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Vondracek, Hugh Douglass (2015) *China's stadium diplomacy and its determinants: a typological analysis of soft power*. [MSc]

<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/58/>

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GU ID: 2127695

**China's Stadium Diplomacy and its Determinants:
a typological analysis of soft power**

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
M.Sc. in International Relations

The University of Glasgow
September 2015

Abstract

Since 1958, China has been engaging in a worldwide program of stadium construction, however, previous research has failed to systematically investigate, developing case-specific explanations and unable even to define the phenomenon under investigation. This analysis employs positivist methodologies to define stadium diplomacy and locate all known cases. A typology and classification system permits a comparison of like types and development of a multi-determinant theory holding China engages in stadium diplomacy to secure friends and resources.

The positivist investigatory technique of operationalizing soft power has been demonstrated effective. This methodology is generalizable and may serve to develop a more rich research programme into the nature, use, and effectiveness of soft power.

[word count: 12,261]

Acknowledgements

To thank everyone in the measure they deserve would fill a space far greater than available here.

I am indebted to my family and to Jenny for their encouragement and especially their love during my Scottish adventure. Without them, none of this would have been possible. To old friends and classmates in Chicago who were patient with my absence and new ones in Glasgow, especially Mariela, Gerald, David, Shannon, Rich, Beth, Tony, Stephen, and Hendrik, I can only say thank you for your friendship which has been so important.

This project has been four years in the making, taking on many forms and directions with the help of several scholars and advisors. Tom Dunmore at PitchInvasion first sparked my interest in the study of soccer and its intersections with politics, and conversations with Yue Zhang and Robert Bruhl were helpful as I first grappled with stadium diplomacy.

I owe special thanks to Brandon Valeriano for being a teacher, mentor, and friend.

There are many more who deserve my thanks. I hope my sincere gratitude will suffice. Of course, any errors are mine alone.

-Hugh Vondracek
Chicago, USA

List of Tables, Figures, & Graphs

Tables

Table 1: Inventory of China's Stadium Diplomacy by Year	16
Table 2: Classification of China's Stadium Diplomacy	25

Figures

Figure 1: Classification system of Stadium Diplomacy by Genotype	23
Figure 2: Chi-Squared Analysis of Stadium Diplomacy	36

Graphs

Graph 1: Stadium Diplomacy Graphed By Region	19
Graph 2: Stadium Diplomacy Since 2000 Graphed By Region	19

Contents

Abstract	2
Acknowledgements	3
List of Tables, Figures, & Graphs	4
Introduction	7
<i>Structure of the Analysis</i>	8
Theoretical Foundations	9
<i>Soft Power</i>	9
<i>Public Diplomacy</i>	11
<i>From Sports Diplomacy to Stadium Diplomacy</i>	12
Defining Stadium Diplomacy	15
Inventory of Stadium Diplomacy & Initial Observations	15
<i>Frequency and Density</i>	18
<i>Acceleration of Stadium Diplomacy</i>	18
<i>Regional Clustering</i>	20
<i>Stadiums for Resources</i>	21
<i>Stadiums for Friends</i>	21
Multi-Determinant Theory of China's Stadium Diplomacy	22
Introduction to Classification Scheme & Typology	23
Research Design	27
Durability of Diplomatic Recognition	27
<i>Operational Definition</i>	27
<i>Findings</i>	28
Resource Richness	31
<i>Operational Definition</i>	31
<i>Findings</i>	32
Analysis and Discussion	35
<i>Accuracy and Utility of the Multi-Determinant Theory of China's Stadium Diplomacy</i>	35
<i>Assessing the Nature of Stadium Diplomacy</i>	37
<i>Assessing the Effectiveness of Stadium Diplomacy</i>	39
<i>Sport & Politics – Not Such Strange Bedfellows: Why Stadiums Appeal</i>	42
<i>The Recipient Regime</i>	43
<i>The Recipient Population</i>	44
<i>The Donor State: China</i>	45
<i>Potential Stumbling Blocks</i>	46

Introduction

Chinese-built and funded stadiums have become an increasingly common addition to skylines around the world, with over 100 having been constructed since the turn of the millennium. However, this phenomenon has never been systematically investigated nor convincingly explained with sufficient scholarly rigour. The body of literature on stadium diplomacy is unable even to answer how many Chinese-built stadiums there are or where they are located; and previous deductive methodologies have led to case-specific explanations of the phenomenon. This analysis locates 140 Chinese built stadiums in 61 countries and develops an issue-based theory of the determinants of China's stadium diplomacy.

This investigation into the determinants of China's stadium diplomacy is particularly timely. China's rise – and its disruptive potential – is often considered in terms of China's material capacity. Yet, its *soft power* is perceived as ineffective: coming *last* in a ranking of thirty states and behind smaller powers such as New Zealand and the Czech Republic (McClory 2015: 25). As a rising superpower, China actively seeks to increase its soft power (Li 2009: 1), and anecdotal evidence of an acceleration and expansion of stadium diplomacy suggests it may be an effective, scalable form of soft power for China.

This research inventories and classifies all cases where stadium diplomacy has been used, identifying observable patterns between typological groups that suggest China uses this form of soft power to pursue multiple foreign policy goals in a variety of contexts around the world. The empirical investigation into the determinants of stadium diplomacy leads to the development of a domain-specific theoretical explanations: *China employs stadium diplomacy to secure friends and resources*. The analysis

will also provide the criteria for falsification of our proposed theoretical understandings.

This analysis represents a scholarly progression into China's use of soft power, employing novel methodologies to operationalize a particular form of soft power in order to classify all observed cases and develop a theory of its determinants. Operationalization permits social scientist to develop, test, and falsify theory over soft power, its determinants and its effectiveness. This methodological approach further permits scholars to distinguish between typological groups in order to develop a theoretical framework for future case selection. Significantly, the research methodology employed here offers up a pattern for future international relations scholarship investigating other forms of soft power.

Structure of the Analysis

The analysis aims to guide the reader from initial investigation to theory-building and appraisal. Beginning with a brief overview of previous scholarship on soft power and sports diplomacy in which this analysis is intellectually located, it continues to an inventory of cases we have located and identified is presented, followed by the resulting typology where cases are classified along two theoretically-specific dimensions. Finally, guided by our findings, we develop new theoretical explanations, test the proposed determinants, and assess stadium diplomacy's effectiveness as a form of soft power. The analysis concludes by offering scholars a generalizable framework to guide future research into other forms of soft power. Now, we begin by examining the literature and the theoretical foundations that ground our analysis.

Theoretical Foundations

Theory provides scholars a lens for scholars to view the world and to interpret their findings about it to others; and any progressive research must be built upon the work of others. This analysis of stadium diplomacy's determinants, its nature, and its ultimate effectiveness is no different. Previous research and ongoing scholarly debate over the nature of soft power and sports diplomacy will guide this investigation of stadium diplomacy, enabling us to place the phenomenon within the framework of an international relations research programme and present any findings and pathways to future inquiry in developed theoretical context. This requires having a grasp of the theoretical foundations of the analysis, and it is with task we begin.

Soft Power

Scholars' understanding of power's sources, its scope, and its use has progressed greatly since Dahl's (1957: 201) definition that power is the ability of A to make B do what B would otherwise not. One of the research programme's most significant theoretical advances has been the identification of an alternative, an *attractive*, form of power. First laid out by Joseph Nye (1990), to wield *soft power* is to "achieve desired outcomes because others want what you want" (Nye 1999), with a state's culture, ideology, and values attracting others to follow it; to borrow its techniques and experiences; to emulate its example; to admire its values and traditions; to seek to achieve its level of development and prosperity (Nye 2002: 8-11; Vuving 2009: 8-12). States seeking major-power or great-power status must be able to use both hard and soft power in the international system, much as a three dimensional chess player's success depends on her ability to simultaneously play both horizontally and vertically (Nye 2004: 72).

Within traditional soft power scholarship, however, there exists a conceptual and a logical hurdle which together hold back theoretical progression. In conceiving soft power, Nye (2002: 8-11) makes a clear distinction between economic power – which he considers coercive or “hard”– and soft power; though whether this distinction between economic power and soft even exists, and if it does where that dividing line is, remains unspecified (Li 2009: 3). Indeed, the US does not wield its hegemonic power through “guns and Hollywood alone” (Mead 2009). Rather it is capable of using its economic power in ways other states find attractive rather than coercive (e.g. humanitarian disaster assistance). Secondly, it is logically unclear why culture, ideology, and values must be the source(s) of attractive power, as Nye (1990: 11) insists. Indeed certain cultures, ideologies, and values may be repulsive, depending upon the recipient.

The conceptual and logical deficiencies within the traditionalist scholarship suggest a deeper definitional problem. If soft power really is “like love, easy to feel but hard to define” (Nye 1999), that is a problem. Without a definition of the phenomenon under investigation, how do scholars (1) know soft power is in play? (2) measure soft power? and (3) know if soft power translates into policy outcomes? (Li 2009:4). Without these basic data, generalizable scholarship is impossible.

Li (2009: 7) succinctly sums up the problem *and* the way forward for the research programme. Instead of classifying power – hard v. soft – based its source, scholars ought to classify power based upon how it is wielded, whether power is used to attract or coerce (Li 2009: 7). This simple but radical rethink of power used softly shifts the focus from soft power’s source to its implementation. Doing so makes conceptual sense, allowing for a broader range of interstate behaviour to be placed and studied within the framework of soft power.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy could be considered soft power translated into practice, with states promoting positive, attractive images to those outside its borders by building relations and influencing the opinions of foreign publics (Melissen 2013:1). Culture, especially, offers an effective medium for presenting an appealing image and attracting others' admiration (see: Nye 2002: 8-11), because "it is [through] cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented" to the world (US DoS 2005: 1).

Government sponsored cultural institutions e.g. the Cervantes [Spain], Goethe [Spain], or Confucius [China] Institutes of Language & Culture are among the most obvious and active examples of public diplomacy; but movies and television (Otmazgin 2008: 77; Thussu 2013), food (Reynolds 2012), clothing (MacLeod 2013; Ramzy 2014), and art tours can also be powerful tools of value transmission and cultural attraction. The 1976-79 tour of the mask of King Tutankhamun demonstrates the durable attractive power of art and culture. When it came to America, visitors waited in line for hours, some even bringing sleeping bags, to catch sight of the gold mask (Burghart 2006). The tour sparked "tut-mania" in America, a craze for all things Egyptian with people emulating everything from Egyptian hair and makeup styles to creating new 'tut-inspired' dance moves (Kamp 2013). The attractive power of Egypt's culture is evident even today, and it gives the regime great political leeway. Internationally, Egypt is known as the land of the Nile, King Tut, and the Pyramids, not Tahrir Square or the political violence following the failed Egyptian Revolution.

The political value of an attractive culture is no lost on China's leaders as its public diplomacy has become increasingly sophisticated over the last twenty years

(Zhu 2013: 6, 16, 29), creating its own version of the American Peace Corps, and bringing thousands of students a year to China on university scholarships (Brautigam 2009: 123-124, 158); but China's most famous ambassadors, cultural or otherwise, are its pandas loaned out to zoos around the world as part of China's panda diplomacy (Hartig 2013; *The Scotsman* 2011). China has proven to be pragmatic with its use of public diplomacy, and its willingness to experiment has led it to novel methods of wielding soft power, be that through its pandas, or as we will see, a shared passion for sport.

From Sports Diplomacy to Stadium Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy is a two-way relationship with actor and receiver interacting through a shared interest or activity. What makes sport such an effective context for this intergroup interaction is of clear interest to this analysis. The effectiveness of sports diplomacy stems from its high salience to participants and its capacity to shape public opinion (Jennings 2011: 7). It is an activity in which billions participate¹, and it can bypass verbal or written communication, making it a suitable friendship-building tool (Maguire 2005: 1). Unfortunately, existing "sports diplomacy" international relations scholarship is limited, with those cases selected for investigation sharing similar theoretical characteristics (Murray 2013: 12). The seven most commonly investigated cases: wrestling diplomacy [Iran-USA] (Marks 1999; Chehabi 2001), ping pong diplomacy [USA-China] (Griffin 2014), football diplomacy [Turkey-Armenia] (Gunter and Rochtus 2010), chess diplomacy [USA-USSR], cricket diplomacy [India-Pakistan] (Næss-Holm 2007), baseball or beisbol diplomacy [USA-Cuba] (National Security Archive 2013), and the 1980 & 1984 Olympic Boycotts [USA-USSR]

¹ Football alone claims more adherents than the Catholic Church (FIFA 2010)

(Edelman 2006; Goldberg 2000) all investigate the de-escalatory effects of sport – and athletes – within the context of six enduring, rivalrous dyads (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 143), half of which are “born feuding” dyadic rivals (Wayman 2000). The result of repeatedly selecting theoretically similar cases for investigation is scholars’ knowledge of the nature of sport diplomacy is narrow, constrained to only a subset of cases.

Stadium diplomacy and sports diplomacy both have their theoretical foundations and ancestry in soft power, and both rely on the role of sports as an attractive force ; but they fundamentally disagree on the source of soft power. Sports diplomacy employs traditional conceptions of soft power to emphasize *who* plays whom, with person to person interactions via sport as the source of soft power. Stadium diplomacy relies on an understanding of soft power informed by Li’s (2009) broader conception of power used softly to emphasize *where* they play, with citizens’ interaction with sport in a given place creating attractive power. Stadium diplomacy conceptually relies upon sport as an attractive force, but the *sporting facility* and infrastructure, as well as the activity itself, can be a source of attraction and soft power – a major divergence from previous scholarship into the intersections between sport and soft power.

Success for any type of public diplomacy as a form of soft power depends upon engaging and attracting a broad audience (Melissen 2013); and these modern stadiums are highly visible, tangible symbols of China to even the most marginal members of society in a way that, traditional and more anonymous forms of assistance are not (Pazzanita 1996: 47; Will 2011). Stadium diplomacy, as a form of public diplomacy and attractive power, engages a foreign population to shape perceptions and “create a foundation of trust ... [to] provide a positive agenda for

cooperation” (US DoS 2005: 1-2). However, the mechanism by which this foundation is actually “created” is, as yet, unclear, which results in a lack of definitional and explanatory clarity. Scholarship into soft power has been held back by a lack of definitional clarity over the phenomenon under investigation, and to be considered a progression for the research programme, a piece of research must be capable of answering three questions. (1) How do we know soft power is in play? (2) How do we measure soft power? (3) How do we know if soft power translates into policy outcomes? (Li 2009: 4). For this analysis of stadium diplomacy, Li’s (2009: 4, 7) theoretical lens of a “soft use of power” offers the greatest potential for analytical clarity and power as it can account for the attractive potential of both sport and sport through economic and infrastructural investment.

We will be able to answer these questions and advance the research agenda by applying positivist methods to the traditionally normative soft power research programme². This analysis will (1) provide an operational definition of stadium diplomacy to distinguish between when soft power is and is not in play. (2) Compile an inventory of all observed cases to identify and measure soft power. (3) Guided by China’s policy goals, develop a classification scheme and typology with clearly defined domains and criteria for success and failure in order to assess policy outcomes.

If the methodology employed in this analysis proves effective at assessing soft power and is capable of delivering novel insight, it may serve as a guide for future empirical enquiry into other forms of soft power.

² For the scholarly value of incorporating new positivist methodologies into an existing research programme, see: Sjoberg, Laura (forthcoming) “The Epistemology of the Bedroom, The Normalization of Fear and Being Terrorized” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* [edited special issue].

Defining Stadium Diplomacy

To date, there has been no operational definition of stadium diplomacy, making it impossible to systematically locate and assess the phenomenon, and leaving researchers unable to distinguish between cases that are or are not available for investigation. To this end, I operationally define stadium diplomacy as:

The construction or renovation of sport facilities funded, wholly or in part, by the People's Republic of China outside its own borders.

Inventory of Stadium Diplomacy & Initial Observations

Previous attempts to investigate stadium diplomacy (Alm 2012; Barranguet 2010; Will 2012) have been limited to particular spatial or temporal domains, unable even to answer how many Chinese-built stadiums there are or where they are located. This fragmented, deductive approach has resulted in case-specific explanations that are inappropriate from which to draw generalizable conclusions. However, a comprehensive inventory of all cases where stadium diplomacy has been used as a form of soft power gives social scientists the opportunity to assess potential determinants of Chinese stadium diplomacy. Table 1 inventories all observed cases of stadium diplomacy (n=140) and orders them by year. This represents the first attempt to locate and identify all cases of China's stadium diplomacy (Alm personal communication with author: 12 June] 2015), a significant step forward for academic inquiry into stadium diplomacy and a progression for the empirical study of soft power as Li (2009: 4) calls for.

Stadium #	Recipient State	Completion Date	Stadium Name	Location	New
1	Mongolia	1958	Mogolia Central Sports Palace	Ulaanbaatar	Y
2	Cambodia	1965	Olympic Stadium	Phnom Penh	Y
3	Tanzania	1969	Uhuru Stadium	Dar es Salaam	N
4	Tanzania	1970	Amaan Stadium	Zanzibar	Y
5	Pakistan	1970	Jinnah Stadium	Islamabad	
6	Chad	1972	Stade Nacional	NDjaména	Y
7	Somalia	1978	Mogadishu Stadium	Mogadishu	Y
8	Sierra Leone	1979	National Stadium	Freetown	Y
9	Syria	1980	Tishreen Stadium	Damascus	Y
10	Benin	1982	Stade de l'Amite	Cotonou	Y
11	Mauritania	1983	Stade Olympique	Nouakchott	Y
12	Morocco	1983	Moulay Abdallah Stadium	Rabat	Y
13	Morocco	1983	Salle Omnisports Moulay Abdallah	Rabat	Y
14	Samoa	1983	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	Y
15	Burkina Faso	1984	Stade du 4 Aout	Ouagadougou	Y
16	Gambia	1984	Gambia Independence Stadium	Bakau	Y
17	Senegal	1985	Leopold Senghor Stadium	Dakar	Y
18	Rwanda	1986	Amahoro National Stadium	Kigali	Y
19	Liberia	1986	Doe Sports Complex	Paynesville	Y
20	Suriname	1987	Anthony Nesty Sporthal	Paramaribo	Y
21	Kenya	1987	Moi International Sports Center	Nairobi	Y
22	Myanmar	1987	Thuwunna Indoor Stadium	Yangon	Y
23	Zimbabwe	1987	Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium	Harare	Y
24	Niger	1989	Stade General Seyni Kountche	Niamey	Y
25	Guinea Bissau	1989	Estadio 24 de Setembro	Bissau	Y
26	Papua New Guinea	1991	National Indoor Sports Complex	Port Moresby	Y
27	Papua New Guinea	1991	Sir John Guise Stadium	Port Moresby	Y
28	Mauritius	1991	Stade Anjalay	Belle Vue Maurel	Y
29	Barbados	1992	Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium	Wilbey	Y
30	DRC	1993	Stade de Martys (frmr. Stade Kamanyola)	Kinshasa	Y
31	Djibouti	1993	Stade du Ville	Djibouti City	Y
32	Uganda	1997	Mandela National Stadium (Namboole)	Kampala	Y
33	Nepal	1999	Dashrath Stadium	Kathmandu	N
34	Niger	1999	Stade General Seyni Kountche	Niamey	N
35	Togo	2000	Kegue Stadium	Lome	Y
36	St. Lucia	2002	George Odum Stadium	Vieux Fort	Y
37	Mali	2002	Stade Abdoulaye Nakoro Cissoko	Kayes	Y
38	Mali	2002	Stade Amari Daou	Segou	Y
39	Mali	2002	Stade Babemba Traore	Sissako	Y
40	Mali	2002	Stade Barema Bocoum	Mopti	Y
41	Mali	2002	Stade du 26 Mars	Bamako	Y
42	Mali	2002	Stade Modibo Keita	Bamako	Y
43	Sierra Leone	2002	National Stadium	Freetown	N
44	Seychelles	2002	Piscine Olympique	Victoria	Y
45	Federated States of Micronesia	2002	FSM-China Friendship Sport Center	Pohnpei	Y
46	Fiji	2003	Damodar Aquatic Centre	Suva	Y
47	Fiji	2003	National Hockey Centre	Suva	Y
48	Fiji	2003	National Netball Centre	Suva	Y
49	Fiji	2003	Victoria Tennis and Squash Court	Suva	N
50	Fiji	2003	Vodafone Arena	Suva	Y
51	Myanmar	2003	Thuwunna Youth Training Center Stadium (track)	Yangon	N
52	Djibouti	2004	Omnisport Cener	Dikhil	Y
53	Barbados	2005	Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium	Wilbey	N
54	Sierra Leone	2006	Bo Stadium	Bo, Southern Province	Y
55	Jamaica	2006	Sligoville Mini Stadium Complex	Sligoville	Y
56	Central African Republic	2006	Barthelemy Boganda Sports Complex	Bangui	Y
57	Kiribati	2007	Betio Sports Complex	Tarawa	Y
58	Congo	2007	Municipal Stadium	Pointe Noire	Y
59	Equatorial Guinea	2007	Estadia de Bata	Bata	Y
60	Equatorial Guinea	2007	Estadio de Malabo	Malabo	Y
61	Jamaica	2007	Greenfield Stadium	Trelawny	Y
62	Pakistan	2007	Liaquat Gymnasium	Islamabad	Y
63	Samoa	2007	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	N
64	Samoa	2007	Samoa Aquatic Center	Tuanaimato	Y
65	Antigua & Barbuda	2007	Sir Vivian Richards Stadium	North Sound	Y
66	Liberia	2007	Doe Sports Complex	Paynesville	N
67	Dominica	2007	Windsor Park	Roseau	Y
68	Grenada	2007	Queen's Park	River Road	Y
69	Congo	2008	Denis Sassou-Nguesso Stadium	Dolisie	N
70	Ghana	2008	Accra Sports Stadium	Accra	N

71	Ghana	2008	Baba Yara Stadium	Kumasi	N
72	Ghana	2008	Sekondi Takoradi Stadium	Sekondi Takoradi	Y
73	Ghana	2008	Tamale Stadium	Tamale	Y
74	Angola	2009	Estadio 11 de Novembro	Luanda	Y
75	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional da Tundavala	Lubango	Y
76	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional de Ombaka	Benguela	Y
77	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional do Chiazzi	Cabinda	Y
78	Cameroon	2009	Yaoundé Multipurpose Sports Complex	Yaoundé	Y
79	Congo	2009	Marien Ngouabi Stadium	Owando	Y
80	Laos	2009	Gymnasium Tanggo Buntug	Vientiane	Y
81	Laos	2009	National Aquatics Stadium	Vientiane	Y
82	Laos	2009	National Tennis Complex	Vientiane	Y
83	Laos	2009	South-East Asia Games Stadium	Vientiane	Y
84	Tanzania	2009	Mkapa National Stadium	Dar es Salaam	Y
85	Cook Islands	2009	Telecom Sports Arena	Avarua	Y
86	Senegal	2009	Stade Alassane Djigo	Pikine	N
87	Senegal	2009	Stade Ely Manel Fall	Diourbel	N
88	Laos	2010	Gymnasium Pahoman	Vientiane	Y
89	Mongolia	2010	Buyant Ukhua Sports Complex	Ulaanbaatar	Y
90	Papua New Guinea	2010	Prince Charles Oval	Wewak	Y
91	Mozambique	2010	Estadio Nacional do Zimpeto	Maputo	Y
92	Tanzania	2010	Amaan Stadium	Zanzibar	N
93	Sri Lanka	2010	Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium	Hambantota	Y
94	Zimbabwe	2010	Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium	Harare	N
95	Equatorial Guinea	2011	Estadia de Bata	Bata	N
96	Gabon	2011	Stade de l'Amitie	Libreville	Y
97	Guinea	2011	Nongo Stadium	Conakry	Y
98	Laos	2011	National Indoor Shooting Center	Vientiane	Y
99	Zambia	2011	Levy Mwanawasa Stadium	Ndola	Y
100	Ghana	2011	Ghana Armed Forces Sport Complex	Accra	Y
101	Tanzania	2011	Uhuru Stadium	Dar es Salaam	N
102	Uganda	2011	Mandela National Stadium (Namboole)	Kampala	N
103	Seychelles	2011	Piscine Olympique	Victoria	N
104	Costa Rica	2011	Estadio Nacional de Costa Rica	San Juan	Y
105	Cameroon	2012	Stade de Limbe	Limbe	Y
106	Zambia	2012	Olympic Youth Development Centre Pool	Lusaka	1
107	Kenya	2012	Moi International Sports Center	Nairobi	N
108	Nepal	2012	Dashrath Stadium	Kathmandu	N
109	Bahamas	2012	Thomas Robinson Stadium	Nassau	Y
110	Senegal	2012	Stade Kamine Gueye	Kaolack	N
111	Zambia	2013	National Heroes Stadium	Lusaka	Y
112	Guinea Bissau	2013	Estadio 24 de Setembro	Bissau	N
113	Senegal	2013	Caroline Faye Stadium	Mbour	Y
114	Senegal	2013	Stade Al Boury Ndiaye	Louga	N
115	Senegal	2013	Stade de Kolda	Kolda	N
116	Senegal	2013	Stade de Tamba	Tambacounda	N
117	Senegal	2013	Stade Massene Sene	Fatick	N
118	Algeria	2014	Stade Abdolkader Fréha	Oran	Y
119	Sierra Leone	2014	Bo Municipal Stadium	Bo, Eastern Province	Y
120	Cape Verde	2014	Estadio Nacional de Cabe Verde	Praia	Y
121	Senegal	2014	Stade Mawade Wade de Medina	Saint Louis	N
122	Senegal	2014	Stade Regional de Matam	Matam	N
123	Algeria	2015	Grand Stade d'Alger	Alger-Baraki	Y
124	Cameroon	2015	Bafoussam Omnisport Stadium	Bafoussam	Y
125	Zambia	2015	Independence Stadium	Lusaka	N
126	Ghana	2015	Cape Coast Stadium	Cape Coast	Y
127	Somalia	2015	Mogadishu Stadium	Mogadishu	Y
128	Samoa	2015	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	N
129	Malawi	2015	Civo Stadium	Lilongwe	Y
130	Grenada	2015	Kirani James Stadium	River Road	Y
131	Senegal	2015	Stade Aline Sitoe Diatta	Ziguinchor	N
132	Cameroon	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade de la Reunification	Douala	N
133	Cameroon	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade OmniSports	Yaounde	N
134	Mongolia	<i>Under Construction</i>	New Mongolia Central Sports Palace	Ulaanbaatar	Y

135	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Cambodia National Stadium	Phnom Penh	Y
136	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Cambodia National Tennis Complex	Phnom Penh	
137	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Prek Phnov Stadium	Phnom Penh	
138	Cote d'Ivoire	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade National de la Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	Y
139	Vanuatu	<i>Under Construction</i>	Korman Stadium	Port Vila	Y
140	Vanuatu	<i>Under Construction</i>	Vanuatu Multi-Sport Complex	Port Vila	Y
* (As of 30 June, 2015)					

The analysis begins by identifying shared characteristics observed between recipient states in Table 1. If China consciously pursues stadium diplomacy in pursuit of particular policy goals as Will asserts (2012: 38), there should be identifiable patterns in the data. These identified shared characteristics, then, will inform proposed theoretical explanations and the development of a typology with theoretically significant categories that are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive.

Frequency and Density



Table 1 identifies 140 observed cases of stadium diplomacy across 61 countries. The average distribution is 2.29 stadiums per recipient state, though 44 states out of the 61 recipients have two or fewer stadiums resulting in a modal distribution of 1 stadium per recipient state. Senegal (12) is the most extreme outlier, with the next highest being Mali (6) and Fiji (5). The observations exceed the estimates of previous authors (see: Alm 2012; Ross 2014; Barranguet 2010) and even the most recent self-reported data by more than half (Xinhua 2011)!³ This is a theoretically significant and exciting finding, with the accelerating use of stadium diplomacy suggesting China finds utility in this particular form of soft power.

Acceleration of Stadium Diplomacy

Graph 1 clearly shows China's use of stadium diplomacy is accelerating. Between 1958 and 1990, there are 25 identified cases of stadium diplomacy. From

³ The Chinese government's most recent white paper on foreign aid and investment (Xinhua 2014) no longer list sports facilities as a separate category, making direct comparison impossible.

1990-2010, there were 62 case; and from 2010 through summer 2015 there are 55 examples. This pattern of accelerating soft power mirrors China’s overall foreign aid expenditures (Brautigam 2009: Chapter 6) and is in line with what one would expect to see from an economy that has seen double digit year-on-year growth for nearly a decade



Regional Clustering

The acceleration of stadium diplomacy takes on added theoretical significance when considered with the region to which it has been directed. The recipients of Chinese built stadiums are disproportionately located in Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania with 112 of 140 of all observed cases and 85 of 106 since 2000 being located in these three regions. Stadium diplomacy has been accelerating over time, and the acceleration has been more pronounced within these three regions. Stadium diplomacy's beneficiaries are becoming *increasingly* geographically clustered suggesting the regions are increasingly salient.

Any theory explaining stadium diplomacy must clearly link (1) those salient issues for China that shape its policy preferences with (2) the characteristics of recipient states in these three salient regions. Previous research programmes, separately, identify resource acquisition or diplomatic recognition to be the issue at stake that China pursues through its soft power. The validity of these claims will be tested to see whether their expectations align with our observations of a regional clustering effect. If both existing explanatory theories are found to have merit, reconciling the two may result in a new, more robust theory capable of explaining a greater number of cases.

Stadiums for Resources

The dominant research programme posits China's engagement with the global south, and Africa in particular, is driven by China's pursuit of mineral resources (see: Ferdinand 2012; Ross 2014; Barranguet 2010; Blenford 2007; The Economist 2008a & 2008c; Hawksley 2010, etc.). This resource-seeking foreign policy is informed by and drives China threat theory scholarship (see: Mearsheimer 2001 & 2006; contested

in: Reveron 2007) whose advocates note the global south is home to two thirds of the world's natural resources which China seeks to sustain its economic growth (Winter and Wilson 2010). The “stadiums for resources” research programme clearly links a salient issue at stake – resource acquisition – with our observations of China's regional preference when employing stadium diplomacy to explain the use of stadium diplomacy in recipient states with natural resources.

Stadiums for Friends

The alternative research programme contends that the issue at stake for China is the pursuit of diplomatic recognition in line with the One-China Policy. For this group of scholars, China's enduring rivalry with Taiwan informs and best explains its soft power push (see: Erikson and Chen 2007; McElroy and Bai 2008; Zhu 2013, etc.). The few states that diplomatically recognize Taiwan⁴ are disproportionately located in the Caribbean and Oceania – the regions in which Graph 1 and Graph 2 identified a significant concentration of stadium diplomacy, – where China's uses of soft power can be understood as attempts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan (Kurlantzick 2007; Sheringham 2007; Zhu 2013). The otherwise unusual behaviour of stadium construction in minor-power states makes more sense when seen within the context interstate rivalry, with each side willing to go to ever greater lengths in order to “win” as the rivalry entrenches (Diehl and Goertz 2000). The “stadiums for friends” research regime identifies winning diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan as an especially salient issue at stake and specifically links it to two regions our analysis identifies as theoretically significant.

⁴ Twenty two as of writing, Summer 2015

These separate research programmes have arrived at two superficially credible theoretical explanations of China's stadium diplomacy; and the theories they advance can explain the regionally salient preferences observed in Table 1 and Graphs 1 & 2. When considered in tandem, the "stadiums for resources" and stadiums for friends" appear to hold explanatory power over a significant number of cases. In the sections that follow, a new theory to describe stadium diplomacy will be presented and a typology will be developed in order to classify its beneficiaries along theoretically significant dimensions. Until now, this has represented a deficiency within the field, and it is to this task which we turn our attention.

A New Multi-Determinant Theory of China's Stadium Diplomacy

The inventory of all observed cases of stadium diplomacy suggests the phenomenon has multiple determinants with distinct domains, while existing research has led to disconnected hypotheses, able to explain some cases but leaving many others unexplained. This paper seeks to offer up a new theory of stadium diplomacy capable of guiding future empirical research. However, for any new theory of stadium diplomacy's determinants to be considered progressive (see: Lakatos 1970: 182-191) it must be able to provide multiple, domain-specific explanations. Presented here is a new theory of stadium diplomacy, positing

China employs stadium diplomacy to secure diplomatic recognition in line with the One-China Policy and to secure natural resources.

This proposed theory accounts for the simultaneous existence of multiple determinants, each providing domain-specific explanation. The theory's capacity to guide future empirical research and whether its predictions are confirmed, or not,

through observation will be tested through the creation of a typology where cases are grouped into theoretical groups to enable comparative analysis.

Introduction to Classification Scheme & Typology

The proposed multi-determinate theory of stadium diplomacy's determinants cannot be tested in a deductive manner. An *ex ante* theoretical classification allows researchers to differentiate between types (George and Bennett 2005: 234). It also clearly delineates and operationalizes the typological criteria (Vasquez and Valeriano 2010: 293), permitting the typology to be tested against data, allowing for potential falsifiability – a crucial component of any theory building exercise (Popper 1959: Chapter 1 section 6).

Any classification scheme must create categories that are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive with clearly defined explanatory domains (Baily 1994: 3), and any classification system's utility must be judged by its capacity to offer useful pathways for future inquiry. The classification scheme presented here categorizes recipient states of stadium diplomacy by their shared characteristics along two theoretical dimensions as suggested by previous qualitative research: durability of diplomatic recognition; and resource richness. The resulting typology leads to the creation of ten genotypes as laid out in Figure 1, below.

FIGURE 1: Classification System of Stadium Diplomacy by Genotype

Dimensions	Not Friends	Enduring Friends			Stable Friends			New Friends		
		Resource Rich	Potentially Resource Rich	Not Resource Rich	Resource Rich	Potentially Resource Rich	Not Resource Rich	Resource Rich	Potentially Resource Rich	Not Resource Rich
	(Type 1)	(Type 2)	(Type 3)	(Type 4)	(Type 5)	(Type 6)	(Type 7)	(Type 8)	(Type 9)	(Type 10)

The typology combines two dimensions: durability of diplomatic recognition and resource richness, and results in ten distinct genotypes. Type 2, for example denotes a stadium where the recipient state is an enduring friend that is resource rich.

Type 10 on the opposite end of the spectrum represents a stadium constructed for a new friend that is not resource rich.

Within the typology, Types 2-10 lie within the domain of our proposed theory that China engages in stadium diplomacy to secure friends and resources. Cases classified as Type 1 lie beyond the explanatory domain of our theory, because diplomatic recognition is the sole precondition for China's economic engagement (McElroy and Bai 2008: 239). Thus, a Type 1 observation represents a defection from China to a rival, representing a failure of Chinese soft power to secure its predicted policy preferences. For future theory appraisal, it is important to identify in advance those observations beyond the explanatory domain that could falsify the theory. Observations classified as Type 1 could call into question the theory's validity and potentially falsify it.

A theoretical analysis of types offers the opportunity to assess the determinants of China's stadium diplomacy by operationalizing existing theories and specifying their explanatory domains. A classification scheme makes such an analysis of types possible and gives the analysis structure. However, the typology's ultimate utility rests in its ability to create a mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive classification – the standard criteria for evaluating scientific typologies (Baily 1994: 3), so as to guide future research into Chinese soft power.

In the following two sections, each of the 140 observed cases of stadium diplomacy will be classified along two theoretical dimensions into one of the ten typological groups. The utility of each theoretical dimension as a potential determinant will be assessed, with each section beginning with a research design that lays out the operationalization criteria for each genotype, followed by the findings.

TABLE 2: Classification of China's Stadium Diplomacy					
Stadium #	Recipient State	Completion Date	Stadium Name	Location	New
Type 1: Not Friends, N = 3					
15	Burkina Faso	1984	Stade du 4 Aout	Ouagadougou	Y
45	St. Lucia	2002	George Odium Stadium	Vieux Fort	Y
67	Kiribati	2007	Betio Sports Complex	Tarawa	Y
Type 2: Enduring Friends/ Resource Rich, N = 44					
1	Mongolia	1958	Mogolia Central Sports Palace	Ulaanbaatar	Y
9	Syria	1980	Tishreen Stadium	Damascus	Y
11	Mauritania	1983	Stade Olympique	Nouakchott	Y
22	Suriname	1987	Anthony Nesty Sporthal	Paramaribo	Y
27	Papua New Guinea	1991	Sir John Guise Stadium	Port Moresby	Y
28	Papua New Guinea	1991	National Indoor Sports Complex	Port Moresby	Y
37	Mali	2002	Stade du 26 Mars	Bamako	Y
38	Mali	2002	Stade Modibo Keita	Bamako	Y
39	Mali	2002	Stade Abdoulaye Nakoro Cissoko	Kayes	Y
40	Mali	2002	Stade Barema Bocoum	Mopti	Y
41	Mali	2002	Stade Amari Daou	Segou	YY
42	Mali	2002	Stade Babemba Traore	Sissako	Y
58	Congo	2007	Municipal Stadium	Pointe Noire	Y
60	Equatorial Guinea	2007	Estadia de Bata	Bata	Y
61	Equatorial Guinea	2007	Estadio de Malabo	Malabo	Y
69	Congo	2008	Denis Sassou-Nguesso Stadium	Dolisie	N
74	Angola	2009	Estadio 11 de Novembro	Luanda	Y
75	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional de Ombaka	Benguela	Y
76	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional do Chiazzi	Cabinda	Y
77	Angola	2009	Estadio Nacional da Tundavala	Lubango	Y
78	Cameroon	2009	Yaoundé Multipurpose Sports Complex	Yaoundé	Y
79	Congo	2009	Marien Ngouabi Stadium	Owando	Y
81	Laos	2009	South-East Asia Games Stadium	Vientiane	Y
82	Laos	2009	National Aquatics Stadium	Vientiane	Y
83	Laos	2009	National Tennis Complex	Vientiane	Y
84	Laos	2009	Gymnasium Tanggo Buntug	Vientiane	Y
88	Laos	2010	Gymnasium Pahoman	Vientiane	Y
89	Mongolia	2010	Buyant Ukhhaa Sports Complex	Ulaanbaatar	Y
91	Papua New Guinea	2010	Prince Charles Oval	Wewak	Y
96	Equatorial Guinea	2011	Estadia de Bata	Bata	N
97	Gabon	2011	Stade de l'Amitie	Libreville	Y
99	Guinea	2011	Nongo Stadium	Conakry	Y
100	Laos	2011	National Indoor Shooting Center	Vientiane	Y
104	Zambia	2011	Levy Mwanawasa Stadium	Ndola	Y
106	Cameroon	2012	Stade de Limbe	Limbe	Y
110	Zambia	2012	Olympic Youth Development Centre Pool	Lusaka	Y
117	Zambia	2013	National Heroes Stadium	Lusaka	Y
118	Algeria	2014	Stade Abdelkader Fréha	Oran	Y
123	Algeria	2015	Grand Stade d'Alger	Alger-Baraki	Y
124	Cameroon	2015	Bafoussam Omnisport Stadium	Bafoussam	Y
131	Zambia	2015	Independence Stadium	Lusaka	N
138	Cameroon	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade OmniSports	Yaounde	Y
139	Cameroon	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade de la Reunification	Douala	N
140	Mongolia	<i>Under Construction</i>	New Mogolia Central Sports Palace	Ulaanbaatar	N
Type 3: Enduring Friends/ Potentially Resource Rich, N = 21					
3	Tanzania	1969	Uhuru Stadium	Dar es Salaam	N
5	Tanzania	1970	Amaan Stadium	Zanzibar	Y
7	Somalia	1978	Mogadishu Stadium	Mogadishu	Y
8	Sierra Leone	1979	National Stadium	Freetown	Y
32	Uganda	1997	Mandela National Stadium (Namboole)	Kampala	Y
35	Togo	2000	Kegue Stadium	Lome	Y
44	Sierra Leone	2002	National Stadium	Freetown	N
56	Sierra Leone	2006	Bo Stadium	Bo, Southern Province	Y
70	Ghana	2008	Sekondi Takoradi Stadium	Sekondi Takoradi	N
71	Ghana	2008	Tamale Stadium	Tamale	N
72	Ghana	2008	Accra Sports Stadium	Accra	Y
73	Ghana	2008	Baba Yara Stadium	Kumasi	Y
87	Tanzania	2009	Mkapa National Stadium	Dar es Salaam	Y
90	Mozambique	2010	Estadio Nacional do Zimpeto	Maputo	N
93	Tanzania	2010	Amaan Stadium	Zanzibar	Y
98	Ghana	2011	Ghana Armed Forces Sport Complex	Accra	Y
102	Tanzania	2011	Uhuru Stadium	Dar es Salaam	N
103	Uganda	2011	Mandela National Stadium (Namboole)	Kampala	N
122	Sierra Leone	2014	Bo Municipal Stadium	Bo, Eastern Province	Y
125	Ghana	2015	Cape Coast Stadium	Cape Coast	Y
129	Somalia	2015	Mogadishu Stadium	Mogadishu	Y

Type 4: Enduring Friends/ Not Resource Rich, N = 32					
2	Cambodia	1965	Olympic Stadium	Phnom Penh	Y
4	Pakistan	1970	Jinnah Stadium	Islamabad	
10	Benin	1982	Stade de l'Amite	Cotonou	Y
12	Morocco	1983	Moulay Abdallah Stadium	Rabat	Y
13	Morocco	1983	Salle Omnisports Moulay Abdallah	Rabat	Y
14	Samoa	1983	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	Y
19	Rwanda	1986	Amahoro National Stadium	Kigali	Y
20	Kenya	1987	Moi International Sports Center	Nairobi	Y
21	Myanmar	1987	Thuwunna Indoor Stadium	Yangon	Y
26	Mauritius	1991	Stade Anjalay	Belle Vue Maurel	Y
33	Nepal	1999	Dashrath Stadium	Kathmandu	N
43	Seychelles	2002	Piscine Olympique	Victoria	Y
46	Fiji	2003	National Hockey Centre	Suva	Y
47	Fiji	2003	Damodar Aquatic Centre	Suva	Y
48	Fiji	2003	National Netball Centre	Suva	Y
49	Fiji	2003	Victoria Tennis and Squash Court	Suva	N
50	Fiji	2003	Vodafone Arena	Suva	N
51	Myanmar	2003	Thuwunna Youth Training Center Stadium (track)	Yangon	Y
55	Jamaica	2006	Sligoville Mini Stadium Complex	Sligoville	Y
63	Jamaica	2007	Greenfield Stadium	Trelawny	N
65	Samoa	2007	Samoa National Natatorium	Tuanaimato	Y
66	Samoa	2007	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	Y
68	Pakistan	2007	Liaquat Gymnasium	Islamabad	Y
92	Sri Lanka	2010	Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium	Hambatota	Y
101	Seychelles	2011	Piscine Olympique	Victoria	N
107	Kenya	2012	Moi International Sports Center	Nairobi	N
108	Nepal	2012	Dashrath Stadium	Kathmandu	N
119	Cape Verde	2014	Estadio Nacional de Cabe Verde	Praia	Y
127	Samoa	2015	Apia Park Stadium	Apia	N
135	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Cambodia National Stadium	Phnom Penh	Y
136	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Cambodia National Tennis Complex	Phnom Penh	Y
137	Cambodia	<i>Under Construction</i>	Prek Phnov Stadium	Phnom Penh	Y
Type 5: Stable Friends/ Resource Rich, N = 2					
31	DRC	1993	Stade de Martyrs (fmr. Stade Kamanyola)	Kinshasa	Y
134	Cote d'Ivoire	<i>Under Construction</i>	Stade National de la Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	Y
Type 6: Stable Friends/ Potentially Resource Rich, N = 0					
Type 7: Stable Friends/ Not Resource Rich, N = 10					
23	Zimbabwe	1987	Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium	Harare	Y
29	Barbados	1992	Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium	Wilbey	Y
30	Djibouti	1993	Stade du Ville	Djibouti City	Y
36	Federated States of Micronesia	2002	FSM-China Friendship Sport Center	Pohnpei	Y
52	Djibouti	2004	Omnisport Cener	Dikhil	Y
53	Barbados	2005	Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium	Wilbey	N
57	Antigua & Barbuda	2007	Sir Vivian Richards Stadium	North Sound	Y
94	Zimbabwe	2010	Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium	Harare	N
132	Vanuatu	<i>Under Construction</i>	Korman Stadium	Port Vila	Y
133	Vanuatu	<i>Under Construction</i>	Vanuatu Multi-Sport Complex	Port Vila	Y
Type 8: New Friends/ Resource Rich, N = 5					
6	Chad	1972	Stade Nacional	N'Djaména	Y
18	Liberia	1986	Doe Sports Complex	Paynesville	Y
25	Niger	1989	Stade General Seyni Kountche	Niamey	Y
34	Niger	1999	Stade General Seyni Kountche	Niamey	N
64	Liberia	2007	Doe Sports Complex	Paynesville	N
Type 9: New Friends/ Potentially Resource Rich, N = 2					
54	Central African Republic	2006	Barthelemy Boganda Sports Complex	Bangui	Y
130	Malawi	2015	Civo Stadium	Lilongwe	Y
Type 10: New Friends/ Not Resource Rich, N = 21					
16	Gambia	1984	Gambia Independence Stadium	Bakau	Y
17	Senegal	1985	Leopold Senghor Stadium	Dakar	Y
24	Guinea Bissau	1989	Estadio 24 de Setembro	Bissau	Y
59	Dominica	2007	Windsor Park	Roseau	Y
62	Grenada	2007	Queen's Park	River Road	Y
80	Cook Islands	2009	Telecom Sports Arena	Avarua	N
85	Senegal	2009	Stade Alassane Djigo	Pikine	N
86	Senegal	2009	Stade Ely Manel Fall	Diourbel	Y
95	Costa Rica	2011	Estadio Nacional de Costa Rica	San Juan	Y
105	Bahamas	2012	Thomas Robinson Stadium	Nassau	N
109	Senegal	2012	Stade Kamine Gueye	Kaolack	

111	Guinea Bissau	2013	Estadio 24 de Setembro	Bissau	Y
112	Senegal	2013	Caroline Faye Stadium	Mbour	N
113	Senegal	2013	Stade Massene Sene	Fatick	N
114	Senegal	2013	Stade Al Boury Ndiaye	Louga	N
115	Senegal	2013	Stade de Kolda	Kolda	N
116	Senegal	2013	Stade de Tamba	Tambacounda	N
120	Senegal	2014	Stade Regional de Matam	Matam	N
121	Senegal	2014	Stade Mawade Wade de Medina	Saint Louis	N
126	Grenada	2015	Kirani James Stadium	River Road	Y
128	Senegal	2015	Stade Aline Sitoe Diatta	Ziguinchor	N
* (As of 30 June, 2015)					

Research Design

Table 2 classifies the 140 cases of Chinese stadium diplomacy observed since 1958 and reports the number in each category. There are ten genotypes based upon the recipient state's diplomatic recognition and resource richness. We begin by discussing the durability of diplomatic recognition which, in line with preferred Chinese terminology, we can consider the "friendship dimension".

Durability of Diplomatic Recognition

Operational Definition

The dimension consists of four hierarchical categories derived from Rich (2009)⁵. An *enduring friend* (Type 2, 3, 4) is operationally defined as a state that has recognized China and the One-China policy since at least 1976 without interruption; a *stable friend* (Type 5, 6, 7) is a state that has recognized China and the One-China policy since at least 1977 without interruption; and a *new friend* (Type 8, 9, 10) is a state that has recognized China and the One-China policy since 1990. A *non-friend* (Type 1) is operationally defined as a state that does not currently recognize China or the One-China policy.

⁵ The author has expanded Rich's (2009) original data set through 2014.

Findings

We begin by observing 97 stadiums (69% of all observations) have been directed to enduring friends, 28 (20%) to new friends, and 12 (8.5%) to stable friends; while 3 cases (2.4% of all observations) are classified as Type I.

How to differentiate between the beneficiaries of China's soft power was a major concern of Dunmore's (2011) attempt to make sense of the phenomenon. By examining patterns of stadium diplomacy in the Caribbean, he hypothesized that China's use of stadium diplomacy was associated with recent changes in diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan. Will (2012) also hypothesized that rivalry between China and Taiwan was associated with the distribution of stadium diplomacy. However, her hypothesis pointed to a number of projects being directed towards early supporters of China. That 125 stadium diplomacy projects (89%) have been directed towards enduring and new friends (Types 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10) appears to confirm both Dunmore (2011) and Will's (2012) hypotheses that China uses stadium diplomacy to reward those states which supported China's initial application to the UN in 1971 (or other early-adopters) and those which have most recently recognized Beijing.

Scholarship into the use of soft power as a tool of interstate rivalry is surprisingly underdeveloped (for one of the few examples, see: Mabon 2013). This is surprising, because the scholarship around rivalry is robust, and rivals using soft power to resolve issues at stake would be consistent with previous research into the behaviour and win-at-all-costs mind set of rivals. Rivals will go to extraordinary lengths to win, even if it causes themselves harm (Diehl and Goertz 2000). They carry historical and psychological baggage with a reason to mistrust the other (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007), because their relationship is formed through

a process of repeated negative interactions, with each round deepening the rivalry spiral (Valeriano 2012). And for those “born-feuding” rivals which have been in conflict since their birth, such as China and Taiwan⁶, these patterns of bellicose behaviour are especially pronounced and harder to modify (Wayman 2000).

China’s born-feuding rivalry with Taiwan dates to the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the birth of communist China and nationalist Taiwan. Yet even though it was the victor, China was not internationally recognized until 1971 after it mobilized diplomatic support – much of it from newly independent former colonies in the global south – and wrested its UN seat from Taiwan (Brautigam 2009: 35; 67-69). Ever since, China’s foreign policy has been coloured to a great extent by its continued efforts to diplomatically isolate its rival, Taiwan (Erikson and Chen 2007: 69; Ellis 2012: 11), and it has expended a disproportionate amount of effort in pursuit of this policy goal (Erikson and Chen 2007: 69). Objectively, Taiwan ought to be an afterthought: recognized by less than two dozen other mostly minor powers, its economy dwarfed by its mainland rival. But for China, the relationship vs. Taiwan has become loaded with intrinsic value, making it highly salient ((Erikson and Chen 2007: 69; Vasquez 2009).

If China does indeed use stadium diplomacy as a soft power tool within the context of rivalry, it is significant that 17 of the 22 states that continue to recognize Taiwan are in the Caribbean and Oceania (Archibold 2012; Kurlantzick 2007: 42, 142-144). Caribbean and Pacific states are “miniscule and little known [but] vitally important in the diplomatic game between Beijing and Taipei” (Zhu 2013: 156); and they appear to be serial targets in of Chinese soft power. Scholarship on China’s

⁶ Considering Taiwan as an interstate rival is problematic, as it is not considered a state member of the international community; however, it has territorial integrity and sovereignty. It also has mutually salient issues at stake with China, with both considering the other a rival. For this reason, it is logical to consider Taiwan as an interstate rival of China.

international relations grounded in realist logic (e.g. China threat theory Mearsheimer 2001 & 2006) cannot account for the China v. Taiwan rivalry as a potential issue at stake, its salience to China's decision-makers. Critically, realist logic cannot explain the demonstrated preference to direct stadium diplomacy to enduring and new friends (Types 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10).

The typology defines in advance discrete theoretical categories in a replicable and rigorous manner consistent with Baily's (1994: 3) prescription. Considering the observations within the context of interstate rivalry is a novel approach that brings clarity to the distribution of China's soft power: able to account for the intersections roles regionality and rivalry with Taiwan play in China's foreign policy (Erikson and Chen 2007: 69; Reveron 2007: 26, 31, 32). The evidence broadly supports the proposed hypothesis that China uses stadium diplomacy to reward diplomatic recognition – and rejection of Taiwan – with 89% of observed cases directed towards enduring and new friends. On the whole, it appears the durability of diplomatic recognition offers at least partial explanatory power as a determinant of stadium diplomacy. However, 12 cases were directed towards stable friends (Type 5, 6, 7) without a clear association with the historical development of the China v. Taiwan rivalry. Additionally, 3 cases (2.4%) were classified as Type 1, falling beyond the explanatory domain of the proposed theory. These three failures of soft power to secure diplomatic recognition demonstrate China's stadium diplomacy is often but not always effective. Together, the presence of 15 cases considered Types [1, 5, 6, 7] suggests the durability of diplomatic recognition on its own lacks the explanatory power to describe the entire phenomenon.

Resource Richness

Operational Definition

To identify cases of stadium diplomacy where resource acquisition may be in play requires the development of some form of indicator so that one can determine whether and to what degree the proposed determinant of resource acquisition explains empirical observations. Dichotomously classifying states *ad hoc* as either resource-rich or resource-poor as Barranguet (2010) and Ross (2014) have done is methodologically questionable; and it risks missing nuance between states and within China's resource-acquisition strategy.

This typology classifies states into three hierarchical categories: resource-rich; potentially resource-rich; and not resource-rich. A state is operationally defined as *resource-rich* if natural resource revenue and exports equal at least 20% of total fiscal revenues and exports over averaged over five years as identified by the IMF (2012: app.1, table 2& 2007) or has proven reserves in excess of 10 billion barrels of oil or 3 trillion cubic meters of gas (BP.com 2014). A state is operationally defined as *potentially resource-rich* if it has "identified reserves where production has not yet begun or reached significant levels," (IMF 2012: app.1, table 2) or has proven reserves less than 10 billion barrels of oil or 3 trillion cubic meters of gas (BP 2014), or if it possesses proven reserves of rare earth elements (United Nations Statistics Division 2015). A state is operationally defined as *not resource-rich* if it fails to meet the criteria for the above two categories.

To rely solely upon the IMF definitions (2007; 2012) of a resource rich state creates a bias towards small, resource-driven economies and would exclude large, more economically diverse economies. Thus, the classification criteria considers

states with large absolute resource reserves to be resource-rich, even if resource exports represent a smaller share of the state's economy (e.g. the USA with large absolute exports of natural gas). A potentially resource-rich has reserves of natural resources, but they are neither large in absolute terms nor are they the primary economic drivers. Such potentially-rich states also represent a different type of partner for China. In states with relatively underdeveloped extractive capacity, China may be behaving as a savvy investor or talent scout, identifying untapped sources of future value in order to maximize its rate of return. A rich-poor dichotomous classification would be unable to capture this type of partner state or China's *moneyball* behaviour.

The resources selected upon are suggested by the literature as being particularly salient to China for continued economic growth (Ferdinand 2012: 88), and by extension, regime stability (Zheng⁷ quoted in Will 2011). Relying upon dyadic resource trade data potentially raises validity concern, as the data are self-reported (United Nations Statistics Division 2015). However, this should not fundamentally affect the analysis as it examines underlying trends which affords a degree of tolerance for imprecision.

Findings

Initial observations reveal that of 140 cases of stadium diplomacy since 1958, 51 (36% of the total) have been directed towards resource-rich states (Type 2, 5, 8); 23 (16%) have been directed towards potentially resource-rich states (Type 3, 6, 9); and 63 (45%) have been directed towards not resource-rich states (Type 4, 7, 10). This distribution pattern is unexpected, given the preponderance of literature support

⁷ Zheng Yongnian is the Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.

for a resource-pursuing Chinese foreign policy appears in question with 45% of cases occurring in states classified as not resource-rich.

The pursuit of natural resources is often employed to explain China's international economic relations, particularly with other developing states (see: Naim 2009; *The Economist* 2008a & 2008b; *New African* 2008; Hawksley 2010, etc). Such hypotheses rest on the claim that China's domestic political stability is dependent upon maintaining the economic growth that lifted over *500 million* Chinese out of poverty since Deng's Market reforms (Ravallion 2009; Zheng quoted in Will 2011). The raw materials needed to fuel this development though, increasingly lie beyond China's borders, necessitating China import its "industrially vital" natural resources (Ferdinand 2012: 88) and pushing China towards new, non-traditional suppliers with higher risks but potentially higher rates of return (Brautigam 2009: 56).

Barranguet (2010), Ross (2014), and Alm (2012: Chapter 8) adopt this 'stadiums-for-resources' explanation in their analyses. Unfortunately, their distinctions between resource rich and poor states are implicit, lacking definitional – and subsequently analytical – clarity. Such ad hoc classification methodologies result in an assumption of identical resource-richness across the entire domain under investigation, which is not the case, But between them, Barranguet (2010), Ross (2014), and Alm (2012: Chapter 8) appear to credibly explain the majority of cases within Africa where most cases are located.

Resource acquisition, then, appears to be a determinant of China's use of soft power, at least in Africa, but the lack of empirical research delineating a mechanism or process by which soft power might be applied to secure tangible economic gains is concerning, and it speaks to deeper problems in the research programme. The typology developed in this research allows us to make claims about the determinants

of China's stadium diplomacy that are supported by data. 52.8% of Chinese soft power was directed towards states that are resource-rich or potentially resource-rich (Type 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9). One interpretation of this finding is that the predictions of previous investigations are correct about half of the time. On the other hand, those predictions fail about half the time with nearly half the beyond the explanatory domain of this theoretical perspective, including geographic pockets where there is little or no economic rationale for Chinese investment (Sheringham 2007; Chen 2012). Whether the proposed multi-determinant theory can account for the apparent lack of direction within the dimension of resource-richness will be an important test of its empirical accuracy.

Both the resource-richness of China's partners and the durability of diplomatic recognition individually offer partial explanatory power over China's stadium diplomacy; and when considered together the determinants seem to explain a preponderance of the observations. The proposed multi-determinant theory of stadium diplomacy, then, appears credible, although questions remain. Of greatest theoretical interest is what will be the direction of resource-richness as a determinant. In the following discussion, the two determinants will be combined to empirically assess the nature of stadium diplomacy and test the power of the proposed theoretical explanation. Such progressive inquiry is in keeping with Li's (2009: 4, 7) positivist prescription for a more empirically rigorous investigation of various forms of soft power to develop new theory with explanatory power, capable of guiding future empirical research.

Analysis and Discussion

The discussion will address three main tasks: theory appraisal to determine whether the proposed multi-determinant theory is empirically accurate and theoretically useful, assessing the nature and effectiveness of stadium diplomacy, and identifying potential implications for international relations research programmes.

Accuracy and Utility of the Multi-Determinant Theory of China's Stadium Diplomacy

Theory appraisal is a crucial component of progressive research (see: Vasquez 1998: chapter 10). If the multi determinant theory proposed here to explain stadium diplomacy is not accurate or useful, it ought to be discarded (Vasquez 1998: 230). The multi-determinant theory of stadium diplomacy identifies two sets of policy aims and their associated theoretical dimensions, with each holding partial explanatory power over the observational data. The resulting typology combines the two determinants and applies them to all cases to create ten theoretical groups with Types 2-10 in the explanatory domain of the theory.

To determine whether the multi-determinant theory offers empirically accurate descriptions of observations about the world – the first criteria of “good theory” (Vasquez 1998: 230) – the resulting typology is tested in Figure 2 using a two-tailed Pearson's Chi-squared analysis (valid $n = 137$). Figure 2 summarizes the typological data from Table 2 and tests it against a null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two hypothesized determinants of stadium diplomacy and the observed distribution of China's soft power. A rejection of the null hypothesis allows for the confident claim that a relationship between the proposed determinants *does* exist; and a multi-determinant theory provides empirical accuracy with explanatory power.

Figure 2 displays the nine typological groups within the explanatory domain of the multi-determinant theory. Observed values are listed first, with expected values below in parentheses. Typological groups whose observed value exceeds the expected value are bolded.

FIGURE 2: Chi-Squared Analysis of Stadium Diplomacy

	Enduring Friends	Stable Friends	New Friends	
Resource Rich	44 (36.11)	2 (4.47)	5 (10.42)	51
Potentially Resource Rich	21 (16.28)	0 (2.01)	2 (4.70)	23
Not Resource Rich	32 (44.61)	10 (5.52)	21 (12.88)	63
	97	12	28	137

$$\chi^2 = 23.1685; P = 0.000117 < 0.001^{***}$$

H₀: There is no relationship between the two dimensions of China's policy goals and the distribution of China's of stadium diplomacy

A two-tailed Pearson chi-squared analysis on the typological distribution yields a χ^2 statistic of 23.1685 at 4 degrees of freedom. The χ^2 statistic exceeds the critical value (18.465) at $\alpha=0.001$, offering an extremely high level of statistical confidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the multi-determinate theory of stadium diplomacy without committing a Type I error.

The proposed theory is empirically accurate and able to account for observed data, meeting the first hurdle of theory appraisal. However, the value in theory lies in its ability to guide future empirical research. The ultimate worth of this analysis as an exercise in theory-building will be its ability to guide further inquiry in stadium diplomacy and provide generalizable avenues for scholarship into *other* forms of soft

power. The third part of the discussion will assess whether this research can create new pathways for progressive, generalizable scholarship, but for now, we turn our attention to whether the multi-determinant theory of stadium diplomacy can lead to new understandings of the nature, its use as a form of soft power, and its effectiveness.

Assessing the Nature of Stadium Diplomacy

Previous attempts to assess stadium diplomacy have fallen short, because they have been purely descriptive exercises, failing to place the phenomenon under investigation into the context of existing international relations scholarship. This section of the analysis will employ the multi-determinant theory of stadium diplomacy to assess how soft power is employed in the states most likely to benefit from it (Types 2 and 10), whether it is effective at achieving its policy goals, and what makes it so effective. One of the major contributions of the typology has been to specify the qualitative differences between the recipients of stadium diplomacy and to show that patterns exist in its use, with some groups of states more likely to benefit than others. States considered enduring friends and resource rich (Type 2) and those considered new friends and not-resource rich (Type 10) are disproportionately the beneficiaries of this form of soft power. Combining two separate theoretical dimensions and their associated determinants into the typology permits the identification of distributive patterns between typological groups. However, in order to assess the nature of stadium diplomacy and its effectiveness in a specific domain, it then becomes necessary to disentangle the determinants and interpret their relative importance.

Qualitative evidence suggests that within Type 2 states such as Angola (Guest 2009), Gabon (Dunmore 2011), and Equatorial Guinea (Ross 2014), the primary policy outcome China seeks is resource acquisition, though that is not to say that each state's enduring friendship with China has is not important. In fact, Brautigam (2009: 154-157, 161) notes the duration of bilateral economic cooperation with China positively correlates with the scope and scale of Chinese infrastructure investment; but the body of qualitative evidence suggests the *primary* determinant of Chinese stadium diplomacy in Type 2 states is the acquisition of natural resources.

A similar task to disentangle and interpret the relative importance of multiple determinants within Type 10 states remains. The task is made easier, though, because it would be logically incongruous for resource-acquisition to be a determinant of Chinese soft power in resource-poor states (Type 10). Again, there is a body of qualitative evidence suggesting China employs stadium diplomacy to secure diplomatic recognition in the Bahamas (Archibold 2012), Antigua and St. Kitts (Ellis 2012: 11) Costa Rica (Alexander 2014: 74), the Cook Islands (Alm 2012: 86), and other small states where China has “no other reason ... to go horsing around” (John Tkacik quoted in Sheringham 2007).

The multi-determinant theory links the typological groups of states most likely to benefit salient issues for China to suggest that China employs stadium diplomacy to pursue a variety of policy outcomes across multiple contexts. It could is a foreign policy tool that China can employ in multiple situations, but it appears to be used most often to secure resources from its enduring friends (Type 2) and diplomatic recognition from its resource-poor new friends (Type 10).

Assessing the Effectiveness of Stadium Diplomacy

China's use of stadium diplomacy to pursue specific policy outcomes is of particular theoretical interest, as this research represents one of the few fully operationalized examples of such behaviour. The questions that must be asked are *whether stadium diplomacy effective at achieving policy outcomes, and how we would know?* These are fundamentally definitional issues. Specifically, any assessment of soft power's effectiveness must define the intended outcome and the criteria for policy success or failure.

In China's use of stadium diplomacy to acquire natural resources, the criterion for policy success is the use of stadium diplomacy leading to higher exports of natural resources to China. It is beyond the scope of this preliminary investigation to assert direct causal relationships between stadium diplomacy and any specific policy outcome; although Barranguet (2010), Guest (2011), and Ross (2014) have each asserted such a transactional relationship exists between China and its resource-rich partners. The data collected here is not sufficiently to isolate the effect stadium diplomacy played in any subsequent resource acquisition⁸, but the typology suggests that a relationship *does* exist between China's soft power and its natural resource-exporting beneficiaries. However, delineating the exact relationship between stadium diplomacy and the importation of natural resources will fall to others.⁹

Assessing the effectiveness of stadium diplomacy at securing diplomatic recognition also presents difficulty, though the expected causal sequence is reversed

⁸ Isolating the effect of stadium diplomacy poses a challenge as China often secures natural resources as part of a larger economic package that includes multiple forms of investment, secured through infrastructure-backed loans. For a full account of how China's economic engagement and its resource-backed loans work in practice, see: (Brautigam 2009: Chapter 5).

⁹ A time-lagged regression analysis (or similar) of stadium diplomacy and natural resource imports to China could begin to measure the effectiveness of stadium diplomacy at securing natural resources.

from that in resource-acquisition. Existing diplomatic recognition is the sole precondition for Chinese economic engagement (McElroy and Bai 2008: 239), meaning a stadium would only be constructed in a state that *already* recognizes China. This is made apparent by the inventory, with no project directed towards a recipient that did not contemporaneously recognize China. What *can* be assessed, however, is whether stadium diplomacy effectively deters recipient states defecting from China to Taiwan. Recall that 3 cases were classified as Type 1, located in states that are current allies of Taiwan, though all recognized China when they received a Chinese stadium. These three cases – Burkina Faso, St. Lucia, and Kiribati – (2.4% of all observations) can be seen as examples of stadium diplomacy *failing* to secure the diplomatic recognition China seeks. Even without claiming causality, it should be considered impressive that stadium diplomacy, in 97.6% of cases, is associated with the successful deterrence of diplomatic defection to Taiwan.

There also exists a fourth potential measure of success: stadium diplomacy's capacity to change opinions and preferences, to make other states want what China wants (Nye 2002: 8-11). This is a normative form of power not easily measured, but there is compelling qualitative evidence that the effort China expends on stadium diplomacy *is* influencing other states' policy preferences, especially when it comes to supporting China's attempts to isolate Taiwan.

The opening ceremony of Micronesia's China Friendship Sport Centre (case 36 in Tables 1 & 2) neatly illustrates the extra-ordinary emphasis China places on its soft power push and the effect Chinese soft power has in the recipient state. When Micronesia's President officially received the latest "concrete, tangible... symbol of mutual friendship" (FSMgov.org 2002), he was joined on stage by China's Ambassador, Xu Jun. Remarkably, Ambassador Xu is also the Dean of China's

Diplomatic Corps! That China sent one of its elite level diplomats to open a gymnasium on an island in the middle of the Pacific barely 10 kilometres across says something about China's priorities.

It is in the context of China's rivalry with Taiwan, however, that stadium diplomacy's attractive capability to shape opinion and policy is most striking – and explicit. Senegal's President Wade rejected Taiwan in favour of China in 2005 (Wade 2008, Xinhua 2007), and China renovated eleven regional stadiums to thank him for his trouble (Xinhua 2012) (Cases 85, 86, 109, 112-116, 120, 121, 128 in Tables 1 & 2). Dominica's 2004 Memorandum of Diplomatic Recognition, ending 21 years of Dominican-Taiwanese relations, even included the construction of Windsor Park Cricket Stadium (case 15 in Tables 1 & 2) as one of the four "pillars" of the agreement (Douglas 2010)! Within six years Prime Minister Skerrit was fully backing China, making it clear that:

"Support for the One-China policy was far-sighted, progressive, and definitely in the interest of all the Dominican people. I am happy therefore to reaffirm our commitment to the One-China policy and to further confirm our intention to work at strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperation" (quoted in Douglas 2010).

Perhaps the most illustrative example of stadium diplomacy's attractive power is the case of Grenada. In 2004, three years before Grenada was due to host the Cricket World Cup, Hurricanes Ivan and Emily destroyed the national cricket stadium, jeopardizing its ability to host; but China came to the rescue, built a new cricket ground, and the World Cup went ahead in a brand new stadium. The handover of Queen's Park (case 62 in Tables 1 & 2) was attended by China's Vice President; and the Prime Minister of Grenada recounted how in exchange for rejecting Taiwan in

2005, China offered a financial assistance package that included the emergency stadium renovations (Grenada Today 2007). Because of its new friendship with China, Grenada kept the World Cup, and China secured a very public defector from China. Cue, handshakes and smiles all around! It was at this point the band played the Taiwanese national anthem, making the Chinese Vice President “visibly uncomfortable.” The band director was fired. If possible, the situation descended into even greater farce when in 2012 Taiwan unsuccessfully sued Grenada for breach of contract over previous Taiwanese-funded infrastructure loans (Jamaica Observer 2012). After sticking its finger in Taiwan’s eye a second time, Grenada will host the 2016 CARIFTA Games in the Kirani James Athletics Stadium which opened in 2015 (case 126 in Table 1 & 2). One can only assume the band played the correct anthem the second time around.

In all these cases, Chinese soft power, and stadium diplomacy in particular, appears to have contributed to bringing the recipients’ preferences in line with those of China. And while Hirschman’s (1980: 18, 28, 29, 34, 37) observation that within asymmetrical dyads, the smaller state will come perceive its own interests as converging with the larger state may give readers pause, the preponderance of qualitative evidence and the nature of leaders’ comments suggests that soft power plays a successful role in securing policy goals through persuasion and attraction, especially when employed within the context of China’s rivalry with Taiwan.

Sport & Politics – Not Such Strange Bedfellows: Why Stadiums Appeal

To understand the potential power of stadium diplomacy as soft power is to ask *what makes stadiums so attractive*. There are three sets of answers to that question, dependent upon whose point of view one assumes: the recipient regime, the recipient

population, and the donor state. Stadium diplomacy has several features that make it attractive to all three sets of actors which partially explain its effectiveness.. Some features are perspective-specific, but several are shared. To answer what makes stadiums particularly attractive, we will examine the three actors in turn.

The Recipient Regime

China's attractive power may stem in some cases partly from the fact it is the only major power willing to engage those states with a history of default, which cannot guarantee repayment, or are ostracized by the international community (Brautigam 2009: 56, 280). However, this cannot explain more than a handful of observations. The more compelling argument is stadiums are attractive to regimes, because they are highly visible and capable of transmitting "notions of national glory" (Menon 2010: 687).

A growing body of literature finds states – especially small or developing states (Eisenberg 2006: 56) – consider international tournaments, and the facilities that host them, as prestige builders (Rhamey and Early 2013).¹⁰ For aspirational states, a new world-class stadium can offer a spring board to a more prominent position in world affairs International sport brings with it the prospect of an influx of athletes, fans, and media and allows a leader to demonstrate she is competent and can deliver (Bloomfield 2010: 28) all while wrapping herself in the glory of sporting triumph. Indeed, the visibility, popularity, and mobilizing potential of sports – and full sports stadiums – reinforce the regime (Football and Fascism 2003) enabling

¹⁰ It is worth noting that since the African Football Confederation rescinded the Cup of Nations tournament hosting rights from Kenya and Zambia in 1996 and 1998 due to inadequate infrastructure (Darby 2003: 12), states aspiring to host the event must have modern stadiums. Every subsequent Cup of Nations from 2002 through to 2023, bar two, has included at least one Chinese-built stadium.

leaders to channel intense nationalism – or other forms of identity – to their own purposes (Bloomfield 2010: 36, 38).

The Recipient Population

It is hard to overstate how important it is that stadiums are so highly visible as public diplomacy to *all* members of society. Soft power depends, to a large extent, upon engaging and attracting a broad audience (Melissen 2013), and a modern stadium's high profile can create and focus positive forces of patriotism and national pride. These modern Chinese-built stadiums are extremely visible, tangible symbols to even the most marginal members of society (Pazzanita 1996: 47; Will 2011) that their country is “World-Class” (Danny Jordaan¹¹ quoted in Bloomfield 2010: 279).

It is relatively easy to demonstrate how this might occur. The UK's status as the most soft power-ful state has much to do with the global reach of the English Premier League (McClory 2015: 26); and it would not be too far of a stretch to claim football is the UK's biggest export seeing as Manchester United claims 659 *million* fans around the world (manutd.com 2012). If a poor fan in Dar es Salaam watching Manchester United on television would look outside and see the Mkapa National Stadium (case #87 in Tables 1 & 2), that Tanzanian fan could feel great pride knowing her country's brand new (Chinese-built) national stadium is at the same world-class level as Manchester United's (and at a higher level than many of the stadiums in which her heroes play).¹²

¹¹ Danny Jordaan, Chair of the Local Organizing Committee for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, the first major intercontinental sports tournament to be hosted by an African country.

¹² If the Mkapa National Stadium hosted a premiership team in 2015-2016, it would be the third largest and the newest of any Premiership stadium.

Such an illustration demonstrates how an object can become imbued and transmit national values to serve as a force of attraction for even the most side-lined members of society. Soft power must be able to attract broad cross sections of civil society in order to be effective, and by utilizing national pride and sport, stadium diplomacy appears capable of doing so.

The Donor State: China

The highly visible nature of stadium diplomacy also serves China's purposes. Effective soft power engages and attracts broad portions of the audience, but it can only achieve its goals if the audience knows to whom it is supposed to be attracted. These massive, modern stadiums symbolize to even the most marginal members of society, in a way more traditional forms of soft power do not, that it is China providing assistance (Pazzanita 1996: 47; Will 2011). And just in case there was any doubt, there is often a large plaque by the main gate reminding everyone who walks in to watch a match of China's friendship (Ross 2014). Alexander (2014: 74) notes the visibility of a stadium project extends beyond the recipient state's borders and can influence the "swing states" to initiate a cascade (Erikson and Chen 2007: 80-82) by demonstrating just what friendship with China can bring.

The strongest reason for china to employ stadium diplomacy, though, is also the most straight forward. At risk of stating the obvious, China uses stadium diplomacy, because China can "offer what the global south wants" (Wade 2008), and it can do so comparatively cheaply by bringing to bear its comparative advantages (Polgreen 2009; Lu 2011; Brautigam 2009: 299).

Potential Stumbling Blocks

Stadium diplomacy's attractive capacity as a form of soft power stems from sport's ability to convey many of the same political values with which international relations scholars are familiar: rivalry, identity, conflict, competition. Through stadium diplomacy, both the donor and recipient states increase their political exposure and influence; but ultimately, the reason stadiums are so attractive as soft power is sports matter a lot to a lot of people and can shape public opinion (Jennings 2011:7)

China must be careful to avoid throwing away the gains it has secured through its use of soft power. China's rise has bred suspicion about its motives (see: China threat theory: Mearsheimer 2001 & 2006, Naim 2009). The difficulty China faces is soft power is less effective if China is perceived as threatening (Reveron 2007; Vuving 2009: 8-12). No matter how many stadiums China builds, if it earns a reputation – deserved or not – as an aggressor willing to operate outside the established norms of the international community, the effectiveness of China's soft power could be severely limited. Such a constraint would be self-inflicted, and could impede China's peaceful pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

Implications and Pathways for Future Research

This analysis of China's stadium diplomacy has yielded novel insights into the nature of China's soft power and the contexts within which it is used. Employing positivist methodologies to investigate soft power has led to new theoretical understandings, opening potentially fruitful pathways for future empirical research for the interstate rivalry and soft power research programmes.

Rivalry

The research programme surrounding interstate rivalry is one of the most robust and consequential in international relations scholarship, because it the most devastating patterns of behaviour within the international system with high levels of empirical accuracy. Rivalry scholarship has led to understandings of who fights whom (Bremer 1992; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007), the steps leading to the creation of those rivalrous pairs (Valeriano 2012), and what those rivals fight over (Vasquez 2009). Valeriano (2012) and Vasquez (2009) write of the role power politics practices play in the formation and entrenchment of rivalry, but there has not been a similar investigation into the use of soft power within the context of rivalry or its impact.

This research has identified a form of soft power used within the context of interstate rivalry. China may be unique in employing soft power to gain an advantage over a rival, but knowing what we know about the mind set of rivals that seems unlikely. This research has opened a new series of questions about rivals' behaviour, and future scholarship ought to similarly apply Li's (2009) positivist methodology to investigate the use of power used softly within dyadic rivalry.

Soft Power

The most significant implication of this research for soft power scholarship is the demonstrated generalizable utility of Li's (2009) prescription for a positivist approach to the study of rivalry. Operationalizing a specific form of soft power, the issues at stake, and the intended policy outcome has led to new insights China's soft power.

Adopting similar positivist techniques would offer scholars the tools to greatly advance our empirical and theoretical understandings of the nature of soft power, its use, and its effectiveness.

Conclusions

Has this analysis yielded theoretically significant or generalizable advances for scholarship into stadium diplomacy and soft power? On both counts, it has. This investigation has, for the first time, locates and identifies all cases of stadium diplomacy and creates a typology with which to classify them into ten genotypes based upon the characteristics of the beneficiary states. This research has developed and appraised a theory capable of multiple, domain-specific explanations suggesting China's use of stadium diplomacy is shaped by its ongoing rivalry with Taiwan and its need to secure natural resources. This multi-determinant theory offers explanatory power with empirical accuracy.

All these new data together represent an advance on the previous fragmented, case-specific literature on stadium diplomacy, but these findings also bear on scholarship of China's use of soft power. The determinants identified here as shaping the use of stadium diplomacy may also inform other uses of soft power by China. The typology developed here offers pathways for future empirical research by allowing scholars to delineate the boundaries of the domain under investigation and to guide the selection of theoretically meaningful cases for comparative study.

The most significant contributions of this research, however, lies in its incorporation of soft power as a tool of rivalry, and its use of generalizable positivist methodology for the investigation of soft power. This analysis has demonstrated positivist approaches to the study of soft power are available to scholars and yield to

significant findings. Positivist methodologies of defining and measuring the phenomenon under investigation with criteria for evaluating success or failure can be used in concert with existing normative scholarship to advance our knowledge of soft power, its nature, and its use.

China's continued rise as a global superpower will see its increasingly frequent and sophisticated use of soft power. This research has created new empirical knowledge of the nature of stadium diplomacy and China's use of soft power, and it has shown pathways for further empirical inquiry into the use and nature of other forms of soft power. For scholarship to remain relevant, social scientists must be equipped to engage with a world in which soft power is playing an increasingly important role.

Appendix 1: Coding Decision Matrix

Country	Durability of Diplomatic Recognition				Resource Richness			Type Determination
	enduring	stable	new	not friend	rich	potentially rich	not rich	
Afghanistan	1					1		3
Albania	1				1			2
Algeria	1				1			2
Andorra	1						1	4
Angola	1				1			2
Antigua & Barbuda		1					1	7
Argentina	1						1	4
Armenia			1				1	10
Australia	1				1			2
Austria	1						1	4
Azerbaijan			1		1			8
Bahamas			1				1	10
Bahrain	1				1			2
Bangladesh	1						1	4
Barbados		1					1	7
Belarus			1				1	10
Belgium	1						1	4
Belize				1			1	1
Benin	1						1	4
Bhutan				1			1	1
Bolivia	1				1			2
Bosnia			1				1	10
Botswana	1				1			2
Brazil	1						1	4
Brunei		1			1			5
Bulgaria	1						1	4
Burkina Faso				1			1	1
Burundi	1						1	4
Cambodia	1						1	4
Cameroon	1				1			2
Canada	1				1			2
Cape Verde	1						1	4
CAR			1			1		9
Chad			1		1			8
Chile	1				1			2
Colombia	1				1			2
Comoros	1						1	4
Congo	1				1			2
Cook Islands			1				1	10
Costa Rica			1				1	10
Croatia			1				1	10
Cuba	1						1	4
Cyprus	1						1	4
Czech R.	1						1	4
Denmark	1					1		3
Djibouti		1					1	7
Dominica			1				1	10
Dominican Republic				1			1	1
DRC		1			1			5
East Timor			1		1			8
Ecuador	1				1			2
Equatorial Guinea	1				1			2

Ecuador	1			1		2
Equatorial Guinea	1			1		2
Egypt	1				1	4
El Salvador			1		1	1
Eritrea		1			1	10
Estonia		1			1	10
Ethiopia	1				1	4
Fiji	1				1	4
Finland	1				1	4
France	1				1	4
Gabon	1			1		3
Gambia		1			1	10
Georgia		1			1	10
Germany	1				1	4
Ghana	1				1	3
Greece	1				1	4
Grenada		1			1	10
Guatemala			1		1	1
Guinea	1			1		2
Guinea-Bissau		1			1	10
Guyana	1			1		3
Haiti			1		1	1
Honduras			1		1	1
Hungary	1				1	4
Ivory Coast		1		1		5
Iceland	1				1	4
India	1			1		2
Indonesia	1			1		2
Iran	1			1		2
Iraq	1			1		2
Ireland		1			1	7
Israel	1				1	4
Italy	1				1	4
Jamaica	1				1	4
Japan	1			1		2
Jordan		1		1		5
Kazakhstan		1		1		8
Kenya	1				1	4
Kiribati			1		1	1
Kuwait	1			1		2
Kyrgyzstan		1			1	9
Leos	1			1		2
Latvia		1			1	10
Lebanon	1				1	4
Lesotho		1			1	10
Liberia		1		1		8
Libya		1		1		5
Liechtenstein	1				1	4
Lithuania		1			1	10
Luxembourg	1				1	4
Macedonia		1			1	10
Madagascar	1				1	3
Malawi		1			1	9
Malaysia	1				1	4
Maldives	1				1	4

Mali	1			1		2
Malta	1				1	4
Marshall Islands			1		1	1
Mauritania	1			1		2
Mauritius	1				1	4
Mexico	1			1		2
Federated States of Micronesia		1			1	7
Moldova			1		1	10
Monaco	1				1	4
Mongolia	1			1		2
Morocco	1				1	4
Mozambique	1				1	3
Myanmar	1				1	4
Namibia			1		1	9
Nauru			1		1	1
Nepal	1				1	4
Netherlands	1				1	4
New Zealand	1				1	4
Nicaragua			1		1	1
Niger			1	1		8
Nigeria	1			1		2
North Korea	1			1		2
Norway	1			1		2
Oman	1			1		2
Pakistan	1				1	4
Palau			1		1	1
Panama			1		1	1
Papua New Guinea	1			1		2
Paraguay			1		1	1
Peru	1			1		2
Philippines	1				1	4
Poland	1				1	4
Portugal	1				1	4
Qatar	1			1		2
Romania	1				1	4
Russia			1	1		8
Rwanda	1				1	4
Samoa	1				1	4
San Marino	1				1	4
Saudi Arabia			1	1		8
Senegal			1		1	10
Seychelles	1				1	4
Sierra Leone	1				1	3
Singapore			1		1	10
Slovakia			1		1	10
Slovenia			1		1	10
Solomon Islands			1		1	1
Somalia	1				1	3
South Africa			1		1	10
South Sudan			1	1		8
South Korea			1		1	10
Spain	1				1	4

Sri Lanka	1					1	4
St. Kitts and Nevis			1			1	1
St. Lucia			1			1	1
St. Vincent			1			1	1
Sao Tome & Principe			1		1		1
Sudan	1			1			2
Suriname	1			1			2
Swaziland			1			1	1
Sweden	1					1	4
Switzerland	1					1	4
Syria	1			1			2
Tajikistan			1			1	10
Tanzania	1				1		3
Thailand	1					1	4
Togo	1				1		3
Tonga			1			1	10
Trinidad	1			1			2
Tunisia	1					1	4
Turkey	1					1	4
Turkmenistan			1		1		8
Tuvalu			1			1	1
UAE		1			1		5
Uganda	1					1	3
UK	1					1	4
Ukraine			1			1	10
Uruguay		1				1	7
USA		1			1		5
Uzbekistan			1		1		8
Vanuatu		1				1	7
Venezuela	1				1		2
Vietnam	1				1		2
Yemen	1				1		3
Zambia	1				1		2
Zimbabwe		1				1	7

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