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The Impact of the European External Action Service on the
National Diplomacy of Finland

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, and became a functioning body in 2011, under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Since then it has had the task of serving the European Union's (EU) common foreign policy, representing the union abroad, and developing common strategies (Council Decision 2010/427/EU (1)). The EEAS brings national diplomats, civil servants from the European Commission and officials from the Council secretariat together under a common roof (Adler-Nissen 2013: 658). The creation of the EEAS has arguably been one of the most important foreign policy related inventions in the EU to date. It has also been a highly controversial invention (Adler-Nissen 2013: 658). A lot of attention has been devoted by academics and authorities to the functioning of the EEAS and the work of the High Representative. However, less analysis has been focused on the implications of and the challenges posed by the new service for the national foreign services of the individual member states (Ondejcikova 2012: 90). Observers in the member states have expressed fears that the EEAS, as the Union's common diplomatic service, will eventually undermine national diplomacy (Adler-Nissen 2013: 659). For this reason it has in many states been received with scepticism and apprehension. The self-proclaimed aim of the service is to be a catalyst that can bring together the foreign policies of the various member states, and to strengthen the voice and the position of the EU on the global arena. It does not, however, claim to replace or override national foreign ministries or diplomatic services (Council Decision 2010/427/EU). This paper is interested in discovering whether or not, and in what ways, the EEAS has in fact impacted the role and functioning of the national foreign services.

Of particular interest to this dissertation is the impact of the EEAS on the diplomacies of small member states. Small member states have particular shared concerns and characteristics, such as worries about large member states having too much influence on the EEAS and the EU foreign policy more generally, and about the weakness of leadership at the centre (Raik 2013: 4). They face different foreign policy challenges from larger and more powerful states, and are particularly challenged by their need to receive recognition on the international scene (Batora 2005: 6). Diplomacy is a fundamental tool for doing so, but its substance and the way it operates have begun to transform over time (Jazbec 2010: 66). For this paper, Finland and its foreign service were chosen as the case study. Finland is a good

example of a well-off, small member state. Soon after its EU accession in 1995 the country had gained a reputation as a model-pupil, being integration-minded but also constructive and pragmatic. The country has been a strong supporter of a unified and coherent common foreign policy (Raik 2013: 53). Since the early 2000s, however, there has been a gradual shift in attitudes about the EU toward a more critical stance (Raik 2013: 54). This provides for an interesting case study on how the recent establishment of the EEAS has impacted on the country and its foreign service in particular. Finland is also the target of far less research than the larger and more influential member states. Through thorough analysis, this paper will argue that the EEAS has not resulted in substantial changes to structures or policies, and most changes that can be observed are due largely to domestic reasons. We find that most instances of Europeanisation stem from the country's EU accession in the 1990s. Nonetheless, we additionally argue that the EEAS has added to the importance of the EU framework for Finnish foreign policy, has contributed to the socialisation of individual diplomats and the foreign policy elite, and has resulted in increased cooperation between national missions and the EU delegations.

The wider issue that this dissertation concerns itself with is that of the Europeanisation of foreign policy. Radaelli and Saurugger define Europeanisation as “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (Saurugger and Radaelli 2008: 213). In the words of Radaelli, “Europeanisation provides a theoretical lens on the effects of integration on domestic political structures” (Radaelli et al. 2006: 58). Europeanisation can be a two-way process. The member states can upload their preferences to Brussels and also download them from EU policy menus (Radaelli 2003: 8). In this paper we will focus our attention particularly on top-down Europeanisation, because we are interested in how the EEAS has impacted upon the Finnish foreign service, as opposed to the other way around. It might be interesting to also study potential instances of uploading and bottom-up Europeanisation, but this is unfortunately not possible within the scope of this study. Europeanisation does not necessarily accord with harmonisation, as member states may not opt for the same types of domestic policy change (Montpetit 2000: 590). This dissertation will focus on analysing the Europeanisation of foreign policy in Finland, asking specifically whether or not, and in what

ways, the EEAS has had a Europeanising effect on the Finnish foreign service.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier note that “much of the literature on European integration refers to the domestic impact of the European Union as ‘Europeanization’” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 1). We will utilise this top-down approach as it is the most appropriate for the type of study to be conducted. We will conceptualise foreign policy Europeanisation along two interrelated dimensions: national adaptation and identity reconstruction. Closely related to identity reconstruction, we will additionally make use of a Bourdieu-inspired framework developed by Adler-Nissen that focuses on the symbolic, as opposed to material, challenges presented by the EEAS for national diplomacy (Adler-Nissen 2013: 658). In the next chapter we will move on to an exploration of the relevant literature and an explanation of the methodology and the theoretical structure of the paper.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Both theoretical and empirical studies of the relationship between Europeanisation and foreign policy are relatively plentiful. Europeanisation has increasingly been used to study the ways in which the EU matters for various policy areas, including foreign policy (Börzel 2003: 57). Due to the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy making, Europeanising pressures from the EU level are not as strong as for issues such as economic and social policy (Börzel 2003: 59). There is, nonetheless, empirical evidence of changes in member states' foreign policies as a result of interaction with the European level. For example, the quality and quantity of information available and repeated interactions have changed working patterns among diplomats of member states, resulting in coordination. Europeanisation as a concept is not as much an explanatory theory, as “an attention-directing device” (Olsen 2002: 943). It allows us to focus on processes of change and to look into the nature of the “reciprocal relationship” between the national and European levels (Börzel 2002: 195). We aim to use this concept to uncover the patterns of influence and change between the EEAS, meant to serve as the common diplomatic service of the Union, and the national diplomacy of Finland. Wong suggests that three conceptions of Europeanisation can be useful for explaining changes in foreign policymaking of member states: national adaptation (a top-down process), national projection (a bottom-up process), and identity reconstruction (Wong 2005: 135). Europeanisation as national adaptation can be defined as a process of domestic change due to adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process. The character of the process depends on the “goodness of fit” of adaptation pressures and domestic institutions (Torreblanca 2001: 3). Europeanisation as national projection can be seen as a process whereby member states attempt to export domestic policies and ideas to the EU level (Gross 2007: 505). Identity reconstruction refers to changing policy preferences, elite socialisation, and even eventual convergence of national foreign policy (Gross 2007: 506). As discussed, due to the limited scope of the study, we will be invoking only the concepts of national adaptation and identity reconstruction in our research, in order to understand whether such processes are taking place in the case of the Finnish Foreign Service as a result of the establishment of the EEAS.

The European External Action Service has been studied by many observers from various angles. The focus thus far, however, has remained on its structure and on critiquing

its functioning. As the EEAS is still relatively young, studies focusing on the effects this new European diplomatic body has had on the national foreign services of the member states are scarce. One study that has approached this topic is “Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy – The Struggle between National Foreign Services and the EU’s External Action Service” by Rebecca Adler-Nissen. Adler-Nissen goes into the topic of how the EEAS has exercised power over the member states and their national foreign services. She uses a Bourdieu-inspired framework addressing symbolic power, and applies it to argue that the EEAS does not challenge national diplomacy on a material level, but rather on a symbolic one. According to her the EEAS questions the state’s monopoly on symbolic power, which explains the resistance by many national foreign services. She analyses the transformation of authority in global politics and the emergence of a new form of diplomacy, posing a challenge to traditional state diplomacy. The material and institutional powers of the EEAS have been exaggerated by critics; however the symbolic powers have been underrated by both critics and supporters (Adler-Nissen 2013). The article provides a very interesting perspective with its focus on symbolic power and the changing nature of diplomacy. The Bourdieu-inspired framework developed by Adler-Nissen will be useful to apply in the section of our study focusing on identity reconstruction, to explore whether or not, and in what ways, the EEAS has presented significant symbolic challenges in the case of the Finnish diplomatic service.

Barbora Ondejcikova has taken a detailed look at, similarly to this dissertation, the impact of the EEAS on the national diplomacy of an individual Member State in her paper “The Impact of the EEAS on the National Diplomacy of Slovakia as a Case Study of Small EU Member States – an Advice Paper for the Aspirant EU Countries of the Western Balkans”. She has chosen to focus on Slovakia and its diplomatic service. Ondejcikova’s work provides a useful base for our research, as although Finland and Slovakia are very different countries in many respects, both are small member states. Ondejcikova finds that Slovakia demonstrates an interest in sending national diplomats to the EEAS structures to benefit from acquiring experience and knowledge. She states that the three main sectors of Slovak national diplomacy are economic, cultural, and public, and finds that the sectoral priorities of the diplomatic corps have been influenced by the establishment of the EEAS, European integration and the changing role of diplomacy. Slovakia benefited from clear rules set on external relations because of their stabilising effect on the international environment. Overall Slovakia appears to have welcomed the EEAS and the subsequent cooperation with diplomatic services of other member states as well as opportunities for national representation

within the EU. Slovak embassies and missions reported an improvement in the cooperation with the EU delegations, which have better access to information than the diplomatic service of a small country does (Ondejcikova 2012). The study is very practical and focused on empirical data. It will be interesting to conduct a similar study on another member state, with an additional, more theoretical interest in Europeanisation and foreign policy.

The European External Action Service has clearly stirred up some attention among policy makers and academics, and for a good reason. In addition to Ondejcikova's case study on Slovakia, there does nonetheless not exist a massive amount of detailed and comprehensive research into what effects the establishment of a common European diplomatic and Foreign Service has so far had on the national diplomacies of the member states. Particularly the effects on the smaller and less powerful member states have not been extensively studied. Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik conducted a study titled "The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies" that looks into the relationship between the EEAS and a wide range of countries in early 2013. They also include a section on Finland, providing a basis on which to expand and conduct further, in-depth study. Skander Nasra conducted research on small state diplomacy in his paper "EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon: What Role For Small State Diplomacy". Nasra illustrates how the success of the common foreign policy is commonly regarded as dependent on the extent to which the large EU states have common interests, but how in reality there are many examples of small states being able to influence EU external relations and pursue their objectives through the EU framework (Nasra 2011: 164). According to Nasra, the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent creation of the EEAS intensifies the so-called Brusselisation process, shifting authority from national capitals to Brussels where foreign policy results from the intergovernmental interaction between member states and the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty may particularly carry benefits for small member states in terms of the pooling of information and analyses, systems of burden-sharing and a global policy platform (Nasra 2011: 172).

Chapter 3: Methodology and Theory

The methodology of the research will be predominantly qualitative. The independent variable in the study is the EEAS and the conditions its establishment has created, while the dependent variable is the Finnish foreign and diplomatic service. To what extent the EEAS has resulted in further Europeanisation of the Finnish diplomatic service appears to be most effectively investigated through official documents from the EU and the Finnish government, and second-hand interviews of officials and diplomats. Official statistics and numerical data will also be given to support the findings. As the paper will take the form of an evaluative case study, we will begin with a focus on Europeanisation theory in order to explain what it is, how it functions, and in what ways the Europeanisation framework can aid us understand how the EEAS influences individual member state foreign services. The focus will then shift to the case study of the interaction between the EEAS and the Finnish foreign and diplomatic service. We will attempt to uncover whether Europeanising forces have influenced the national foreign and diplomatic service as a result of the establishment of the EEAS. We shall be looking at changes to the organisation and resources of Finnish Foreign Service, changes in views and priorities, and signs of policy-making elite socialisation, among other factors. Domestic and other external factors that may have influenced any of the perceived changes will be accounted for, such as actors, institutional structure, economic factors, and norms and ideas.

3.1 Europeanisation- the Theoretical Framework

In chapter 2 we reviewed some of the literature relevant not only to the External Action Service and its interaction with national foreign and diplomatic services, but also on the wider concept of Europeanisation. As suggested, the theoretical basis for this case study is top-down Europeanisation, and we will look at whether or not national adaptation and identity reconstruction have taken place due to the EEAS in the case of the Finnish foreign and diplomatic service. Our conceptualisation will include budgetary changes, organisational and bureaucratic change, changes to the diplomatic network, changes to staff, policy change, and transfer of competences to the EEAS as indicators of adaptation. Indicators of identity reconstruction may include the emergence of shared norms and values among policymakers, shared definitions of European and national interests, and value attached to a European approach to policy issues (Gross 2007: 506). Therefore, we will look at changes in discourses,

norms, and values, changes in traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects, development of an increasingly salient EU agenda, and indicators of elite socialisation. The Bourdieu-inspired framework developed by Adler-Nissen will be useful in the section focusing on identity reconstruction, as it will help us understand the symbolic challenges represented by the European-level diplomatic service to national diplomacies. The lens of Europeanisation, which traces the top-down influences from the European to the national level, makes it possible for us to examine the ways in which Finland has been shaped by, and how it has interacted with, the European External Action Service. Because the EEAS has not imposed any legally binding changes or requirements upon the member states, we are primarily interested in so-called voluntary, as opposed to coercive, mechanisms of Europeanisation. Coercion refers to the imposition of formal rules, while voluntary Europeanisation takes place through normative and ideational pressures, such as the power of example and good ideas (Radaelli 2003: 14-16). According to the Council decision establishing the European External Action Service, its existence does not affect the rights of the member states to decide the direction, structure, or work of their national diplomacies (Declaration 13 2010: (1-2), Declaration 14 2010: (1)). We are thus not looking at an instance of legal coercion. Europeanisation is often conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure that can both offer additional resources to exert influence and constrain the ability to pursue certain goals (Borzel 2003: 63). We expect to see instances of both in the case of the Finnish foreign and diplomatic service.

Chapter 4: Finnish Foreign and Diplomatic Service and the EEAS

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland attends to matters of foreign and security policy. Among other tasks, it handles public diplomacy, with a network of diplomatic and consular missions abroad that serve Finnish citizens and the society more widely (Formin). Finland's EU accession in 1995 was the primary motivator of a major restructuring of the Ministry in 1998. The current structure includes a geographical division into four departments (Europe; the Americas and Asia; Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Africa and the Middle East), and a parallel functional division into the Department for Development Policy, Department for External Economic Relations, and the Political Department (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Operation and Finances 2015). The Europe department handles general EU matters jointly with the Prime Minister's Office, while coordination of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues is managed by the CFSP unit of the political department. Most of the work is carried out by the relevant geographical departments (Raik 2013: 56). Finnish foreign policy went through a period of relatively strong adaptation due to EU membership towards the end of the 1990s, as both the structure of the Ministry and the substance of Finnish diplomacy experienced a considerable degree of Europeanisation (Raik 2013: 60). The country's accession marked a stronger Western orientation and a focus on building more global outreach. Finland has been a strong supporter of the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and has shown relatively strong commitment to common positions, goals, and actions (Raik 2013: 54). In recent years, however, the country has witnessed a gradual shift toward more EU sceptical attitudes, in addition to a degree of re-nationalisation of its foreign policy. We will return to this in chapter five, on national adaptation.

The EEAS was established as a *sui generis* autonomous institution (Council Decision 2010/427/EU 1(2)). Its structure is divided into two main elements, the central administration with its headquarters in Brussels, and the EU delegations in third states or international organisations (Council Decision 2010/427/EU 1(4)). The creation of the EEAS as a fully integrated European foreign service has been met with fears in many of the member states that its existence will eventually undermine national diplomacy. According to Alexander Stubb, now Prime Minister but then the Finnish Foreign Minister, "[a] lot of us [foreign ministers] are going through a bit of an existential crisis" due to this new body (Radtke 2012:

163). Yet the EEAS at the moment is understaffed, employing about 3,400 people, and in 2014 had a budget of only 519 million euros out of the total EU budget of 142.7 billion euros (European Commission 2013). In addition, decisions on EU foreign policy are still taken by the member states and require unanimity (Adler-Nissen 2013: 658). So how is this small organisation so anxiety-provoking in Europe? And are these anxieties well-founded? Is the EEAS a genuine threat to national diplomacy? The official position of the Finnish government is that the creation of the EEAS makes a stronger and more unified CFSP possible, which in turn strengthens the global position of Finland (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2009: 68). When the service was established the institutions and many of the member states, including Finland, battled for control over it. Thus far the service has been criticised for poor inter-institutional cooperation with the Commission, and for lacking an overarching strategic framework that would enable it to develop a more coherent and integrated common foreign policy, and demonstrate added value compared to member states' foreign services (Raik and Balfour 2012: 2). According to one review, the national diplomacies have adopted a "wait and see" position toward the EEAS. Many member states have cut their foreign policy budgets and changed structures but have been slow at discovering and utilising division of labour exercises and burden-sharing arrangements (Raik and Balfour 2012: 3).

All changes in the foreign and diplomatic service after the establishment of the EEAS are not necessarily due to Europeanising pressures. It is important to take into account the effect of other external and domestic factors that may have modified traditional national diplomacy. Such elements may include new actors, such as international organisations and transnational corporations (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 57-58). Globalisation and global interdependence, and the resulting system of multilateralism, can also alter the way in which diplomacy is conducted. The development of technology and new forms of communication leads to increased interconnectedness and faster communication, which provides new challenges for traditional state diplomacy. The economic crisis and other economic concerns that result in limited funds have a practical constraining impact on the foreign and diplomatic services of states (Ondejcikova 2012: 95). And finally, the general Europeanising trend since Finland's EU accession must not be ignored. We are not looking for all signs of Europeanisation since Finland has been a member state, but rather, the effect specifically of the EEAS in the last few years. All of these factors will be taken into account in our analysis, in order to best grasp the developments actually due to the EEAS and its Europeanising

influence. This paper will now move on to an analysis of Finland and how the EEAS has impacted upon its foreign and diplomatic service.

Chapter 5: National adaptation

This part of the paper will utilise the Europeanisation framework to analyse whether or not, and to what extent, national adaptation has taken place in the Finnish Foreign Service as a result of the EEAS. Adaptation requires the adjustment of national practices, preferences, and positions in order to make them more acceptable to the EU (Balfour and Raik 2013: 35). In practical terms it is the smaller member states, such as Finland, that have more limitations to their sovereignty and more to gain from embracing common norms and structures. According to the Council decision establishing the EEAS, one third of the EU diplomatic corps is recruited from the national diplomacies of the member states, and the rule of meaningful representation and geographical balance shall be upheld (Council Decision 2010/427/EU (10)). In practice this is favourable to the small member states which stand to gain proportionately more from the increased exposure and strengthened voice. In order to explore whether changes have taken place in the Finnish foreign and diplomatic service as a result, we shall look at changes in budgets and resources for diplomacy, in the structure and organisation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in staff, in policies, in the general organisation of Finnish diplomacy, and in the transfer of functions and competences, after the EEAS was established. For each of these features individually we will also consider the presence and impact of other factors.

Firstly, any impact of the EEAS may manifest itself in the form of changing budgets and resources that are devoted to Finnish diplomacy, as this new European diplomatic service gains power and shares the role of the national diplomacies. The EEAS currently has the budget of a medium-sized member state, its total expenditure for the year 2015 being 531,300,500 euros (European Commission 24 June 2014). The administrative budget of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been, and is being, gradually reduced. The planned average cuts are 13 million euros per year in the period 2012 to 2016 (Raik 2013: 56). The trend in the total budget of the Foreign Service has been fairly consistent, with no massive budget changes. The total expenditure in 2010 was 226,203,000 euros, and in 2014 it was 227,008,000 (Ulkoasiainministeriö: Talousarvioesitys 2015). The administrative budget of the Ministry is gradually reduced, while before 2010 it was increasing every year (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018). There is not overwhelming evidence, however, that budget cuts for diplomacy have been the

result of the EEAS. The need to reduce costs of foreign policy and diplomacy appears to stem largely from domestic economic factors, particularly the economic crisis of 2009. Due to the crisis the government has been under increasing pressure to improve the efficiency of the public sector and to reduce public spending, which has invariably also affected the Foreign Ministry (Finnish Embassy in London 2011). Additionally the budget for international aid and development has been a target of large cuts, which is not related to the EEAS (Nieminen 2015). Indeed, the budget cuts do not seem to offer conclusive evidence that the national diplomacy of Finland is being impacted by the EEAS. Nonetheless, the budgetary pressures in Finland, among many other member states, may be a driving force for deeper integration even if principled support has not increased. Indeed, there are signs of increased willingness across the EU to consider the potential economies of scale that may be gained through the EEAS, particularly its network of delegations, for reasons of practicality and burden-sharing (Balfour and Raik 2013: 39). The logic of efficiency is compelling for many member states.

Second, we will assess whether the EEAS has resulted in any changes, or in any future plans to make changes, to the organisation and structure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Major restructuring might be a sign of transferring competences or sharing the burden as the EEAS took on functions previously belonging to the national Foreign Ministries. As previously mentioned, EU accession in 1995 was a major motivator for a restructuring of the Ministry (Antola 2004: 95). The structure has remained largely the same ever since and no major changes are currently foreseen (Raik 2013: 56). According to the operating and financial plan for 2015-2018 the Ministry is committed to developing its services, internal and external communication, administrative structure, and internal policies in the next few years (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018). There is no indication that such plans would be in any way influenced by the existence or work of the EEAS. The main motivators seem to be domestic concerns, such as the need to reduce costs and work more effectively with fewer resources. This reflects the highly pragmatic Finnish working culture, where decisions are for the most part based on financial cost-and-benefit calculations. This being said, if the EEAS proves itself to be a more efficient and financially viable alternative to the national Foreign Ministries, and as it brings new options and instruments to the field of diplomacy, it might hold the potential of in the future taking over more competences from them. This is particularly likely in the case of small and pragmatic member states such as Finland.

Third, we shall take a look at any changes to the organisation of Finnish diplomacy since the EEAS began its work. By this we refer to changes in the network of international representations and missions. The number of Finland's diplomatic representations abroad increased in the 1990s but has remained relatively stable in the 2000s, the total number of current missions being 91 (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018). The government has, along with the budget cuts, started to reduce the amount of missions, as the total number of missions in 2011 was still 98 (Ulkoasiainministeriön tilinpäätös 2011). The ministry has been under domestic pressure by the ruling parties to reduce the expenditure on diplomatic representation abroad (Raik 2013: 56). Representations operate with minimal resources and have increased the share of local staff. With its limited number of missions, Finland supports the largest possible network of EU delegations, the contributions of which it views as significant. An incentive for cooperation between the national missions and the EU delegations, and a source of Europeanising influence, are the non-binding Guidelines for EU Cooperation in Third Countries, and the Guidelines for EU Political Demarches. These guidelines define the task of EU delegations to gather and share information with the national missions and to coordinate the preparation of joint reports, and develop a common EU calendar (EEAS 2011a: 1,2). They also advise the member states to reciprocate by sharing information, and advice regular meetings between Heads of Missions (EEAS 2011a: 1,2,3). Many missions have reported an improvement in cooperation with the relevant delegation since the establishment of the EEAS. EU delegations in third countries have made the EU an increasingly important framework for national diplomats, and have brought added value due to having better access to information than a small diplomatic mission does (Ondejcikova 2012: 104). On the other hand, in pre-Lisbon Treaty times the practice of the rotating presidency was important particularly to the embassies of small member states as it gave them the opportunity to represent the whole EU for six months. The visibility and access of these national diplomats from these member states may be expected to weaken in favour of the EU delegations (Raik 2013: 57). The position of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is that Finland benefits greatly from the EU delegations; however these cannot replace national representation. The reasons for cutting down the number of missions and the resources of the remaining ones originate for the most part from the domestic financial situation as well as changing priorities. Their position seems to be that if representations must be reduced, which takes place for domestic reasons, then the EU delegations may help to compensate for such a loss (Raik 2013: 57). Finland has traditionally engaged in several practical co-location arrangements with the other

Nordic countries, cooperating in practical aspects such as sharing premises and equipment. However, in principle Finland has no strong preference for either the Nordic or the EU framework, and wishes to strengthen both (Raik 2013: 58). There may thus be scope for the EEAS to expand the influence and importance of the EU framework for Finland's national diplomacy.

Fourth, tying in with any budgetary changes and changes to the structure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, are changes to diplomatic and other administrative staff. Small foreign services tend to employ a much higher percentage of diplomatic personnel posted at embassies to the total number of staff than larger member states (Ondejcikova 2012: 96). This means that the diplomats can focus less on diplomatic tasks, as they are overburdened with consular and administrative tasks. The total amount of staff employed by the Ministry has remained relatively consistent. Between years 2010 and 2011 it decreased from 1,531 to 1,510, but then rose to 1,585 in 2012 (Ulkoasiainministeriön tilinpäätös 2012: 48). In 2013 the total amount of staff employed again decreased slightly to 1,558 (Ulkoasiainministeriön tilinpäätös 2013: 48). Out of the total 1,558 employees 558 were posted to missions abroad (Ulkoasiainministeriön tilinpäätös 2013: 49). The EEAS, on the other hand, employs about 3,400 people, and is therefore in size comparable to Belgium's foreign service (Adler-Nissen 2013: 658). Although it is thus bigger than the Finnish Foreign Service, its size hardly represents a threat to the member states. Many of the diplomats working on issues related to the European Union consider their workload to have increased as a result of the EEAS increasing the need for coordination (Raik 2013: 57). As for Finnish representation in the EEAS, the Ministry has reported disappointment at its lack of success in posting national diplomats. The only Head of Delegation positioned secured by a Finn thus far has been Pirkka Tapiola's appointment in 2013 to Moldova (Embassy of Finland in Abu Dhabi 2013). These results are said to have decreased Finnish diplomats' eagerness to apply. On the one hand, concerns have been expressed about brain-drain - if the best candidates do not return from the EEAS to bring back new perspectives and experiences with them, gaps might be left in the national Foreign Service. Thus far the amount of Finns that have gone to the EEAS have been low enough for this to pose only a minor problem (Raik 2013: 58). On the other hand, there is a risk that the EEAS may remain distant from the national Ministry if the circulation of staff is very limited. This would be detrimental to the EEAS's attempts to contribute to a common European diplomatic culture. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that

working in the EEAS, as in other EU institutions, has an Europeanising effect on individual diplomats, as they learn to work in the multi-national and complex setting (Raik 2013: 59).

Fifth, we shall assess whether the EEAS has had an impact on the concrete diplomatic policies of Finland. EU accession for Finland resulted in a process of “policy assimilation”, with the policy of neutrality replaced by strong support for the CSDP and by military non-alliance in order to adapt to EU membership (Raik 2013: 54). There is thus a strong trend of Europeanisation dating far before the creation of the EEAS. In recent years the perception that Finland needs to maintain an ability to safeguard its national interests has been strengthened. Despite its support for the EEAS, it has maintained a stress on the importance of national control and the primacy of national control. Establishment of the EEAS thus far has not brought about substantial changes in Finnish foreign policy, and there is no indication of major changes in the near future. Strengthening of the relations with the EU and increasing use of the EU framework have been emphasised more after the EEAS was established (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018: 7-8). But the action and financial plan of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for year 2014-2018 outlines a stronger focus in foreign policy on countries and regions the importance of which is increasing in terms of Finnish national interests. The plan discusses the importance of European cooperation on foreign and security matters, but emphasises that Finland must also focus on its bilateral relations with developing countries, non-governmental actors, and the other Nordic countries (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018: 8). The intergovernmental nature of European common foreign policy is underlined time and time again (Raik 2013: 54). One example of Finland changing its policy and adapting to common European policies is its approach to Central Asia. This region is not a national priority of high importance, but after the 2004 enlargement Finland has supported the EU’s plans to build closer ties with the region, and has actively contributed to the development of an EU strategy (Raik 2013: 55). EU membership generally has therefore had an impact on at least lower-priority foreign policies of Finland. Although the current observable impact of the EEAS on policy choices is low, it may contribute to Finland altering its policies in the future, adding to the EU’s influence in the realm of foreign policy.

Sixth, we will examine the possibility that functions and competences have been transferred to the EEAS from the national foreign and diplomatic service. Finland has been a fairly strong supporter of common foreign policy within the EU. However, many of its priorities regarding the EU’s international role fall partially outside the mandate of the EEAS.

These include contributing to EU development policy, ensuring respect for common rules and standards, strengthening economic diplomacy, and stressing the need for more coordinated use of various EU foreign policy instruments (Raik 2013: 55). Finland has, nonetheless, also been one of the most supportive member states of the EEAS, and regards the strengthening of it as a priority, in order to improve the unity and coherence of EU foreign policy (Raik 2013: 56). Currently the position of the Finnish Foreign Ministry is that it is too early to evaluate whether or not some or any of its functions could be transferred to the EEAS (Raik 2013: 57). EU delegations are seen as harbouring much potential to increase their functions. Although Finland is not interested in the EEAS or EU delegations replacing national diplomacy, it sees high potential for burden-sharing due to national diplomacy constraints, particularly in overseas missions, such as limited financial resources and personnel capacity (Ondejcikova 2012: 105). Thus far Finland has been disappointed by the level of information-sharing and reporting between the EEAS headquarters and the national Ministry (Raik 2013: 57-58). One area in which Finland would like to share the burden with the EU delegations is consular services. Finland is interested in developing the EU delegations capacities in this area as it, in addition to the practical value, might ameliorate the legitimacy of the EEAS. The country regrets the resistance of some other member states in this regard (Raik 2013: 58). In addition to information-pooling in Brussels, this could offer a source of informational support as well as reduce costs through burden-sharing (Nasra 2011: 175). Finland is, however, itself hesitant about transferring power and competences to the EEAS and the supranational level more generally. A lot of this hesitation has to do simply with the fact that the EEAS is still relatively young and under construction, and must prove its value before it may be seriously considered when nationally planning the resources and structures of foreign policy.

In conclusion, the level of national adaptation in the face of Europeanising pressures generated by the establishment of the EEAS has been relatively low. Both the structure of the Foreign Ministry and the content of Finnish diplomacy experienced significant Europeanisation in the aftermath of EU accession, but the establishment of the EEAS has not greatly altered material factors or policy choices. It has, however, increased the importance of the EU framework for national diplomacy. We have analysed changes in the foreign policy budget, the structure and organisation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the organisation of the diplomatic network, the staff, the policies, and finally whether competences have been transferred to the EEAS, and this is the conclusion supported by our findings thus far. We will next move on to the second aspect of the Europeanisation framework, namely identity

reconstruction. This will help us identify any changes caused by the EEAS to Finnish national diplomacy on a more ideational and value-based level.

Chapter 6: Identity reconstruction

This paper shall now move on to the aspect of Europeanisation called identity reconstruction. Identity reconstruction refers to changing domestic interests and identities as a result of Europeanisation pressures and national adaptation to these pressures (Gross 2007: 505). Collective understandings attached to European policies cause adaptation pressures on domestic processes, and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed, when they do not resonate well with domestic understandings (Palosaari 2011). In the case of Europeanisation, this would refer to the development of an increasingly “European” identity. In order to deepen our analysis of the potential identity reconstruction taking place in Finland we will utilise Adler-Nissen’s framework inspired by Bourdieu. The framework focuses on symbolic, as opposed to material or institutional, effects of Europeanisation pressures. According to Adler-Nissen, the material and institutional competences of the EEAS have been vastly exaggerated, while the symbolic struggles over it have been underestimated (Adler-Nissen 2013: 659). The framework conceptualises a European diplomatic field, a structured social space with state and non-state actors struggling for dominant positions. A field is a structured space of social relations, functioning according to known rules. The boundaries of the field as well as who populates it are a subject of constant struggle. When newcomers enter the field there is a mismatch between the dispositions agents embody and the positions they occupy in a given social configuration. The fact that the state diplomat is currently a dominant agent in the field of diplomacy hinges on Bourdieu’s symbolic power. Particular perceptions are imposed upon social agents who then accept the current order as just and correct (Adler-Nissen 2013: 660-661). The state traditionally holds a monopoly on legitimate symbolic power, and the EEAS as a newcomer questions and challenges this. Traditional approaches to studying diplomacy have, according to Adler-Nissen, often overlooked that the state’s ability to carry out its diplomatic functions depends on its exercise of this symbolic power (Adler-Nissen 2013: 659-660). The operationalization of the framework builds on three dimensions of the struggle: the debates and negotiations concerning the entry of the new actor into the field, the relative positions of newcomers and incumbents, and the classificatory struggles and dispositions of newcomers and incumbents (Adler-Nissen 2013: 662). In order to take all of these into account, and assess the influence of the EEAS on Finnish diplomatic service, we shall first outline the treaty negotiations and debates on the formal competences of the EEAS. Then we will

examine any changes in Finland of discourses, norms, and values; changes in traditional policy positions in favour of an increasingly salient EU agenda; and indicators of elite socialisation.

Ian Manners claims that the EU is constituted through symbols and symbolism (Manners 2011: 243). This takes a lot of effort, particularly because the EU is now establishing itself in a field with the nation-state's established monopolisation of symbolic authority (Adler-Nissen 2013: 664-665). When proposing the establishment of the EEAS on March 25th 2010, the former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stated that "the Treaty of Lisbon offers precisely the opportunity to build modern policy for the modern world – moving beyond traditional diplomacy" (Council of the European Union 25 March 2010). The national Foreign Service, constituted of a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic corps, remains the recognised model for diplomacy, and the use of state language was evident in the Convention on the Future of Europe 2002-3, when the EEAS was first discussed. The possible implications of an EU diplomatic service were debated intensely in many member states, with over forty per-cent of English news coverage framing the EEAS in terms of potential erosion of national diplomacy and sovereignty (Adler-Nissen 2013: 666). Following the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force in 2009, intense constitutional struggle took place over the EEAS' legitimate practices. There was much inter-institutional struggle as well as struggle among the member states (Adler-Nissen 2013: 667). Finland was one of the member states scrambling for power and control over the new diplomatic service. There was also much competition between the Commission and the Council for control, which has been viewed in Finland as unconstructive and as preventing the full harnessing of the EEAS' potential for European foreign policy (Raik 2013: 55).

In addition to political structures and policies, the EU can also influence the norms, values, and discourses prevalent in a member state. Discourse, for example, may transform interests and preferences, and be key for securing legitimacy for EU policy choices (Radaelli 2003: 10). Ashton's discourse on the EEAS suggests that being recognised as "genuine" diplomacy is crucial to its success. This illustrates Bourdieu's point that for a newcomer to establish itself in a given field it must "play by the rules" and buy into the established codes of the field (Bourdieu 1977: 170). Newcomers must situate themselves in relation to the established language and the history of the field (Adler-Nissen 2013: 665). In Finland the discourse focusing on intergovernmental decision-making in EU foreign policy and the primacy of national structures still remains strong (Raik 2013: 54). This is mitigated by the

fact that Finland has shown strong commitment to the EEAS and common EU positions and actions, as well as high levels of convergence (Raik 2013: 60). However, the recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism and an increasingly cautious and critical approach. These developments reflect the political atmosphere in the EU in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2009, as well as the changing domestic political landscape after the rise in popularity of the Eurosceptic party called the True Finns. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs views increased involvement in the structures and processes of EU diplomacy as important in terms of strengthening a European outlook along with the national one (Raik 2013: 60). This could be a way for the EEAS to help to continue to build Europeanised norms and discourses in Finland and the other member states. The discourse of one, unified European voice on the international stage is strong in Finland, illustrated by the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja's speech in Policy Dialogue "Shaping the EU system of diplomacy: the European External Action Service and the future of foreign policy". According to Tuomioja, in order for the EU to successfully protect and promote "our" values and interests and to have global impact, the union must act and speak as one (Tuomioja 2013). His speech illustrates that a European identity and values certainly exist in Finland, and are brought increasingly to the forefront of politics as a result of the establishment of the EEAS.

Next, we shall assess the relative positions of the newcomer, in other words the EEAS, and the incumbent, in other words the Finnish Foreign Service, by looking at any changes in the relative importance to Finland of its traditional policy positions versus the EU foreign policy agenda. Has the EU agenda become increasingly salient after the establishment of the EEAS? One area of inevitable national priority has always been the country's relations with its giant Eastern neighbour, Russia. Nurturing bilateral relations with Russia has retained its importance. The EU framework has not changed this, but it has become increasingly important as a medium for dealing with Russia in the recent years (Raik 2013: 54). The EU provides an "umbrella" for dealing with issues and provides collective security. Despite this, it has not reduced the need for national diplomacy, particularly because Russia is a high-priority issue for Finland and the EU has not always been effective enough in helping to defend Finnish interests, for example on the issue of Russian customs duties on wood and timber which harm Finland economically (Raik 2013: 54-55). Intergovernmental decision-making and vastly differing positions among the member states mean that Finland has struggled to put issues of national importance on the EU-Russia agenda and to develop the relationship in a consistent manner (Raik 2013: 55). This situation has not ameliorated after

the establishment of the EEAS, nor has the importance of Russia in Finnish national diplomacy changed. Though Finland makes increasing use of the EU framework and supports further empowering of the EEAS, it does not appear to have relaxed its traditional policy positions on matters of high national priority. In fact, the lack of unity and coherence in the EU, illustrated by the dispute over the EEAS and the continued fragmentation of the union's external relations, have strengthened the belief among Finland's foreign policy decision-makers that the maintenance of strong national diplomatic structures is necessary to safeguard national priorities (Raik 2013: 54). Rather, the case may be that it has taken on new policy positions that the EU and EEAS promote as high priorities. We will explore this next.

Finland has been less critical of the High Representative than some other member states, reflected in the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja's statement regarding the former High Representative Catherine Ashton: "Member states are less willing to work together than before. The High Representative is doing her best in these circumstances. She is totally dependent on member states' willingness to commit" (Raik 2013: 56). The blame is thus placed more on the member states, with some diplomats having expressed private critique that the larger member states are failing to coordinate national moves at the EU level and are not allowing the EEAS to take effective leadership (Raik 2013: 56). This does reflect the importance of the EU framework and an increasingly Europeanised political culture in Finland. The country and its Foreign Service have been relatively receptive to the new actor in the diplomatic field, particularly compared to some of the other member states. Finland has been a strong supporter of a new European foreign and security policy strategy as a means of strengthening the EEAS (Raik 2013: 58). Finland is fairly willing to give the EEAS and its agenda even more power than it currently possesses. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs particularly expects strong leadership in agenda-setting and the definition of common priorities (Raik 2013: 59). This illustrates the importance Finland is willing to give to the EU agenda, as it is in fact willing to allow the EEAS to set more of its foreign policy agenda than the service currently does. This implies that for Finland the EEAS, as a new actor to the field, does possess a fair level of symbolic power, as it is doubtful that the service would otherwise be looked to for leadership in agenda-setting.

Finally, the symbolic power of the EEAS and any identity reconstruction taking place in Finland may be reflected in instances of elite socialisation. The prevailing view among the foreign policy elite in Finland is that the EEAS can bring much added value to national diplomacy, but it cannot replace it (Raik 2013: 54). Finland wants to strengthen the EEAS in

order to create a more coherent EU foreign policy, but the diplomatic elite is pragmatic and therefore not overly optimistic about the short-term perspectives, particularly due to power struggles between member states and between the institutions (Raik 2013: 56). Finnish diplomats have, on the whole, not been very enthusiastically applying to join the EEAS. According to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, experience at the EEAS is, formally at least, equivalent to experience within the national service. Nonetheless, many diplomats have expressed concerns that serving away from the national service may have a negative impact on their career prospects upon returning to the Ministry (Raik 2013: 59). There are some signs of elite socialisation, however. The foreign policy leadership has indicated willingness to accept reduced visibility in exchange for common EU representation abroad. Their main concerns lie not with the EEAS, but with the perceived weak commitment of many other member states (Raik 2013: 59). Finnish diplomats describe Finland's approach to the EEAS as more adaptive than proactive, and would like to see more efforts from the national diplomatic service and foreign policy machine to influence EU decision-making and to upload preferences to the European agenda (Raik 2013: 60). Overall, then, it appears that there is a fair bit of elite socialisation taking place in Finland in response to the establishment of the new diplomatic actor.

In conclusion, Adler-Nissen used Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic power to create a framework for assessing the challenge posed by the EEAS for national diplomacies. The theory helps expose power struggles that are inherent in the emergence of new actors and practices in the diplomatic field (Adler-Nissen 2013: 680). It is not an individual action or quality that makes a practice "diplomatic", but it is rather a measure of prestige granted by the field in which the practice takes place. Diplomacy has a symbolic dimension and those who can master this, Adler-Nissen argues, will dominate the field (Adler-Nissen 2013: 681). From our analysis of the symbolic power of the EEAS and the challenges this has posed and poses for the Finnish national Foreign Service, we conclude that although the changes have not been massive, some impact is visible. Furthermore, the EEAS does appear to challenge and change domestic discourses, views, and policy agenda to a certain extent, suggesting that it might be in the process of building up its symbolic power. The process of the service's creation and the disputes over its functioning and competences indicate that it does in some way provide a challenge to state monopoly on diplomatic power. Also the slow but visible processes of elite socialisation suggest that the Finnish Foreign Service is adapting to the existence of the EEAS. The effects we have observed are too slight and too few to constitute

major identity reconstruction, but there is certainly possibility for more Europeanisation processes to take place in Finland in the future. The service is only about five years old, still in its infancy, and changing the domestic diplomatic culture and thinking is a slow process that will take more time to properly manifest itself (Ondejcikova 2012: 105). It would be very interesting to conduct a similar study in five to ten years' time to assess whether identity reconstruction has truly taken place.

Chapter 7: Evaluation of findings

Many different processes, such as globalisation and multilateralization challenge national diplomacy. Yet diplomacy still to a considerable extent takes place within a field of established roles and rules that have existed for hundreds of years (Adler-Nissen 2013: 679). Adler-Nissen's theoretical framework asks how new actors in this field adapt, transform, or even undermine it. Our study supports Adler-Nissen's argument which is that, in material and institutional terms, state diplomacy remains dominant in Finland and has not been altered to a significant effect by the EEAS, at least thus far. The case of the EEAS sheds light on how certain international practices have become naturalised. The contestation over it and the power of the state have exposed the historical contingency of the state's symbolic power (Adler-Nissen 2013: 680). According to Adler-Nissen, Europe is likely to see the emergence of a hybrid form of diplomacy. The EEAS depends on the national foreign services, not least because one-third of its staff comes from the member states. The commitment of member states is crucial for the future of European external action and its success on the international arena (Adler-Nissen 2013: 680). This is precisely why the EEAS needs to develop the type of symbolic power that has thus far been reserved for national diplomacies.

The EEAS holds multiple potential benefits for small member states like Finland, although their full manifestation will take some more time. The common diplomatic service has great potential for the pooling of information and resources beyond the capacities of small states, and small member states are the ones most likely to benefit (Nasra 2011). Future benefits may also be reaped when more national officials are seconded to the EEAS and they eventually return back to the national Foreign Service. This will also provide a source of further Europeanisation. Another major benefit of the EEAS for small state foreign services is the potential of burden-sharing, which as we have seen has already taken place to some extent. Closer involvement in EU foreign policy decision-making can increase the sense of ownership of member states. This can give small states a stronger voice and encourage their national foreign services to take greater responsibility in areas of EU foreign policy (Nasra 2011). Burden-sharing can also lower the material inequalities between small and large national diplomacies. Such effects could be discovered through comprehensive comparative study looking at various member states and their foreign services post-Lisbon Treaty. Finally, the EEAS may offer a strengthened global policy platform for small states, including

strengthened visibility and more unified external action. Finland supports such developments and expects to reap such benefits as the EEAS develops (Ulkoasiainministeriön Toiminta- ja Taloussuunnitelma sekä Kehysehdotus 2015-2018). Acting through a unified EU framework can give Finland opportunities to punch above its weight internationally.

As for future research, it would be interesting to incorporate the bottom-up Europeanisation approach to the study. Through this we could learn about the ways in which Finland can influence the EEAS, and the CFSP more generally. Smaller member states are often assumed to have very few opportunities to upload their own policies to the EU level due to the domination by larger member states. It would provide interesting further study to look at Europeanisation and the relationship between Finland and the EEAS from this perspective. It would also be beneficial to conduct a study similar to the one we have just conducted several years in the future. This is because, as discussed, identity reconstruction and other forms of domestic change tend to take a long time to manifest, and the EEAS is still a relatively young body. Finally, our research may be useful for small countries aspiring to join the EU. It can provide them with a sense of what opportunities and challenges EU accession might bring to their foreign and diplomatic services.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

To conclude, Finland, despite the rising Euroscepticism, remains relatively supportive of strengthening the role and functioning of the EEAS. Our study has examined the Europeanisation processes of national adaptation and identity reconstruction in the aftermath of the creation of the EU's own diplomatic service. In terms of national adaptation, we have seen that the material factors of the EEAS, such as its budget, resources, and staff, are indeed exaggerated as threats as Adler-Nissen has suggested. Not very much adaptation in terms of material and institutional capabilities can be detected in Finland. Indicators such as the closing of missions and the reduced budget of the Foreign Service rather reflect domestic changes. Even the positive attitude toward European foreign and security cooperation and the EEAS partially stems more from domestic requirements for efficiency as well as from identity reconstruction after Finland's EU accession in 1995. However, even if it is not due to a completely Europeanised identity, we did find that the national missions have collaborated and exercised various forms of burden-sharing with the EU delegations after the EEAS was created. Elite socialisation is fairly strong in Finland, as is the Europeanising effect on national diplomats seconded to the EEAS. The Finnish government has insisted on maintaining a constructive role within the union, and has maintained a strong commitment to not just an economic community, but a "community of values" (Prime Minister's Office, 2013b). Cooperation has given added value to national diplomacy in terms of information, an enlarged network of contacts, and a chance to promote Finland and Finnish interests. Finland has wanted to develop a more unified and coherent common external strategy in order to maximise its own international influence, and the EEAS has provided a step in the right direction. Nasra predicts that the future of small state diplomacy "is likely to be progressively framed by the EU's foreign policy system" (Nasra 2011). We shall see if this will indeed be the case, and if so, what it will mean for Finland and its Foreign Service.

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