



University
of Glasgow

Gardner, Paul John (2015) *Is the purpose of censorship in China only to curtail collective action?* [MSc]

<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/55/>

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author(s)

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author(s)

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, institution and date must be given



**University
of Glasgow**

School of Social and Political Sciences

**Is the purpose of censorship in China
only to curtail collective action?**

September 2015

2109879

**Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of
M.Sc. in Chinese Studies**

Word Count: 14,934

Abstract

King et al suggest censorship in China is now focused on preventing possible collective action and that Chinese citizens are therefore allowed ‘the full range of expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its policies, and its leaders’ (2013, 14). This dissertation is based on an analysis of instructions which the Chinese propaganda authorities send to media organisations, including Internet companies. It finds that the Chinese Communist Party does not allow the ‘the full range of expression’ about the Party/state and its leaders either in news media or in user generated content. Although the propaganda authorities are much more selective about censoring information related to Party/state criticism than under Mao, they use a range of tactics to manipulate sensitive information about the state, its policies and its leaders, in an attempt to create an information environment that is favourable to the Party/state.

Contents

1. Introduction	4
2. Historical background to censorship in China	7
3. The challenge of controlling information in the reform era	9
3.1 Marketisation of the media	9
3.2 Growth of the Internet	9
3.3 Satisfying demands for information	10
4. China's censorship system	12
4.1 Rules and regulations	12
4.2 Self-censorship	13
4.3 Using technology to control information online	16
4.4 Selective censorship	17
4.5 Guiding public opinion.....	21
5. Propaganda instructions	25
5.1 Data	25
5.2 Methodology	27
5.3 Overview of propaganda instructions	29
5.4 Background on the themes selected for detailed analysis.....	30
5.5 Censorship of news media.....	32
5.6 Censorship of user generated content	35
5.7 Indirect censorship of user generated content	38
5.8 Guiding public opinion.....	40
5.9 To censor or not to censor?.....	42
5.10 Comparison with the conclusions of King et al (2013)	45
6. Conclusion	47
7. Appendix	51
Appendix A: Propaganda instructions January to June 2011	51
Appendix B: Propaganda instructions January 2014 to June 2015	102
8. Bibliography	145

1. Introduction

The Chinese state maintains a large scale and sophisticated censorship system (Shambaugh, 2007; Brady, 2006, 2008). However, in the reform era the development of a commercial media sector and the growth of the Internet have made control of information more difficult than it was under Mao (Zhang, 2011; Zheng, 2010; Lewis, 2013; Luo, 2014). The fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now, at least to some extent, seeks to win the trust of its citizens rather than simply ruling by force means the state also needs to satisfy a growing demand for information (Zhang, 2011). The Chinese propaganda authorities have therefore developed a more nuanced approach towards the control of information (Tai, 2014; Link, 2012).

King et al argue that censorship in China is now focused on reducing ‘the probability of collective action’ (2013, 2) and the propaganda authorities no longer seek ‘to suppress criticism of the state or the Communist Party’ (2013, 1). A number of other scholars also argue that censorship is largely motivated by a desire to avoid social disorder (Shirk, 2011; MacKinnon, 2008). The number of collective actions in China has grown rapidly in the reform era, from around 8,700 in 1993 to 180,000 in 2010 (Liu and Chen, 2012). Chinese leaders are said to be haunted by the ‘colour’ revolutions which toppled regimes in a number of the former Soviet republics (Wall Street Journal, 2013). Censorship can help to limit the potential for collective action by limiting opportunities to find out about possible protests and by keeping different groups with similar concerns ‘in ignorance of one another’ so that there is ‘uncertainty among the discontented about the overall level of discontent’ (Sullivan, 2014, 31; Lorentzen, 2014, 404). Propaganda and censorship can also play a role in limiting potential collective action by signalling the strength of the regime ‘in social control and capacity to meet potential challenges’ (Huang, 2015, 22).

Chinese citizens do have considerably more freedom to discuss political issues than was possible under Mao (Shirk, 2011; Perry 2013; Yang, 2014). However, in this dissertation I argue that King et al are wrong to suggest that

censorship is limited to preventing collective action and that Chinese citizens are otherwise allowed ‘the full range of expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its policies, and its leaders’ (2013, 14). If Chinese citizens have the freedom that King et al describe, it would suggest that China now has a ‘public sphere’ in which, with the exception of content involving potential collective action, people can ‘express and publicise their opinions freely’ (Jurgen Habermas, 1989: 231, cited in Yang & Calhoun, 2007, 213). However, a number of scholars argue that the CCP still uses the propaganda system to ‘structure the symbolic environment’ in China in order to ‘manufacture consent’ so that its citizens accept, and if possible support, the Party’s continued rule (Lynch, 1999, 2; Zhang, 2011, 29, 37). These scholars suggest that although the CCP no longer seeks to win ‘blind devotion’ from its citizens, as it did under Mao, the Party does believe it needs to win and retain hearts and minds in order to stay in power (Shambaugh, 2007, 58; Brady, 2008; Perry, 2013; Chan, 2002). Indeed, Brady argues that propaganda work ‘has become the very life blood of the party, the main means for guaranteeing the party’s ongoing legitimacy and hold on power’ (2006, 59). As Lippmann argued, ‘without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strictest sense of the word is impossible’ because ‘access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable’ (1954, 43). If the CCP really is content to allow a genuine public sphere to develop, it will significantly limit its ability to use propaganda to shape people’s views about its legitimacy (Shambaugh, 2007).

This dissertation looks at whether the purpose of censorship in China is only to curtail collective action or whether the propaganda authorities do also seek to limit the ability of Chinese citizens to express negative views about the Party/state, its policies and its leaders. It is based on an analysis of instructions issued by the propaganda authorities to media organisations including Internet companies. Whereas King et al (2013) only looked at content deleted on social media, propaganda instructions show what information the Chinese authorities are seeking to control in both news media and in user generated content (information posted by individual netizens). These instructions also provide a

valuable insight into the range of strategies the propaganda authorities use to control information, including limiting the amount of information on certain topics and increasing the amount of pro-government content on sensitive subjects, as well as trying to delete information entirely.

This analysis of propaganda instructions finds that as well as censoring content that involves potential collective action, the CCP also prevents Chinese citizens from expressing and accessing ‘the full range of expression’ about the Party/state and its leaders in news media and in social media (King et al, 2013, 14). Although the propaganda authorities are much more selective about what information they censor, they use a range of tactics to manipulate sensitive information about the state, its policies and its leaders, in an attempt to create an information environment that is favourable to the Party/state.

2. Historical background to censorship in China

The CCP has placed a high priority on propaganda and censorship since it was created in the 1920s. The Party developed propaganda techniques during the Chinese civil war and propaganda played an important part in their victory (Taylor, 2009; Chassin 1965; Shambaugh, 2007). Once they had won the civil war, propaganda then became a key mechanism in the CCP's efforts under Chairman Mao to transform Chinese society by seeking to overwhelm its citizens 'with official information and interpretations of reality' (Shambaugh, 2007; Lynch, 1999, 3).

Propaganda and censorship were relaxed in the early reform period as a reaction to the excesses of the Mao years (Brady, 2008). The greater sense of freedom resulted in more people speaking out against the regime and ultimately in the protests in Tianenmen Square in 1989 (.ibid). Chinese leaders also saw the role that greater media freedom had played in the collapse of Communism in Europe (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011).

As a result, the Party has put a renewed emphasis on propaganda and censorship since 1989. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992 President Jiang Zemin ordered that the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) should become an 'extremely important department' with its powers increased (Shambaugh, 2007; Brady, 2008, 49). Since then, the head of the CPD has also been a Political Bureau member and the department is seen as one 'one of the four major organisational pillars of the CCP' (Zheng, 2010, 153) acting under the direction of the Central Leading Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work (Shambaugh, 2007).

In recent years, the Internet has become an increasing focus of propaganda and censorship efforts. In 2013, President Xi Jinping said that 'on this battlefield of the internet, whether we can stand up, and gain victory, directly relates to our country's ideological security and regime security' (Cook, 2015). In 2014, a new Central Internet Security and Informatisation Leading Group was established, to coordinate work on cyber security and internet management

(Cook, 2015). A new Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was also set up and some commentators have speculated that this body has actually become more important in the propaganda structure than the CPD (Bandurski, 2015a).

3. The challenge of controlling information in the reform era

Censorship is often seen as preventing any information the state disapproves of reaching its citizens (Cole, 1998). However, there are a number of reasons why Chinese citizens have access to more information than in the past, in spite of the renewed emphasis on propaganda since 1989. In the reform era, marketisation of the media and the growth of the Internet have made it more difficult to control information. In addition, there appears to be greater acceptance that widespread censorship is not compatible with a state that wants to persuade its citizens that it is legitimate.

3.1 Marketisation of the media

In the Mao era nearly all the main communication channels were under state control, so that, in principle, the Party could exercise direct control over information (Zhang, 2011). The CCP still exercises strong control over official media, such as People's Daily and China Central TV (CCTV), and in some cases, the CPD drafts editorials and key news articles in these media (Shambaugh, 2007; Esarey, 2006). However, there has been a significant increase in the number of media outlets and most are now financially independent of the government (Zheng, 2010; Stockmann, 2013). The number of media outlets makes it impossible to exercise the same kind of detailed control that was possible in the past (Zheng, 2010). The need to attract advertising revenue also means that commercial news media are under pressure to push the limits of censorship as far as possible in order to cover stories that interest their readers, including social issues and stories which may be politically sensitive (Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Tong & Sparks, 2009; Zhao 2008).

3.2 Growth of the Internet

The most significant challenge to the CCP's efforts to control information has come from the Internet. The CCP clearly recognises the importance of the

Internet in driving continued economic growth (Sullivan, 2014; MacKinnon, 2011) and by the end of 2013, China had 618 million Internet users (Luo, 2014, 1289).

As 'a user-centred communication tool' the Internet has given more power to individuals and social groups (Tai, 2006, 202), significantly increasing the amount of information available to Chinese citizens and their ability to share views (Lewis, 2013; Luo, 2014; Yang, 2009). For example, at the time of the Wenzhou high-speed train collision in 2011, when more than 40 people died, about 26 million messages about the incident were posted on the microblogging platform Sina Weibo within a week (New York Times, 2011). The Internet has also played a role in organising collective action (Tai, 2006; Esarey & Qiang, 2011; Yang, 2009). For example, in 2007, local authorities in the city of Xiamen decided to move the site of a planned PX chemical factory after 20,000 people took part in protests organised on the Internet and by text, following warnings about the health risks published in a blog (Yang, 2009; Huang & Yip, 2012).

In 1999, Lynch suggested that with millions of individuals and organisations now able to contribute 'to the construction of the symbolic environment' the propaganda system had 'crumbled dramatically' (Lynch, 1999, 7&3). Although most scholars believe that the Internet has not revolutionised access to information quite so dramatically, it is generally accepted that new technology has at least to some extent eroded the ability of the propaganda authorities 'to keep a tight lid on information flow' (Zheng, 2010, 161; Tai, 2014; Qiang cited in Shirk, 2011).

3.3 Satisfying demands for information

Apart from the fact that it has become more difficult to completely stop information circulating, simply banning any information that is critical of the Party/state can also be counterproductive. Widespread censorship is not consistent with the CCP's emphasis 'on building trust and confidence between

the ruler and the ruled' (Zhang, 2011, 24). Hassanpour (2011) found that the Egyptian government undermined its legitimacy during the Arab Spring by completely blacking out the Internet, because it was obvious that the authorities were trying to conceal information (cited in Roberts, 2014, 3-4). In some situations, if people do not hear any news they may also assume the worst, 'inferring that there might have been bad news that was censored' (Shadmehr & Bernhardt, 2012, 1). The propaganda authorities therefore have an incentive to try to be more subtle about the way they control information, so that it is not too obvious to Chinese citizens (Link, 2012).

Knowledge that censorship is occurring can also increase people's interest in a topic and result in them going out of their way to find out more information about it (Qiang, 2014; Roberts, 2014). Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, recognised that in some situations, if people cannot get information from sources the government control they will look elsewhere (Doob, 1995). The limits of banning information were exposed when the media were initially prevented from covering the outbreak of SARS in 2001/2 (Zhang, 2007). Lack of information caused panic and anger and people looked to other sources in search of the facts (Shirk, 2011). In order for the CCP to be able to use the media to persuade its citizens to support its continued rule, the information people see also needs to have some degree of credibility (Stockmann, 2013). As the People's Daily noted in 1998: 'If we do not allow any exposé and criticism of negative phenomena in society, people will hardly believe in our propaganda' (Chan, 2002, 49). The authorities therefore recognise that a certain amount of openness is necessary to satisfy the 'increasing demands by the public for timely and accurate information' (Zhang, 2011, 5). Giving citizens the opportunity to find out more about issues they are concerned about and providing an outlet to vent frustrations may make it less likely that they will demand political change (Beach, 2013) and even give the state some degree of 'participatory legitimacy' (Nathan, 2003, cited in Lewis, 2013, 692-3).

4. China's censorship system

Over the last 25 years, the Chinese propaganda authorities have responded to the problems involved in controlling information by developing a highly sophisticated censorship system. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances has enabled the CCP to remain in power longer than many of its critics predicted (Nathan, 2013). What Deng Xiaoping referred to as 'crossing the river by feeling the stones', 'a pragmatic, trial and error method', has its roots in the Communist base areas during the war with Japan (China Daily, 2009; Perry, 2013, 19). China's propaganda bosses have also been learning and innovating in response to the challenges of controlling information in a modern society (MacKinnon, 2011).

As the following sections set out, the propaganda authorities use a complex range of strategies to try to control the information its citizens see. This includes using rules and regulations, encouraging self-censorship and technological controls. However, the censorship system increasingly relies on manipulating the information that people see, rather than simply trying to prevent people seeing all the information the state disapproves of. The Party/state does allow much greater discussion of political issues than was possible under Mao but they try to ensure that the balance of information on sensitive issues is skewed in their favour.

4.1 Rules and regulations

Rules and regulations have played an increasingly important part in exercising control over organisations and individuals who are not under the direct authority of the state.

A range of rules and regulations have been issued to limit the scope for independent reporting. News media are supposed to consult propaganda departments when major disasters occur or when reporting politically sensitive matters; only run foreign and nationally important news stories based on copy

provided by Xinhua; and to get approval to publish stories produced by other news outlets (Brady, 2008; Tai, 2006). In practice, the authorities have generally seemed to tolerate the media ignoring, or at least bending, the rules unless stories are seen as particularly sensitive (Stockmann, 2013). In 2014, new rules were also introduced to try to prevent journalists providing information to other domestic and foreign media or posting information online (Human Rights in China, July 2014).

Laws prohibit people from posting a wide range of information online, for example, content that is 'damaging to the state or state organs' (Tai, 2006, 98). The descriptions of what is prohibited are typically vague, to give the authorities scope to take action against companies and individuals as they think appropriate at the time (.ibid). Since 2005, the authorities have increasingly tried to crack down on anonymity online to make it easier to exercise control over what people post (Tai, 2006; Beach, 2013; Reuters, 2015a). Since Xi Jinping became President, there has been a further tightening up of rules regarding the Internet. In particular, since 2013, new rules have sought to prevent 'online rumours' and online comment that 'seriously harms' public order or state interests (Cook, 2015).

4.2 Self-censorship

The government puts much of the responsibility for censorship on media organisations, by making them responsible for the behaviour of their reporters and customers, and on individual netizens (Qiang cited in Shirk, 2011; Brady, 2008).

Articles in the official media, such as Xinhua and People's Daily, as well as in government documents seek to establish frames for the way sensitive issues should be discussed (Brady, 2009b; Edney, 2014). For example, in 2013 a document, known as Document No. 9, was circulated to senior officials and newspaper editors, warning against attempts to subvert Chinese society, by promoting ideas such as 'Western constitutional democracy' and 'universal

values' of human rights (New York Times, 2013a). An anti-rumour campaign, linked to the new laws introduced in 2013, has sought to discourage people from spreading information online (Benney, 2013). As a result of these efforts, netizens know that some criticism of government policies is tolerated but that serious criticisms, for example, 'criticism of the political system is not' (Brady, 2008, 134).

Meetings and training ensure media owners and journalists know what is expected of them (Brady, 2009a; Edney, 2014). For example, in 2002 a group of Internet companies were brought together to sign a Public Pledge, promising not to release or spread material 'harmful to national security and social stability' and to encourage Internet users to 'use the web in a civilised way' (Tai, 2006, 101). In September 2014, the bosses of more than 100 Chinese websites gathered for 'a work conference' where they 'signed a letter of commitment' promising to report illegal content and to publicise hotlines for people to report 'rumourmongering' (Xinhua, 2014a). Journalists are also given training in 'theories on socialism with Chinese characteristics' (BBC, 2013).

The pressure to self censor is backed up by the threat of coercion. Getting 'on the wrong side' of the propaganda authorities can be fatal for media organisations, who are dependent on the state for their ability to operate (Edney, 2014, 52; Zhang, 2011). For example, in 2009-10 Fanfou, China's first microblogging platform, was closed down after users posted information about riots in Xinjiang (Beach, 2013). In April 2015, the new Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) reminded Internet companies that failure to comply with instructions would lead to 'fines, temporary suspensions or outright closure' (Wall Street Journal, 2015b). In the same month, the CAC threatened Sina Weibo with a suspension of its Internet news services unless it took steps to improve censorship of 'illegal content' (Xinhua, 2015).

Journalists who go too far may incur financial penalties or risk having their press cards, and therefore their livelihoods, taken away (Esarey, 2005; Dong,

2012; Stern & Hassid, 2012). They can also be prosecuted for offences such as attempting to incite subversion or leaking state secrets (Edney, 2014). In 2015, journalist Gao Yu was sentenced to seven years for ‘leaking’ Document 9 (The Guardian, 2015b). As of December 2014, 44 journalists were imprisoned in China, the most jailed journalists in a single country (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014).

Netizens also have incentives to be careful about what they post online. Being ‘flagged up to the authorities as a potential troublemaker’ can affect their careers (Shirk, 2011). Reporters Without Borders records 73 netizens as being in prison in China (2015). Since the introduction of the new laws on rumourmongering, netizens can be given jail sentences of up to three years if their ‘false’ posts are viewed by 5,000 Internet users or reposted more than 500 times (Mooney, 2014; Yang, 2014, 111).

Journalists and netizens may also face charges unrelated to what they have posted. A number of journalists involved in critical reporting have been prosecuted for ostensibly committing offences such as bribery and corruption (Zheng, 2010). As the anti-rumour campaign got underway, Charles Xue, a blogger with 12 million followers, who criticised the government, was arrested after he had allegedly been caught with a prostitute (The Atlantic, 2013).

The propaganda authorities widely publicise their efforts to monitor the media and online activity and to punish those who cross the line (Brady, 2008; Yuan, 2010). Charles Xue was paraded on national television after his arrest (The Atlantic, 2013) and Xinhua said his toppling ‘sounded a warning bell about the law to all Big V’s’, netizens with large numbers of followers (New York Times, 2013b).

As Link suggests, the Chinese state’s efforts to encourage self censorship are like ‘the anaconda in the chandelier’, most of the time it does not move but everyone knows it is there and everyone gets used to making the adjustments needed to ensure it does not strike (Link, 2002).

4.3 Using technology to control information online

The Chinese censorship system also makes extensive use of technology to control what people see online. Indeed some scholars suggest that far from undermining authoritarian control, new technology has ‘become an effective instrument of control’ for the CCP (Zhang & Zheng, 2009, 2).

During significant periods of unrest in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, the authorities have cut off access to the Internet in these areas altogether (Sullivan, 2014). It is clear that the CCP regards this as a last resort, given the importance attached to new media in helping to drive economic growth. However, the state can still exercise a significant level of control, short of shutting the Internet down.

China’s Internet is connected with the rest of the world through ‘a few major backbone Chinese networks’, creating a relatively ‘controlled information environment’ (Tai, 2006, 102-3) in which access to certain foreign websites can be ‘banned’ (King et al, 2013). Although it is possible to access blocked websites, for example, by using Virtual Private Networks, in practice, the number of people doing this has been fairly small (Dong, 2012).

For the most part, however, censorship within China is carried out by individual Internet companies. Studies have found that about 13-16% of social media posts are deleted by Internet companies (King et al, 2013, 6; Bamman and O’Connor, 2012). Technology has also been used since 2002 to prevent people searching for text that contains banned words or phrases (Zheng, 2008; Sullivan, 2014). Qiang identified 820 search terms that were filtered on Sina Weibo, including ‘Cultural Revolution’, ‘press freedom’ and ‘propaganda department’ (2011). The advantage of blocking key words is that it significantly limits the potential for information to spread but the censorship is less obvious to netizens because they are not prevented from posting the content (Ng, 2014).

There are limitations to online censorship. Chinese netizens make use a variety of techniques, including slang, alternative characters, egao (spoofs), satire and euphemisms that are difficult for computer programmes to pick up (Edney, 2014; Qiang, 2011, 2014). However, as the number of Internet users has grown, the effort involved in monitoring online activity has also increased. It was estimated that in 2013, Sina Weibo alone employed more than 4,000 censors to identify content that technology cannot pick up (The Economist, 2013). In 2013, Beijing News suggested that more than two million people are employed by the government and companies to monitor web activity (BBC, 2013). In addition, netizens are encouraged to inform on users who post information the state disapproves of (Qiang, 2011). Xinhua reported that in the first eight months of 2014, 680,000 cases of ‘illegal’ online information had been reported on a national website and more than 800 informants had been given rewards (Xinhua, 2014a). Even if not all sensitive content is deleted, ‘by making access to information less convenient’ the authorities can have a significant impact on the amount of ‘negative’ information that reaches people (Roberts, 2014, 1-2).

4.4 Selective censorship

Although the Chinese authorities maintain an extensive censorship system, they are more selective about what information they censor than under Mao. The Chinese authorities have accepted that they cannot censor everything that is politically inconvenient. As Deng Xiaoping, put it, ‘If you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in’ (MacKinnon, 2008, 32). The authorities now aim to achieve overall control of the political information in the public domain rather than to control everything (Brady, 2009b; Zheng, 2010; Shambaugh, 2007; Zhang, 2011). One Chinese scholar, Li Yonggang, compared the propaganda system to a hydroelectric water-management system, ‘a huge, complex system with many moving parts’ in which it is not necessary ‘to have total control over every detail of water level or pressure at any given time’ in order to keep the system working (MacKinnon, 2011, 37).

The Chinese authorities allow a wide range of topics to be discussed in news media and in user generated content, particularly softer news stories, such as sport and entertainment, but also policy issues, including the economy and social problems, such as pollution and food safety (Yang and Calhoun, 2007; Zheng, 2010; Stockmann, 2013; Shirk, 2011). However, self-censorship will often play a hidden role in shaping how these issues are discussed.

In some cases, the propaganda authorities have allowed people greater freedom to discuss certain issues because it benefits the state. In particular, the CCP has, to some extent, encouraged the media and netizens to act as watchdogs to tackle corruption among lower level officials (Shirk, 2011; Tong & Sparks, 2009; Lorentzen, 2014). Popular nationalism in the media and online can help Chinese leaders to put additional pressure on other countries by suggesting they are constrained by public opinion (Stockmann, 2013; Weiss, 2013). Social media can also act as 'a de facto polling system', providing feedback the state can use to adapt policy and to identify potential threats (Sullivan, 2014, 31). In other cases, the propaganda authorities seek to strike a balance between satisfying the increasing demands by the public to discuss issues and 'for timely and accurate information', particularly on issues like pollution and health care that people are facing in their everyday lives, while 'protecting the party from its possible negative effects' (Zhang, 2011, 5; Stockmann, 2013, 7).

The propaganda authorities also partially censor some information. An analysis of propaganda instructions between 2008 and 2012 found that the number of instructions involving attempts to ban stories outright fell from 65% to 41% of the total (Tai, 2014, 195). For example, in some cases the authorities instructed media organisations to limit the amount of coverage they gave to a particular story (.ibid). Bamman and O'Connor also found that social media posts were more likely to be deleted if they were reposted a number of times or the author had a lot of followers (2012), limiting the number of people the information could reach. Similarly, small circulation magazines enjoy much greater freedom than the mass media, allowing more critical information and ideas to be communicated just to small groups (Zhao, 2008; Lewis, 2013; Esaray,

2005). Therefore, although it may be possible to find information about certain issues, there may still have been considerable censorship in order to limit its impact.

The line between what can and cannot be published is also not static. There have been periods of 'liberalisation and retrenchment' (Stockmann, 2013, 5). For example, censorship increases during periods of leadership transition (.ibid). The authorities have also adapted their censorship strategies as they have developed new techniques for controlling the Internet and as a result of seeing some of the negative consequences of greater freedom.

News media had most freedom in the way they covered policy issues in the period after marketisation had started, during the 1990s and early 2000s, with a flourishing of investigative journalism (Bandurski, 2015b). Since then there have been increasing steps to rein in the most independent minded publications (.ibid). For example in 2013, government censors rewrote an editorial calling for political reform in *Southern Weekly*, replacing it with a tribute to the CCP (Xu, 2015).

The Internet has provided opportunities for Chinese netizens to influence their fellow citizens, the media and government agendas (Hassid, 2012; Luo, 2014), in ways that are likely to be undesirable to an authoritarian state. For example, when a young migrant, Sun Zhigang, died in 2003 after being detained by police for not having the right papers, the Internet 'fanned the flames of public anger' (Tai, 2006, 267) and the government subsequently abolished the system of arbitrarily taking migrants into custody (Goldman, 2005). At the time of the high speed train crash at Wenzhou in 2011, the news was broken by eyewitnesses on Weibo and there was a 'furious online reaction' to the government's handling of the aftermath, which led to the resignation of a number of senior officials and a public apology from the Prime Minister (BBC, 2011). Since then, the authorities have sought to limit the scope for freedom of expression online, including launching the anti-rumour campaign and putting pressure on the Big Vs (Ng, 2015; Mooney, 2014).

Although the dividing line between what is and is not allowed may change, there is general agreement that the propaganda authorities do still go to considerable lengths to try to prevent information that might encourage collective action (King et al, 2013; Lewis, 2013; MacKinnon, 2008). This is consistent with evidence that the authorities make most effort to censor information in areas where risk of revolt is greatest. Bamman, O'Connor and Smith found that up to 53% of all messages in Tibet, where there have been protests about Chinese rule, are deleted, compared with 12% in Beijing and 11% in Shanghai (2012).

It is less clear from the literature whether the authorities draw the line at censoring content involving potential collective action, or whether they do still seek to control Party/state criticism. A number of studies show that the Internet, in particular, is 'a cacophony of voices' with people giving vent to concerns on a wide range of issues, often based on personal experience, including abuses of power, corruption and environmental problems (Sullivan, 2014, 26; Beach, 2013). In some cases, people are even expressing highly contentious political views, with the CCP 'being constantly exposed, ridiculed, and criticised' (Qiang, 2011). As King et al (2013) point out, those who argue that the purpose of Chinese propaganda is to manufacture consent for the regime generally give examples of censorship involving the potential for collective action. For example, Brady says the media are not allowed to report on 'events of social chaos, citizens appealing to the government, illegal organisations or demonstrations, strikes, walkouts, ethnic or religious clashes, criminal violence, clashes between locals and the police or PLA' (2008, 105).

There is some evidence, however, that the authorities do seek to prevent people expressing a full range of political views. An ongoing study of censorship on WeChat has found 'numerous posts' being censored which relate to 'government policies', particularly corruption (Ng, 2015). Although King et al suggest the public are allowed 'the full range of expression' about the state, its policies and leaders, the evidence in their study shows that some social media

posts about ‘highly visible and apparently sensitive policies associated with events that had no collective action potential’ were censored (2013, 12). About 10% of the content concerning the ‘one child policy, corruption policy, and news of increasing food prices’ was deleted, although this was significantly lower than the 80% deletion rate they identified in cases involving potential collective action (.ibid). Therefore, although the Chinese authorities do not seek to censor all content involving Party/state criticism it is by no means clear that they allow people to say whatever they like.

4.5 Guiding public opinion

Traditional censorship – deleting information – is not the only way the authorities seek to control sensitive information. Rather than simply trying to prevent any discussion of inconvenient subjects, since Tiananmen in 1989 the propaganda authorities have increasingly focussed on media management in order to ‘guide public opinion’ (China Media Project). Public opinion guidance seeks to make the state ‘the primary definer’ of events by ensuring that as much pro-government commentary as possible appears on critical issues and by delegitimising alternative sources of information (Zhao, 2008; Sullivan, 2014; Tai, 2014; Lewis, 2013). As Ng suggests, ‘steering conversations’ and drowning out ‘dissenting commentary’ in this way is ‘a de facto form of censorship’ (2015). The idea that setting the agenda can play ‘an important role in manufacturing the consensus’ behind government policies is influential among Chinese communications scholars (Li, 2009 and Zhang, 2001, cited in Jiang, 2014, 171). The evidence shows the media has a strong impact ‘impact on political attitudes’ (Stockman, 2013, 13). Hassid suggests that the propaganda authorities consider that ‘discussion of even relatively sensitive issues is acceptable online if newspapers have already set the agenda’ (2012, 223).

The challenge of controlling online content has led to an increasing sense of urgency about the need to guide public opinion on the Internet since the 1990s. In 2007 President Hu Jintao called for the Party to ‘assert supremacy over

online public opinion' and to 'study the art of online guidance' in order to 'use' the internet (Economist, 2013). Xi Jinping has also emphasised the need for 'public opinion struggle' online (Cook, 2015).

One part of this strategy has involved adopting 'the methods of mass persuasion and mass communication theories' from the West (Brady, 2006, 74). The CCP pushes government bodies to put out information about stories they would previously have avoided, in order to try to set the agenda (Shirk, 2011; Lewis, 2013; Steinhardt, 2015). During the protests over plans for the chemical factory at Xiamen in 2007, when it became clear they could not prevent information reaching the public, the authorities used 'a propaganda blitz' in an attempt to 'guide public sentiment' (Perry, 2013, 21-22). After the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan the government quickly acknowledged the severity of the disaster and the State Council gave daily press conferences (Stockmann, 2013). In 2013 the State Council issued a reminder about the need to put out more information, in order 'to expose rumours' (Xinhua, 2013). Government bodies have also been encouraged to open websites and social media accounts. By December 2011, there were over 50,000 government accounts across the four major microblog platforms in China (Sullivan, 2014, 32).

Although the Chinese authorities make use of Western public relations methods, they are not constrained by the willingness of the media and individual citizens to repeat the messages they want to communicate. Commercial media organisations can be instructed to post news content that supports the government's views (Shirk, 2011; Tai, 2014). When the Politburo Standing Committee ordered government departments to start releasing information on SARS in April 2002, editors were instructed to focus on positive stories and the media was filled with a large amount of 'uniform and upbeat' coverage, emphasising 'the leadership's care for the people and the sacrifice of party members, doctors and ordinary people' (Zhang, 2007, 543-4; Zhao, 2008, 41).

The Party/state has also been making efforts to try to ensure that official media account for a much higher proportion of the news that is spread on social media. In the last few years, official media have succeeded in increasing their presence on social media, overtaking or displacing commercial media (Cook, 2015). In 2014, Xi Jinping called for an acceleration of efforts to create ‘new media groups that have strength, communication capacity, credibility and are influential’ in order for the Party to be better placed to set the agenda online (SCMP, 2014). Internet companies are also directed by propaganda authorities to ‘white list’ certain politically sensitive terms so that when netizens search for information relating to them they are directed to news articles and websites containing Party/state propaganda (Edney, 2014, 63).

The propaganda authorities also use thousands of volunteer and paid propaganda workers in an attempt to give the impression that the consensus on controversial issues is in favour of the CCP and to guide discussion away from conclusions not favoured by the Party (Yang, 2007; Edney, 2014; Shirk, 2011). These efforts grew out of a number of experiments by local authorities around 2007/8. As part of its efforts to turn round public opinion on the Xiamen PX plant in 2007, the local authority employed over 120 ‘experts’ to serve as internet monitors and commentators defending the government’s position (Perry, 2013, 21-22). A ‘public sentiment office’ established by Hebei Province at the time of a scandal about tainted milk in 2008, which ‘manufactured internet discussions’, was also credited with preventing mass protests (Perry, 2013). Some authors argue that posts by paid propaganda workers are easy to spot because they tend to be ‘repetitive and mechanical’ and run the risk of undermining genuinely pro-government opinion because ‘people will suspect it was done for money’ (Link, 2012; Shirk, 2011). However, the propaganda authorities are placing an increasing emphasis on this approach. In 2013, it was estimated that 250,000–300,000 people, known as ‘50 cent party members’, were paid to post comments supporting the Party (King et al, 2013, 1). CCP organisations have also been recruiting volunteers to take part in this work. In February 2015, it was revealed that the Communist Youth League had set out to recruit 20% of its members (about 18 million

people) to serve as ‘civilisation volunteers’ to act as models for ‘good netizens’ (GlobalVoices, 2015).

The focus on ‘positive’ messages (Brady, 2006) suggests the Chinese authorities want to persuade people to support the Party/state, rather than simply to prevent possible collective action. In 2003, Hu Jintao spoke about the need for ‘mainly positive propaganda’ (Tai, 2006, 183) while the media and website companies are now regularly urged to spread ‘positive energy’ (Xinhua, 2014b). A bulletin issued by the CPD following a meeting of propaganda bosses in January 2011 also emphasised the need to channel public opinion on a range of policy areas such as ‘income distribution, the stock market and property market, employment and social security, education and public health and sanitation, and safe manufacturing’ (Nieman Reports, 2011).

Therefore, even if the state does not entirely eliminate information it disapproves of, it does attempt to achieve ‘roughly one-sided messages’ (Stockmann, 2013, 260) on certain policy issues, in an effort to ensure ‘the picture of the world seen by the average Chinese Internet user is skewed in the regime’s favour’ (MacKinnon, 2008, 33).

The next section looks at propaganda instructions issued to Chinese media organisations to determine whether the authorities do only seek to censor content involving potential collective action as King et al (2013) suggest, or whether they do also censor some content concerning the Party/state, its policies, and its leaders. While the study by King et al (2013) focused on content deleted from social media, the analysis below considers a range of censorship tactics the propaganda authorities use to control information published in news media and posted by individual netizens.

5. Propaganda instructions

5.1 Data

Media organisations receive a ‘daily flood of official letters, faxes and telephoned instructions’ from the propaganda authorities (Tong & Sparks , 2009, 342). A senior manager at one of China’s largest Internet portals told Xiao Qiang he received instructions from propaganda officials ‘at least three times a day’ (2011). The propaganda authorities have a preference for issuing oral instructions, to try to avoid a paper trail ‘because the CCP recognises the shaky legal grounds’ for the powers which the propaganda authorities exercise (Brady, 2008, 19). However, the number of written directives has increased because of the problem of communicating verbally ‘with a multiplying number of websites and media outlets’ (CDT, 27.9.2010).

These instructions are usually secret (Tai, 2014). The data used for this dissertation has been collected by China Digital Times (<http://chinadigitaltimes.net>), ‘an independent’ media organisation (Tai, 2014, 192). China Digital Times (CDT) has a strong reputation as a source of propaganda instructions and has been cited by a number of scholars and media (for example Tai, 2014; Ng, 2013; The Guardian, 2014a; Link, 2012; Wasserstrom, 2010). The site is run by Xiao Qiang, an adjunct professor at the School of Information at Berkeley in the United States, who Link describes as leading the world ‘in ferreting out and piecing together how Chinese Internet censorship works’ (2012).

The instructions posted on the CDT website have either been leaked on Chinese social media or are sent directly to CDT by Chinese journalists (Link, 2012). CDT staff then confirm that the instructions are genuine by checking each of them ‘against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation’ (CDT, 4.6.2011).

In some cases, the wording of the instructions posted on CDT is altered to protect the source of the leak. However, the reputation of the CDT site provides reasonable confidence that the meaning has not been changed. The wording of these ‘altered’ instructions is also similar to occasional photocopies of propaganda instructions which have been posted on other sites. For example, a photo of one of the instructions about a film called ‘Under the Dome’ in March 2015 was posted on Weibo (CDT, 3.3.2015).

Tai identified that the instructions on the CDT website between 2007 and 2013 came from more than 30 different central and local propaganda bodies, although over 95% came from either the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) or the State Council Information Office (SCIO) (2014, 193-4). As well as being the lead propaganda organisation, the CPD has direct responsibility for print and broadcast media, while the SCIO has responsibility for the Internet (.ibid; Shambaugh, 2007). The instructions are used to inform media organisations to control news content, both offline and online, and interactive content created by individual netizens on social media platforms such as Sina Weibo and WeChat.

A number of studies have looked at what information is deleted on social media by the censors (King et al, 2013; Bamman and O’Connor, 2012) or which key words are blocked (Ng, 2013). However, these studies are only able to focus on one part of China’s complex censorship system. Propaganda instructions provide a broader insight into what information the Chinese authorities are seeking to control and how they try to exercise that control because they deal with both online and offline content and they show what the authorities are trying to censor, as opposed to the outcomes. The latter may be affected by how effectively media organisations implement the instructions and the ability of individual netizens to get around censorship.

Tai (2014) looked at propaganda instructions to study how the authorities sought to control information e.g. by banning content or guiding public opinion. She concluded that the propaganda authorities are gradually changing

their censorship efforts from simply banning information to a greater focus on ‘more subtle strategies’ to guide public opinion (Tai, 2014, 186). However, she did not seek to identify whether or not the content related to potential collective action and also did not distinguish between instructions aimed at news media and those aimed at controlling interactive content such as social media.

5.2 Methodology

I have examined propaganda instructions from two periods. I looked at the leaked instructions in the first six months of 2011 (Appendix 1) to establish if it was the case that the propaganda authorities did not seek to ‘suppress criticism of the state or the Communist Party’ during the same period that King et al examined in their study (2013, 4). In addition, I looked at leaked instructions between January 2014 and the end of June 2015 (Appendix 2), to establish if the propaganda authorities sought to censor criticisms of the Party/state in this more recent period.

In order to analyse the propaganda instructions I used content analysis, as this is a useful technique for making inferences from texts by ‘systematically identifying specified characteristics’ (Krippendorff, 2004; Bryman, 2012). I analysed the instructions based on the textual evidence, the context within which they were issued and used the literature considered in earlier sections of this dissertation to further contextualise the instructions (Krippendorff, 2004).

I divided the research into two parts. In the first stage, I sought to establish whether the propaganda instructions related to criticisms of the Party/state and CCP leaders or to potential collective action, by undertaking a ‘systematic’ review of the instructions during the two periods (Krippendorff, 2004; Bryman, 2012). In the second stage, I selected a number of propaganda instructions on the same ‘themes’ (Krippendorff, 2004) to look at in more detail at (a) whether the authorities were seeking to censor news media content, user generated content or both, (b) what strategies the authorities used to control the different types of information, and (c) to assess why the information had been censored.

I selected four themes that are ‘relevant’ to answering the question whether censorship in China is only aimed at curtailing collective action (Krippendorff, 2004). I examined three themes concerning Party/state criticism - two involving policy problems and one involving criticisms of the CCP and its senior leaders – and one theme related to potential collective action, in order to see if there were any differences in the way the authorities sought to censor the two different types of content.

There is no straightforward definition of what content might involve the potential for collective action. Any serious criticism of the Party/state and its leaders may be regarded as having the potential to encourage people to act together to try to change the political system. As Zhang suggests, a ‘Citizen’s right to know’ in China is greatly restricted by the ‘discourse of political stability’ (2007, 545). However, I have sought to follow King et al’s definition of potential collective action as:

‘events which (a) involve protest or organized crowd formation outside the Internet; (b) relate to individuals who have organized or incited collective action on the ground in the past; or (c) relate to nationalism or nationalist sentiment that have incited protest or collective action in the past’ (2013, 6).

I divided the instructions into the two categories – potential collective action and Party /state criticism - based on an analysis of their content and, where possible, by looking at relevant media articles. In some cases, it was not possible to establish the reason for the instruction or whether it was linked to possible collective action and these instructions were therefore recorded as ‘other’ (Appendices 1 and 2). I also treated media/censorship as a separate category because King et al (2013) find a high level of censorship of these issues, even though these are examples of Party/state criticism.

5.3 Overview of propaganda instructions

There were a large number of propaganda instructions in both periods related to Party/state criticism, as well as instructions related to potential collective action.

Propaganda instructions that were clearly intended to limit the threat of collective action that were planned or underway included one concerning protests about price rises by kidney dialysis patients in Chongqing (CDT, 1.4.2015) and another about reports of a number of possible 'illegal' gatherings in Shandong (CDT, 19.3.2011). In addition, the first period includes the Arab Spring and the second period included protests about democracy in Hong Kong, both of which were likely to cause significant concern about the potential for protests in mainland China. Consequently, there are a number of propaganda instructions related to both these events (Appendices 1 and 2).

King et al's examples of Party/state criticism include the one child policy, corruption, education policy and news on power prices (2013, 11). There are a number of instructions about policy issues such as these during the two periods examined in this dissertation. In the period which King et al looked at, this included propaganda instructions on stories about the one child policy (CDT, 19.3.2011), corruption (CDT, 23.4.2015) and fuel prices (CDT, 23.2.2011), as well as instructions on issues such as food supplies for government officials (CDT, 4.6.2011). The second period also includes propaganda instructions on issues such as the death of Xu Caihou, the former military leader who had been investigated for corruption (CDT, 16.3.2015), the growth of private education (CDT, 14.4.2015) and oil price increases (CDT, 13.1.2015), as well as instructions concerning doctors taking a selfie at an operating table (CDT, 24.12.2014), the removal of crosses from churches (CDT, 14.8.2014) and bitcoins (CDT, 8.5.2014). There were also a number of instructions in both periods concerning CCP leaders, including one about Premier Wen Jiabao (CDT, 4.3.2011) and another telling media not to link to a foreign news story suggesting President Xi Jinping was attracting hero worship (CDT, 10.3.2015).

There were 77 instructions related to Party/state criticism, out of a total of 153 instructions during the first period (Appendix 1). In the second period, 79 related to Party/state criticism out of a total of 161 instructions (Appendix 2). As the first period is shorter, the number of instructions posted on the CDT website has fallen. There are a number of possible explanations for this. For example, this might be because there were fewer instructions issued during this period or because fewer instructions were being leaked to CDT. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess this. It is also not possible to draw firm conclusions about the proportion of instructions that involve Party/state criticism – although this is similar in both periods – because the data analysed here only includes leaked propaganda instructions. As we do not know the motivations of the people who leaked the instructions, it is possible they are more likely to leak instructions about Party/state criticism than those involving potential collective action, or vice versa. Censorship instructions from central propaganda organisations are also more likely to be leaked than those from local propaganda organisations because they will receive much wider distribution. It is possible that more propaganda instructions about collective action are issued by local propaganda bodies because most protests are very localised (Liu and Chen, 2012). However, it is clear that in both periods, contrary to the conclusions of King et al, the propaganda authorities did seek to prevent people expressing some ‘comments about the state, its policies, and its leaders’ (2014, 14).

5.4 Background on the themes selected for detailed analysis

This rest of this section is based on a detailed analysis of propaganda instructions related to four themes – living standards; environmental problems; the CCP and its leaders; and the Arab Spring.

In the first period, I looked at instructions that concerned living standards, which is an issue that has caused significant ‘social frustrations’ in China and is regarded as important to the CCP’s legitimacy (Shambaugh, 2014). There were nine leaked instructions about living standards during the first six months

of 2011, including six about prices of housing and other goods or services and one about income inequality (highlighted in blue in Appendix 1). In the second period, I looked at instructions about environmental problems, which is another policy area that is seen as important to the legitimacy of the CCP (Shambaugh, 2014). There were ten propaganda instructions concerning environmental policy between January 2014 and the end of June 2015 (highlighted in green in Appendix 2). A number of these instructions were about pollution in Chinese cities and were issued early in 2014 when pollution levels reached particularly high levels in Beijing (Huffington Post, 2014). Several other instructions followed the release the following year of, 'Under the Dome', a film about China's pollution problem (The Guardian, 2015a). I excluded one of the propaganda instructions from my analysis because it involved an explosion at a PX factory (CDT, April 2015). PX plants have been the focus for a number of protests (Forbes, 2015), so it is reasonable to expect the propaganda authorities to have been motivated by a desire to reduce the potential for further collective action in this case.

In the second period, I also looked at instructions concerning the CCP and its leaders (highlighted in yellow in Appendix 2). A number of scholars have written about the importance the CCP attaches to projecting and protecting the image of the Party and its top leaders (Shambaugh, 2000; Qiang, 2014). Xi Jinping has also had a higher profile than his immediate predecessors, with some scholars and journalists even suggesting there has been, to some extent at least, a return to the Maoist cult of personality (New York Times, 2015a). There were 22 propaganda instructions concerning the presentation of the CCP and particularly its senior leaders during the period from January 2014 to June 2015. In addition, a number of the instructions about corruption cases also concern senior leaders.

I also examined instructions issued during the period from January 2011 to June 2011 related to the Arab Spring (highlighted in orange in Appendix 1), to see if there were any differences in the way information was censored in this case compared to cases involving Party/state criticism. The Arab Spring, or

Jasmine Revolution, is a clear example of a situation that was likely to create concerns about collective action in China. Protestors took to the streets of a number of Arab countries and in several cases succeeded in bringing down the government (Daily Telegraph, 2011). There were also attempts to generate a Jasmine Revolution in China (South China Morning Post, 2011). There were six leaked instructions during this period related to the Arab Spring (Appendix 1).

A systematic analysis of the propaganda instructions issued on these themes shows that an important focus of the instructions is on removing content related to Party/state criticism, as well as potential collective action, from news media and social media. In addition, the authorities use a range of other strategies to further manipulate the information available to the public on policy issues and the CCP.

5.5 Censorship of news media

During both the periods examined for this dissertation, the authorities used propaganda instructions to delete or prevent some information in news media – both traditional news media and news sections on websites - about stories involving criticism of the Party/state and central Party leaders, as well as those involving potential collective action.

In March 2011, the SCIO issued an instruction to websites ‘to immediately remove’ a news story headlined ‘In China 94% Are Unhappy; Top-Heavy Concentration of Wealth’ and related information (CDT, 8.3.2011). The article was based on Gallup’s annual world happiness survey, which suggested that only 6% of Chinese people were happy (The Guardian, 2011). In the same month, after Shanghai and Chongqing introduced property taxes, the media were told they could not report opinions that property taxes steal money (CDT, 19.3.2011). The media were also told they could not include ‘independent interviews or commentary’ in news stories about housing rationing in two villages in Shenzhen (CDT, 19.3.2011). In April 2011, the SCIO told websites

not to report a story about alcohol purchased in Guangdong being ‘at sky-high prices’, adding that any reports that had already been posted ‘must be deleted immediately’ (CDT, 23.4.2011).

In 2015, the authorities also made significant efforts to ban coverage of the film on China’s pollution problem, ‘Under the Dome’. Initially, the People’s Daily website and other outlets posted links to the film, along with an interview with the former CCTV presenter who produced it, and it was praised by the minister of environmental protection (New York Times, 2015b). However, within two days of the film appearing online the propaganda authorities said ‘all media must refrain from further promoting’ it (CDT, 1.3.2015). A few days later, another instruction from the CPD, went further, telling all media to ‘absolutely discontinue coverage of the documentary ‘Under the Dome’ and its creator, as well as reports, commentaries, interviews, and special topics that concern or extend to this film’ (CDT, 3.3.2015). An instruction from the Beijing Internet Management Office also told the media to: ‘remove all reports, commentary, and other contents about the film from the home pages and news pages and from [mobile] clients before 9 p.m. We will check in five minutes.’ (.ibid).

The propaganda authorities also banned media coverage that might be seen as having a negative effect on the image of CCP leaders, particularly Xi Jinping. In November 2014, websites were instructed to rewrite or delete content about horoscopes suggesting ‘the incompatibility of Gemini and Scorpio’ because Xi is a Gemini and his wife is a Scorpio (CDT, 21.11.2014). In December 2014, media were told not to cover a story about a school student writing to Xi suggesting he needed to lose weight (CDT, 24.12.2014). In January 2015, websites were told to delete news related to an advert for a drink produced by the Mengniu Dairy called “Da Hun Jun”, which means “Great Meat Monarch” (CDT, 27.1.2015). The homophonous word hunjun means a ‘fatuous and self-indulgent rule’, which CDT suggested could be interpreted as ‘a pejorative reference to Xi Jinping’ (.ibid). In February 2015, media were told not to ‘report content’ about a group of musicians who had released a music video

about Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan and to ‘thoroughly delete any reports that have already been published’ after some netizens started making fun of the video (CDT, 2.2.2015). In October 2014, media were instructed to delete any coverage of former Premier Wen Jiabao visiting his former school (CDT, 15.10.2015). CDT noted that unauthorised reports about current and past CCP leaders are often censored (.ibid).

In a number of other cases, the authorities sought to limit negative coverage, rather than banning it altogether. In March 2011, the media were told not to hype salary increases given to the People’s Liberation Army (CDT, 8.3.2011). In early 2014, websites were told to delete links to a story on the China National Radio website about a report by the Chinese Social Science Academic Press and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, which suggested pollution in Beijing was reaching levels unsuitable for human habitation (CDT, 13.2.2014). However, the instruction did not ban links to coverage in other media, which had presented the story less critically (.ibid). In some cases news media were told ‘not to hype’ a story, which means to limit the amount of coverage and not to place it prominently (Tai, 2014, 194). In early 2014, media were told that it was ‘forbidden to hype’ a story about people wearing gas masks while running in the smog during an annual event in Beijing (CDT, 24.2.2014; China Daily, 2014). In June 2015, propaganda authorities also told websites not to hype a story about a three and a half year old child reading Xi Jinping’s book ‘Governance of China’, after netizens started to mock the story (CDT, 26.6.2015).

During the Arab Spring, traditional media and online news were significantly restricted in their ability to produce their own news coverage. The media were told not to use the phrase ‘civil society’ in any news coverage (CDT, 10.1.2011), or to refer to ‘revolution’ or demands for ‘democracy’ in their coverage of the protests, or to ‘draw connections between the political systems of Middle Eastern nations’ and the system in China (CDT, 24.2.2011). At the beginning of March, they were told ‘not to report on any information related to Chinese Jasmine’, which was a way of calling for protests in China (CDT,

8.3.2011). On a number of occasions they were also told that they could not write their own copy on the protests (CDT, 8.2.11; CDT, 23.2.2011).

The propaganda authorities generally took a stronger line in censoring information involving the potential for collective action and information about Xi Jinping, with more instructions to ban content. Nevertheless, the authorities also banned some content concerning policy issues, while seeking to limit the amount of coverage in some other cases. Although, there is some difference in the degree to which the different types of news coverage were censored, the authorities did not allow a full expression of views about the two policies areas or the CCP and its leadership in the news media.

5.6 Censorship of user generated content

The study by King et al (2013) focused on content that was deleted on social media. However, it is also clear from the propaganda instructions analysed for this dissertation that the Chinese authorities did seek to delete some Party/state criticism posted online by individual netizens both in the period that King et al (2013) looked at and in the more recent 2014/15 period.

There were a number of particularly strongly worded propaganda instructions which involved content about CCP leaders on social media during the period from January 2014 to June 2015. In March 2014, media companies were told 'to prevent' content about a suggestion that Chairman's Mao's remains should be cremated 'from spreading online' (CDT, 14.3.2014). In July 2014, Internet companies were told to delete all online images of the 'Yuyuantan inflatable toad' and 'related commentary' after pictures of an art installation were used by some netizens to poke fun at former President Jiang Zemin, who is often called 'The Toad' (CDT, July 2014). In April 2015, websites were told to 'find and delete' a video showing a CCTV anchor calling Mao Zedong a 'son of a bitch' and singing a parody of a Cultural Revolution song at a dinner party (CDT, 8.4.2015). In March 2015, the media were told 'to resolutely block and delete' content with links to a news article in the New York Times suggesting

Xi Jinping was attracting hero worship reminiscent of the Mao era and to ‘strictly control related commentary on interactive comment sections’ (CDT, 10.3.2015). In June 2015, propaganda authorities also told websites to close comment sections related to the story about the child reading Xi Jinping’s book (CDT, 26.6.2015). Therefore, the propaganda authorities do not ‘offer freedom to the Chinese people to criticise every political leader’ (King et al, 2013, 10).

The authorities also censored some user generated content concerning living standards in the first half of 2011. King et al cite stories involving ‘food prices’ and ‘power prices’ as examples of issues that did not involve potential collective action (2013, 9). One instruction during this period, about alcohol prices in Guangdong, said ‘online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and other interactive spaces’ were not to circulate the story and made it clear that in particular, the authorities wanted Internet companies to ‘delete harmful information meant to attack the Party, government, and social system’ (CDT, 23.4.2011). In February, after the National Development and Reform Commission raised fuel prices, the SCIO instructed websites to close commentaries and news postings on the issue and to delete ‘all related’ discussions on platforms such as ‘micro-blogs, blogs, online forums, instant message services, and text messages’ (CDT, 23.2.2011). The first half of 2011 also saw a number of other instructions to censor user generated content involving stories about living standards. One instruction said ‘all search engines, blogs, websites, forums, and microblog services must immediately conduct thorough searches for and delete all negative information related to’ a story about a low price apartment (CDT, 8.2.2011). President Hu Jintao had visited the tenant to publicise a government housing scheme but accusations began to circulate online about corruption by the renter and the local government (Li and Carey, 2011). In May 2011, the SCIO also told websites to ‘control online opinion’ regarding information relating to low-income housing (CDT, 4.6.2011). The instruction about the story based on Gallup’s world happiness index made it clear that ‘forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and other interactive spaces are not to discuss the matter’ (CDT, 8.3.2011).

During the 2014/15 period, the propaganda authorities also made efforts to limit access to some information on social media about environmental problems. For example, websites were first told that ‘online public opinion’ about ‘Under the Dome’ ‘must be regulated’ (CDT, 3.3.2015). A few days later, websites were told, to ‘strengthen management of forums, blogs, Weibo, WeChat, and other interactive platforms’ and the instruction explicitly told Internet companies to ‘resolutely block and delete speech that uses this as an opportunity to cast doubt or attack the government’ (CDT, 3.3.2015). After another few days, websites were told to delete the film altogether (CDT, 6.3.2015).

These efforts to block content on Party/state criticism were similar to instructions issued during the Arab Spring in 2011. However, there is a greater sense of urgency and threat in the wording of some of the Arab Spring instructions, reflecting concerns about the possibility that events in Arab countries could lead to protests in China. At the height of the protests in Arab countries in early February, websites were told ‘to strengthen [monitoring] of posts, forums, blogs, and particularly posts on microblogs’, warning that the authorities would ‘forcibly shut down websites that are lax in monitoring’ (Daily Telegraph, 2011; CDT, 8.2.11). In the week after the Tunisian government fell, websites were instructed to conduct ‘strict searches of interactive spaces’ including ‘blogs, micro-blogs, instant message tools and text message services’ and to ‘immediately delete’ the phrase ‘A nice bunch of Jasmine’ and related information (CDT, 23.2.2011). Given that website owners are committed to preventing information that may cause social disorder (Tai, 2006, 101), they would have been left in no doubt that they needed to stop, as far as possible, any information that was inconsistent with messages coming from official media, and in particular to prevent any content that might encourage protests in China. Propaganda instructions are usually only issued to media organisations, however as the Arab Spring reached its peak, on 1 March, the SCIO issued a public notice strongly warning that it was ‘forbidden to use the Internet, instant messaging tools, the media, and other methods’ to engage in a range of behaviour including ‘organizing or inciting resistance’ and

‘trumping up or distorting facts, spreading rumors, or harming societal management and order’ (CDT, 4.3.2011). It warned that ‘administrative bureaus will follow the law in strictly watching for and dealing with the above behaviours’ (.ibid). The wording of the notice was clearly intended to encourage self-censorship, discouraging netizens from commenting on these issues, as well as reminding media organisations about their responsibilities to control online content.

Although some of the most strongly worded propaganda instructions involving censorship of user generated content concerned the Arab Spring, the authorities did also censor some content involving Party/state criticism. The instructions concerning content about senior CCP leaders, in particular, were emphatic about the need to delete or block certain content. However, the authorities also limited discussion of policy issues and on occasions were clear that their aim was to prevent content that ‘cast doubt on’ or attacked the Party/state. These findings are clearly inconsistent with the suggestion that the authorities do not delete content ‘with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies’ (King et al, 2013, 1).

5.7 Indirect censorship of user generated content

The propaganda instructions also played an important role in indirectly limiting Party/state criticism on social media.

Lorentzen (2014) observes that control over news media is tighter than in the case of social media. Indeed, he argues that a key reason for increasing controls on news media in recent years has been to try to retain the overall balance of information that is available to the public as more information has become available via social media (.ibid). However, the actions taken by the propaganda authorities to control online news content will also effect the information that appears on social media. In order for a genuine Habermasian public sphere to exist, citizens need ‘to have independent information on the most important collective issues, allowing them to form their own opinions’

(Lewis, 2013, 682). Censoring news coverage means fewer people are likely to be aware of a story, or of certain aspects of the story, or to know about alternative interpretations of these stories to those coming from the government. Therefore they are less likely to comment on issues that concern the CCP on social media and if they do, they are less likely to put forward views the Party wants to avoid. For example, CDT suggested the key reason for instructing media not to hype the story about a three year old reading Xi Jinping's book was to curb critical comments on social media, such as one Weibo post which said they could not 'tell whether this is a good omen, or if it means the "Governance of China" is written for three-year-olds' (CDT, 26.6.2015).

Another way the authorities sought to limit the amount of negative content available on social media was by preventing journalists posting information on their social media accounts. In a number of cases, such as the Xiamen PX protests, journalists were influential in spreading information online (Weber, 2011). In February 2014, the propaganda authorities instructed journalists not to repost strong criticisms of the government's approach to pollution which were made on Weibo by someone using CCTV's official finance account (CDT, 24.2.2014). One instruction on 'Under the Dome', 'reminded' media personnel that they could not post content to official or personal social media accounts that 'violates regulations' or 'else face severe punishment' (CDT, 6.3.2015). This instruction also showed that the propaganda authorities were seeking to enforce the rules introduced in 2014 banning journalists posting certain information online (Human Rights in China, 2014), by requiring them to submit regular records detailing their use of 'Weibo and Wechat accounts' (CDT, 6.3.2015). These efforts, like the campaign to reign in the Big Vs, will limit the range of information and views that people see on social media.

The instructions also play an important part in encouraging self-censorship by establishing and reinforcing norms, including limits on Party/state criticism, for example by reminding news media and Internet portals that they are expected to prevent 'harmful information meant to attack the Party, government, and

social system' (CDT, 23.4.2011). The resulting news coverage, as well as people seeing what content is removed online, will also help to shape the public's understanding about what is permissible. There are also regular reminders in the instructions about the importance attached to these issues and the potential penalties for crossing the line, for example, saying 'everyone, once again act quickly' and 'implement this directive immediately' in the case of 'Under The Dome' (3.3.2015), warning that the authorities would 'forcibly shut down websites that are lax in monitoring' during the Arab Spring (CDT, 8.2.11) and the threat of 'severe punishment' for any journalists posting information about 'Under The Dome' on social media (CDT, 7.3.2015).

Even when the propaganda authorities do not directly seek to delete content on social media, their broader censorship efforts are clearly intended to reduce the amount of criticism of the Party/state online. It is difficult to assess how much effect this indirect censorship of social media content will have but it does further limit the ability of people to express and see views that are critical of the Party/state, its policies and the CCP.

5.8 Guiding public opinion

As well as banning or limiting certain information, the authorities also use propaganda instructions as part of their efforts to guide public opinion on issues involving Party/state criticism and potential collective action.

On a number of occasions, the authorities used propaganda instructions to guide public opinion on living standards and environmental problems. An instruction in February 2011 said websites had to 'lead public opinion and propaganda' regarding regulation and control of the real estate market, promoting efforts 'by the CCP and State Council' to resolve problems with housing costs (CDT, 17.2.2011). In March 2011, the media were told that news stories about the housing rationing in two villages should use information from Shenzhen authorities 'as the standard' (CDT, 19.3.2011). The propaganda authorities also instructed 'websites in all localities' to run an article which

criticised people who blamed the government and factories for pollution, saying everyone benefitted from modernisation which had led to the pollution problem, and therefore ‘no one is qualified to blindly point a finger’ (CDT, 27.2.2014).

Between January 2014 and June 2015, the media were also told to run two positive stories about Xi Jinping and the CCP. In August 2014, the media were instructed to repost on their homepages and news pages an article by Duowei, a Chinese language website based in New York, entitled ‘Xi Jinping Is Awakening China’ (CDT, 20.8.2014). The Duowei website is blocked in China but the page for this article was unblocked (.ibid). Similarly, in February 2015, all media were instructed to ‘prominently show’ a propaganda film, ‘The Communist Party of China Is With You Along the Way’, which promotes the role of the CCP in achieving the China Dream, a slogan associated with Xi Jinping (CDT, 9.2.2015).

Even during the Arab Spring, the propaganda authorities did not simply try to ‘ban’ content about the protests. Although news media were told that they could not write their own copy, they were encouraged to ‘use copy circulated from Xinhua’ or ‘standard copy sources’ (CDT, 8.2.11; CDT, 23.2.2011). According to a leaked document, in 2007, in addition to Xinhua, ‘standard sources’ included 66 other official media directly under the control of the state, such as the People’s Daily and CCTV and government websites (Qiang, 2010). Articles in the official media framed the Arab Spring in terms of chaos rather than as pro-democracy protests and attacked attempts to generate a Jasmine revolution in China. For example, Xinhua said there had been 10-days of ‘consecutive chaos’ in Egypt and quoted a Cairo resident saying they supported President Mubarak because ‘he is the one who can calm down the unrest’ (Xinhua, 2011). Global Times, which is run by the People’s Daily, compared Chinese protesters to ‘beggars in the streets’ (Bloomberg, 2011).

Issues such as pollution and living standards are ones that people directly experience, so censorship cannot simply make the problems invisible to

Chinese citizens. By providing information that supported the government's interpretation of these issues, often at the same time as limiting critical information, the propaganda authorities were attempting to limit the potential for people to develop views that were critical of the government's performance. Although most people would not gain direct experience of the Arab Spring, it would have been difficult to prevent people coming into contact with some information about these events. Guiding public opinion meant people were more likely to see official interpretations of the protests, which emphasised the negative consequences of the Arab Spring.

These instructions help to reinforce the CCP's efforts to ensure official media content dominates online (Cook, 2015; SCMP, 2014) and the use of voluntary and paid propagandists to post pro-CCP content on social media (Yang, 2007; Edney, 2014; GlobalVoices, 2015). Therefore, in some cases, the Chinese state does still attempt to 'overwhelm' its citizens with 'official information and interpretations of reality', as it did under Mao (Lynch, 1999, 3). These efforts will help to ensure that people who do post information online are more likely to make comments based on the government's narrative and if they want to post links to a news story, they are more likely to link to a story based on official sources. This further limits the ability of Chinese citizens to express and access the full range of negative comments about the Party/state.

5.9 To censor or not to censor?

The propaganda instructions examined in this dissertation provide some indication of the reasons why the authorities intervened to censor information in these cases.

Each of the policy issues which was censored involved strong criticisms or significant problems. For example, the Gallup survey suggested that a large majority of Chinese people were unhappy and the 'banned' article linked this to income inequality (CDT, 8.3.2011). The period in early 2014 saw a combination of particularly bad pollution figures together with a number of

very negative stories, such as the report which raised concerns that Chinese cities were becoming unfit to live in (Huffington Post, 2014; CDT, 13.2.2014). ‘Under The Dome’ was a well produced, strongly argued, exposition of the scale of China’s pollution problem (The Guardian, 2015a). Chai Jing, who made and presented the film, exhorts viewers to take a stand, saying “This is how history is made. With thousands of ordinary people one day saying, ‘No, I’m not satisfied, I don’t want to wait...I want to stand up and do a little something’” (Wall Street Journal, 2015a). In the case of the alcohol prices in Guangdong and ‘Under the Dome’ the propaganda instructions show that the authorities were concerned that the stories could encourage people to ‘attack the Party, government, and social system’ (CDT, 23.4.2011) or ‘to cast doubt or attack the government’ (CDT, 3.3.2015). This is consistent with the observation that the Party/state will allow discussion of problems as long as they are ones that can be solved and the government is shown to be dealing with them (Brady, 2006, 2008; Chan, 2002). As government performance is now one of the main sources of the CCP’s legitimacy, the Party/state needs to ensure that it is seen to be meeting people’s expectations on issues like living standards and the environment (Zhao, 2009; Zhu, 2011).

Another important factor appears to be the volume of negative information. In early 2014, there were a number of negative stories about pollution in Chinese cities. In the first half of 2011, there were a series of stories about prices and living standards including the National Development and Reform Commission’s decision to raise fuel prices twice in three months (BBC, 2011) and ‘a series of low-income housing scandals’ that had been exposed on the Internet (CDT, 4.6.2011). Similarly, over 200 million people had viewed ‘Under the Dome’ by the time the censors intervened (New York Times, 2015b). This is consistent with evidence that negative content is more likely to be deleted if it is posted by people with a significant number of followers or is reposted by a number of netizens (Bamman and O’Connor, 2012; Wertime, 2014). This suggests that the CCP is less concerned about specific complaints and one off news stories or social media posts about issues like the environment and living standards. They appear to be concerned that their

legitimacy is particularly at risk if large numbers of people become aware of serious concerns about sensitive policy issues or that there a number of related problems.

Another important factor in the censorship of 'Under the Dome' was that it was released just before the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference were about to start. The propaganda notice issued on 3 March stressed that 'media and websites at all levels must in the coming days tightly focus on major developments at the Two Sessions in order to create a favourable atmosphere of public opinion' and 'refrain from sensationalising certain sensitive topics coming from the Internet and society' (CDT, 3.3.2015). The importance of timing in whether and how information is censored has been noted by a number of scholars. For example, part of the reason that information about the SARS epidemic was controlled particularly tightly was because it occurred at a time of leadership transition (Stockmann, 2013, 147). Key Party/state events are important opportunities to promote positive messages and the propaganda authorities appear to be determined to prevent those messages being diluted or undermined by negative information, whether or not it relates to potential collective action.

The key factor determining whether the propaganda authorities seek to control information about CCP leaders appears to be seniority. All the propaganda instructions about the CCP involved very senior CCP leaders, both current leaders and past leaders. The central authorities have allowed a certain amount of criticism of local leaders, particularly concerning corruption (Shirk, 2011; Tong & Sparks, 2009; Lorentzen, 2014), however, they appear to be determined to prevent, as far as possible, content that criticises, or even simply ridicules, the senior leadership. This suggests they believe that anything which challenges the perceived 'moral', as well as economic performance, of its top leaders risks undermining their performance legitimacy (Zhao, 2009, 429).

5.10 Comparison with the conclusions of King et al (2013)

There are a number of reasons why the conclusions from this study differ from those of the study by King et al (2013). Their methodology means they probably understate the extent to which content involving Party/state criticism is censored. They also understate the significance of the censorship of Party/state criticism which is identified in their study.

The study by King et al did not include microblogs such as Weibo and WeChat (2013, 3-4), which they considered 'to be too short for the content analysis performed with their techniques' (Ng, 2013, xix). Given the important role microblogs have played in enabling people to share views (Sullivan, 2014, Ng, 2013; Ng, 2015) this is a significant omission. Indeed, the propaganda authorities have made a lot of effort to increase control of content on Weibo, which has reduced the popularity of this platform to some extent since 2013 (Mooney, 2014).

The study by King et al also examined social media posts that occurred within 'volume bursts', 'the occasional sharp spikes in volume around specific subjects' (2013, 6). Therefore, their results reflected 'the flurry of censorship after and in reaction to a particularly sensitive event' (Ng, 2015), which means they were more likely to pick up content related to collective action.

In particular, King et al's methodology only involved looking at what information was deleted (2013). This does not take account of the range of other strategies the propaganda authorities use to manipulate the information that appears on social media. For example, key word blocking means people are in principle allowed to post their views on certain issues but in practice other netizens are unlikely to see what they have written, so they have not been allowed to express their views in any meaningful way. As Ng (2013) found that the names of senior Party leaders are blocked on Weibo, there will be less need to delete this kind of content. A focus on deletions also does not take account of the 'de facto' censorship involved in the efforts the Chinese authorities are making to set the agenda by trying to ensure pro-government information

dominates what people see on sensitive issues (Ng, 2015; MacKinnon, 2008,). As Yang suggests, the authorities are putting an increasing emphasis on ‘generating bankable stories in the global marketplace of internet narratives’ (2014, 112). Therefore, focusing simply on what is deleted is likely to give an increasingly misleading impression of what information is controlled by the propaganda authorities.

Nevertheless, the study by King et al (2013) does show that some content involving Party/state criticism is deleted. Their analysis of three policies that ‘had no collective action potential’ found that about 10% of posts were censored (.ibid, 12). They appear to conclude that this means people are allowed the full range of expression on issues involving Party/state criticism because this is lower than the 80% deletion rate for content involving potential collective action (.ibid). In order to effectively limit potential collective action it is likely to be necessary to delete as much related content as possible. However, the fact that the propaganda authorities are more selective about deleting content involving Party/state criticism does not mean netizens are allowed ‘the full range of expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its policies, and its leaders’ (King et al, 2013, 14). The instructions examined in this paper show the propaganda authorities seek to manipulate some information about the Party/state and its policies that is particularly critical and/or which risks reaching large numbers of people. Although the censors may allow negative comments about local officials, they appear keen to try to prevent, or at least limit, negative content about senior Party leaders.

6. Conclusion

The propaganda instructions reveal a great deal about what information the Chinese authorities seek to control and how. However, there are limitations to this study. Future research could usefully seek to identify how the Chinese authorities use all the different elements of the propaganda and censorship system in an effort to control information on issues the Party/state considers to be particularly sensitive. In particular, this will need to take account of the efforts the propaganda authorities are making to increase the amount of pro-government information that is posted on social media. Future research also needs to look at how successful the propaganda authorities efforts to skew information in favour of the Party/state are in practice. While some authors consider that the authorities have effectively lost control over the information reaching its citizens (Lynch, 1999) others believe the propaganda authorities' efforts mean the Chinese Internet 'functions largely as a mass-dissemination device for official information' (Schneider, 2013). MacKinnon believes that 'skilful management of the Internet might buy the Chinese Communist Party another few decades in power' (2008, 34). Despite all the resources devoted to reducing negative information and increasing the volume of pro-government information to what extent are the propaganda authorities really succeeding in manipulating the views of ordinary citizens?

Nevertheless, this analysis of propaganda instructions shows that the Chinese authorities do not allow 'the full range of expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its policies, and its leaders' (King et al, 2013, 14). The methodology used by King et al (2013) means they probably understate the extent to which content involving Party/state criticism is censored. In particular, they do not take account of the range of strategies used by the propaganda authorities to control information. They also understate the significance of the censorship of Party/state criticism that is identified in their study.

The propaganda instructions analysed for this dissertation show that the Chinese authorities go to significant lengths to limit people's ability to express

and see some views that are a threat to the CCP's legitimacy and try to ensure that on certain issues, any critical views are drowned out by pro-government information. Far from allowing 'even vitriolic' criticism of Party leaders, as King et al suggest (2013, 1), the propaganda authorities sought to ban content which simply pokes fun at senior Party leaders, past and present. The propaganda authorities also intervened to censor some information on living standards and environmental problems where there was a risk that people would be particularly critical of the Party/state and/or where there was potential for those criticisms to reach large numbers of people. The authorities also controlled negative information that could conflict with the positive messages coming out of the Two Sessions, one of the Party/state's main annual propaganda opportunities. These efforts appear to be designed to reduce the risk of Chinese citizens developing a negative impression of the Party/state's performance on sensitive issues.

Some news content involving Party/state criticism, as well as content involving the potential for collective action, is deleted by the propaganda authorities. A number of the propaganda instructions concerning CCP leaders, as well as content on living standards and environmental problems, told media organisations that they could not run specific stories or certain elements of the stories. In some cases, particularly those involving policy issues, the information was not banned but media were told to limit their coverage, which meant the information was partially censored so that it appeared to be less significant.

The propaganda instructions also sought to delete some user generated content about senior CCP leaders, living standards and environmental problems. This is clearly inconsistent with the conclusion that the authorities do not seek to censor 'posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies' (King et al, 2013, 1).

In addition, the analysis of propaganda instructions underlines the fact that the censorship system is complex and that the Chinese authorities use a range of

strategies to control content involving both Party/state criticism and potential collective action, rather than simply deleting information.

The propaganda instructions reinforce self-censorship by reminding media organisations and individual netizens of the norms for what is, and is not, permissible and reminding them of the potential costs of crossing the line. It is difficult to assess how much criticism of the Party/state never appears because of self-censorship. However, it is clear that self-censorship is intended to act as a constraint on people's freedom to express negative views about the Party/state.

The Chinese authorities also seek to set the agenda by a combination of banning or limiting some news content about policy issues and CCP leaders and forcing news media to run certain government approved stories. Even where the authorities do not try to delete content posted by individual netizens, their efforts to set the agenda will to some extent influence what is posted on social media. Once the state has set the agenda, people are less likely to post critical information than would otherwise be the case and they are more likely to post links to news stories that the government approves of. This is part of the broader effort the Chinese authorities are making to skew the balance of information online in favour of the Party/state. This limits people's ability to express a full range of views on the Party/state and, in particular, it limits people's ability to see negative information about the Party/state.

Censorship of Party/state criticism is more selective than before the reform period because the state accepts that widespread censorship is not compatible with developing a vibrant, modern economy and winning the trust of its citizens. This means the public sphere is more pluralistic than under Mao (Lewis, 2013). However, censorship is not limited to curtailing collective action. The Chinese authorities do not allow people to 'express and publicise their opinions freely' (Jurgen Habermas, 1989: 231, cited in Yang & Calhoun, 2007, 213) about 'the state, its policies, and its leaders' (King et al, 2013, 14). In some cases, the CCP limits 'access to the real environment' (Lippmann,

1954, 43), controlling the information people can communicate and access about sensitive policy issues and senior CCP leaders in the news and on social media, by a mix of deleting or limiting negative comments and by attempting to ensure that any criticisms are drowned out by information and interpretations which are favourable to the CCP.

7. Appendix

Appendix A: Propaganda instructions January to June 2011

Key:

	Living standards
	Arab Spring

Propaganda instructions as posted on http://chinadigitaltimes.net/	Collective action	Party/ state criticism	Other (including media / censorship)
From the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee: a certain netizen, Xia Shang, has claimed online that he will take part in the National People’s Congress election. No news unit will interview this person, report or propagate [the story]. Journalists will have no contact with this person. (June 29, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			X
From the State Information Office: websites in all regions will immediately find and delete Central Ethnicity University Professor Zhao Shilin’s blog entry: “An open letter to the Chinese Communist Party and central government regarding the Chinese Communist Party’s 90th Anniversary propaganda problem.” (June 20, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			X

<p>From the State Information Office: All websites, especially interactive links, will immediately delete the article “Cherishing Chiang Kai-shek” and all related commentary. (June 19, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: during the special period of welcoming the Party’s 90 anniversary, no media outlets will report or render negative opinion or news regarding the movie “Beginning of the Great Revival.” (June 16, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: will all news websites attach Central Party School Professor Xie Chuntao’s “Lecture on Party History Knowledge” lecture No. 7: “Establishing Goals for the Socialist Market Economy System,” to the news section on homepages. Keep it there until the release of lecture No. 8. (June 14, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>		X	
<p>From the Propaganda Department of Jilin Provincial Party Committee: on matters concerning Jinhua Tires Changchun factory strike, local media cannot report as they like before getting approval. News on the resumption of work will be uniformly reported. (June13, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		

s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: temporarily stop reporting on the online collective complaint against Yili Company. Immediately remove articles already reported. (June 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		
<p>State Information Office: all websites will thoroughly clear all news concerning the outrage over the pregnant woman who was beaten in Zengcheng, Guangdong. Close all blog accounts that are conducting on-the-scene broadcasts. Thoroughly clear online forums. (June 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		
<p>A notice from the Propaganda Department of Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee, Henan province:</p> <p>1. Highlights for next week, June 13 – 17, a joint research group of national ministries will come to Henan to conduct research. Of the eight groups conducting research, three will come to Zhengzhou. They will primarily focus on surveying the Central Plain’s economic development during the last period, and will be controlled by Secretary Lu. No media are permitted to report on the two welcoming banquets or the proposal for a meeting between representatives of the National People’s Congress and the Development and Reform Commission. In</p>		X	

<p>order to produce a pleasant atmosphere, the provincial propaganda department has explicitly ordered that while the research group is in Henan, all negative reporting will cease in the province. In regard to the research group's activities in the region, publish only this news. (June 10, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>			
<p>2. The 2011 National Safe Production Tour will be held in Henan June 15 – 24. When this research group is in Henan, no media will report on the hidden ailments of the mining industry or other such problems. (June 10, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>		X	
<p>3. During the 60th anniversary of Tibet's peaceful liberation, all media will report according to the central government's mainstream reports. Carry out reproduction of the news as a group. (June 10, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		
<p>A notice from the Propaganda Department of Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee, Henan province:</p> <p>When reporting, pay attention to the following:</p> <p>1. The provincial health department's press release is the standard for all provincial news on epidemics. (June 10, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>		X	

s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			
2. Media will do absolutely no interviewing and no reporting on land disputes near the education office at the Zijin Mountain overpass. (June 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/	X		
3. In regards to Henan’s Chengtai Investment Co Ltd. illegal fundraising, even the Secretary has instructed that city-level media can carry out positive propaganda on small- and medium-sized investment companies. The contact person at the Bureau of Small- and Medium-sized Corporations is Chief Huang: 13643826623. (June 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			X
4. “Leaving Zhenzhou to See the Nation” will be published soon. Will all media choose photos and send them to zzxwcbc@163. (June 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			X
5. All city-level media will not report on matters concerning the Deng Feng Hao Management Committee. (June 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			X
6. All media will not follow up on matters concerning the explosion at the police bureau’s dangerous products storage facility. (June 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/		X	

s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media will not speculate about matters regarding the release [from a mental hospital] of the worker Xu Wu from Wugang, Hubei. Xinhua News Agency and The Hubei Daily will be the standard for all reports. (June 9, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: so called “independent candidates taking part in elections” is a political matter manipulated by the international anti-China force. No media are allowed to report on the election activities of Li Chengpeng and others. (June 9, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: do not continue hype Li Na’s [tennis championship] win. (June 6, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/07/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>			X
<p>From a Provincial Internet Administration Office: Reporting of news related to the recent ethnic conflicts between Mongol minority and Han majority in Xilinhot or... No discussion of any form on all micro-blogging sites, blogs, and discussion forums. Violators will be subjected to a RMB 30,000 fine. (May 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-june-6-29/</p>	X		

s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/			
<p>From a Provincial Internet Administration Office: Reporting of news related toor Foxconn’s new suicide incident are prohibited. No discussion of any form on all micro-blogging sites, blogs, and discussion forums. Violators will be subjected to a RMB 30,000 fine. (May 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to immediately remove photos and news reports regarding Chengdu bus explosion incident from front pages. Interactive spaces must immediately work on preventing the spread of related information and commentary. (May 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: To all print and TV media: The serial bombings in Fuzhou, Jiangxi must be referred as “5.26 Criminal Case.” No mentioning of “administration building” or “bombing incident” in titles will be allowed. (May 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: In regard to the serial bombings in Fushun, Jiangxi, all discussion and comment sections of all websites must be shut down. All</p>	X		

<p>interactive spaces must be managed well. (May 26, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			
<p>From a Provincial Internet Administration Office: Urgent: All discussions of the Jiangxi serial bombings are requested to be immediately and thoroughly deleted. No discussion should be allowed if posts cannot be managed. All photos of corpses need to be deleted. (May 26, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Urgent: Another Foxconn worker committed suicide. No reporting of any form will be allowed on interactive spaces including all discussion forums, micro-blogs, and blogs. (May 26, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Urgent: In regard to the serial bombings in Fuzhou, Jiangxi, all print and TV media are requested to only use copy circulated from Xinhua News Agency. No independent interviews or reports are allowed. Do not post any related photos, video clips, or special reports. Any reports violating this regulation are subjected to immediate removal. (May 26, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		

<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In regard to the arrest of Ai Weiwei for economic crimes, Xinhua News Agency has its official response to foreign press. All local media outlets are not to conduct independent reporting.</p> <p>(May 26, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In regard to the soon-to-be-released official compensation plan of the deadly Shanghai high-rising building fire, all media are to use copy circulated from Xinhua News Agency. No independent reports will be allowed.</p> <p>(May 25, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: In regard to information relating to low-income housing, all websites are requested to strictly enforce the regulations and control of online opinion. No recommendations or discussions of related topics will be allowed. Any questioning, attacking, or action-calling posts need to be immediately removed. (May 23, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: In regard to the “Mongol shepherd run over and killed for protecting grassland” incident, all websites are requested to strengthen</p>	X		

<p>control and immediately remove negative comments. No recommendations or discussions are allowed on any interactive spaces including discussion forums and blogs. (May 23, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Urgent: In regard to Foxconn’s Chengdu plant explosion, all media and websites are to wait for an official report. No independent reports, re-posts, or recommendations will be allowed. (May 20, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Xichuan Provincial Propaganda Department: With regards to Foxconn’s Chengdu iPad2 plant explosion, no independent reporting can be conducted. Unauthorized reports will be immediately deleted. (May 20, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Do not hype the so-called “Principal Fang Binxing ‘shoe-throwing’ incident widely reported by foreign press. All websites including interactive spaces such as discussion forums, weblogs, microblogs, social media are requested to immediately</p>			X

<p>remove related articles and comments. (May 20, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Hubei Provincial Propaganda Department: In regard to today’s deadly building collapse in Qiaokou, Wuhan, all media are to wait for an official report. All media are not to conduct follow-up reports. (May 19, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From Yueyang Municipal Propaganda Bureau of Hunan province on May 9, 2011: Yueyang Evening News violated news-reporting regulations by posting the article “alleged car problems related to gas quality, gas station denies” with photos, and it has brought broad negative impacts. According to the instructions from the Central and Provincial Propaganda Departments, it is clear that negative reports are strictly prohibited during the celebration period of the 90th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. And all reports regarding the Central Government as well as province- and city-owned enterprises in Yueyang need to be positive. Therefore, Yueyang Evening News is requested to investigate this incident and seriously punish all the related employees. All news agencies need to learn</p>		X	

<p>their lesson. (May 19, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p> <p>Attention to all websites, particularly interactive spaces: Immediately delete Southern Metropolis article “Internet Opinion Elites Subsidized by Youyang, Chongqing” and all related information. (May 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p> <p>All websites are not to re-post the Southern Metropolis editorial named “Remembering Them as Time Passes by.” Immediately delete articles if already posted. Shut down all discussions of this topic on all interactive spaces. This is a first-grade command and must be followed immediately. (May 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In regard to the Southern Weekend report on “special organic food supply exclusively for government officials,” all media are not to re-post or discuss the issue. This instruction applies to any negative information regarding special food supply for government officials. (May 6, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>		X	

s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/			
<p>From the Hunan Provincial Propaganda Department: All media are to stay with the official line in response to the Cheng Guangbiao controversy. All media are to conduct positive reporting, and no negative reports will be allowed. (May 4, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the Guangdong Provincial Propaganda Department: In regard to the incident in which a factory worker, Xu Wu, escaped from a psychiatric hospital in Wuhan, all media outlets are not to report or comment. (May 3, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directive-s-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In the coming days media at all levels, including Internet media, must strengthen their public opinion leadership efforts related to important issues involving agriculture. (May 1, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to continue effectively organizing positive on-line guidance related to the development and surveillance of the Internet. Regarding the related special topic, “Exposing Internet Management Abroad,” during the May Day</p>			X

<p>period all websites are requested to continue implementing the requirements by prominently placing this topic on website front pages. When placing copy related to this topic in special areas, websites must accord with the demands of the notice and place it in important and prominent positions on front pages. (April 30, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In the coming days all media, including Internet media, must assiduously prepare propaganda on the topic “scientific development, transformative methods.” (April 30, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites, and particularly interactive spaces, are requested to immediately delete the article, “Ten Crimes Endured by the People of China.” (April 29, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are to strengthen on-line leadership and surveillance. (April 29, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>	X		

<p>From the State Council Information Office: In a prominent position on the headline news area of your front pages, please repost the article “Bold Service as an Underground Pioneer,” and leave it up until 8:00 pm. (April 29, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media at all levels, including Internet media, are requested to set in place key propaganda work related to pushing forward the achievements of model workers. (April 29, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites, particularly interactive spaces, are requested to immediately delete the poem <i>Cry From Sichuan (Shu zhong yin)</i>. (April 29, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost the article “Apple’s Google Maps Locator Function Incites Controversy Among Mobile Phone Users” in a prominent position on front pages and in the headline news areas on the front pages of opinion and commentary</p>			X

<p>sections. Please keep the article up until 6 pm April 29, 2011. (April 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In the coming days all levels of media, including Internet media, must advance reporting and public opinion leadership on the problem of food safety. (April 27, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/05/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-27-may-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Websites are not to report or hype the story “At Guangdong Petrol, ‘Alcohol purchased at sky-high prices.’” Reports that have already been posted must be deleted immediately. On-line forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and other interactive spaces are not to circulate the story. Delete harmful information meant to attack the Party, government, and social system. (April 19, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Do not report or repost stories regarding the Yunnan elementary school student who was attacked.</p> <p>All websites must strictly fulfil the demands regarding propaganda and reporting. They</p>			X

<p>are to strengthen control and surveillance of news comment spaces, blogs, on-line forums, micro-blogs, and other interactive tools.</p> <p>Harmful information that attacks the Party and government, or attacks the socialist system of our nation must be deleted immediately. (April 19, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>			
<p>State Council Information Office: Regarding the case of Yao Jiaxin hitting a person with his car and then stabbing her to death, all websites are requested to employ copy circulated from the Xinhua News Agency. Do not conduct follow-up reports, and do not repost stories related to this case. (April 17, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In the Chongqing corruption case, today the trial is set to begin over the case of Li Zhuang, the defense lawyer who is suspected of fabricating evidence. Media and websites in all cases are to use copy circulated from the Xinhua News Agency. Do not comment, do not hype, do not repost. (April 17, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p>	X		

<p>Regarding reports on the trial over the case of Li Zhuang’s “crime leak” (<i>lou zui</i> 漏罪), only repost copy from the Xinhua News Agency. Strengthen surveillance of news comment posts, on-line forums, blogs, microblogs, and other interactive spaces. Delete harmful information in a timely manner. (April 17, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department Do not report on the luxury dinner at Hui Gongguan (a restaurant) costing close to 10,000 <i>yuan</i>, spent by the Shanghai Red Cross, Luwan District chapter. (April 16, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Anhui Provincial Propaganda Department (issued at 3:00, April 14, 2011): Provincial media are to immediately return from Haozhou city, Lixin county. Do not conduct further follow-up interviews or reports regarding Zhou Wenbin’s political recantation-style report information against leaders of the local land bureau. (April 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Guangdong Provincial Propaganda</p>			X

<p>Committee: All media are not to conduct their own interviews regarding the news that Xing Dan, Assistant Secretary of the Working Committee on Education for the Shenzhen Communist Youth League, has passed away. (April 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Bureau: Today Do not conduct interview regarding the disturbance that occurred today at Luting North Road. Wait for an integrated report to be issued. (April 13, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: For the article from Xinhua Network by Ren Junming, entitled, “Must the American-style lies continue to be told?”, all websites are requested to repost in a prominent position on their website front pages or the front pages of their opinion and commentary sections. (April 13, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to immediately delete the article, “29 Differences Between Democratic Countries and Autocratic Countries,” as well as related information.</p>		X	

<p>This is particularly required for all on-line interactive spaces. (April 13, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department: Regarding the coal gas explosion in Heping Ward, Chaoyang District, media are not to conduct their own interviews or reports. (April 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost on both their front pages and headline news sections the article, “Reform and Attack of Monopolistic Industries in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan.” (April 8, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to post in a prominent position the article: “China State Council News and Information Office Formally Unveils iPad App to Better Introduce the World to China.” (April 8, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p>	X		

<p>All websites are requested to delete the posting “Proposal Offered to ‘Rights Protection’ (<i>wei quan</i>) Tobacco Workers Around the Country by China ‘Rights Protection’ Peasant Zhou Decai,” as well as all related information. (April 8, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to prominently post the article “The School Motto ‘Honor Morality’ Has Begun to Circulate Among Teachers and Students at Hebei Agricultural University (Hebei Nongda).” (April 7, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites, particularly those with video and audio channels, are to look for and delete the song <i>Meat Pancake (Rou bing)</i> by Gamahe Danzeng. (April 2, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Ninth Bureau of the State Council Information Office: All websites are asked to monitor interactive spaces and immediately delete rumors similar to the following: “Breaking news: Japanese elites discussing plan to emigrate to Hainan Island, China.” (April 2, 2011)</p>	X		

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-2-8-2011/			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested, on their front pages and headline news pages, to repost the story “Unlawful Tax Activity by Google’s China Business Discovered Again.” Leave the story up until April 1, 8:00 am: a “Level One” implementation order. (March 30, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested not to publish or repost the story “State Council to Enlarge Foreign Investment Supervisor Bureau.” Websites that have already posted the story are requested to immediately remove it. (March 30, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the party propaganda committee of one of the autonomous municipalities: In no case is it allowed to report regarding “Information about tickets for the 2012 ships,” which has appeared on microblogs. (March 29, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p>	X		

<p>Recently, interactive spaces on many websites have been buzzing about the affair, “Peking University To Screen Radical-Minded Students.” All website authorities are requested to stop these discussions, and quickly water down this topic. (March 29, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: For reports regarding radioactivity from Japan and the discovery of items with trace amounts of radioactivity in China, all media are only to use copy circulated from the Xinhua News Agency. Media are not allowed to conduct their own interviews and reports. (March 29, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report, repost stories, or comment on the execution of a drug trafficker from the Philippines. (March 28, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are not to repost the story, “Website of the China Government Securities Depository Trust & Clearing Co, Ltd., Chinabond.com.cn, suffers an DDoS</p>		X	

<p>attack that suspects service; website cannot be accessed.” If the story has already been posted, websites are requested to immediately delete it and related content. (March 24, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>			
<p>March 24, 2011: From the State Council Information Office: On their news and commentary pages, all websites are requested to post in a prominent position the stories, “Arab League Criticizes Military Action Against Libya,” and “In The Eyes of Hegemonism, There Is Only ‘The Crime of Opposing Western Profiteering.’” (March 24, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-24-31-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost, in its entirety and in a prominent location, the article from China-Tibet Web, “Can Seeds of Enmity Bear Fruits of Harmony?” It is not permitted to change the title, and the article must remain up until March 19, 10:00 am. (March 18, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Starting on March 17, all websites are</p>		X	

<p>requested to prominently repost on their front pages information regarding radiation levels in main urban areas, provided by the Environmental Protection Department. This information must be placed in a fixed location, and note that it must be updated every day. All provincial-level Internet surveillance and propaganda Departments are requested to strictly examine websites under their jurisdiction, and strictly enforce the demands of this notice.</p> <p>Every day, all websites that provide cell-phone reports must also issue, “Daily Radiation Levels in Main Urban Areas From the Environmental Protection Department (Office of National Nuclear Safety).” All mobile phone companies must understand that this is a political duty, and immediately implement it. (March 16, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Regarding Shanghai’s and Chongqing’s experiments with initiating property taxes, opinions that property taxes steal money are not to be reported or hyped. (March 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost, on the</p>			X

<p>front page and in a prominent position, the story, “Internet Freedom: Unilateralism, Hillary Clinton style.” It is not permitted to change the title, and the article must stay on the front page until March 15, 6:00 am. (March 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			
<p>State Council Information Office: All websites must post on their front page news section the article, “For 33 years, 75-year-old Professor Yang Changlin has Shown Concern and Love for Tibetan College Students in Almost 10,000 Instances.” Leave this article up until the day after tomorrow (the 15th) at 6 pm. (March 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media must solidly grasp reporting on disaster conditions after the large earthquake in Japan, and objectively and quickly report on trends as they develop. Place particular emphasis on grasping the relationship between anti-seismic and relief efforts for the Japan and Yunnan earthquakes and propaganda reporting for the national meetings of the “Two Congresses.” Do not weaken the theme of reporting on the Two Congresses.</p> <p>We must fully propagandize the state of the</p>		X	

<p>rescue work that our teams have initiated in Japan. We must closely follow the circumstances of Chinese people and overseas Chinese in Japan.</p> <p>Do not deliberately criticize or champion the actions of the Japanese government, and do not make any comparisons with anti-seismic and rescue efforts in our country. Give scientific explanations of the explosions and leaks at the nuclear facilities. Do not play up or casually speculate and analyze the influence of leaks on China. (March 13, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: On March 13, there will possibly be illegal gatherings and activities in Jinan, Qingdao, Yantai, Weifang, and Rizhao. Do not give interviews or reports. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype the super moon. It is not permitted to draw connections between the moon, earthquake, fires, and other natural disasters. It is allowed to use scientific explanations circulated by the Xinhua News Agency, and purely astronomical information issued by expert Departments can be published. (March 12, 2011)</p>			X

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype questions about housing rationing in Qiaoxiang Village and Shenyun Village, Shenzhen. Related information should use information from Shenzhen authorities as the standard. Do not give independent interviews or commentary. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: For the Yunnan earthquake, we must mainly report on the active rescue activities of political leaders. We absolutely must not allow the earthquakes to dilute the message of the Two Congresses. We cannot report on representative members being absent from the meetings. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: In related reports, media cannot use the term “cultural industrialization.” (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype family planning</p>		X	

<p>problems. Do not report on the issue of having two children. Policy changes on family planning will use information issued by authorities as the standard. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			
<p>From The State Administration of Radio Film and Television: It is not allowed to directly broadcast television programs originating from outside our borders. If there are currently any such broadcasts reporting on the earthquake in Japan, immediately cut them off. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: When reporting on the current earthquakes, media are not to compare the earthquake in Yunnan with the earthquake in Japan. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>Shanghai Party Committee Propaganda Department: Activities and comments related to Han Han, beyond his car racing, are not to be reported. (March 12, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	

<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the partitioning of household assets of He Hongsang, the gambling king of Macau. (March 11, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the taxi strike in Lanzhou. (March 11, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the incident of an exchange student in Norway injuring himself after parachuting from a tower at the Chinese Academy of Science. (March 11, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the suicide and death of Xu, Assistant Director of the Testing Center at the National Administration College. (March 11, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the absences of delegates from the Two Congresses. (March 11, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	

directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the case of tax evasion by Ma Zhongqi in Huaiyuan county, Ningxia. (March 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the need to standardize responses to proposals and motions at the Two Congresses. (March 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the sinkholes caused by coal mining in Shanxi. (March 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: On March 9, China Management Report (Zhongguo jingying bao) and Southern Metropolis (Nanfang dushi bao) report on Huang Qifang's criticism that some people have mismanaged the automobile industry. All newspapers are not to re-publish or report the story. (March 11, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	

<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on extractions in the Chunxiao gas field by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Zhonghaiyou). (March 10, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to immediately remove the story “In China 94% Are Unhappy; Top-Heavy Concentration of Wealth” and related information. Forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and other interactive spaces are not to discuss the matter. (March 7, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All local websites must meticulously propagandize and report on the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. Set up special areas, columns, and webpages on the “Two Congresses,” and set up “Two Congress” headlines in prominent positions. These must stand out and give off an animated and grand propagandistic air. It is required to provide timely, accurate, and full reporting on the important activities of Party and state leaders at the “Two Congresses.” All websites are to fully employ the</p>		X	

<p>capabilities offered by Internet media, and comprehensively utilize text, images, animation, and other multi-media interactive forms of propaganda to report on the Two Congresses. This is particularly necessary for the important content and spirit of the opening ceremonies of the Two Congresses, news conferences, and working reports of the government and the standing committee of the National Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress.</p> <p>In general, propaganda requires that we circle around and hold high the flag of the Party; focus on building up the interests of the nation; in all things serve the people; and maintain reform and innovation. Please emphasize positive propagandizing of unity, stability, and enthusiasm. All reports must fully reflect the democracy of the meetings, and the general scene of unity, fact-seeking, and bold advancement. (March 5, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media must carefully report on any cases related to high-speed rail. (March 4, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on the self-immolation in Beijing of a man from</p>	X		

<p>Qinhuangdao. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: In their reports on the proposals before the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, media are in all cases to use copy circulated from the Xinhua news agency. Do not hype the “Proposal King”; do not question the function of the Consultative Congress. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report or hype the news that Liu Zhijun had 18 mistresses. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to hype People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Congress representative Liu Xiang’s lack of preparation. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on excessive use of public security in Beijing during the</p>		X	

meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. Do not hype the story “The People’s Security Apparatus Fears the People.” (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/			
From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on the corruption case of the Party Committee Secretary in Wushe County, Henan. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/		X	
From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on the death of a Hebei Industrial University (Hebei gongye daxue) at a train station in Daqing. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/			X
From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on the student from Southwest University (Dongnan daxue) who illegally assembled and distributed pamphlets. (March 4, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/	X		
From the Central Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to hype the salary increase		X	

<p>given to the People’s Liberation Army. (March 3, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to immediately remove all of the so-called “romantic novel” <i>Shenyun xianyin</i> written by the Buddhist writer “Cibei shengyin” (“Merciful Sagely Voice), as well as related information, from websites and e-book downloading pages. Online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and other interactive spaces are not to discuss them. (March 3, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: Media are not to report on any information related to “Chinese Jasmine.” (March 2, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to immediately search for and delete the story “Citizens’ Personal Information is Precious: China Banking Regulatory Commission Appears to Have Leaked the Personal Information of 188 Citizens.” All websites and interactive spaces, including online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant messaging services, and</p>		X	

<p>text messaging services are to thoroughly search for and immediate delete this story and related information. (March 2, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/</p>			
<p>The following from all major websites is based on a publicly posted, urgent announcement issued by the State Council Information Office on March 1, 2011:</p> <p>According to the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” and related laws and regulations, at the same that citizens’ legal freedom of speech is protected, it is forbidden to use the Internet, instant messaging tools, the media, and other methods to engage in the following behavior:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) organizing or inciting resistance, violating what is covered by the constitution, laws, and regulations; 2) trumping up or distorting facts, spreading rumors, or harming societal management and order; 3) organizing or inciting illegal gatherings, protests, or demonstrations, disturbing order in public spaces; 4) engaging in other activities that violate national, societal, or collective interests, as well as the legal interests of citizens. <p>Administrative bureaus will follow the law in strictly watching for and dealing with the above behaviors. For those activities that constitute criminal behavior, judicial organs</p>	X		

<p>will determine the punishment. (March 1, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>			
<p>Tomorrow, February 27, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will have an interactive exchange with netizens. All websites must repost on-line copy from the Xinhua news agency in a timely, prominent, and comprehensive manner. It is not permitted to report by only choosing portions of the content and self-selecting a headline. All websites must increase in strength leadership of on-line opinion. During and after Prime Minister Wen's goes on-line for his interactive session, there must be strengthened surveillance of all interactive spaces, including forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant messaging services, and social network websites. As soon as harmful information emerges it is to be immediately deleted. Do not permit it to continue to spread. For websites under their jurisdiction, all provincial Internet supervisory bureaus must intensify their surveillance, make strict their demands, and be absolutely intolerant when problems emerge. (February 26, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>A notice from an unnamed provincial propaganda bureau: 1) All media are not to</p>		X	

<p>report or repost any information related to Wu Gan (whom netizens have termed the “super vulgar butcher” <i>chaoji disu tufu</i>).</p> <p>The above information is to be provided only to principal people in charge at media organizations. (February 25, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>			
<p>2) Do not report, repost, or comment on the Shaanxi-registered drug dealer who was executed in Fangchenggang in Guangxi. (February 25, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>3) Intensify surveillance of small newspapers and journals and the Internet. (February 25, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>			X
<p>4) Do not provide any further reports on Gui Zheng Tang taking bile from live bears. (February 25, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office:</p> <p>This week websites in all areas are to increase propagandizing the spirit of General Secretary Hu Jintao’s important speech on studying and discussing supervision and</p>		X	

<p>innovation in society. Intensify active leadership of online opinion, and create a positive online atmosphere for the opening of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.</p> <p>All websites must disseminate copy from important central news units, including <i>People’s Daily (Renmin ribao)</i> and the Xinhua News Agency, in a timely, accurate, and prominent manner. When propagandizing on General Secretary Hu Jintao’s speech, emphasize the two following points: 1) In supervising society we must persist in taking the people as the base, and govern for the people; conscientiously implement the basic purpose of the Communist Party: to wholeheartedly and enthusiastically serve the people; continuously and effectively achieve, protect, and develop the fundamental interests of the greatest number of people. 2) In supervising society we must unwaveringly persist in walking the road of collective prosperity; completely protect and improve systematic arrangements for the livelihood of the people; quicken the development of all societal endeavors; ensure that development achievements are more collectively enjoyed by all of society. (February 24, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/</p>			
---	--	--	--

<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Media reports on the current changing situation in the Middle East must use standard copy sources. Reports cannot have the word “revolution” (<i>geming</i>). Regarding the reasons for the emergence of these mass protests, nothing can be reported regarding demands for democracy or increases in commodity prices. Reports also cannot draw connections between the political systems of Middle Eastern nations and the system in our country. In all media, when the names of the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and other countries are given, the names of Chinese leaders cannot appear next to them. (February 24, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the State Council Information Office: In the upcoming period, regulation and control of online opinion must be strengthened. All major news websites must resolutely persist in accurate public opinion leadership and strengthen vigorous positive propaganda, giving particular emphasis on the spirit of the CCP’s 17th plenary meeting. We must strictly control online opinion as it emerges in interactive spaces, as well as negative news and reports in the media. Continue to strengthen vigorous propagandizing of the topic “A Look Back at the 11th Five-Year Plan; A Look Forward to</p>		X	

<p>the 12th.” (February 23, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are not to report on the following content related to disclosures and leaks found on WikiLeaks: China purchasing U.S. national debt to apply political pressure to the U.S. government. Information of this sort found on foreign websites must strictly be blocked and deleted. (February 22, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Please delete all posts related to the item “Candidates for Representative at the People’s Congress Have No Legal Standing” found on any website or interactive space, including micro-blogs, blogs, online forums, breaking news services, and text messages. (February 21, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to conduct strict searches of interactive spaces such as online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant message tools, and text message services. Immediately delete the phrase “A nice bunch of jasmine” and related information. (January</p>	X		

<p>21, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All search engines are requested to immediately screen out Cheng Yizhong’s Hong Kong University lecture, entitled “One Journalist’s Reflections.” All websites and interactive spaces, including online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant message services, and text message services, are to thoroughly search for and immediately delete this text and related information. (February 20, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>			X
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Posts related to the item “Gene research is a new tool in national recognition” cannot appear. All websites are requested to examine online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant message services, text messages, and other interactive spaces. (February 20, 2011) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All interactive sites, including on-line forums, blogs, micro-blogs, instant message services, and text message services are requested to note and delete information related to the item “On CCTV’s <i>Soccer</i></p>	X		

<p><i>Tonight (Zuqiu zhi ye)</i>, a sign reading ‘Fuck You Japan’ is displayed in the background on the giant screen.” (February 20, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: For news on the fuel price increases issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, all websites are requested to close commentaries and news postings. Delete all related discussions on platforms such as micro-blogs, blogs, online forums, instant message services, and text messages. (February 19, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: The media is not allowed to further report on Gui Zhen Tang’s production of bear bile. It is forbidden to hype this affair. (February 18, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: Please immediately remove all news related to “leather milk” from the front pages of websites. Interactive spaces such as online forums, blogs, micro-blogs, and text messages are forbidden from hyping and discussing this incident. (February 18, 2011)</p>		X	

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: It is not permitted in any form to repost or report information related to the distorted reports and malicious hype found on WikiLeaks that implicate the diplomacy, exchange reserves and investments, and other sensitive problems. All on-line interactive spaces are to thoroughly search out this type of information and immediately delete it. (February 17, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Central Propaganda Department: Recently, media in all regions have issued a series of reports on the movement to free abducted children by using pictures taken with mobile phones. These cases have garnered widespread interest in society, as well as the heightened attention of relevant government bureaus.</p> <p>Because this item has received so much attention, and is quite sensitive, all media must firmly grasp proper leadership of public opinion. Reports on the movement to release abducted children and itinerant child beggars with the help of mobile phone cameras and microblogs should have a reduced presence on news pages. To properly lower excitement, do not issue serial articles on the</p>		X	

<p>movement. This will avoid giving people the impression that the problem is compounding. All media reports and commentaries must strictly observe regulations regarding reporting on minors, and are not to criticize the institutions currently in operation or the social aid system. Prevent reports from inappropriately providing people with a handle [for criticism]. We must steadfastly maintain positive propaganda, and emphasize reporting on relevant measures adopted by bureaus at all levels of government, as well as the work that they are doing and the achieved results. Put forward and mobilize societal energy to support those who have experienced loss, and exert effort to help vagrant and begging children. Promote and give form to a positive societal trend of pitching in on work for society and caring for others. (February 15, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-10-15-2011/</p>			
<p>From the State Council Information Office: For the Liu Zhijun affair, all major websites must use standard source material and only repost copy circulated from the Xinhua News Agency. Do not place the affair as a lead story, and do not establish it as a special topic. Close news comment posting capabilities for the story, and positively lead public opinion on online forums and blogs. Strictly supervise microblogs, online social</p>	X		

<p>networks, and instant message services.</p> <p>Immediately delete articles that attack the Party and government, raise questions about the achievements of high-speed rail construction, or use this incident to fan collective action. (February 14, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-10-15-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau and the State Council Information Office: Regarding regulation and control of the real estate market, all websites must successfully lead public opinion and propaganda. They must actively promote [efforts by] the CCP and State Council to resolutely restrain rapid increases in real-estate prices; safeguard the determination of the masses to stay in their residences; and promote the positive achievements of the State Council Secretariat’s “Notice of Issues Related to Progress on Regulation and Control of the Real Estate Market” and reform of real estate taxes. (February 10, 2011)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-10-15-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office and Bureau 11 of the Ministry of Public Security:</p> <p>For the disturbances in Egypt, media across the nation must use copy circulated from Xinhua. Websites are to strengthen</p>	X		

<p>[monitoring] of posts, forums, blogs, and particularly posts on microblogs. Our bureaus will forcibly shut down websites that are lax in monitoring. (January 28, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>			
<p>The CCP Central Propaganda Bureau has recently issued a notice demanding that all news work units organize reporters to launch the interviewing activity “A Walk Through the Grass Roots for the Beginning of Spring” (<i>Xinchun zou jiceng</i>). The activity will unite the changes occurring among low social strata, link together the experiences of the masses, and reflect achievements in developing China’s economy and society. All news units must organize reporters during the Spring Festival to go deep into the lower social strata for interviews, working to create a holiday atmosphere of celebration and ardent happiness. (January 22, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Internet Surveillance Office: Regarding the attack on police in Tai’an, Shandong, websites are to strengthen positive opinion leadership, and emphasize the sacrifices and injuries of the policemen. Do not publish details on the handling of the case, nor give commentary on the police’s work. Strengthen control of interactive links,</p>	X		

<p>and delete negative information regarding the incident. (January 22, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Shandong Provincial Party Propaganda Bureau: All media must diligently execute propaganda and reporting related to the Central Propaganda Bureau's special effort to attack breaches of intellectual property and faulty rip-off products. The effort is particularly aimed at activities that cheat and harm farmers. (January 18, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Shandong Provincial Party Propaganda Bureau: For the merger of Shandong Finance College and Shandong Economics College, there have been no authoritative announcements from related bureaus. Malicious hype is not permitted. (January 18, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the State Council Information Office: All websites are not permitted to repost news reports related to Tajikistan returning 1,000 square kilometers of land to China. If such reports have already been posted, all website</p>		X	

<p>editors are requested to immediately delete them. (January 12, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>			
<p>A notice from the Henan Provincial Propaganda Bureau: All media and websites are not to report on the deaths that are suspected to have been caused by looting tombs on the stretch of the Zhengzhou-Lushi freeway between Luoyang and Luoning. (January 11, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>		X	
<p>From the Jilin Provincial Propaganda Bureau: All media are not to report on the recent illegal cross-border shootings near Baishan city by two people suspected to be North Korean military personnel. Two Chinese people were killed in the incident. (January 5, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>	X		
<p>A notice from the State Council Information Office: All search engines, blogs, websites, forums, and microblog services must immediately conduct thorough searches for and delete all negative information related to “affordable rental of 77-yuan/month,” “tenant pays 77-yuan/month.” It is absolutely not allowed to continue to permit</p>		X	

<p>the circulation of rumors and discussion of the incident, including statements that the tenant was a government employee and negative information that smears the General Secretary. The State Council Information Office will institute strict punishments against websites that continue to allow the circulation of such information, as well as local Internet control bureaus to which they belong. (January 2, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/</p>			
<p>From the Central Propaganda Bureau: It is forbidden to use the term “civil society” (<i>gongmin shehui</i>) in reporting. It is not permitted to hype this topic. (January 4, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/01/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-december-15-2010-january-4-2011/</p>	X		
<p>From the Shandong Provincial Party Committee Propaganda Bureau: Please recall reporters who are investigating the case of several banks in Jinan accused of producing counterfeit financial documents. (January 1, 2011)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/01/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-december-15-2010-january-4-2011/</p>		X	

Appendix B: Propaganda instructions January 2014 to June 2015

Key:

	CCP and senior leaders
	Environmental problems

Propaganda instructions posted on http://chinadigitaltimes.net/	Collective action	Party/ state	Other (including media / censorship)
Find and delete all news related to “Island’s Sunrise” winning Song of the Year at the Golden Melody Awards. (June 27, 2015) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-pull-blinds-down-on-islands-sunrise/			X
No website may hype the story “Three-and-a-half-year-old Reads Xi Jinping’s ‘Governance of China’ Cover to Cover.” Close related comment sections. (June 25, 2015) https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-toddler-cant-put-xi-down/		X	
Find and delete the article “Qing’an Heilongjiang Disciplinary Inspection Official Beaten to Death After Reporting on County Officials.” Do not hype this story. (June 10, 2015) https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-delete-article-on-beaten-to-death-disciplinary-official/		X	
Without exception, the media are not to report on: 1. The delegation from Myanmar visiting		X	

<p>China. (June 9, 2015)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-aung-san-suu-kyi-dome-oriental-star/</p>			
<p>Without exception, the media are not to report on:</p> <p>2. The documentary “Under the Dome” winning an environmental award. (June 9, 2015)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-aung-san-suu-kyi-dome-oriental-star/</p>		X	
<p>Three propaganda arrangements concerning the Oriental Star:</p> <p>1. Increase positive propaganda on humanitarianism, use Xinhua News Agency copy</p> <p>2. Control entertainment sections and advertisements for Yangtze River travel during rescue effort and time immediately surrounding the disaster</p> <p>3. Strengthen supervision of reporters’ individual Weibo accounts. (June 9, 2015)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-aung-san-suu-kyi-dome-oriental-star/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding the capsizing of the Oriental Star cruise ship, media from all locales must not dispatch reporters to the scene. Reporters already there must be immediately recalled. All coverage must use information released by authoritative media as the standard. (June 1, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitru-e-cruise-capsizes-in-yangtze/</p>		X	

<p>All websites must urgently delete the Global Times commentary, “Overseas Forces Attempt to Incite Post-80s, 90s Generation.” (May 26, 2015)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/minitru-e-delete-global-times-commentary-on-overseas-forces-inciting-students/</p>	X		
<p>Do not hype the report “Man in Xi’an Whose Home Was Demolished Murders the Man Responsible.” When handling this type of case, take care to downplay collective opposition, and do not publish gory images. (May 26, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/minitru-revenge-for-forced-demolition-in-xian/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding the assembly of groups to “save the [rail]road” and the disturbance of order in Linshui County, Sichuan, coverage must accord with Xinhua News Agency wire copy and information released by the local authorities. Control comments on news web pages. Delete text, images, and video posted by netizens concerning clashes with the police. (May 18, 2015)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/minitru-e-violent-protest-to-save-the-railroad/</p>	X		
<p>Media must not follow-up on or hype the Qing’an shooting incident. All related reports follow authoritative news media as the standard. Take note and delete negative, harmful Internet commentary. (May 13, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/minitru-e-</p>	X		

do-not-hype-the-qingan-shooting-incident/			
<p>All websites, please close comments on the article “Man Sentenced to 14 Months for Splashing Ink on Tiananmen Portrait of Chairman Mao.” Do not hype related topics. (April 23rd, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrueman-sentenced-for-mao-portrait-ink-attack/</p>		X	
<p>Sites must stop republishing the Global Times article “Foreign Media Grabs Chance to Hype China’s ‘Great Cannon’; May be American Effort to Shift Blame.” Don’t comment on related topics or content, and downplay the story. (April 13, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitruedo-not-republish-great-cannon-report/</p>			X
<p>Find and delete the article “Lu Xin: Private Education Growth Entering Era 4.0.” (April 14, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitruedelete-vice-education-ministers-speech/</p>		X	
<p>All websites are to find and delete the indecent video of Bi Fujian parodying a song from “Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy.” Also delete the Youth.cn article “Bi Fujian Owes the People an Apology.” Cool down related discussions, and stop hyping the story. (April 8, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitruccctvs-bi-fujian-bad-mouths-mao/</p>		X	

<p>Do not place news of the Zhangzhou, Fujian PX explosion in lead story sections of news agency websites. Take note and control negative commentary related to petrochemical projects. (April 7, 2015) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitru-fujian-px-explosion/</p>	X		
<p>All websites immediately cool down focus on “Uncle” Ou Shaokun’s visit with a prostitute. Do not make it a lead story. Control commentary, and block searches for important related information. (April 7, 2015) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitru-cool-down-on-uncle-ou-shaokun/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding a portion of uremic patients in Chongqing gathering and petitioning because of new health care prices, all media must refrain from reporting on the story (including electronic newspapers and journals, websites, the Weibo and WeChat accounts of legal professionals, mobile clients, and other new media platforms), and reporters cannot be sent to the scene of the incident. In the near future, all media must without exception proceed according to unified plans in reporting that touches on new health care prices. Do not publish anything without authorization. Do not organize discussions or investigations. Do not hype negative or tangential issues. Immediately report issues you are unable to get a handle on. Furthermore, the media must strengthen</p>	X		

<p>internal management. Media personnel must not provide information to or facilitate interviews for foreign media or organizations. Those employed by the media must not post inappropriate content to their personal Weibo or WeChat accounts. (April 1, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-patient-protest-in-chongqing/</p>			
<p>Find and delete the article published by Beijing Pangu Investment titled “Response to Hu Shuli’s Unjustifiable Visit to Guo Wengui’s Family Grave.” The media must not republish or hype the article. (April 1, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-editor-sues-tycoon-terminal-patients-protest/</p>			X
<p>Don’t hype news related to the article “Accused of Prostitution, ‘Guangzhou Uncle Ou’ Detained in Changsha.” (March 30, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-dont-hype-ou-shaokuns-detention/</p>			X
<p>Take care to delete the following articles:</p> <p>1) “Man Who Publicly Wore Large Beard, Instigated Wife to Wear Veil, Sentenced to Six Years”. (March 30, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-news-on-uyghur-jailed-for-beard-karamay-fire/</p>	X		

<p>Take care to delete the following articles:</p> <p>2) “Online Publication of Information About Karamay Bungalow Fire Banned.” (March 30, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-news-on-uyghur-jailed-for-beard-karamay-fire/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding the large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on GitHub, do not conjecture or comment of your own accord before the authoritative media have reported the case, and do not republish foreign coverage. (March 28, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-dont-conjecture-on-github-ddos-attack/</p>			X
<p>A Shenzhen blogger tweeted that provincial authorities ordered him to delete a post about potential man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks involving the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC): The provincial government news office called to say that I have to immediately delete the article “Google Says CNNIC Issues Certificates for Man-in-the-middle Attacks.” (March 26 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-man-in-the-middle-attacks-enabled-by-cnnic/</p>			X
<p>Regarding the death of Xu Caihou due to bladder cancer, use only Xinhua wire copy. Do not make the story headline news on the homepage. Close comment sections. (March 15, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-</p>		X	

downplay-death-of-xu-caihou/			
<p>Resolutely block and delete the foreign media article “‘Daddy Xi’ Again Ignites Leader Worship Among the Chinese People” and related news. Strictly control related commentary on interactive comment sections. (March 9, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-nyts-daddy-xi-ignites-leader-worship/</p>		X	
<p>Video websites are to delete “Under the Dome.” Take care to control related commentary. As the new reporting period for media personnel Weibo and WeChat accounts begins, concerned personnel are kindly asked to proactively submit account information to the record keeper. We reiterate that media personnel must not post content that violates regulations on either personal or official public platforms, or else face severe punishment. (March 6, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-dome/</p>		X	
<p>No website may repost images related to the knifing incident at a railway station in Guangzhou today, no exceptions. This type of negative news must absolutely not be promoted during the Two Sessions. (March 6, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-guangzhou-train-station-knife-attack/</p>	X		
<p>Beijing Internet Management Office: Please remove all reports, commentary, and other contents about Chai Jing’s “Under the</p>		X	

<p>Dome” from the home pages and news pages and from [mobile] clients before 9 p.m.</p> <p>We will check in five minutes. Everyone, once again act quickly, follow directions, and implement this directive immediately.</p> <p>(March 3, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitruue-clamping-dome/</p>			
<p>Shanghai Propaganda Department</p> <p>Information Service: All news work units: The News Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department has put forth the following notice: The Two Sessions are about to begin. Media and websites at all levels must in the coming days tightly focus on major developments at the Two Sessions in order to create a favorable atmosphere of public opinion for the representatives’ and committee members’ discussions of national affairs. To prevent the dilution of Two Sessions topics, you must have a firm hold on public discussion and refrain from sensationalizing certain sensitive topics coming from the Internet and society. Media and websites of all types and levels (including Weibo, WeChat, and news portals) must absolutely discontinue coverage of the documentary “Under the Dome” and its creator, as well as reports, commentaries, interviews, and special topics that concern or extend to this film and its creator. Websites and services that have already carried content must take down</p>		X	

<p>special features or clamp down on the backend. Discontinue reporting on discussions related to certain departments and work units concerned with this film. Strengthen management of forums, blogs, Weibo, WeChat, and other interactive platforms, and resolutely block and delete speech that uses this as an opportunity to cast doubt or attack the government. The above notice is only to be in the hands of propaganda management departments and those who are in charge of media organizations. Do not send this up the line. While carrying out these instructions, take care to maintain secrecy. (March 3, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitru-clamping-dome/</p>			
<p>All media must refrain from further promoting “Under the Dome.” Online public opinion [surrounding the documentary] must be regulated. (February 28, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitru-dont-hype-dome/</p>		X	
<p>Report cautiously on recent tensions between Hong Kong and the mainland. Do not hype related content. (February 27, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitru-tamp-hong-kong-mainland-tension/</p>			X
<p>Immediately delete NetEase’s “Hong Kongers Do Not Live off Mainland ‘Charity.’” (February 27, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitru-tamp-hong-kong-mainland-tension/</p>			X

<p>Find and delete negative information from foreign websites involving the Minister of Commerce and J.P. Morgan. (February 9, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitruue-j-p-morgan-hired-son-commerce-minister/</p>		X	
<p>Social media and interactive platforms are kindly asked to immediately remove information and malicious commentary about the leaked HSBC Switzerland client list. Mobile clients, strictly check related content. (February 9, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitruue-li-xiaolin-swiss-leaks/</p>		X	
<p>Media should take care to suitably disseminate the core points of related essays by Minister for Education Yuan Guiren and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Zhu Jidong, and should not issue or reprint criticisms or challenges. (February 9, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitruue-support-attacks-western-values-education/</p>		X	
<p>All media are kindly asked to prominently show the short propaganda film “The Communist Party of China Is With You Along the Way” by On the Road to Rejuvenation Studio. (February 8, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitruue-ccp-along-way/</p>		X	
<p>Do not hype or report content touching upon “Two ‘Daddy Xi Loves Mama Peng’ Performers to Hold Vocal Recital” or “Two Henan Grassroots Singers to Hold Concert.”</p>		X	

<p>Thoroughly delete any reports that have already been published, and tidy up content on mobile carriers and interactive [comment] sections.” (February 2, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitrue-clean-comments-daddy-xi-loves-mama-peng-concert/</p>			
<p>All websites delete comments and news related to the advertisement for Mengniu Dairy’s deshelled drink “Da Hun Jun.” (January 27, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitrue-mengniu-dairys-deshelled-drink/</p>		X	
<p>Websites must not quote from news about “China starting to block foreign VPN services.” We reiterate the following propaganda discipline: information from sources which violate regulations or have not been verified by authoritative media must not be republished. (January 25, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitrue-china-starts-blocking-foreign-vpns/</p>			X
<p>All news websites please take note and close commentary related to the article “Ministry of Finance: Consumption Tax on Oil Products to be Raised Again on January 13.” (January 12, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitrue-no-comments-rising-oil-consumption-tax/</p>		X	

<p>All websites nationwide must not repost the article “Wenzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone Public Security Bureau Spends 100,000 on Cellphone Trojan Horse.” If already reposted, immediately delete. (January 7, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitruewenzhou-police-purchase-surveillance-equipment/</p>			X
<p>Online news sources strictly use authoritative copy from central and Shanghai major news units. Using material from commercial sites is strictly prohibited. Using information from Weibo, WeChat, other social media, or foreign media is strictly prohibited. The use of inaccurate or incomplete information published by netizens who were at the scene is strictly prohibited. Publication of excessively tragic and bloody images is strictly prohibited. 2) No sites are allowed to write [unique] headlines. 3) Strictly prohibit relating this event to anti-corruption. Delete malicious information, remove opportunities to attack the Party and the government, and information attacking the social system. (January 2, 2015)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitruerurgent-notice-concerning-shanghai-stampede/</p>		X	

<p>Please make the article “Central Politburo of the CCP: Formation of Intra-Party Cliques Will Absolutely Not Be Tolerated” a sticky post. Note and thoroughly examine comments on interactive sections. (December 29, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-party-cliques-will-tolerated/</p>		X	
<p>Take care to control negative commentary on the news of “doctors taking a selfie at the operating table.” Do not excessively hype content on doctor-patient relations. (December 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-downplay-surgeons-selfie/</p>		X	
<p>Content related to Ling Jihua must strictly abide by propaganda discipline. Do not act on your own to hype the issue. Strictly control online commentary. (December 22, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-hype-ling-jihua-probe/</p>		X	
<p>Do not reprint this report: “Elementary School Student Sends Letter to Secretary-General Xi, Teasingly Suggests Daddy Xi Lose Weight.” (December 18, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-lose-weight-daddy-xi/</p>		X	

<p>It is forbidden to report in a critical manner on the “USD 270 billion Sino-Russian oil agreement” or the “USD 24 billion Sino-Russian currency exchange agreement.” If in the course of reporting you must touch on these agreements, you must describe their positive elements. You may refer to “long-term benefit,” “Sino-Russian friendship,” “weapons cooperation,” and similar topics. (December 17, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitru-e-sino-russian-currency-swap-gas-deal/</p>		X	
<p>Without exception, use Xinhua wire copy as the standard in coverage of the recent Zhou Yongkang case. The media must not interpret the case without authorization. Take special care to control the amount of coverage and netizen commentary. All media and websites must pay attention to recent requirements for republishing reports. (December 7, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitru-zhou-yongkang-case/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding the matter of China abolishing organ donation from death row inmates as of January 1, all websites in all locals are not to hype the issue and must close comment sections. (December 4, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitru-e-executed-will-longer-organ-donors/</p>		X	

<p>The media may republish and recommend coverage of the three instigators of Hong Kong’s illegal “Occupy Central” [movement] turning themselves in for arrest. However, reports from authoritative media must be held as the standard. Websites must take care to increase examination and control of netizens’ posts. (December 3, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china-news/main/world/</p>	X		
<p>The media are not to report on the investigation of Caixin Magazine editor Xu Xiao. (December 2, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-xu-xiao-endangering-national-security/</p>			X
<p>Use only official media wire copy on the escalation of the illegal Occupy Central movement. Strictly implement [this directive]. (November 30, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-hong-kong-protest-escalation/</p>	X		
<p>Do not reprint or report on the latest violent terror incident in Shache, Xinjiang. (November 30, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-report-latest-violence-shache-xinjiang/</p>	X		
<p>Do not report on the matter of Internet writer Hua Qianfang’s Weibo remarks on Wuzhen. All websites are forbidden from republishing related responses. (November 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-misquoting-classics/</p>			X

<p>Do not hype the murder case at a Beidaihe military region sanatorium. Do not put the story in the top news section of the homepage. Take note to guide related commentary. (November 20, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitruemurder-beidaihe-sanitorium/</p>		X	
<p>All portals, please take note to check your horoscope channels and self-media accounts, and to rewrite or delete content about “the incompatibility of Gemini and Scorpio.” There cannot be any negative fortunes for Scorpions born on the week of November 20. (November 20, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitruerharmonious-horoscopes-first-couple/</p>		X	
<p>Without exception, adopt a unified approach with authoritative media in reporting on the case of former [Central] Military Commission [General] Xu Caihou. All websites in all locales must strictly inspect coverage of this case. If problems arise, responsibility will be traced. (November 19, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitruere-reporting-xu-caihou-case/</p>		X	
<p>All websites in all locales are forbidden from reporting on U.S. president Obama’s call at APEC for China to open the Internet. (November 11, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitruescrub-obamas-call-open-internet/</p>			X
<p>All websites must take care to delete the</p>		X	

<p>Caixin article “Passing Through the Subway: Pan Xiaomei, Migrant Mother in Beijing.” (November 10, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-migrant-mother-killed-beijing-subway/</p>			
<p>Classified Message from the Guangdong Anti-Pornography Office: Latest Blacklist from the Ministry of Culture. Anthony Wong, Denise Ho, Chapman To, Paul Wong, William So, Jenny Tseng, Wong Ka Keung, Joey Yung, G.E.M., Sammy Leung, Albert Leung, Yuen-Leung Poon. Those people in category 1 are prohibited, and absolutely cannot perform. Those in category 2 are strictly controlled. You must report to the Ministry of Culture Market Administration before a performance may be examined and approved. After approval, you must report once again to the Market Administration for permission to perform. At the same time, you must communicate with the performance finance [management] organization and guarantee that no “Occupy Central” discussion arises, taking full control of the event. (November 7, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-update-blacklisted-hk-pop-stars/</p>	X		
<p>All websites in all locales: Absolutely do not hype negative information about the APEC summit in Beijing, and take care to delete related negative commentary. (November 5, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-</p>		X	

good-beijing-apec-summit/			
Disable commentary on the article “Lu Wei on Inability to Log On to Facebook: We Haven’t Closed A Single Foreign Website.” Implement immediately. (October 30, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrue-lu-wei-denies-closing-foreign-websites/			X
All websites must find and delete the article “Chow Yun-fat Responds to Potential Ban from Mainland: I’ll Just Make Less, Then.” (October 27, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrue-chow-yun-fat-banned-mainland/	X		
Do not hype the article “Fang Zhouzi Attacks Zhou Xiaoping: Sleepwalking Through America, Then Denouncing the Country’s Crimes.” If you have already posted the story, please remove it immediately. (October 20, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrue-fang-zhouzi-digs-zhou-xiaoping/			X
Temporarily do not report on the violent incident that occurred Sunday [October 12] in Maralbeshi, Kashgar, Xinjiang. (October 19, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrue-violent-incident-kashgar/	X		

<p>All websites (including official media) find and delete the articles “Beauty in the Shrubbery,” [Chinese] and “Xi Yuanping Article Remembers Father; Photo With Wife Zhang Lanlan Revealed” [Chinese]. In addition to related content on news websites, also clean up related information on interactive platforms. (October 18, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitruedelete-coverage-xi-yuanping-wife-zhang-lanlan/</p>		X	
<p>All websites find and delete the article “Xinhua: What Kind of People are the Internet Writers Xi Jinping Questioned?” and related content. (October 16, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrueshush-story-xis-praise-patriotic-bloggers/</p>			X
<p>In regards to [the article] “Wen Jiabao Appears at <i>Alma Mater</i> Nankai High School to Welcome the School’s 110th Anniversary,” do not promote related content. Please find and delete any coverage already published. (October 15, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitruedont-hype-wen-jiabaos-high-school-appearance/</p>		X	
<p>Regarding news of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s absence from public appearance, media must not make unauthorized conjecture or commentary. Websites must take note, investigate, and control netizen commentary. (October 10, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitru</p>		X	

e-kim-jong-uns-absence/			
<p>All websites are kindly asked to prominently republish the People’s Daily Online article “Open Letter from Scholar Living in U.S. to Those with Ulterior Motives.” (October 3, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/minitrue-open-letter-hk-peoples-daily/</p>	X		
<p>All websites must immediately clear away information about Hong Kong students violently assaulting the government and about “Occupy Central.” Promptly report any issues. Strictly manage interactive channels, and resolutely delete harmful information. This [directive] must be followed precisely. (September 28, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-delete-harmful-information-hong-kong/</p>	X		
<p>Without exception, no media is to report on or republish the poem that Shen Hao’s wife posted online. Regarding Shen Hao and other criminal suspects, the media must not publish content reflecting them positively. Do not interfere with judicial proceedings. (September 26, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-poem-shen-hao/</p>			X
<p>Carry the Xinhua News Network wire story “Uyghur Scholar Ilham [Tohti] Suspected of Separatism, Sentenced to Life Imprisonment.” Make sure to strictly check related comments, and to resolutely find and delete harmful information. (September 23,</p>	X		

2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-ilham-tohtis-life-sentence/			
Do not report or carry coverage of the Hong Kong Federation of Students class boycott. Internet media are to control commentary. Immediately remove inflammatory language and images. (September 22, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-hk-student-federation-boycotts-class/	X		
The media must not hype or comment on the Scottish referendum. All websites must take care to control content on interactive platforms. (September 20, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-scottish-referendum/			X
All websites are to delete the article “22 Village Libraries Built by Peking University Graduate Continue to Be Forced to Stop Operations.” The media absolutely must not report on the closing of China Rural Library libraries. (September 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-scrub-story-shuttered-libraries/		X	
All video websites are kindly asked to immediately remove the September 7, 2014 episode of “Mr. Bole’s Weidou Show.” (September 15, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-ai-weiwei-appears-cctv/	X		
This evening, Xinhua will issue a report on the latest details in the case of suspected news extortion by 21st Century Net. Please			X

<p>strictly adhere to the Xinhua document in your coverage. Do not quote other sources. Also, all media are asked to pair coverage with editorial condemning 21st Century Net’s illegal behavior and firmly supporting the public security response. (September 11, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-21st-century-net-extortion-case/</p>			
<p>Regarding the National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision on election of the chief executive of the Hong Kong S.A.R., as well as the so-called “Occupy Central Movement,” use coverage by authoritative, central government media as the standard. All Internet platforms must take care to check related content and commentary. (September 1, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-beijing-decision-hong-kong-elections/</p>	X		
<p>Please find and delete the article “In PLA Exercises, ‘Blue Army’ Captures ‘Red Army’ Commander with Cabbage Ruse.” (September 1, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/minitrue-blue-captures-red-pla-military-exercise/</p>			X
<p>Delete content related to “laser pointer shone on Li Keqiang at Youth Olympics closing ceremony.” (August 31, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-laser-pointer-li-keqiang/</p>		X	

<p>All media are kindly asked to repost on the double homepages [main and news] the Duowei article “Xi Jinping Is Awakening China.” Take care to control commentary. (August 19, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-promote-duowei-article-xi-jinping/</p>		X	
<p>All websites must immediately delete the Tencent Finance article “Red Cross’s ‘Secret Warehouse.’” Do not hype discussions related to the Red Cross. (August 19, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-red-cross-rents-storage-shipping-cos/</p>		X	
<p>The media must not hype security related to the Youth Olympics. (August 17, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-youth-olympics-security/</p>		X	
<p>The media must not report on the removal of crucifixes from Gulou Church in Hangzhou and Salvation Church in Wenzhou. (August 14, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-crosses-removed-churches/</p>		X	
<p>All websites must find and delete “Analysis: Why Can’t the Situation and Number of ‘Naked Officials’ in 10+ Provinces Be Disclosed?” Do not hype related discussions. (August 7, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-axe-story-naked-officials/</p>		X	

<p>Do not hype the report “Karamay, Xinjiang: Five Types of People Prohibited from Public Transportation, Including Those with Long Beards.” (August 5, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-beards-xinjiang-busses/</p>	X		
<p>All websites are kindly asked to prominently display Xinhua and CCTV coverage of Guo Meimei, and to actively organize and direct commentary. (August 4, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-guo-meimeis-confession/</p>			X
<p>Urgent Notice from the Propaganda Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to Internet discussion staff at every level of all departments on the primary websites of People’s Daily, Xinhua, Phoenix, Sina, Tencent, Sohu, NetEase, etc.: with regard to the investigation into Zhou Yongkang, all news, Internet comments, front page commentary, and background articles should closely follow the view of the People’s Daily’s “Steadily and Strictly Governing the Party”. At the same time, all disciplinary inspection websites and government <i>weibo</i> accounts must forward positive commentary. Prior to 3:00PM today, submit a first-round report on your overall progress including the following figures: number of participants, name of websites posted to, total number of posts, number of <i>weibo</i> forwards along with a brief sample post; number of original web comments</p>		X	

<p>published (including a sample headline and the website or forum), and one excellent sample article. We will select an exemplary report. On the request of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s Propaganda Department, these tasks are to be carried out until further notice. Attach great importance to these tasks, and see to it that they are done well. (July 30, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitru-zhou-yongkang-investigation/</p>			
<p>Without exception, all media must refrain from reporting on the violent terror incident in Shache County, Xinjiang. (July 29, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitru-violent-terror-incident-shache-county-xinjiang/</p>	X		
<p>Please take note to republish: “China Conducts Successful Domestic Land-Based Anti-Missile Test.” (July 26, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitru-promote-successful-land-based-anti-missile-test/</p>			X
<p>Delete all online images of the “Yuyuantan inflatable toad” and related commentary. (July 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitru-remove-giant-toad-internet/</p>		X	

Find and delete news related to an investigation into Song Zuying. Set “Song Zuying + bad news,” “Song Zuying + army disciplinary inspection commission,” etc. as forbidden search terms. (July 15, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitruer-song-zuying-investigation/		X	
Take note and delete Internet rumors regarding Jia Qinglin and Guo Boxiong, as well as related content. (July 13, 2014). http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitruer-delete-jia-qinglin-guo-boxiong-rumors/		X	
News of the investigation of Rui Chenggang should not be on the double homepages [main and news]. Do not hype related content. (July 12, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitruer-cctvs-rui-chenggang-investigation/			X
Use only authoritative media reports concerning the Hangzhou bus fire incident. (July 7, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitruer-use-official-reports-hangzhou-bus-fire/			X
All websites must take care to control user commentary under the article “Peng Liyuan Says Young Xi Jinping Resembled ‘Do Min-joon.’” (July 6, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitruer-young-xis-resemblance-korean-star/		X	

<p>Video websites must strictly delete the following Cantonese music videos: (1) Kay Tse’s “Egg and Lamb”; (2) “Do You Hear the People Sing” (all versions). (July 2, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitrue-delete-two-cantonese-music-videos/</p>	X		
<p>Regarding the decision to process Xu Caihou, Jiang Jiemin, Li Dongsheng, and Wang Yongchun: without exception, use only Xinhua wire copy, and do not hype the matter. Remove related reports from the headlines of the “double homepages” [the homepage and the main news page]. Take care to control commentary. (July 1, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitrue-xu-caihou-tigers/</p>		X	
<p>Delete “Violent Terror Incident in Qaraqash County, Xinjiang: Thugs Murder On-Duty Militia.” (June 26, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/minitrue-delete-article-terror-attack-qaraqash-xinjiang/</p>	X		
<p>All major websites please prominently re-post the following articles in the headline section of your homepage: 1. China News Agency’s “HK Media Reveals Connection Between ‘Occupy Central’ Internet Defenders and CIA” 2. The Global Times’ “Who is Actually Behind ‘HK Independence’?” (June 25, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/minitrue-reprint-news-us-govt-connections-hk-activism/</p>	X		

<p>State Council Information Office: Effective immediately, find and delete all news related to the 6/22 Hong Kong referendum, thoroughly clean up related comments, and promptly send a work report [on your progress]. Forcibly cancel blogs and microblog posts reprinting harmful information. Ensure that no information related to the referendum appears online. Guangdong Province is to cut signal on all programs from Hong Kong television stations, especially on June 22. (June 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/minitruue-hong-kong-referendum/</p>	X		
<p>All websites: from now on, do not hype, do not comment, do not modify headlines, do not distribute bloody photographs, do not link to old stories, do not publish commentary, and use only official wire copy on news related to violent terror attacks, trouble caused by mental disorders, or police opening fire. (June 18, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/minitruue-take-liberties-covering-violence/</p>	X		
<p>Find and delete the article “Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Group Head Indicates CASS Permeated by Foreign Influence.” (June 18, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/minitruue-delete-article-foreign-infiltration-cass/</p>			X

<p>Interactive platforms carefully control background commentary on the article “12 Female Officials Under Investigation for Corruption; Some Use Sex to Gain Power.” Delete content that maliciously attacks the system or is directed against government officials. (June 17, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/mini-true-corrupt-female-officials-using-sex-gain-power/</p>		X	
<p>All websites are asked to strengthen on-duty work during this time of highest sensitivity. Closely observe reporting discipline. Ensure that a responsible editor is always present. (June 3, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/mini-true-time-highest-sensitivity/</p>	X		
<p>We stress once again the responsibility of websites to check content. Strictly delete information about redressing and commemorating June 4th (including so-called sideways expressions). Anyone found to be violating discipline during this inspection will be severely punished. (June 3, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/mini-true-time-highest-sensitivity/</p>	X		
<p>Take care to find and delete the Tencent Entertainment article “Amnesiacs, With What Can We Save You?” (June 3, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/06/mini-true-time-highest-sensitivity/</p>	X		

<p>Don't hype or embellish the article "Forbes Announces the 100 Most Powerful Women; Peng Liyuan Comes in at 57". (May 30, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruth-peng-liyuans-power/</p>		X	
<p>All websites must find and delete the article "Zhao Chu: Dangerous Urumqi–The Grozny Express." (May 26, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-comparing-xinjiang-chechnya/</p>	X		
<p>All websites must take care to delete hearsay about PLA troops massing at the border with Vietnam. (May 22, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-rumor-pla-troops-vietnam-border/</p>			X
<p>The media must not report, comment on, exaggerate, or hype traffic controls and security measures for the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). (May 21, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-increased-security-shanghai-cica-summit/</p>		X	
<p>Delete the [Ta Kong Bao] article "Three Officials Killed by Terrorists in Kashgar, Xinjiang."</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-xinjiang-vietnam-taking-beating/</p>	X		
<p>We warn you once again: The media must absolutely use only Xinhua wire copy in coverage of attacks on Chinese businesses in Vietnam, etc.</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-</p>			X

xinjiang-vietnam-taking-beating/			
Websites must take care to delete the article “China’s History of Taking a Beating Is Actually a History of Asking for a Beating.” http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-xinjiang-vietnam-taking-beating/			X
All reports regarding the projects and situation of Chinese firms in Vietnam that have been violently attacked must only use Xinhua wire copy and information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website. Outlets must not publish or broadcast independently collected material, re-publish foreign media reports, or organize commentary without permission. Strictly manage interactive links and news posts. (May 15, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-anti-chinese-riots-vietnam/			X
Absolutely do not report on any news related to “Chinese-funded enterprises in Vietnam being attacked by Vietnamese.” Do not republish foreign coverage. Stringently find and delete related news, commentary, and images on interactive [Web] platforms. (May 14, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-anti-china-protests-vietnam/			X
No website is to promote the article “The Network of Authority and the Criminal Underworld: the History of Liu Han’s Wealth.” (May 12, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-		X	

liu-hans-wealth-pla-corruption/			
When publishing the commentary “Army Corruption Must Come First,” websites must not alter the headline without permission. (May 12, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-liu-hans-wealth-pla-corruption/		X	
Please find and delete Zhang Xuezhong’s article “Gao Yu’s Actions Should Not Constitute a Crime” [Chinese]. (May 7, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/			X
Find and delete harmful information related to the article “Corrupt Chinese Officials Who Flee Abroad Run off with Trillions, Money Impossible to Recover.” http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/		X	
Find and delete harmful information involving quotations falsely attributed to Deng Xiaoping related to the article “Deng Liqun Better Qualified Than Deng Xiaoping.” http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/		X	
All websites must continue to find and delete coverage of “the collision of Vietnamese naval ships and Chinese [oil] exploration vessels” and “confrontation between a large number of Chinese and Vietnamese coast guard boats.” Immediately report on work progress.			X

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/			
<p>The Global Bitcoin Summit 2014 will be held on May 10-11 in Beijing. All websites are asked not to participate in or report on the summit. Do not hype bitcoins. All reporting on bitcoins must henceforth accord with the specifications of financial regulatory agencies. Please carry out the above immediately. (May 7, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/</p>		X	
<p>1. All websites must strictly search out and delete content related to the detention of Pu Zhiqiang and the so-called XX Commemoration Seminar. Take care to delete related images from Weibo and other interactive platforms. (May 6, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruue-pu-zhiqiang-guangzhou-stabbing/</p>	X		
<p>2. Strictly use Xinhua News Agency wire copy when covering the Guangzhou railway station stabbing incident.</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruue-pu-zhiqiang-guangzhou-stabbing/</p>	X		
<p>3. Take note to delete images of a man stepping on the head of a Liu Shaoqi statue.</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitruue-pu-zhiqiang-guangzhou-stabbing/</p>		X	
<p>1. Do not recommend links, and do not list trending search terms related to the Urumqi, Xinjiang train station explosion.</p> <p>2. Concerning the Urumqi train station</p>	X		

<p>incident, commentary should focus on: reverence for casualties and those injured; condemnation of violent behavior; the conscientious maintenance of ethnic cooperation and social stability.</p> <p>3. All media platforms that cited Xinhua’s non-regulated English-language draft on the Urumqi incident must immediately delete coverage and wait for the Xinhua News Agency’s Chinese-language wire copy. (May 3, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-condemn-violence-focus-ethnic-cooperation/</p>			
<p>All websites are kindly asked to find and remove articles and posts related to CCTV head Hu Zhanfan’s so-called “insider trading.” Please focus your attention on Weibo and forums. (April 25, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitrue-cctv-head-hu-zhanfans-insider-trading/</p>		X	
<p>All websites, please prominently repost positive commentary on the article “Cyberspace Administration of China Issues ‘Ten Points on Meetings.’” (April 28th)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-admonishing-online-news-publishers/</p>			X
<p>State Council Information Office: All websites are to find and remove the video “Actual Footage of Chengdu Police Surrounding and Beating Homeowners Who Were Defending their Rights.” (April 22, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitru</p>	X		

e-police-beat-homeowners-chengdu/			
All websites must immediately delete the Tencent Finance article “Red Cross’s ‘Secret Warehouse.’” Do not hype discussions related to the Red Cross. (August 19, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitruer-red-cross-rents-storage-shipping-cos/		X	
State Council Information Office: All websites are to find and delete the following articles: (1) “Shen Weichen’s Mistress is Shanxi Singer Tan Jing, Husband Reveals” (April 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitruemistresses-housing-handshakes/		X	
State Council Information Office: All websites are to find and delete the following articles: (2) Real Estate Developer Flees Gu Junshan’s Sinking Ship; Gu and Greentown’s Song Weiping Intersected”; (April 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitruemistresses-housing-handshakes/		X	
State Council Information Office: All websites are to find and delete the following articles: (3) “Li Keqiang Meets Chinese and Foreign Entrepreneurs at Boao, Shakes Hands with Li Xiaolin” and related photos. (April 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitruemistresses-housing-handshakes/			X

<p>State Council Information Office: Do not hype the story “Eight Years Needed to Absorb Housing Stock in Haining, Zhejiang; Developers Say [Local Market] Will Collapse.” (April 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitrue-mistresses-housing-handshakes/</p>		X	
<p>Central Propaganda Department: The media are not to report on Hu Jintao’s visit to Hu Yaobang’s former residence. Media websites must immediately delete any republished [coverage]. (April 14, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitrue-hu-jintao-visits-hu-yaobangs-home/</p>		X	
<p>State Council Information Office: All websites immediately delete content related to the 17-year-old Uyghur who was shot and killed by police after running a red light in Aksu, Xinjiang. Also delete photos and news related to the community action that followed. The term “Aksu 17-year-old” is temporarily prohibited from Weibo. (April 14, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/04/minitrue-uyghur-youth-killed-police-aksu/</p>	X		
<p>State Council Information Office: Follow Peaceful Beijing’s [Weibo] notice in reporting the incident of a man stabbing people in Beijing’s Huairou district. Do not hype the story or report on it without authorization. Interactive platforms must close commenting. (March 27, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-</p>		X	

stabbing-beijing/			
<p>Central Propaganda Department: The media absolutely must not report without authorization on the accidental death of State Council Information Officer Deputy Director Li Wufeng. Internet media must delete related speculative and accusatory comments as soon as possible. (March 26, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-information-official-li-wufengs-death/</p>			X
<p>Central Propaganda Department:</p> <p>(1) The media must immediately cool down coverage of the Pingdu homicide case. Discontinue follow-up reporting. (March 24, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-pingdu-death-taiwan-protests/</p>	X		
<p>Central Propaganda Department:</p> <p>(2) Regarding Taiwanese students protesting the trade agreement, you may focus on coverage of conflict and clearing out the protesters, but you must take care with your wording. (March 24, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-pingdu-death-taiwan-protests/</p>	X		

<p>Central Propaganda Department: All media must refrain from hyping or exaggerating the referendum in Crimea. In your coverage, you may not connect the story to our own country's issues with Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang, and you must not comment without authorization on the Foreign Ministry's position on and handling of the Crimean issue. (March 17, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-crimea-votes-join-russia/</p>			X
<p>State Council Information Office: Delete the foreign news story "Zhang Chunxian Confirms He Is on National Security Commission" and related information from the entire [Chinese] Internet.</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-zhang-chunxian-zhou-bin/</p>		X	
<p>Also, concerning investigations of Zhou Bin and his family, as well as reports, articles, discussions, and schemes about "human flesh searches" and "charts" of Zhou Bin and his family: absolutely do not promote these on the news, Weibo, WeChat, or any other channels. Those who have already done so are kindly asked to push the story backstage. Violators will be severely punished and investigated for related transgressions. (March 16, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-zhang-chunxian-zhou-bin/</p>		X	
<p>Concerning so-called rights defender Cao Shunli dying of illness while awaiting trial:</p>	X		

<p>the media must not report the story, and interactive [online] platforms must take care to thoroughly delete all related images and commentary. (March 15, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-cao-shunlis-death/</p>			
<p>Urgent Notice: (1) You may only use authoritative, standard sources when covering the knifing incident in Changsha. Do not comment or hype the story, and do not send reporters to investigate. Filter online discussion of the issue. (March 13, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-changsha-knife-attack/</p>	X		
<p>Urgent Notice: (2) Take care to delete the article by Zhang Lifan and Pu Zhiqiang, “On Respecting the Wishes of the Dead; Proposal to Cremate Mao Zedong’s Remains and Rebury Him.” Prevent related content from spreading online. (March 13, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-changsha-knife-attack/</p>		X	
<p>Urgent Notice: (3) All websites must cease republishing the following articles. Please remove them if they have already been republished: “Large-Scale Shuttering of Tencent WeChat Accounts“; “1200 Small Towns in Germany Fly ‘Free Tibet’ Flags” from the Global Times; “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets with Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister[, Thanks Vietnam for Help in Search for Malaysian Flight]” from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and “Why</p>			X

<p>Cutting Short a Provincial Secretary’s Speech Wins Praise” from the Guizhou Daily. (March 13, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-changsha-knife-attack/</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-changsha-knife-attack/</p>			
<p>Urgent Notice: (4) Websites must not hype the article “Zhou Qiang: Courts Must Dare to Persist, Take Responsibility.” Do not change the headline. Interactive sites must prohibit accusatory commentary. (March 13, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-e-changsha-knife-attack/</p>		X	
<p>State Council Information Office:</p> <p>(1) All websites must delete the article “Wang Qishan Tells Secretary of Jilin to Stop: ‘Wouldn’t You Say This Is Formalism?’” (March 11, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-wang-qishans-anti-formalist-outburst/</p>		X	
<p>State Council Information Office:</p> <p>(2) Remove from all website homepages the news that “three suspects in Kunming detained before violent terrorist attack; five fled to Kunming to commit crime.” Do not hype the story. (March 11, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitru-wang-qishans-anti-formalist-outburst/</p>	X		
<p>Central Propaganda Department: The media may not independently analyze or comment on the lost Malaysia Airlines flight. Related coverage must strictly accord with</p>			X

<p>authoritative information issued by the Civil Aviation Administration of China and with Xinhua News Agency wire copy. The domestic aviation department can promptly provide related information to passengers' family members. All media must refrain from interviewing family members without permission, and must not incite any discontented sentiment. All media continue to give increased publicity to the Two Sessions.</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitruemalaysia-airlines-flight-mh370/</p>			
<p>State Council Information Office: Websites in all localities are kindly asked to promote the article "When It Comes to Smog, We Cannot Blindly Point Fingers." (February 25, 2014)</p> <p>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitruere-blame-smog/</p>		X	
<p>State Council Information Office: (1) CCTV Finance's posts on smog may not be reposted to the Weibo accounts of media organizations and media personnel. (February 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitruenaked-pigs-smog/</p>		X	
<p>State Council Information Office: (2) It is forbidden to hype the contents of the Beijing News article "Beijingers Don Breathing Masks in Smog for 'Naked Pig Run.'" (February 23, 2014)</p> <p>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitruere-naked-pigs-smog/</p>		X	

naked-pigs-smog/			
State Council Information Office: All websites must immediately delete the article “Foreign Media Say UBS Helped Wife and Daughter of Zhang Shugang Set up Secret Offshore Company,” along with related contents. (February 18, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitruue-zhang-shuguang-familys-offshore-company/		X	
State Council Information Office: All websites are kindly asked to delete the article “Report Says Pollution in Beijing Approaching Level Unsuitable for Human Habitation.” (February 12, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitruue-delete-beijing-nearly-uninhabitable/		X	
State Council Information Office: All websites must find and delete the article “Who Is [This Weibo User] Sihaiweichuanbo Behind Xi Jinping’s Steamed Buns?” [zh] by the author Zheng Zhi. Do this immediately. (January 1, 2014) http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/01/minitruue-weibed-xi-jinpings-steamed-buns/			X

8. Bibliography

The Atlantic (2013) 'What Is Behind China's Big Internet Crackdown?', available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/what-is-behind-chinas-big-internet-crackdown/279772/>, accessed on 12th June 2015

Bamman, D., O'Connor, B. and Smith, N. (2012) 'Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese Social Media', *First Monday*, Volume 17, Number 3, pp. 3–5.

Bandurski, D. (2015a) 'News and propaganda resolutions for 2015', available at: <http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/01/12/37683/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

Bandurski, D. (2015b) 'Breeding tigers, and China's caged press', available at: <http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/04/10/38580/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

Bandurski, D. (2015c) 'Propaganda converges', available at: <http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/06/08/38886/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

BBC (2011) 'China lifts fuel price, raising inflation concerns', available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12520643>, accessed on 28th July 2015

BBC (2012) 'Weibo brings change to China', available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18887804>, accessed on 10th June 2015

BBC (2013) 'China employs two million microblog monitors state media say', available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24396957>, accessed on 10th June 2015

Beach, S. (2013) 'Beyond censors' reach, free expression thrives, to a point', in Committee to Protect Journalists, *Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control*, available at: <https://cpj.org/reports/china2013.pdf>, accessed on 8th July 2015

Benney, J. (2013) 'The Great Fearwall of China', *China Policy Institute*, available at: <http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/03/the-great-fearwall-of-china/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

Bennett, I. (2013) 'Media Censorship in China', available at: <http://sites.asiasociety.org/asia21summit/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Media-Censorship-in-China-Council-on-Foreign-Relations.pdf>, accessed on 9th May 2015

Bislev, A (2014) 'Nationalist Netizens in China: Online Historical Memory', *Journal of China and International Relations*, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 117-136

Bloomberg (2011) 'China Blocks Coverage of 'Jasmine Revolution' Protests', available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXPYo69JxiBo>, accessed on 23rd June 2015

Brady, A-M. (2006) 'Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, University of Westminster, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 58-77

Brady, A-M. (2008) *Marketing Dictatorship*, Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield

Brady, A-M. (2009a) 'The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction', *The China Quarterly*, Volume 197, pp. 1-24

Brady, A-M. (2009b) 'Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China's Popular Authoritarianism', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 53, Number 3, pp. 434-5

Brady, A-M. ed (2012) 'China's Thought Management', London: Routledge
Studies on China in Transition

CDT (27.9.2010) 'Digital Media Makes More Work for Ministry of Truth',
available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/09/digital-media-makes-more-work-for-ministry-of-truth/>, accessed on 10th July 2015

CDT (10.1.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/01/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-december-15-2010-january-4-2011/>,
accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (8.2.11) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-january-2-28-2011/>, accessed on 10th July
2015

CDT (17.2.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-10-15-2011/>, accessed on 6th
July 2015

CDT (23.2.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/02/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-17-21-2011/>, accessed on 31st
May 2015

CDT (4.3.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-february-24-march-1-2011/>, accessed on
31st May 2015

CDT (8.3.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-2-7-2011/>, accessed on 6th July
2015

CDT (19.3.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/03/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-march-10-18-2011/>, accessed on 6th July 2015

CDT (23.4.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/>, accessed on 6th July 2015

CDT (4.6.2011) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/06/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-may-1-31-2011/>, accessed on 6th July 2015

CDT (13.2.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitrue-delete-beijing-nearly-uninhabitable/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (24.2.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitrue-naked-pigs-smog/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (27.2.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/minitrue-blame-smog/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (14.3.2014) available at: <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-changsha-knife-attack/>, accessed on 29th May 2015

CDT (16.3.2014) available at: <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/03/minitrue-zhang-chunxian-zhou-bin/>, accessed on 7th July 2015

CDT (8.5.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/minitrue-gao-yu-dispute-vietnam-bitcoin/>, accessed on 1st August 2015

CDT (23.7.2014) available at: <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/river-crabbed-toad-story/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (14.8.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-crosses-removed-churches/>, accessed on 1st August 2015

CDT (20.8.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-promote-duowei-article-xi-jinping/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (31.8.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-laser-pointer-li-keqiang/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (July 2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/minitrue-remove-giant-toad-internet/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (24.12.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-downplay-surgeons-selfie/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (21.11.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-murder-beidaihe-sanitorium/>, accessed 25.5.15), accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (21.11.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/minitrue-harmonious-horoscopes-first-couple/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (24.12.2014) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/minitrue-lose-weight-daddy-xi/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (13.1.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitrue-no-comments-rising-oil-consumption-tax/>, accessed on 1st August 2015

CDT (27.1.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/01/minitrue-mengniu-dairys-deshelved-drink/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (9.2.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/02/minitrue-ccp-along-way/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (1.3.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-dont-hype-dome/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (3.3.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-clamping-dome/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (10.3.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-nyts-daddy-xi-ignites-leader-worship/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (16.3.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-downplay-death-of-xu-caihou/>, accessed on 1st August 2015

CDT (1.4.2015) available at: <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-patient-protest-in-chongqing/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (8.4.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-cctvs-bi-fujian-bad-mouths-mao/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (7.4.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-fujian-px-explosion/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (14.4.2015) <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-delete-vice-education-ministers-speech/>, accessed 29th May 2015

CDT (23.4.2015) <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-april-11-april-19-2011/>, accessed 29th May 2015

CDT (9.6.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/minitrue-delete-dome/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CDT (26.6.2015) available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitrue-toddler-cant-put-xi-down/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

Chan, A. (2002) 'From Propaganda to Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China's Media Policy', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 11, Number 30, pp. 35-51

Chassin, L. M. (1965) *Communist Conquest of China*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson

Cheek, T. (2015) 'Chinese Propaganda in Historical Perspective: Five terms to consider', *China Policy Institute*, available at: <https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2015/05/11/chinese-propaganda-in-historical-perspective-five-terms-to-consider/>, accessed on 11th May 2015

China Daily (2009), 'Crossing the river by feeling the stones?', available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-02/16/content_7479611.htm, accessed on 1st June 2015

China Daily (2014) 'People shun outdoors amid smog', available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-02/24/content_17300028.htm, accessed on 31st May 2015

China Media Project, 'Guidance of Public Opinion', available at: <http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/11/05/423/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

China Media Project (2011) 'Hu calls for stronger web controls', available at: <http://cmp.hku.hk/beta/2011/02/21/10152/>, accessed on 31st May 2015

CNN (2015) 'China crackdown makes it harder to get around the Great Firewall', available at: http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/28/technology/china-censorship-vpn-great-firewall/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fmoney_latest+%28CNNMoney%3A+Latest+News%29, accessed on 10th June 2015

Cole, R. ed (1998) *The Encyclopaedia of Propaganda*, Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference

Committee to Protect Journalists (2014) 'China is world's worst jailer of the press', available at: <https://www.cpj.org/reports/2014/12/journalists-in-prison-china-is-worlds-worst-jailer.php>, accessed on 12th June 2015

Cook, S. (2015) 'The Politburo's Predicament, A Freedom House Special Report', available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/12222014_FH_ChinaReport2014_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 8th June 2015

Daily Telegraph (2011) 'Arab Spring: timeline of the African and Middle East rebellions', available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839143/Arab-Spring-timeline-of-the-African-and-Middle-East-rebellions.html>, accessed on 31st May 2015

Ding, S. (2015) 'Modernization without Democratization in the Digital Age: China's Micromanagement of Its Contentious State–Society Relations', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Volume 23, Number 1, pp. 1-22

Dong, F. (2012) 'Controlling the internet in China: The real story, Convergence', *The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies*, Volume 18, Number 4, pp. 403-425

Doob, L. W. (1995) 'Goebbels principles of propaganda', in ed R. Jackall (ed.) *Propaganda*, London: Macmillan

Earp, M. (2013) 'Legal threats to journalists persist', in Committee to Protect Journalists, *Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and*

control, available at: <https://cpj.org/reports/china2013.pdf>, accessed on 15th May 2015

The Economist (2013) 'A giant cage', available at <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled>, accessed on 18th May 2015

Edney, K (2014) *The Globalisation of a Chinese Propaganda*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Esarey, A. (2005) 'Cornering the market: State strategies for controlling China's commercial media', *Asian Perspective*, Volume 29, Number 4, pp. 37-83

Esarey, A. (2006) 'Speak no evil: Mass media control in contemporary China', *Freedom House Special Report*, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Speak%20No%20Evil-%20Mass%20Media%20Control%20in%20Contemporary%20China.pdf, accessed on 7th June 2015

Esarey, A. & Qiang, X. (2011) 'Digital Communication and Political Change in China', *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 5, pp. 298–319

Forbes (2015) 'Environmental Protests Expose Weakness In China's Leadership', available at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesasia/2015/06/22/environmental-protests-expose-weakness-in-chinas-leadership/>, accessed on 27th July 2015

GlobalVoices (2015), 'Leaked Emails Reveal Details of China's Online "Youth Civilization Volunteers"', available at: <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/05/25/leaked-mails-reveal-details-on-chinas-online-youth-civilization-volunteers/>, accessed on 16th June 2015

Goldman, M. (2005) 'Introduction: From Comrades to Citizens in the Post-Mao Era', in M. Goldman (ed.) *From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

The Guardian (2011), 'In China, to get rich is not always glorious', available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/10/china-development-environment, accessed on 6th July 2015

The Guardian (2014a), 'China blocks foreign news sites that revealed elite's offshore holdings' [/www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/china-foreign-news-sites-offshore-holdings](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/china-foreign-news-sites-offshore-holdings), accessed 27.7.15

The Guardian (2014b), 'In China, to get rich is not always glorious', available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/china-beijing-pollution-hazardous-report, accessed on 15th May 2015

The Guardian (2014c), 'Chinese repression of dissent intensifies under ruthless Xi Jinping', available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/china-repression-dissent-xi-jinping, accessed 17.7.2015

The Guardian (2015a), 'Under the Dome: will this film be China's environmental awakening?', available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/05/under-the-dome-china-pollution-chai-jing, accessed on 15th May 2015

The Guardian (2015b), 'US and EU criticise Chinese journalist's jailing for 'leaking state secrets'', available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/gao-yu-and-document-no-9-china-jails-journalist-for-leaking-state-secrets, accessed on 8th May 2015

Hassid, J. (2012) 'Safety Valve or Pressure Cooker? Blogs in Chinese Political Life', *Journal of Communication*, Volume 62, pp. 212–230

Huang, H. and Yip, N (2012) 'Internet and Activism in Urban China: A Case Study of Protests in Xiamen and Panyu', *Journal of Comparative Asian Development*, Volume 11, Number 2, pp. 201-223

Huang, H. (2015) 'Propaganda as Signalling', *Comparative Politics*, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325101, accessed on 17th July 2015

Huffington Post (2014) 'Beijing Air Pollution At Dangerously High Levels', available at: www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/16/beijing-air-pollution_n_4607200.html, accessed on 15th May 2015

Human Rights in China (2014) 'New Rules Tighten Control on Use of News Information', available at: <http://www.hrichina.org/en/press-work/hric-bulletin/new-rules-tighten-control-use-news-information-hric-translation>, accessed on 10th June 2015

Jiang, Y. (2014) 'Reversed agenda-setting effects', *The Journal of International Communication*, Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 168-183

Johnson, M. (2015) 'The enduring themes of Chinese propaganda', *China Policy Institute*, available at: <https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2015/05/05/the-enduring-themes-of-chinese-propaganda/>, accessed on 11th May 2015

Jowett G. S. & O'Donnell, V. (1992) *Propaganda and persuasion*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications

King, G., Pan, J. and Roberts M. E. (2013) 'How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression', *American Political Science Review*, Volume 107, Number 2, pp. 1-18

- Lasswell, H. D. (1995) 'Propaganda', in R. Jackall (ed.) *Propaganda*, New York: Macmillan
- Lewis, O. A. (2013), 'Net Inclusion: New Media's Impact on Deliberative Politics in China', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Volume 43, Number 4, pp. 678-708
- Li, C. and Carey, E. (2011), 'The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?', *China Brief*, Volume 11, Number 23, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38811&cHash=c0006cd99bfe551991fcf1924d37c0cf#.VeXMryxzPug, accessed, 31.5.2015
- Link, P. (2002) 'China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier', available at: www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/apr/11/china-the-anaconda-in-the-chandelier/, accessed on 27th July 2015
- Link, P. (2013) 'Censoring the News Before It Happens', available at: www.chinafile.com/censoring-news-it-happens, accessed on 4th May 2015
- Lippmann, W. (1954) *Public Opinion*, New York: Macmillan
- Liu, Y. and Chen, D. (2012) 'Why China Will Democratize', *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 35, Number 1, pp. 41-63
- Lorentzen, P. (2014) 'China's Strategic Censorship', *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume 58, Number 2, pp. 402-414
- Luo, Y (2014) 'The Internet and Agenda Setting in China: The Influence of Online Public Opinion on Media Coverage and Government Policy', *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 8, pp. 1289-1312

Lynch, D.C. (1999) *After the Propaganda State*, Stanford: Stanford University Press

MacKinnon, R. (2008) 'Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China', *Public Choice*, Volume 134, pp. 31–46

MacKinnon, R. (2011) 'China's 'Networked Authoritarianism'', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 22, Number 2, pp. 32-46

Mooney, P (2014) 'Command and Control: The state of journalism in China, 25 years after Tiananmen', *Nieman Reports*, available at: <http://niemanreports.org/articles/command-and-control/>, accessed on 11th May 2015

Nathan, A. J. (2013) 'Foreseeing the unForeseeable', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 24, Number 1, pp. 20-25

New York Times (2011) 'In Baring Facts of Train Crash, Blogs Erode China Censorship', available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/world/asia/29china.html, accessed on 7th June 2015

New York Times (2013a) 'China Takes Aim at Western Ideas', available at: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html?_r=0, accessed on 8th May 2015

New York Times (2013b) 'Crackdown on Bloggers Is Mounted by China', available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/asia/china-cracks-down-on-online-opinion-makers.html?_r=0, accessed on 12th June 2015

New York Times (2015a) 'Move Over Mao: Beloved 'Papa Xi' Awes China', available at: http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/move-over-mao-beloved-papa-xi-awes-china.html?referrer=&_r=2, accessed on 15th May 2015

New York Times (2015b) 'China's 'Silent Spring' Moment?', available at: www.nytimes.com/2015/03/19/opinion/why-under-the-dome-found-a-ready-audience-in-china.html?_r=0, accessed on 3rd June 2015

Ng, J. (2013) *Blocked on Weibo: What Gets Suppressed on China's Version of Twitter (and Why)*, New York: The New Press

Ng, J. (2015) 'Politics, Rumors, and Ambiguity: Tracking Censorship on WeChat's Public Accounts Platform', available at: <https://citizenlab.org/2015/07/tracking-censorship-on-wechat-public-accounts-platform/>, accessed on 2nd August 2015

Nieman Reports (2011) 'China's Propaganda Department: New Restrictions on the Press', available at: <http://niemanreports.org/articles/chinas-propaganda-department-new-restrictions-on-the-press/>, accessed on 1st August 2015

O'Brien, D. and Earp, M. (2013) 'Made in China: Models for media and censorship' in Committee to Protect Journalists, *Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control*, available at: <https://cpj.org/reports/china2013.pdf>, accessed on 8th July 2015

Perry, E. J. (2013) 'Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: "Re-Orienting" Party Propaganda', *Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series*, available at: http://www.harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvard-yenching.org/files/featurefiles/Elizabeth%20Perry_Cultural%20Governance%20in%20Contemporary%20China_0.pdf, accessed on 5th May 2015

Qiang, X. (2010) "'Standard copy' A signature method of the CCP for controlling the Internet', *China Digital Times*, available at: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/10/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-september-23-30-2010/>, accessed on 21st May 2015

Qiang, X. (2011) 'From "Grass-Mud Horse" to "Citizen": A New Generation Emerges through China's Social Media Space', available at: <http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/hearing/s/2011/CECC%20Hearing%20Testimony%20-%20Xiao%20Qiang%20-%202011.17.11.pdf>, accessed on 14th May 2015

Qiang, X. (2014) 'Fear and Anger on the Chinese Internet: The Struggle Between Censors and Netizens', available at: www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Xiao_Testimony.pdf, accessed on 8th June 2015

Reporters Without Borders (2015) '2015: Netizens imprisoned', available at: <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-barometer-netizens-imprisoned.html?annee=2013>, accessed on 12th June 2015

Reuters (2015a) 'China censorship sweep deletes more than 60,000 Internet accounts', available at: www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/us-china-internet-censorship-idUSKBN0LV16S20150227, accessed on 10th June 2015

Roberts M. E. (2014) 'Fear or Friction? How Censorship Slows the Spread of Information in the Digital Age', available at: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mroberts/files/fearfriction_0.pdf, accessed on 15th May 2015

Saich, T. (1997), *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe

Schneider, F (2013) 'The Mass-Media Logic behind China's Internet Controls', available at: <http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/11/the-mass-media-logic-behind-chinas-internet-controls/>, accessed on 8th June 2015

Shadmehr, M. & Bernhardt, D. (2012) 'A Theory of State Censorship', *APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper*, available at:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2105407

Shambaugh, D. (2000) 'The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era', in D. Shambaugh (ed) *The Modern Chinese State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174-187

Shambaugh, D. (2007) 'China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy', *The China Journal*, Number 57, pp. 25-58

Shambaugh, D. (2014) 'China at the Crossroads: Ten Major Reform Challenges', available at:

<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/10/01-china-crossroads-reform-challenges-shambaugh-b.pdf>, accessed on 27th July 2015

Shirk, S. L. (2011) *Changing Media, Changing China*, New York: Oxford University Press

South China Morning Post (2011) 'Fresh call goes out for Beijing 'jasmine' rallies', available at: <http://www.webcitation.org/5wuvYKGui>, accessed on 31st May 2015

South China Morning Post (2014) 'Xi Jinping calls for new style of media organisation', available at: <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1576351/xi-jinping-calls-new-style-media-organisation>, accessed on 31st May 2015

Steinhardt, H. C. (2015) 'From Blind Spot to Media Spotlight: Propaganda Policy, Media Activism and the Emergence of Protest Events in the Chinese Public Sphere', *Asian Studies Review*, Volume 39, Number 1, pp. 119-137

- Stern, R. E. and Hassid, J. (2012) 'Amplifying Silence: Uncertainty and Control Parables in Contemporary China', *Comparative Political Studies*, Volume 45, Number 10, pp. 1230–1254
- Stockmann, D. and Gallagher, M. E. (2011) 'Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China', *Comparative Political Studies*, Volume 44, Number 4, pp. 436–467
- Stockmann, D. (2013) *Media Commercialisation and Authoritarian Rule in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Sullivan, J. (2014) 'China's Weibo: Is faster different?', *New Media & Society*, Volume 16, Number 1, pp. 24–37
- Tai, Q. (2014) 'China's Media Censorship: A Dynamic and Diversified Regime', *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Volume 14, pp. 185-209
- Tai, Z. (2006) *The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society*, Abingdon: Routledge
- Taylor, J. (2009) *The Generalissimo*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- The Daily Telegraph (2011) 'Arab Spring: timeline of the African and Middle East rebellions', available at:
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839143/Arab-Spring-timeline-of-the-African-and-Middle-East-rebellions.html, accessed on 31st May 2015
- Tong, J. & Sparks, C. (2009) 'Investigative Journalism in China Today', *Journalism Studies*, Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 337-352

Wall Street Journal (2013) All for One: China's New Deal, available at:
<http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579210032460595174>, accessed on 10th July 2015

Wall Street Journal (2015a) Pollution Documentary 'Under the Dome'
Blankets Chinese Internet, available at:
<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/02/pollution-documentary-under-the-dome-blankets-chinese-internet/>, accessed on 30th May 2015

Wall Street Journal (2015b), 'China Internet Regulators Announce More
Explicit Rules on Web Censorship', <http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-internet-regulators-put-explicit-new-censorship-rules-in-place-1430233546>,
accessed on 7th July 2015

Wasserstrom, J. N.(2010) *China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford: OUP

Weber, I. (2011) 'Mobile, online and angry: the rise of China's middle-class civil society?', *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies*, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 25-45

Weiss, J. C. (2013) 'Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China', *International Organisation*, Volume 67, Number 1, pp. 1-35

Wertime, D. (2014) 'Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on "Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States"', available at:
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Wertime_Written%20Testimony.pdf,
accessed on 8th June 2015

Wu, G. (2009) 'In the name of good governance', in X. Zhang & Y. Zheng (.eds) *China's Information and Communications Technology Revolution*, London: Routledge

- Xinhua (2011) 'Egyptian people yearning for normal life amid anti-Mubarak protests', available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-02/04/c_13718515.htm, accessed on 21st June 2015
- Xinhua (2013) 'Information transparency vital for image', available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/16/c_132802739.htm, accessed on 8th June 2015
- Xinhua (2014a) 'Chinese websites commit to public supervision', available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/11/c_133636181.htm, accessed on 8th June 2015
- Xinhua (2014b) 'Internet moguls urge rule of law in cyber space', available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/01/c_133759213.htm, accessed on 8th June 2015
- Xinhua (2015) 'Sina faces suspension over lack of censorship', available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/11/c_134142437.htm, accessed on 16th June 2015
- Xu, B. (2015) 'Media Censorship in China, Council on a Foreign Relations', *Council on Foreign Relations*, available: <http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515>, accessed on 10th June 2015
- Xu, D. (2014) 'Online Censorship and Journalists' Tactics', *Journalism Practice*, Volume 95, Number 5, pp. 704-720
- Yang, G. and Calhoun, C. (2007) 'Media, Civil Society, and the Rise of a Green Public Sphere in China', *China Information*, Volume 21, Number 2, pp. 211-36

Yang, G. (2014) 'The Return of Ideology and the Future of Chinese Internet Policy', *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, Volume 31, Number 2, pp. 109-113

Yuan, W. (2010) 'E-democracy@China: does it work?', *Chinese Journal of Communication*, Volume 3, Number 4, pp. 488-503

Zhang, X. (2007) 'Breaking News, Media Coverage and 'Citizen's Right to Know' in China', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 53, pp. 535-545

Zhang, X. and Zheng, Y. (2009) 'Introduction', in X. Zhang & Y. Zheng (.eds) *China's Information and Communications Technology Revolution*, London: Routledge

Zhang, X. (2011) *The transformation of political communication in China*, London: World Scientific

Zhao, D. (2009) 'The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 53, Number 3, pp. 416-433

Zhao, Y. (2008) *Communication in China*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield

Zheng, Y. (2008) *Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press

Zheng, Y. (2010) *The Chinese Communist Party as Organisational Emperor*, London: Routledge

Zhu, Y. (2011) "Performance Legitimacy" and China's Political Adaptation Strategy, *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 16, Number 2, pp. 123-14