Dignity and free will: the moral foundations of the Human Rights regime

Abstract

The concept of human dignity is often placed at the centre of human rights discourse, providing the moral foundation on which human rights are based. Probing deeper into the meaning of dignity, it becomes clear that dignity relates to the supposed innate capacity humans have for free will. When this capacity is restricted, it is taken that a person’s dignity is violated. Human rights then become premised on the ideal of individualism, protecting only the right of individuals to retain their capacity for free choice. This is witnessed in the dominance of civil and political rights in the practice of human rights. More expansive notions of social and economic rights prove more difficult to reconcile with a human rights regime premised on dignity.

Recent research in neuroscience challenges the extent to which humans hold the capacity for free will. Taking this research into account, through the methodological approach of reflective equilibrium, this dissertation will examine whether the philosophical underpinnings of human rights discourse remain consonant with recent empirical findings in neuroscience. Where areas of tension are found between human rights discourse and the empirical evidence, alternative moral foundations will be suggested that are congruent with the empirical evidence, which could also offer a more extensive approach to the implementation of human rights.