School of Social and Political Sciences

A genealogy of the normative identity of the

European Union and its origins in

development assistance: a post-structuralist

analysis

September 2017

███████

Presented in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the Degree of

M.Sc. in International Relations

Word count: 14992

Table of contents

List of tables

List of abbreviations

ACP…………………….……………….…African, Caribbean, and Pacific states

AFC…………………………………………………………...Agenda for Change

CPA……………………………………………. Cotonou Partnership Agreement

EDF…………………………………………...European Development Fund

EEC…………………………………………. European Economic Community

EU…………………………………………….…………………….…European Union

FDA……………………………………….……Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

JAES…………………………………………...…… Joint Africa-EU Strategy

NECD…..................................The New European Consensus on Development

TEC……….……Treaty of Rome (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community)

TEU…………………….…..Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)

Abstract

This dissertation examines the normative identity of the European Union. It posits the following research question: How does the EU use development aid to establish its normative identity? Development assistance is a significant element in the EU's normative identity, because it allows the EU to include the clauses of political conditionality which have a normative basis and therefore serve as the foundation for its normative identity. The theoretical approach of this work is Foucauldian discourse analysis, used simultaneously with deconstruction. The results indicate that the EU uses development assistance as a mean via which it establishes its normative identity in the global community. The aim of this dissertation is to construct a genealogy of development assistance in order to explain how the EU benefits from development assistance in regards to its identity. The discourse shows that the systematic portrayal of developing countries as inferiors, and the historically strong position of Europe on the international arena, allow for the efficient usage of disciplinary power in the context of development assistance in establishing the normative identity of the EU.

1.   Introduction

The European Union (EU) is the biggest assistance donor in the world (European Commission website). The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) also established the EU as a development actor.[1] Essentially, the EU has been a development actor since its birth, and development assistance has played an important role in determining the character of the EU and its position international relations. Only six years after committing themselves to the goal of promoting development in its former colonies, the six member states collectively signed the Yaoundé Convention in 1963, which was the first development agreement between the EU and some of its former colonies. In comparison to its non-reciprocal and politically unconditional predecessors, the contemporary equivalent, Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), is a distinctly different agreement. The main difference between the CPA and its predecessors, with the exception of Lomé IVbis, is political conditionality based on normative elements. Whilst the CPA is the legal basis for the European Development Fund (EDF), the EU has made receiving development assistance conditional on passing political reforms and adhering to the norms of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and good governance. The views on the successfulness of such conditionality are mixed. Some argue that there is no correlation between political reforms and aid flow (Burnside and Dollar, 1997, cited by Svensson, 2000: 64). The EU's argument for such conditionality is mostly stated on moral and ethical bases, which we shall investigate in depth later. It is important to understand that the debate on how and why the EU uses norms mostly takes place in the context of development assistance. It is reasonable to presume that the two spheres – development assistance and normative political conditionality – are strongly interrelated, as both elements are contained in the CPA.

The research question of this dissertation is simple: How does the EU use development aid to establish itself as a normative power? Accordingly, this

---

[1] Throughout the time the EU has been referred to by its various official names. For the sake of consistency, in this dissertation I will refer to it as the EU.

dissertation has three central concerns, each corresponding to a particular element in the research question: The normative identity of the EU, how development assistance facilitates this identity, and how can we better interpret the idea of normative *power*. The primary aim of this work is to put the research question into the context of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA), and by this method, trace the mechanisms of power relations between the EU and developing countries. By doing so, we are able to pinpoint how development co-operation serves as a vehicle for the EU's normative power. In short, I will show how the EU's identity of normative power is an outcome of development assistance. As a lesser aim, this work shall also provide an examination and overview of the mechanics of the power relations between the EU and developing countries. Let it be said in advance, that the two aims are in fact impossible to disentangle. Analysis of power relations is a necessary precondition of analysing identity, and thus the former precedes the latter. To give a short outline of the central problematic, which shall be extended as the work progresses, we can say that the identity of the EU, or whether the EU is 'good', depends on who is speaking. Whilst there are gaps between the EU's self-portrayal and others perception, coupled with its difficulties to speak with one voice, the question of who is benefitting what from development assistance is answered differently. The scope of this dissertation is to analyse how the normative identity based on development assistance benefits the EU, and consequently the effects on developing countries are secondary. In short, this work is focused on how the EU benefits from development cooperation. By focusing on this particular aspect, this work does not deny the compatibility between the benefits of the EU and the benefits of development assistance on developing countries.

The relevance of this work is its contribution to the existing academic debate. Since 2002, the literature has debated whether the EU is a normative power. As with most debates, there are equally valid concerns from both sides of the argument. I will dissect this aspect more in the literature review section to come, but let it be said that this dissertation argues on the side of proponents of the idea that the EU is indeed a normative power. Whilst contributing to an existing argument, this paper does so with a distinct methodology. One aspect in favour

of the decision to engage in a post-structuralist approach is the fact that all contemporary political agreements are essentially founded on a paper, meaning that apart from the realm of real-life events, all these elements were first conceived textually. In this sense, analysis of discourse can be an alternative starting point in answering the question of whether the EU is a normative power.

The emphasis of this dissertation is on theory, and this has a considerable impact on the form of this paper. In an orthodox manner, I shall first provide the review of the current state of the literature, after which I shall describe the theoretical approach more in depth and explain my treatment of data. The only part of research with a specific method is the presentation of the deconstructive readings of the data. The real centre of the dissertation is the penultimate section before the conclusion, where the results of deconstructive analysis are put into the context of the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, and the research question answered. The academic purpose of this dissertation is to deconstruct the discourse of development assistance between the EU and the ACP. That said, I will not seek to establish a particular 'truth' in the objective sense of the term, but it is also important to keep in mind that the post-structuralist approach does not deny truth either, as it constantly seeks to know how truth are actively made (Goosen, 1996: 388). Consequently, I will explain how the particular truths in this discourse are made, and by extension, the identity of the EU.

2.   Literature review

There are considerable bodies of literature on the topics of EU development aid and its normative identity. However, the distinct bodies of literature on either development aid or the normative identity of the EU are comparatively larger than the literature analysing both elements simultaneously. In this literature review I will consider the literature in the following order: 1. The genesis of the idea of the EU's normative power and its historical background; 2. The chief argument of the opponents and the proponents of the idea; 3. The arguments on the source of the EU's norms, and the implications they have on the EU's normative power; and 4. The EU's self-representation. After, I shall explain how this dissertation benefits the literature. By the end of this section, I will have examined the most prevalent approaches to the question of the identity of the EU. It is important to acknowledge that the research question is essentially a question of identity. It is important to mention that the literature analysing both the normative identity of the EU and development aid is based on the general understanding that development aid is the necessary mean based on which the normative identity is established.

The current body of literature on the normative identity of the EU started with the idea of Normative Power Europe (Manners, 2002). Some argue, that the NPE debate is the new central element in the wider debate on the question of the EU's identity (Diez, 2005). Over the past decades, the debate on the identity of the EU has seen numerous arguments made for and against the different ways in which the EU could be considered as an actor. The earliest debate took place during the neo-realist revival in the 1970s, with Francois Duchene calling the EU a 'civilian power' (Diez, 2005: 613). He made the argument of the EU relaying on the use of non-military forces from the understanding that the EU is civilian by design, and although the integration of defence capacities could be possible, it is not the measure of first resort (Orbie, 2006: 123). Evidently, this is against the rationale of realist theorists, who regard military as an essential element for actorness (Wright, 2011: 9). Between the 1970's and early 2000's, the debate on European identity could be divided into two broad camps: realists arguing that the EU cannot have the identity of an actor as long as it lacks the

means of coercion, and those in favour of the idea of civilian power, who argued that economic means are a sufficient substitute for military coercion. (Cf Bull, 1982; Hill, 1990; Smith, 2005). The idea of the civilian power Europe is significant, because it was the first time the EU was argued to have a collective identity without a military structure.

Before taking a more focused look at the contemporary debates, let us examine the outline of the original idea. Manners (2002: 252) argues that because the EU is "constructed on a normative basis", it is also prone to act in a normative manner in the global community. He is helpful in providing a definition of 'normative power': the "ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics" (Manners, 2002: 236). Manners' argument is based on the thesis that it is the post-war historical context, and the relative unpopularity of nationalism, that gave the EU its normative identity. Whilst considering Manners' idea, it is important to keep in mind the policy developments at the time. Only two years prior to Manners' article, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed. The Agreement is the legal basis for the allocation of the funds of the European Development Fund, which is the principal instrument for EU's development aid (European Commission website). Indeed, Manners has an understanding that development aid plays a significant role in how the EU's norms are diffused (Manners, 2002: 245). Later, he has claimed that the exact beginning of norm diffusion in its current sense dates to 1995, when the EU included norms as an elements of political conditionality in return for providing development assistance for development aid (Manners, 2006a: 187). Indeed, since 1995, the starting date of the last period of the Lomé Convention – the aid agreement before Cotonou – the EU has not signed a single partnership agreement without normative clauses (Farrell, 2005: 275, cited in Afionis and Stringer, 2014, p. 7).

The most general division in the contemporary debate on whether the EU has the identity of a normative power is between those who agree with the idea and those who oppose it. In general, the realist camp who were sceptical of the idea of the EU's civilian power, are also sceptical of its normative power. Hyde-Price (2006) argues that if that if the EU uses norms for other ends, then it is still acting out of self-interest, therefore being a realist power. Some argue that

defining 'normal' and imposing it on others, also entails having the state-like mechanisms to enforce the judgement. As the EU is not a state, it cannot be a normative 'power' (Kaina, 2015: 39). These two arguments provide an insight into the opponents' view: a) either the EU does not have the means to enforce its normativity; or b) even if it does, then it is done in self-interest, making EU a realist power. More recent scholars have updated the debate, arguing that the deep divides in the debates surrounding the EU's identity are caused by similar divides in the International Relations discipline in general (Del Sarto, 2015: 217). Del Sarto (2015: 218) elaborates, saying that the contemporary arguments accepting the EU's normative identity have effectively incorporated the ideas of power and self-interested alongside norms. Thus undermining the idea that 'normative' is incompatible with 'self-interest' (Youngs, 2004: 431). There is also a middle ground between the two arguments, some, make an effort to integrate the realist notions of self-interest with the question of identity. In particular, there is an argument that the normative power of the EU can be considered as a mean to achieve geopolitical and commercial interests (Langan, 2012: 245). Indeed, if the CPA originally included provisions for both trade and development, and all agreements with third countries since 1995 include normative elements as political conditionality, then it is hard to argue against the claim that the EU uses its development policy for other ends.

Amongst the people who agree with the idea that the EU is a normative power, there is an ongoing debate whether the EU is a 'norm-taker' or 'norm-maker' (Carbone & Orbie, 2014: 6). In the recent times, the literature has more taken the side that the EU is a norm-taker (Carbone 2013: 347), meaning that the EU relies on existing international norms and amplifies them. This idea is in accordance with Manners (2006b), who argues that the norms diffused by the EU are not European in essence, but these norms being accepted by Europe is what makes them European. Throughout development agreements, the EU refers to importance of fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals and recently, also to the Sustainable Development Goals, as evident in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the New European Consensus on Development (NECD). This tactic has several implications on EU's identity. First, the norms pursued by the UN are internationally accepted, as the UN is the single biggest

international organisation. However, the UN is not an 'actor' in the traditional sense of the term. If the EU uses UN-backed norms as the core of its identity, then whilst it is known that the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (ACP) oppose conditionality clauses (Sicurelli, 2013: 11), they cannot oppose the norms in themselves. In short, the EU is able to maintain the legitimacy of its norms by appealing to the authority of the UN. Whilst indicates that the EU is not innovative in creating its norms, being a norm-taker can also be interpreted as a strategical step towards reinforcing its own identity as a normative power.

Having discussed the general debate on the identity of the EU, and the authorship of the norms the EU promotes, we can proceed to discuss how the EU sees its own identity. According to the literature, the EU generally promotes an image of itself as a "force for good" (Merlingen, 2007: 438). This is evident from the practice of EU promotes norms holding the position that the EU, and its normative basis, should serve as an example for the international community (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002: 782). Some take this idea further by claiming that the EU's self-perception stands on the technique of contrasting itself with the international community. The practice of contrasting itself with the rest of the international community based on the question of identity: the EU is a normative power because the rest of the global community is not. Thus, it is the outside that should aspire to change according to the norms of the EU (Diez: 2005: 614). Evidently, there are opportunities for profound conflicts depending on the perspective from which the normative identity of the EU is discussed. It can be argued that whilst the EU and the international community do not criticise the norms the EU promotes, the developing countries in the ACP group do oppose the way in which these norms are diffused. In reviewing the perspectives of how the EU sees its own normative identity, we need to consider what are norms in the first place. Some argue that the normative power of the EU is the *practice* of spreading the principled norms of the EU. The principled norms are human rights, democracy, the rule of law and environmental protection. (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008: 609). Based on the previous notion that the EU tries to portray itself as a force for good, it is also wise to consider Sjursen's (2006: 172) argument that the EU tries to pursue the political conditionality with as little coercion as possible. This is further supported by the remark that the political

dialogue has assumed a more important place in agreements (Borzel & Risse, 2005: 4). From this cluster of arguments, it is evident that the EU is concerned with its identity in both theory, referring to how the agreements are designed, and practice, referring to how the goals are achieved based on the agreements made. To assess the self-reflection of the EU, it is reasonable to assert that it considers its own foundations legitimate. The principled norms, on which the EU emphasises on a regular basis, are also the norms on which the EU was founded. In turn, we can consider the EU's active pursuit of its norms as an indication to validation of its own identity.

Having discussed the various aspects of the literature on the EU's normative power, it is suitable to provide some concluding thoughts. First, if we consider the way in which the general debates of International Relations affect the debates on the identity of the EU (Del Sarto, 2014), it is also interesting to observe the neo-realist revival at the time. At the forefront of neo-realism was Kenneth Waltz, who saw power not as a means to an end, but also an end in itself (Cf, Waltz, 1979; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy website). This is reflected in the arguments of the authors who oppose the idea of the EU as a civilian power – if one does not have direct means for physical coercion, then one is not a strong actor. Second, in the scope of this dissertation, it is particularly, interesting to observe the arguments of Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008) who consider normative power a practice. As reflected in the introduction, the understanding that power is not an object to be acquired, but instead a way to behave, is distinctly Foucauldian.

It can be said, that the literature reviewed it generally well-structured and there is a decent body of arguments detailing most aspects which can be discussed under the umbrella of EU's normative power. The literature most definitely benefits from being a popular research topic. However, there are also evident gaps in the literature. First, the articles reviewed mostly rely on empirical evidence and case studies and the methodologies used are quite limited. In some sense, this is justified, as most research questions posit something measurable, which can be answered by looking at historical data on the EU's development aid. However, methodologically the body of literature is not diverse. Secondly,

as International Relations is a relatively young academic discipline, and the general debates also influence the debate on the identity of the EU, there are some epistemological gaps which have already been answered in other disciplines. The questions on identity and power have undergone rapid new understandings since the age of post-modernism. Somehow, this influence, has not really reached International Relations, and by extension, the topic of the normative identity of the EU.

Against the backdrop of the reviewed literature, the merit of this dissertation is three-fold: First, I will use a methodology which would focus on the importance of the textual elements of the documents governing development aid and by extension, the normative identity of the EU. By doing so, I will add diversity to the existing body of research. Second, by using relevant philosophical concepts to elaborate on the existing concepts of identity and power, I will be able to cast some new light on alternative ways to perceive the relationship of political conditionality between development aid and normative identity.

3.   Theoretical approach

Generally, the theoretical approach to this task is post-structuralist. More specifically, the main framework under which the research is conducted is the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). After explaining how the FDA works, I will introduce the method of deconstruction with which the textual data (also explained below) is analysed. There are no set rules for the FDA, but doing FDA is based on three pillars: Analysis of power relations, subjectification (investigating the bases on which subjects are constructed), and lastly, presenting the findings by writing a genealogy (Willig and Stainton-Rogers, 2007: 91). Regarding genealogy, this is perhaps best explained by Foucault himself: "it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality" (Foucault, 1977: 139). Writing a genealogy of the EU's normative identity thus entails writing a "history of the present" (Garland, 2014: 367). In this context, writing a history of the present means engaging with the current interrelation between development assistance and the EU's normative identity via examining the origins of development assistance. Although, despite mentioning exact dates and treaties wherefrom we can trace the origin of contemporary development aid, the purpose of constructing a genealogy is to provide a critique which would be capable of meticulously tracing the descent and evolution of contemporary phenomena into its current form. Doing so implies approaching the past events of significance with the ideas and concepts of the present (Garland, 2014: 367). In short, this genealogy is rooted in the analysis of power relations, because power is the most fundamental constituent in relationships and therefore always present (Foucault, 1990: 93). Essentially, this dissertation aims to construct a genealogy of power relations between the EU and developing countries, in order to explain the normative identity of the EU.

What really sets the FDA apart from other approaches to discourse analysis, is that for Foucault, text was not the total form of representation, and discourse is made of both text and practices (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 31). Therefore, in addition to analysing the documents underpinning development assistance and norms, I will also look at the case of Guinea-Bissau between 2011 and 2015

10

(Council of the European Union website). Although Foucault developed his thought in a structuralist setting, the understanding that discourse is not a structure, but rather an event, elevates Foucauldian philosophy from structuralism to post-structuralism (Foucault, 1970, cited by Johnston, 1990: 804; Andersen, 2003: 2). The major implication of this understanding is that the discourse on the normative identity of the EU is not only the texts constituting the legal basis for it, but also the actions, practices, and disciplines surrounding and interacting with these texts (Andersen, 2003: 9). We can give a short definition for discourse – everything in the domain of the sayable relating to a particular event. This domain consists of, and is shaped by, the motivations, statements, and intentions relating to the text (Andersen, 2003: 10). Consequently, language is not a mere tool via which ideas are conveyed, but rather an object of knowledge in itself (Andersen, 2003: 10).

Regarding the mechanics of the theory, the central element of the FDA is power. When it comes to the analysis of modern power, which is a central concept in both International Relations as a discipline and the debate on EU's normative identity, the central element is 'disciplinary power' (Lynch, 2016: 20). The 'power' in disciplinary power is omnipresent and all states of affairs are the outcome of power (Foucault, 1990: 39; Mills, 2003: 35). Another important aspect is that in the FDA, "power is performative", citing Foucault's clarification that power is short for power relations (Mills, 2003: 35). Consequently, power is not an object to be acquired, and afterwards employed, but having power has the meaning of being able to act in a way in which others included in the same power relation act in the desired way as well. Another implication of power being performative is that it requires continuous action. In Foucauldian understanding, if the EU would stop diffusing norms, its normative power would perish. By extension, an integral element of the EU's normative power are the disciplines. To define 'discipline', we need to look at the French title of Discipline and Punish. The French original – *Surveiller et punir* translates into English as 'monitor and punish' or 'conduct surveillance over x and punish'. Thus the best way to define the concept of discipline is to say that it is a social practice which enables the dominant actor in the power relation to exercise power over the other. It is the moment, when the other becomes

controllable and this control is achieved by confinement (Cf, Foucault 1977 & 1990). For instance, the social practice of confining the mad to enable collective understanding of the subject and thus started the discipline of psychiatry. Grouping individual states as the 'ACP' is a precondition for the discipline of development assistance.

Based on the brief outline of the FDA as a methodology, we can immediately see that it does not provide us direct 'methods' to engage with the data. Rather, the FDA is a 'theory', allowing us to examine political events in the context of Foucauldian philosophy. The role of discourse in the process is simple. "Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault, 1990: 101). In the context of examining the EU's normative identity under the FDA, we can understand discourse as a dialectic, where the process of diffusing norms is juxtaposed with the practices of doing so, and based on a synthesis of the two, we can deduce the motivations behind the EU's construction of itself as a value-based actor. Whilst the FDA focuses on the interrelation between power and identity, it does so by examining the state of discourse permitting certain identities. Thus, in the thematic chapters to follow, I will first, examine power relations at the time of the TEC, then investigate how the EU has constructed the identities of developing countries since, and finally, we will have an insight into how the EU's normative identity is based on the systematic creation of suitable identities for developing countries.

4.   Methodology

4.1   Deconstruction as a method

The method used for the analysis of relevant documents is deconstruction. Deconstruction was proposed by Jacques Derrida in *Writing Before the Letter,* and also published in *On Grammatology* in 1967 (Derrida, 1967). Deconstruction is both a method of reading and writing, but in this dissertation I shall employ it as a method of critical reading. There is also an epistemological overlap between deconstruction and the FDA, as for both philosophies, language is inherently ambiguous, and any statement can be freely interpreted regardless of the author's intent. In turn, the freely interpreted text can also help us to interpret the motivations and the intents of the author (Dobie, 2011: 159). Perhaps deconstruction is best explained using structuralist vocabulary: Every statement has a 1. A particular object to which it refers, and 2. A particular way in which it refers to this object. These elements of the statement are respectively called signified and signifier. The structuralists argued that linguistic signs are mental concepts, and not fixed values. Derrida, being a *post*-structuralist, takes it a step further arguing that the meaning of a statement can also be indefinitely deferred, because despite linguistic signs being mental concepts, in discourse these concepts can also assume the identity of the signified, triggering an endless chain of signifieds. (Dobie, 2011: 159, 165). Consequently, we refer to language itself, and language, like in the Foucauldian understanding, is not a tool to convey ideas, but an object of knowledge in itself. The difference between the FDA and deconstruction is that if the former works with the ambiguity of language on the level of the interaction between textual and other discursive practices, then deconstruction works with the ambiguity of language at the level of text. In other words, the limits of representation for Derrida are the limits of language (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 31). Therefore, I shall employ deconstruction first, and only then accommodate the findings to the FDA. Working together, the result would be an insight into a) how the meaning of the EU as a normative identity is made, and b) the concrete practices used by the EU in reinforcing this identity. To explain the specifics of deconstruction, it is similar to the FDA. Like in the FDA, a statement is possible because it exists in

a network of statements permitting its meaning, for Derrida, a word, or a concept is possible because it is surrounded by others permitting its meaning. My deconstructive analysis will focus on the following questions:

1. What are the main binary oppositions in the texts?
2. How do these oppositions construct the identity of developing countries?
3. Which terms are privileged and how are these privileges supported?
4. Which aspects of the texts are marginalised or centralised?

Thus, I will be able to answer how the EU constructs the identity of Africa and why it is necessary for its self-portrayal as a good actor, and most importantly, how do the textual elements of the documents influence our understanding of the EU as a normative power.

4.2 Data selection

4.2.1 Texts for deconstruction

Based on the theoretical approach and the method of deconstruction outlined above, I will now explain the selection of data. First, the data in question are two texts outlining the normative dimension of the EU's partnership with developing countries. First, is the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which is the legal basis for the European Development Fund (European Commission website). The notion of development aid belongs to the genesis of the EU in 1957. The Treaty of Rome (TEC) included provisions and serves as the legal grounding for the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF also serves as the main instrument via which the EU provides development aid to developing countries, and also specifically to the ACP region. The EDF is financed by separate contributions by the EU member states. However, the funds of the EDF (about €30bn for the period between 2014-2020) are separate from the EU budget and therefore governed by the rules of the EDF itself, meaning, that the control over the EDF belongs to the European Commission (European Commission website). The CPA is set to expire in 2020, but up until

then revised every five years. The CPA sets goals for how the development aid should be used and simultaneously includes the clauses for negative political conditionality, which consists of normative clauses. The logic underpinning the dichotomy between the allocation of development aid and normative elements are simple: if the CPA is not followed by one party in its completeness, then as the last resort, another party can suspend the agreement unilaterally.

The second document is the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). Apart from the central normative elements in the CPA, the JAES is considerably more normative in its character. Whilst the JAES does not serve as a legal basis for concrete instruments of development assistance, it does constitute an important element of the development discourse between the EU and Africa. Furthermore, the JAES serves as an important element in the general framework of texts belonging to this development relationship. The JAES differs from the CPA in two ways: a) it emphasises on the supranational African identity, and empowers the idea of the AU, and therefore b) grammatically considers Africa as a single identity. As the JAES refers to Africa, the signified in the deconstructive analysis depends on the context.

The basis for the selection of these two documents is based on the account of deconstruction above: First, as the EU regards the CPA as a central element of the development aid, then by extension, it is also the central document in the construction of the EU's normative identity. Second, the introduction of JAES, allows us to observe two conflicting texts. In CPA, the attitude of the EU is considerably more austere, and the author's intent in JAES is clearly to portray the EU and Africa as equals. In this sense, we can posit that the purpose of JAES is to compensate for the critics who describe the CPA as a tool of coercion (Hurt, 2003). For this research, it is essential to discover how two seemingly different texts can carry same foundational elements. In addition to the two core documents, I will also supplement my analysis with appropriate references to other texts of importance. the analysis of these two primary texts is firstly justified by the scope of the dissertation. Secondly, these texts are based on the understanding that they play a central role in underpinning the logic of development assistance. Lastly, the JAES is a particularly interesting document

because it allows us to examine the representation of the continent with which Europe has had the longest relations. In addition, I shall analyse two more texts, although in lesser depth. These texts are the Agenda for Change (AFC) and the NECD. Neither of the texts contain a direct geographical referent, but are still important in understanding how the EU views development assistance.

4.2.2 The case of Guinea-Bissau

As stated before, discourse consists of both textual elements and practices. To account for the latter, I will also employ the help of the case of Guinea-Bissau. That said, it is important to remark that although I employ a practical case, the case is not the unit of primary interest of this dissertation (Yin, 2014: 31). When using cases, the scope of the unit of analysis is dependent on the research question (Yin, 2014: 31). Despite the case consisting of many events between 2011 and 2015, I will focus on two aspects in particular (Council of the European Union website). Firstly, I will use the case to give a practical example of disciplinary power under the chapter explaining the role of power/knowledge in the creation of the EU's normative identity. Second, I will consider the conditions based on which the norms were lifted and full development cooperation resumed. In short, the supplementary role of the case of Guinea-Bissau is clearly bordered by the explanation of a) how the EU deployed Foucauldian disciplines in trying to make the country conform to the normative elements, and b) I will show why the EU's tactic was successful and what is the effect of such disciplinary techniques on its normative image. The role of the case is to reflect and supplement the textual elements found by deconstructing the texts, and, account for that discourse is made of more than just text.

5.   Deconstruction - results

The deconstructive analysis consists of reading and deconstructing four texts. Two of them are key texts, outlining the relationship between the EU and developing countries. The two other texts are included to provide a better understanding of how the EU views its role as a normative development actor without a direct referent. Although the Agenda for change (AFC) and the New European Consensus on Development do not refer to any geographical region directly, they are still relevant, because with the developing countries with which the EU has formal relations either constitute the ACP group, or, are included in the geographical Africa.

5.1 The main binary oppositions

Below is a table demonstrating the frequencies of the elements of the binary oppositions in the CPA and JAES.

Document	CPA	Frequency	JAES	Frequency
Identifying sign	ACP	733	Africa	234
Identifying sign	EU/Community	223	African union	32
Identifying sign	Parties	187	Africa-EU	25
Identifying sign	African Union	5	Parties	2
Identifying sign	Africa	1		

Table 1: Main binary oppositions and their frequencies

In the CPA, the main binary opposition is between the EU/Community and the ACP states. Whilst Article 1 of the CPA establishes that the collective noun 'parties', it still appears less frequently than individual mentions of the ACP group of the EU/Community. Regarding individual mentions of 'Africa', the CPA uses the word 6 times, five out of which as 'African Union' (CPA arts. 6, 8, 11, 58; CPA Annex IV art. 12b). It is remarkable that all five instances of the African supranational identity were added with the 2010 revision of the

document. Compared to the mentions of 'Pacific' or 'Caribbean', which both appear only three times and are mentioned together in all instances, the direct references to the African group in the ACP are more frequent. Overall, the authors' intent in the CPA is to assign Africa the identity of the ACP. In comparison, JAES makes a more direct reference to 'Africa'. The emphasis on the African supranational identity is also prevalent. Art. 98 (JAES) defines the 'African Union' as the naturally emerged interlocutor to the EU. However, despite assigning African countries their supranational identity, JAES still mostly refers to African countries with the signifier 'Africa'. We can see that the identity of African countries is treated differently in both of these texts. If the main binary opposition in the CPA is 'EU/Community-ACP', then in JAES, the main opposition is between the EU and Africa. This is in contrast with the authors intent when writing both the CPA and JAES, which is, in case of the JAES, portrayal of Africa via its supranational identity, and in the case of CPA, portrayal of 'parties', indicating the equality between the Member States of the EU and the ACP group. The centre-point of identity in the CPA is art. 1, which solves the question of identity by trying to avoid clear opposition, thus establishing the collective 'parties'. In JAES, the individual mentions of Africa are in contrast with their definition of the AU as the natural equal of the EU. Lastly, we can see that the 2010 revision of the CPA reflects the understanding presented in the JAES three years prior.

5.2 Identity constructed from the binary opposites

Having established the individual signifiers for both the EU and Africa, let us look at the characteristics attributed to these entities. In this way, we can look closely what these signs mean.

Document	CPA	JAES
Objective	""Parties" hereby conclude this Agreement in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States (CPA art. 1)"	"To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, … sustainable economic development, … in Africa "(JAES art. 8).

Table 2: The objectives of the core documents

We can see that in both cases the main objective of the documents uses the most common signifier for developing/African countries in their respective texts. In both cases, the objectives appear in the central part of the paper – the part immediately following the general provisions. Thus, the objectives can be regarded as the textual element most significant in determining how the signs 'ACP' (CPA) and 'Africa' (JAES) are substantiated. In both cases, the objectives of the texts are to better the situation of developing countries. The texts portray African as in need for improvement, but it is done indirectly. Both texts mention development as the penultimate element in their central sentences in determining their objectives. I.e., the objectives of the documents are to improve the development of developing countries. In this sense, developing countries are framed as problematic, and the problem of developing countries relative underdevelopment is the justification for the existence of these partnerships. In deconstruction, the term 'development' has meaning inasmuch as there exists the absent but grammatically exact opposite. If developing counties are portrayed with the problem of underdevelopment, we can deduce that it makes sense inasmuch as they are developing. Notice, that neither the CPA nor the JAES make a direct reference to their developing counterparts as 'developing'. However, the status of 'developing' is acquired by juxtaposing the underdeveloped ACP/Africa with its comparatively developed opposite – the EU.

To explore this aspect further, we can also look at the instances where the EU presents itself as better than Africa. Chapter 5 (CPA) is dedicated to monitoring and evaluation, carried out according to the assessment of the ACP-EC Development Finance Cooperation Committee. This consists of "regular assessment of development operations" (CPA art 32). In the JAES, art. 18 describes the principle of African ownership, but also adds that EU guidance will be included, where appropriate. By synthesising the portrayal of developing counties in the objectives, with clear examples of how the EU can crop the developing countries' agency where deemed appropriate, we can arrive at the general binary opposition 'developing-developed. Clearly, of the two signs, 'developed' is privileged over 'developing'. Another relevant aspect in determining how meaning is made in regards to the developing countries', and by extension the EU's, identity, is the wording of the objectives. Whilst the purpose of the documents is to assist developing countries in development, the documents do not refer to them in direct negatives. Whilst the idea that developing countries need to be helped in development, lead us to an understanding that developing counties are therefore underdeveloped, similarly, we can look at two other documents outlining the general view of the EU on developing countries.

Document	AFC	NECD
objective	"eradicate poverty is the primary objective of development policy and a priority for EU external action in support of EU's interests for a stable and prosperous world. (AFC art. 2)"	"reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty" (NECD art. 10).

Table 3: The objectives of supporting documents

In both cases, these documents lack a direct reference to a specific geographical region, but they still substantiate the discourse on development aid: both the AFC and the NECD emphasise the on the reduction of poverty, whilst the AFC

also makes a more direct reference to the global community in general. Both documents describe the main problem in developing world as poverty, but the AFC goes to the extent of associating it with the stability of the international community. The reference to the "stable and prosperous world" in the AFC (Art 1) gives us a sense that a) the EU plays an important role in helping the developing world, and b) this is a task of great importance.

5.3 Elements supporting the privilege

Having established that: 1. Developing countries are portrayed as 'developing'; 2. It ought to develop under EU guidance; 3. 'developing' in an inferior sign to 'developed'; and 4. It is a task of great importance for the EU, we can have a more substantive look at the development aid, more specifically, the political conditionality underlining the requirements for development aid.

Document	CPA	JAES	AFC	NECD
Specific norms	Human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance (CPA art 8, art 9).	Human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance, freedom, equality, solidarity (JAES art 6).	Human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance, gender equality, solidarity (AFC art. 2).	Human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance, gender equality (NECD art. 14).
Political conditionality	Yes	No	No	No
Emphasis on dialogue	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4: The normative elements in documents

We can see that the number of normative elements present in any document varies to an extent, but all four documents emphasise on the importance of four core values: Human rights, democracy, rule of law, and good governance. More importantly, these four values are the same values upon which the EU was founded (Treaty on European Union (TEU) art F). In other words, the identity

of the EU serves as a model identity for developing countries. We can recall the earlier notation that the EU diffuses principled norms, i.e., norms upon which it is founded (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008: 609). The normative clauses of the documents serve as an important function for the establishment of the dialectic of 'developing-developed'. In the case of the CPA, which is the only document that is politically conditional, the second binary opposition, which supports the dominant EU-ACP binary opposition, is the opposition between political conditionality and development aid. Although they are not binary oppositions in the traditional sense, they still form an opposing pair on the nexus of development and political conditionality, where they mutually reinforce each other and the absence of one violates the agreement. Structurally, there is not much difference between the two elements of the nexus, but text clearly emphasises on the importance of the political conditionality as an "essential elements" (CPA art. 9) However, political conditionality in the form of a retributive action is clearly marginalised. Art. 9 (CPA), which is the primary article focusing on the normative elements, makes a reference to art. 96 of the CPA, which appears near the end of the document. The critics accusation that the CPA is a tool of coercion is only possible if there is a method with which to coerce (Hurt, 2003). That is, a Foucauldian discipline. In short, art. 96 (CPA) sets out the possessive aspect of the EU's power, that is the suspension of the agreement, but the structure of the paper marginalises the apparent position of the measure. When we take a closer look at article 96, it states that either party can suspend the agreement, or, ask for political dialogue which must be started 30 days after the request. On the other hand, the article makes a strong emphasis for the need to follow the political norms set out at the centre of the agreement. In the remaining three papers, AFC, JAES, and NECD, the normative elements have the central task of being located at the centre of the paper. Whilst the CPA is the only document out of four that has direct political conditionality, there is certainly an effect of spill over, because all four papers exist in the same discourse and also share the same normative basis. We can say that the normative basis of the EU in international relations is solid, as the texts provide mutual support for one another. Evidently, if a developing country fails to meet the political conditionality, then it breaches the normative rules in all four agreements simultaneously. By including the negative political conditionality in

only one of the four major documents, the EU is able to reinforce its identity as an altruistic donor. The recurring emphasises on the importance of dialogue signify the EU's reluctance of taking retributive action. Art. 96 (CPA) makes this even more concrete: suspension of the agreement is understood as the last resort. The strong emphasis on the political dialogue proves Sjursen's (2006: 172) earlier argument that the EU tries to use as little coercion as possible in diffusing norms.

5.4 Marginalisation – centralisation

By marginalising some elements of the text, and centralising others, the author of the text can choose the elements to which the reader pays the most attention. When we look at the normative elements presented in the documents, we can see that they occupy a certain position in the text. In the CPA, the normative clauses are featured prominently in the first chapter of the text. This means that the authors have decided to privilege the normative clauses over other issues covered with the agreement. Consequently, art. 96 (CPA), which prescribes the retributive actions if the normative clauses are not carried out, are left marginalised. As stated before, in the post-structuralist argument, the weight of the elements of text can be reassigned to assess the meaning of the text and the authors intentions. Clearly, by giving less structural weight to the retributive articles, separately from the description of the normative clauses, the CPA emphasises more on the need to fulfil the normative conditions, rather than threatening the ACP. The relevant point emerging here is that there is a gap between the criticism that the EU has faced for the CPA, and the motivations with which the CPA was written to portray the identity of the EU in a certain way. The element which is featured more prominently, is intended to draw more attention. Hence, the EU wishes to portray itself as a bearer of values, but the critics see the EU as a coercive actor.

When we talk about the marginalised and centralised elements of the documents, then in the JAES, the elements of normativity are featured more

prominently, and art 1 of the JAES establishes the partners as equals based on their common history and the JAES goes as far as to establish both the EU and Africa as communities of same values, both sharing the same normative elements of human rights, freedom, … rule of law and democracy" (JAES art. 1). The main relationship between centralised and marginalised elements in the JAES is not that of normative conditionality and corresponding retributive measures like in the CPA, but rather, in JAES, the normative elements are at the centre, and the marginalised element is the African need to fulfil these conditions. In some sense, it is strikingly different from the CPA, throughout which there is the understanding that the normative clauses apply for the developing countries. However, JAES makes a definite effort towards partners' equality by repeatedly claiming that the normative elements are concerns for both parties. Correspondingly, the marginalised element of the text is direct referencing to that it is primarily Africa who is in need to fulfil the normative clauses. Only in art. 17 (JAES), there is a subtle reference in normative and development cooperation, the EU's experience is superior, and art. 18 (JAES) stresses the importance of African ownership, whilst appropriate, with EU's guidance. Despite the different elements being marginalised in the CPA and the JAES, they fulfil the same function of being the supportive element for the opposition of the EU and Africa, and, developing vs developed. This understanding emerges from the intentional conflict provided by the authors of the text. Both the CPA and the JAES portray the developing countries in different light: if the CPA is more overt in its language, then the contradiction provided by the JAES elevates Africa to the same level. Now, this conflict can have several interpretations. In the AFC and NECD, the normative elements are featured at the centre of the gravity of the article as well. In NECD, whilst it is one of the main elements, it is marginalised by default because the document serves other purposes than development aid outside the EU.

To provide an intermediary conclusion, we can say that development assistance is the key element in the textual construction of the identities of developing countries. Whilst the EU seeks to marginalise its own use of coercive measures, and highlight its altruistic role and the idea of equality between partners, it is

also evident that in general, the documents underpinning development aid serve the basis for the foundation of the EU's normative identity.

6   Thematic Chapters

6.1 Development relations are power relations

With reference to the set task of constructing a genealogy on the EU's normative identity. The first step is to establish that development cooperation is a power relation, because the normative identity of the EU is an outcome of power relations. With regard to the contemporary situation between the EU and developing countries, it is safe to say that development relations have an origin. The origin of the relations of development assistance between the EU and development countries, is embedded into the formation of the former. The birth of the EU coincides with the birth of development aid in its current form, as article 131 of the Treaty of Rome specifies that the EU shall promote social and economic development to "serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire" (TEC art. 131). However, in order to give meaning to this singular event in history, we must consider the context in which it is located. Let us discuss the significance of the historical context on the example of colonial Africa. Between the 19th century and the beginning of decolonisation, the history of Africa only existed from the perspective of Europe (Danaher et al, 2000: 99). It is the case that the relations between Europe and Africa date back much longer than development cooperation between the EU and developing countries. It is also the case that Africa, a colonial subject, was subjected to overt European power. With the exception of the United Kingdom, who became a Member State of the EU in 1973, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany were amongst the six original signatories of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 1900, these five countries also controlled 90.4% of the geographical Africa. (Townsend, 1941: 19, cited by Montholyoke website) To have a better perspective on the context in which modern development assistance was born, we also need to consider that as the history of Africa, being written from the European perspective, is a colonial product, it carries an ideology and fundamentally represents European interests in the region (Danaher et al, 2000: 99; xii). The Foucauldian perspective, that power is not just acquired and carried out, but is performative, still

accommodates for the argument that power serves the interest of the dominant side of the power relations. As it is in the interest of the EU to use power in Africa for its self-interest, it also follows that the most fundamental constituent between Europe and Africa before decolonisation was power, i.e., the two were engaged in power relations (Daldal, 2014: 161; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy website).

In 1957, when the TEC was signed, the power relations between Europe and Africa has existed for over a century. Moreover, TEC and the birth of modern development aid) coincides with the time of European powers losing grip over their former colonial possessions. Certainly, the continuation of domination over now-independent countries in an overt manner would violate the norms of democracy and the rule of law, and thus violate the essence of the EU itself (TEU art. 6).

It is a fact, that development assistance keeps the former colonies in tight relationship with the EU. Let us look at what the wording of Art 131 (TEC) connotes. Primarily, it recognises the aspirations of the former colonies and establishes the character of the EU as an altruistic actor. It conveys the sense of the EU being responsible for the development of the people and states of the developing world. It signifies that the relations had supposedly progressed from overt domination to overt assistance. In line with the contemporary documents deconstructed above, Art 131 (TEC) also portrays its former colonial possessions as 'developing', which attains meaning from the EU being 'developed'. It is important to understand that during the time of modern development assistance, the EU keeps representing developing countries as inferiors. We can juxtapose this representation with the stated purpose of development assistance, which establishes development assistance as the duty of the EU, and developing countries as inferiors in regards to development. In turn, the EU becomes a paternalistic figure to its former colonies, and the connotes a sense of dependency. We can deduce the following: a) The overt dependency on Europe signifies a continuation from the colonial era. In both cases, the former colonies were dependent on the Europe, in the case prior to 1957, this dependency was colonial. Post-1957, this dependency is based on aid and assistance. In the latter case, the previously explicit form of domination has

become secretive and concealed. In both cases, we are dealing with power relations. Modern development cooperation really marks the significant turning point in history, as the power relations that previously stood on possession and conquering, now stand on a seemingly noble goal.

In addition to the previous point of recording the singularity of events without a linearity, we cannot explore what is found at this singularity, unless we look the birth of development assistance independently of its historical narratives. "What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity." (Foucault, 1977: 142). In subjugating the relations between Europe and developing countries to an analysis of power relations, we have found the "shameful origin" of development assistance (Foucault, 1977: 141). Finding evidence conflicting with the EU's presentation of its image highlights the EU's motivations. Practically, we have to look at what the modern development assistance is doing *as well*, regardless of its intended purpose or stated mission. Looking at development assistance as a means to power, allows us to juxtapose it with the immediate historical context in which it is situated, and then have an indication of the motivations of the EU. Nowhere in the documents serving as a basis for development assistance does it say that the purpose of development assistance is to facilitate the continuous EU's dominance over its former colonies, but development assistance certainly does this *as well*. Fundamentally, we can be certain that power relations exist, and there is incentive for the EU to maintain its position in these relations. So we have to look for the histories that the EU is not telling. The untold history of development assistance also gives us an insight into how the EU constructs its own identity. Already decades before the political conditionality of the CPA, the EU actively engaged in self-promotion. After all, the stated purpose of development assistance is said to be its service to the people of developing countries. Concealing shameful origins is a distortion of truth – it demonstrates the author's intent in shaping the discourse.

6.2 The construction of the Other

Having argued that the purpose of development assistance is not only to help developing countries, but also to maintain the previously-existing power relations between Europe and developing countries in service of the EU's normative power, we also need to investigate the required characteristics of developing countries as the 'other' in service of the task of establishing the normative identity of the EU. The structure of the power relations between the EU and developing countries is two-dimensional. Of course, the EU's diffusion of norms also affects the international community as a whole, but for the mechanics of the power relations, based on which the normative identity is achieved, this relationship is essentially two-dimensional. In trying to answer the research question, we can also posit it differently in order to accommodate it to the FDA: On what basis does the EU constitute its normative identity? The question of the subject's self-determination of identity inevitably leads us to the Other, via which this task is to be achieved. Foucault argues, that it requires the Other, to know oneself, and further, the Other is a projection of the self (Foucault 2001: 543). Based on that the totality of discourse is the sum total of all discursive practices, both textual and non-textual, we can posit that the EU can relate to its other, that is developing counties, both textually and practically (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 31). By the end of the dissertation, we will have examined both realms. Let us now proceed with the textual practices of the discourse.

As established in the deconstructive analysis, the grammatical opposition of 'developed-developing' denotes respectively the EU and the developing counterpart of the EU. If we posit, that it requires the other to know the self, then it follows that the identity of the EU is constructed on its opposition to developing countries. In order to explain the construction of the other, we have to look at the techniques of the representation of the other. In the JAES, the element of central concern is the linguistic sign 'Africa'. Whilst in the context of the JAES, it denotes a geographical group of states, it also depicts them societally homogenous. The JAES is a document which does not speak of specific issues relevant to individual countries. On the contrary, it problematizes

30

Africa as a whole. It is problematic in itself to problematize the region of Africa as culturally homogenous – which is certainly not the case – because it depicts the Other inaccurately (Saïd, 1978: 2). According to Saïd's argument, the practical developed image of the West only makes sense in comparison to the relatively primitive Orient. In some sense, the collective noun 'Africa' reflects the colonial practice of relating Europe to the Orient, but, whilst it's not the main element of concern in this dissertation, it is still useful to remark that the history of colonisation reflects also reflects its practices (Danaher et al: 103). Based on the argument that both colonial relations and development cooperation are essentially power relations, it follows that the portrayal of Africa in the contemporary documents underpinning development cooperation, also reflects the practices.

In assessing the construction of the Other, we need to look at the implied outcomes reflected on Africa. First such outcome is the theme of agency. Despite that the EU dominates the discourse on development cooperation, discourse still provides the means of resistance (Mills, 2003: 35). This argument is based on the premise that whilst there is a dominant discourse on the topic, it also provides opportunities for the emergence of non-dominant discourses (Ramazanolgu, 1993: 21). It is also the case that discourse relates to identities. We can deduce this by reversing the Foucauldian argument that identities are produced by dominant discourses, and these discourses themselves act as a proxy between the subject and the power (Benwell & Sotoke, 2006: 30). To sum it up, discourses produce identities, but the same discourse also provides the means of resistance. At the centre point of this schema are the identities of the EU and developing countries. It is important to understand that the power relations between the EU and the Africa are further consolidated into the domination of the EU with the conflicting portrayal of the identity of Africa. In a sense, this conflicting portrayal creates a non-uniform identity for Africa in its relations with the EU, and thus reduces its means of resistance.

As mentioned, the practice of unindividuation is especially prevalent in JAES, but this representation of Africa is also mirrored in the practices of development cooperation. Bicchi (2006: 287), sees the EU foreign policy in developing

countries as generally inflexible and also conveying the idea that the EU is a positive role model for everybody. It follows, that there is a symbiotic relationship between development assistance documents and the practices. In both cases, the idea underpinning the conflicting portrayal of African identity is to reduce the means of resistance. As a second instance, in the case of Africa we can look how even the idea of Africa is reduced to the single letter 'A' in the ACP. The EU has also been previously criticised that the ACP group is too diverse and far from homogenous. It is also the case that the 79 members of the ACP group have competing interests between themselves (Lacomte, 2001: 16). For the third level of the representation of Africa as the other, we can look at the case of Guinea-Bissau in 2011. In this instance, the political consultations which resulted in the suspension of development assistance for four years, is based on the identity and problems particular to one country, meaning, that the limits of the identity of Guinea-Bissau are also the limitations of power relations in this case (Council Decision of 18 July 2011). Conclusively, we can see that the practice of development assistance encompasses three technical levels: representing developing countries as an unindividuated mass, like in the case of JAES; 2. Conflicting the representation in JAES with the more general ACP, generalising further the sign 'Africa', which is already quite generic, and finally, based on these two representations, in case of breach of normative elements, the country's identity is particularised as an object of knowledge. The culprit is put into the spotlight.

Discourse happens between parties, it is intersubjective. In the FDA, discourse also transmits power (Foucault, 1990: 101). The first argument here has profound implications between the conflicting portrayal of African countries and the EU's power in the scope of development discourse. By the conflicting portrayal of its interlocutor, developing countries are 'locked' into a power relation with a partner, against who it is difficult to resist. Let us consider the previous point of discourse providing means of resistance, because smaller discourses can emerge next to the dominant discourse which can be oppressive. If a single developing country would use the discourse as a means of resistance against the political conditionality, it raises the question of 'who is speaking?'. In the case of developing countries rejecting sanctions on Burundi in 2017, the

EU can override and specify, that the sanctions are not based on the identity of Burundi, but instead Burundi having subscribed to the framework between the EU and the ACP (Uwimana, 2017). By fracturing the identity of the other, the EU can shield itself from singular instances of criticisms. Criticisms are directed toward an identity, like in the above case, when developing countries oppose sanctions, and going against the 'EU', who in this context is a normative power, these criticisms remain ineffective in questioning the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power.

6.3 Power/knowledge

We have seen that development relations are power relations and both the era of colonialism and development cooperation can be reduced to an analysis of power. On the example of Africa, we have also seen that the conflicting representation of developing countries as the other, allows the EU to dominate the discourse better, resulting in a more solid normative identity of the EU. Before, proceeding into the final step of the EU achieving the status of the judge of normativity. We must first assess how developing countries are objects of knowledge, and how this in turn increases the power of the EU preceding the normative identity of the EU.

Based on that the EU has more power in conducting the dominant discourse on development cooperation, developing countries are objects of knowledge. Establishing the developing countries as objects of knowledge has profound impact on the creation of the EU's normative identity. Because power creates the objects of knowledge (Gogoi, 2015: 17), we can also say that power precedes knowledge. In short, knowledge is the product of power. If power creates objects of knowledge, then we must look at the discursive practices of how the EU uses developing countries as an object of knowledge, in order to make it comply with its goals. Another important characteristic of power is to produce knowledge (Foucault, 1977, cited by Stevenson and Cutcliffe, 2006: 718). In turn, the produced knowledge enhanced the agent's power (Rawlinson, 1987:

387). The mutual cooperation of power and knowledge, is also known as power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Thus, we can argue that if the EU produces knowledge on the normative elements of political conditionality in development cooperation, then in turn, this knowledge will enhance its normative power. The quality of being an object of knowledge is achieved by being designated a linguistic sign in a systematic fashion. The central point of the argument here is the understanding that whilst the EU has control over its subject/object dichotomy, then developing counties lack this agency. When we consider other as an object of knowledge, then we also reflect on its inseparable counterpart, the EU. The knowledge produced by the EU about the other in turn constructs the identity of the author, that is, the EU.

Let us turn to the case of Guinea-Bissau to see how the power/knowledge of the EU is facilitated. If we look at the idea of panopticism in Discipline and Punish, we can see that the purpose of power is different than normally perceived in the International Relations. To elaborate, in power relations, power itself can only be understood via intersubjectivity, and consequently, it exists only when it is exercised. In other words, power is performative (Mills, 2003: 35). The performativity of the power leads us to an understanding, that in order for the EU to conduct the relations of development cooperation with a certain goal, it needs to facilitate the existence of these relations with disciplines. The latter we can understand as certain techniques which allow effective exercising of power. If knowledge, in Foucault, refers to the statements enhancing the authority of the speaker, then disciplines are the exact technique with which this is to be achieved. The prisoners, in Discipline and Punish, do not know whether the guard is in the tower or not, but the possibility of the guard being in the tower automatically removes the need for physical punishment, and thus the prisoners regulate their behaviour without physical intervention. It follows that in order to exercise power over the object, the power needs to acquire certain disciplines. The same discipline that is present in the case of prisoners was also present in the case of Guinea-Bissau in 2011. After the development assistance was cut following the 2012 coup d'état, cooperation was resumed again in 2015, based on the free elections of 2014 (European Council website). Whilst the country proved itself capable of holding democratic elections, the decision was based

on the EU Election Observer Mission. The discipline of panopticism was exercised with the presence of 46 observers, which is not enough to maintain a continuous presence everywhere, but clearly enough to create a sense of presence (Hall, 2014: 2). The probable presence of observes in each and every polling station certainly contributed to the relatively successful outcome of elections. This argument is further backed up that disciplinary power, compared to the more conventional understanding of power, is to be productive. The difference between the Foucauldian power and traditional power is that if the latter belongs to the sovereign and serves the purpose of controlling subjects with fear, then the former belongs to no-one in particular and is productive (Lloyd and Thacker, 2016: 105). The productivity of the disciplinary power inflicted on the polling stations of Guinea-Bissau, constitute something of an implicit coercion. Whilst not having to punish the country with further reduction of aid, the EU made Guinea-Bissau comply with its diffusion of norms without directly engaging in it. The publicised story of the event, maintains the narrative that Guinea-Bissau's situation improved after the justified and positive intervention of the EU (Council of the European Union website).

Whilst in the case of Guinea-Bissau, the country was subjected to an explicitly Foucauldian discipline, all the cases of political consultations under the CPA follow the discipline of confinement. In a sense, by already summoning the suspects of violation of norms to consultations, confines them into a space wherein which they are examined. Confinement, whilst being more of a meta-discipline, as it does not have a direct practice related to it, enables the EU better study its subjects. The placement of a developing country into the space where it is studied and examined, effectively turns the country into an object of knowledge. Whereas textually, the confinement of developing countries, each listed individually in the preambles of the documents underpinning the legal basis of development aid, confines them into the space of 'ACP' or 'Africa'. After confining the objects under a newly-assigned linguistic sign, they situation can be directed in favour of the EU. The key element in confining developing countries into political consultations or certain parts of documents, is that they become 'objects of knowledge' (DuBois, 1991: 21).

The implications of developing countries as objects of knowledge allows for a more controlled creation of development discourse. By establishing developing countries as objects of knowledge, the EU is able to deploy relevant disciplines in order to exercise dominance in power relations. The effect of disciplines it two-fold: First, it allows better maintenance of power relations, and second, it amplifies the creation of knowledge, the latter being better structured. In turn this knowledge, in addition to the increased efficiency of normative power of the EU, amplifies that power as well, in the manner of a nexus. As discourse transmits the power, all these effects are visible in discourse as well. In addition, discourse allows power to exist (Foucault, 1980: 93). The interplay between discourse and power means that we can only understand discourse via the analysis of power relations, and vice versa – we can only understand power relations via interpreting the discourse on the subjects. Doing a discourse analysis on the EU's normative power is essentially reduced to the relations of power between the EU and developing countries.

6.4 The judge of normality

At the centre of the FDA is the judge of normality. Its central location is based on its ability to be ubiquitous in the political discourse and thus influence and construct the discourse, and use it in its favour. In this chapter, we will assess how the EU is the judge of normality in the discourse on development assistance. Foucault argues that the judges of normality are everywhere and that every situation is essentially governed by a judge (Foucault, 1977: 304). Regarding the omnipresence of normative judgements, we must examine the EU's influence on the discourse of development assistance in two aspects, Firstly, how the EU sees the discourse, and secondly how the EU sees itself in this discourse. Both aspects reveal themselves when we look at how the EU sees development assistance in the global context. In 2016, the EU introduced the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), which has the task of setting the security and foreign policy of the EU in the global context (EUGS, 2016). The EUGS does two things. First it defines that

"the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons," (EUGS, 2016: 10) and secondly, it also re-emphasises the EU's commitment to development aid, which constitutes a fundamental part of aforementioned global order. (EUGS, 2016: 3). Lastly, there is also evidence for the EU's self-portrayal. The document makes a mention of the EU being the biggest aid donor in the world (EUGS, 2016: 3). Consequently, EUGS conveys the EU's understanding of the global context, developing countries, and its own role in relation to both. The global order based on values and norms gives us an interpretation of the ideal toward which the EU is striving – a direct goal for its diffusion of norms. Akin to the previous point on the origin of norms, the normative global order shares the same normative basis upon which the EU is founded. In addition, the EUGS gives us the understanding of development aid as an essential element in achieving the global order based on values and norms. The EU's good awareness of its central role in the process of interlacing development assistance with global norms is evident from its emphasis on its own size as a development actor. Perhaps the EUGS is the best evidence for the EU's view on the global community and its own relevance within.

We can juxtapose this interpretation of the EUGS with the results of the deconstructive analysis. The last chapter discussing the marginalisation and centralisation of certain elements in the documents revealed that coercive measures are normally not in focus, allowing for the portrayal of the EU as a force for good. Conversely, the centralised elements focus on the sense of unity between the ACP group and the EU, and in addition, emphasise on the developing countries' need to better integrate into the global community. The systemic marginalisation of coercive elements, coupled with the EU's vision of the global community above, results in an understanding that the EU is both altruistic and an important 'pole' in international relations. Clearly, the EU views itself as indispensable, and the authors understanding of development assistance with the altruistic EU in its centre point institutes the normality of development assistance – it is normal that developing countries are dependent on the EU in their struggle for better life, because after all, a) the EU is good, and b) the EU is the most generous donor. Consequently, the normative

elements in development agreements assume the role of formalities. As a result, there is an interesting conflict. On the one hand, the perfect global order has a normative basis, and on the other hand, developing countries accept the norms as an inevitability in order to develop.

Whilst the discourse on development aid and the EU's identity is sometimes conflicting, we can look at the techniques employed by the EU in trying to facilitate the relevance of global norms. The most fundamental task of the judge is to separate the normal from abnormal in the society. The abnormal is assigned a negative identity, and this identity is not to punish the abnormal, but to be a role model for those, who by the method of exclusion are normal (Foucault, 1977). Essentially, the judge of normality separates the abnormal from the normal (Foucault, 1977: 199). This technique also removes the need to be primarily occupied with disciplining the normal. In short, the EU does not need to concern itself with disciplining countries who abide by its norms, it only needs to separate those who don't, and consequently, the countries abiding by normative clauses model themselves to an identity inversely proportional to 'abnormal' – that is 'normal'. The technique of separation is in close relation with identity. It is an active practice via which the EU institutes its own identity at the centre of the global order based on values and norms. Here it is useful to recall the idea that discourse is the sum total of all discursive practices, both textual and practices that give meaning to the texts. The separation of Guinea-Bissau as abnormal is done implicitly. Starting political consultations already signify that the country is an outlier in the normative global community. More importantly, the implicit definition of Guinea-Bissau as 'abnormal' is a discursive practice. Whilst it is impossible to find evidence for such definition in the textual materials on the case, it is also evident that political consultations of this character only happen in case normative elements are breached. The normative elements are called "essential elements", and Guinea-Bissau has violated both the essence of development aid, The EU, as the former is based on the principles of the EU, and the well-being of the global community (CPA art. 9). The importance of separation, however, is not only to increase the power of the EU, but instead to rehabilitate the agent with a negative identity (Foucault, 1977: 304). Thus, the ideal goal for the EU, in applying article 96 in practice, is

not to showcase its power, but in future make it possible for fewer cases of the article being used possible in the first place. As we established before, the purpose of power is to be productive, rather than punitive. That is the social use of normative power. The real power of the judge is its ability of turn subjects into objects of knowledge by the means of division (Foucault, 1977: 24), and as an unavoidable by-product of the whole process, turn itself into the central element of the discourse. Every time the EU employs punitive measures, its normative authority strengthens, but it will be the strongest if these measures will not have to be applied at all.

6.5 Discourse is a performance

So far the discourse analysis has revealed that the EU employs a range of disciplines to establish itself as a normative power, and the power it achieves is performative. To understand how the EU uses development assistance to establish itself as a normative power, we also need to investigate the role of the discourse in this process. Earlier we also established that discourse transmits power. In other words, whilst discourse transmits power and makes it possible for the EU achieve a normative identity, discourse also allows for power to exist. Discourse is the necessary precondition of power. To better analyse the discourse on development assistance, we can interpret it from the perspective of the EU as the judge of normality.

Firstly, the EU is the judge of normality, because of its relentless diffusion of norms. Whilst 'the judge of normality' designates the practices employed by the EU, it also designates its position in the discourse. We have also established that normative elements in the documents underpinning the normative identity of the EU have value, because they are ubiquitous. The remaining question is simple: Why are these norms considered valuable? A short answer would be that whilst the norms diffused are not European in essence, they become European by the active practice of diffusion (Manners, 2006b). Indeed, the post-war Europe was the necessary political environment for the development of the normative basis

opposite to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. We can say that in part, the reason why the norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are valuable is the historical context which gave them value. Secondly, the seemingly inherent value of these norms is created alongside with the normative identity of the EU. A particular insight into this question is offered by Foucault: "Each society has its regime of truth … the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true" and certain discourses are establish as true with "the mechanisms … to distinguish true and false statements" (Foucault, 1980: 131). The interrelation between discourse and truth is fundamental in understanding the link between normative political conditionality and the normative identity of the EU. Namely, it is the practices employed by the EU to facilitate the power relations with developing countries that also establish the norms diffused by the EU as true. The relentless diffusion of norms and the systemic portrayal of developing countries as inferiors both contribute to establishing the current discourse on development aid and the necessity to have normative elements as a 'regime of truth'.

In the same passage, Foucault gives us a further insight into the mechanics of the regimes of truth: "the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (Foucault, 1980: 131). In the same sense as knowledge exists via power, so does truth (Foucault, 1980: 131). The status of the EU in regards to its relevance as a normative power in the global context is its dependent on its ability to create a regime of truth. This regime of truth is naturally facilitated by the discourses and practices of the EU. In short, the survival of the same regime of truth which allows the current discourse on development assistance to exist, is also dependent on how well the EU facilitates the discourse. As power is maintained by disciplines, the same disciplines that allow the EU to be a normative power also allow the discourse authorising the EU's position as a normative power to exist. The idea of discourse being a performance stands on the understanding that if power is performative and discourse enables power to exist, then the discourse which allows for the continuation of the power relations between the EU and developing countries has to be as performative as the disciplines of power with which the discourse is maintained.

The second element of the idea of discourse being performative is the European ideology. Danaher et al (2000: 100) remark that the European history is a history of complete vision. A deconstructive understanding of this idea implies, that European notions of future and present, like history, are visions of totality too. This argument is especially relevant in this context, as the present situation of development cooperation has the task of creating a better future. The idea of being non-exclusive of multiple interpretations also contributes the idea of the performativity of discourse, and consequently emphasises the need to actively investigate the on-going practices constituting the discourse on development assistance. This is because facilitating a vision of totality in the development discourse, and by extension its normative elements, implies actively supressing the voices of criticisms and dissent. We can recall the theme of marginalisation and centralisation in the deconstruction, which showed that the general system facilitating the suppression of dissent in the discourse on development assistance is the marginalisation of coercive measures and the emphasis on the inherently good norms. The EU's suppression of dissent does not stand on violence but instead on the social position associated with the normative elements. Consequently, if a developing country wants to improve its position, it would naturally align its understanding of the norms with the EU. Simultaneously, the ubiquity of normative elements in the discourse on development creates an ideology. In European context, ideology is a systemic view of the events, which carries the interest of the dominant side of the power relation (Danaher et al, 2000: 100). The advantage of the EU in shaping the discourse on development and normativity is that it is up to the EU to determine the legitimacy of other actors. Statements unaligned with the EU's vision are given the value of being false.

7.   Conclusion

To conclude, it is evident that the power relations between the EU and developing countries are asymmetrical. Further, it is also evident that there is a conflict between the EU's portrayal of its mission of development assistance, and the untold benefits derived from this mission. When the EU states a particular purpose for its operations, we should always be left with the question of what does this focus on the statement of intent leave unfocused. In other words, the EU's portrayal of itself as altruistic, also leaves room for understanding why is this portrayal beneficial to the EU as a political actor. Surely, development assistance plays an important role in many countries' economies, and to this date, no-one has offered a viable alternative. Despite having been critical of the EU's development assistance, it must be stressed that developing countries would not be better off without it. However, it is also important to understand that the benefits of development assistance to both the EU and developing countries are wholly compatible in trying to understand how the EU uses developing countries to its own advantage.

This work has also shown how the EU uses development assistance to establish its normative identity. In answer to the research question posited in the beginning, we can see that the function of development assistance is two-fold: Firstly, receiving development assistance in not optional for the benefactors, as their economies are severely dependent on it. Secondly, for the normative identity of the EU, development assistance is important inasmuch as it includes the politically conditional elements of normativity. Most importantly, there is nothing *essential* about development aid in allowing the EU to diffuse its norms on the global arena. Rather, development aid is the logical continuation from the era of colonialism – both periods signify economic and social dependence. Thus, the question *'how'* is particularly suitable to this examination, as it allows to look at the techniques and practices derived from, and supporting, development assistance.

In relation to the FDA, development assistance occupies one of the most central positions. As it is the mean, by the employment of which the EU is able to

achieve its goal, i.e., normative identity, it is the springboard for the employment of different mechanisms of disciplinary power. The question of the interrelation between development assistance and the politically conditional elements of normality is not the question of the specific norms, but rather, a question of norms in general. In essence, the analysis has shown that the norms the EU diffuse – human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance – are valuable inasmuch as they constitute a regime of truth reinforcing the normative power of the EU. The norms in themselves are important as they serve the practical application of a disciplinary power. For instance, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, 'democracy' was an important norm, because it allowed the usage of article 96 (CPA). We can say that norms are important for the EU because they provide an opportunity to pursue its normative identity. There is nothing inherently important about the value of any specific norm. Norms are pretexts to power.

The contribution of this dissertation is bridging the gap outlined at the end of the literature review section. That is the understanding that whilst there has been a substantial debate on how the EU is (or according to some, is not) a normative power, there has not been any substantial employment of the post-structuralist approach. By dissecting the normative identity of the EU from the Foucauldian perspective, I have made the academic contribution of interlacing the two disciplines of philosophy and international relations. Thus, many insights gained from this work could be useful for the ongoing academic debate on the topic. First, in order to really understand how the normative identity of the EU is made, and how it appears meaningful, one has to view the discourse permitting the relations between the EU and the developing countries as a performance. Secondly, power too has to be understood as a continuous process. Although in this context, development aid and normative identity, it has a clear origin, there needs to be a more substantive employment of power as it is understood outside the general conception of power in the discipline of International Relations. Likewise, employing deconstruction as a method as diversified the academic merit of this work. By deconstructing the texts, it has moved the approach of this dissertation from Foucauldian to post-structuralist in general. Deconstructive reading, as a method, contributed significantly to the

understanding of this discourse. After all, both Foucault and Derrida are concerned with how meaning is made. If the latter has a strong emphasis on the text, then the former adds to it by looking at the practices surrounding the text.

There are numerous further research opportunities based on this work. "Genealogy ... depends on a vast accumulation of source material" (Foucault, 1977: 139-140). The scope of this dissertation is limited, and consequently, so is the accumulation of source material. It is plausible to argue, that with the inclusion of a more diverse range of data, the debate on the normative identity of the EU would gain a more thorough perspective. Secondly, the debate would also benefit from writing a genealogy on the values of specific norms. If on the one hand, the theoretical approach itself was the main goal of this work, then on the other hand, having a bigger data set – analysing more texts and practices – would enable to stretch the genealogy of the normative identity of the EU to unimaginable lengths. This work, however, has set the example that approaching the identity of the EU philosophically, can yield results otherwise hard to establish.

8   List of references

Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2014) *The environment as a strategic priority in the European Union-Brazil partnership: Is the EU behaving as a normative power or soft imperialist?* Sustainability Research Institute. Leeds, UK, available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260526989_The_environment_as_a_strategic_priority_in_the_European_Union-Brazil_partnership_Is_the_EU_behaving_as_a_normative_power_or_soft_imperialist>, accessed on 30th August 2017.

Andersen, N. A. (2003) *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann.* Bristol: Policy Press.

Benwell, B. and Stokoe, E. (2006) *Discourse and Identity.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bicchi, F. (2006) 'Original Articles 'Our size fits all': normative power Europe and the Mediterranean'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 258-303.

Borzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2004) *One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.* Workshop on Democracy Promotion, 4-5 October, Centre for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, available at <www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/atasp/publikationen/4_artikel_papiere/18/tandt_stanford_final.pdf>, accessed on 1st September 2017

Bull, H. (1982) 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?'. Journal of Common Market Studies 21(2), pp. 149-170.

Carbone, M. (2013) 'Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa'. *International Relations* 27(3), pp. 341-355.

Carbone, M. and Orbie, J. (2014) 'Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: The European Union and the trade–development nexus'. *Contemporary Politics* 20(1), pp. 1-9.

Council Decision 2011/492/EU of 13 July 2011 concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Republic of Guinea- Bissau under Article 96 of the partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part. (2011). Official Journal of the European Union, L203, pp. 2-6

Council of the European Union. 'Guinea-Bissau: EU lifts restrictions on cooperation', available at < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/24-guinea-bisau-eu-lifts-restrictions-on-cooperation/>, accessed on 1st September 2017

Council of the European Union. 'Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement - consultation procedure',
available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/article-96-cotonou-agreement/>, accessed on 1st September 2017.

Daldal, A. (2014) 'Power and Ideology in Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci: A Comparative Analysis'. *Review of History and Political Science* 2(2), pp. 149-167.

Danaher, G., Schirato, T., Webb, J. (2000) *Understanding Foucault.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Del Sarto, R. A. (2015) 'Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the 'Arab Spring''. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54(2), pp. 215-232.

Derrida, J. (1997) *Of Grammatology.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Diez, T. (2005) 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power Europe''. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3), pp. 613-636.

Dobie, A. B. (2011) *Theory into Practice: An Introduction to Literary Criticism.* Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

DuBois, M. (1991) 'The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development'. *Alternatives* 16, pp. 1-30.

European Commission (2014) *The Cotonou Agreement and multiannual financial framework 2014-2020.* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

European Commission. (2011) 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change', COM/2011/0637

European Commission. 'ACP - The Cotonou Agreement', available at < https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en>, accessed on 30th August 2017.

European Commission. 'European Development Fund (EDF)', available at <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments/european-development-fund_en >, accessed on 1st September 2017.

European Council. (2016) 'The new European consensus on development', *Official Journal of the European Union* C210 COM/2016/0740, pp. 1-38

European Union (2016) *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.* Available at < http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf>, accessed on 31st august 2017

European Union. (1957) 'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community' (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957. available online < http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf>, accessed on 1st September 2017

European Union. 'Development and cooperation', available at < https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/development-cooperation_en>, accessed on 30th August 2017.

European Union. 'A growing Community – the first Enlargement', available at <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1970-1979_en>, accessed on 31st August 2017.

Farrell, M. (2005) 'A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa'. *Journal of European Integration* 27(3), pp. 263-283.

Foucault, M. (1977) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Bouchard, D. F. (ed), *Michel Foucault: Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 139-164.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* New York: Random House.

Foucault, M. (1980) 'Two lectures' in Foucault, M. and Gordon, C.(ed) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977,* pp. 78-108.

Foucault, M. (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977.*

Foucault, M. (2001) *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. (2002) *The Order of Things.* London: Routledge.

Garland, D. (2014) 'What is a "history of the present"? On Foucault's genealogies and their critical preconditions'. *Punishment & Society* 16(4), pp. 365-384.

Gogoi, M. (2015) 'A Critical Analyses of Edward Saïd's Orientalism through Foucaultian Perspective of Knowledge-Power Relation', *Research Innovator* 2(4), pp. 16-24.

Hall, F. (2014) Report: Parliamentary Election and First Round of the Presidential Election in Guinea Bissau, 13 April 2014. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election_observation/missions/2009-2014/2014_04_13_guinea_bissau.pdf>, accessed on 3rd September 2017.

Hill, C. (1990) 'European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model – or Flop?', in Reinhardt Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of an International Actor*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hurt, S. R. (2003) 'Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention'. *Third World Quarterly* 24(1), pp. 161-176.

Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ''Normative' power Europe: a realist critique'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 217-234.

Johnston, J. (1990) 'Discourse as Event: Foucault, Writing, and Literature'. *MLN* 105(4), pp. 800-818.

Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2017) 'Political Realism in International Relations', available at < https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>, accessed on 30th august 2017.

Langan, M. (2011) 'Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of 'Normative Power''. *New Political Economy* 17(3), pp. 243-270.

Lecomte, H. B. S. (2001) *Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations.* Overseas Development Institute. London, UK, Available at <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4742.pdf>, accessed on 31st august 2017

Lloyd, M. and Thacker, A. (2016) *The Impact of Michel Foucault on the Social Sciences and Humanities.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lynch, R. A. (2016) *Foucault's Critical Ethics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (1990) *History of Sexuality: An Introduction.* London: Penguin.

Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2), pp. 235-258.

Manners, I. (2006a) 'Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 182-199.

Manners, I. (2006b) 'The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35(1), pp. 167-180.

Merlingen, M. (2007) 'Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of `Normative Power Europe''. *Security Dialogue* 38(4), pp. 435-453.

Mills, S. (2003) *Michel Foucault (Routledge Critical Thinkers).* London: Routledge.

Montholyoke website, available at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/colonies.htm>, accessed on 31st August 2017.

Nicolaidis, K. and Howse, R. (2002) 'This is my EUtopia ...': Narrative as Power'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4), pp. 767-792.

Orbie, J. (2006) 'Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 41(1), pp. 123-128.

Ramazanoglu, C. (1993) *Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism.* London: Routledge.

Rawlinson, M. C. (1987) 'Foucault's strategy: knowledge, power, and the specificity of truth'. *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 12(4), pp. 371-395.

Rumelili, B. and Cebeci, M. (2016) 'Theorizing European Identity: contributions to constructivist international relations debates on collective identity', in Kaina, V., Karolewski, I. P., Kuhn, S. (eds), *European Identity Revisited.* London: Routledge, pp. 31-43.

Saïd, E. (2003) *Orientalism.* London: Penguin.

Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. (2008) 'Empowering Africa: normative power in EU–Africa relations'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(4), pp. 607-623.

Sicurelli, D. (2013) *The European Union's Africa Policies.* London: Routledge

Sjursen, H. (2006) 'What kind of power?'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 169-181.

Smith, K. (2005) 'Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate'. *Politique Européenne* 17, pp. 63-82.

Goosen, D. P. (1996) 'The Rhetoric of Scapegoat: A Deconstructive View on Postmodern Hermeneutics, in Porter, S. E. and Olbricht, T. H. (eds) *Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology: Essays from the 1994 Pretoria Conference.* Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, pp. 383-392.8888

Stevenson, C. and Cutcliffe, J. (2006) 'Problematizing special observation in psychiatry: Foucault, archaeology, genealogy, discourse and power/knowledge'. *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing* 13(6), pp. 713-721.

Svensson, J. (2000) 'When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality'. *Journal of Development Economics* 61(1), pp. 61-84.

The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007) *A joint Africa-EU Strategy*. Lisbon.

Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992. 1992 O.J. C 191/1 European Union (2016) 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', available online <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf>, accessed on 1st September 2017.

Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics.* Melano Park, CA: Addison-Wesly

Willig, C. and Stainton-Rogets, W. (2008) *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Wright, N. (2011) 'The European Union: What Kind of International Actor?'. *Political Perspectives* 5(2), pp. 8-32.

Yin, R. (2014) *Case Study Research.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Youngs, R. (2004) 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42(2), pp. 415-435.