NATO documents it may seem that NATO did not referred to them sufficiently, but this can be explained by the length of the texts and their purpose. The strategic culture of the EU, expressed in its official strategy in 2016 and developed since the 2003 ESS, has had a constructive influence on the relationship between EU and NATO, on which boundaries they decided their

cooperation should be based upon; finally, this last document lays out how this *"change in the culture"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 2) has operated since December 2016. Since *"our joint work undertaken over the past year has delivered substantial results"* (EU-NATO, 2017: 2), the EU's strategic culture constructive influence has proved effective.

The analysis of these documents confirms NATO's recognition and acceptance of the two main norms expressed by the EUGS: the principled pragmatism and the autonomous and complementary role of the EU. Indeed, when dealing with security issues, EU and NATO will make use of hard capabilities by being considerate at the same time of *"the values enshrined in the Treaties"* (EU, 2016: 7); in addition, NATO recognizes and praises the autonomous role the EU is planning to achieve at the international level and the complementarity between the two organizations, thus confirming the global value of the EU that the EUGS heavily underlined.

6. Concluding Remarks

This dissertation sought to assess the development of the EU's strategic culture and to evaluate how/if the new norms and ideas expressed in the EUGS have influenced the relationship between EU and NATO since its release. We attempted to achieve two objectives. First, we sought to determine how the strategic culture of the EU has developed since 2003. Through critical discourse analysis, we first deduced the main norms and ideas that characterized the 2003 ESS, since we considered it to be the first document to officially outline a specific strategic direction; then, by analyzing the 2016 EUGS, we were able to determine if those norms and ideas had developed, changed, or had been dismissed. Secondly, we turned our attention to NATO's documents and to joint EU-NATO declarations in order to understand if those norms had been recognized by NATO and integrated in its discourse, thus contributing to construct their relationship.

The basis on which these objectives laid was the definition of strategic culture itself. Strategic culture, in Meyer's words, comprises "*the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's pursuit of security and defence goals*" (2005: 12). The strategic documents taken into consideration expressed clearly the norms and ideas on which the EU should rest its actions and began to built a strategic path for the EU. We considered the strategic culture as a context in which actors play and by which, at the same time, they are influenced: indeed, this context defines the strategic options, but, at the same time, those options need to be recognized and accepted by other actors to be available and have meaning. Strategic culture "*is, after all, not a one-way street, but the product of the dynamic interplay between discourses or narratives, on the one hand, and practices on the other*" (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 529).

The comparison between the ESS and the EUGS found that two main norms have begun to emerge: the concept of principled pragmatism and the autonomous and complementary action of the EU in regards to NATO. The EU will be guided by a *"principled pragmatism"* (EU, 2016: 8): *"the values enshrined in the Treaties"* (EU, 2016: 7) will be combined with a pragmatic evaluation of the international setting and every issue or threat will be dealt with by being considerate of those values and, at the same time, by acknowledging the need for hard capabilities. The EUGS stated that the experience with soft power and the values that drive the EU make it a unique and valuable actor at the international level: in order to fulfill this global role though, the EU needs to develop hard capabilities and consequently combine soft and hard power when it has to outline its policies and international operations. The principled pragmatism norm was what made EU's perception on international cooperation shift: with the EUGS it is seen as a responsibility for the EU and not as a way of gaining guidance and protection. The EU indeed is presented as a capable and uniquely powerful actor who does not look for directions and protection in the strategic environment, but who, on the contrary, actively engages with other international actors and wisely makes use of its diverse capabilities.

In order for these new norms to be successfully implemented, the recognition by other actors is fundamental, otherwise they would not have any meaning. This is what scholars refer to strategic culture as being socially constructed (Gray, 1999; Lock, 2010): indeed, the EU does not act alone in the strategic environment and, especially in the cooperation on security issues, its norms and ideas have to be accepted by its relevant counterpart, NATO, in order to become available and applicable. The NATO documents and the joint declarations analyzed proved that the recognition happened on NATO's part: the cooperation with the EU global actor is considered fundamental and it is referred to as being unique in terms of capabilities and soft power. Finally, while suggesting the development of hard power, NATO recognized the autonomy of this 'new' EU and the complementarity of the two organizations, thus acknowledging the powerful and essential role that the EU has come to achieve in the strategic security sector and the relevance of EU values in their

partnership. These findings confirmed the constructive role of strategic culture, as well as its social aspect.

Our research was limited by two factors: the recent nature of the EUGS and the few NATO and joint available documents. Indeed, further research could benefit from more detailed reports on the norms' implementation and on the progress of the strategy in specific sectors; and more details on the creation and implementation of the new norms and on how NATO developed its response could be gathered by analyzing internal parliamentary debates of both EU and NATO.

Finally, our dissertation pointed out how the development of the EU's strategic culture has still not ended: then again, it is a product of a *"dynamic interplay"* (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 529). The actions of the EU at the international level will continue to affect both its strategic norms and ideas, and, consequently, how it approaches its counterparts and how they, in turn, will respond: the social aspect of the strategic culture guarantees that its development could be a steady and consistent process.

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http://www.natolibguides.info, last accessed 9/08/2017

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APPENDIX A: List of analyzed documents:

EU strategies, speeches and documents:

- Council of the European Union, (2015) The EU in a changing global environment: a more connected contested and complex world, pp.1-3, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/12/download, last accessed 25/07/2017.

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Joint EU-NATO documents:

- EU-NATO, (2016) Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Warsaw, pp.1-2, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-eu-nato-joint-declaration/, and http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm, last accessed 4/08/2017.

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APPENDIX B: Coding criteria

Coding criteria: we describe the main ideas behind each node.

NODES	
1. Need for coherent strategy	• the EU needs a a proper strategy in order to be more capable, active and coherent and to achieve a significant international role: a strategy is an indication of the capacity of an actor to act globally and be influent.
2. Global value of the EU	• The EU is globally valuable thanks to its diverse capabilities, its stress on values and its experience in the use of soft power.
3. EU strength and unique tools	• The node refers to the concept of the EU as a unique global player due to the combination of its tools: soft and hard power (it also combines the passages of the codes 6 and 7 where hard and soft capabilities are mentioned together as the more useful and powerful feature of the EU).
4. Security issues as fundamental	• The global contemporary context has made security a priority, hence the development of a strong cooperation in this field is fundamental for the life of the organizations and the security of their members.
5. EU need for hard power and security capabilities	• In order to protect itself (ESS) and to fulfill its role as security provider (EUGS), the EU needs to develop hard capabilities and to combine them with its already advanced soft power experience.
6. EU's soft power	• The EU prefers peaceful and non military means when dealing with crisis; it is a fundamental feature of the EU and a reason of its global value.
7. References to EU values	• The EU considers fundamental to be considerate of the values on which it is founded when dealing with crisis and developing specific countermeasures and operations.

NODES	
8. Global issues' complexity: need for cooperation	• Given the complexity and interconnectivity of today's security threats, the action of a single power is not sufficient, also because the power is not centralized anymore: cooperation between the multiple poles of power is not an option.
9. EU on relationship with NATO: autonomy and complementarity	• Cooperation with NATO is fundamental for the EU's answer to security threats since NATO is the first security provider. In these passages, the EU is not yet fully autonomous and relies on NATO's action.
10. EU role as security provider	• Specific EUGS's node: the EU does not seek international cooperation only to protect itself and reach its goals, but it does so because it considers its responsibility as a global actor to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders. This autonomous role is in particular underlined when addressing the complementarity between NATO and the EU.
11. To protect the EU: cooperation, unity, valued partnerships	• Specific EUGS' node: the EU needs to act and be resolute together in order to defeat the internal forces that are trying to tear it apart; it needs to stick together in order to be influent internationally and achieve its goals, but, above all, to protect its members.
12. NATO-EU strength	• EU and NATO passages on their cooperation: the mix of their specific means and their advanced experience with soft (EU) and hard (NATO) power is mutually reinforcing and complementary.
13. NATO's role as security provider	• NATO clearly highlights its role as a fundamental security provider for the EU and its members, but, at the same time, recognizes the always more important role of the EU.
14. NATO on partnership with EU: boundaries	• NATO acknowledges the importance of EU's action and cooperation. EU and NATO are unique and essential partners, they reinforce and complement each other, but, at the same time, they are autonomous and need to respect their decision-making autonomy.
15. NATO and EU: progress made	• Both organizations recognize how the established cooperation is becoming a new norm and how they can witness a change in the culture of their mutual engagement.

APPENDIX C: Distribution of nodes in the data

Table 1 expresses the distribution of nodes in the ESS and EUGS

	ESS	EUGS
NODES	References	References
1. Need for coherent strategy	16	26
2. Global value of the EU	7	21
3. EU strength and unique tools	6	6
4. Security issues as fundamental	6	7
5. EU need for hard power and security capabilities	5	26
6. EU's soft power	9	8
7. References to EU values	4	21
8. Global issues' complexity: need for cooperation	17	15
9. EU on relationship with NATO: autonomy and complementarity	4	9
10. EU role as security provider		30
11. To protect the EU: cooperation, unity, valued partnerships		32

Table 2 expresses the distribution of the nodes in all the documents analyzed (19)

NODES	Sources	References
1. Need for coherent strategy	12	75
2. Global value of the EU	12	59
3. EU strength and unique tools	10	41
4. Security issues as fundamental	13	35
5. EU need for hard power and security capabilities	15	66
6. EU's soft power	8	30
7. References to EU values	12	52
8. Global issues' complexity: need for cooperation	16	74
9. EU on relationship with NATO: autonomy and complementarity	12	53
10. EU role as security provider	13	76
11. To protect the EU: cooperation, unity, valued partnerships	10	84
12. NATO-EU strength	5	18
13. NATO's role as security provider	4	12
14. NATO on partnership with EU: boundaries	4	26
15. NATO and EU: progress made	1	11

Table 3 expresses the comparison of the main norms expressed by the EUGS between the EUGS (and EU documents released after 2014), the EU-NATO joint documents and NATO's speeches and statements.

NODES	EUGS and EU's documents	JOINT documents	NATO's documents
EU need for hard power and security capabilities	46	2	10
References to EU values	41	4	2
EU's autonomy and EU-NATO complementarity (node 10+15)	45	3	26