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Russia as the significant other in Polish
parliamentary discourse. The dimension of national
identity and foreign policy
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List of Abbreviations

DHA – discourse-historical approach

EaP – Eastern Partnership program

EU - European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PiS – political party “Prawo i Sprawiedliwość”, right-wing (eng. Law and Justice)

PO – political party “Platforma Obywatelska”, center to center-right (eng. Civic Platform)

PSL – political party “Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe”, center-right (eng. Polish People’s Party)

SD – political party “Stronnictwo Demokratyczne”, center (eng. Alliance of Democrats)

SDPL – political party “Socjaldemokracja Polska”, center-left (eng. Social Democracy of Poland)

SLD – political party “Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej”, center-left (eng. Democratic Left Alliance)

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Introduction

Fourteen years after joining the European Union, Poland, which used to be so loyal to political and economic integration with the West after the Cold War is now regularly criticized for lacking solidarity with the EU, violating its values and principles by introducing internal reforms and having conflict relations with major EU states (Stur, 2017). This transformation occurred during the rule of Jarosław Kaczyński's Law and Justice (PiS) party which seeks to achieve a guaranteed autonomous foreign policy, strengthen national identity and distance Poland from fundamental values of the European project. Current PiS party ideology emphasizes the specific nature of the historical experience of Poland and perceives the nation as the main organizing principle and a key reference point for any individual in defining the social life and the very existence of a person (Zamoyski 2016; Balcer et.al, 2016).

These changes highlight the importance and impact of ideational factors of Polish national identity on foreign policy as "both Polish national identity and the ideological basis of the country's foreign policy are heavily permeated and conditioned by the historical inheritance" (Gorska, 2010). In recent years, transformations of Polish national identity and foreign policy have been largely defined by its accession to the Western structures of the EU and NATO and distancing from the communist past associated with Russia (Tulmets, 2014). The reverse trend of distancing from the EU based on the growing importance of the national identity idea for Poland asks for a deeper understanding of reasons triggering Poland's self-understanding as an international actor. It is said that identity helps to define values and norms upon which state priorities are formed, so examining a state's foreign policy development and transformations requires understanding the process of evolving identity and its implications (Prizel, 1998). Based on these assumptions, the purpose of this dissertation is to study the influence of perceptions about Russia on the evolvement of Poland's identity as an international actor.

For a large part of its history, Poland did not exist as an independent state. In the 18th Century, Poland was partitioned into three parts: Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Prussian. For 123 years lacking a sovereign state, ethnic Poles experienced attempts at cultural assimilation and repression, which caused a series of uprisings. The development of the country fully depended on the pace of development of the three dominant powers. In the 19th Century, Poland gained a limited independence although stayed under control of the Russian Empire. The beginning of the Second World War meant another collapse of a sovereign state for Poland

(Batt and Wolczuk, 2002; Lewicki and Mandes, 2015). In 1939, Russia and Germany signed the Ribbentrop – Molotov non-aggression Pact which consisted a secret clause about dividing Polish lands between them. The invasion of Nazi troops was followed by the Soviets. The historical experience of being under occupation created an obsession among Polish politicians regarding the issue of territorial defense, first of all out of fear of threat from its neighbors. The long history of defeat and invasion when neighboring powers were bilaterally making decisions about the development of Poland had a strong impact on the construction of Polish national identity, where victimization was taking a central place (Mach, 2000; Kaminska 2007; Ziv 2014).

Today, Jarosław Kaczyński blames the previous government for turning Poland into Germany's vassal in the international arena, or even into a Russian-German "condominium". The PiS leader has been treating international relations through categories of geopolitics, the balance of power and the "concert of powers". Witold Waszczykowski from PiS said in his interview in 2015: "Russia and Germany create a distinctive concert of powers over the head of Poland" (Balcer et.al, 2016). While Russian-Polish political relations are almost non-existent, Russia still serves as a case in point in Polish foreign policy. Poland perceives Russia as a revisionist power willing to use its military capacities in order to achieve its goals. The Foreign Policy Strategy of Poland says that Russia disregards fundamental values of international law, such as inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and abstention from the use of force (www.msz.gov.pl).

Drawing from the fact that the transformation of Poland's image and foreign policy has been happening as a consequence of the change of the ruling party makes it interesting to examine Polish parliamentary discourse as the platform for negotiating Poland's identity and foreign policy vision. Thus, although the main limitation for the research may be presented by differing political ideologies in Poland, the historical role of Russia as a significant Other still creates a particularly interesting case to study the discursive nature of Poland's identity. In the constructivist understanding of international relations, beliefs and concepts that actors built upon interpretations of history lead to the formulation of their behavior in relation to other actors in the system. In this context, this dissertation seeks to find out what is the role of Russia as a significant Other in the shaping of Poland's identity and foreign policy? Is Russia a meaningful part/ motif of Polish parliamentary discourse about foreign policy? If so, what topics and arguments prevail in debates that include Russia? The contribution of this research is twofold: one is to provide an understanding of continuity and change in contemporary

Poland's identity construction. The other is to discuss Poland's relations with Russia through the 'Self/ Other' lens.

Those questions are challenging to address as the complexity of Polish-Russian relations reveals itself with the combination of both international and domestic factors. With the background of a burdened historical past, Poland's Russia policy has traditionally been an important dimension of internal political discussions, and moreover, Russia continues to affect Polish national security. Despite the troubled and tragic historical relationship between Russia and Poland, there was a moment of reconciliation between Poland and Russia in 2008-2010 during the coalition government of Civic-Platform (2007-2015)¹. The task of Prime Minister Donald Tusk was to ensure the EU's support in disputes with Russia and hence proving that Poland was not a typical Russophobic state. The Civic Platform coalition worked actively towards the normalization of Polish-Russian relations through establishing better contacts with Moscow and Vladimir Putin personally. Starting from 2008, two principles of a new paradigm of bilateral relations were formulated by Tusk. The first said that "both countries have had enough and are 'sick and tired' of the 'atmosphere of cold'", and further declared that Poland will "deal with Russia, keep dialogue with Russia 'as it is'" (Nowak and Kobrinskaya, 2010). There was a change in the discussion tone regarding historical issues between two countries on the level of high political representatives, particularly with regards to the mass murder of Polish officers by NKVD in 1940 in Katyń². Unfortunately, such an improvement in bilateral relations was saddened by the air disaster in Smolensk which happened on the 10th of April 2010 killing 96 representatives of Polish high-ranking officials from political, clergy, military and civil life³,

¹ Civic Platform's initiatives in 2008 included the reactivation of an expert joint Group for Difficult Issues, a consultative agency working for development of common understanding of historical issues; establishment of Polish-Russian Dialogue and Reconciliation Centers in Moscow and Warsaw working for supporting cultural and scientific dialogue; establishment of the Polish-Russian Civil Dialogue Forum that was aimed at bringing together Polish and Russian intellectuals, and representatives of science, culture, media and politics for discussion of various aspects of bilateral relations; reactivation of the Polish-Russian Governmental Commission for Economic Co-operation and the Polish-Russian Business Council with the purpose of improving bilateral economic relations. In 2009 the organization of Polish-Russian Non-governmental Forum took place in order to bring the two nations closer, since previously the non-governmental cooperation has been basically non-existent (Nowak, 2010).

² Series of mass executions of Polish citizens, mostly captured officers of the Polish army. The executions were carried out based on the decision of "Troika" of the NKVD of the USSR in accordance with the resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU(b) on March 5, 1940. According to published archival documents, a total of 21,857 people were shot (Общество «Мемориал», 2015).

³ The list of victims included Polish President Lech Kaczyński and his wife, former Polish President Ryszard Kaczorowski, the entire general army command, the Chief of the Polish General Staff and other senior Polish military officers, the president of the National Bank of Poland, Poland's deputy foreign minister, Polish government officials, 15 members of the Polish parliament, senior members of the Polish clergy, and relatives of victims of the Katyń massacre (www.smolenskcrash.eu).

including President Lech Kaczyński, who were heading to the memorial ceremony in Katyn on the Polish airplane TU-154 in foggy weather conditions. The reaction of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and their personal commitment to the crash investigation contributed significantly to the reconciliation process. This atmosphere of solidarity brought out warm sentiments between Poles and Russians and gave the impression that Polish-Russian rapprochement could last for the longer perspective (Dempsey, 2015; www.cbos.pl). The main positive outcome was the introduction a visa-free regime to Poland for the Kaliningrad inhabitants in 2011 (www.ria.ru).

However, this reconciliation in bilateral relations and all achievements coming out of it were abandoned after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Civic Platform suspended all political dialogue with Russia in the spring 2014 and accused Russia of intervening in the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine. Since then, contacts are carried out at the level of no higher than the Deputy Minister, there are no contacts between parliamentarians of the two countries. Poland supported the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions by the West and Russia in response banned the import of agricultural products from Poland. Later on, Poland refused to hold the planned years of Russian culture in Poland and Polish culture in Russia in 2015. When the Law and Justice party came to power in 2015, Poland's policy towards Russia remained essentially unchanged, but some details were added. More attention was paid to claims to the Russian authorities in connection with the investigation of the TU-154 airplane crash in Smolensk as the black box recorder and the wreck have been held in Russia since the tragedy. The Polish side suspended the visa-free regime of local border movement between the Kaliningrad region and neighboring Polish regions in the summer of 2016. Moreover, amendments to the so-called "the law on decommunization" have been taking place, according to which the demolition of monuments to Soviet soldiers-liberators could acquire a mass-forced character. The Embassy of Russia in Poland reports that there is a permanent "information war" against Russia: "every day we hear sharply negative statements of Polish officials about our country, the main Polish media publish and broadcast materials about Russia almost exclusively critical in nature, based on the principle "when it comes to Russia – it's either bad or nothing" (www.poland.mid.ru).

Thus, considering such sharp transformations in Poland's foreign policy, the focus of this dissertation on examining Poland's relations with Russia from the 'Self/Other' perspective allows for the treatment of the events of the Smolensk crash in 2010 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 contextually as shaping bilateral relations. Moreover, the basic features of these events provide additional value in terms of comparison between internally and externally shaping factors. While the tragedy in Smolensk is actually restricted to Polish home

affairs, it included strong Russian symbolic connotations with the background of historical improvement in Polish-Russian relations. The annexation of Crimea, in turn, is an externally shaping factor happening in a wider context of international relations development. It became an unprecedented point in Russia's revival of the imperial policy towards its neighbors that actually takes its start from the war in Georgia in 2008 up until the ongoing conflict in the South-East of Ukraine. Thus, while both events in Smolensk and Crimea can be treated, respectively, as points of improvement and deterioration in Polish-Russian relations, it is important to consider that Poland's unstable security environment already existed before the intensified normalization of relations with Russia in 2010.

These assumptions provide a comprehensive analytical framework for the purpose of this dissertation as seeking to examine patterns of change and continuity in Poland's identity in relation to Russia as its significant Other. Social and political science understands identity as a reflection of the environment the Self exists in while being constructed in relation to various Others (Wendt, 1992; Prizel, 1998; Hopf, 2002; Ehin and Berg 2009; Pożarlik, 2013). Drawing from theoretical assumptions developed by constructivists (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002), identification with the Other on the continuum from negative to positive creates perceptions of the state's strategic interests and opportunities, while contributing to the development of a collective Self based on common interest. Following this idea, this dissertation is built upon the hypothesis that the more there is a change in the relations between a Self and a significant Other, the more possible become identity transformations. To be more precise, in the constructivist view, negatively changing relations with the significant Other shall cause processes of differentiation from it, where the Self would be described as better than the Other causing the strengthening of a collective Self. In contrast, positively changing relations are assumed to reveal certain elements of the identity of a Self that serve as the basis for the interest in such improvement. Additionally, the history of repeating negative or positive connotations about the Other/ Self in relation to the Other would assume to provide the aspect of continuity for respective identity elements. Therefore, coming back to the main research question, comparing periods of improvement and deterioration in Russian-Polish relations may serve for a more thorough understanding of Russia's role in the shaping of Poland's identity and foreign policy. Moreover, identifying patterns of change and continuity in the discursive representations of Self and Other in the Polish parliament allows examining to what extent is Russia a meaningful motif for foreign policy discussions.

Chapter One reviews a broad spectrum of literature related to identity studies with a particular focus on building a theoretical framework for understanding concepts of national and

state identity, and its relationship with foreign policy. It analyses the role Russia has been playing as a significant Other in the construction of Polish national identity, which will set the research presented in this paper in the context of existing literature. The theoretical framework of this dissertation is based on the constructivist approach as widely employed in identity-based explanations across academia (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1994; Wendt, 1999; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Zehfuss, 2001; Hopf, 2002; Bukh 2009; Gorska, 2012). Chapter Two offers an in-depth explanation of the applicability of the events under study along with the outline of the research methodology based on the discourse-historical approach developed by Ruth Wodak (2009) in the broadly defined field of Critical Discourse Analysis. The empirical research in this dissertation is based on the analysis of Polish parliamentary discussions about foreign policy in their original language, taken from years 2010 and 2013-2014 as related to periods of events under study – the airplane crash in Smolensk and the Ukrainian C the annexation of Crimea, respectively. Chapter Three discusses the research findings which have been categorized by periods of improvement and deterioration in Polish-Russian relations as drawn from the context of the events. These findings are discussed in the Conclusion chapter in relation to the stated research questions.

Chapter 1. The concept of ‘identity’ as a research problem.

1.1. Identity as a social construct

As the principal object of this dissertation is the way in which Russia impacts the construction of state identity in Poland, this dissertation initially sought to utilize the literature on identity studies in order to frame the research presented. Discussions about identity have been receiving more attention in both academia and politics in the last decades, as they inevitably include questions that reflect the concern of all humanity - “who we are” and “where we are going”. Still, conceptualizing identity in social science appears to be very problematic as there is no common opinion about its ontological and epistemological definitions across different disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, and international relations. While being a contested and crucial concept in social science, identity is too dynamic and complex for being captured in a single theoretical paradigm. Nevertheless, identity proves to be too important for a scientific inquiry, because ‘having an identity’ and ‘understanding identity’ is a fundamental part of a given form of social order (Pozarlik, 2013).

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that the use of ‘identity’ varies according to the context and theoretical tradition from which the inquiry comes. They underline some key uses of the term and highlight a multiple and even contradictory theoretical burden of ‘identity’:

“Clearly, the term ‘identity’ is made to do a great deal of work. It is used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to focus on self-understanding rather than self-interest; to designate sameness across persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, foundational aspects exist; to highlight the processual, interactive development of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality of the contemporary experience of “self”, a self unstably patched together through shards of discourse and contingently “activated” in differing contexts”.

(Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:8)

In the social academy, ‘identity’ is traditionally interpreted through ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ understandings. This differentiation is essential to understand as the way ‘identity’ is used will inevitably impact its effectiveness as a category for analysis. The ‘Strong’ identity concept is based on ‘essentialism’ as an idea of attaching an unchangeable set of characteristics to particular individuals and social groups. The essentialist approach to ‘identity’ relies on the way

individual and collective identities are formed exclusively out of individual or collective will and puts emphasis on sameness over time or across persons – identity is something that all individuals or social groups possess or aspire to possess. This understanding of identity also implies notions of group boundedness and homogeneity, highlights the distinctiveness from non-members and a clear division between outside and inside. This exact ‘strong’ type of understanding of identity is widely used in the literature on race, ethnicity, gender, and nationalism (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).

‘Weak’ conceptions of identity were developed by constructivists as a criticism of ideas of essentialism and define identities as discursive constructs heavily dependent on a certain context (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Constructivist theory treats the society as bounded by a social cognitive structure where discursive formations may dominate and compete. The core of this theoretical understanding lies in the idea that the identities of an individual inevitably contribute to the formation of discourses and social cognitive structure, while, on the other hand, they are shaped, constrained and enhanced by the very social products that they create. Therefore, identity represents a social construct resulting from describing and conceptualizing it. Each individual in society bears many identities and each identity relies on the collection of discursive practices, which include language (written or verbal), and characteristic of physical behaviors, such as dress, customs, habits, and gestures. In a social life, many individual’s identities prevail in certain domains, some may appear in multiple discourses, while others, mostly personal ones, appear in none (Hopf, 2002; Ehin and Berg, 2009; Wodak, et.al, 2009).

Describing and conceptualizing identity appears to be a mission impossible without the notion of defining Self through relations with various Others – understanding who I am inevitably requires understanding who I am not – which implies that identity bears an inherently relational character. Self and Other are commonly perceived as mutually necessary components of both Self, Other and their identities. Individual’s identities serve for categorization of people based on common features, for understanding actions of the Other, but also understanding of own actions. Our daily social practices inevitably include representations of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and the more linguistic, cultural and racial differences increase, the stronger the sense of the ‘Other’ becomes. Consequently, many constructivists write about Self – Other relations in terms of contradictions, where the Other usually receives negative attributes, and Self is seen as a positive one. It also emphasizes the common theoretical assumption that identity relationship cannot exist without the conflict and subordination. Quite often, this existential feature is manifested in treating the Other as a threat to the Self, the threat based on contradictions and differentiation (Prizel, 1998; Ehin and Berg 2009, Tulmets, 2014).

Symbolic interactionism offers a slightly different stance to this discussion and talks about Self and Other relationship in terms of symbiotic, complementary and mutually constitutive relationship. It emphasizes the changeable and interactive character of identity construction and bridges the gap between social and behavioral sciences through integrating the subjective construction of meanings about self-understanding with the objective action of defining the 'Self' through relation to the Other. The importance of this relationship is even more evident when the identity construction is happening in a society where dimensional and symbolic mobility is a dominant way of life, such as the European society (Pozarlik, 2013).

Therefore, the source of identity can be traced from the interactive space shared with others. Identity structure is highly social and social is the sphere where individual and collective meet, merge and transform each other, they acquire certain meanings as they emerge as a consequence of a certain role-playing. The fundamental line here is that individual is always deeply entrenched in a given social structure within which 'Self' and 'Other', 'We' and 'Them' exist in the recognition of the 'Self' and 'Other' as actors that play different roles within the society. For both constructivist and symbolic interactionist accounts, it is common to explain the construction of identity as a process of negotiating meanings assigned to certain forms of behavior. When accepting the 'Self' as a reflection of a society, social identity represents a set of such meanings that Self takes on when relating itself to the Other as another social object. Hence, social identities may serve as cognitive schemas helping an individual/s define "who I am/ we are" in the context or situation, and determine certain roles in the social structure of shared expectations and understandings (Wendt, 1994; Holf, 2002; Pozarlik, 2013).

An important dimension of identity problemata in international relations research is perceiving the state as an actor engaged in the interactive space of identification. A modern state traditionally has the power to identify, categorize, name and state who is who and what is what, and this function can be traced from different perspectives. Firstly, a state puts efforts in individualizing and aggregating subjects as categorized by gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. – a process called "governmentality" in a modern state, as defined in the sociological science influenced by Bourdieu and Foucault (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Hopf, 2002). The constructivist scholarship literature in international relations also acknowledges the existence and causal power in the construction of national identity by the state, while giving the primary role to intersubjective practices based on norms and ideas. And finally, the state itself performs as an actor in an international system and participates in relevant intersubjective practices leading to the construction of its identities and interests. As this dissertation is focused on the

interaction between states, the following sub-Chapter will review concepts of an identity of a nation-state and its causality with foreign policy as means of acting in the international system.

1.2. The relationship between national and state identity concepts. Implications for state's foreign policy

When looking at its roots, the appearance of national identity is a result of the establishment of nation-states. Although all nations are assumed to have a national identity, these identities may differ in their origin and intensity. Nations can generate their sense of identity from common language, geographic location, collective memory, cultural practices, religion, or a myth of common ancestry. However, while a polity has to meet a set of preconditions to construct a nation, a sense of national uniqueness is developed through the interaction with the outside world, particularly the acceptance or rejection of the Other. In this interaction, identity can shape the perception of the nation about the world and form the state's policy vis-à-vis neighbors (Prizel, 1998). Gradually, this term started acquiring political meaning – national identity started to be seen as one where political component constitutes the basis (Huntington, 2004). The political component of a national identity manifests through the existence of particular characteristics. One of the main characteristics is the national idea, which actively promotes the national identity construction and becomes essentially important in the times of crisis of national identity. Kamaludin Gadjiev (2011) explained that the main function of the national idea lays in defining the national identity among the variety of other nations. The national idea helps to overcome the 'identity crisis' that can destructively influence the character of national identity in general. It influences the specifics of political processes, which is reflected in programs of political parties or documents accepted by the Parliament. National identity is based on a certain vision of the world that is underpinned by the national idea and finds its outcomes in political projects, such as the national strategy of the state (Гаджиев, 2011).

Thus, the structure of the identity of a nation-state, as well as any other type of collective identity, includes perceptions about the antipode. Here, opposite to the concept of 'state's image' is the 'counter-image' aimed at the construction by the state of the negative image of its geopolitical opponent. Gadjiev (2011) wrote that the success of showing the positive image of the state to the world depends on the construction of a certain counter-image of real or potential geopolitical rival. This process is pursued through different methods and approaches, based on the set of contradistinctions, such as 'friend-enemy', 'us-them', 'our – foreign', etc. In this

context, the term 'enemy' bears certain political and ideological colors since its heavily linked to such concepts as 'contradiction', 'rivalry', 'conflict', 'aggression', 'fight', 'war', understood as the clash of politically organized contenting forces (Гаджиев, 2011). Carl Schmitt believed that this 'friend-enemy' pair had a fundamental nature for the political life of a nation as solving a deep existential problem of survival. It is understood as giving politics the existential dimension since theoretically, suggesting the possibility of war, the choice in the framework of this pair raises the problem of life and death (Miller, 1970).

This approach very much echoes the idea of David Campbell (1992) who thought that identity is reproduced when the ruling elite invents and exaggerates different threats in the 'discourse of danger' for the purpose of representing and hence producing 'Us' in relation to dangerous 'Them' (Campbell, 1992). But this would mean that the nation-building cannot be ever completed, as the existence and identity of the state have to be sustained by this 'discourse of danger'. It is hard to validate this point because the 'enemy-friend' pair as internal and external political necessity for the existence of a politically complete community is rather radical and has to be taken consciously, otherwise in the context of contradiction everyone can be assigned as an 'enemy', and no one – as a 'friend'. Do states really have to rely on the 'discourse of danger' as a foundation to maintain their very existence? In reality, not every foreign policy of the state that is employing the negative or dangerous image of the Other is actually pursuing the nation-building. It can simply pursue its understanding of legitimacy in the international system along with motivations to preserve power in such a system. Moreover, since states in their nature are able to develop a variety of nation-building policies, utilizing the 'discourse of danger' shall not play such a necessary existential role. While a war is a fastest and most effective method of generating national identities, the significant value shall be given to the prolonged contact with other cultures that constructs the perception about the Other. Such perceptions may also impact national identity from the inside, as the recognition of the influence of such contact may often be used by nationalist historians for the purpose of rebuilding the concept of national identity retrospectively and take forms of the revival of historical myths (Prizel, 1998). Therefore, while the root of national identity problemata is formed around the Self-Other collision, reflections of this collision can be found in both cultural and geopolitical dimensions.

Meanwhile, the role of the political aspect of the national identity reflected in the construction of an image of a nation-state reveals the weakness of 'identity' as a category of analysis in international relations due to the overlapping notion of national and state identity. So how can one distinguish between 'national identity' and 'state identity' in theory and

analysis? Some scholars write about ‘national identity’ as of something that is better described as ‘state identity’ (Berger, 1996). Others focus on both external and internal dimensions of identity (Banchoff, 1999). The literature body of critical constructivists pays more attention to the boundaries created by identity discourse, rather than to the actual definition or content of ‘state identity’ (Campbell, 1992; Berger, 1996; Banchoff, 1999; Alexandrov, 2003).

Maxim Alexandrov (2003) is a young scholar who focused particularly on finding definitions for the ‘state identity’ concept. As he puts it, the difference between ‘national’ and ‘state’ identity is that while shared norms and values of national identity bind the “imagined community” together and relate it to other nations, state identity understands the Other as an important element in sustaining the “We-ness” of the national community. Thus, the research on identity, whether it is perceived as ‘national’ or ‘state’ one, may not take this definitional divergence as a limitation, but rather as a supportive tool for a more focused research design. In such way, the difference between the two concepts is not fundamental; national and state identity will inevitably overlap at the level of a social collectivity of the nation, and the distinction will come as a result of different research and theoretical approaches and priorities across the political science. The research related to domestic politics, nationalism issues or conflicts based on ethnicity considers identity to be purely ‘national’, whereas the research on foreign policy or international relations tends to be more focused on external aspects of identity (Alexandrov, 2003). A simple etymological distinction between society and state brings out logical consequences. While a ‘nation’ is a name for a given community based on commonalities (ethnic, religious, etc.), ‘state’ pinpoints the political organization of a given society, which therefore allows building the distinction between national identity and state identity. Consequently, a state may be treated as an individual actor in a given system of international relations – an actor able to hold a set of identities – while at the same time its actorness essentially relies on the collective, national identity of the society, and is represented by state officers who are legitimate to communicate state identity at a given historical moment to other actors in the system. This process of interaction between states as holders of a set of identities represents another distinguishing area in the research on identity, specifically covered by constructivists.

The mainstream constructivist theory of Alexander Wendt (1999) explains that “states are people too”, meaning that they can be attributed with behavioral and cognitive properties of individuals. He calls identity “a relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” acquired by actors during participation in collective meanings, which proves the relational character of state identity (Wendt, 1992). There is a limit on how far the

analogy with individuals can be made, reflected in the differentiation between a corporate and social identity of the state. Wendt describes corporate identity as the identity of the state in its core as awareness about its existence represented in the combination of territory and population, linked to the challenge of self-recognition and revision of borders of the political community. Those borders are also a social construct and not necessarily are mapped or demarcated on the land. For example, identity borders of separated nations could be explained through the inclusion of diaspora. Social identity, in turn, represents the set of ideas that actor assigns to itself from the point of view of others as to the social object. In other words, the social identity includes types and roles self-attributed by the actor, such as “democratic state”, “leader of the third world countries”, “superpower”, “the victim of aggressor”, etc. (Wendt, 1994; Wendt, 1999).

Wendt’s strong criticism of the rational choice theory in international relations claims that the constructivist view of the state identity opens opportunities to integrate the changing interests of the actor into the research while putting identity in its core. In short, a “world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, is one in which “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992:183). In analyzing the feature that constitutes the state of nature before the interaction, he distances from the material substrate of an agent – organizational apparatus of governance of the state, seen as created by domestic society before members of the system enter the constitutive process of international society. Actors do not possess a defined ‘Self’ before interaction with the ‘Other’, hence survival in the form of the desire to preserve material basis depends on the evolvement of the Self. The process of defining situations opens a way for actors to define their interests. In fact, actors do not have a ready set of interests that they carry around independent of social context, and the basis for interests comes from identities (Wendt, 1992).

Wendt’s discussion further goes about how various kinds of anarchy are constructed during the interaction between states (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999). He argues that the prevailing of a certain kind of anarchy depends on the conceptions that security actors have, on how they construct their identity in relation to others. Understanding of security “differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the Self is identified cognitively with the Other, and it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends” (Wendt, 1992:399). Thus, if a state identifies positively with other states, the perception about a security threat appears not independently for each state but as a responsibility for all. Successful development of the collective self, therefore, will provide some level of altruistic and prosocial character in security practices (Wendt, 1992). As such, states may be willing to

engage in collective security practices to a different extent depending on where they will appear on the continuum from positive to negative identification with other states. The fundamental line here is that the interaction creates understandings about Self and Other and consequently establishes security interests (Wendt, 1999). In a similar fashion, Ted Hopf wrote that the strategic interest involves threats and opportunities and implies the danger to oneself and the opportunity to avert the danger through relation and collaboration with others. Economic interests, in his view, depend on the extent to which a state can profit from relations with another state, emphasizing that any interest in another state assumes some positive value in maintaining relations with that state (Hopf, 2002).

While pursuing goals by the state is conditioned by its particular identities and unique way of perceiving the reality, the anarchy of the international system is also perceived by each state in its own way. Different cultures of anarchy can co-exist as shared ideas in the collective identities of states. In this logic, foreign policy goals of the state are determined by ideational factors related to the culture of anarchy dominating in the given international system as a whole, or a region of the system, at a given time (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999). State interests are the product of the distribution of power resources in such a system and they reflect collective identities that may also change in the process of social interaction between states. A repeated interaction may also develop stable identities and expectations about each other, pushing actors to create and maintain social structures that consequently constrain choices (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002). The weakness here is that a pure collective identity is difficult to achieve due to egoistic identities among states. For example, the long-standing debate over the “European identity” comes out of the existence of multiple loyalties. However, if treating identities and interests as variables dependent on interaction, we can see collective action as a process of creating new definitions of Self (Wendt, 1994). According to Alberto Melucci (1995), collective identity is a common interactive definition formed by several individuals (or groups on a more complex level) connected through orientation of an action, and opportunities and limitations in which those actions are taking place (Melucci, 1995). Collective identities have been facilitating the construction of anarchy-free zones, or security communities in world politics, particularly in Europe for the last 60 years. For example, the failure of the EU to understand the Soviet Union and Russia, and the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, has resulted in their exclusion from Europe for centuries ahead. It is also evident today that the stronger the sense of European identity a state possesses, the more commitment can be expected for the deepening and broadening of cooperation with the EU (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012). As stated in the Hopf’s research on national identities, strength or weakness of European identities in the

fifteen post-Soviet republics defines their political and economic trajectories of development (Hopf and Bentley, 2016).

Apart from the systemic view of international order, when it comes to the interaction between states, the research inevitably comes to the reverse order when the ‘intersubjective knowledge’ on the collective identity in the society transforms into the formulation of the state’s foreign policy by representatives of this society. Scholarship of identity studies to a different extent have been showing a particular interest in the causality between national identity and foreign policy of the state (Bloom, 1990, Prizel, 1998; Hopf, 2002). William Bloom (1990) argued that the ongoing need for nation-building results in “national identity dynamic” which can often influence foreign policy (Bloom, 1990). Ilya Prizel (1998) wrote that the sense of nation and national identity, although sometimes emotional and irrational, plays a key role in the formation of a society’s perception of its environment and is extremely significant driving force behind the formation of state’s foreign policy, since national identity helps to identify the parameters of what a policy assumes its national interests domestically and abroad. As Prizel reasonably states, while national identity works as a primary link between individual and society, it also links the society and the world. Foreign policy here may serve as both the protector and the anchor of national identity by providing a political elite with a ready tool for political cohesion and mass mobilization. While the cohesion is an inevitable component of all functioning societies, all states often employ national identity for articulating their foreign policies and, on the other hand, find the foundation of their legitimacy in foreign policy (Prizel, 1998).

Elaboration of this scholarly view has led to the recent development of another identity concept – “foreign policy identity” (Tulmets; 2014, Цыфра, 2014; Маринин, 2014; Морозова, 2016). So far, this term is more often encountered as a separate concept in the Russian academic discourse and generally defined as the construction of ideas and perceptions, sometimes mythologized, about established or/and desired world order, about the place, role and status of the state in the world, its real and potential allies, rivals and enemies; it also includes the perception about the state by others, which is established through the analysis of the state’s foreign policy as formulated strategy of behavior in the international environment. (Цыфра, 2014; Морозова 2016). Morozova (2016) notes that foreign policy identity is a collective identity type that is fairly stable considering the historical memory and cultural-historical basis of a nation states, which means that foreign policy identity will not transform with changing external political circumstances but force the state to change its policy in accordance with new circumstances and traditional system of priorities (Morozova, 2016). However, one can observe

that this definition of another collective identity type fails to address several important aspects, such as the reflection of social collective identities, the selective feature of the historical memory, or the impact of interaction with other actors on the construction of such identity.

This concept did not receive much attention from Western scholars, with the exception of Elsa Tulmets (2014) who approached the construction of ‘foreign policy identity’ of a state by employing the role theory as a tool that allows finding the coherent element of foreign policy identity beyond the varying worldviews expressed by political parties. “Individual and collective actors do not have access to all information and cannot grasp every reason for a specific event, position or action. Therefore, they adopt a certain role in their interactions with other actors: national role conceptions are understood as domestically shared views and understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena” (Tulmets, 2014). Understandings of a role are described as the perception of an actor about his or her position vis-à-vis others as manifested through action and language. Therefore, role theory accepts the possibility of changes in roles and their activation under external pressure, which is usually made possible through learning and adaptation. Moreover, Tulmets (2014) highlights the importance of historical and socio-political contexts of foreign policy identities and behavior, in correlation with the social constructivist view (Tulmets, 2014). Still, it is questionable whether there is any practical need to elaborate the ‘foreign policy identity’ concept as it is correlating to a large extent with what was previously defined as ‘state identity’. Considering the overlapping notions of national and state identity, the introduction of a separate concept related to foreign policy can simply lead to more confusion in finding the balance between the dimensions of collective, national and state.

Essentially, constructivism emphasizes the context of the interaction and the role of other actors as a crucial element to consider in the analysis of identity (re-) construction, as the external Other is able to not only shape both national and state identity, but also impact the definition of a state’s national interest, and consequently, constrain foreign policy choices. At this point, this dissertation seeks to take a closer look at the role of Russia in the formation of Polish national identity.

1.3. Russia in Polish national identity

Despite the fact that Russia, along with Germany, is traditionally mentioned as a significant Other in the construction of Polish national identity, the body of scientific literature appears to be quite limited. In studying external influences on the Polish identity, scholars tend

to show more interest in analyzing the influence of Western institutions, the EU and NATO. Still, existing literature provides valuable insights for understanding Poland's identity in relation to Russia. As argued by Mayblin et.al (2016), modern ideas of Polishness and otherness when analyzing particular features of Polish national identity shall be viewed in terms of a 'triple relation' based on three key external influences. It combines the perception of Poland as a former colony in relation to Russian Empire and Soviet domination, as a former colonizer of other Eastern European nations, and thirdly, in relation to Western powers. The position of Poland within this discursive framing is not just an 'inbetweenness' [between East and West]; those three aspects operate in parallel leading to complex and contradictory manifestations of the outcomes of competing discourses, racial and social hierarchies, spheres of influence, distinctions between the Self and the Other, and between 'insider' and 'outsider' (Mayblin, et.al, 2016).

Russia's role in the construction of Polish national identity is largely the outcome of the history of multiple phases of colonial domination in Poland, and particularly the times of 'independence-in-domination' by Russia in the 20th Century. Russia plays a role of a unifying threat in Polish national identity and one of the most popular anxieties in Russian-Polish relations is the perception of Russia as a threat that was hugely reinforced in times of the Second World War and further communicated to younger generations of Poles. As specified by Tomasz Zarycki (2004), in the domestic policy, the main function of the Russian threat is the integration of Poles. Even in the absence of an actual danger, the image of the neighbor, built on the historical memory, serves as a fundamental means of legitimizing the Polish national identity and Polish national state institutions necessary for protecting the people from a common enemy (Zarycki, 2004). Poles are extremely sensitive to narratives about Russian expansionism that poses a threat not just for Poland but for Europe as a whole, which is influenced by a constant flow of commentaries and news in the Polish media about Russian imperial tendencies in the east (Mach, 2000; Zarycki, 2004; Zarycki 2010). Sometimes it is even argued that the negative attitude towards Russians is the "glue that holds Polish identity together" (Mayblin et.al, 2016). In the post-1989 Poland, the Russian threat has been framed by the popular press as an issue of Poland's dependency on Russian gas supplies, and more recently took the form of conspiracy theories around the presidential plane crash in Smolensk in 2010 that happened in a close proximity to the place symbolizing the martyrdom of Poles during the Second World War (Mayblin, et.al, 2016); the threat perception about Russia was also hugely reinforced with the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 and further annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014.

In addressing this sense of threat, multiple negative representations about Russians were formed, such as being ‘backward’, ‘less civilized’ or ‘less advanced’ from the perspective of the Western narrative on modernity based on the respect to international law, democracy, and human rights. Russian influences are perceived as predominantly negative if not highly destructive, while positive cases are just exceptions (Zarycki, 2004; Mayblin et.al, 2016). Here the perception of Russia in Poland fits well into the well-known East-West opposition, one of the greatest metanarratives of the European continent. This topic is specifically discussed in the work of Andrew Wise (2011) where he explains the role of Russia as Poland’s civilizational Other. Wise describes the Orientalizing approach taken by Polish historians, expressed in the East-West dichotomies, where the East is portrayed as a “metaphysical evil and a symbol of menace for their culture” (Wise, 2011). In demonstrating the East-West civilizational divide as the divide between Russia and Poland, Polish scholars, as he says, “appeared as culturalists, who claim to preserve the original purity of their identity from external pollution and the aggressions of the Other, if need be by reconstituting, in an authoritarian manner, ‘their’ culture. Many polish historians thus constructed binaries that essentialized Russians and Poles as belonging to different worlds” (Wise, 2011:74-75). Rejection of the eastern, in particular, Russian, heritage seems to be one of the most characteristic traits of Polish national identity. Interestingly, this Orientalizing perspective about the ‘destructive’ Other was also transferred on the regions of Poland that were governed by Russia in the times of partition, while lands governed by Prussia and Austro-Hungary are perceived as prosperous and modernized regions (Zarycki, 2010; Mayblin, et.al, 2016).

Scholars focusing on Polish national identity observe, that such attitudes towards Eastern neighbors clearly represents the sense of ‘superiority’, which, on the other hand, is often associated with the ‘imperial complex’ of Poles (Zarycki, 2004; Wise 2011; Mayblin et.al, 2016). This sense feeds primarily on memories of the glorious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 16-18th Centuries that incorporated territories of western Ukraine, western Belarus and eastern Latvia (Mayblin, et.al., 2016). Although an attachment to these historical images was cooled in times of the non-existence of the Polish state, it manifests itself in an active appeal to history as a means of maintaining the Polish national identity. In contemporary Poland, although territorial ambitions were abandoned, the idea of Poland having a special status on the international arena, and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, is alive and clearly evident across the Polish elite (Zarycki, 2004). The loss of territories in the East, colloquially named ‘Eastern Borderlands’ has gradually led to the emergence of a nostalgic and idealizing discourse build upon mythologies of a ‘lost homeland’, particularly

manifested in a patronizing, and often arrogant attitude to the Eastern neighbors, especially to those who historically were part of the first Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, the Eastern Borderlands narrative reflects itself in the emotional attachment to ‘lost homeland’ and responsibility which, in turn, constructs a self-image of Poland as a country with a ‘civilizing mission’ in Eastern Europe, a country that could teach these regions how to become European (Tulmets, 2014; Mayblin, et.al, 2016).

Thus, Russia’s role of the oppressor in Polish history serves as one of the foundations in the victimization-based identity of Poland, which, in turn, is being used for “justifying Poland’s moral high ground in its relations with East and West” (Zarycki, 2010). The longer the list of suffering, the more justified the moral superiority of Poland. The suffering and losses of Poles are primarily described in moral and cultural terms with an emphasis on losses of cultural capital. In this context, the Katyn massacre became a central symbol of the suffering of the Poles brought by Russia. Moreover, it has to be specified that the West is also blamed for Poland’s miseries brought under the Soviet rule because of passing Poland to Moscow in Yalta and Potsdam – the argument used for highlighting the ‘debt’ that the West has to return to Poland (Zarycki, 2004). The myriad sacrifices Poland experienced in its history has led to the formulation of the perception about Russia as an area of exclusive expertise of Poles based on a firsthand knowledge about the ‘nature of Russia’. Poland’s Europeanness, on the other hand, gives it a unique status for expressing a special knowledge about the East, since it is both Slavic and Catholic nation. While the first serves for a deeper understanding of the Russian nation, the latter proves Poland’s belonging to Western Europe and Christianity. These specific characteristics of the Polish state are often used by the elite in order to build an image of Poland as a bridging state between Russia and the West (Zarycki 2004, Wise 2011).

Meanwhile, scholars argue that the “Polish superiority complex toward the East cannot be analyzed apart from the context of Polish inferiority complex toward the West” (Zarycki 2004; Wise 2011, Mayblin et.al 2016) and that the first is a function of the latter. It means, that while the arrogance towards the East has own historical roots, it is largely stimulated by a strong ‘inferiority’ complex towards the West. Tomasz Zarycki (2004) explains that from a geopolitical point of view, one can observe a post-colonial (particularly post-communist) syndrome of the loss of illusions in Poland typical for countries experiencing liberation from external dependence, previously considered to be the key factor hindering social and economic development. The ‘inferiority complex’ of Poland as a periphery state is defined through the prism of a structural economic weakness in relation to ‘geographic center’. Different economic development compared to the so-called ‘center’ causes the emergence of self-images in the

symbolic and discursive sphere, while forming the perception of backwardness and inferiority in relation to it. The 'inferiority complex' brings out the feeling of a psychological discomfort due to confrontation of political, economic and social influences: higher standards of living and socio-economic development in the 'center' compared to deeply-rooted structural problems in periphery states. Overcoming the inferiority complex seems to be one of the biggest challenges faced by any periphery and its elite in particular, hence making the lack of respect from the 'center' and the painful feeling of weakness a significant issue in political and economic management of states, development of long-term political strategies, exchange of ideas and negotiation of identities. Finding ways of controlling this effect of relative deprivation is the main task for the elite, achieved mainly through symbolic means in order to provide stability of the social system (Zarycki, 2004).

Within the context of Polish inferiority complex, the key role of Russia in the Polish political discourse is that of changing the scale of Poland's weakness, meaning that it allows to decrease the scope of own problems such as poverty, corruption, backwardness, and weak civil society so that it appears to be not distant from European context compared to the high scale of Russia's socio-economic and political underdevelopment. On the other hand, it allows the Polish elite not to hide or forget about the state's problems, which is necessary from the point of view of credibility. Comparison of weaknesses in relation with Russia as some significant Other serves for strengthening the self-confidence of Poles in communication with foreigners and for healing their frustrations at home that come from a negative perception about the state of Poland's economic, societal and political institutions. Thus, when the Polish media paints the state of affairs in Poland in negative colors, in the search of reasons or someone to blame, depending on ideological sympathies of a particular media source, looking to the East appears to be the simplest consolation. As Zarycki writes, this is why the Polish media are so willing to write about mistakes or weaknesses of Russia (Zarycki, 2004).

Furthermore, another representation of the 'inferiority complex', is that in the post-1989 Poland, when independence brought a chance to re-establish relations with the East and the West, the prevailing modernization discourse of 'transition' was positioning Poland as 'lagging behind the capitalist West'. Along with the feeling of being excluded from the European integration after the Second World War, it reinforced the ideology of 'catching up' and led to a wider acceptance of external influences through taking on the recipient role, and consequently resulted in the recreation of East-West division (Tulmets, 2014; Mayblin, et.al, 2016) The analysis of Polish identity made by Elsa Tulmets (2014) emphasizes that after 1989, Poland was largely constructing its identity against over 40 years of the communist past. It is also often

argued that the image of a potential threat from Russia lies at the heart of Polish foreign policy in the post-Communist period, particularly joining the EU and NATO. While the first was perceived through developing the discourse of ‘return to Europe’ or ‘coming back to modernity’ with a set of values and norms; the latter was seen as a way of preventing instability coming from the East and thus stabilizing the region by reinforcing freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and the common heritage of the Western civilization (Tulmets, 2014).

This Chapter sought to set the research presented in this dissertation within the field of existing literature on national and state identity in order to establish a theoretical framework for the analysis of the role of Russia as a significant Other in the shaping of Poland’s identity. In unfolding both identity concepts, the common denominator says that it is not only the ‘political’ that has to be considered, but its evolving configuration with the cultural-historical basis of a nation-state, which points to a rather inseparable relationship between ‘national’ and ‘state’ identity conceptions. Furthermore, the relationship between national identity and foreign policy proves to be highly dialectic – while national identity is not a constant concept, it is constantly redefined and foreign policy plays an important role in this redefinition process. In such a process, a key importance is given to the interaction with the Other that influences patterns of change and continuity of national and/or state identity, stabilizing certain identity components, constructing new perceptions about the collective Self and consequently establishing interests, assigning roles and behaviors along certain lines.

The construction of Polish national identity has historically been connected to its peripheral location between Eastern and Western civilizations. It is not only this ‘inbetweenness’ of Poland that has been creating challenges, but also its complex history of being a strong state in relation to Eastern Neighbors, being colonized by its stronger neighbors, and then trying to reconstruct the vision of Self by means of ‘returning’ to the Western civilization. This makes the research on the role of Russia as the external Other in Polish national identity interesting and complex at the same time. It is surprising, therefore, that existing literature appears to be rather limited. Firstly, the role of Russia is specifically studied mostly with regards to the ‘national identity’ concept, with a major focus on the historical periods of occupation and colonization of Poland reflected in seeing Russia as a threat. This approach largely fails to reflect theoretically and analytically upon the processes of formulation and transformation of state identity and interests as a distinct area of the research in international relations. Secondly, the state of Polish-Russian relations in the modern period of 2000s is mostly covered from the perspective of the post-1989 transformations in Poland reflected in distancing from the communist past and constructing the new European and Euroatlantic

identities, while the impact of such high-profile events as the presidential airplane crash in Smolensk and the annexation of Crimea by Russia are either barely covered or simply ignored. This dissertation is built upon the assumption that both of these events had a strong influence not only on the state Polish-Russian relations but also could potentially reveal transformations and reinforcement of Poland's identity which opens the area for this research.

1.4. Theoretical framework

This dissertation seeks to employ the theory of constructivism to address research questions and track the impact of Russia on the construction of Poland's identity. As outlined in the previous Chapter, constructivism emphasizes the role of ideational variables in social processes, pointing out that behavior can be shaped by value-based ideas constructed and reproduced during human interaction. There is a precedent for applying constructivism in the study of Polish foreign policy based on its causality with the national identity. Joanna Gorska (2010) wrote that ideational factors are of a causal importance for Polish foreign policy, as "both Polish national identity and the ideological basis of the country's foreign policy are heavily permeated and conditioned by the historical inheritance" (Gorska 2010). Constructivism allows treating identity as an independent variable in the research hence making it possible to identify identity-derived ideas about the existential Other, seen in Russia. Moreover, empirical data in relation to Polish national identity proves that it can play an explanatory function in understanding the subjective determinants of foreign policy. In her study, 'ideas' are treated as building blocks of national identity while being defined as beliefs and concepts that "derive from actors' interpretation of history and provide them with a framework that specifies "proper" and "improper" behavior vis-à-vis other actors in the system" (Gorska 2010). Application of the constructivist theory underlines that national (or state) identity and identity-derived ideas aren't simply rooted in internal properties of the actor, but exist in relation to Others, with Russia commonly referred as the constituting Other for Poland (Prizel, 1998; Zarycki, 2004).

The national identity concept is also closely related to the collective memory of a polity, and due to the selective features of a memory, it becomes important to consider who possesses the custodianship of that memory. Thus, with the change of the custodian of national identity, perceptions of the past, and consequently the parameters of the national interest, change as well. Policy priorities, decisions, behavior, and identity are not established in a vacuum but given in a specific historical past, specific social and political context, within a surrounding of actors, a

certain amount of information available and the happening of particular events (Prizel, 1998; Tulmets, 2014). Based on the notion that interest of actors is defined through the process of defining situations (Wendt, 1994), the analysis Chapter will examine results of the discourse analysis of foreign policy discussions in the Polish Parliament (Sejm).

In the interpretation of analysis results, this dissertation finds useful Joanna Gorska's notion of 'commonality' and 'specificity' of identity-derived ideas to be applied across the Polish political spectrum as tools for evaluating the strength of certain identities in foreign policy. While 'commonality' describes the degree to which certain ideas are internalized by the actor in the relevant social system, 'specificity' refers to the extent to which those ideas actually define limits of permissible or inadmissible behavior. In this logic, constructivism would say that the more specific and widely shared are ideas about Russia within the context of an issue under consideration, the greater will be their impact on the foreign policy of Poland in that issue-area (Gorska 2010).

Chapter 2. Parliamentary discourse as representation of identity – empirical assumptions.

2.1. Annexation of Crimea and Smolensk plane crash as the representative cases

As outlined in the Chapter One, in the existing research on Poland's identity in the foreign policy domain Russia is mainly mentioned with negative connotations of historical memory and within the context of distancing from the communist past while constructing new European and Euroatlantic identities. The literature has widely overlooked the 'Eastern dimension' of identity construction in the post-1989 Poland where Polish-Russian relations were tested by several high-profile events, such as the crash of the Polish presidential airplane in Russia in 2010 and the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 that was followed by the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This dissertation seeks to address this oversight by focusing on these events for two main reasons. Firstly, the contextual background of these events allows examining Poland's relations with Russia from the perspective of periods of improvement and deterioration. Secondly, particular features of these events reflect on internal and external inputs involving 'Russia' which allows examining the research problem on different levels.

With regards to the tragedy in Smolensk, its importance and influence on representations of Russia may be two-fold and reflected in both internal and external areas. Firstly, the tragedy happened against the background of the historical reconciliation process between Poland and Russia with a new paradigm in Poland's Russia policy launched by Donald Tusk – 'to deal with Russia as it is' – dated back to 2008. Significantly, this normalization happened after and despite the Russian aggression in Georgia same year, which, considering the negative perceptions about Russia, was supposed to either deteriorate relations and threaten Poland's identity even more. Secondly, the reconciliation was commonly described with a changing discussion tone regarding historical issues between high-ranked politicians about the mass murder of Polish officers by NKVD in 1940 in Katyń - the symbol of the martyrdom of Poles in times of the Second World War. By a tragic coincidence, when 96 Polish high-ranking political and military officials, senior members of the Polish clergy and relatives of victims of the Katyń massacre were heading to commemorate this event, the airplane crashed in a close proximity to Katyń – the Russian town called Smolensk. It obviously had a strong psychological impact on Poles and influenced Polish home affairs with a strong Russian symbolic connotation. Thirdly, as numerous surveys show, following the tragedy, public opinion about Russia in Poland was mostly positive, which potentially created a political momentum for Poland to

enhance the course on normalization, hence opening unprecedented opportunities for Polish-Russian relations (Tucker, 2010). However, and fourthly, despite the reconciliation background at that time, eight years later the investigation of the crash remains to be an unresolved issue in Russian-Polish relations and Poland still seeks justice (www.polandinenglish.info a), which highlights the interest for the research.

The second event under examination is the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. The impact of this event is undeniable in terms of changing the security environment of Poland and reinforcing negative representations about Russia. Firstly, Russia's aggressive foreign policy actions in the Ukrainian conflict are described by Poland as the violation of the fundamental values of the international law, such as inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and abstention from the use of force, which undermined the whole system of international relations (www.msz.gov.pl). For Poland, as a state historically experiencing security challenges from external powers, the diversion of Russian policy towards revisionism and the use of military force made concerns about the threat of Russia's neo-imperialism and militarism genuine. Interestingly, it also gave way for re-articulating the discourse about the Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008. Of almost prophetic nature were now words addressed by President Lech Kaczynski to Georgian people in Tbilisi when the conflict erupted: "Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow – the Baltic States and later, perhaps, time will come for my own country, Poland" (www.polandinenglish.info b). Secondly, the annexation of Crimea revealed the asymmetric character of Polish-Russian relations in terms of capacities, military and economic potential, national interest and the vision of the international security architecture (Buras and Balcer, 2016). The worsened security environment consequently tested the strength and belief of Poland in its security alliances and thus had an impact on its self-positioning as an actor in the international system. Such a high influence of this event is particularly interesting for the research on identity as reinforcing the processes of othering and sameness in the formulation of Poland's identity. And thirdly, since its accession to the EU in 2004, one of the key priorities for Poland has been developing the EU's Eastern policy in which Ukraine has been a cornerstone. Poland's missionary ambitions in the East, rooted in its national identity, contributed to the vision that democratization and stabilization of Ukraine and its inclusion in the European community is a key factor for providing security on Polish borders. Therefore, Ukraine became a point of rivalry in Polish-Russian relations represented not just in the fight for the sphere of influence but rather in an essential 'clash of civilizations' as being dragged by Poland into the Western value system,

while Russia sees Ukraine as sharing the same civilizational, political and cultural sphere (Kaminska 2007; Dudek 2016; Bieńczyk-Missala 2016).

Examination of the rhetoric around the Smolensk tragedy and the annexation of Crimea, therefore, is assumed to reveal the production of discourses used for construction and reconstruction of certain identities of the Polish state along the lines of improvement and deterioration of Polish-Russian relations. The research as framed within the constructivist theory claims that state identity reflects the environment a state acts in, which makes the study of both events relevant for addressing the research questions. As outlined in the Chapter One, the role of Russia in the construction of Polish identity influences both domestic integration processes and international representation of Poland. While the Presidential airplane tragedy is considered as an internally influencing factor loaded with symbolic connotations about Russia, the Crimean crisis represents an external factor where Russia played the main active role. Thus, an additional value of such approach is the comparison of internal and external inputs involving 'Russia' which allows testing the strength of the 'Russian aspect' in identity discourse and the functionality of Polish anti-Russian prejudice in Polish politics.

2.2. Discourse – historical approach as a research method

Motivated to explore the role of Russia in the shaping of Poland's identity, this dissertation draws on political parties as the main platform for debating political demands of the democratic state and focuses on the analysis of Russia's representations in the Polish parliamentary discourse on foreign policy. The analysis, therefore, incorporates primary sources in the form of transcripts of sittings at the Polish Parliament chosen according to their relevance to foreign policy and both events under study. They were analyzed in original language, Polish, which allowed a more clear and in-depth understanding of linguistic and other semiotic practices in the discourse formation and reproduction. The secondary set of data consists of academic books and articles used for widening the contextual understanding of issues explored and providing more comprehensive explanations of the role of Russia as a significant other in the construction of identity in Poland.

Building upon the data extracted from sittings in the Sejm, it is necessary to briefly draw attention on some characteristics of the Polish party system. The development of the democratic party system in Poland began with the semi-free elections of June 1989 and since then political groupings have been the main actor to influence foreign and security policies with their political actions and ideologies. There are two main subjective factors in Poland's political environment

that must be considered because they inevitably shape the research design later on. Firstly, one of the most typical features of political parties in Poland is their instrumentalization of ideology in their communication which creates difficulties for linking it with the actual state's activity. Therefore, in Polish political discourse ideology plays a significant role, while it is of less importance in terms of political action (Raś, 2017). Secondly, political parties' approaches and attitudes to ideology are subject to constant change, hence it is difficult to employ them in the form of stable variables. Each political party with its messages and ideology is in the ongoing process of definition and redefinition in the actual politics (Husák et.al, 2012).

Thus, the in-depth attention to the development of the Polish political parties and their ideologies can lead to analytical omissions in addressing the main research question. For this reason, party ideologies were taken into consideration as an important background information while the main focus of the analysis was not investigating ideological differences between actors engaged in the political discourse but identifying common or differing patterns and their strength in representations of Russia as a significant Other during parliamentary discussions. Political representatives that participated in parliamentary debates, in this case, are treated as holders of Polish national identity, hence they are assumed to carry certain attitudes to Russia characteristic for Polish national identity in general. They are also treated as representatives of the Polish political elite, as members of collective groupings able to shape Polish political discourse on state identity while having direct access to foreign and security policy discussions.

The constructivist approach taken in this dissertation highlights the importance of competing and dominating discursive formations developed during the participation of actors in collective meanings (Hopf, 2002; Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1994; Wendt, 1999). While it is impossible to grasp identities as a coherent structure, scholars engaged in the constructivist research on national and state identity tend to focus on the analysis of the multiplicity of discourses where the discourse analysis methodology is almost universally applied (Zehfuss, 2001; Bukh, 2009; Wodak et.al, 2009; Tulmets, 2014; Mayblin et.al, 2016). Across the variety of discourse analysis approaches, this dissertation utilizes the discourse-historical approach developed by Ruth Wodak (2009) as a category of Critical Discourse Analysis. A particular value of this methodology is driven by its problem-oriented character which allows integrating the body of available information on the historical background in which discursive 'events' are framed. DHA also allows for the analysis of the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring how particular genres of discourse can be subject to diachronic change. And moreover, DHA treats the data not simply as a body of information but allows integrating social theories in order to explain the context of the situation. Ideology represents another important

dimension for DHA. The methodology treats ideologies as “important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse: for example, by establishing hegemonic identity narratives or by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres (“gate-keeping”)” (Wodak et.al, 2009). One of the purposes of DHA is so-called “demystification’ of the hegemony of specific discourses through interpretation of ideologies. In this way DHA allows the research to be focused on linguistic and other semiotic practices as means for mediating and reproducing ideologies in social institutions.

The first stage of the analysis in this dissertation was aimed at collecting the primary data by means of the “MAXQDA” software designed for qualitative and quantitative analysis in social sciences. Firstly, I took all transcripts of parliamentary sittings in Poland within the period of three months before and after the day of each event under study: the 10th of April 2010 for the airplane crash in Smolensk, and the 18th of March 2014 as the actual date of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. It ensured incorporation of the textual data within the half-year period for each event; the period considered to be relevant for tackling the dynamics of discourses existing within the closest proximity, and hence under the strongest influence, of the event. Those transcripts were then uploaded in the software in order to retrieve and extract relevant textual data based on the search by keywords: “Rosja” (eng. Russia), “Federacja Rosyjska” (eng. Russian Federation), “Rosyjski” (eng. Russian), “Putin”, “Miedwiediew” (end. Medvedev), “Kremlin”, “Moskwa” (eng. Moscow), and additionally, “Ukraina” (eng. Ukraine), “Gruzja” (eng. Georgia).

As the gathered data was acknowledged with, the choice of texts was further narrowed down according to thematic relevance to foreign policy dimension. Hence, for example, if the context of a text was related to administrative issues, such as for example, border control aspects, and was only mentioning Russia to a negligible extent, the text was discarded. I ended up collecting 43 textual units in the form of speeches made by different Polish politicians from a range of political parties which was considered sufficient for the analysis of the Parliamentary discourse in a given context. The analysis covered 10 textual units related to the period before the tragedy in Smolensk and 6 units in the period after. In the case of the annexation of Crimea, 16 textual units were related to the period before the annexation and 11 units to the period after. Notably, many textual units were coming from the same Parliamentary transcripts, which is explained by the focus of the discussion on the Polish foreign policy in these particular sittings. However, this aspect became an advantage, since it also provided more background on the actual character of social and ideological interaction between political representatives in the Parliament and structural shaping of discourses.

The second stage of the analysis involved familiarization with the data in order to search for patterns describing perceptions about Russia across the parliamentary discourse. By reading and re-reading texts, I identified repeated ideas and was able to categorize the topical derivation of discourses about Russia in relation to issues discussed. This made the analysis deductive in terms of constructing a general overview of perceptions about the Other and patterns of ‘commonality’ and ‘specificity’ in identity-derived ideas across the political spectrum in Poland. As the primary data was analyzed in the Polish language, the most representative and relevant quotes from political speeches were then translated from Polish into English and included in the dissertation for the purpose of empirical representation of the research findings.

The third stage was focused on a more thorough analysis of specific discourses with regards to discursive construction and representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in texts. The aim of this part of the research was to unfold strategies of argumentation based on Wodak’s categorization in DHA. Ruth Wodak draws a special attention on the set of five questions helping to frame the DHA. Those include:

1. What names and linguistic references are assigned to persons, objects, events, processes, and actions?
2. How are social actors, objects, events and processes characterized and described?
3. What arguments are used in the discourse under study?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, characteristics, and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances expressed explicitly? Are they intensified or alleviated?

These questions established the direction for analysis and served for unfolding discursive strategies understood as a relatively intentional plan of practices adopted for achieving particular political, social, psychological and linguistic goals. The discursive formation of national identity in DHA distinguishes different types of strategies on macro-level. Constructive strategies are the most comprehensive ones as they attempt to establish/construct a certain national identity through promoting unification, identification, solidarity, or differentiation. Perpetuation strategies are aimed at maintaining and reproducing threatened national identity through preserving, supporting or protecting it. Transformation strategies serve their purpose in transforming a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity, where a speaker is supposed to conceptualize the contours of a new identity. And finally, there are destructive/ dismantling strategies that have a goal to

dismantle some parts of an existing national identity while being unable to offer a new identity model for replacing the old one (Wodak et.al, 2009).

The application of the DHA methodology in this way allowed the problem to be researched from two perspectives. On the one hand, it helped to track which particular foreign policy areas the role of Russia was the most sensitive for Polish politicians. Moreover, it allowed for the unfolding of whether this sensitiveness was represented particularly toward Russia or, in turn, toward other actors while Russia was playing a positive or negative ‘intermediary’ function. Considering that the textual data were extracted on the principle ‘before’ and ‘after’ the event, it allowed me to see which discourses were prevailing/ more stable and which appeared/disappeared with the changing environment. On the other hand, exploring strategies of argumentation in these discourses ensured making more concrete judgments of dynamics and features of Poland’s self-representation in relation to Russia as a significant Other. This dissertation includes the analytical representation of the discursive construction of Poland's image by Polish politicians based on empirical data translated from Polish language and provided in the Appendixes.

Chapter 3. Critical discourse analysis of parliamentary debates in Poland: Russia and Polish state identities.

3.1. Topicality and rhetoric of the discourse before the TU-154 plane crash

The analysis of parliamentary discussions mentioning Russia before the presidential airplane crash in Smolensk reflects the notion of ‘triple relation’ in the Polish national identity, developed by the scholarship (Zarycki, 2004; Mayblin, et.al, 2016). The topicality of discourses identified included: relations with Russia from the perspective of historical rapprochement and the issue of energy dependence on Russia, the role of Poland in the context of EU Eastern Policy development, and the role of Poland in the context of US/NATO-Russia relations.

The context of discussions was framed around the rapprochement process in Polish-Russian relations, however, discourses varied in the continuum from positive to negative across Polish party representatives. Notably, developing positive relations with Russia was of a particular importance for the governing Civic Platform (PO) that took the course on building trust with Poland’s neighbors.

It is necessary to emphasize once again [...] that we [the PO government] did everything we could in order to improve relations with Germany and Russia based on mutual trust. We tried to repair the damages caused by the previous government. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 19.3.2010).

The cooperation with Russia in the Sejm was discussed from several perspectives. Firstly, in the light of an increased dialogue on historical issues and the memory of Katyn, the attention was given to possible prospects of further cooperation and thus formulated the positive discourse of ‘hope’, while at the same time revealing the victimization-based identity of Poland in relation to Russia. Thus, according to Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of PO:

Speaking of relations with Russia, we can see that despite the improvement in the last dozen or so months, they are still burdened with tragic historical matter. [...] Our Polish and Russian approach to the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre is a test of how our relations have normalized. Yesterday, we witnessed the historic moment when the prime ministers of Poland and Russia shared the memory of the victims of the Stalinist regime. [...] We are in

favor of depoliticising the Katyn problem and other white and black spots in the history of Polish-Russian relations. [...] The group of eminent historians and experts contributed to the introduction of a historical discussion on the paths of dialogue and the search for the truth. That was our long way of reconciliation with Germany, so it must also be with the Russians. Bearing in mind remarkable statements, critical of Stalinism, recently articulated by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, I believe that further gestures and actions are possible. We want better economic, cultural and scientific cooperation with Russia. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Representatives of the ‘center’ and the ‘left-wing’ in the Polish Sejm also favored Polish-Russian cooperation. MP Marek Wikinski from Lewica⁴ mentioned that having a *powerful Russia* and a *powerful Germany* as neighbors required building policy of interaction, without daily withdrawals to controversial issues:

Instead of seeking alleged threats, Poland must, through its diplomatic activity, find ways of peaceful cooperation. It is strange that we need to be aware of it today. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Bogdan Lis from SD noted that the success of Polish diplomacy depended on the normalization of the dialogue with Russia:

This is just the beginning of the path to cooperation, but it is undoubtedly the march to continue. Meeting in Katyn allows to hope that the most difficult issues in our relations will find their solution (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

However, discussion of historical rapprochement included the negative/ critical discourse as well, mostly as a counter-opinion coming from the oppositional right-wing PiS party. Thus, PiS MP Grażyna Gęsicka expressed an opinion that:

[The foreign policy paradigm] did not impress Russia which treated Poland as a secondary partner. [...] the speech of Vladimir Putin dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the 2nd World War at Westerplatte was in fact not addressed to Poles, but to his own nation and Germans, while ignoring the role of Poland and the “Solidarity” movement. [In Putin's invitation to the Polish Prime Minister to celebrate the 70th Katyn crime

⁴ Left-wing political party in Poland.

anniversary] there was no mentioning of the term 'crime', no request for forgiveness and no declaration of joint use of archives. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

In a similar vein, PiS MP Karol Kaski said:

[T]he Russian prime minister does not deny today that the Katyn crime was committed by the Soviet Union, although the participation of the Soviet authorities in this murder was confirmed by the USSR itself before its collapse, and later by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. The breakthrough would be the word "sorry" that would fall on the Russian side. It did not fall, however. We also did not disclose all the documents of the crime. (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

At the same time, the analysis showed a rather consequential relationship between the increased cooperation with Russia and prospects for development of the Eastern Partnership as a way to increase Poland's role on the international arena. It was represented through the prism of Poland's self-vision of having the leading responsibility for the EU Eastern policy, based on its exclusive knowledge of the East. Here again, the positive discourse was a prerogative of the governing PO, or 'center' and 'left-wing' parties. Thus, Marek Borowski from SDPL noted that:

Changes in Russia's attitude to Poland were caused by the strengthening of Poland's position in the EU, [because] the road to Moscow, contrary to the map, led and leads through Brussels. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

MP Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz-Deresz from Lewica, while recognizing the Katyn discussions as an *important changing point in Polish-Russian relations*, said:

We will not change our geographical position in Europe and a significant part of our leaders see a constant serious threat in Moscow, and the world starts to gaze at our Russophobia with astonishment. Does the Polish right-wing part need Moscow as terrible and evil? We forget or pretend that we don't know that Russia is one of our main economic partners and it is time to build relations with Russia based on mutual trust. Implementation of our flagship, Partnership, is impossible without cooperation with Russia. [...] Truth is, that we need to understand: the better our relations with Russians are, the more we will be appreciated in

the international arena as a serious country able to negotiate and present EU interests in the East (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

According to Bogdan Lis from SD:

After democratic elections in Ukraine, Poland should confirm its willingness to be Ukraine's ambassador to the European Union, of course if Ukraine so wishes. Undoubtedly, success includes establishing a dialogue with Russia (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

MP Marek Krzakała, the member the governing PO, highlighted the following:

Reconciliation is important because it allows current policy to focus on the challenges of the future and the common shaping of European policy, while not forgetting the important role played by historical politics. [...] The Eastern Neighborhood launched in 2004 can serve for the development of cooperation with both Germany and Russia, and in a long-perspective, solutions developed between the states could become a source of new initiatives for the whole EU. (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

However, the oppositional right-wing, again, expressed rather critical opinions about the perspective of cooperation with Russia within the Eastern Partnership, seeing EU-Russia cooperation as decreasing Poland's influence on this policy. According to the PiS MP Grażyna Gęsicka, Poland did not become the patron and promoter of the EU Eastern policy, because:

Relations with Russia are still the domain of large European Union countries, especially Germany. Russia itself showed considerable reluctance towards the initiative. President Dmitry Medvedev said in May 2009 [that] he was worried that some countries [were] trying to use this structure as a partnership against Russia. (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

According to the PiS MP Karol Karski, the Eastern Partnership reduced the influence of Poland on EU-Russia relations:

[The EaP] has no real impact on shaping the European Union's policy towards Russia. There is no longer an Eastern policy of the European Union, there is a policy towards Russia and a policy towards the rest of the nearby post-Soviet area. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Poland's positioning between 'East' and 'West' was perceived not only through the prism of EU-Russia relations, but also in the context of improving contacts between NATO and Russia. Notably, Poland was dependent on the pace of this cooperation because at that time it was discussing the stationing of NATO missile systems on its lands, which was negatively interpreted by Russia – thus, the cooperation between NATO/US was rather a tricky topic in terms of security, creating both challenges and opportunities. Poland's official position was expressed by Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

We are seeking to increase the American presence in Poland. [...] This will also be favored by the negotiation of an anti-missile agreement with the new architecture of the missile defense system. [...] We look realistically at the possibilities of the US in terms of continuing the current global policy, in particular towards our region. Congratulations to the United States and Russia for signing today in Prague an agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. I hope that the next step will be to reduce the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, especially those close to our borders (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

According to the MP Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz-Deresz from Lewica:

It is a time to take a quick advantage out of improving relations between Washington and Moscow [...] The head of American diplomacy said that the United States wants Russian-NATO cooperation that will bring concrete results and bring NATO and Russia closer together. It is hard not to notice that a new climate was created in the world, which should encourage talks with the eastern neighbor (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

Talking about relations with the US, MP Marek Borowski from SDPL also realized the changing reality for Poland:

Sometimes it seems that some of our politicians and commentators are very worried that relations between the United States and Russia are changing. They believe that the rank and value of Poland can only be built in the context of tensions between the two military powers. Well, it's time to end this perception of the world, as well as of the place and role of Poland in its changes. (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

This commentary was addressed to the right-wing PiS representatives who, instead of finding opportunities in the US-Russia cooperation, criticized the government for not ratifying the missile defense system agreement and doubted the strength of strategic relationship with NATO due to the changing policy of the US. Namely, according to PiS MP Karol Karski:

There is no current schedule of actions that specific NATO military units would undertake to take defense measures in case of aggression against us. It turns out that the plans created in 1999 have already become outdated, because they were created in a completely different reality. (Sejm, 8.4.2010)

While there were no explicit signs for the aggression towards Poland, the discourse of threat came out in relation to energy security as a heavily politicized issue. Karol Karski referred to the Nord Stream⁵ as to a *political project*, not only aimed at changing energy security of Poland and the Baltic States, but also used *as an excuse for Russian military exercises*: [during Ladoga 2009] *the Russian army performed military trainings in pursuit of mystical killers who wanted to damage the line* [i.e. gas line on the bottom of the Baltic Sea]. Thus, he accused both the government and the US for failing to sign the defense agreement, moreover:

Americans gave up the construction of the shield [...] with a special grace on September 17, 2009, which was not only the day of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet aggression against Poland [but also the period when] the Russian and Belarus armies in maneuvers commented all over the world except Poland, were practicing a complete defeat of the opponent. (Sejm, 8.4.2010).

The government and the left-wing looked at the energy issue through rather liberal prism of searching for alternative ways, but PiS used it as a card for pointing on Polish government's weakness and expressing mistrust for Russia. Thus, for example, earlier in March, PiS MP Adam Rogacki expressed similar to Karol Karki's views:

⁵ Nord Stream is the main gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, passing through the bottom of the Baltic sea. The Nord Stream gas pipeline is the longest underwater gas export route in the world with the length of 1224 km. It is aimed on increasing the gas supply to the European market. The majority shareholder is Russian OJSC "Gazprom" which owns 51% stake in the project (www.nord-stream.com).

[W]e all know that Russia not only perceives this [meaning: the Russian gas] as a raw material or product for free market rules, but also as a tool for political games. At least this was experienced by our Eastern neighbors. And I am surprised that at the same time when we discuss the law [on alternative gas supplies], there are negotiations in process, that could make us dependent on Russian gas for years and decades (Sejm, 3.3.2010).

In line with the theoretical framework of this dissertation, analyzing the discourses prevailing in parliamentary discussions revealed patterns of ‘commonality’ and ‘specificity’ of certain identity-derived ideas about Russia. As represented in the Table 1, the topicality of discourses before the tragedy in Smolensk can be categorized in four main groups with both positive and negative connotations. Prominent characteristic of this period of improvement of Poland’s relations with Russia is described with the commonality of ideas about ‘opportunities’ created for Poland as a strong and open state. The governing PO, center and left-wing party representatives articulated with positive discourse about Russia, while perceiving good relations as a chance to improve Poland’s image in the world. Although in this context there were signs of the victimization-based Polish national identity with regards to the Katyn problem, opportunities that politicians found included the construction of Poland’s image as a promoter of the EU Eastern policy and a country able to bridge the East and the West (both the EU and the US). Thus, although there was no clear vision for the further development of bilateral Polish-Russian relations in practice, reconciliation was perceived through the prism of cooperation with third actors, Germany, the US/NATO, and the EU. This gives a reason to assume that the ‘Russian factor’ was rather taken for ‘secondary’ benefits in the form of strengthening Poland’s role in Western structures.

The negative discourse was developed by the right-wing PiS party, which can be explained by its oppositional stance and anti-Russian ideology. The characteristic feature of this discourse group is the lack of trust not only towards Russia, but also toward the EU and NATO as collaborating with Russia on issues that are of a particular importance for Polish interest. This stance mainly highlighted the threatened identity of Poland as not being able to let go of the historical burden in Polish-Russian relations, seeing explicit threat for Poland in the energy security dimension and being suspicious of getting locked in action between the major powers. However, the specificity of the negative discourse as limited to the PiS support only also reflects on the weakness of this discourse of threat and strength of Poland’s identification with Western structures in line with positive pragmatism in its foreign policy.

Table 1. Topical derivation of ideas in the Polish parliamentary discourse about Russia before the TU-154 presidential airplane crash in Smolensk.

Discourse topicality	Argumentation of Lewica, SDPL, SD, PO – positive aspect	Argumentation of PiS – negative aspect
Historical rapprochement with Russia	<p>Opportunity for depoliticization of the Katyn issues</p> <p>Opportunity to establish mutual trust based on the German example</p> <p>Opportunity for increased economic cooperation based on modernization</p>	<p>The perception of treating Poland as a secondary partner</p> <p>Lack of trust and satisfaction prompted by the ‘lack of apologies’ and unresolved issue of access to historical archives</p> <p>[ignorance towards economic cooperation prospects]</p>
Russia’s role in the development of Eastern Partnership policy	<p>Improving relations with Russia as defining Poland’s diplomatic success in becoming a promoter of the EaP, a way to increase the role of Poland in the EU</p>	<p>Russia’s reluctance towards the EaP as undermining the success of Polish diplomacy in the EU Eastern policy</p> <p>EU (major states)-Russia cooperation as undermining the role of Poland in the EaP</p>
Poland in the context of NATO-Russia improved cooperation	<p>Opportunity to increase and strengthen the place and role of Poland in changing reality</p> <p>Opportunity to ensure reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals close to Poland’s borders</p>	<p>Changing US-Russia relations as a reason to doubt US-Poland strategic cooperation</p> <p>The reason to criticize the government for the failure to ratify the anti-missile system agreement</p>
Poland’s dependency on Russian gas	<p>Need to search for alternative ways and diversification of gas supplies</p>	<p>The perception about Russia as using the gas as a tool for political games; energy security threat for Poland</p>

Source: author’s representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

3.2. Topicality and rhetoric of the discourse after the TU-154 plane crash

After the crash of TU-154 airplane in Smolensk, Russia as a foreign policy partner of Poland literally disappeared from the parliamentary discourse. The lack of discussions in the Sejm can be explained by the fact that the crisis of Poland's political apparatus decreased attention and capacities to further develop active foreign policy in the nearest period of time.

As highlighted during discussions by the Prime Minister Donald Tusk, legal terms were not easy when it came to the actions and tasks. Laws relating directly or indirectly to the investigation of the Smolensk crash were different in Russia and Poland because from the Polish point of view the aircraft was state-owned, and from the Russian point of view the catastrophe was civil. There was no agreement between Russia and Poland that would describe similar situations regarding commitments of both states as well as the procedures to be followed for an explanation of the causes of the disaster. With regards to cooperation with Russia, Donald Tusk reported:

From the first hours after the catastrophe, we are in touch with the Russian side, also with the highest representatives, and thus with the Prime Minister and with the President of the Russian Federation [...] I have obtained assurance from both the prosecutor's office and the accredited representative of the Polish state that nothing has happened so far that would allow us to question the good will and readiness of the Russian side to cooperate fully. (Sejm, 29.4.2010).

The discourse of solidarity with Russia and the whole world was entrenched in the discourse of Polish sacrifice and tragedy. As reflected in the speech of PO MP Jan Kulas:

In the post-war history of Poland there was no such national tragedy. [...] Undoubtedly, thanks to this great sacrifice [...] the world in solidarity with us learned about the history and the great drama of Katyn. The relationship between Poland and Russia is deeply and positively changing. Almost all of us participated in mourning of national solidarity. The last national tragedy should teach us, politicians, greater prudence and tolerance, as well as building more human relations in political life. (Sejm, 6.5.2010).

In the three months period after the tragedy, the main concern of the Polish Sejm was the ongoing investigation as it started to take longer than people expected. Discussions emphasized the information chaos happening in Poland and in this context the right-wing PiS criticized the government for becoming even more dependent on Russia. Thus, PiS MP Jarosław Zieliński stated:

Yesterday's press conference of the Interstate Aviation Committee in Moscow shows that everything in this matter really depends on the Russian side (Sejm, 20.5.2010)

About a month later Jarosław Zieliński was talking about *the shocking case of theft of money from the Smoleńsk sp. Fund of Andrzej Przewoźnik by Russian workers*, apparently silenced by the Polish government from the public for several weeks after the case happened:

Meanwhile, the government continues to provide Poles with information about excellent cooperation with the Russian side and vice versa, and about exceptional participation of Russia in the investigation of the circumstances related to the Smolensk disaster. [...] What actions did Polish and Russian governments take in order to solve the crime of internal military forces of Russia? [...] Two months after the catastrophe in Smolensk we have a huge information chaos, too much talking, manipulations and a complete helplessness of the Polish state, which on its own desire completely fell into dependence in this question on Russia (Sejm, 10.6.2010).

The internal shock and instability, along with the involvement of Russia in the investigation process, withheld any further discussions on foreign policy, particularly in the dimension of the East-West cooperation, thus removing discourses previously found in the analysis. The main subject in the context of the Eastern policy was the discussion of border control agreement with Belarus and Russia. Additionally, with the beginning of the Nord Stream pipeline construction, some attention was paid to the energy security topic with the criticism of the government by both the left- and the right-wings. Thus, quoting PiS MP Karol Karski:

Unfortunately, at the moment, [...] despite the best, as the government decrees, relations with Germany and Russia, the construction of Nord Stream have just started. [...] Unfortunately, energy security remains an empty slogan. (Sejm, 6.5.2010).

MP Tadeusz Iwiński from Lewica also expressed his criticism:

Poland from the beginning took wrong tactics and strategy. [...] Instead of blocking the construction of the North Pipeline and protesting against it, you had to keep calm negotiations with Germany, Russia and other countries [that participated]. It has been known for several years that the Northern Gas Pipeline will be built, and we stayed on the platform, the train left and we are still protesting. [...] we are not united (Sejm, 6.5.2010).

Overall, the topical derivation of discourses about Russia in the period after the Smolensk tragedy are contrasting with the period ‘before’ in terms of intensity. There was a significant reduction of the importance of the cooperation in the domain of foreign policy. The tragedy is an internal factor for Poland, so connotations about Russia were directed mainly toward the government’s efficiency in solving the issue. Thus, it is evident that while the PO was emphasizing ‘the good will and solidarity’ of Russia, the right-wing articulated with government criticism about increasing dependency on Russia in the investigation process. As for the energy security, changing environment with the beginning of the Nord Stream construction was also a reason to criticize the government for the fact that its cooperative policy with Russia and Germany proved to be inefficient in ensuring Poland’s interests.

Table 2. Topical derivation of ideas in the Polish parliamentary discourse about Russia after the TU-154 presidential airplane crash in Smolensk.

Discourse topicality	Argumentation of PO – positive aspect	Argumentation of PiS – negative aspect
Cooperation with Russia in the investigation of the crash	Continuing reconciliation; good will and solidarity of the Russian state.	The lack of trust towards transparency of Russian cooperation in the investigation matters. Criticism of the government as voluntarily putting Poland under dependence on Russia in the process of investigation.

The discourse of ‘lost opportunities’ with the construction of the Nord Stream		Criticisms of the government as taking a wrong approach towards energy security situation*
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**(argumentation supported by the left-wing)*

Source: author’s representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

3.3. The role of Russia in the shaping of Poland’s identity and foreign policy in the period of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations

While understanding the topical derivation in the parliamentary discourse allowed to understand the context of representations of Russia across the lines of ‘commonality’ and ‘specificity’ in the opinions of politicians, analyzing argumentation strategies in the textual data according to Ruth Wodak’s (2009) categorization revealed the processes of representing ‘us’ in relation to the Other in the parliamentary discourse. The categorization of argumentation strategies included constructive, perpetuation, transformative and dismantling, as explained in the methodology Chapter of this dissertation. Notably, those strategies appeared to go in parallel with each other even when related to the same thematic aspect. This sub-chapter explains the role Russia played in the shaping of certain elements of Poland’s identity and provides analytical representation of those functions in the Table 3. An extension of this empirical analysis with quoted examples from the textual data is provided further in the Appendix 1.

The most comprehensive strategy type is the constructive one represented in an attempt to construct/establish a certain identity through promoting unification, solidarity and identification. In the period before the Smolensk tragedy this appeared to be the most common strategy for constructing Poland’s image in the parliamentary discourse. Thus, Poland was represented as making its voice stronger in the EU and enjoying a stable period of development, which was underpinned by the image of the patron and promoter of the EU Eastern policy. This aspect draws back to the well-established component of Polish national identity based on its missionary vision in the Eastern Europe. In this context, Russia plays a role of a consolidating factor for Poland’s identity – Polish-Russian reconciliation was perceived as a way to ensure the success of Polish diplomacy in the East and increase Poland’s value in the EU. Moreover, reconciliation with Russia would prove the ability of Poland to serve as a bridge between civilizational East and West, underpinned by the idea of improving relations with both neighbors, Russia and Germany. Poland was represented as a free, independent and strong state

that gives a key importance to relations with its neighbors. A state ready to distance from the historical burden in relations with Russia and move towards mutual trust, based on German example.

On the other hand, the differentiation from Russia in approaching historical issues and international politics actually consolidated Poland's victimization-based identity as a state seeking historical truth, justice and respecting the inviolability of borders in line with the international law. For Poland, the lack of apologies from Russia was a matter of historical justice and preserving its honor. Poland was also postulated as a state 'knowing the value of democracy' and thus standing for territorial integrity of Georgia – an issue lasting since the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.

Interestingly, in the context of an improved dialogue between Russia and the West, constructive processes went in parallel with the transformative strategy of argumentation in expressing the images of Poland. Thus, the left-wing party representatives suggested that in a 'changing new reality' Poland had to 'stop seeking threats' and pursue peaceful cooperation with Russia while subscribing to the US foreign policy. This would mean becoming 'a mature partner who knows its value' instead of being 'a petitioner seeking defense'. Therefore, Russia, and particularly its changing relations with the West, played a role of a designating factor in transforming some components of Poland's state image and conceptualizing its new contours.

The designating role of Russia for the success of Polish diplomacy revealed itself in an opposite way with the dismantling strategy of argumentation when some components of existing national identity are denied without offering a new identity model. Thus, for example, for PiS politicians Poland did not become the patron of the Eastern policy and its significance was reduced in the context of EU-Russia cooperation. Both right- and left-wing politicians also claimed that with changing US policy the myth about the US-Poland strategic partnership was 'ruined' and Poland did not have a real protection from its ally anymore. Meanwhile, in describing the failure of Poland to be successful in its alliances, there was no alternative suggestions for further development.

According to Ruth Wodak (2009), the perpetuation strategy of argumentation in the discourse is aimed at maintaining and reproducing threatened national identity though preserving and protecting it. In the Polish case both before and after the tragedy in Smolensk, while there were no explicit military threats, the security and interests of the state were undermined by the energy dependence on Russia. Politicians of both the left- and the right-wing spectrum mentioned that Poland was not safe and secure as long as the energy security problem was unresolved. In harsh utterances, characteristic of the PiS party, Russia's energy policy was

described as 'political games' and the Nord Stream pipeline was compared with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The less rigid discourse of PO and the left-wing contained the image of Poland as the promoter of the European energy security system as an alternative way to ensure Polish interest. Once the Nord Stream construction began, Poland had to admit the inefficiency of its policy in energy security. Meanwhile, the long and unclear process of investigation of the Smolensk crash also led to internal divisions in the Polish Sejm as blaming the government for Poland's helplessness and dependency on Russia when the Polish state was suffering under the information chaos.

Thus, in the period of positively changing Polish-Russian relations, the discourse analysis shows that connotations about Russia were important for both domestic and international environments of Poland. Russia played a role of a consolidating factor for certain well-established elements of Poland's identity constructed in relation to the East, while at the same time designating the success of Polish diplomacy in the Western structures. On the other hand, the reconciliation and the absence of real threats, did not ensure the absence of the discourse of danger for Poland. Thus, Russia was still threatening Poland with the aspect on falling into dependency on it, be it in the energy sector or in the airplane investigation process.

Table 3. Functionality and the role of Russia in the construction of Poland's image in the period of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations.

Argumentation strategy	The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Constructive strategy – the aspect of identification, unification and solidarity	Poland as a state that builds relations with neighbors based on mutual trust, bridging state between East and the West.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's identity of a bridging state between the East and the West in the context of reconciliation with Russia.
	Poland with a stronger voice in the EU, patron and promoter of the Eastern Partnership.	<i>Designating</i> the success of Poland in the EaP. Causal function: increasing the role of Poland in the EU requires improving the dialogue with Russia.
Constructive strategy – differentiation aspect	Poland as a state seeking historical justice and truth, respecting the international law and knowing the value of democracy.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's historical victimization-based identity.
Perpetuation strategy – maintaining and reproducing threatened national identity	Poland as a state with low security in energy sector due to the dependency on the Russian gas and the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Poland as a promoter of European energy security system.	<i>Threatening</i> energy security of Poland as an explicitly unreliable partner; forcing Poland to search for alternative ways of providing security.
	Poland as a state seeking justice, truth and transparency in international proceedings – Poland's helplessness caused by dependency on Russia in the Smolensk catastrophe investigation.	<i>Internally divisive factor.</i> Causal function: lack of transparency in the investigation of the Smolensk crash led to the criticism of Polish government as falling into dependence on Russia.

<p>Transformative strategy – transforming some components of national identity through providing new identity contours</p>	<p>Poland as a state ‘knowing its value’ and willing to cooperate peacefully with Russia, instead of just seeking defense from NATO.</p>	<p><i>Designating</i> transformations of Polish foreign policy towards a policy of cooperation. Causal function: if Russia-US dialogue improves, Poland has to use the opportunity and adjust the foreign policy to increase its role.</p>
<p>Destructive strategy – dismantling some components of national identity without providing an alternative.</p>	<p>Destruction of the idea of strategic partnership with the US and security assurances of the NATO membership.</p>	<p><i>Designating</i> the success of Polish foreign policy. Causal function: improving Russia-US dialogue undermines the liability of the Poland-US strategic partnership.</p>
	<p>Destruction of the image of becoming a patron and promoter of the Eastern Partnership.</p>	<p><i>Designating</i> the success of Polish diplomacy. Causal function: if the dialogue between Russia and the major EU states improves, Poland’s influence on the development of the EaP becomes restricted or even undermined.</p>

Source: author’s representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

3.4. Topicality and rhetoric of the discourse before the annexation of Crimea

Russia's engagement in the political crisis in Ukraine in 2013 ensured the prevailing negative discourse about it, described commonly as *'pressure'* and *'imperial ambitions'*. Along with challenging the success of the Eastern Partnership that Poland understood itself to be the 'patron' of, the instability in the East was perceived as an existential threat for the Polish state, giving a rebirth to the threatened elements of national identity. Moreover, in the failure to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine in Vilnius in November 2013⁶, Russia was portrayed as intentionally blocking Poland's foreign policy objectives.

Thus, Romuald Ajchler from SLD said that [Putin] *arranged it in the way he wanted*, while Krzysztof Lipiec from PiS was more precise about the idea of Russia tackling particularly Polish interests:

Overactive role of the Russian Federation led to the failure of signing the association agreement in Vilnius. The Russian Federation was so active that it did everything to ensure that what is in the Polish interest in Vilnius was not implemented [...] It is in the obvious Polish interest to block the rebirth of dominant imperial ambitions in the East. (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

Meanwhile, the right- and center-right also openly blamed the EU for the outcomes of the Vilnius summit, which was taken quite painfully – it was a *strategic failure of the EU and the strategic defeat of Poland*. The EU was described as not being able to adequately respond to the Russian threat. According to Krzysztof Szczerski from PiS:

Europe proved its fundamental weakness in Vilnius, it could not keep the border once appointed by Stalin in Yalta [...] it is unable to face geopolitical actions related to imperial plans of Putin's Russia [...] it is divided, lacks strong leadership and has no determination and courage, and many EU states just prefer to pursue the close cooperation policy and a minimum level of confrontation with Russia, because they do not care (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

⁶ On the 21st of November, 2013, the government of Ukraine declared that it would suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement with the EU. As stated from the President Viktor Yanukovich's address to EU officials, this decision was taken for 'reasons of national security' and the need to increase a falling trade with Russia and other CIS countries. The government of Ukraine also declared about the return to negotiations with the Customs Union. The withdrawal of the government from signing the Association Agreement fueled protests in Ukraine, biggest since 2004 (Konończuk, 2013)

His colleague Ludwik Dorn from Solidarna Polska supported the idea of rather passive EU approach:

What everyone knew was going to happen, that is, when the Russian Federation exerted a powerful pressure. And not only did we know that it would happen, because it must happen - it is obvious that the strongest countries of the European Union also knew that it must happen, and they just waited (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

MP Marek Sawicki from PSL agreed that the diplomatic crisis in Ukraine was caused due to the lack of conviction and determination of major EU countries:

When it comes to [France and Germany], their dedication to economic partnership with Russia was definitely greater than the right for liberation of pro-European Ukrainian society (Sejm, 19.2.2014)

Prevailing for the left-wing, the situation was more about the choice that the EU, although weak, was about to make. It was a discourse of competing for Ukraine with Russia, where Poland assigned the responsibility on the EU. MP Jacek Czerniak from the SLD assumed that Putin would rather see Ukraine in the Asian Union and would do everything for it to happen. His question was:

If such Union would be stronger, would the EU offer something better? (12.12.2013)

His colleague Leszek Miller from SLD said that the European aid fund was to compensate Ukraine for deterioration of economic relations with Russia:

Russia exerts and will exert pressure, so there must be a proposal for adequate compensation from the West (12.12.2013)

MP Witold Klepacz from Twoj Ruch⁷ had a similar opinion, while noting that *connecting Ukraine to a drip of EU subsidies will cause a tougher dispute with Russia:*

⁷ Center-left political party in Poland.

In black scenarios, this may end with a trade war, the largest victim of which would fall Ukraine, because Ukraine [is not foreign for Russia], and the role of Russia is not passive, [it] is a destructive role. [...] If we want to be a symbol of modernity and openness, we must create conditions through which Ukrainian business can escape dependence on the Russian market. [...] The EU must answer a fundamental question: what is more important, the expansion of the Community for Ukraine or healthy relations with Russia? We are currently unable to achieve both of these goals. (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

As for Poland itself, its great political and economic effort in supporting Ukraine was constantly emphasized and there was no political disagreement regarding the need for nomination of free rights and aspirations for the Ukrainian society. Democracy in Ukraine was directly linked to democracy in Poland and the whole EU. Interestingly, it reflected both the missionary self-vision of Poland in relation to the Eastern Europe and its superiority complex towards the East due to belonging to a more ‘civilized’ world. Despite the aspiration to support Ukraine, there was a criticism of Ukrainian political system with particular emphasis on such systematic issues as corruption. Moreover, politicians expressed the vision of the world as divided in two camps, based on differentiation from Russia. The PSL MP representative Janusz Piechociński spoke about changing type of rivalry in the world:

New rivalry based on the ability to collaborate and interact, respect differences and shared values, instead of old type of rivalry based on the struggle in diplomacy, politics, economics, and, God forbid, military. [...] Well, we want the Russians to understand [that this is] the standard and the expectation of keeping the word, showing trust, building trust, because only this is how the new world is built, and lack of trust, return to old mechanisms, to use advantages, especially military ones, economic, shows the inability to keep up with time. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Furthermore, in the context of EU-Russia ‘competition’ as positive-negative contrast, it produced the notion that it was up to Ukraine to decide which side it would take. As stated by Witold Klepacz from Twoj Ruch:

Ukraine, you have to decide for yourself whether you want to play in the European Champions League or in the Kremlin Cup (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

This aspect is also evident from the speech of the Prime Minister Donald Tusk:

In the context of the controversy over the future of Ukraine, the future of Europe or the Eurasian [...] the Ukrainians themselves must decide for the future of Ukraine [...] There are two very different political organizations around Ukraine, different in their essence, goals, structure - on the one hand, Russia, which clearly defines its interest with regard to Ukraine, and on the other hand the European Union, which after many years of fluctuations, largely thanks to Polish efforts, also began to declare, more clearly than ever, its intentions regarding the future of Ukraine. Of course, one of the reasons for the growing sense of helplessness of the European Union in the confrontation with organized and uniform actions of Russia is that the European Union is something other than Russia. [...] The European Union is not and, in the future, will not be impressed from one center of power, as in the case of Russia. [...] If the European Union is not always firm enough, determined and organized when it confronts its plans or dreams with a politically unified empire, it is precisely because it is not an empire and an imposter. And thank God. (Sejm, 19.2.2014)

With the changing realities and East-West ‘rivalry’, threatened environment formulated the discourse of danger for Poland’s security as an issue of a separate concern. On the one hand, Russian foreign policy influenced Poland’s perception about its allies. The right-wing was especially worried about security assurances that Poland could receive in the context of the Russian pressure. As highlighted by Bogdan Rzońca from PiS:

Poland for many years has been in different alliances, alliances of victories and defeats. We know that these alliances, no matter what they were, have never given final security assurances [...] If the EU was capitulating from Russia because of the Ukrainian matter, the question comes whether Poland has plan B. On the other hand, would Poland capitulate if it left the question simply with the EU? (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

His colleague from PO, Jacek Żalek (who later joined PiS) and is known for his nationalistic views, also raised his concern about the liability of allies in times of the crisis:

If 75 years ago the countries of Europe were not limited in diplomatic notes and care of their own borders, they would probably look different and the Soviet Russia would not be a

totalitarian power of evil. [...] A few days ago, we could count on the fact that relations between states are regulated on the basis of international law. Well, no. The law is no longer relevant. Military and financial strength counts. I see two options: either we will remain naive idealists or we will recognize a new reality. Reality is brutal. Territorial guarantees submitted to Ukraine by the United States, Great Britain and Russia proved to be an ordinary lie. [...] Putin is not afraid of the European Union, he is not afraid of NATO, he is not afraid of the UN, but everyone is afraid of Putin. If NATO as a military organization limits its activities to a press conference and internally quarrels about the choice of the right words, then this is a disturbing signal not only for Ukraine, but for all of us. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

However, others found the strength and hope in Western communities as the only way to deal with the threat, and Poland was assumed to have a special place in the unity of action. As expressed by Witold Klepacz from *Twoj Ruch*:

As a Community, we are one of the largest players in the international arena. We must feel this strength. If we make a joint effort to join Ukraine to the European Union, no one will be able to threaten us. [...] For the European Union, invariably Poland is a country that can be a bridge between East and West. Therefore, in particular through our efforts to open to our eastern neighbors, we must show our openness to Ukraine. (Sejm, 12.12.2013)

The official position of Poland was highlighted by the Prime Minister Donald Tusk:

We today, with particular strength, emphasize the need for a community of the whole West, because it is a guarantee for all, and if not a guarantee, it is the only hope for success in this dangerous confrontation for Poland. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

The escalation of the crisis in Crimea also prompted politicians to consider threats created for Polish economy. Thus, MP Leszek Miller from SLD highlighted the need to ensure the interests of Polish investors in Russia and Ukraine:

Keeping in mind the problems of Kiev, we cannot forget about our own security. The destabilization of the international situation means a huge threat to our economic relations with Ukraine and Russia. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

PSL MP Janusz Piechociński, while criticizing Russia for not understanding matters of trust, drew attention to the state of Polish-Russian relations, emphasizing that:

The strength of Polish economy condemns [us] to think rationally in relations with Kremlin [...] decrease unnecessary emotions [such as around the Kaliningrad region]. We need good, friendly relations with Russians, people to people, so that when we come out of this great turn in the relationship, we would be able to return to a better phase in mutual relations. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

And finally, the escalation of the conflict in Crimea created the discourse of a ‘fight’, particularly prompted by moral ideals and taking the form of demonstration of ‘strength’. This ‘assertive policy stance’ was characteristic for the center-right and the right-wing of the Sejm. As pointed by Jacek Żalek from PO:

An adequate response to the demonstration of strength is the demonstration of strength. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

He was supported by PO colleague Grzegorz Schetyna:

The Russian authorities have committed an act of aggression [...] The sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine has been violated by Russia. [...] Our reaction, the reaction of the free world, to a series of Russian behaviors must be unambiguous, determined and fierce. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

The right-wing PiS in the face of Jaroslaw Kaczynski took a stance in favor of increasing Polish patriotism and improving Polish military capabilities:

Today, we know for sure that history has not passed and Poland should prepare for it. [...] We must strengthen our armed forces and this should be a really serious effort [...] The ratio of power is very unfavorable. [...] We need to rebuild everything that is associated with patriotism in Polish consciousness, Polish identity, sense of national duty, and if necessary, also with sacrifice. We should have a modern army, but we should also have soldiers who are ready to sacrifice for their homeland. (Sejm, 5.3.2014)

As presented on the Table 4, topical derivation of the Parliamentary discourse before the annexation of Crimea can be categorized in three separate groups and there are both similarities and differences between the left- and the right-wing views. First of all, in contrast with the first part of the analysis of the peaceful times in Polish-Russian relations, it is evident that the threat perception ensured more ‘commonality’ of ideas and pushed the Polish political class to develop more uniform opinions about the crisis. It is important to remind ourselves that in the previous analysis the right-wing PiS was separated from other political parties as the only one producing negative and differing discourses about Russia. In this case, representations about Russia were only negative, picturing it as an aggressor with imperial ambitions, violating the international law, exerting the pressure on Ukraine and presenting a threat for Poland as well. Moreover, the perception of Russia intentionally hampering the signing of Association Agreement with Ukraine highlighted the sensitiveness of the issue for Poland understanding itself as the leader and patron of the Eastern Partnership. This notion of a threatened differentiation from Russia is infiltrated in all further discourse groups, as represented in the above-mentioned quotations. The discourse of the EU-Russia rivalry is consequential and here the common opinion of politicians was that Ukraine had to choose between the two sides, explicitly understood as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In this context, the growing threat perception ensured a stronger identification of Poland with the Western community.

Patterns of ‘specificity’ of opinions about the situation are also differing from that of the initial analysis of the period of reconciliation. First of all, the threatened environment changed the grouping of opinions by allowing to refer the governing center-right PO-PSL and PiS to the same group, as they expressed similar views. They both blamed the EU for being passive towards Russia’s pressure, some of the right-wing politicians even openly doubted the reliability of Poland’s allies after the Vilnius summit. However, such criticisms only lasted until the conflict escalated and Vladimir Putin received a request for assistance in ensuring peace and tranquility in the territory of Crimea. Since then, the discourse of seeing key security guarantees in the Western community became common for all political parties. Ideas of a more assertive foreign policy and increasing Polish military capabilities were also more characteristic for the right- and center-right. Some ideas were, in turn, more specific for the left-wing as concerned about the EU’s response in economic dimension in the context of its ‘competition’ with Russia over Ukraine.

Table 4. Topical derivation of ideas in the Polish parliamentary discourse about Russia before the annexation of Crimea.

Discourse topicality	Argumentation of the left, center- left wing parties	Argumentation of the center-right, right-wing parties
Negative representations of Russia	Common perception of Russia as an aggressor with imperial ambitions, violating the international law; Common perception about intentionally active role of Russia in the failure to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine; Strong differentiation from Russia based on morality and the vision of the world.	
The discourse of danger for Poland's security	Common perception about the existential threat for Poland; Common idea about the need to ensure economic security of Poland in light of the crisis; Common discourse in favor of the unity of the Polish political class.	
		The need for an assertive foreign policy approach and increasing Poland's military capabilities.
Rivalry between Russia and the EU	Common perception about Poland having a special place in advocating Ukrainian issue in the EU; Common perception of Ukraine as the rivalry point, having to choose one side between Russia and the EU; Common understanding of a Western community as the key security guarantee from the Russian threat.	
	The perception of the EU responsible for providing financial compensations to Ukraine in the context of EU-Russia (economic) competition over Ukraine.	The idea of blaming the EU for weakness and passive policy towards Russia at the Vilnius summit; Concerns about security assurances to be provided by the Western community after the 'failure' at the Vilnius summit.

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

3.5. Topicality and rhetoric of the discourse after the annexation of Crimea

In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, the threat perception about Russia was intensified and expressed in both left- and right-wing spectrum. Russia was portrayed as violating principles of international law and peaceful co-existence, as a threat for Polish security. Moreover, the uniform opinion about the key importance of the membership in the EU and NATO as the only guarantee of Polish security continued to take place. Significant feature of this discourse was the need for Poland to be strong and equal in the allies, and the idea of intensification of relations with NATO in terms of providing military security of the state (Appendix 2). However, the uniform opinions in assessing Russia's actions did not ensure the continuance of the discourse in favor of a political unity. The annexation of Crimea became a real catalyst for internal divisions, particularly between the governing PO-PSL and PiS, which now had a leverage to blame the government for its failures in maintaining and protecting the Polish interest. Interestingly, this political contestation was so high that performances about Russia were prevalingly made by right and center-right parties.

In a short aftermath of the Crimea annexation, the right-wing brought the discourse about the threatened energy security of Poland back on surface, highlighting that in energy sector Poland was treated as a *vassal* or *irrelevant neighbor*. MP Józef Rojek from Solidarna Polska said that it was really embarrassing that 25 years after independence Poland's main gas supplier was Russia, which had shown that in various cases it can blackmail its gas consumers:

Suddenly, thanks to Putin's policy, old sermons about Russia were replaced, motivated by criticism and fear, that is – in short – suddenly we started talking [...] By observing the policy of this government towards Russia, I am aware that Poland has been losing in one of the most important issues in recent years. Every month to the cash registers of Russian gas and oil giants goes \$ 2 billion from Poland. [...] Poland's relations with Gazprom have an almost vassal character and are very far from the relations characteristic to the developed countries of democracy. (Sejm, 3.4.2014)

PiS MP Jan Warzecha explicitly emphasized that Polish energy security was under threat due to the events in Ukraine and, in parallel, due to tightening energy relations between Russia and Germany:

As shown by recent events in Ukraine, Russia's practices regarding indisputable countries and Russia's increasingly disrespectful attitude towards the EU countries, Poland's energy security is under threat. In the face of growing anxiety in the world, we must do everything not only to become independent of the Russian fuel, but also to break the monopoly on the horizontal transmission of gas from the East to Europe. [...] Another fact that is alarming for our energy security is the tightening of trade relations between Germany and Russia. [...] Poland in these talks is overlooked - like an irrelevant neighbor. (Sejm, 3.4.2014)

In light of the deterioration of the conflict, the governing PO-PSL could not avoid addressing its previous policy of reconciliation with Russia. Minister Radoslaw Sikorski confirmed that Polish foreign policy was loyal to the ancient maxime *plus ratio quam vis* – *the reason above than the power*, and the only possible logic remained truth to Donald Tusk's first exposé that said to pursue the policy towards Russia 'as it is':

When Russia cooperates with the world and respects its rules, we rejoice at it and we are the first to cooperate. However, when Russia annexes the territories of neighbors and threatens them with violence, we quickly draw conclusions. A lot more: we will be the first to enjoy Russia's path of aggression. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Thus, the new 'as it is' approach as described by the Minister of Foreign Affairs was largely described in terms of the difference from Russia based on civilizational morale and increasing ideological confrontation with the West:

[I]n a civilized world, public hearings don't happen under muzzles of Kalashnikov [...] Russia has not learned the lesson of its totalitarian history [...] Russia has not understood what a failure for it were the Soviets [...] Russia recognizes the right for collection of lands, as did Moscow princes in the late middle ages [...] West is the model enemy of Russia [...] the West, including Poland, has never sought to exclude Russia from the international community, it was not the West that rejected Russia. Russia itself chose to return to the rails of anarchic development model [...] Moscow is challenging an ideological confrontation [...] that it cannot win. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Sikorski's colleague from PO, Grzegorz Schetyna, also supported such vision when describing Russia as *returning to the dream of Soviet utopia and the restoration of its own greatness*. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

For MP Jan Vincent-Rostowski from PO, Russian behavior was also explained by the growth of a certain ideology in the context of which the democratic development of Ukraine would be a *deadly threat* for Russia:

[T]he growth of a certain ideology [...] historiosophy, which puts national egoism above the rule of international law, which puts the rights of persons of Russian nationality over the rights of their neighbors [...] Russia's actions result from fear, but not from fear of NATO, from the EU, and fear of an example that could be given to the Russians by a free and democratic Ukraine [...] we cannot delude ourselves that Russia, especially the current authorities in Moscow, will easily depart from its extremely dangerous activity [...] Such developments would be a deadly threat to the current Kremlin authorities. [...] it explains the behavior of the Russian Federation, but it does not justify it in any way. (Sejm, 8.5.2014).

However, for the PiS, the situation was more about blaming the government for wrong foreign policy approach and tightening relations with someone who is now called an aggressor. Very representative is the speech of Witold Waszczykowski:

For six years you presented a false picture of the international situation in the region, and especially a false image of the Russian policy [...] In 2008, you completely downplayed the Russian military action against Georgia. You interrupted the isolation of Russia and allowed the Russian minister of foreign affairs to present a false version of the events. Russia is developing and opening up to the world, you argued in the exposé of 2011. Minister Lavrov was [honored with honors] and had meetings with Polish ambassadors. You were even an advocate of Russia's admission to NATO. In December last year, you concluded an agreement with Russia on the coordination of foreign policy by 2020. At that time, Russia was already conducting an open policy of blackmailing Ukraine. You announce that, despite the ongoing aggression towards Ukraine, next year will be Russia's year in Poland [...] It is amazing that it is only today that you see that the Russian state seems to have its own vision of the world. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Thus, in the context when Poland became a neighbor of aggressor and his victim, Waszczykowski argued that the maxime *si vis pacem, para bellum* – *if you want peace, get ready for the war* – had to be introduced in the foreign policy approach:

I realize that the Russian aggression is canceling your long-standing illusions about reconciliation with Moscow. This reconciliation, realized in trustworthiness and abandonment of activity in the East was [actually] wanting to sell to the world, especially to Western Europe, as a certain pass to the elite club of Russia's privileged friends (Sejm, 8.5.2014).

A strong criticism of the government was continued by MP Krzysztof Szczerski, PiS:

Why do we need such a minister, a recovered superman, accidental hero? When the shots on Maidan were falling, you were skiing, when Russia was blackmailing Ukraine with a request and threat that it would not sign an association agreement with the Union, you signed with Lavrov a memorandum on the harmonization of the global policy of Poland and Russia. Until now, the government insists on the idea of the Polish Year in Russia. And the Prime Minister is asking who creates the pro-Putinist party in Poland? (Sejm, 8.5.2014).

It was a reference to the speech of Donald Tusk, also representative about how ‘Russia’ was used in the political contestation in the Sejm:

Interestingly, most of these right-wing and ultra-right parties, which will probably occupy a fairly serious position in the European Parliament, not only think about dismantling the European Union, but also support Putin more or less openly in his actions in Ukraine. (Sejm, 8.5.2014).

Despite the rivalry between the PO-PSL and PiS, the discussion showed some common points. Both agreed that the image and prestige of Poland were undermined especially in the context of the Eastern policy promotion, and emphasized the need to search for new ways of improve Poland’s position. Thus, apart from the co-responsibility of the allies, a new discourse, shared by both PO-PSL and PiS, related to strengthening Poland’s role in the region based on the solidarity among the CEE states facing the common threat in the face of Russia. According to Witold Waszczykowski, PiS:

The strength of our diplomacy should be our position in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This is where we should strive for the position of the spokesperson for the interests of the region through intensive cooperation with the countries of the Baltic Sea, Central and Southern Europe. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Jarosław Górczyński from PSL emphasized the growing importance of the regional cooperation in light of the crisis:

The history of Central Europe [...] shows us all how the unity of Slavic nations becomes important, especially in the era of events in our eastern neighbor Ukraine. I am referring to further intensified development of our activities within the Visegrad Group [...] against threats arising at this stage (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Radosław Sikorski mentioned that Poland could rely on its regional partners:

The crisis in Ukraine has shown that we can count on the majority of our European partners, including in the field of eastern policy. In the Visegrad formula, we develop cooperation in the field of energy. We share [...] common history and political goals with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Another way for improving the image of Poland was increasing its engagement in global issues. This can be explained not only with the fact that Russia undermined Poland's prestige, but also the fact that while turning to the West, Poland had to show its allies the readiness to acknowledge the crisis happening globally and not just close to its borders. Moreover, in the context of confrontation with Russia as a global power, Poland had to seek for new ways of increasing its global actorness too. As highlighted by Grzegorz Schetyna from PO:

One of the consequences of events in Ukraine is for us to raise awareness of external threats and convince us that we must do everything to make Poland strong internally, have a stable position in a united Europe, but open to friendly cooperation and allied policy in other parts of the world [...] The Ukrainian crisis does not only have regional implications. Due to the politics and position of the Russian Federation, it reflects on global politics (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

PiS MP Waszczykowski also found the perspective of Poland's strength in a more global engagement:

As part of ambitious diplomacy, we should also not lose interest in the idea of renewing cooperation with the US and much more active [policy] in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Moreover, the need to ensure Poland's security gave a push for a new discourse of closer integration with the EU and joining the euro-zone. It would *determine the future of Poland in terms of security*, as said by Stanisław Żelichowski from PSL (Sejm, 8.5.014). Minister Radosław Sikorski explained the benefits of the eurozone:

The events that take place in Ukraine should mobilize us for faster integration with the euro area. The decision on the possible adoption of the single currency will not only have a financial and economic character, but above all a political dimension, including our security. In the eurozone, the principle one for all, all for one is absolutely mandatory, because serious threats to one country automatically mean perturbations in all. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

MP Janusz Palikot from Twoj Ruch even compared this option with stationing the missile shield:

[T]here is nothing that prevents us from treating the eurozone as an anti-missile shield as an element of military action, not only political or economic. (Sejm, 8.5.2014)

To sum up, as presented on the Table 5, the annexation of Crimea further intensified the threatened discourse about Russia whose actions were commonly described as unprecedented in the last 25 years of the history of Poland. Intensification of the threat perception provided almost unilateral opinions about the EU and NATO as the key security guarantee for Poland, with a particular focus on the need to increase NATO's military presence on the Polish soil (Appendix 2). Some new discursive topics were introduced after the annexation of Crimea. One is the opportunity identified by the left-wing and PO-PSL in joining the eurozone in order to increase the interdependency between Poland and other EU states and hence gain better security assurances from the allies. Another is the idea of strengthening Poland's role regionally and globally, commonly shared in the Sejm. It was prompted by the need to recover Poland's image

and prestige, ensure better support from regional neighbors and engage further in the arena where Russia was exerting its influence as the political crisis in Ukraine was described to go far beyond its borders.

The most significant aspect of the analysis is the fact that the annexation of Crimea triggered strong divisions in the Polish Sejm and destructed the discourse of the political unity which was developed earlier. This led to a rivalry between the governing PO-PSL and PiS, which, after the re-assessment of the security situation, gained a strong leverage to blame the PO-PSL government for their policy of reconciliation with Russia. PiS also brought back the discussion of energy security issue as another symbol of the Russian threat and the weakness of the Polish government.

Table 5. Topical derivation of ideas in the Polish parliamentary discourse about Russia after the annexation of Crimea.

Discourse topicality	Arguments of the PO-PSL coalition government	Arguments of the PiS political party
Negative representations of Russia, the discourse of threat	Common perception about Russia as a state violating the principles of the international law and peaceful co-existence*; Common perception of an existential and unprecedented (in the last 25 years) threat for Poland*.	The perception of Russia treating Poland as a vassal and irrelevant neighbor in the energy sector, a threat for energy security
	Foreign policy maxime: <i>plus ratio quam vis</i> – the reason above than the power Emphasizing the difference from Russia based on civilizational morale and increasing ideological confrontation with the West <i>The aspect of the defense from PiS:</i> criticism of the opposition as blaming the PO-PSL for reconciliation with Russia in order to gain seats in the European Parliament and dismantle the EU, while implicitly supporting the ideology of Putin	Foreign policy maxime: <i>si vis pacem, para bellum</i> – if you want peace, get ready for the war Failure of Polish foreign policy as the outcome of false image of the Russian policy developed by PO-PSL government, particularly during the reconciliation period
Intensified cooperation with	Common perception of the EU and NATO as the key security guarantors of Polish security in the face of Russian threat, the need for strong and equal position of Poland in these structures*;	

alliances as a key security measure	The idea of intensification of relations with NATO for the purpose of providing the military security of Poland	
	The idea of further EU integration and joining the eurozone as an opportunity to increase Poland's security*	
The search for new ways to recover an undermined image and prestige of Poland	Strengthening Poland's role in the region based on the solidarity among the CEE states facing the common Russian threat; The need to increase Poland's engagement and visibility globally.	

**(argumentation supported by the left-wing)*

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

3.6. The role of Russia in the shaping of Poland's identity and foreign policy in the period of deterioration in Polish-Russian relations

In correlation with the analysis of the period of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations, a deeper look into constructive, transformative, perpetuation and dismantling argumentation strategies used by politicians revealed that they worked in parallel and often showed causal relationships. This sub-chapter explains which role Russia played in the shaping of certain elements of Poland's self-image before and after the annexation of Crimea, as reflected on the Table 6. An extension of the empirical analysis of the construction of the images of Poland is provided in the Appendix 2 with inclusion of quotations from textual units.

To start with the perpetuation strategy of argumentation aimed at maintaining and reproducing threatened national identity though preserving and protecting it, Russia's policy in Ukraine obviously had a threatening effect on Poland's perceptions about self. Before the annexation of Crimea, politicians from both wings emphasized that the instability in Ukraine was an existential threat for Poland, commonly bringing back the discourse of Poland's historical experience of aggression and democratization of the state. Poland was portrayed as knowing the value of democracy and in this context, democracy in Ukraine was understood as defining the future of Poland and the whole EU. After the annexation of Crimea, this discourse intensified and moved towards the idea of a real political and military threat, unprecedented for the last 25 years history, and Polish politicians felt that their state would be the next to experience Russian aggression. Moreover, a rapid deterioration of the security environment, consequently brought back the image of Poland as being threatened in the energy security sector, which was colored with such explicitly negative descriptions of Poland as the 'vassal' in the gas contracts with Russia.

In the constructive argumentation with the aspect of expressing identification, solidarity and unification, Russia's actions in Ukraine played a role of a consolidating factor for Poland's identity based on the missionary self-vision about the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was giving Poland a special status in the conflict. Poland was portrayed as the main advocate of Ukraine, the leader of the European Eastern policy. The geopolitical location of Poland between the East and the West, its special knowledge about the East were understood as giving Poland a 'special place' for taking the initiative, speaking the truth and standing up for Ukraine. At the same time, the intensification of the discourse of threat consolidated identification with the Western community based on the differentiation from the dangerous Russia, while emphasizing the need to be strong and united. These aspects slightly

transformed after the annexation of Crimea as a consequence of the intensification of the threat perception. Firstly, the superiority complex of Poland described with a strong feeling of national pride was reinforced as now Poland was not only the leader of the Eastern policy, but an example, a model, an inspiration for others in terms of democratic change, a state defining the future of the EU. Secondly, the threat perception from Russia consolidated Poland's European identity through emphasizing the need to be equally strong and recognized among other EU members. While realizing the threatened environment, politicians highlighted that they felt safe in the EU and NATO. Thirdly, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia's policy played a role of a triggering factor in terms of intensification of Poland's regional identity based on solidarity, common history and political goals. Moreover, as the conflict had global implications and was described as the 'rivalry' with Russia, it became a trigger for Poland to become an actor engaged more in global issues.

However, as the analysis shows, processes of identification and solidarity, although widely shared in the Sejm, did not ensure the uniformity of the discursive image of Poland. Thus, for example, for some politicians Russia's political pressure became a basis to articulate with the notion of 'differentiation' of Poland not only from Russia, but also from the Western European states and Ukraine. In the consolidation of Polish superiority complex towards the East, politicians described Poland as enjoying security and civilizational advancement in comparison with Ukraine, highlighting the satisfaction from Poland's choice to turn West 25 years ago. On the other hand, Russia served the designating role for the success of Polish diplomacy, as the implementation of its priorities in the East was limited by revealed difference with the EU in the level of strategic interest.

For the right-wing PiS, the disappointment in the outcomes of the Vilnius summit even took the form of the dismantling strategy of argumentation in terms of destructing certain identity components. They talked about the possibility that the EU would 'surrender' before Russia and claimed that Poland lost its leading role in the regional policy. However, in such cases politicians did not offer any new contours for Poland's identity with regards to its institutional membership, and such moods not only did not find much of the support, but also came to end when the conflict escalated and the uniformly identified with strong and safe Western community.

And finally, Russia's foreign policy triggered the transformation of Poland's self-image in terms of replacing some elements of identity with another. Thus, the image of being ambassadors of Ukraine in the EU was sometimes replaced by PO politicians with the image of its defenders, in a form of 'fighting' in a moral sense for the values of the international law.

Moreover, the demonstration of strength by Russia a trigger for moving towards a more assertive foreign policy. For the right-wing PiS it was also about improving the Polish army, raising Polish patriotism, and rebuilding Polish identity in a moral sense. Russian actions also triggered the discussion of further European integration and joining the eurozone as a long-term security measure advocated by the left-wing and PO-PSL. Importantly, changing external environment was a triggering factor for internal structural transformations in the Sejm. Thus, while in the early stages of the Ukrainian crisis widely accepted was the image of Poland as a state with united political class, the annexation of Crimea became a catalyst for critical divisions in the Parliament, particularly between the PO-PSL governing coalition and PiS.

Table 6. Functionality and the role of Russia in the construction of Poland's image in the period of deterioration of Polish-Russian relations.

Argumentation strategy		The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Constructive strategy – the aspect of identification, unification and solidarity	Before Crimea	Poland as the flagship and leader of the European policy in the East, an advocate of Ukraine, a strong state able to bridge East and West.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's identity of a main advocate for Ukraine, particularly entitled for this role due to historical legacy and geopolitical factors;
		Poland with a special place in the EU, able to speak the truth for Ukraine.	<i>Consolidating</i> Polish threatened identity based on historical experiences entitling it to 'speak the truth' and take initiative;
		Poland standing for the strength and unity of the Western community in the response to the crisis.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's institutional identification with the West. Causal function: intensification of the discourse of danger pushes strengthening of collective identities based on the differentiation from the dangerous Other.
	After Crimea	Poland as a strong state, an example, model and inspiration for others in terms of democratic change, proud of its achievements and feeling safe in the EU and NATO.	<i>Consolidating</i> the identity component of a superiority complex with a strong feeling of national pride. Causal function: belonging to Western institutions limits the threatened component, while allowing to further construct the 'special' image of Poland in the context of an unprecedented event.

		Poland advanced in the political hierarchy of the EU, defining the future of the EU and hence striving to increase its voice and recognition in the Union.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's European identity. Causal function: threat perception creates the need to increase Poland's role and value for the EU.
		Poland as a state that needs to strengthen its position regionally and globally.	<i>Triggering</i> the strengthening of regional identity and the development of a global actorness due to the scope of the influence of the conflict.
Constructive strategy – differentiation aspect	Before Crimea	Poland strategically more interested in the democratization of Ukraine than the Western European states.	<i>Designating</i> the success of Polish diplomacy. Causal function: implementation of Poland's priorities in the East can be limited by the difference in strategic priorities with major EU allies.
		Poland enjoying security and civilizational advancement comparing to Ukraine, feeling satisfaction from the choice to turn West 25 years ago.	<i>Consolidating</i> the identity component of a superiority complex towards the East based on belonging to a 'more civilized' world.
	After Crimea	Particular emphasis on Poland's belonging to the 'civilized West' that respects the international law; treating international law as a security instrument.	<i>Consolidating</i> Poland's 'Western' identity based on strong differentiation from Russia.
Perpetuation strategy – maintaining and reproducing	Before Crimea	Poland experiencing an existential threat at its eastern border. Democracy in Ukraine as defining the future of Poland and the EU. Poland knowing a real value of democracy.	Historically <i>threatening</i> Polish identity, reinforcing threatened, victimization-based identity and sentiments about Poland's historical experience of aggression and democratization.

threatened national identity	After Crimea	Poland threatened by Russia in energy sector, treated as an irrelevant neighbor and a vassal in gas contracts with Russia.	Reinforcement of Poland's identity of feeling <i>threatened</i> about the dependency on Russia.
		Poland experiencing a real political and military threat for the first time in 25 years, very sensitive to the issue of maintaining the inviolability of borders, fearing the Russian aggression.	Reinforcement of Poland's <i>threatened</i> national identity, caused by Russia. Causal function: increasing the need for security assurances from allies.
Transformative strategy – transforming some components of national identity through providing new identity contours	Before Crimea	Poland internally transforming towards unity among Polish political class as a way to strengthen its voice in the Eastern policy.	<i>Triggering</i> internal transformations as a response to the threatened environment.
		Poland transforming from being ambassadors of Ukraine to its defenders, understood as a 'fight' in a moral sense for the values of international law. Poland moving towards the policy of strength, improving the army and raising Polish patriotism.	<i>Triggering</i> the transformations of Polish foreign policy approach towards the demonstration of strength.
	After Crimea	Poland considering further European integration and joining the euro-zone as a long-term security measure not only in economic, but also in political and military dimensions.	<i>Triggering</i> transformations of financial reform discussion, pushing Poland for further European integration.

		Poland internally divided after the reassessment of Russia' policy, with a strong criticism of PO-PSL for rapprochement with Russia.	<i>Internally divisive factor.</i> Triggering reassessment of Poland's Russia policy and consequently causing internal conflict between PO-PSL and PiS.
Destructive strategy – dismantling some components of national identity without providing an alternative.	Before Crimea	Poland as a state that failed to reach its objectives within the EU after the Vilnius Summit in November 2013.	<i>Designating</i> the success of Polish diplomacy in the EU. The idea of Russia intentionally disturbing Polish foreign policy plans.

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova

Conclusions

This dissertation sought to explore the influence of Russia on the shaping of Poland's identity and unfold the functionality of the discourse about Russia in Poland's parliamentary discussions on foreign policy. In parallel with theoretical assumptions outlined in this dissertation, ideational factors about Polish national identity, while heavily permeated by the historical and geopolitical factors, proved to be of causal importance for Polish foreign policy. Moreover, following the hypothesis stated in this dissertation, the analysis revealed a continuing importance of Russia as a significant Other for the shaping of Poland's identity. Changing Polish-Russian relations had an impact on the development of Poland's collective identities on various levels. These changes were mainly revealed in line with the notion of a 'triple relation' in Poland's identity construction, understood as Poland's self-image as historically threatened by Russia, having responsibility for the 'Eastern Borderlands', and identifying with the West (Zarycki, 2004; Mayblin, et.al, 2016). The influence of Russia in the context of positively developing relations in 2010 showed itself in revealing and strengthening of some identity elements as a basis for the interest in reconciliation with Russia. Thus, such interest was mainly prompted by perspectives of the successful construction of Poland's image of a state bridging East and West, particularly in the context of being the leader in the EU Eastern Partnership policy. On the other hand, more transformations were caused by deterioration of the Polish-Russian relations as Poland's external environment was rapidly changing. By exerting the pressure on Ukraine and annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia as a significant Other influenced strengthening, dismantling and transforming elements of Poland's collective identities in relation to both East and West, as well as constructing new definitions of Self.

Thus, change and continuity in contemporary Poland's identity construction are well tracked through the prism of the functionality of the discourse about Russia. First of all, the threatened and victimization-based identity of Poland proved to have a continuous character throughout both study periods. While in 2010 there were no explicit threats for Poland, Russia still served as a threatening factor in the energy sector where it was portrayed as an unreliable partner using raw materials as a political tool. The threat perception intensified with the Ukrainian crisis, bringing out the component of Polish identity of seeing Russia as a civilizational and 'backward' Other. Consequently, it largely defined Poland's identification on both domestic and international levels based on differentiation from Russia.

Secondly, Russia played a role of a consolidating factor for Poland's identification as the leading patron of Ukraine and the bridge between the East and West. While in peaceful times in improving relations with Russia Poland saw an opportunity to strengthen this element of identity, the crisis in Ukraine brought out a strong identification of Poland as Ukraine's defender, model, example and inspiration for states like Ukraine. On the other hand, differentiation from Russia revealed the superiority complex of Poland towards the East with high levels of national pride, consequently highlighting the differences between Poland and Ukraine in terms of civilizational advancement.

Thirdly, the strength of Poland's institutional identification with the West proved to be highly influenced by Russia as designating the processes of change and continuity of Polish foreign policy interests. In 2010, when Russia enjoyed positively changing relations with NATO, politicians recognized the changing realities and felt the need to transform Polish foreign policy towards a more peaceful cooperation, while also 'deconstructing the myth' of the strategic partnership with the US and NATO. Also, in peaceful times while the success of the Eastern Partnership was perceived as conditioned by the reconciliation with Russia, increased dialogue between Russia and the major EU states produced fears of the reduction of Poland's influence on the EU's policy. The unity of support of the EU and NATO increased along with the differentiation from Russia during the security crisis in 2013-2014 when it was portrayed as violating the international law and principles of co-existence. The threatened national identity of Poland forced intensification of identification with the 'strong and safe Western community' that belongs to the opposite vision of the world than the dangerous Eastern neighbor. The more there was a threat from Russia, the more Poland strived for the recognition of its special place in the EU as a state having an 'expert knowledge' about Russia and hence 'defining the future of the EU'. Moreover, the influence of Russia was triggering discussions about further European integration as a security measure, and increasing Poland's regional and global actorness as a strategic interest in the context of changing realities.

Clearly, in the years researched, Russia was a meaningful motif of Polish parliamentary discourse about foreign policy as the political class negotiated Poland's development in the international arena in reference to Russia. In such references, evaluations of Russia serve as a *sui generis* instrument for the construction of Poland's perception about its allies and inevitably create challenge-opportunity windows for stabilizing, strengthening and constructing Poland's historical, Western, and regional identities. Of a significant importance is the fact that the functionality of discussions about Russia serves as a divisive factor in the Polish Sejm as reflected in the patterns of commonality and specificity of topical derivation in opinions across

political representatives. Thus, long and unclear investigation of the airplane crash in Smolensk in 2010 along gave an impetus for the opposition to blame the government for voluntarily putting Poland under dependence on Russia in solving the issue of a state importance. Then in the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, the anti-Russian ideology of PiS ensured its continuous stance with negative discourse about Russia and even pushed the process of internal unification and solidarity with the governing coalition. However, although the annexation of Crimea could potentially intensify the discourse in favor of a unity against the common threat, it worked in an opposite way and became a source for internal political contestations and blaming the PO-PSL government for the policy of rapprochement with Russia. As revealed in the discourse analysis, Russia's functionality transformed from being a unifying existential threat, towards being a *sui generis* instrument for achieving parties' internal and external political goals, such as undermining the policy of the government and winning more places in the upcoming elections to the European Parliament. Obviously, events in Crimea and the lack of reaction from the West as Poland would want to play a significant role in giving a new impetus for constructing a 'stronger' Polish identity with a 'more autonomous' foreign policy as promoted by PiS today. Russia's actions in Ukraine were understood as intentionally leading to the failure of the implementation of Poland's foreign policy objectives and prompted the discourse on taking a more assertive foreign policy, increasing Polish patriotism and own capabilities. A consequent interest for further analysis would suggest to research Russia's interest and/or intentions in creating a more complicated or deteriorated environment for Poland at both domestic and international levels.

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Appendix 1. Representation of argumentation strategies employed in the construction of Poland’s image in the period of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations.

Table 3.1. Extension. The analysis of images of Poland in the period before the TU-154 presidential airplane crash in Smolensk in 2010.

The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Constructive strategy of argumentation – the aspect of identification, unification and solidarity	
Poland with a stronger voice, patron and promoter of the Eastern Partnership, the state able to bridge East and West, building relations with neighbors based on mutual trust.	<i>Consolidating factor/ Designating factor</i> Reconciliation with Russia as consolidating Poland’s identity of a state bridging East and West and designating the success of Polish diplomacy in the Eastern dimension; a way to increase the role of Poland in the EU.
<i>Examples from the textual data:</i>	
Poland should confirm its willingness to be Ukraine's ambassador to the European Union [...] Undoubtedly, success includes establishing a dialogue with Russia (Bogdan Lis, SD, Sejm 8.4.2010)	
There is a need for Poland to present the whole European Union [...] It is simply the duty of Warsaw, the need for a moment. [...] The truth we need to realize is the following: the better relations we have with Russia, the more we will be valued on the international arena as a serious country that is able to negotiate and be able to present the Union's interests in the East. (Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz, Lewica, Sejm, 8.4.2010)	

Today, Poland is an important partner for the largest EU countries. Our vote really matters. Incidentally, it was the strengthening of our position in the European Union that also caused a change in Russia's attitude to Poland [...] The role of Poland is appreciated and recognized [in a] united Europe. Poland strong in Europe, Poland is a co-host of Europe (Marek Krzakała, PO, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

The strategic goal of Poland is to play an increasingly important role in the European Union and NATO. We also want to have the West, understood as an achievement in the sphere of civilization achievements expressed in common values, norms and standards, on both sides of our border. We focused on building good relations with our neighbors. We have led to better relations with Germany and Russia. [...] Poland strong in Europe, patron and promoter of its eastern policy. The presence of Poland in the European Union contributes to the shaping of the new Polish identity. [...] It draws both from the Piast spirit, focused on Western values and the Christian roots of integration, as well as from the Jagiellonian spirit, focused on close dialogue and agreement with the East. [...] We are in favor of depoliticising the Katyn problem and other white and black spots in the history of Polish-Russian relations. (Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Polish diplomacy has become noticeable in Europe and in the world. The leaders of other countries count with the opinion of Poland. We have made every effort to ensure that diplomatic relations with our neighbors - with Germany and with Russia - improve in order to try to base them on mutual trust. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Constructive strategy of argumentation – the differentiation aspect

<p>Poland as a state seeking historical justice and truth, respecting the international law and knowing the value of democracy.</p>	<p><i>Consolidating factor</i></p> <p>The differentiation from Russia in approaching historical issues and international politics as consolidating Poland's victimization-based identity as a state seeking historical truth, justice and respecting the inviolability of borders in line with the international law.</p>
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Examples from the textual data:

We invariably postulate the territorial integrity of Georgia. [...] Our experience teaches us that [modernization reforms] is the surest way for a membership in the institutions of the Western world. [...] The war in the Caucasus in 2008 made us all aware that the use of military force to resolve regional conflicts, including in Europe, is something real. [...] We Poles know what the value of democracy is. (Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

The speech of Vladimir Putin during the celebrations connected with the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II on Westerplatte [...] ignored the importance of Poland. [...] Putin also ignored the role of “Solidarity” and the massive social resistance in the Eastern bloc countries, especially in Poland (Grażyna Gęsicka, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

On the eve of the ceremony on September 1, 2009 from the Russian Prime Minister we learned that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was not so unjustified. [...] During the ceremony, it was President Lech Kaczyński who saved the honor of Poland, clearly presenting what took place in September 1939. (Karol Karski, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Perpetuation strategy of argumentation

<p>Poland as a state with low security in energy sector due to the dependency on the Russian gas and the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Poland as a promoter of European energy security system.</p>	<p><i>Threatening factor</i> (the aspect of dependency) Russia as an unreliable partner using energy resources as a tool for political games, which pushes Poland to search for alternative ways of ensuring its energy security.</p>
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Examples from the textual data:

The creation of adequate fuel reserves and their control are [...] particularly important in the situation we have in Poland, when [the] external gas supplies [come from] a single source. It is Russian gas. And we all know that Russia [treats it] as a tool for political games. Even our Eastern neighbors have experienced it. Honestly, I’m surprised that at the same time when we are talking about this bill, negotiations are under way, which [will] make us addicted to Russian gas for years and decades. (Adam Rogacki, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

For centuries, also in recent times, the location of Poland is conditioned by relations with the world's greatest powers: our immediate neighbors, that is Russia and Germany [...] There is no [common energy] policy in the European Union. Poland does not bring any initiatives in this area. Representatives of the government do not know how to join the Union and Prime Minister Putin: there is no real friendship and trust, if we do not feel safe. (Grażyna Gęsicka, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Germany and Russia are building a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, which Minister Sikorski, as a member of the PiS government, compared to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. [...] the gas pipeline is still a political project aimed at reducing the energy security of Poland and the Baltic States. (Karol Karski, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Today, it is necessary to stop complaining and focus on creating a European energy security system - initiated by Poland as a matter of course. If we want to feel safe - more secure - then we have to build connections of the Polish gas network with the European network as quickly as possible (Marek Borowski, SDPL, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

We support initiatives to strengthen energy security and solidarity. [...] We support projects of significant importance for the diversification of gas supplies to the Union, such as the Nabucco pipeline, and, more broadly, the whole concept of the southern energy corridor. (Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Transformative strategy of argumentation

<p>Poland as a state 'knowing its value' and willing to cooperate peacefully with Russia, instead of just seeking defense from NATO.</p>	<p><i>Designating factor</i></p> <p>Defining transformations of Polish foreign policy towards a peaceful cooperation. Causal function: if Russia-US dialogue improves, Poland has to use the opportunity and adjust the foreign policy to increase its role.</p>
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Examples from the textual data:

We should quickly take advantage of the opportunity that has been created by the improvement of relations between Washington and Moscow and the American-Russian dialogue [...] it is high time to build relations with Russia based on mutual trust. [...] An unsuccessful attempt to bring the military closer to the US, based on a missile shield project, leads to the statement that Poland must be a mature partner who knows its value, and not, as before, a petitioner seeking defense. (Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz, Lewica, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

We are also concerned about a certain restraint about the positive inclusion of Polish diplomacy in the new global foreign policy of America [...] Sometimes we get the impression that some of our politicians and commentators are very worried about the fact that relations between the United States and Russia are improving. [...] it's time to end this view of the world, as well as the place and role of Poland in its transformations. [...] Instead of soliciting the [missile] shield earlier, Poland should try - to the extent of its capabilities - to subscribe to Barack Obama's new foreign policy. (Marek Boroski, SDPL, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Our neighborhood with a powerful Russia and on the other with powerful Germany should lead - as it seems obvious - not so much to the daily drawing of disputable issues as to the construction of a policy of cooperation. Instead of seeking alleged threats, Poland must, through its diplomatic activity, find ways of peaceful cooperation. (Marek Wikiński, Lewica, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Destructive/ dismantling strategy of argumentation

<p>Destruction of the image of becoming a patron and promoter of the Eastern Partnership.</p>	<p><i>Designating factor</i></p> <p>Defining the success of Polish diplomacy. Causal function: if the dialogue between Russia and the major EU states improves, Poland's influence on the development of the EaP becomes restricted or even undermined.</p>
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Examples from the textual data:

<p>Poland has not obtained a mandate from the European Union to shape the whole of the Union's eastern policy. It did not become the patron and promoter of the Polish Eastern policy. Relations with Russia are still the domain of large European Union countries, especially Germany. Russia itself showed considerable reluctance towards the initiative. (Grażyna Gęsicka, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)</p>	
<p>By creating such a rugged Eastern Partnership, Poland's influence on relations between the European Union and Russia has been reduced or even minimized. [...] Although Poland has an influence on the Eastern Partnership program, it is treated as insignificant in the countries to which [the program] refers. It [the program] has no real impact on shaping the European Union's policy towards Russia. There is no longer an Eastern policy of the European Union, there is a policy towards Russia and a policy towards the rest of the nearby post-Soviet area. (Karol Karski, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)</p>	
<p>Destruction of the idea of strategic partnership with the US and security assurances of the NATO membership.</p>	<p><i>Designating factor</i> Defining the success of Polish foreign policy. Causal function: improving Russia-US dialogue undermines the liability of the Poland-US strategic partnership.</p>
<p><i>Examples from the textual data:</i></p>	
<p>The myth that has been promoted by the Polish Foreign Ministry not so long ago, that we are a strategic partner of the USA, has been ruined. (Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz, Lewica, Sejm, 8.4.2010)</p>	
<p>Poland is still not covered by current contingency plans, which would determine how NATO allies would help us in the event of aggression against our country. [...] It turns out that the plans created in 1999 have already become outdated, because they were created in a completely different reality. [...] Soon, we will remain one of the few NATO countries that is not protected by any real American forces. (Karol Karski, PiS, Sejm, 8.4.2010)</p>	
<p>What makes up [the] raison d'état? First of all, military security of the state. In this case, fortunately, there are no major threats. We are in NATO, we are actively working on a new formula for the functioning of the Alliance. If something disturbs me and the SDPL, it is a certain overzealousness in</p>	

relations with the United States, based on the erroneous belief that Poland and the USA can combine strategic ties. [...] In this room the spirit of this strategic agreement with the United States is constantly wandering. (Marek Borowski, SDPL, Sejm, 8.4.2010)

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

Table 3.2. Extension. The analysis of the images of Poland in the period after the TU-154 presidential airplane crash in Smolensk in 2010.

The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Perpetuation strategy of argumentation	
Poland as a state seeking justice, truth and transparency in international proceedings – Poland’s helplessness caused by dependency on Russia in the Smolensk catastrophe investigation	<i>Internally divisive factor/ Threatening factor</i> (the aspect of dependency) Causal function: lack of transparency in the investigation of the Smolensk crash led to the criticism of Polish government as falling into dependence on Russia.
<i>Examples from the textual data:</i>	
Two months after the Smolensk catastrophe, instead of the truth about the causes and circumstances of this tragedy, we have a huge information chaos, understatements, even manipulations and complete helplessness of the Polish state, which at its own request became completely dependent on Russia in this matter. (Jarosław Zieliński, PiS, Sejm, 10.6.2010)	

Source: author’s representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

Appendix 2. Representations of argumentation strategies employed in the construction of Poland’s image in the period of deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.

Table 6.1. Extension. The analysis of images of Poland in the period before the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Constructive strategy of argumentation – the aspect of identification, unification and solidarity	
<p>Poland as the flagship and leader of the European policy in the East, an advocate of Ukraine, a strong state able to bridge East and West. Due to its geopolitical location and historical legacy, Poland has a special place in the EU for taking the initiative, speaking the truth and defending the sovereignty of Ukraine. Polish priority is the strength and unity of the Western community in the response to the crisis.</p>	<p><i>Consolidating factor</i></p> <p>Russia’s political pressure on Ukraine leading to the intensification of identification of Poland as the main advocate of Ukraine, particularly entitled for this role due to historical and geopolitical factors. Causal function: intensification of the discourse of danger pushes strengthening of collective (Western) identities based on the differentiation from the dangerous Other.</p>
<p><i>Examples from the textual data:</i></p>	
<p>We must learn to live in the neighborhood of Russia, and at the same time stop worrying about the decisions that she makes. As a Community, we are one of the largest players in the international arena. We must feel this strength. If we make a joint effort to join Ukraine to the European Union, no one will be able to threaten us. [...] For the European Union, invariably Poland is a country that can be a bridge between East and West. [...] Poland must be perceived not only as a sibling in big events, but also as a partner in the development of Ukraine. Poland must be a country that, through open policy, will be the flagship of the European Union and will convince all Ukrainians to the idea of integration. Of course, this will not be achieved</p>	

without the cooperation of all political forces in our country. [...] We must develop a joint action plan for the events in Ukraine as a European Union, and the leader in this matter must be Poland due to its geopolitical location. (Witold Klepacz, Twój Ruch, Sejm, 12.12.2013)

Just as all governments in free Poland were in favor of Atlantic integration, we are constantly supporting the European aspirations of Ukraine. We have been doing this consistently since 1991, when we were the first in the world to recognize the independence of this country. [...] the consistent and strong voice of Poland in the East contributes to the fact that the European Union is increasingly appreciating our activities. [...] because it is thanks to Poland that the European Union's neighborhood policy has opened to the East. [...] After all, the Eastern Partnership countries are not only the neighbors of Europe, it is also, and perhaps above all, European neighbors. We constantly remind our friends about this fact in the European Union. [...] Democratization and modernization in the East are priorities for Polish foreign policy. (Radosław Sikorski, PO, Sejm, 12.12.2013)

It is about the deepest possible, as the most solid placement of Poland in the Western community, in the European Union, but also in the Atlantic community. [...] because it is a guarantee at all, and if not a guarantee, it is the only hope for success in this dangerous confrontation for Poland. Poland is the last place from which signals should flow that we do not believe in the sense of the community of the European Union, the United States, Canada, because in reality only the community of the West as a whole is capable of vigorous and decisive steps towards threats that are present in this part of the world today. This is the condition sine qua non of effective action. Poland is particularly entitled to remind this obvious truth. (Donald Tusk, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Today, we Poles, all in one voice, defend the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. Today we are persuading the European Union, we are convincing the representatives of the free world that this crisis is serious, that we all have to tell the truth together, describe the threats. Only in agreement and in building a community, we are able to seek a peaceful solution to this conflict and find it. [...] It is up to us to have the initiative that we would like to carry out in the coming weeks (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

We must be pragmatic and rational, we must build a community of actions, consistency of actions, and the ability to inform each other and build a consensus around the national target, because our national goal is a safe space on the eastern border to the east of the European Union, transparent

and democratic space with friendly states and nations. This is the goal worth living for, that is the goal that is worth pursuing, that is the goal for which you cannot go back to 1968, 1980 or any of those other tragic years that not only affected Poland, but also Hungary or the Czech Republic. (Janusz Piechociński, PSL, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

From the time when the idea of bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union was born, Poland plays a leading role in this great historic process. [...] I declare on behalf of the Polish government [...] that Poland will support the signing of the association agreement at the time when the Ukrainian government will put such a proposal, even if tomorrow. [...] We want this voice, the Polish voice, to be the voice of all of Europe. [...] The Polish goal is to maintain a uniform policy of the whole Western Community. It is primarily about the European Union. Poland for obvious reasons - and because this is our national interest, and because these are the conditions of our security, but also for the fact that we believe that this is the effective action of the advocates of Ukraine and Russia - all the time will care [...] that the position of the entire Western community would be common and uniform. (Donald Tusk, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Constructive strategy of argumentation – the aspect of differentiation

Poland as a state strategically more interested in the democratization of Ukraine than the Western European states

Designating factor

Russia’s political pressure on Ukraine as a factor revealing the differences in strategic priorities of Poland and major EU allies and designating further success of Polish diplomacy.

Examples from the textual data:

Poland was a leader, Poland with Sweden, but in reality, decisions were in the hands of Germany and France. Regarding these two countries, their attachment to economic partnership with Russia was definitely greater than the reasons for freedom and pro-European Ukrainian society. (Marek Sawicki, PSL, Sejm, 12.12.2013)

<p>We are very keen that Ukraine will be welcomed to the European Union. But just go a bit further to the west and you do not feel it anymore. Other scenarios and other strategies are there. (Leszek Miller, SLD, Sejm, 12.12.2013)</p>	
<p>In Ukraine we have our strategic, existential interests. Not all of our friends, partners, and allies in the European Union have such interests in Ukraine and this must be acknowledged (Ludwik Dorn, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 5.3.2014)</p>	
<p>Poland enjoying security and civilizational advancement comparing to Ukraine, feeling satisfaction from the choice to turn West 25 years ago.</p>	<p><i>Consolidating factor</i> Political crisis in Ukraine as consolidating identity component of a superiority complex towards the East based on belonging to a 'more civilized' world.</p>
<p><i>Examples from the textual data:</i></p>	
<p>[T]oday Poles, feeling great fear of what is happening in the East, feel at the same time satisfaction with what we have today in Poland, when we compare our situation for a moment not to the situation of Switzerland or America, but to the situation of our neighbors. And that is why what today constitutes Polish security, also in the material dimension, in the Polish civilization advancement, should be [...] the subject of joint, mutual care and satisfaction, because this threat also shows how much we have reasons for mutual satisfaction that these 25 years of Polish independence turned out to be the right way. (Donald Tusk, PO, 5.3.2014)</p>	
<p>The fact that today Poland has a relatively safe situation compared to Ukraine results from the fact that 25 years ago in Poland a reform was introduced, called the Balcerowicz and Tadeusz Mazowiecki reform. This change led today [to] consolidated Poland in the sense of security, freedom and belonging to Western Europe (Janusz Palikot, Twój Ruch, Sejm, 5.3.2014)</p>	
<p>Let's thank once again all those who had the imagination, for the fact that the Polish scenarios were and are different than the more tragic to the east of Poland. (Janusz Piechociński, PSL, Sejm, 5.3.2014)</p>	

Perpetuation strategy of argumentation	
<p>Poland as a state experiencing existential threat in light of the instability at its eastern border. Democracy in Ukraine as defining the future of Poland and the EU. The notion of having a historical experience of aggression, thus knowing the value of democracy.</p>	<p><i>Threatening factor</i></p> <p>Reinforcing threatened, victimization-based identity and sentiments about Poland's historical experience of aggression and democratization.</p>
<p><i>Examples from the textual data:</i></p>	
<p>This is a test of our determination, our leadership, our courage, our influence and our skills. [...] It is in the obvious Polish interest to block the rebirth of dominant imperial ambitions in the East. Earthquakes usually occur at the meeting point of tectonic plates, today we are threatened that this contact of tectonic plates of geopolitics will be the greater part of our eastern border. (Krzysztof Szczerski, PiS, Sejm, 12.12.2013)</p>	
<p>[I]t is obvious that it is in Poland's existential interest that there will be a non-anti-Russian, but Western-oriented state that constitutes a safe buffer zone for us in this 500-km long section. This is important in the dimension of politics, in the economic dimension, but also in the military dimension, as evidenced by the events of the last week. (Ludwik Dorn, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 12.12.2013)</p>	
<p>In principle, for 20 years, a dogma that Poland can be a democratic state only when Ukraine is democratic, and Europe can be a democratic state, including Poland, only when Ukraine can be democratic, organized the behavior of all Polish governments in the last 20 years, the governments and presidents of our country [...] That is why, we are looking at [what is happening] today with a certain horror and shock (Janusz Palikot, Twój Ruch, Sejm, 19.2.2014)</p>	
<p>We, Poles, certainly will not be indifferent to these events. I am talking here about both our emotions, which are also built by historical experience, our own, often personal experience, experience with violence, but we will also not be indifferent, because we are aware that the development of events in Ukraine will also determine its history, the future of the entire region, including the direct impact on the future of Poland, on the security of</p>	

Poland and Poles, for geographical, political and historical reasons. [...] For Poland, the worst scenario, and this scenario, unfortunately, is a real threat, is the ongoing disintegration of the Ukrainian state. (Donald Tusk, PO, 19.2.2014)

Every nation has the right to their dreams. [...] We had these dreams, we went to these dreams, to this Polish dream, independent, sovereign, democratic Poland in democratic Europe through great historical events. At the cost of many sacrifices, we walked through 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 and 1981, and also through 1989. [...] And this dream came true. We are talking about a different Europe today, not the Warsaw Pact and NATO - we are talking about a Europe that has come through 1989. [...] not only the Ukrainians, but also every other nation in the East, not only in the post-Soviet space [...] cannot constantly ask questions: Will they come in or will they come back? (Janusz Piechociński, PSL, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Today, we know for sure that history has not passed and Poland should prepare for it. (Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

...they will hit us, Russia will hit us. [...] I appeal to the government to take an action. (Ludwik Dorn, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Everyone on their own counts some historical lessons to understand what is happening today on the Ukrainian-Russian border, what is happening in Europe today. [...] If today the Polish government postulates reasonable but firm steps, it is because we draw - I am convinced of it - correct conclusions from our own and European history. [...] Since the time when Poland regained its independence, there was no such critical situation near our borders. I want to assure you that in this great historical confusion, we will be looking for ways of action, whose main goal is, first and foremost, the security of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. (Donald Tusk, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Transformative strategy of argumentation

Poland internally transforming towards unity among Polish political class as a way to strengthen its voice in the Eastern policy.

Triggering factor

The threatened environment created by Russia's political pressure in Ukraine as a factor triggering Polish political class for more unity, which was previously unusual.

Examples from the textual data:

Solidarna Polska has a proposition - it offers all clubs, especially the opposition, and perhaps also the Civic Platform and the PSL, a common alliance in the name of Polish interests in eastern policy (Ludwik Dorn, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 12.12.2013)

Of course, [Polish interest] will not be achieved without the cooperation of all political forces in our country. (Witold Klepacz, Twój Ruch, Sejm, 12.12.2013)

[Thanking the Sejm for] an unusual level of solidarity at such a critical moment. (Donald Tusk, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

We managed to show - as not often in important matters - the unity of the Polish political class. We [spoke], both representatives of the government coalition and the opposition, [with] one voice. [...] We were, we are and we will agree that only a common Polish voice will be heard not only in Kiev, but also in Brussels or in Washington. Our internal unity, common language will strengthen our voice in the European Union, in NATO, in the OSCE, in all international organizations that will be able to help the Ukrainian cause. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

We believe [...] that the principle of unity is today definitely the most important and that disputes about details are not essential here. (Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

The notion of moving from being ambassadors of Ukraine to its defenders, with the sense of a ‘fighting’ in a moral sense for the values of international law/ moving towards the policy of strength, improving the army and raising Polish patriotism.

Triggering factor

The demonstration of strength by Russia as a factor prompting Poland to move towards a more assertive foreign policy, with the demonstration of strength, intensified moral sense of a ‘fight’ and improving national army.

Our reaction, the reaction of the free world, to a series of Russian behaviors must be unambiguous, determined and fierce. [...] For many years, from the early 90s, we were ambassadors of Ukraine. Today it is not enough to be the ambassadors of Ukraine, today we must be its defenders. Our position in Europe allows it, predestines us to this and makes us be the advocates of the Ukrainian cause among our partners in the European Union and NATO. Today, the diplomatic actions of our government are an expression of our faith, our history, our beliefs that have always guided Poles

over the years, when we fought for free Poland, for human rights, for democracy, for the rule of law. Poland bears moral responsibility for the Ukrainians being able to effectively ask for the same things today. [...] I want to say a word about what the Russian president said yesterday, attacking or accusing Poland of training militants on Maidan. He was right because he said that the Poles are the defenders of the Maidan. Yes, we are the defenders of the Maidan - a symbol of steadfastness and victory. And today we can say that we will always be the protectors of Maidan, this symbol, a symbol of defense against lawlessness, violation of elementary standards of democracy, basic norms of international law. We will always be on the side of freedom and solidarity. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

An adequate response to the demonstration of strength is the demonstration of strength. [...] We are fighting for something much more serious than complacency and a sense of well-fulfilled duty. We are fighting to restore international law, to treat contracts seriously and make promises. We fight for the primacy of the rights of nations and human rights over brutal force and economic profit. Today Ukraine is the symbol and essence of our fight. (Jacek Żalek, PO, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

We must strengthen our armed forces and this should be a really serious effort. [...] The ratio of power is very unfavorable. And hence the question is about our consciousness, about the awareness of Poles [...] We need to change this awareness. This is also our common task. We need to rebuild everything that is associated with patriotism in Polish consciousness, Polish identity, sense of national duty, and if necessary, also with sacrifice. Even the most modern army without soldiers ready to fight is not worth much. We should have a modern army, but we should also have soldiers who are ready to sacrifice for their homeland. [...] We must help Ukraine in various ways, in various spheres, it is beyond doubt, but we ourselves must be much stronger, also in the moral sphere, than we are today. (Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS, Sejm, 5.3.2014)

Destructive/ dismantling strategy of argumentation

Poland as a state that failed to reach its objectives within the EU after the Vilnius Summit in November 2013.

Designating factor

Russia's aggression in Ukraine as a factor determining the success of Polish diplomacy, reducing Poland's confidence in the EU and disturbing

	the implementation of Poland's foreign policy objective in the context of the EaP.
<i>Examples from the textual data:</i>	
<p>For many years, Poland has been in various alliances, winning alliances and losers. We know that these alliances, no matter what they were, never gave final guarantees of security. So now, if the European Union surrenders to Russia and to the Caucasian countries in the matter of Ukraine, my question is: Does Poland have any plan B? [...] imagine that the European Union for some reasons has stopped working, does not work. I have a question whether in this situation we have a plan of action. (Bogdan Rzońca, PiS, Sejm, 12.12.2013)</p>	
<p>This debate on Eastern Partnership allows me to state that Poland has lost the role of a leader in this part of Europe, in the Central and Eastern Europe. It was undoubtedly after the Smolensk tragedy. (Krzysztof Lipiec, PiS, Sejm, 12.12.2013)</p>	

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

Table 6.2. Extension. The analysis of images of Poland in the period after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The image of Poland	The role of Russia
Constructive strategy of argumentation – the aspect of identification, unification and solidarity	
<p>Poland as a strong state, an example, model and inspiration for others in terms of democratic change, proud of its achievements and feeling safe in the EU and NATO. A state advanced in the political hierarchy of the EU, defining the future of the EU and hence striving to increase its voice and recognition in the Union.</p>	<p><i>Consolidating factor</i></p> <p>The annexation of Crimea led to intensification of a superiority complex of Poland with a strong feeling of national pride. Causal function: belonging to Western institutions limits the threatened component, while allowing to further construct the ‘special’ image of Poland in the context of an unprecedented event.</p> <p>In parallel, consolidating Poland’s European identity. Causal function: threat perception creates the need to increase Poland’s role and value for the EU.</p>
<p><i>Examples from the textual data:</i></p>	
<p>The position of Poland depends on what we have achieved over the last 25 years. From this we can and we want to be proud [...] We must praise this pride, we must be able to carry it forward, use our experience, create better conditions for socio-civilization development of countries such as Ukraine, for which the Polish example is model [...] [The EaP] is our idea, our initiative, but implemented by the entire European Union. This is something that we can be proud of, which provides a civilizational change [...] We count on further development of this program. We want to be proud of its effectiveness [...] showing the Polish way, Polish example, Polish model. We want to show it, we want to confirm that the idea for a peaceful transformation of the last 25 years has been the best in Poland. And we are proud of it. We are all at heart with Ukraine, with Ukrainians.</p>	

[...] the way from Kiev to Brussels, goes to Europe through Warsaw. They knew about it then and know now, and they must know about it, and we must convince them in that belief. [...] Not only do we change, we open our possibilities of acting for the sovereign Ukraine, but we also show the countries, the German and French parliamentarians what the real situation in Ukraine looks like. [...] We have been in NATO for 15 years, we have just celebrated the 10th anniversary of our membership in the European Union. These are things that cannot be overestimated, these are processes, these are our joint investments, of which we are proud today and which we have talked about: we have done a lot, we are continuators of this great civilization change, this great modernization process. We are proud that we could participate in this. [...] Today we know that Poland must be strong [...] this strong Poland must be in a strong Europe. Our expectations towards the Union must go hand in hand with our contribution to the continuous expansion of the European project. [...] The more Polish presence, the Polish idea, Polish emotions and Polish involvement, the better the future Europe. We believe deeply that we have a patent, that we have an idea, that we want Europe to change, that it would be even more effective, that our voice, the Polish voice in Europe would mean more and be even more audible. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

In just a quarter of a century, we have transformed our country, politically and economically devastated by communism, into a sovereign and democratic state, capable of providing a decent quality of life for an increasing part of its citizens. [...] We consider a referendum carried out by the self-proclaimed authorities of Crimea illegal [...] We also do not accept unilateral decisions of the Kremlin about the inclusion of Crimea. We will respond appropriately to Russia as we do in Ukraine together with the whole West. [...] We are influencing the position of the entire Union [...] Poland is an inspiration here. [...] The North Atlantic Alliance is the best defense system that Poland has had in its history. We underline the importance of the 15th anniversary of our accession to NATO. We see that it serves the security of Poland and the security of its allies. [...] Poland has clearly advanced in the political hierarchy of the European Union - from a country that looks at the Union through the prism of securing only financial interest, we have become a country that is increasingly taking responsibility for the fate of the entire Union. [...] The crisis in Ukraine has shown that we can count on the majority of our European partners, including in the field of eastern policy. (Radoslaw Sikorski, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

<p>In matters of alliances we are safe, we are not threatened by any war [...] NATO is capable of acting in a situation where it would have to act. (Leszek Miller, SLD, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>From today's perspective of 25 years, it can be seen that the direction of Poland's integration with the structures of NATO and the European Union was right. Today, thanks to NATO and the European Union, we have greater political security in Poland. [...] which is why it is so important that these institutions are strong. But it is also important that Poland's position in these institutions should be equally strong and stable (Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>We are convinced that the Polish future, both in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in the long-term perspective, such a strategic one, can be safe when we are a very important, valued, respected element of an integrated Europe (Donald Tusk, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>The term "strong Poland" is not only an ambitiously sounding slogan, but a real symbol that should build a measurable shape in building the European Union of the second decade of the 21st century. The Polish raison d'état requires such actions aimed at respecting Poland's vital interests in the EU structures [...] Let us act in a way that co-responsibility among others for the decision-making process and for Poland's interests in the European Union to be perceived as the success of the entire Union, including our country, in shaping the vision of modern Europe and the global arena. [...] [We] need to systematically build the image of Poland as a reliable, predictable and proven ally in the North Atlantic Treaty. (Jarosław Górczyński, PSL, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>At the moment, it is in Poland's interest that the structures to which we belong, which is our great achievement, the European Union and NATO, are as strong as possible and our position in these structures is relatively high. (Stanisław Żelichowski, PSL, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>We all realize that we live in an era of uncertainty, but that does not mean that we are being threatened by war because we are safe in NATO [...] Poland should stick to the mainstream EU and NATO (Tadeusz Iwiński, SLD, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>
<p>We mean as much in Europe as we mean in the region. [...] We should return to the position of a determined promoter of the open-door policy and the expansion of NATO and the Union further east. (Witold Waszczykowski, PiS, Sejm, 8.5.2014)</p>

Poland as a state that needs to strengthen its position regionally and globally

Triggering factor

The political crisis and Russia's foreign policy as a factor creating the necessity for Poland to develop as a stronger regional and global actor, able to respond to new threats.

Examples from the textual data:

One of the consequences of events in Ukraine is for us to raise awareness of external threats and convince us that we must do everything to make Poland strong internally, have a stable position in a united Europe, but open to friendly cooperation and allied policy in other parts of the world [...] The Ukrainian crisis does not only have regional implications. Due to the politics and position of the Russian Federation, it reflects on global politics (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Polish diplomacy needs a fair diagnosis, international environment of Poland, and then defining our *raison d'état* and national interest, ambitious defining the position of Poland in the region and in the world. The strength of our diplomacy should be our position in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This is where we should strive for the position of the spokesperson for the interests of the region through intensive cooperation with the countries of the Baltic Sea, Central and Southern Europe. We mean as much in Europe as we mean in the region. (Witold Waszczykowski, PiS, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

The history of Central Europe, especially now, when we celebrate the tenth anniversary of our presence in the structures of the European Union, shows us all how the unity of Slavic nations becomes important, especially in the era of events in our eastern neighbor Ukraine. I am referring to further intensified development of our activities within the Visegrad Group [...] against threats arising at this stage. (Jarosław Górczyński, PSL, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Constructive strategy of argumentation – the aspect of differentiation

Emphasizing Poland's belonging to the community that respects the international law, treating international law as a security instrument.

Consolidating factor

Explicit differentiation from Russia as a factor consolidating Poland's identification with the Western and more civilized community.

Examples from the textual data:

Instead of democratizing and modernizing, Russia is entering the next corner of its complicated history. [...] Russia does not accept the principles that the international community has laboriously worked out for decades, while remembering the enormity of the tragedy of two world wars. What's more, the Russian state seems to have its own vision of the world. [...] in contrast to the votes that flow from the Kremlin, the West, including Poland, has never sought to exclude Russia from the international community. On the contrary, for many years we have been making efforts to develop relations with her through numerous institutions and instruments [...] Due to centuries of experience, Poland is particularly dependent on partner-like and good-neighborly relations with Russia. [...] It is not the West that has turned Russia off. It was Russia who chose to return to the tracks of the anachronistic development model. (Radoslaw Sikorski, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

We must compare or contrast with our policy - ours, that is, Polish, and also the European Union - which is based on the primacy of international law, on the primacy of respect for democracy and equal respect for all Europeans, regardless of their nationality. (Jan Vincent, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Today in Eastern Europe, we have a crime, violation of international law, regional and bilateral agreements and numerous deaths as a result of the aggressor's armed operations. This crime has still not been punished. [...] Activity to punish the aggressor is our raison d'être. Observance of international law is one of the few instruments in our security arsenal. The active support of independent and democratic Ukraine is also our raison d'être. (Witold Waszczykowski, PiS, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Perpetuation strategy of argumentation	
Poland facing a threat from Russia in energy security, treated as an irrelevant neighbor in energy talks and as a vassal in gas contracts with Russia.	<i>Threatening factor</i> (the aspect of dependency) Russia's policy in Ukraine as a factor reinforcing Poland's threatened identity of being dependent on Russia.
<i>Examples from the textual data:</i>	
As shown by recent events in Ukraine, Russia's practices regarding indisputable countries and Russia's increasingly disrespectful attitude towards the EU countries, Poland's energy security is under threat. In the face of growing anxiety in the world, we must do everything not only to become independent of Russian fuel, but also to break the monopoly on the horizontal transmission of gas from the East to Europe. [...] Another fact that is alarming for our energy security is the tightening of trade relations between Germany and Russia. [...] Poland in these talks is overlooked - like an irrelevant neighbor. [...] soon we will face an energy deficit and then the necessity of buying very expensive gas from the West. (Jan Warzecha, PiS, Sejm, 3.4.2014)	
Poland's relations with Gazprom have an almost vassal character and are very far from the relations characteristic of the developed countries of democracy. (Józef Rojek, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 3.4.2014)	
Poland experiencing a real political and military threat for the first time in 25 years, very sensitive to the issue of maintaining the inviolability of borders, fearing the Russian aggression.	<i>Threatening factor</i> The annexation of Crimea as further reinforcing the threat perception about Russia in Poland. Causal function: increasing the need for security assurances from allies.
<i>Examples from the textual data:</i>	
For the first time in 25 years, in the territory of one of our neighbors, our other neighbor is in a war, for the first time in 25 years we have to deal with an extremely serious threat to the basic interests of our country. [...] At present, our current foreign policy is subject to a great test as far as	

Eastern policy is concerned. The basic imperative of Polish eastern policy is to maintain a belt of sovereign states separating us from Russia. Russia is today the only country that threatens us militarily. [...] It is in our interest that Ukraine should be a sovereign and independent state. Today, Russian intervention threatens her, and such destabilized Ukraine is unfortunately a threat to the Polish *raison d'état*. (Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Solidarna Polska, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

When Russia cooperates with the world and respects its rules, we rejoice at it and we are the first to cooperate. However, when Russia annexes the territories of neighbors and threatens them with violence, we quickly draw conclusions. A lot more: we will be the first to enjoy Russia's path of aggression. (Radoslaw Sikorski, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

The first goal is to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine. From the beginning it was a superior issue. We Poles know how important it is to maintain the principle of inviolability of borders in Europe. We are sensitive to this [...] It happened for the first time in the recent history of Central and Eastern Europe. [...] the law has been broken by Russia, and we, Europe, have not been able to prevent it. (Leszek Miller, SLD, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

How hard is this threat to our security - we see every day, we see it in television and media coverage. It is a political threat implemented by Russian politics, disinformation and propaganda policy. (Grzegorz Schetyna, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

[W]e feel threatened for the first time in 25 years. And we are rightly feeling threatened. [...] History is a story in a sense, but today the starting point is much better for the West, for democracy, for international law than it was in 1949. (Jan Vincent, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

The situation is really serious, the most serious for many, many years, because in fact the geopolitical situation of Poland has changed, comparable to that of 1989. We are simply in a completely different world. [...] today we feel safe because of agreements signed with the European Union, NATO and because of the current position - strong or weak - of Poland in Europe, and in particular of course in the European Union. [...] [But in fact] We are not taken seriously. Poland is in a difficult situation. It in a sense resembles that of the 1930s. The illusion is that the fact of our presence in NATO and in the European Union gives us a sense of security. It does not give. [...] Ukrainians have been deceived. Of course, by Russia too. Who will give me a guarantee today that it will not be the same with us. Why should we believe that the United States, which has not

engaged in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as we would like it, will get involved in ours if Putin does annexation, say, of Lublin or Olsztyn. [...] Let's stop cheating on ourselves and our compatriots. (Janusz Palikot, Twoj Ruch, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Transformative strategy of argumentation

Poland considering further European integration and joining the euro-zone as a long-term security measure not only in economic, but also in political and military dimensions.

Triggering factor

The threat created by Russia as a factor for pushing Poland for further European integration and introducing a major financial reform.

Examples from the textual data:

[T]here is nothing that prevents us from treating the eurozone as an anti-missile shield as an element of military action, not only political or economic. (Janusz Palikot, Twoj Ruch, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

One of the ways to strengthen our position is to gradually prepare for joining the euro zone. Entering the Eurozone in the longer term will in some sense determine the future, including security. (Stanisław Żelichowski, PSL, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

The events that take place in Ukraine should mobilize us for faster integration with the euro area. [...] In the eurozone, the principle one for all, all for one is absolutely mandatory, because serious threats to one country automatically mean perturbations in all. In today's complicated international situation, creating such interdependencies between Poland and other European countries is in our interest. (Radoslaw Sikorski, PO, Sejm, 8.5.2014)

Source: author's representation, Anastasiya Kochetkova.

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