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**An Unlikely Interim Fix: The Urgent Case for a  
UN Security Council Reform**

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## **Abstract**

Many scholars, authors and politicians have stated that the UN Security Council, in the contemporary world, is ‘not fit for purpose.’ Two decades of discussions and deliberations over why and how to reform the Council has not resulted in a consensus in the international community. However, there is an urgent need to reform the Council to improve its efficiency and save itself from irrelevance. This paper intends to deliver a comprehensive analysis of the UNSC reform issue and provide an ‘interim fix’ as an alternative solution to break the reform impasse.

The paper analyses the foundational design of the UNSC using the Institutional Design Theory and reiterates the inherent need for a reform of the Council. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the reform process. A comprehensive examination of the reform proposals show that the two reasons that equally contribute to the reform stalemate are the lack of consensus among the reform groups and the firm opposition of the P5 to any reform agenda that encroaches on their special status or veto right. Using the Veto Player Theory and the Path Dependency Theory, the paper arrives at a finding that a reform implementation through formal amendment of the UN Charter, is unlikely to be foreseen in the near future. Upon such circumstances and taking into account the urgent need for a Council reform, the final part of this paper provides a strategic ‘interim fix.’ This involves introducing various reform strategies that curb the veto right of the P5, as it is the veto right contribute the most to the inefficiency of the Council. The paper suggests the implementation of such a reform strategy through a loose phased agreement, which does not involve a formal amendment to the Charter – to move past the reform impasse and advocate for an immediate fix.

## **List of Abbreviations**

**AU** – African Union

**ECFR** – European Council on Foreign Relations

**EU** – European Union

**GPF** – Global Policy Forum

**ICC** – International Criminal Court

**LON** – League of Nations

**NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Non-PM** - Non-Permanent Members

**OEWG** – Open Ended Working Group

**P2** – France and U.K.

**P3** – Russia, China and U.S.

**P5** – Permanent members of the UN Security Council –  
U.K., U.S., China, Russia and France

**PM** – Permanent Members

**UN** - United Nations

**UNC** – United Nations Charter

**UNGA** – United Nations General Assembly

**UNSC** – United Nations Security Council

**WMD** – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## INTRODUCTION

“We need to keep hope alive and strive to do better.”

-Kofi Annan

The United Nations (UN) is the principal international organization that is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Security Council (UNSC), whose decisions are binding for all member States, is without a doubt the most powerful organ in the UN that works towards fulfilling the mandate of sustaining international peace and security (Freiesleben, 2013). However, the Council is being increasingly criticised for its underrepresentation and illegitimacy in decision-making that results in the inefficiency of the Council (Ronzitti, 2013). According to many, the UNSC suffers legitimacy because the Council, especially in procedural matters, makes decisions that are unrepresentative of its member States (Odunuga, 2018). This stems from the fact that the Council is inherently made of only 15 members, out of which only the permanent five (P5 - China, Russia, U.S., U.K., France) have the final say in all constitutional matters due to their exclusive veto rights. The veto right is one of the most criticised factor and has been termed as ‘undemocratic’ and anachronistic’ in the international forum (Okhovat, 2011).

In other words, the UNSC is challenged for being ‘a relic of the past,’ an organization whose rules were determined in 1945 that does not reflect the contemporary political climate of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Imber, 2006). Upon such criticisms, the movement for a reform of the UNSC surfaced during the early 1990s and it reflected the concerns of the undemocratic veto rights, illegitimacy in the decision-making process, and underrepresentation in the Council. As a mark of the beginning of the movement for a Council reform, the ‘Open-Ended Working Group’ (OEWG) was established in 1993 as a UN working body to explore the proposals for reform on the question of equitable representation and the increase in the membership of the Council (OEWG, 1994). It has been 24 years since the group’s consecutive yet unfruitful deliberations. Many reform groups were formed to advocate for their demands in reforming the Council and each had their own reform agenda.

It has been over two decades of such discussions over a probable structural reform of the Council but no changes have been made yet due to the varied interests and differential concerns of the reform groups and the P5. The OEWG is being dubbed as the “Never-Ending Working Group (Gould & Rablen, 2016). This is now being referred to as the ‘reform

impasse' where things are at a deadlock and there are lesser practical possibilities of implementing a reform by the day.

## **1.1 Literature Review**

Since the 1990s, there have been many academic papers focusing on the analytical assessment of the reform proposals and the prospects of their implementation. Though there has always been a consensus on the need for a reform, Kuzma's analysis on UNSC reform and the various reform proposals in 1998 suggested that "the basic positions on reforms are still too far apart for any reform to take place in the near future" (Kuzma, 1998). Research throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century focused on analysing the reform proposals but concluded with the same finding –the implementation of a reform remains an elusive concept for the near future.

While many authors targeted the P5 for the reform stalemate and rightly so, literature also evolved to criticise the inflexibility and the motivations of the reform groups. Justin Morris' paper in 2000 questioned the key assumptions and motives of the reform proposals (Morris, 2000) and Schaefer's paper in 2016 substantiated this argument by stating that the motivations of the reform groups have to be 'depoliticised' to see any improvement in the reform process. Mark Imber's analysis of the reform proposals in 2006 also explained the politicization of the rule-making process in the matter of UNSC reform and the self-interested motivations behind the demands of the reform groups (Imber, 2006). These papers established that the reform groups are interested in gaining a seat in the Council and not in improving the democracy or efficiency of the Council. Through in-depth analysis of the historical and contemporary consequential study of the UNSC reform debacle, even recent papers concluded with the same remark as Kuzma's in 1998 — "Insurmountable obstacles lie ahead and it is unlikely that the Council will be reformed any time soon" (M. Rodriguez, 2010; Ronzitti, 2010; Imber, 2006; Alene, 2015; Gould & Rablen, 2016).

Despite the stalemate, literature on UNSC reform also took a constructive turn by containing a political analysis of the reform debates and at the same time, trying to suggest the kind of reforms that would be 'most achievable/desirable' under contemporary political conditions (Wirkola, 2010; Lehmann, 2013; Gowan & Gordan, 2014; Gould & Rablen, 2016). Volker Lehmann's paper advocated for ACT's proposal of implementing a Code of Conduct, which according to him, would help improve the efficiency of the Council the most (Lehman, 2013).

Gould & Rablen's paper (2017) used politically relevant and timely concepts such as *equity* and *efficiency* to assess the various reform proposals and suggested that the best way to reform the Council would be to weaken the veto rights of the P5. Baccarini (2018) analysed the ways by which the Council could assess its formal rules – how they work to create the lock-in effect and then set out to amend them through informal reform procedures.

Literature in the recent past goes beyond the reform stalemate and suggests alternative solutions and pathways to move past the reform issue at large. Odunuga's paper (2018) proposes a hard-to-achieve alternative solution to the issue where he suggests empowering regional organizations to step up their roles in promoting regional peace and stability in a way to balance the veto power of the P5 (Odunuga, 2018). Yet, such an alternative does not make any difference, as the UNSC will still retain its faulty design and continue to be ineffective. In retrospect, Granja (2017) insists on eliminating the veto rights for the Council to run effectively. Granja's work on the implications of the elimination of veto rights and its prospects of increasing the Council's efficiency is a more significant analysis considering the urgent need to make the Council more legitimate and effective. There is a lack of focus on realistic strategies of reforming the Council and regulating the veto power or suggesting immediate alternative solutions to end the reform impasse, which is a considerable gap in the literature.

## **1.2 Outline**

This paper will focus on providing a comprehensive analysis of the UNSC reform debacle explaining with historic context, the need for a reform, the existing reform proposals and reasoning the lack of improvement in the reform process. Most importantly, it will focus on introducing alternative strategies to curb the veto rights that could improve the efficiency of the Council; given that it is the exploitation of the veto right that has damaged the reputation of the Council the most (Lehmann, 2013). The paper suggests the implementation of such strategies through a specific type of agreement that does not involve a formal amendment to the Charter. Though this might be an 'unlikely fix,' it is directed towards acknowledging the urgent need to reform the UNSC without which, the Council is at risk of losing its relevance.

The first Chapter of this paper will use take a theoretical approach to explore the viability of the current state of operations of the UN (the *status-quo*). It will use the Institutional Design

Theory, developed by Robert E. Goodin, to analyse the factors that constitute a ‘good institution’ and mirror that with the UNSC to ascertain if the Council is still capable of operating efficiently with its institutional design and foundational rationale. The second Chapter will establish various reform groups, their demands, the attitude of the P5 towards a reform and relate it with the veto payer theory, as developed by George Tsebelis (2002) and explained by Elida Wirkola (2010) with regards to the UNSC, to give a broader perspective of the prospects of reform implementation. The chapter will also look into whether an expansion in membership or an extension of the veto power, which are two of the most sought-after reform agendas, would help increase the efficiency of the Council.

Upon discussing the current situation and the prospects of reforming the Council, the third chapter will move on to suggesting various *strategies* that could be used to invoke a reform to regulate the use of veto that might have a better degree of improving the Council’s efficiency. The strategies focus on curbing the veto rights of the P5, by some means, as it is the veto right that create the most difficulty in passing a resolution in the Council (Okhovat, 2011). These strategies are analysed with the concept of ‘*desirability, acceptability and achievability*’ as developed by Kuzma (1998).

The chapter also introduces an ‘interim fix’ by suggesting the implementation of a reform through the concept of loose phased agreements as elucidated by Catherine C. Langlois & Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. This is an attempt to go past the reform stalemate and the difficulty in formally amending the Charter, to introduce a reform as an intermediate solution. This might not be a universally applicable concept, but it sets a tone for a mechanism that will induce cooperation among the P5 without involving a formal amendment of the Charter. Though this does not promise increased efficiency in the working of the UNSC, it fills the gap in the literature by introducing realistic concepts and strategies by which a reform can be implemented as an interim fix, considering the urgent need to reform the Council. Overall, this paper aims at broadly explaining the UNSC reform issue and introducing an alternative fix to break the reform impasse.

### 1.3 Scope

Though there has been an overwhelming amount of literature on UNSC reform and no positive outcome or a prospect of reform implementation, it is important to keep laying focus on the prospects of a reform and push for an urgent need to reform the UNSC. In today's day and age, with the increasing number of security threats and the change in the nature of such threats stemming from the evolution of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), failed States and Civil Wars, it is vital for an organization such as the UN, to be more effective than ever. Peace and security are two very important things in the world today to be sustained and the UN, being the only legitimate actor that could act for the sustenance of peace, has been far less efficient than it has promised to be.

March 2018 marked 7 years of upheaval in Syria and the conflict has reduced many lives to dust and the city to rubble. Since the upheaval in Syria in 2011, there were many attempts by the UN to carry through a resolution to condemn human rights violations in Syria. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which was adopted by the UNSC during the 2005 World Summit, was yet another effort intended to prevent genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. This responsibility means that the P5 have the responsibility to not veto 'when the world is confronted by such heinous crimes' (Adams, 2015). However, in the words of Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the R2P:

“Syria has brought into stark relief the reality of a twentieth century UN struggling to respond to 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges and the use of veto in a mass atrocity situation is inconsistent with the aspirations of a 193-member UN General Assembly (Adams, 2015).

Russia has vetoed 12 resolutions on Syria as of April 2018 (See Appendix A). These vetoes do not account for moral reasons but are purely motivated by self-interested political concerns of Russia and China and their relations with Syria. Over 400,000 people have fallen prey to the war in Syria and UNSC's inaction has been one of the main reasons for the continuation of the mass atrocities in Syria (Halliyade, 2016). The Council, which clearly has the power to change the course of life for Syrian citizens, is being held back by its own structural deficiency in the UN Charter – especially the one that gives the P5 the right to veto. The crafty use of veto has also resulted in the Council being disreputably known for its failure to

curb the Rwandan genocide and its blatant inaction in similar events in Bosnia, Darfur or Kosovo (Halliyade, 2016).

A reform to regulate the veto power and to the structure of the Council could change its working methods and make it more effective in preventing such horrendous mass atrocities the way it was intended to do. This makes it empirically a crucial topic to base more research and focus on, despite the continuous delay in seeing an improvement in the matter. Ultimately, the UNSC is a noble institution with moral objectives and even under its current stalemate retains its relevance and importance. It is thus important to reiterate the foundational rationale of the organization, the reasons owing to the stalemate of the UNSC reform issue and more importantly, to suggest alternative ways to get ahead of the problem in the immediate future – which is exactly what this paper aims to do.

## Chapter – I

### Status-Quo: Why the UN Security Council Needs Reforming?

“The world has changed dramatically since 1945, and the Security Council must change, too,”

- Kofi Annan, 2006

The current structure of the Council is not well equipped to deal with the plethora of global challenges such as terrorism, refugee crises, violence, nuclear proliferation etc. and does not have an effective way of addressing such issues (Fungurai, 2017). Upon debates and discussions over the inefficiency of the Council, many reform proposals started to surface among the States and various regional organizations. However, even after two decades of such deliberations, there is still no consensus in the international community. Assuming the continuity of this scenario, the UNSC might have to work with its current state of operations without undergoing any change – the *status-quo*. If the *status-quo* prevails, would the Council still be able to adapt to contemporary political climate in the future? If not, why does the Council so desperately needs reforming?

The UN Security Council has been criticized for its inherent design and has been regarded as incapable to tailor to the changing political climate. Underrepresentation of the members of the UN, the illegitimacy in decision-making, the infamous veto rights and the UN’s rigid charter — make the UN ‘unfit for its purpose’ (as described by many) and puts challenges on effective operation of the organization (Bayeh, 2014). Upon such criticisms, this Chapter will call upon the mentioned criteria of scrutiny of the Security Council and try to relate them to the factors that determine a ‘good institution’ according to Robert E. Goodin’s Theory of Institutional Design. This is to see if the Council, despite its criticisms, could still be relevant in today’s political climate with its foundational design and rationale. By doing so, it will set up a clear argument of why *status-quo* is not a solution to improving the efficiency of the Council - as the Council lacks the basic foundational principles that make an institution effective in the longer run.

## 2.1 Institutional Design Theory and the UNSC

The foundation of any institution determines its strength. The design of an organization reflects on the future degree of its efficiency (Koremenos et al, 2001). The UN Security Council has a deeply flawed design, structurally and in its Charter. According to the Institutional Design Theory, two of the most important principles that make up a ‘good institution’ is *revisability* and *robustness* (E. Goodin, 1996). These principles are not universally applicable or commended without qualification. However, they tend to act as basic foundational and desirable factors that help ascertain where an institution stands in terms of its design and if it is capable of having a long effective lifetime.

### 2.1.1 Revisability

This principle points to how any ‘good institution’ should be **flexible** in its design to be able to evolve and revise itself over time. The two key points behind this principle are that humans are fallible, and societies change (E. Goodin, 1996). This is to say that human behavior and values, upon which our actions are predicated, are themselves subject to change, hence changing the political climate at regular intervals. Therefore, it is important or rather more efficient to design an institution in such a way that it is flexible enough to evolve over time and admit to ‘learning over doing.’ (E. Goodin, 1996). Applying this to the UN, it is evident that the UN Charter is not flexible at the least (March & Olsen, 1984). This inherent fault in the design was foreseen even before the formation of the UNSC (Baccarini, 2018). The countries who opposed the veto power and even the creation of the permanent members began to insist on a process that would allow for future amendments to the Charter, prior to the ratification of the UNC in 1945 (Garcia, 2012).

Though such a provision was created, an amendment to the UNC requires an affirmative vote from a majority of the UNGA members, ratified by a two-thirds majority of UNSC members and a collective ‘yes’ from the P5 (UN, 1945). No one predicted that such a provision would result in a ‘lock-in’ in the Council and will only limit any possibility for a change (Baccarini, 2018). Even if they did, it was outweighed by the desperate need for the establishment of an international organization to promote peace. While there was a unique moment in 1963 where an alteration was made to the Charter pertaining to an expansion in the non-permanent membership from 11 to 15, negotiations in the recent past have not led anywhere.



This is because the P5 have developed different and contradictory interests among themselves over time and hence have started to use their veto right to protect their national interests, rather than for the greater good (Kuzma, 1998). This has also led to the crafty use of the veto rights. The Syrian Civil War is a great example to substantiate this claim. With a mounting 400,000 fatalities and 11 million refugees (and counting) to date, the UNSC has failed to contain the issue since its inception in 2011. While U.K and France's use of veto has plummeted since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia and China, especially in the case of Syria, have been exploiting their veto right to promote national interest over the prevention of mass atrocities (See Appendix A).

Russia and China have also been promoting the use of 'silent veto' where the States give an early warning of a no-vote and thereby prevent any draft resolution from tracking into the Council (Aljazeera, 2015). In 2012, a veto was cast restricting any sanctions on the Assad regime and another veto was cast in 2014 blocking the referral of the Syrian case to the ICC (The Interpreter, 2018). Six resolutions were vetoed in 2017, highest number since 1998 (UNSC Report, 2018). Out of the six, Russia and China have vetoed five resolutions on Syria and all against imposing a sanction on Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons (See Appendix A). This play with the veto in the case of Syria stems from the matter of protecting their allies. Such a wily use of their veto power will prevail as long as Russia and China continue supporting their allies. Thus, the Council at-large failed not only to prevent but also to respond timely to the crisis (Halliyade, 2016).

Syria being the most recent example of the failure of the Council in upholding its objectives, it has to be noted that the Council has previously been ineffective in preventing and responding effectively to mass atrocities in Darfur, Bosnia, Gaza or Rwanda, etc., (Ronzitti, 2010; Halliyade, 2016). Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of the UNSC in such cases that have been globally recognized and criticized, there is no 'easy' way to make amendments to the Charter or revise the UNC to drive the Council to reflect contemporary realities. Any reform agenda, according to the UNC, has to go through a positive vote of the P5 for implementation. Due to the P5's varied interests and their inherent desire to retain their special status in the Council, they tend to block any reform that infringes on their special status, thus making the Council inflexible in adjusting to current geopolitical reality.

The design of the Charter and its inherent rigidity makes any reform difficult to process and implement. This ends up making the Council ‘change-resistant’ (M.O. Hosli & Dorfler, 2017). According to Pierson (2000), creators who build a change-resistant institution do so to make sure that they do not end up in a worse-off situation but will introduce hurdles for the improvement of the position of all other members. Hence, the institution will not be able to adapt to altered interest constellations (Mahoney, 2000, p.519). Thus by making the Council inflexible through its rigid Charter, the creators of the UNSC have made it impossible for the institution to revise itself over time and be flexible enough to be effective even through the changing political realities.

### **2.1.2 Robustness**

This principle comes in contrast with *revisability*. While it is important for the organizational design to be flexible, it should also be able to bind itself to a certain course of action following its objectives. While doing so, the organization should be *robust* in any sense that they should be capable enough to adapt to new situations; not be brittle and destroyed by them (E. Goodin, 1996). This principle has been lacking in the working of the UNSC, which has also contributed to its inefficiency.

The role of the Council has increased since the end of the Cold War. There is an imperative need for the Council to be efficient to prevent mass atrocities especially in today’s world where new security threats are stemming from international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed States and Civil Wars. The constant tensions between the NATO powers and Russia, the on-going Syrian Civil War, the mass ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, nuclear tensions between North Korea and Iran, and the Civil Wars in Yemen and Ukraine – a few among many – point to the need for an organization such as the UN to keep things from worsening.

The objectives of the UN are more relevant today. However, the UNSC has failed to stick to their course of action in achieving their objectives. The organization was set up to sustain international peace and security but we still see the Council unable to sustain the massive human rights violations and mass atrocities happening all over the world. The UNSC, despite its promises to fulfill its objectives, is unable to act upon such atrocities efficiently due to the ‘lock-in’ in the Council on resolutions regarding such crises. This lock-in arises because of

the differential interests of the P5 and their ability to veto upon such difference in interests (Granja, 2017).

John Ikenberry (2001), in his paper, even excluded the UNSC in his list of major institutions that were established after the WW2, or even after the Cold War. According to his analysis, the UNSC's role in avoiding conflict escalation, effective conflict resolution, managing the Cold War and subsequent international and civil conflicts, has been far too incompetent (Baccarini, 2018). The special status of the P5 is being exploited to fit national interests, which directly puts the efficiency of the organization into question. The voting system in the UNSC, the infamous veto rights and the organization's undemocratic representation of the world — inherent in the design of the Council — make the Council ineffective in performing robustly to gratify its objectives.

### **2.1.3 Legitimacy and Democracy**

Moving from E. Goodin's factors for determining a good institution to a more general perspective on international treaties and organizations, *legitimacy* and *democracy* are inherently two important principles that help efficient functioning of an organization (Christiano, 2009). It is safe to say, due to the underrepresentation of the members of the UN and the extensive special status of the P5, the UNSC denounces both the principles to an extent (Kuzma, 1998).

Article 2(1) of the UN Charter states that its first principle is that the organization will act based on the "principle of sovereign equality of all States." This equality, owing to the formal voting procedures, finds itself in expression in the UN General Assembly. The UNGA is the only main plenary organ of the UN where all the Member States are represented and has one vote each, regardless of their size or population (Blum, 2005). Countries like China and India with a population of over a billion have the same voting rights as countries like San Marino and Monaco whose population lingers in thousands. Therefore, the UNGA is frequently referred to as the 'democratic organ' of the UN (Blum, 2005). Contrasting the General Assembly with the UN Security Council, the level of democracy or legitimacy in voting rights plummets incredibly.

UN's membership has increased almost fourfold since its founding – from just 51 in 1946 to 193-member States today. Furthermore, during its inception, the UN comprised a majority of European countries and a number of Latin nations but today, there is a majority of UN members from Asia and Africa, who are not actively represented in the Council. The P5, although are few of the most powerful countries in the world, are not the only ones. Decolonization post-1945 gave rise to new States who now seek a seat in the Council - India, Japan, and Brazil for example. Such States have developed economically, fostered international recognition and have grown to become considerable global economic giants (Lulseged, 2013).

When the number of members in the UN shot from the initial 51 to 112 in 1963, and following the process of decolonization, there were many discussions about making a structural reform to the Council in order to improve representation. Though this was constantly rejected by the P5, with the massive increase in UN's membership, the need for a reform could no longer be postponed (Lau, 2003). Hence, in 1965, there was an expansion in the non-permanent membership of the Council from the initial 6 to 10 without having to formally amend the Charter – through including resolution 1991 A (XVIII) (Granja, 2017).

This amendment was successful as it fulfilled its intentions of increasing the UN representation and was one of the important decisions of the UN in making itself more relevant to political reality. The motion for a reform today follows similar reasoning. Since 1965, the members of the UN have increased from 117 to 193, and going by the concerns of the member States, there is an obvious need for wider representation to improve the efficiency and legitimacy in the decision-making process. Fifteen members are making the decisions in the Council, out of which only five have the final say. Yet, such decisions have an impact on the rest of the world. Thus, to ensure legitimacy in the decision-making process of the Council, a wider representation of all countries in the Council is necessary (Oduvuga, 2018).

Another factor that undermines legitimate and democratic decision-making is the veto rights for the P5. The veto rights are being used as a privilege and a tool to promote self-interested motives than as a responsibility to prevent rash decisions in the Council (Schaefer, 2016). Since 1946, the P5 have exercised their right to veto on various occasions, some on cases of application of membership by States and others on humanitarian crises, peacekeeping missions etc. Around 35 resolutions were vetoed on issues relating to crises in the Middle

East (from the Palestinian crisis to the on-going Syrian Civil War) (See Appendix A). Such vetoes prevent the Council from upholding its objective of maintaining peace and security (Halliyade, 2016). This veto power for the P5 has become an extensive issue especially in the post-Cold War era as the concept of security and threat has changed and acts like veto will worsen the state of a crisis, making the UN ‘unfit for its purpose’ (Independent, 2012).

International organizations, in the present societal climate, have developed to play such massive roles to be as influential as the States themselves. The UN Security Council’s objectives and operations are dedicated towards dispute settlement of civil conflicts as well as the international maintenance of peace and security. An organization with such power and responsibility lacks the legitimacy of power in the Security Council (Sato, 2009). The Council’s inability to function effectively during the Cold War due to East-West opposition, and its inaction in Syria due to differential national interests of Russia and China can be taken as examples to prove the illegitimacy in the decision-making process, which leads to the ineffectiveness of the Council (Sato, 2009).

Ultimately, there are three main underlying issues with the structure of the UN:

1. Illegitimacy/ Lack of democracy — The UN’s composition of members and its decision-making in the Security Council does not reflect an appropriate representation of its present member States;
2. Inflexibility – The lack of flexibility in the UNC that makes it almost impossible to introduce a change to the Council, structural or otherwise and;
3. Ineffectiveness – The Council is being increasingly incapable of being robust in fulfilling its primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security in the world (Sato, 2009).

While we discuss the inherent defects with the structure and design of the UN Security Council, it is also important to acknowledge the rationale of the founding of the UN back in 1945. All the factors of ineffectiveness of the Council that we identify now were indeed foreseen during its founding. However, there was a necessity to overlook such factors in order to push for the creation of an international institution. The design of the organization made sense during 1945 considering the then political climate and the desperate need for an international organization to prevent yet another world war.

## 2.2 Rationale of the Creation of the UNSC

The UN was formed upon the end of the Second World War, one of the most disastrous events in history, as a signification for maintaining continuing peace in the world thereafter. In August 1943, at the Quebec Conference, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State of the United States and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, drafted a declaration that insisted on the establishment of a “general international organization based on the principle of sovereign equality of all nations.” This declaration received collective agreement and it was issued after a Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow in October 1943. Upon such dialogs, in late 1944, U.S., British, Soviet and Chinese representatives recommended a General Assembly comprising of the all member States and a Security Council that sits only the Big Four (France was an added later on) and six other members (Non-PMs) who are to be chosen by the Assembly (Office of the Historian, 2000). It was then at the Yalta Conference in 1945 that the ultimate draft of the Charter, including the regulations for voting and veto rights, was finalized.

During the negotiation stage of the establishment of the UN, many small and medium-sized States protested the special status for the ‘victors of the war.’ They called it an infringement on the sovereign equality of the States (Wouters & Ruys, 2005). In turn, the P5 claimed that it would take the privileged veto right as a responsibility to maintain international peace and security and would not use it to obstruct the working of the Council in any way (Kochler, 1991). The Big Four’s reasoning was based on the need to ensure peaceful relations among themselves and they convinced the other States that the only way this could be done is by introducing a mechanism working in their favour (Wouters & Ruys, 2005; Granja, 2017). The P5 managed to convince the members by reassuring them that the UN, despite their special status, will always be less subjective to obstruction than the case of League of Nations (LON), where a unanimous decision was necessary to pass resolutions (Wouters & Ruys, 2005).

The failure of LON also had a huge impact on the States reaching a consensus on the structure and design of the UN. As the founders of the UN recognized that the tension inside the LON was between the principle of equity and the lack of effective governance, they made this a ‘point of departure’ for the establishment of the successor organization (Grigorescu, 2005: p.33). They took into account that equity that existed in the LON did not lead to efficient functioning and thus might not be the best foundation for its successor. Therefore, the States

agreed that the design of the UN was more of a ‘realistic’ paradigm as the then ‘great powers’ were accepted to be the ‘potential enforcers of collective decisions’ (Grigorescu, 2005).

At the end, when the P5 threatened their withdrawal from the UN if the veto rights weren’t granted, the other members were faced with a decision where they had to choose between having an international organization for the sustenance of peace and security that could potentially prevent more destruction and not having one at all (Nadin, 2014). Furthermore, to ensure the credibility of the new organization, the participation of the Big Four was essential. Thus, the States complied with the special status and the veto rights.

Upon such a consensus, the UN Charter (UNC) was established. Article 27 of the Charter established the veto rights of the P5. The ultimate rationale behind the veto power has been that no decision would be taken in the Council without a joint agreement of the P5, the winning allied powers of the WW2, without whom the organization would not have been credible (Akindele & Akinterinwa, 1995). Put simply, it was always conceived that the Council rather be stuck in a stalemate than be used to make a decision opposed by one or more of the dissident great powers – the result of which might potentially lead to another war (Claude, 1962). Many scholars have also reasoned that it is the presence of the UN and its “delicate balance between the first, second and third worlds” that has helped evade yet another World War (Nanjundan, 1995).

### **2.3 Why Status-Quo is Not a Solution?**

While we have established the rationale, defending the foundation and design of the UN, the institution failed to adopt the important factors that depict the effectiveness of the organization in the long run. Based on such a consideration and the growing inefficiency of the Council in sustaining peace and security – mostly due to the veto power of the P5, a reform of the Council to improve its working methods is necessary.

The *status-quo* has created a class divide between the veto players and the member States. Regardless of the member States’ opinions and concerns, the final decision lays in the hands of the P5 and they have the authority to block any resolution in the Council, even to protect their national interest (Weiss, 2003). UNSC’s failure to respond to mass atrocities and prevention of humanitarian crises in cases such as Darfur, Bosnia, Rwanda etc. is due to the

exploitation of the veto right by the P5 to support national interest over sustaining international peace and security (Nadin, 2011). Drawing on Russia and China's vetoes on Syria, there is still no practical reason for vetoing a resolution aimed purely at protecting the civilians from further bloodshed in the hands of Assad's regime. Such confusion and disagreement in the Council encourages continuity in mass atrocity-related acts.

In the words of the 66<sup>th</sup> elected president of the UN, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, in an interview with Independent (2012):

“The ability of five countries to veto Security Council decisions is no longer credible and the outdated system is endangering international peace and security. The world has changed; the UN should also reform itself to deal with the issues of today. 60 years ago, who could imagine we would now be discussing climate change, food security or even the world would reach seven billion people. This is exactly why there is a need for a more active and effective UN. If the Security Council reflected the whole world in a fair way, then we might see a more effective council.”

In conclusion, the UN is a relic of the past – a reflection of the geopolitical realities of 1945 and not of today (Transconflict, 2017). Furthermore, the inherent design of the founding of the UN is flawed and is not tailored to fit the changing political climate. The veto power of the P5 obstructs efficient working of the Council the most, evident through the case of Syria – the most recent example. It has let down the principle objective of the UN of maintaining international peace and preventing conflict escalation at many instances. Analysing the foundational rationale of the UN but also the umbrella of changes that overweighs the rationale, it is safe to conclude that there is an urgent need to reform the Council to increase its efficiency and relevance in the contemporary world.



## **Chapter – II**

### **Assessing the Reform Proposals**

States have become entrenched in supporting the various options for reform and should start thinking anew on their positions.

- Kofi Annan (UN News, 2006).

The previous chapter established the faults in the inherent design of the Council. It also iterated how the world has changed around the creation of the Charter and how the use of veto has obstructed efficient working of the UNSC — pointing to the glaring need to reform the structure of the Council. This flashes spotlight on the efforts taken in the past few years to implement a reform to the Council to make it more effective.

The reform proposals, to an extent, address the problems identified in the previous chapter. They look into the Council's working methods, the exclusive veto power and the undemocratic structure of the Council, among other concerns (Okhovat, 2011). However, whether the proposals have primarily worked towards furthering the effectiveness of the Council is a statement in question. After almost two decades into the movement for a reform, it is unsurprising that such efforts have not been fruitful because of two reasons. Firstly, the reform groups are highly inflexible with their demands; contradictory to each other and have an overweighing advocacy to promote self-interested demands than pressing on the improvement of efficiency of the Council at large. Secondly, the P5, whose votes are mandatorily required to make even the slightest change to amend the Council, are not open to accepting any limitation on their veto rights or radical reform proposals (M. Malone, 2004).

Reasons owing to this stalemate, the nature of reform proposals recently, have shifted course to suit the fair political reality of today. Despite having many radical reform groups advocating for the abolishment of veto rights, there are also a few pragmatic approaches to reforming the Council today. This is being achieved by reform proposals advocating for minor changes that would directly touch upon increasing the factor of efficiency such as voluntary restraint of veto rights or implementation of the Code of Conduct etc. (Wouters &

Ruys, 2005). However, such a pragmatic approach to reforming the Council becomes just one among the other reform proposals and fails to gain more momentum in the international forum. To get a hold of the viability of the reform proposals and if one or any of them could solve the problems of the Council established in the previous chapter, a detailed assessment of the reform proposals is necessary.

This chapter will go over a few important proposals in detail and analyse them based on how they address the issues of inefficiency in the UNSC through their demands. The selection of the reform proposals is based on the impact that they had on the UNSC reform debacle and the international community during the reform process over time. The second part of the Chapter will assess the attitude of the P5 towards a reform of the Council. It will also use the Veto Player Theory (as explained by George Tsebelis in general and by Elida Wirkola (2010) pertaining to the UNSC) to assess whether a reform is likely to be foreseen in the near future and if so, whether it would solve the issue of the inefficiency of the Council.

### **3.1 The P5**

The United States advocates for a reform that is referred to as “The Quick Fix” which allows addition of five new PMs – one to Germany, one to Japan and the remaining three to countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It also suggests one additional non-permanent member seat, totally summing up to not more than 20 or 21 members. U.S. did not publicise a stance regarding the extension of veto rights. They rather said, “It could be decided once expansion is achieved” (C. McDonald & M. Patrick, 2010). Though this sounds like a proposal that is inclusive of the unrepresented countries, the Third World Nations rejected the proposal on the basis that it is still undemocratic. While America’s proposal aims to expand the membership to the unrepresented, its main goal, it claims, is to maximize the efficiency of the Council.

U.K favours permanent seats for Germany and Japan and permanent regional seats for Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Russia, on the other hand, has a generic view on the reform issue. It supports expansion but only when it is limited to 21 seats. It favours the extra seat for developing and industrialized countries, and the selection of permanent members from Latin America and Africa.

China, with an opposing view, does not support India or Japan to be permanent members of the Council. China also is against the G4's calls on UNSC reform, as it believes the expansion should be dealt in a 'rational and consensus-based model' with greater representation from the "developing world," particularly Africa (P. Panda, 2011). Its position is being supported by the United for Consensus (UfC) group, comprising of about 40 countries.

France, unlike any of the other P5, has always been open to reform and regulation of the veto rights. France, along with the U.K (P2), are the only permanent members to approve and advocate for a reform regulating the veto rights. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, M. Laurent Fabius mentioned in the 70<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly meeting that the veto right (that they benefit from), "must not be a privilege but a responsibility." He proposed the idea that, in the event of mass atrocities, the P5 would give up their power of vetoing decisions/resolutions. France also extensively extends its support to the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) in their initiatives to bring similar changes to the Council.

### **3.2 G4: Brazil, Germany, Japan and India**

G4's proposal is to add new national permanent seats to economically strongest and the most influential countries in the international community (Martini, 2009). They declared themselves as four of the candidates for the new permanent seats and the other seat(s) to African countries in their official proposal released in 2005. Germany and Japan are the fourth and second largest financial contributors to the UN's overall budget, and Brazil one among the top 10 contributors (See Appendix B). India and Brazil are also emerging as regional and potential global powers, thus validating their demand for permanent seats for themselves.

If this proposal were adopted, the new members would automatically enjoy the veto rights (Article 27, UNC). While Germany and Japan have been more pragmatic and lessened their demand for the extension of veto rights, India, and Brazil are still set strong on immediate extension of veto rights (Schaefer, 2016). To this end, India stated that it would defer the use of their veto power until after a review is undertaken (Martini, 2009). However, their proposal has not been evident in resolving the existing issues of the Council. In addition to that, there is also no unity among the G4 members in advocating for their demands. While India and

Brazil assert on emphasizing the group's demands and the implementation of their proposal, Germany and Japan to an extent, have been open to intermediary agreements – as long as a majority of the UNGA and the two major European powers (P2) back such agreements (Martini, 2009).

There are also pre-existing animosities and regional rivalry that would not make it an easy ride for the G4. For instance, Pakistan, being a nuclear-armed rival of India, finds it hard to agree with India's bid to become a PM on the Council, stated that their proposal promotes "national aspirations", and cannot enhance the current issue of underrepresentation (The Free Press Journal, 2018). For similar reasons, UfC also directly opposes G4's bid for a reform. U.S., Russia and the African Union (AU), whose support G4 was intently lobbying for, rejected G4's UN reform plan on the basis that a reform has to be proposed "the right way and at the right time" (CHINAdaily, 2005).

Overall, despite surfacing a strong proposal, the overshadowing rejection of G4's proposal by its rivals and the lack of unity among the G4 members make the likelihood of the implementation of the proposal close to none.

### **3.3 Uniting for Consensus (UfC)**

The UfC, also known as the *Coffee Club*, is a group of about 40 countries whose leaders include Italy, Colombia, South Korea and Pakistan. China, though being a part, remains a silent and an indirect observer. The group was developed in the 1990s against the bid of the G4. The group advocated an increase in the non-permanent members by a total number of 10 but was dead strong against an expansion in PMs or extension of veto rights. UfC drafted many revised proposals over time, but it is crucial to iterate that the foundation of the group was based on the sole idea of opposing its regional rivals and what they called an 'unjust reduction of their international political relevance' (Martini, 2009). This factor overweighs the group's desire for a better Council. Hence its motivations are also largely strategic and self-interested (Schaefer, 2017).

Although the reform bid of UfC seems reasonable enough to gauge support from the P5, the underlying objective of the group is to stall the reform process and make it difficult for G4 to get their reform proposal on the table. States like Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, and China in

the group are deliberately prolonging the reform process, as they would prefer status-quo to an extension of permanent membership to their rivals – which would leave them even less satisfied (Baccarini, 2018). Motivations of the members’ proposals matter in this case as it will reflect on their actions post any implementation of reform to the Council. Proposals motivated by self-interest more so than democracy and efficiency of the Council will not induce any changes but might only put the Council into more political sclerosis.

### **3.4 The African Union (AU)**

The AU is steered by the Committee of Ten (C10), which is the African Parliamentary Alliance for UN reforms. Africa, being the only continent with 54 countries, does not have a single permanent seat on the Council and thus their proposal demands the need for improved democracy and “full representation for African countries.” The Ezulwini Consensus was proposed in 2005 under AU’s draft resolution (A/59/L.67) and was adopted as AU’s common stance on reforming the Council. Pertaining to minimal representation, AU’s proposal advocates expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats and the Ezulwini Consensus demands two new PM and five non-PM seats to African countries, which will be selected by the AU. It also strongly pushes for the extension of veto rights (should they remain) to the new PMs.

The UNSC is also on top of the AU agenda for reform due to its crucial role in peace and security in African countries (Martini, 2009). There is no major contradiction to Africa’s bid for increasing membership to African countries by other UN members, which puts Africa’s proposal as the *heavyweight* of the UN reform debate (Gowan & Gordan, 2014). However, the likeliness of implementation of their proposal is not any higher than the other proposals. AU’s insistent hold on an extension of veto rights and their uncertainty in which countries to be selected to fill the seats become big hurdles to overcome in the process of garnering majority support. Upon the decision to create their own selection criteria, the AU also seem to be overlooking the proposed UN selection criteria and create some criteria of its own (GPF, 2005). Although the Ezulwini Consensus mentioned that the criteria would be based on the capacity and the representative nature of the countries, no clear definition of the criteria was stated. The underlying motive of AU’s proposal is to gain more recognition and decision-making power in the UN. While it is a fair demand, considering their present

underrepresentation, the many political obstacles in the way lessen their chances of garnering majority support in the international community.

### **3.5 The Italian Proposal**

The Italian proposal takes a completely different perspective on reforming the Council. Established in 1994, this proposal suggests the addition of 8-10 non-permanent member seats but these seats to be assigned to regions (such as AU, EU etc.) instead of countries on a rotational basis. The selected regions are to develop a process or a criterion to elect their permanent representatives (GPF, 1998). However, its position changed in a few months when Italy started to advocate for a new category of ‘semi-permanent members’ to rotate more frequently (Verzichelli & Cotta, 2000). Such a reform, according to Italy, would have the possibility of representing both medium and small powers who, until that point, did not have the chance to serve in the SC – hence be more effective than an expansion of PM seats (R. Falchi, 2006).

Italy’s active role in the reform discussions started in early 2009. It denounced G4’s proposal and AU’s reform agenda. Italy claims that its proposal, which does not emphasize on the expansion of PMs, shows its diplomatic efforts in increasing the efficiency of the Council. However, Italy’s goal is to become a semi-permanent member in the medium term and then get a permanent seat for the EU. The motivation behind the reform agenda of Italy has been a combination of self-interest and global recognition while also looking out for improving the Council’s representation. Italy also felt that its contribution to the UN should be globally recognised (R. Falchi, 2006). Italy’s proposal, however, has not found a consensus for both legal and political reasons (Martini, 2009). A major setback to Italy’s proposal of adding regional groups like the EU and AU as members of the SC is that not all regional organizations are fully representative of their countries. The EU, in itself, does not comprise of all European countries. While Italy’s proposal addresses the issue of representation and legitimacy in the Council, its proposal has a few loopholes and does not wholly output to fair representation and effectiveness of the UNSC.

### 3.6 ACT

The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group (ACT), comprises of about 22-member States and focuses on improving the working methods of the UN Security Council. The group built up their work upon the S5 (Small 5) group that was active in the early 2000s but hugely failed to exercise their goals to improve the working methods and efficiency of the Council (Schaefer, 2017). “ACT aims to increase both the involvement of non-Council members and the accountability of the Council to the entire UN membership” (GPF, 2013). The group also officially introduced the ‘Code of Conduct’ in 2015 which advocates for voluntary restraint of the use of veto by the P5 in any case of genocides, crimes against humanity and war crimes (UN Centre for Reform, 2015). The Code gained the support of 104-member States including U.K and France (P2) but did not garner the votes of the P3 (Russia, China and the U.S).

What sets this group apart from the others is that they choose to be independent of other regional reform groups and work as a separate entity solely concentrating on improving working methods and procedures with the current composition of members. The group’s pragmatic approach to focus on better functioning of the Council, disregarding the personal stakes of States in enlargement of the Council, and their sole emphasis on improving working methods and transparency has made it the most genuine UNSC reform group out of all others (Einsiedel et al, 2015). The group is not strategically motivated, as its members are not primarily driven to gain membership on the Council (Lehmann, 2013).

However, two main obstacles stand in the way of the implementation of this proposal. Firstly, the pre-existing deadlock among the various reform proposals makes ACT’s proposal just one among the bunch. This makes it difficult for the group to stand apart and reiterate its genuine interests in the development and betterment of the Council. Secondly, due to the failure of its predecessor, the group might be succumbing to the pressure of the P5 and this publicly manifests a construct that such a proposal is difficult to get through in the first place.

### 3.7 Summary of the Important Reform Groups

Group	Extension of membership	Extension of veto rights?	Motivation	Obstacles/ Opposition
<p><b>P5:</b></p> <p><b>P3</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US, Russia and China</li> </ul>	<p>Total number of members to not exceed 20-25.</p>	NO	<p>Maintain pre-existing status of PMs and increase efficiency of the Council at the same time.</p>	<p>No direct obstacle because of veto; Clashes with other States' reform proposals.</p>
<p><b>P2</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.K and France</li> </ul>		<p>NO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Suggests <b>voluntary restraint of veto power in the case of mass atrocities.</b></li> </ul>		
<p><b>G4</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brazil, India, Japan and Germany</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6 NEW PMs: Permanent membership for each of them and two other African countries</li> <li>Non-Permanent members to be increased from 10-14.</li> </ul>	YES	<p>Permanent seat on the Council;</p>	<p>Opposed by UfC and China</p>
<p><b>Uniting for Consensus (UfC)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Italy, South Korea, Canada, Spain, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina, Pakistan, Malta, Costa Rica, Colombia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obscure expansion of permanent members.</li> <li>Add 10 non-permanent members.</li> </ul>	NO	<p>Regional rivalry: To prevent regional rivals from getting a permanent seat and a veto extension.</p>	<p>G4; All States supporting extension of permanent seats.</p>



and San Marino.				
<b>African Union (AU)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Two new permanent members to African countries.</li> <li>• Five new non-permanent members.</li> </ul>	YES	More representation to African countries; African countries to have a say in the decision-making process of the UN.	AU to not compromise on extending veto rights. P5 and ACT against AU's veto demand. UfC against extension of permanent members and veto rights.
<b>L69</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Over 42 countries</li> </ul>	YES	More representation by expanding the Council; Growing convergence with Africa's stance on reforms.	Overlapping concerns with G4 and AU's proposals and States against extension of veto rights.
<b>ACT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About 27 countries</li> </ul>	INDIFFERENT	Improve the working methods of the Council. Make the UN more efficient and legitimate in its procedure. Increase representation and make SC more transparent.	P5; States against the piecemeal approach
<b>The Italian Proposal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No new permanent members.</li> <li>• 10 new non-permanent members assigned to about 24-30 countries – from every region – on a rotational basis.</li> </ul>	NO	Focus on equitable representation and improving legitimacy and efficiency of the decision-making process in the Council.	Question of fair representation; underrepresented regional organizations; Pro-veto expansion groups.

### **3.8 The Attitude of the P5 Towards the Prospects of Reform**

The P5, in the early 1990s, when reform proposals started to surface, was susceptible to any reform and made a commitment within themselves to prevent any discussion of reforming the Security Council (Bourantonis & A. Panagiotou, 2006). Though they were against any kind of reform, as the international community now sees the reform process as the standard of “appropriate behaviour” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), there is a need for the P5 to support reform attempts to make them look less self-interested in the international community. The P5 thus extended their support for a reform but kept themselves on the guard with the process. While U.K. and France are willing to favour an expansion of the Council and regulation of veto use, U.S. and Russia portray a tepid behaviour towards the said reform agenda as they think that would make the Council less effective. China, on the other hand, was initially dead against a reform (The Guardian, 2015).

While the P2 are vocal and supportive of a UNSC reform without portraying any underlying disagreement, the P3 are not exactly revealing their original stance on the reform agendas without masking it with their agreement due to the moral of international acceptance. Throughout the reform process, China remained only an observer of the reform debates and efforts, its stance being dubbed as the “the spoiler.” China, by suggesting new seats to developing countries to enhance representativeness, subtly tries to discard the inclusion of strong candidates and potential new global powers such as the G4. China, at the end of the day, only makes vague statements about where it stands on the reform debacle so that it could potentially disapprove any reform proposals on the table easily, without much contradiction about their previously made comments. Kai Schaefer (2017) in his paper mentioned that China’s stance according to Lipson (2007) could be identified as ‘organized hypocrisy.’

One of the reasons Russia is regarded as a global power today is its special status in the UNSC. Therefore, it tries its best to defend its national interest by trying to maintain the status-quo or, failing that, allowing only the least possible changes to the Council (Bourantonis & A. Panagiotou, 2006). The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Gennady Gatilov, said Russia would agree to an expansion of the Council if there were a two-thirds majority (ideally 100%) in the General Assembly (RT, 2015). This by itself is a devious statement. With so many rival organizations with numerous different reform agendas and proposals, Russia knows that it is

unlikely that one single reform would bag majority vote from the UN members unless it is a minor reform, in which case, does not affect the P5 and their special status. Out of the five permanent members, Russia has been the most vocal in rejecting any proposal that restricted the P5's exercise of veto. Sergey Lavrov, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, made the following statement to the UNGA Working Group on the Security Council in 1996:

“We cannot agree with any formulas or initiatives meant to undermine or revoke the right of veto envisaged in the Charter. This has been our invariable position. Neither can we agree with arguments in favour of restricting the use of the right of veto. We are confident that nobody in our Group is sincerely interested in such an outcome.”

Thus, despite actively taking part in the reform debate, Russia maintains a conservative stance to safeguard its national interests and so does U.S. U.S., in theory, has been endorsing some kind of a UNSC reform since the 1990s. While Clinton's administration backed permanent membership for Germany and Japan, America, Bush focused more on Japan's bid for permanent membership. During Obama's administration, India gained some momentum as Obama vaguely endorsed India's bid during his visit to India in 2010 (FP, 2105). However, the U.S, like China and Russia, has also been a vague observer in the reform process. Donald Trump, in 2017 in his speech at the UN for the first time as the President of the United States, pushed for a reform of the Council (Independent, 2017) but there has been no subsequent efforts made further. U.S. leaders have depicted from their lethargy that a Council reform does not reflect wholly on their national interest. U.S, unsurprisingly, only supports a Council reform “as long as it doesn't take away their veto power” (The Indian Express, 2018). As Richard Gowan, a Senior Policy Fellow at the ECFR stated in one of his interviews, “It simply isn't a priority for the U.S. and other big powers right now. Even States that aspire permanent seats on the Security Council, like Germany and India, have bigger worries” (MUNPlanet, 2014).

The P5 are portraying themselves as being in favour of a reform but not only do they have conflicting opinions among themselves, they also are against any major changes to their veto rights. Their strategy seems to be to acknowledge the international impetus for a reform but at the same time, allow only minor changes to the Council. To them, it is not only a matter of maintaining their special status in the Council and protecting their national interests – but also

portraying support for the reform process. With all the confusion as to how to reform the Council, the end decision is in the hands of the P5 and they are not going to make a formal amendment to implement a reform an easy process.

### **3.9 Prospects of a UNSC Reform**

The Veto Player Theory, developed by George Tsebelis (2002), puts a definition to what we have been discussing about the self-interested notions of the P5. This theory, as explained by Wirkola (2010), argues that the veto players (P5) shape the legislative policies in the world. That is to say, if one or more of the veto players do not agree to certain change/policy, it is likely that the status-quo will prevail (Ganghof, 2003). In other words, the veto players will indefinitely use their power to prevent a change from the status-quo in order to further their own interests (Tsebelis, 2002; Wirkola, 2010).

The only successful reform that surfaced in 1965 – when the membership of the Council was increased from 10-15, happened only because the veto players collectively agreed to the reform agenda. The fact that no reform in the present age is close to attaining fruition is because the veto players have disagreed in their response to any of them. Thus, by contrasting the successful reforming of the Council in 1965 with the series of unsuccessful reform proposals until today, it is clear that one of the main factors that is haltering the reform process is the disagreement of and among the veto players. While this theory does not provide any explanation for the shift in positions of the veto players from their agreement to a reform in 1965 to their disagreement today, the theory substantiates the fact that “if any of the P5 have incentives to block a proposed change, the status-quo will prevail” (ibid).

While the P5 constitute as a major reason to the reform stalemate, the lack of consensus from the rest of the world and the reform groups are also to blame (Mahmood, 2013). The reform groups are too inflexible with their demands and are primarily motivated by national interest as aforementioned in this chapter. Their primary intentions are not to increase the efficiency of the Council but to gain a seat in the Council or more so, to not let their rivals get a seat. States like Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, to mention a few, are defending the states-quo though it does not favour them, as opposed to an uncertain process of change that could leave them even less satisfied (Baccarini, 2018). If all the member States agree on one reform agenda and push for it collectively, there are more chances that the P5 would agree to it in

order to meet the international consensus – if it is the P5 against the rest of the world (Axelrod, 1998). However, even with an international consensus, a formal amendment of the Charter to implement a reform is still a difficult process to achieve. This is due to the firm stance of the P5 and the necessities to process a formal amendment, which requires an affirmative vote from at least 128 members of the UNGA, two-thirds majority from members of the UNSC and no use of veto by any of the P5 (UN Charter, Article 27, Chapter V). Thus, even with an international consensus, it is still naïve to predict the approval of the P5.

In retrospect, even to say that reforming the Council is the answer to solving contemporary political issues would be a misconception and a flawed argument. Reform proposals have been dwelling mainly on the matter of expansion of membership of the Council and abolishing or extending the veto rights, among other concerns. Though the outcome or the consequences of a reform cannot be predicted easily, the next part of the chapter will analyse whether such a reform would help make the Council more effective.

### **3.9.1 Expansion of Membership and Extension of Veto Rights:**

Expansion in membership might increase the legitimacy of the decision-making process, as members representing all parts of the world would then be involved in the decision-making process together. However, with more members, the votes or vetoes (in the case of extension) are only going to be more of an obstacle in drafting a resolution. Adding more members to the Council improves diversity, legitimacy and makes the Council more democratic, but does not ensure better functionality (Cristol, 2015). Gould and Rablen (2016) concluded their paper on UNSC and its prospects of reform by stating “expansion at the levels currently under consideration will provide only modest improvements in equity and will also come at the expense of efficiency” unless the voting rules and regulations are also amended (Gould & Rablen, 2016). Similar analysis can be made to the aspects of extension of veto rights. This is to say that even if new PM seats are added and the veto right is extended to them; the same stalemate is likely to prevail.

For instance, let us say the G4’s proposal is adopted and India, Brazil, Germany and Japan become the new permanent members with veto rights. Let us take the case of Syria here and assume that, upon the newly reformed Council, there is a resolution on the table against Assad regime. Considering the new PMs and their relations with Syria and Assad, Germany, Brazil

and Japan are most likely to support the resolution. With Germany condemning the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime (DW, 2018), Japan supporting the U.S-led air strikes against Syria (Japan Times, 2018) and Brazil's stress on the urgency of international engagement to end the conflict in Syria, it is predictable that these three countries will not veto the resolution. However, India might take a different stance. India has been disinterested in a regime change in Syria. India's position on the Syrian crisis is rooted in its foreign policy objectives. Syria's extended support to India in the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan might affect India's decision to an extent (Mehta, 2017). While we cannot absolutely predict India's decision, it is fair to say that there will be factors that might influence their decision in overriding the Assad regime (Mehta, 2017).

The decision of the initial P5 will remain the same regardless of the changes made in the Council. Russia and China are most likely to veto the resolution. The path dependency theory, explained by Johannes Marx (2010) substantiates this assumption. This theory suggests that States are faced with a limited number of options that are dependent on the past trajectories of the decisions made by them (Marx, 2010). Assessing the decisions taken by the P5 in the case of Syria prior to today, it is likely that their decision will stay the same provided their relationship with Syria also stays the same.

Thus, even a structural reform of the UNSC here does not make any difference in improving the effectiveness of the Council but only makes it more complicated. The stalemate continues to prevail regardless. Expansion of members might help in balancing legitimacy in the decision-making process and the composition of members in the Council but, in hindsight, expansion of veto rights will only lead to more complications and stalemate.

### **3.10 In Conclusion**

This Chapter has elucidated two main things. Firstly, the analysis of the reform groups has pointed out that the demands of the majority of the reform groups are self-interested and motivated by gaining UNSC seats and global recognition, rather than improving the efficiency of the Council. The inflexibility in their demands makes it difficult to reach a common ground in the international community on how to reform the Council. Secondly, the chapter has also established the firm stance of the P5 and their disagreement to any major

reform proposal that might infringe on their special status or veto right. In retrospect, the expansion in membership or extension of veto rights, which are two of the common reform agendas of the existing reform groups, is also not a viable solution to the issue of inefficiency of the UNSC.

Without an international consensus on a particular reform agenda, the process of reform is halted in its first step. Even with a consensus, the process of formally amending the UNC to implement a reform is difficult to achieve. To this end, it is necessary for a new beginning in the on-going reform process. The following chapter will introduce such a new beginning or rather, an intermediate fix to move past the reform stalemate, acknowledging the urgent need for a Council reform, as enhanced in the first chapter.

## **Chapter – III**

### **Alternative Reform Agenda: An Interim Fix**

“Improvable, not perfectible...”

-Kofi Annan, 2005

As the previous Chapter emphasized, despite the constant battle from all major reform proposals, the implementation of a reform is not foreseeable in the near future due to the lack of flexibility amongst the reform groups coupled with the rigid stance of the P5. Nor is an expansion in membership or an extension of veto going to improve the Council’s efficiency. As a new beginning to the reform process, for a reform agenda to be adopted in the Council, the first step is for all the reform groups and member States to collectively support one particular reform agenda. To this end, it is vital that the reform agenda intrinsically focus on improving the aspect of efficiency of the Council in some way, and not benefit the interests of some member States over the others. With this under consideration, this chapter will introduce various strategies to regulate the veto rights.

The immediate turn to reform strategies that work towards regulating the veto rights in particular, is because it is the veto right that prevents the Council from taking timely decisions and being effective in cases of mass atrocities (J. Padelford, 2018). Although the movement for reform encompasses other issues in the Council such as expansion in membership, improving its working methods etc., the veto rights create the most controversy. It encroaches on the principle promise of the UN to sustain peace and security. The failure of the UN to contain mass atrocities in cases such as Syria, Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia etc. due to the continual use of the veto has prompted a widespread desire to revise the Charter or find other means to curtail the veto (J. Padelford, 2018). Furthermore, curtailing the veto right of the P5 will fall under the desires of the member States. This chapter will also analyse these strategies to assess their potential to be implemented based on Kuzma’s (1998) analysis of the reform proposals by the degree of their *acceptability*, *desirability* and *achievability* in the international forum.

Even with an international consensus on a reform agenda, the previous chapter established that a formal amendment to the Charter to reform the Council might still be a tricky process and is not foreseeable in the near future (Alene, 2015; Gould & Rablen, 2016). To tackle this



issue, it is important to introduce alternative strategies to induce agreement among the P5 for working towards a reform agenda without instigating a formal implementation of a reform. The third and the last part of the chapter focuses on introducing such an ‘interim fix’ through a specific type of agreement to induce cooperation among the P5 to agree to a specific reform agenda and ensure efficient working of the Council for the immediate future.

## **4.1 The Veto**

One of the main shortcomings of the Council that contributes to its failure to respond effectively and on a timely basis is the use of veto by the P5. Leigh-Phippard argues that the retention of veto rights could be in the interest of the United Nations. This statement is based on the notion that removing the veto right might cause the influential members in the UN to lose interest in the operations of the organization (Kuzma, 1998). Though the veto power has been categorised as ‘anachronistic’ and ‘undemocratic,’ it is still generally acknowledged that it is neither pragmatic nor realistic to demand for the abolishment of the veto rights (K. R. Gupta, 2006).

Moreover, it is also unrealistic to assume that the P5 will approve such drastic reform proposals regarding the eradication of veto rights. Thus, the best way forward is to try to focus the reform proposals on diluting and curtailing the veto power instead of abolishing it. The efforts that have been taken in this front have not been paid attention to at large. This is again because too much importance and attention is given to the existing reform groups and their demands to securing a seat in the Council and extending the veto rights, rather than to instigate a more effective Council (ibid). A more concentrated and collective effort on diluting the veto right rather than the present fight to eradicate it is essential. Such a take on reforming the Council will also gain more traction among the reform groups and member States once introduced in the international forum, as the rest of the world will only benefit from such a reform.

### **4.1.1 Strategy A: WV**

According to this strategy, two permanent members must vote against a resolution for it to be considered a veto and for the resolution to necessarily fail. Gould & D. Rablen named this as the ‘WV’ (Weaken Veto) strategy in their paper on UNSC reform (2016). This strategy could

also pin in a rule that no single permanent member can veto a resolution if the other four permanent members agree to it.

This strategy is most likely to contribute to increasing the efficiency of the Council and it is relative to the status-quo. Such a reform would also prevent any unilateral decision in the Council against the will of the greater international community. If this reform was implemented in 1945 along with the formation of the organization, it would have prevented 195 unilateral vetoes casted against the will of the rest of the international community (Toro, 2008). Since 1946 to today, a total number of 204 vetoes have been casted by the P5. Out of the 204 vetoes, only 32 of them have been vetoed by more than one of the P5 countries (See Appendix A). Such a reform will also help increasing the legitimacy of the decisions taken by the P5 while retaining the composition of the status-quo. This assumption is made because if a resolution in the Council is not suitable for implementation for various political and economic reasons and not national interest, it is only obvious and practical that more than one of the P5 would veto it. It also ensures prevention of one country's interests trumping over the others.

In terms of *acceptability* or *achievability*, its run is shortened as it dilutes the veto right a bit too much to suit P5's desirability. Furthermore, such a strategy might not fully eliminate the use of veto for national interest. For instance, Russia and China have together vetoed resolutions regarding Syria or Middle Eastern conflicts **eight times**, reasons owing to their personal interests in the conflicts. Thus, it is naïve to assume that this strategy will fully prevent the crafty use of veto rights. However, this model is one of the few proposals that dominates *status-quo*, prevents obstruction of the Council in the hands of one country, while also retaining the current composition of the Council (Gould & D. Rablen, 2016).

#### **4.1.2 Strategy B: *The Code of Conduct***

The second strategy would be to impose voluntary restraint in the use of veto to any decisions taken under Charter VII of the UNC. This Chapter involves decisions regarding “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” This strategy dates back to 1945 when Australia suggested such an amendment to the UNSC, which was later, rejected (American Diplomacy, 2008). France also endorsed a similar position when it called for a self-restrained

veto usage in 2013 upon UN's failure to prevent the Syrian Civil War (The New York Times, 2013). The proposal would be to evoke and renew this failed amendment as it would encourage and push the P5 to act with more authority and unity in matters failing the objectives of the UN under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter. What goes hand in hand with this proposal is ACT's *Code of Conduct*. The Code suggests and advocates for the voluntary suspension of the use of veto in the case of mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. ACT's Code of Conduct garnered the support of 104 member States of the UN, nine members in the UNSC and even two veto-yielding members, France and U.K.

The Code is more than just an initiative on the veto. It is a political commitment of not only the P5 but all the members of the UNSC. The purpose of this reform is to 'shame into action any state seen as dithering in the face of massive human rights violations' (Cristol, 2015). In terms of *acceptability and achievability*, there are chances mainly because the P2 are already in support of such a reform. It is however, not desired by the P3 and hence might make the process of implementation more difficult to achieve. In retrospect, though the Code is a fair approach to reforming the Council, it is still an illusion to think that it will make a difference if or when any one of the P5 perceives its vital interests to be threatened (World Policy, 2015). However, what it would do is at least make the P5 think twice about the vitality of their interest at risk as opposed to their international reputation in vetoing a resolution aimed at responding to a humanitarian crisis.

#### **4.1.3 Strategy C: *Statement of Reasoning***

Another way of implementing a reasonable reform in the Security Council is for countries using the veto to provide a 'statement' defending their reasons for the use of veto (Deutsche Welle, 2004). This strategy reflects a diplomatic courtesy and does not restrain the use of veto. However, it invokes a logical process by which the divide between the interests of the P5 and the other members can at least be slightly bridged. This reform ticks all three aspects of the analysis (*achievability, desirability and acceptability*) as it does not stamp on the special status of the P5 or their veto rights in any way. This could be an advantageous factor when it comes to this reform proposal being put to vote, as it cannot be easily rejected by the P5 with any logical geopolitical explanation that does not reflect national interest. Such a

reform would make the Council more effective whilst dealing with mass atrocity-related cases.

In retrospect, a blanket statement to reason their use of veto might be a pointless reform. Russia and China, for instance, have always claimed that their vetoes are a reflection of their principled position on what would best restore peace and have never alluded to pure geopolitical motives. Providing a statement of reasoning that might or might not be acceptable in the international forum, after casting a veto, does not change the working of the Council in any way. However, through such a demand, at least in matters relating to humanitarian aid, civilian protection and peacekeeping missions, in the case of mass atrocities such as genocides, war crimes or other humanitarian emergencies, the P5 are more likely to abstain from vetoing a resolution if it does not involve their vital interests. They would rather use their veto on matters that would involve protecting their national interest while also adhering to the principle of saving the “succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Weiss, 2003).

#### **4.1.4 Strategy D: *Redefinition***

Another way to implement a sensible reform that could help reconstruct the use of veto and most importantly, reduce the use of ‘*double veto*’ to a certain level is to redefine what comes under ‘procedural’ and ‘non-procedural’ matters. A double veto is when a P5 member deploys two successive vetoes to prevent any substantive resolution from being passed – one regarding the preliminary question as to whether a matter is a procedural one and then another one consecutively in the non-procedural decision itself, by the same member (Liang, 2018). Article of 27(2) and (3) of the UN Charter states that a resolution can be adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members on procedural matters and on all other matters, will be adopted by “an affirmative vote of nine members and the concurring votes of the P5.” This practice of double veto arises due to lack of a proper definition to what comes under ‘procedural’ and ‘non-procedural’ matters. This is because what is procedural and non-procedural is also decided by the P5 (Kuzma, 1998). Thus, redefining the statement inscribed in Article 27 and explaining the term ‘procedural’ and ‘non-procedural’ through standing rules – could help prevent the crafty interpretation of the UNSC rules and the subsequent use of double-veto. Such a reform also ticks three aspects of analysis, as it merely demands a

clearer and a universal interpretation of the provisions of the UNC. Redefining would at least prevent the use of double veto, if not eliminate the crafty use of veto.

## 4.2 Analysing the Strategies

Gould & Rablen, (2016) through their analysis of the reform proposals, concluded by saying that weakening the veto right of the P5 through this strategy would best improve the equity and efficiency of the Council (Gould & Rablen, 2016). This is because, while retaining the power, this strategy curbs the crafty use of the veto power in such a way that it also allows legitimate decision-making under the current composition of the Council. One downfall of this strategy would be garnering the agreement of the P5 to such a reform agenda. To that end, on a more achievable standpoint, *Strategy C* might be the best pick. This is because, by demanding a *statement of reasoning for the use of veto*, the member States are merely asking for a validation for the use of veto. This would barely even qualify as a ‘reform’ as it would not include significant amendments to the Charter. It is also more likely to be ‘accepted’ by the P5, as there is no logical reason that they could state upon their disagreement. Such a reform might also essentially be *desirable* for the P5, as it does not encroach on their special status like the current reform proposals. However, the outcome of the implementation of such reforms might not improve effective working of the UNSC. This is because the States might just keep vetoing resolutions, but now with a statement reasoning their veto, acceptable or not. In any case, with a view of diluting the veto right in its simplest form and attempting to make the Council more effective, this strategy could be a start to the process.

On the topic of achievability, having garnered support from many member States and the P2 already, the *Code of Conduct* introduces a better way of restraining the P5 from using their veto to obstruct effective working of the Council. While restraining the use of veto in certain matters and not curbing the veto power on others, the strategy helps increasing the efficiency of the UNSC, especially in matters of humanitarian crises. Both these strategies, the *WV* and the *Code of Conduct*, do not check all the aspects of achievability, desirability or acceptability. However, these strategies might prove to be more effective than *Strategy C* as it involves a higher degree of restraint on the use of veto. In the end, any of these strategies, if implemented, would instigate some level of improvement in the efficiency of the Council.

A major limitation with these strategies is that there is no definitive outcome of increased efficiency of the Council through the implementation of such reforms. In any case, where the P5 perceives a threat against approving a resolution in the Council, it is going to veto it, despite the implemented principle reforms. However, such reforms establish a momentum in the reform process. Another limitation with suggesting such reforms is that they could still be ‘too ambitious’ as the P5 could still veto such an effort to reform their veto rights. Any dilution of the veto power is not an ‘acceptable’ reform agenda according to the P5, such strategies could remain as ‘an unlikely fix.’ Though a collective push from all the member States on one particular reform agenda has not surfaced yet, it is still unlikely that the P5, or moreover, the P3 will agree to such reforms and not veto them in the Council. This makes a formal amendment of the UNC to implement such reforms difficult to achieve. Upon such a consideration, the next part of this chapter will introduce an alternative strategy, through a specific type of agreement that could prompt cooperation among the P5 to implement a particular reform agenda.

### **4.3 A Strategy to Make the P5 Cooperate**

A formal amendment to the UNC for a reform implementation firstly needs an affirmative vote from a minimum of 128 members of the UNGA. Secondly, it needs ratification from two-thirds of the member in the UNSC and finally, a collective yes from the P5 and no vetoes from any of the P5. This kind of a consensus for one particular reform agenda is not foreseeable in the near future (Alena, 2015; Gould & Rablen, 2016). Thus, upon such circumstances, considering the urgent need for a Council reform, this part of the chapter introduces alternative methods that might induce cooperation among the P5 and as an ‘interim fix’ to the UNSC reform issue and stalemate.

#### **4.3.1 Phased Agreements**

Linear phased agreements put simply, means that the signatories to the agreement will collectively work towards the specified goal and accommodate restrictions on that movement. In this case, the goal being an effective Security Council, the P5 and the member States will

agree to one path (a reform proposal) that could initially attempt to reach the goal (efficiency) and then work towards that path.

There are two types of such phased agreements: *Strict* and *loose phased agreements*. Strict phased agreement is when the parties to the agreements, work on their path/movement towards the goal and will always attempt to go back to the path in any case of deviation. In contrast, loose phased agreements do not “force any party to the agreement to “return to any specific path whenever a deviation from strategic intent occurs, and simply specify a pace at which signatories move towards the cooperative goal” (C. Langlois & P. Langlois, 2001). To engineer cooperation among the P5 and the member States – to make them agree to one reform proposal and work towards the end goal, a loose phased agreement could be a better choice as it is not coercive or restrictive in any way. According to C. Langlois & P. Langlois’s paper:

“We find that loose phased agreements allow for a quickening of the pace at which cooperation can be reached and provide better treaty value than strict designs.”

Such agreements can be used in the UNSC reform issue if there is constant disapproval from the P5 to formally reform the UN Charter. In such a case, a reform proposal can be implemented through a loose phased agreement, independently without changing or reforming the UN Charter. A *loose phased agreement* could work in the UNSC, as it sets a path towards the goal through a selected reform proposal and at the same time, does not restrict or demand results from the P5. The result could be more effective if one of the aforementioned strategies is implemented under a loose phased agreement. This could fall positively on the end goal of achieving legitimacy and effectiveness in the decisions taken by the Security Council, though the pace of development might be slow. Strict phased agreements involve the signatories being punished some way in case of deviation but there are no such punishments for loose phased agreements. While cooperation is more likely to be achieved when the signatories are accountable for their (in)actions, the P5 would be more open to signing a loose phased agreement.

In the current scenario, formal amendment of the Charter seems like a far-reaching proposal. Hence, according to this paper, the suggestion would be to pick one of the mentioned strategies, implement it under a loose phased agreement and gauge the level of change and action from the P5 to further develop on the reform to attain efficiency in the long run.

Furthermore, based on the theory of reputation, the strategies that attempts to regulate the use of veto, mirror more of a legal obligation in terms of responding to mass atrocity crimes. To this end, disagreeing to any of these strategies would stir more agitation among the members of the UN (Daugirdas, 2014). A major limitation with this type of a reform implementation is that though the P5 and the member States agree upon a reform agenda under such an agreement, the outcome of their cooperation and the reform agenda is unpredictable. A single strong political prediction cannot be made to this end, as the level of cooperation in a loosely structured agreement is always uncertain. To gauge the consequences and the outcome of a reform implementation through such an agreement is a topic for further research as achieving one common reform agenda followed by an informal reform implementation are by itself, a tough picture to imagine in the near future.



## Conclusion

The foundational rationale of the UNSC contrasts with the factors that determine a ‘good institution’ as per the Institutional Design Theory developed by E. Goodin. Though such factors are not universally applicable, *Revisability*, *Robustness*, *Legitimacy* and *Democracy* are some of the factors that help sustain the efficiency of an international organization, were they to be inherited in the organization. The UNSC lacks flexibility; its rigid charter makes it impossible to implement change, thus lacking the quality of adapting to the changing political reality; its underrepresentation mirrors illegitimacy in the decision-making process and the veto rights of the P5 undermines democracy within the organization. All these factors stem from the inherent design of the Council and lack of a ‘good’ foundational design. This has led to the inefficiency of the Council and the current stalemate in the Council’s reform process. Thus, from above considerations and from the additional fact that the Council’s voting rules and regulations do not compliment contemporary reality, it can be said that the UNSC should be revamped in some way, to better fit the political environment of today and be efficient in its operations and promises (Kuzma, 1998; Imber, 2006; Granja, 2017).

The reform process has also been long into existence, since the 1990s, but there has been no trace of change. The *Veto Player Theory* suggests that the P5 are the final decision-makers, even in the case of a reform resolution. It predicts that the P5 are not going to make it easy for the reform groups to change or dilute their special status in the Council. The *Path Dependence Theory* substantiates this claim by stating that the actions/decisions of the P5 and the agendas of the reform groups are going to reflect the actions/decisions taken by them in the past. In any case, the P5 are going to make it difficult to implement change in the Council, as they do not want their power and status in the Council to dwindle away.

Although the P5 play a major role in disrupting the reform process, the reform groups and member States also shoulder equal blame. This is due to their inflexibility and intrinsic focus on self-interested gains rather than improving the efficiency of the Council (Mahmood, 2013). If all reform groups focus on one particular reform agenda narrowed on the principle of increasing the efficiency of the Council, it is likely, although not predictable, that the P5 will form an agreement towards the agenda (Axelrod, 1998). For this to happen, the reform agenda

has to primarily focus on aspects of improving efficient working of the Council and not benefit specific member States over the others.

Having clearly established that a change in the Council's processes is the need of the hour, this paper, towards the end, also offers a few alternative strategies to implement minor changes to the veto power that could potentially improve the efficiency of the Council. While these strategies do not promote the national interest of any member state, it would also not string disagreement among the reform groups, as they have nothing to lose by advocating for such strategies that curb the veto rights of the P5.

These strategies are assessed with Kuzma's (1998) concept of *desirability, acceptability and acceptability*. Upon such an analysis, the 'most achievable' strategy could be either the *Code of Conduct* as it already has the support of the P2 and establishes a fair case of reform or the "*Statement of Reasoning*" as this would merely constitute as a reform. This is because it only asks the least from the P5 – to provide validation for their use of veto and does not curb their power in any way. Through the theory of Reputation, it is unlikely that the P5 would reject such a proposal as it only furthers the use of veto as a responsibility rather than a privilege – provided the rest of the world collectively advocate for such a reform (Axelrod, 1998). However, on the downside, such a reform might not bring any change at all, as the P5, in any case thinking that their national interests are at risk, might veto a resolution despite such principles (Cristol, 2015). But, it is indeed, a start to break the stalemate and instigate an improvement in the reform process.

Despite the glaring need for a UNSC reform, there is always the question of whether the P5 will agree to a reform agenda, even with the rest of the world pushing for a common principle of reform. To tackle this issue of non-cooperation among the P5, and the difficulty to foresee a formal amendment to the UNC, this paper also introduces the *loose phased agreements* to implement a reform without having to formally amend the Charter. Such an agreement would mean that the signatories to the agreement would work towards a goal without forcing any of them to 'return to any specific path whenever a deviation from the strategic intent occurs, and simply specify a pace at which they will move towards the cooperative goal' (C. Langlois & P. Langlois, 2001). This paper suggests that a reform agenda can be introduced through such an agreement in the UN Security Council. This would mean that there would be no coercion towards the P5 to comply with the agreement (a reform proposal) but at the same

time, will push the P5 to work at a specific pace towards achieving all the aspects of the reform proposal. While this might fail, as it does not have any consequence/punishment for non-compliance, this could work with the P5, with one of the mentioned strategies for a veto reform, as it could induce an initial agreement among them without formally amending the UN Charter – serving as an interim solution for the immediate future.

Overall, the strategies set out in Chapter III tries to overlook the reform impasse and suggest alternative ways to implement change without infringing too much on the special status of the P5. Though the suggested *loose phased agreement* might not be empirically tested or universally applicable to ensure cooperation/compliance, it fills the gap in the literature about UNSC reform wherein it goes beyond the reform stalemate to introduce a strategic intermediate fix to the UNSC reform stalemate. This paper has provided a broader view on the reform issues of the UNSC and has suggested ways to move past the reform stalemate and strategically bring about minor reforms to the veto rights — to increase the efficiency of the Council for the long run. The outcome or consequences of a reform of the Council could be a base for future research. Further research can also focus on a detailed analysis of the strategies introduced, their potential outcome and the future of the UNSC.

The late Kofi Annan said, “I hope the entire membership will make a new and urgent effort to explore new ways forward. The people of the world are waiting” (UN News, 2006). The immediate step now is to turn to the member States and the reform groups, push them to advocate for one common reform agenda and start from there.

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## Appendix A

Source: UN Security Council

### Security Council - Veto List (in reverse chronological order)

Date	Draft	Agenda Item	Permanent Member Casting Negative Vote
1 June 2018	<a href="#">S/2018/516</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
10 April 2018	<a href="#">S/2018/321</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
26 February 2018	<a href="#">S/2018/156</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
18 December 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/1060</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
17 November 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/970</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
16 November 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/962</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
24 October 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/884</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
12 April 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/315</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
28 February 2017	<a href="#">S/2017/172</a>	Middle East	China Russian Federation
5 December 2016	<a href="#">S/2016/1026</a>	Middle East	China Russian Federation
8 October 2016	<a href="#">S/2016/846</a>	Middle East	Russian Federation
29 July 2015	<a href="#">S/2015/562</a>	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> )	Russian Federation
8 July 2015	<a href="#">S/2015/508</a>	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Russian Federation
22 May 2014	<a href="#">S/2014/348</a>	Middle East - Syria	China Russian Federation
15 March 2014	<a href="#">S/2014/189</a>	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> )	Russian Federation
19 July 2012	<a href="#">S/2012/538</a>	Middle East - Syria	China Russian Federation
4 February 2012	<a href="#">S/2012/77</a>	Middle East - Syria	China Russian Federation
4 October 2011	<a href="#">S/2011/612</a>	Middle East - Syria	China Russian Federation
18 February 2011	<a href="#">S/2011/24</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
15 June 2009	<a href="#">S/2009/310</a>	Georgia	Russian Federation
11 July 2008	<a href="#">S/2008/447</a>	Peace and Security - Africa (Zimbabwe)	China Russian Federation
12 January 2007	<a href="#">S/2007/14</a>	Myanmar	China Russian Federation
11 November 2006	<a href="#">S/2006/878</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
13 July 2006	<a href="#">S/2006/508</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
05 October 2004	<a href="#">S/2004/783</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
21 April 2004	<a href="#">S/2004/313</a>	Cyprus	Russian Federation
25 March 2004	<a href="#">S/2004/240</a>	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	USA
14 October 2003	<a href="#">S/2003/980</a>	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	USA
16 September 2003	<a href="#">S/2003/891</a>	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	USA
20 December 2002	<a href="#">S/2002/1385</a>	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	USA
30 June 2002	<a href="#">S/2002/712</a>	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	USA
14-15 December 2001	<a href="#">S/2001/1199</a>	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	USA
27-28 March 2001	<a href="#">S/2001/270</a>	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	USA
25 February 1999	<a href="#">S/1999/201</a>	The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	China
21 March 1997	<a href="#">S/1997/241</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
07 March 1997	<a href="#">S/1997/199</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA


10 January 1997	<a href="#">S/1997/18</a>	Central America: efforts towards peace	China
17 May 1995	<a href="#">S/1995/394</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
02 December 1994	<a href="#">S/1994/1358</a>	The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Russian Federation
11 May 1993	<a href="#">S/25693</a>	The situation in Cyprus	Russian Federation
31 May 1990	<a href="#">S/21326</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
17 January 1990	<a href="#">S/21084</a>	Letter dated 3 January 1990 from Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council	USA
23 December 1989	<a href="#">S/21048</a>	The situation in Panama	France UK USA
07 November 1989	<a href="#">S/20945/Rev.1</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
09 June 1989	<a href="#">S/20677</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
17 February 1989	<a href="#">S/20463</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
11 January 1989	<a href="#">S/20378</a>	Letters dated 4 January 1989 from Libya and Bahrain to the President of the Security Council	France UK USA
14 December 1988	<a href="#">S/20322</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
10 May 1988	<a href="#">S/19868</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
15 April 1988	<a href="#">S/19780</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
08 March 1988	<a href="#">S/19585</a>	The question of South Africa	UK USA
01 February 1988	<a href="#">S/19466</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
18 January 1988	<a href="#">S/19434</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
09 April 1987	<a href="#">S/18785</a>	The situation in Namibia	UK USA
20 February 1987	<a href="#">S/18705</a>	The question of South Africa	UK USA
28 October 1986	<a href="#">S/18428</a>	Letter dated 17 October 1986 from Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council	USA
31 July 1986	<a href="#">S/18250</a>	Letter dated 22 July 1986 from Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council	USA
18 June 1986	<a href="#">S/18163</a>	Complaint by Angola against South Africa	UK USA
23 May 1986	<a href="#">S/18087/Rev.1</a>	The situation in Southern Africa	UK USA
21 April 1986	<a href="#">S/18016/Rev.1</a>	Letters dated 15 April 1986 from Libya, Burkina Faso, Syria and Oman to the President of the Security Council	France UK USA
06 February 1986	<a href="#">S/17796/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 4 February 1986 from Syria to the President of the Security Council	USA
30 January 86	<a href="#">S/17769/Rev.1</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
17 January 1986	<a href="#">S/17730/Rev.2</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
15 November 1985	<a href="#">S/17633</a>	The situation in Namibia	UK USA
13 September 1985	<a href="#">S/17459</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
12 March 1985	<a href="#">S/17000</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
06 September 1984	<a href="#">S/16732</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
04 April 1984	<a href="#">S/16463</a>	Letter dated 29 March 1984 from Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council	USA
29 February 1984	<a href="#">S/16351/Rev.2</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USSR
27-28 October 1983	<a href="#">S/16077/Rev.1</a>	The situation in Grenada	USA
12 September 1983	<a href="#">S/15966/Rev.1</a>	Letters dated 1 September 1983 from the USA, the Republic of Korea, Canada and Japan to the President of the Security Council and Letter dated 2 September 1983 from Australia to the President of the Security Council	USSR
02 August 1983	<a href="#">S/15895</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
06 August 1982	<a href="#">S/15347/Rev.1</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
26 June 1982	<a href="#">S/15255/Rev.2</a> (as corrected)	The situation in the Middle East	USA
08 June 1982	<a href="#">S/15185</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
04 June 1982	<a href="#">S/15156/Rev.2</a>	Question concerning the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)	UK USA
20 April 1982	<a href="#">S/14985</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
02 April 1982	<a href="#">S/14943</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
02 April 1982	<a href="#">S/14941</a>	Letter dated 19 March 1982 from Nicaragua to the Secretary-General	USA

20 January 1982	<a href="#">S/14832/Rev.1</a>	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
31 August 1981	<a href="#">S/14664/Rev.2</a>	Complaint by Angola against South Africa	USA
30 April 1981	<a href="#">S/14462</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
30 April 1981	<a href="#">S/14461</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
30 April 1981	<a href="#">S/14460/Rev.1</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
30 April 1981	<a href="#">S/14459</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
30 April 1980	<a href="#">S/13911</a>	The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights	USA
11-13 January 1980	<a href="#">S/13735</a>	Letters dated 22 December 1979 from the USA to the President of the Security Council US and Iran hostage question	USSR
7-9 January 1980	<a href="#">S/13729</a>	Letter dated 3 January 1980 from 52 countries to the President of the Security Council	USSR
16 March 1979	<a href="#">S/13162</a>	The situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security China and Viet Nam border dispute	USSR
15 January 1979	<a href="#">S/13027</a>	Telegram dated 3 January 1979 from Democratic Kampuchea to the President of the Security Council	USSR
31 October 1977	<a href="#">S/12312/Rev.1</a>	The question of South Africa	France UK USA
31 October 1977	<a href="#">S/12311/Rev.1</a>	The question of South Africa	France UK USA
31 October 1977	<a href="#">S/12310/Rev.1</a>	The question of South Africa	France UK USA
15 November 1976	<a href="#">S/12226</a>	Admission of new Members Viet Nam	USA
19 October 1976	<a href="#">S/12211</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
29 June 1976	<a href="#">S/12119</a>	The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights	USA
23 June 1976	<a href="#">S/12110</a>	Admission of new Members Angola	USA
25 March 1976	<a href="#">S/12022</a>	Request by Libya and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories	USA
06 February 1976	<a href="#">S/11967</a>	The situation in the Comoros	France
26 January 1976	<a href="#">S/11940</a>	The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question	USA
08 December 1975	<a href="#">S/11898</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
30 September 1975	<a href="#">S/11833</a>	Admission of new Members Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam	USA
30 September 1975	<a href="#">S/11832</a>	Admission of new Members Republic of South Viet-Nam	USA
11 August 1975	<a href="#">S/11796</a>	Admission of new Members Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam	USA
11 August 1975	<a href="#">S/11795</a>	Admission of new Members Republic of South Viet-Nam	USA
06 June 1975	<a href="#">S/11713</a>	The situation in Namibia	France UK USA
30 October 1974	<a href="#">S/11543</a>	Relationship between the UN and South Africa	France UK USA
31 July 1974	<a href="#">S/11400</a> (as amended)	The situation in Cyprus	USSR
26 July 1973	<a href="#">S/10974</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
22 May 1973	<a href="#">S/10928</a>	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK USA
21 March 1973	<a href="#">S/10931/Rev.1</a>	Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and security in Latin America	USA
29 September 1972	<a href="#">S/10805/Rev.1</a> (as amended)	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK
10 September 1972	<a href="#">S/10784</a>	The situation in the Middle East	USA
25 August 1972	<a href="#">S/10771</a>	Admission of new Members Bangladesh	China
04 February 1972	<a href="#">S/10606</a>	Consideration of questions relating to Africa of which the Security Council is currently seized and implementation of the Council's relevant resolutions the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK
30 December 1971	<a href="#">S/10489</a>	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK
13 December 1971	<a href="#">S/10446/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question	USSR

05 December 1971	<a href="#">S/10423</a>	Letter dated 4 December 1971 from Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the UK and the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question	USSR
04 December 1971	<a href="#">S/10416</a>	Letter dated 4 December 1971 from Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the UK and the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question	USSR
10 November 1970	<a href="#">S/9976</a>	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK
17 March 1970	<a href="#">S/9696</a> and Corr.1 & 2	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK USA
22 August 1968	<a href="#">S/8761</a>	Letter dated 21 August 1968 from Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the UK and the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia	USSR
04 November 1966	<a href="#">S/7575/Rev.1</a>	The Palestine question	USSR
21 December 1964	<a href="#">S/6113</a> (as amended)	The Palestine question	USSR
17 September 1964	<a href="#">S/5973</a>	Letter dated 3 September 1964 from Malaysia to the President of the Security Council	USSR
13 September 1963	<a href="#">S/5425/Rev.1</a>	The situation in Southern Rhodesia	UK
03 September 1963	<a href="#">S/5407</a>	The Palestine question	USSR
22 June 1962	<a href="#">S/5134</a>	The India-Pakistan question	USSR
18 December 1961	<a href="#">S/5033</a>	Letter dated 18 December 1961 from Portugal to the President of the Security Council concerning Goa	USSR
30 November 1961	<a href="#">S/5006</a>	Applications for Membership Kuwait	USSR
07 July 1961	<a href="#">S/4855</a>	Complaints by Kuwait in respect of the situation arising from the threat by Iraq to the territorial integrity of Kuwait	USSR
13 December 1960	<a href="#">S/4578/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council the situation in the Congo	USSR
3-4 December 1960	<a href="#">S/4567/Rev.1</a>	Applications for membership Mauritania	USSR
17 September 1960	<a href="#">S/4523</a>	Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in the Congo	USSR
26 July 1960	<a href="#">S/4409/Rev.1</a>	Telegrams dated 13 July 1960 from the USSR to the Secretary-General	USSR
26 July 1960	<a href="#">S/4411</a>	Telegrams dated 13 July 1960 from the USSR to the Secretary-General	USSR
09 December 1958	<a href="#">S/4130/Rev.1</a>	Admission of new Members Viet-Nam	USSR
09 December 1958	<a href="#">S/4129/Rev.1</a>	Admission of new Members Republic of Korea	USSR
22 July 1958	<a href="#">S/4055/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 22 May 1958 from Lebanon and Letter dated 17 July 1958 from Jordan to the President of the Security Council Complaints by Lebanon and Jordan concerning the interference in their internal affairs by the United Arab Republic	USSR
18 July 1958	<a href="#">S/4050/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 22 May 1958 from Lebanon and Letter dated 17 July 1958 from Jordan to the President of the Security Council Complaints by Lebanon and Jordan concerning the interference in their internal affairs by the United Arab Republic	USSR
02 May 1958	<a href="#">S/3995</a> (incorporating the amendment) <a href="#">S/3998</a>	Complaint by USSR in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 18 April 1958 entitled Urgent measures to put an end to flights by US military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union	USSR
09 September 1957	<a href="#">S/3885</a>	Admission of new Members Viet-Nam	USSR
09 September 1957	<a href="#">S/3884</a>	Admission of new Members Republic of Korea	USSR
20 February 1957	<a href="#">S/3787</a>	The India-Pakistan question	USSR
04 November 1956	<a href="#">S/3730/Rev.1</a>	Letter dated 27 October 1956 from France, the UK and the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in Hungary	USSR
30 October 1956	<a href="#">S/3713/Rev.1</a> (as amended)	Letter dated 29 October 1956 from the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the Palestine question	France UK
30 October 1956	<a href="#">S/3710</a> (as amended)	Letter dated 29 October 1956 from the USA to the President of the Security Council concerning the Palestine question	France UK
15 December 1955	<a href="#">S/3510</a>	Admission of new Members Japan	USSR
20 June 1954	<a href="#">S/3236/Rev.1</a>	Cablegram dated 19 June 1954 from Guatemala to the President of the Security Council	USSR
18 June 1954	<a href="#">S/3229</a>	Letter dated 29 May 1954 from Thailand to the President of the Security Council	USSR
29 March 1954	<a href="#">S/3188/Corr.1</a>	The Palestine question	USSR
22 January 1954	<a href="#">S/3151/Rev.2</a>	The Palestine question	USSR
19 September 1952	<a href="#">S/2760</a>	Admission of new Members Cambodia	USSR
19 September 1952	<a href="#">S/2759</a>	Admission of new Members Laos	USSR
19 September 1952	<a href="#">S/2758</a>	Admission of new Members Vietnam	USSR
18 September 1952	<a href="#">S/2754</a>	Admission of new Members Japan	USSR
16 September 1952	<a href="#">S/2483</a>	Admission of new Members Libya	USSR
09 July 1952	<a href="#">S/2688</a>	Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial warfare	USSR
03 July 1952	<a href="#">S/2671</a>	Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial warfare	USSR

06 February 1952	<a href="#">S/2443</a>	Admission of new Members Italy	USSR
30 November 1950	<a href="#">S/1894</a>	Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa); Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea	USSR
12 September 1950	<a href="#">S/1752</a>	Complaint of bombing by air forces of the territory of China	USSR
06 September 1950	<a href="#">S/1653</a>	Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea	USSR
18 October 1949	<a href="#">S/1408/Rev.1</a>	Regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces	USSR
18 October 1949	<a href="#">S/1399/Rev.1</a>	Regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces	USSR
11 October 1949	<a href="#">S/1398</a>	Regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1337</a>	Application for Membership Ceylon	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1336</a>	Application for Membership Austria	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1335</a>	Application for Membership Ireland	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1334</a>	Application for Membership Finland	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1333</a>	Application for Membership Italy	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1332</a>	Application for Membership Transjordan	USSR
13 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1331</a>	Application for Membership Portugal	USSR
07 September 1949	<a href="#">S/1385</a>	Application for Membership Nepal	USSR
08 April 1949	<a href="#">S/1305</a>	Application for Membership Republic of Korea	USSR
15 December 1948	<a href="#">S/PV.384</a>	Application for Membership Ceylon	USSR
25 October 1948	<a href="#">S/1048</a>	Identical notifications dated 29 September 1948 from France, the UK and the USA to the Secretary-General Berlin blockade	USSR
18 August 1948	<a href="#">S/PV.351</a>	Application for Membership Ceylon	USSR
22 June 1948	<a href="#">S/836</a>	Letter dated 26 May 1948 from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to the President of the Security Council transmitting the Third Report of the Commission	USSR
24 May 1948	<a href="#">S/PV.3038</a>	Letter dated 12 Mar 1948 from Chile to the Secretary-General events in Czechoslovakia	USSR
24 May 1948	<a href="#">S/PV.303</a>	Letter dated 12 Mar 1948 from Chile to the Secretary-General events in Czechoslovakia preliminary question	USSR
10 April 1948	<a href="#">S/PV.279</a>	Application for Membership Italy	USSR
01 October 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.206</a>	Application for Membership Italy	USSR
01 October 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.206</a>	Application for Membership Finland	USSR
15 September 1947	<a href="#">S/552</a>	The Greek question concerning the situation in northern, Greece preliminary question	USSR
15 September 1947	<a href="#">S/552, S/PV.202</a>	The Greek question concerning the situation in northern Greece	USSR
21 August 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.190</a>	Application for Membership Austria	USSR
21 August 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.190</a>	Application for Membership Italy	USSR
19 August 1947	<a href="#">S/486</a>	The Greek question Greek frontier incidents	USSR
19 August 1947	<a href="#">S/471</a> and <a href="#">S/471/Add.1</a>	The Greek question Greek frontier incidents	USSR
18 August 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.186</a>	Application for Membership Portugal	USSR
18 August 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.186</a>	Application for Membership Ireland	USSR
18 August 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.186</a>	Application for Membership Transjordan	USSR
29 July 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.170</a>	The Greek question Greek frontier incidents	USSR
25 March 1947	<a href="#">S/PV.122</a>	Incidents in the Corfu Channel	USSR
20 September 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.70</a>	Telegram dated 24 August 1946 from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General	USSR
29 August 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.57</a>	Application for Membership Portugal	USSR
29 August 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.57</a>	Application for Membership Ireland	USSR
29 August 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.57</a>	Application for Membership Transjordan	USSR
26 June 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.49</a>	The Spanish question	USSR
26 June 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.49</a>	The Spanish question preliminary question	USSR
26 June 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.49</a>	The Spanish question	USSR
18 June 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.45</a>	The Spanish question	USSR
16 February 1946	<a href="#">S/PV.23</a>	Letter from the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations to the Secretary-General dated 4 February 1946	USSR

## Appendix B



## Appendix C

