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**Radicalization in Canada: Understanding and Conceptualizing the Motivations
behind the October 2014 Attacks**

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Abstract	5
Introduction	6
The Problem	6
Terminology	7
Dissertation Objective	8
Outline of Dissertation	8
Chapter One: The (R)evolution of Terrorism.....	10
Introduction	10
Old Terrorism	10
New Terrorism	11
Homegrown Terror: The New Strategy	13
Implications of Homegrown Terror.....	14
New Terror and Canada	15
Canadian Counter-Terror Efforts	16
The (R)evolution Summarized	18
Chapter Two: Literature Review of Motivational Explanations	19
Introduction	19
Individual Level.....	19
Individual Pre-Conditions.....	20
External Stimuli	22
The Domestic Level.....	26
Domestic Triggers	27
The International Level.....	29
International Triggers	30
Conclusion.....	32
Chapter Three: Methodology	33
Introduction	33
Discourse Analysis	33
Political Discourse Analysis.....	34
Political Techniques	34
Case Studies as a Research Strategy	36
Conclusion.....	37
Chapter Four: The St-Jean-sur-Richelieu Attack.....	38
Introduction	38
The Incident	38
Contextual Variables	39
Individual Level	39
Potential Domestic Level Triggers	39
Potential International Level Triggers	40
Speeches under Examination.....	41
Canadian Government Conceptualization.....	42

Coercion	42
Legitimization and Delegitimization	42
Representation and Misrepresentation	43
Couture-Rouleau's Conceptualization	45
Discussion	45
Applying the Multilevel Variable	46
Policy Implications	47
Chapter Five: Parliament Hill Shooting.....	49
Introduction	49
The Incident	49
Individual Pre-Conditions	50
Individual Level	50
Potential Domestic Trigger	51
Potential International Trigger	52
Speeches under Examination.....	52
Stephen Harper Conceptualization.....	52
Coercion	53
Legitimization and Delegitimization	54
Representation and Misrepresentation	54
Zehaf-Bibeau Conceptualization	55
Coercion	56
Legitimization and Delegitimization	56
Representation and Misrepresentation	58
Discussion	59
Applying the Multilevel Variable	59
Policy Implications	60
Chapter Six: Conclusion	63
Findings.....	63
Metaphorical Analysis	64
Recommendations	65
Reference List.....	66

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Abstract

In October 2014, Canada witnessed two separate homegrown attacks in the span of two days, which left questions on why these Canadian citizens became violently radicalized. The purpose of this analysis is to determine what motivated the two homegrown attacks and to investigate if the political discourse surrounding the events understands the causes to address its grievances. By employing discourse analysis and contextual variables to case studies, this study found that political officials were oversimplifying the motivations behind the attacks. They excluded the variables at the individual level. From the data examined, this analysis recommends that greater emphasis be put into managing radicalized individuals through prevention programs as terrorism becomes increasingly more sophisticated.

Introduction

In late October 2014, Canadians were left in a state of shock and dismay when two Canadian citizens, in two separate incidents, orchestrated terror attacks on Canadian soil. On the surface, the perpetrators, Martin Couture-Rouleau and Michael Zehaf-Bibeau lived seemingly uneventful lives, growing up in Canadian suburbs, attending Canadian schools, and working conventional jobs. Yet, the pair resorted to violence, without warning and seemingly without logical reason (Bruemmer, 2014a). In the aftermath of the attacks, political officials tried to make sense of the incomprehensible situation, as these incidents dismantled a long held national narrative that Canada was impenetrable from terrorism because of its geographic remoteness, economic prosperity, and established policy of multiculturalism (Sageman, 2008: 269). The October 2014 attacks demonstrated that while national security has been focused on keeping Canadians safe from external threats, the real threat was coming from within. Defense Minister Jason Kenney declared “today, homegrown terrorism is not a remote concept but sadly a Canadian reality” (Kennedy, 2015).

The Problem

A remaining question to be addressed is what triggered two Canadian citizens into becoming radicalized to act violently against their own country. Mark Sedgwick characterized the process as “what goes on before the bomb goes off?” (2010: 479). Yet, while a seemingly simple question, little is agreed upon about what causes violent radicalization, as there are numerous theories on the subject, each highlighting a different variable. Although, one consensus is that pitting violent radicalization solely as the result

of extreme religious views or ideologies is overly simplistic and does not make for effective counter-terrorism policy. The reasons that contribute to an individual becoming violently radicalized and engaging in terrorism are difficult, as the motives may stem from anything from psychological issues, social reasons, or political grievances (Knefel, 2013). Given this complexity, the motivations behind violent action are often murky, which has left political officials scrambling to compose a suitable response (Borum, 2011: 9).

Terminology

Radicalization, as defined by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is an individual process where the beliefs that one holds evolve from moderate to extreme (2011). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) outlines the beliefs as those that “exist on the fringes of society and are increasingly unacceptable” (CSIS, 2012: 33, cited in Monaghan, 2014: 488). The RCMP emphasizes that holding radical views is not a problem, only becoming an area of concern when the national security of the state is threatened by those views. Important to this definition is that radicalization has no defined characteristic because extremist beliefs can permeate any individual regardless of sex, race, class, religion, or ideology (RCMP, 2011). The ultimate end point of the radicalization process is conducting a terror attack. An act of terrorism, as defined under the Criminal Code of Canada, is

“Committed (A) in whole or in part for a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective, or cause, and (B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government, or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada” (Government of Canada Justice Laws, 2015).

As these concepts have been clearly defined, it is easier to move forward to examine the process behind an individual's descent into violent radicalization.

Dissertation Objective

The objective of this dissertation will be to uncover the motivations surrounding the October 2014 terror attacks. Two research questions will be addressed. First, as discussed above, what factors motivated the individuals to act violently? Also, did Canadian political rhetoric in the aftermath of the attacks correctly conceptualize the attacks, taking into account the perpetrators' reasoning as well as the contextual variables? While the study of terrorism and radicalization is not a new topic of study, there is little research on the October 2014 cases because they occurred so recently. Furthermore, Canada has very little experience with violent radicalization as the RCMP have assessed that it is a relatively new phenomenon to Western industrialized countries, particularly Canada, due to its lack of experience with homegrown Islamist based terrorism, that requires further study to identify at-risk individuals (1999: 4-5). Thus, it is necessary to investigate the motives behind the October 2014 cases to address this problem and potentially aid in the formulation of counter-terror efforts.

Outline of Dissertation

In order to answer the research questions posed, this dissertation is outlined in the following manner. Chapter one will examine how terrorism has evolved into an individual affair that has made it increasingly difficult to formulate effective counter-terrorism policy. Chapter two will examine the literature surrounding the motivations

behind radicalization, categorizing the competing and complementary theories into three levels of analysis to compose a multilevel variable. Chapter three will provide a brief overview of the methodology utilized, in order to understand the degree to which each level of analysis was applied by the political rhetoric to the 2014 cases. Chapter four will investigate the October 20th Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu attack and chapter five will examine the Parliament shooting that occurred two days later. Finally, chapter six will determine if Canadian public officials are correctly identifying, the motivations behind the incidents in order to effectively compose counter-terror policy that addresses its causes. The tensions that have emerged amongst Canadian citizens are concerning, as political and law enforcement officials struggle to identify the variables that threaten to fracture the foundations of a relatively peaceful society.

Chapter One: The (R)evolution of Terrorism

Introduction

Since the attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, when al-Qaeda members outmaneuvered Western intelligence agencies, Canada and its allies have taken an aggressive approach to destroying terrorist organizations and their operational centers around the globe (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 14). However, terror organizations have also adapted to these counter-terror efforts, transforming their strategies as time has progressed, which has made it increasingly difficult for state officials to formulate effective and relevant policy (Tucker, 2001: 1). Modern day terrorism has permeated borders around the world, attracting a diverse number of followers to its extremist causes, forcing Western states to spend an increasing amount of time detecting and attempting to prevent domestic terror threats (Crenshaw, 2007: 18). To understand why terrorism has gone from a highly disciplined profession to a global effort to recruit as many followers as possible, it is important to look at its evolution from old terror into new terror.

Old Terrorism

Traditional terrorism was defined by its hierarchical structure localized in one physical area (Gofas, 2012: 18-21). Old terror was organized by a chain of command that structured those who determined the goals and strategies at the top. Supporters who conducted the attacks or contributed weaponry and intelligence were placed in the middle and general enthusiasts of the cause at the bottom (Spencer, 2006: 8). Secular interests guided the goals of these organizations, as the state sponsored them to informally meet

foreign policy goals by supplying the groups financially and militarily as a means to an end (Hoffman, 2006: 258-261). The nature of the attacks centered around being organized as theatrical performances to maximize publicity amongst political figures, the media, and the general public to garner the most support for the cause (Jenkins, 1974: 4). The targets selected tended to be high-level political officials and civilians were largely avoided (Hoffman, 2006: 230-231). Once the terror attack happened, the group would admit it was responsible for the violence to open up dialogue for a negotiated solution for their grievance (Jenkins, 1974: 1-6). Counter-terror efforts during this era focused on finding and destroying the centers of command for these organizations (Hoffman, 2006: 260-261). Violence was used rationally, as far as the use of force goes, as the interactions with the state by these organizations had an end point (Laqueur, 1996).

New Terrorism

However, the nature of attacks changed because counter-terrorism efforts adapted to these efforts. This made the planning and carrying out multifaceted attacks difficult, forcing groups to modify their structure, tactics, and goals in order to maintain relevancy and continue to be effective (Bates, 2012: 4). The foundations of new terrorism took root in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack. The tactics utilized by these three events were more lethal than previously encountered because civilians became the target (Crenshaw, 2007: 3-4). The succession of mass civilian casualties in various places including New York City in 2001, Bali in 2002, Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005 affirmed the belief that a new era of terrorism had begun (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 14). As a result of this new non-militant focus, academia had to construct a

new framework to describe the new characteristics of terror as older models became obsolete (Gofas, 2012: 18). Essentially, the old game became revolutionized by new rules (Laqueur, 1996).

New terror organizations widened out, rejecting the hierarchical layout, and adopted a transnational approach that encompassed amorphous goals to garner a diverse number of followers (Crenshaw, 2007: 25). Instead of political goals that were dictated by the state, objectives of new terror became limitless in nature (Crenshaw, 2007: 8). The new rules of terrorism called for a more expansive and fanatical strategy that rejected the global status quo completely (Gofas, 2012: 21-23). Examples of this include al-Qaeda's apocalyptic goal of destroying the West and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant's (ISIL) plan of a global Islamic state, promising its followers a place in paradise if they help the mission (Wood, 2015). These unlimited motivations make defeat impossible, since states cannot destroy transnational terror that has irrational demands.

International terror networks have also lowered the barrier to entry, allowing anyone the opportunity to become a terrorist because of an information revolution that made communication and indoctrination from different locations easier and less costly (Tucker, 2001: 1-2). The Internet serves as a driver because it has made it easier to discuss and form relationships with other extremist individuals and to garner information about possible targets (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 8-9). Marc Sageman models new terror as global social movements because today's terror is largely leaderless as most leaders have been killed or are in hiding (2008: 31-33). This has made it increasingly hard for states to identify who is a terrorist, as anyone now has access to extremist information on the Internet while not necessarily being an official member of the organization. It has become

a war of ideas, as states work to formulate policy that steer individuals away from adopting extremist views (Sageman, 2008: 31-33).

Given this amateur component, the norms that regulated the type of violence in the past are non-existent (Hoffman, 2006: 197-198). Actors have more independence to determine the type of force and who to target, as they are unrestrained by the chain of command under the old terror model (Gearson, 2002: 15-20). Due to this, tactics have become increasingly destructive and targets even less selective, as the recent increase of suicide bombings in public places has demonstrated (Crenshaw, 2007: 4). These actors use violence against the state and its civilians as a way to express themselves, rather than to employ it as a strategy (Gofas, 2012: 21). Modern day terrorists do not want a place at the negotiation table as a legitimate actor, which makes the formulation of a preventative state strategy against terrorism near impossible (Crenshaw, 2007: 10).

Homegrown Terror: The New Strategy

The transnational nature of new terror has led to an increase in homegrown terror in Western states as individuals, who hold radical views, are becoming motivated to commit terrorist acts in the state that they reside in or are citizens of (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 5). These individuals are likely to plan and conduct an attack independently, without organizational aid or support, as they may never come into contact with any members of the terrorist organization (McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son, 2013). Rather, these individuals become sympathetic to extremist causes that the terror movement promotes and are motivated to undertake violent means, this serves as a way to become part of the movement or to have an outlet for any other grievances against the

state that they may have (Marks, 2003). An example of the international reach of these extremist causes occurred in September 2014, when the spokesperson for ISIL, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, in an Internet video, called for its followers to kill “disbelievers” of the cause in Canada, Australia, and France by any means necessary (Davidson, 2014). Termed lone wolves, these violently radicalized individuals are the result of the new design of terrorism. It has become easier for these terror movements to promote attacks from within because counter-terror efforts have made it difficult to enter Western countries to conduct large-scale attacks (Siegel, 2014).

Implications of Homegrown Terror

Homegrown terror has become an issue of concern for policymakers for a number of reasons (Marks, 2003). The first reason is that these radicalized individuals are harder to detect because they are less likely to work in a large group and share their violent plans with anyone (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010: 5). Law enforcement agencies are left with little to no information about an imminent attack, as there are fewer clues to work with (Marks, 2003). It is easier for states to detect organized terror groups because the chances are greater that a member may try and back out of the plot, allowing for a confession or at least an informant to be placed inside. In addition, the spectrum of extremist beliefs makes it impossible to predict who may actually act violently towards the state (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010: 3-5). Not all individuals who hold grievances against the state may act forcefully, as expressing discontent or holding radical views is not illegal (RCMP, 2011). Lastly, these individuals tend to live rather unexceptional lives as citizens or residents of the host country (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010: 3-5). These individuals,

growing up in the country of attack, are already well integrated into the norms and culture, making it harder for states to detect their plots (McCoy and Knight, 2015: 269). Given these factors, it has become a complicated affair to develop a counter-terrorism strategy to compose a profile of which individuals pose a risk to national security.

New Terror and Canada

Canada has not been immune to new terror's expansive agenda as there have been incidents of homegrown terror plots that have forced government officials to open up a discussion about the national security strategy. This homegrown concern was evident in the 2011 declassified CSIS report, "A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today," which found that from twenty-four sampled identified radicals residing in Canada, who had been charged for terrorism related plots, seventy-five percent were Canadian citizens (CSIS, 2011: 14). In 2013, Richard Fadden, the former head of CSIS, testified to Parliament expressing concern about the fragmentation of al-Qaeda, stating that it "has morphed into something that is harder to get your hands on" as its extremist message has permeated Canadian soil (Freeze, 2013). He testified that CSIS's domestic operations now included "following a number of cases where we think people might be inclined to acts of terrorism" (Freeze, 2013). Thus, by 2014, the Department of Public Safety, labeled the threat posed by domestic terror as the top priority for intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in addition to international terror groups. Canadian security agencies are admitting that they face a daunting challenge as terrorism becomes increasingly multi-faceted (Blaney, 2014: 1-10).

The most prolific example of homegrown terror occurred in 2006, when Canadian law enforcement agencies uncovered a plot in Southern Ontario. A group of Canadians planned to bomb the Parliament Building in Ottawa and the Toronto Stock Exchange, take over the Canadian Broadcasting Center, and behead the Prime Minister (McCoy and Knight, 2015: 262 - 264). The suspects had all grown up in suburbs surrounding Toronto and attended local universities, before becoming sympathetic to al-Qaeda's ideology by listening to cleric Anwar al-Awlaki's lectures (Davison and Thompson, 2014). When asked why they felt the need to act so aggressively, one of the members of the group, Saad Khalid, wrote that he became radicalized because, "it was Canadian foreign policy, specifically in Afghanistan" (Davison and Thompson, 2014). The Toronto group chose Canada as their target, rather than going to fight in the Middle East because, as Khalid put it, "my rationale was that if I were to go to Afghanistan to fight, I would be just one more person, while in Canada I could make a bigger difference. I would be more useful to the 'cause' that way" (Davison and Thompson, 2014). The 2006 terrorism plot became a very public reminder that Canadians now faced a terror threat on multiple fronts.

Canadian Counter-Terror Efforts

Since 9/11, Canada has become more active in its efforts to monitor these domestic terror plots. Canadian political figures have increased use of mass surveillance, in order to appear tough on terror. The Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, which was in effect until 2007, allowed RCMP and CSIS to hold secret trials and anticipatory detentions of individuals for up to 72 hours, as well as offering new methods of surveillance by expanding which crimes could be monitored (Department of Justice,

2015; MacLeod, 2015). Prior to this law, Canada had no anti-terror legislation and Canadian officials quickly implemented new laws to keep up with their international allies (MacLeod, 2015). In 2013, the Combating Terrorism Act brought back pre-emptive hearings and arrests as well as prohibiting individuals from leaving Canada to commit terrorism abroad (Government of Canada Justice Laws; Berthiaume, 2013). Given these new measures to increase the homeland security of the state, it is still an enormous task for state officials to monitor and prevent the threat posed by terrorism, especially when it is homegrown and conducted by individuals or small groups, rather than organizations (The National Post, 2013).

Just as Canada has taken steps domestically, it has also expanded its counter-terror efforts abroad through its efforts in the Middle East with its allies. In Afghanistan, Canada worked along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to defeat the Taliban regime and to rebuild Afghanistan (CBC News, 2011). During the 2003 Iraq war, Canada provided informal backing to the “coalition of the willing” by allowing U.S. naval ships to refuel in Newfoundland and having Canadian pilots participate in “training” missions with U.S. forces (Engler, 2013). Most recently, Canada aided its allies in the current conflict with ISIL. In September 2014, Operation IMPACT began when it was announced that Canada was sending in 100 advisors, in a noncombat role, to Iraq to aid the Middle East Stabilization Force (National Defense and Canadian Armed Forces, 2015). In October, Operation IMPACT expanded when Prime Minister Stephen Harper authorized air strikes in Iraq and CF-18 fighter jets were sent over along with 700 military personnel (Campion-Smith, 2014). However, the more militaristic and pro-active role that Canada has taken in foreign affairs has led many to question whether this

activism abroad has brought unwanted threats back to home soil. Prime Minister Harper has come under fire for positioning Canada as an explicit, rather than informal, supporter of international counter-terror efforts (Nuttall, 2014).

The (R)evolution Summarized

This chapter has demonstrated that the threat posed by terrorism is not going away, even as counter-terrorism efforts become more sophisticated and more aggressive (Tucker, 2001: 1-3). The framework behind old terrorism is not completely obsolete, as it is necessary to understand the way terror has evolved into such a lethal and unrestricted force that is seen today. Homegrown terrorism has become a key strategy adopted by social movements, like al-Qaeda, in order to remain effective. Western individuals are the new targets of this strategy as domestic terror is simply easier to conduct (Crenshaw, 2007: 32). Canadian officials are struggling to understand how their citizens are being drawn to become part of these movements. Thus, several competing and complementary theories will be analyzed in the next chapter in order to understand why individuals seek violent means as an outlet against their own country.

Chapter Two: Literature Review of Motivational Explanations

Introduction

Since the 1960s, the academic community has put in considerable effort to identify key factors that motivate a radicalized individual to turn to violent action (Borum, 2011: 7- 9). Motivation is defined here as the degree to which a factor influences the individual to violently act (Borum, 2013: 105). The purpose of this analysis will be to compose a multilevel variable from synthesizing the diverse number of competing and complementary theories presented at the individual, domestic, and international level. Pre-conditional and external factors will be examined in relation to each level (Francis, 2012). Moreover, Peter Sederberg's three-pronged metaphor will be applied as a way to provide guidance for the state response to the motivations at each level (2003: 272). Some caution must be applied to this analysis because the causes of violent radicalization should not be generalized for every actor nor should the context behind an individual's radicalization be excluded (Kundnani, 2012: 9). The route to radicalization is in no way a one-size-fits-all model and political responses must be wary of this when composing counter-terror policy (Francis, 2012).

Individual Level

The literature surrounding violent radicalization has predominantly focused on the process on the individual level, seeing it as a personal journey. The first prong of Sederberg's metaphor is used to aid in the understanding of how individuals turn to violent extremism, categorizing motivations as a disease. This epidemiological metaphor

characterizes terrorism as cancerous cells that must be eliminated once discovered. A cure must be found, through the use of “antibiotics,” to rid the body of the disease before it spreads (Sederberg, 2003: 272). In other words, the pathway to radicalization at the individual level must be redirected to inoculate the population from extremist ideas. Yet, eradicating infectious ideas and beliefs is extremely difficult. The disease cannot be destroyed, but can be managed to prevent its spread to other healthy cells (272-273). The state must win a “war of ideas” as opposed to using physical force as a solution (DeAngelis, 2009). The disease metaphor structures the response to a complex problem like radicalization as an internal problem that requires state intervention for prevention (Sederberg, 2003: 270).

Individual Pre-Conditions

Attempts to explain the motivations behind violent radicalization have gone back and forth debating on whether to factor in the mental capacity of the terrorist to conceptualize his or her actions (Corner and Gill, 2015: 23). In the 1970s, it was claimed that terrorists had some sort of mental abnormality as they used violence as an outlet for their deviant impulses (Borum, 2011: 14). Scholars utilized medical explanations to look for a particular personality characteristic because terrorists were depicted as being “on something” or “crazy” to commit such “senseless violence” (Sederberg, 1989: 73-75). In the 1980s, terrorists were branded as individuals who harbored aggression and feelings of inadequacy from their family background (Post, 1986: 241-242). Yet, research in the 1990s and early 2000s, through improved methodological methods, decreased the role mental illness had on terror activity. Essentially, the debate on the role of mental capacity was characterized as, “an act of targeted violence is either the action of a rational terrorist

or an irrational mentally unstable civilian” (Corner and Gill, 2015: 23-24). The research has gone from one position to another, debating how much attention the mental capacity of the terrorist should be given.

Given the cyclic nature of the explanations behind individual behavior, it is not surprising that experts have returned to mental illness as a pre-conditional factor (Corner and Gill, 2015: 23). Christopher Hewitt in his book, *Understanding Terrorism in America*, argues that the likelihood of having a psychological issue was higher amongst terrorists who acted alone (2003, p. 80; Spaaj, 2010: 862). Ramon Spaaj and Mark Hamm conducted a study on lone wolves and found that mental illness was a factor in 40 percent of the 98 individuals studied, when compared to 1.5 percent of the general population in the United States (The New York Times, 2014). A second study by Emily Corner and Paul Gill found that 31.9 percent of the lone wolf terrorists examined appeared to have some sort of mental illness, when compared to 3.4 percent of terrorists of the sample that operated as on behalf of an organization (2015: 27-28). Spaaj emphasizes that mental illness may be more frequent in lone wolf terrorism as terror groups are less likely to recruit members that are mentally ill, thus these individuals are more likely to act independently (2010: 862-864). These studies suggest that the relationship between mental illness and violent individuals needs to be reopened.

Mental illness can be characterized as a factor that makes individuals more susceptible to be negatively impacted by environmental variables (Corner and Gill, 2015: 32). Keith Farrington, in a study on stress and family violence, found that those who are already mentally ill do not have the response mechanisms needed to handle stress effectively and are more prone to look to violence as an outlet (1986: 140-142; Corner

and Gill, 2015: 25). Gill and his colleagues found that a third of the sampled lone actor terrorists in their study (32.8%) had high levels of stress at the time of the attack and 74.3 percent of that sample had experienced the stress stimuli 12 months prior to their attack (2014: 429). Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil, in a study that examined lone wolf attacks on public officials, found that the attacks occurred when the individual's quality of life appeared to be in a period of decline (1999: 325-333). Given these findings, mental illness, while not the only element that motivates individuals to action, can have an impact on how a stressful situation is handled. Mentally ill radicals, in stressful situations, may be more probable to act in ways that are irrational and against their self-interest (McCauley, Moskalenko, Van Son, 2013: 8). This is not to conclude that all individuals who become violently radicalized are mentally ill and it is necessary to examine each case individually. The individual external factors are examined below.

External Stimuli

The first individual stress variable under examination is alienation theory, which is defined as the feeling as if one does not belong to or is not accepted within his or her community (Christmann, 2012: 25). Corner and Gill found that over half of their sample (52.9%) of lone actor terrorists was socially isolated (2015: 31). Clark McCauley claims that there are several factors that lead to alienation including estrangement from family or the community, perceived discrimination, or a recent move into the country (2009: 4-7). Fein and Vossekuil found that most of the case studies were undergoing troubles in their personal lives, either with family or with work, that helped to remove them from interacting with society (1999: 325-333). The 2007 New York City Police Department report on radicalization described alienation as a trigger because the isolation creates an

incubation environment where extremist beliefs can form through the guidance of the Internet or a charismatic individual (Silber and Bhatt: 40). Individuals may isolate themselves from society, cutting off any contact, and view the external environment with increasing hostility (Crenshaw, 1981: 393). Given these findings, alienation theory is a viable model that requires further inquiry on its effects on the radicalization process, as well as identifying isolated individuals who are at risk to becoming violent (Corner and Gill, 2015: 31).

Holly Knapton provides an evolutionary component to the alienation argument, as she adds that exclusion from mainstream society can influence an individual's identity. Knapton asserts that people are innately required to need social interaction and any sort of ostracization, from exclusion or rejection, has implications. She claims that early humans required group interaction to avoid starvation and for protection against external elements. Individuals who are rejected from or discriminated against in their community or society are reacting due to an evolutionary mechanism because ostracism implies almost certain death. Distressed and isolated, these individuals will go to extreme means to be accepted by any sort of group to belong, in order to survive (Knapton, 2014: 39-45).

The radicalization process may be sped up if individuals are lacking, in what Knapton characterizes, as human basic needs: to belong, to have control, to have meaning, and to have self-esteem (2014: 40). Kipling Williams and Lisa Zadro found that ostracized participants exhibited feelings of anger and low self-esteem, as well as a feeling that their life had no meaning (2005: 20-25; Knapton, 2014: 40-41). Margarita Bizina and David H. Gray add that social marginalization contributes to individuals taking up extremist ideologies as a way to reclaim an identity and a purpose in life (2014:

73). Bradford Kelley and Ava Morgenstern examined radicalization in Dutch society and found that young Dutch Muslims, in the wake of the murder of the Theo van Gogh, felt rejected by Dutch society. The youths had difficulty identifying with mainstream society when they were unable to find employment, due to perceived suspicion and growing racism towards the Muslim population (Kelly and Morgenstern, 2006). Martha Crenshaw adds that the consequences of such exclusion can lead to individuals or groups feeling little attachment to the Western country as the state neglects to fully integrate them into society (1981: 381-385). Thus, it becomes easier for terror groups, either online or in the country, to manipulate and ignite the distressed and isolated individual into action (McCauley, 2009: 6).

Individual stimuli that may also contribute to the radicalization process include Ted Robert Gurr's theory of relative deprivation, which is defined as "the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence" (1970: 23). Gurr claims that the degree of deprivation is dependent on the divide between expectations and capabilities. Individuals are more prone to violence when they feel intense frustration and helplessness at the inability to improve their situation or status in society (Salah, 2013: 165-166). The frustration-aggression mechanism, which is a component of the relative deprivation theory, can escalate to violence if sustained over a long period of time (Gurr, 1970: 23-25). The individual's perception of his or her deprivation determines the move to violent action, instead of his or her actual socio-economic status. Relative deprivation is part of an individual's perception on their emotional wellbeing (King and Taylor, 2011: 610).

Farrington's general stress model builds upon the influence of deprivation, stating that there is a relationship between stress, violence, and frustration as violence can be a coping mechanism to let out frustration. Farrington positions the utilization of violence in relation to "response capabilities," categorizing the response as either "instrumental" or "expressive" (1986: 134). Instrumental violence is defined as a rational violent means to meet an end. An example of this is when a parent may hit his or her child to correct their behavior. Expressive violence is defined as irrational, impulsive behavior that handles stress stimuli by lashing out. Farrington uses the example of domestic violence as an illustration of the expressive response because those who partake in this violence do so irrationally (1986: 135-137). This model relates to the radicalization process as individuals whose lives are in a "downward spiral" may use expressive violence as a way to handle the increasing frustration that they are experiencing from their external environment (Corner and Gill, 2015: 25).

Sederberg's disease metaphor allows for the state to conceptualize radicalization as a chronic issue that must be monitored to prevent such cancerous ideas from spreading to the general public and causing social disorder (Sontag, 1978). Obviously feelings of deprivation, alienation, or exclusion cannot be eliminated completely, especially when these feelings are subjective to the individual (King and Taylor, 2011: 610). Yet, the right treatment plan must be established by the state to ensure that the individual has a way to express his or her grievance in a nonviolent manner (Sederberg, 2003: 274-275).

The Domestic Level

If the previous section's factors are considered pre-conditions that make an individual more receptive to violence, then the domestic factors discussed in this section can be categorized as external triggers that contribute to such action (Francis, 2012). Sederberg's crime metaphor provides conceptual guidance on how to address extremist ideas that are motivated because of domestic factors. Under this prong, governmental responses must take a "policing" approach because the terror attack is classified as a criminal affair (Sederberg, 2003: 271). Crime cannot be eliminated, as remnants of it will always remain or new illicit operations will emerge. In other words, terrorism can only be managed because it is an inherent vice of society. Sederberg writes that al-Qaeda's global network has been policed around the world as countries enacted surveillance methods to monitor at-risk individuals at home. Yet from this policing, a dilemma emerges as states are faced with balancing the management of at-risk individuals and maintaining national security because what may be effective policy may not be acceptable to its citizens (Sederberg, 2003: 270-273). New terrorism is increasingly unstructured and harder to detect, which has led to implications for individual freedoms at the domestic level (Zekulin, 2011: 10-11).

Domestic Triggers

Increased surveillance in the aftermath of a terror attack is usually the first response chosen by the state, even if the effects of such monitoring do not have definite findings (Fussey, 2007: 270-273). The advancement of surveillance technologies is seen as a way to gather intelligence on individuals and deter future instances of crime. The United Kingdom's use of closed-circuit television is the most obvious example of state surveillance. Yet, counter-terror efforts have been criticized for being intrusive and draconian in the management of terror threats because law enforcement agencies' oversight has expanded, promoting a big brother-like effect, which has led to an increasing number of citizens being monitored by the state (Haggarty and Gazso, 2005: 172-175). The management of daily terror threats through counter-terror efforts, if overly aggressive, can contribute towards greater insecurity of the state rather than deterring future attacks (Spalek and Lambert, 2008: 257-260).

Jeffrey Monaghan claims that intensive surveillance mechanisms can be polarizing to society if one group of citizens becomes the target of extensive attention by law enforcement agencies (2014: 489-490). Sorting persons and identifying target populations may help contribute to the domestic radicalization process, as these populations feel alienated from their peers or incredibly frustrated by the amount of attention given to them by state intelligence agencies (Fussey, 2007: 176). Ian Brown and Douwe Korff add that these surveillance technologies can be biased in the creation of a "would-be terrorist" profile that creates false positives, leading to the monitoring of a large number of innocent people who fit the criteria (2009: 125). This matters as the algorithms in place to prevent radicalization may lead to the discrimination of an entire

minority group, even if no criminal offense has been committed (Brown and Korff, 2009: 125-131). Moreover, counter-radicalization efforts have yet to identify why some radicalized individuals do not commit violent acts despite hitting all the criteria (RCMP, 1999: 4-8). According to Andrew Silke, the effects of surveillance are important because if an already alienated member of the community feels discriminated, there is a greater chance that the individual will become sympathetic to extremist ideology (2008: 112-113).

Leda Blackwood and her colleagues add that the relationship between law enforcement agencies and Muslim communities, who are usually the targeted communities of monitoring efforts, is important. The reception of surveillance methods by these communities is critical because they see the methods as representative of the opinion of the general public. This means that the treatment by the police, if seen as unfair, implies that the larger public does not respect the Muslim community (2015: 12 - 13). Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick argue that in the aftermath of a terror attack, Muslim communities become antagonized and humiliated by their domestic peers because of their religion becoming associated with violence. Given this suspicion, these communities approached police with a sense of insecurity, vulnerability, and anger as they find themselves to be the victims of hate crimes or preemptive police action created by police experiences that shows little regard for their citizenship (2011: 15-16). Counter-terror measures may actually stigmatize these communities into becoming more receptive to other narratives that may alleviate their grievances (Silke, 2005: 242-248).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and increasing number of domestic attacks, political figures made homeland security a top priority (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011: 40). Yet,

domestic policies can create divisions amongst the population, as members of a community feel unjustly targeted by the state's counter-terror measures. Coercive methods, employed under the Sederberg's crime framework, may undermine the security of the state if the additional legislation alienates an already vulnerable population (Spalek and Lambert, 2008: 263). The path to radicalization is complex, as grievances at the domestic level may be one of the many factors that lead to an individual's violent escalation.

The International Level

The third aspect of the multilevel variable is the international level, which focuses on the effects that a state's foreign policy may have on an individual's motivation into violent action. The final prong of Sederberg's metaphor is employed for this section, which conceptualizes terrorism as an act of war in order to formulate the most appropriate response. The metaphor calls for a unified public response because sacrifices must be made in a military battle against a foreign enemy in an external state. A domestic enemy is not included because it could divide the country if the public looks within for someone to blame (Sederberg, 2003: 271-273). The political rhetoric calls for a simplified agenda because, in this framework, the threat from terrorism does not require daily management. It must be completely annihilated, as ultimate victory is the state's primary objective. The war metaphor's framework conceptualizes that any domestic attacks are the consequences of the greater War on Terror (Hartmann-Mahmud, 2002: 427- 430).

International Triggers

However, a side effect of this metaphor is that an already marginalized group may feel scapegoated by the political and military actions of the state (Sederberg, 1989: 89). Grievances directed towards the state's military actions abroad can be classified as "humiliation by proxy" as individuals feel the state is attacking members of his or her community (Christmann, 2012: 26). Radicalized individuals may not hold grievances towards their home country's culture or the general public (Mueller, 2015). Instead, these individuals may become radicalized because they feel that their home country is at odds with their identity (Berjawi, 2015). An example of this emerged during the trial of the 2006 Toronto 18 plot as the individuals appeared to have no issue with mainstream Canadian culture, as wiretaps overheard the individuals talking about their love of Tim Horton's donuts, a popular Canadian coffee chain, and how beautiful Ontario looked during the winter (RCMP, 1999: 5). Rather, the grievance that radicalizes individuals into action is a "perceived injustice" that the West is overly focused on conducting military operations in the Middle East (Christmann, 2012: 26). Examples include widespread disapproval surrounding the perceived biased decisions of the second Iraq War and Western states favoring Israel in the negotiations with Palestinians (O' Duffy, 2008: 37). Initiating action against the West is seen as a way to protect the community that they identify with, whether it is an ideological or cultural association (Mueller, 2015).

According to David Ignatius, aggressive foreign policies that employ polarizing rhetoric help to create an environment that inadvertently encourages a conflicted narrative for these individuals (2015). Political grievances may stem from the "us" versus "them" narrative that is employed by Western political leaders in order to appear tough

on terror (Berjawi, 2015). Ignatius uses the example of the Charlie Hebdo terror attack to illustrate this point, as in the aftermath of the attack, the magazine put the Prophet Muhammad on its cover. This move was seen as largely offensive to the Muslim community, even if the non-Muslim public argued that the cover was necessary to continue to defend free speech in a time of crisis. Yet, openly disregarding a religion may be like enlarging an already festering wound (Ignatius, 2015). Western states must be wary of adding fuel to the fire of radical dialogues if political stances antagonize Muslim communities, as individuals who may feel alienated from mainstream society could become stigmatized and more receptive to other narratives that are more receptive of them (Ignatius, 2015).

Managing the threat posed by domestic terrorism becomes increasingly difficult for political officials when their foreign policy goals conflict with the domestic security of the state (Sedgwick, 2010: 490). Government officials must be wary of a hardline approach that may feed into radical dialogue because political grievances may be one of the variables that triggers violent action by an individual (Ignatius, 2015). Conducting attacks on domestic soil is seen as a way to garner the most attention for their grievance as opposed to going overseas and actually joining an extremist organization (Davison and Thomson, 2014). The international level of the multilevel variable is one factor in the radicalization process, but it should be emphasized that there is no single trigger that causes radicalization.

Conclusion

Given the numerous studies and theories that focus on different areas of the radicalization process, the aim of this section was to systemically develop a variable that took into account the complexity of the radicalization process at the individual, domestic, and international levels. Theories and studies were synthesized in order to understand how these factors influence the radicalization of the individual in different ways and at different degrees. Yet, the radicalization process is a personal journey that is difficult to compose a predictive model for (Hudson, 1999: 15; McCauley, 2009: 16-17).

Sederberg's three-pronged metaphor highlights how several factors can be at play for an individual to become radicalized into action, making the conceptualization of an appropriate response difficult for the state (2003: 272-273). The use of the metaphor model illustrates that the labeling that is given to a terror attack has vast implications for how the state responds to the event, whether it be a disease, crime, or war (DeAngelis, 2009). In the next section, the methodology will be outlined that is needed to use this multilevel variable in order to conceptualize the 2014 terror attacks in Canada.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction

To conceptualize the 2014 terror attacks that are under investigation in this dissertation, political discourse analysis, a school within discourse analysis, will be used as it allows the multi-level variable theory to be applied in the most thorough manner (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011: 3). Three rhetorical techniques will be employed as a way to explore the political reactions to the terror attacks in order to assess if Canadian officials understand why the attacks happened. In addition, the context prior to the attacks will be investigated to ensure all facts of the cases are presented. Political discourse in Canada is often convoluted because of the numerous voices in the political arena, thus it is essential to examine the multiple voices to ensure that the correct response to an attack is being administered.

Discourse Analysis

The study of rhetoric has always been central to politics because of its reliance on linguistics as “acts of verbal persuasion” in the political arena (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 303). Descartes defined people as essentially “linguistic animals” because of their dependence on language to organize their feelings (p. 303). Discourse analysis examines the strategies that people employ in their speeches, dialogues, or writings to better understand their thought processes (Bryman, 2012: 529-530). Understandably, there are numerous explanations of discourse because it is a broad concept within constructivism. Yet for simplicity, discourse is defined, in this dissertation, as the cognitive and social

actions that influence the social composition of reality (Strauss and Feiz, 2014: 1-3). The discourse under investigation here refers to the public speeches and monologues by numerous actors (van Dijk, 1997c: 2).

Political Discourse Analysis

This dissertation relies on political discourse analysis (PDA) because the actors under examination, the Canadian officials and the terrorists, are political participants, as the goal of their actions was to impact the policymaking process (van Dijk, 1997b: 13). John Wilson claims all language should be considered as “political discourse” because “language is inherently political” (2015: 775). How an actor defines his actions is dependent on the language he employs and therefore language must be a central area of study (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 1). Politics is essentially a struggle for power and is dependent on the use of discourse, as individuals compete against each other to have the authoritative voice on an issue (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 318). PDA looks at why people in positions of power choose the words that they do and how those words are rhetorically presented (Bhatia, 2006: 179). Norman Fairclough theorizes that in language, things are not simply named; they are conceptualized metaphorically to insinuate meanings to invoke images within the audience’s mind. Studying political rhetoric leads to a better understanding how reality is spun by the words and sentences chosen by the actor (Fairclough, Mulderrig, and Wodak, 2011: 358-360).

Political Techniques

The application of PDA is dependent on the use of persuasion through the use of rhetoric for political or social change (Fairclough, Mulderrig, and Wodak, 2011: 369).

Three techniques, as proposed by Paul Chilton and Christina Schaffner, will be utilized to show this: coercion, legitimization and delegitimization, and representation and misrepresentation. The purpose of these techniques is to understand how the actor is shaping his or her social reality as they describe past events, their surroundings, or other individuals (2011: 311-312). The techniques are described below.

Coercion is a technique used to control the topic under discussion by framing how it is understood. This technique does not have to be explicit in the discourse because the speaker can coerce the audience by appearing knowledgeable about the situation. Examples of this include setting the topic of discussion, positioning themselves as the speaker for a larger cause, or by the assumptions employed about the situation or environment. Power is exerted as the speaker controls the flow of information in his or her speech (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 311).

The second technique that is employed is legitimization and delegitimization, which is defined as the creation of categories of opposition to persuade the audience to obey the speaker's wishes. The speaker will legitimize themselves by presenting their performance, characteristics, or ideologies in a positive light, while delegitimizing their opponents or events through the use of words that construe negative connotations (Evans, 2013). Examples of delegitimization include referring to other entities as "enemies within," "them," or "foreigners" (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 312). Differences between actors are manipulated to persuade the audience that the speaker is reasonable, as they speak for the larger public (van Eemeron, Jackson, and Jacobs, 2011: 95).

Finally, representation and misrepresentation is utilized to shape the audience's perception of reality to invoke a solution that is beneficial to the speaker (Mazid, 2014:

143-144). Chilton and Schaffner label this as being “economical with the truth” as facts may be omitted to listeners in order for the solution that the speaker offers to seem like common sense and therefore justifiable (2011: 312). The speaker is presenting a solution that fits his or her understanding of reality. The goal of this technique is to garner a large amount of support for the speaker’s vision (Fairclough, Mulderrig, and Wodak, 2011: 358-359).

The use of PDA allows the investigator to understand how actors politicize the topic under discussion to promote a certain viewpoint (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 312). The three techniques allow for the linguistic utterances of actors to be interpreted and be attributed to a prong of Sederberg’s metaphor. Yet, PDA is normative and understandings of an actor’s utterances are subject to debate (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 3-5). The aim of the use of these PDA techniques will be to see how discourse can be important in the conceptualization of the 2014 terror attacks.

Case Studies as a Research Strategy

Teun van Dijk emphasizes that PDA explains the meanings behind discourse by taking into account its social context (1997a: 2). Given this, the attacks will be examined under the case study research strategy to ensure that both the context and discourse are adequately assessed. According to Robert K. Yin, a case study is a research strategy that is important because “it attempts to examine (a) a real-life phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1981: 59). Multiple case studies are utilized in order to investigate if there is a common characteristic amongst the cases in order to understand the phenomena (Yin, 1981: 63). Yin argues that this strategy allows the researcher to answer the research

question, apply the theoretical assumptions, and interpret the results through the data presented (Yin, 1984: 30). Case studies as a research strategy are essential for answering a complex research question when numerous contextual variables are present (Schell, 1992: 2).

Conclusion

The purpose of the methodology outlined above is to investigate if the terror attacks in 2014 received the most effective responses. Given the importance of political speeches surrounding an attack, the goal of this analysis will be to determine if the diagnosis that Canadian government officials gave for the attacks matches the reasoning that the perpetrators gave for conducting their assault. The next chapter will describe and investigate the first case study under examination using the three PDA techniques outlined.

Chapter Four: The St-Jean-sur-Richelieu Attack

Introduction

The first case under observation is the October 20th incident that occurred in a parking lot, just outside of Montreal. The analysis will take a two-step approach by first looking at the context prior to the event at the individual, domestic, and international level and then examining the discourse surrounding the event. The purpose of examining the discourse is to investigate how Canadian government officials explained the attack and compare it to how the perpetrator understood the purpose of his actions to be. Martin Couture-Rouleau gave no warning to his family or friends of his plans, leaving Canadian officials scrambling for an explanation for his actions after his death (MacCharles and Woods, 2014).

The Incident

On October 20th, 2014 Couture-Rouleau killed Canadian Armed Forces Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, while injuring another soldier, when he deliberately ran his vehicle into the two individuals in a parking lot in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu (CBC News, 2014a). Couture-Rouleau had been sitting in his sedan for two hours, watching the two soldiers, before he began his assault (Bruemmer, 2014b). Immediately after his attack, RCMP officers, in a high-speed chase, pursued Couture-Rouleau where he eventually lost control of his car. Upon exiting his vehicle, Couture-Rouleau was shot dead as he attempted to escape by foot (Bacchi, 2014).

Contextual Variables

Individual Level

Prior to his attack, Couture-Rouleau's personal life appeared to be in a "downward spiral" (Corner and Gill, 2015: 25). He was separated from his wife and was in a custody battle for his young child (Lambert, 2014). Court documents from October show that his wife did not approve of his recent conversion to Islam and was seeking sole custody (The Winnipeg Sun, 2014). Couture-Rouleau was unemployed, as he faced financial troubles after his unsuccessful bid to run a power-washing business (Bruemmer, 2014a). He declared bankruptcy in February 2014, owing \$22,000 with only \$542 in his bank account (The Winnipeg Sun, 2014). Friends of the family stated to *The Toronto Star* that after his business failed, he became depressed and distrustful of other people (MacCharles and Woods, 2014). His father grew concerned about his son's behavioral changes, checking him into a psychiatric hospital, a stay that lasted only one day (Bruemmer, 2014b). Couture-Rouleau's life was becoming progressively worse as his psychiatric state became impacted by a stressful personal situation.

Potential Domestic Level Triggers

At the domestic level, Couture-Rouleau was the target of surveillance efforts by the RCMP, which may have impacted his future violent behavior. In 2014, the RCMP began monitoring his actions because of concerns about his social media activity that appeared to be endorsing extremist causes. In June, Couture-Rouleau became one of 93 "high-risk travelers" that the RCMP was monitoring, believing that he had intentions to go to the Middle East and join militant groups (Woods, 2014). In July, The RCMP seized

his passport, when he tried to leave Canada to go to Syria through Turkey (The National Post, 2015). Throughout the summer and into the fall, the RCMP visited Couture-Rouleau several times to discuss his grievances (Feith, 2015). On October 9th, the RCMP met with Couture-Rouleau a final time in an attempt to moderate his views, coming out of the meetings optimistic that he would take his life in a less radicalized direction (Woods, 2014). The factors at the domestic level depicted an individual who had become a focus point for counter-terror management measures.

Potential International Level Triggers

At the international level, Couture-Rouleau appeared to hold political grievances against the West's military operations in the Middle East, which he expressed online. He identified himself on Facebook as Ahmad Rouleau and on Twitter he called himself Abu Ibrahim AlCanadi (Bruemmer, 2014b). His Facebook status updates were littered with criticisms of Canada's support for the American military operations against ISIL. He posted statuses of anti-Western conspiracy theories as well as fundamentalist posts about Islam. In one post he wrote, "military men are just dumb stupid animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy" (Peritz, Ha, and Perreux, 2014). His Twitter profile (Figure one) featured ISIL's flag and he subscribed to a few accounts that promoted violent extremist causes (The Winnipeg Sun, 2014). At this level, Couture-Rouleau appeared angry at the direction of the foreign policy of western states.

Figure one: Couture-Rouleau's Twitter Account (2014)



Speeches under Examination

Given the context surrounding Couture-Rouleau's actions, the discourse will be examined, before both variables will be compared. Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney and Quebec Public Security Minister Lise Theriault addressed the attack at a press conference several hours after it occurred (CBC News, 2014c). Blaney's statement as well as several answers from the question period will be examined. The responses given will be analyzed using the three PDA techniques to show the construction of the government's argument.

Canadian Government Conceptualization

Coercion

Blaney began his speech by immediately setting the topic of discussion and positioning himself as the authoritative speaker on information surrounding the event.

(Time: 0:14- 0:40)

“I am horrified by what took place here. This is a terrible act of violence against our country, against our military, against our value [*sic*]. This is a sobering reminder of the sacrifices and bravery of our men and women who serve our country and I certainly would like to express my deep condolence [*sic*] to the family of the fallen and also my best wishes for the military who is still in hospital [*sic*] as we speak” (CBC News, 2014c).

Blaney coerces the listeners into accepting a subordinate role, modeled like a teacher and student dynamic, through his use of referent pronouns. He uses “our” and “we” to refer to his audience and “I” and “my” to refer to himself (CBC News, 2014c).

Blaney exercises the use of “I” to express his “deep condolence [*sic*]” and his “best wishes” to make his role as a politician nonexistent (2014c). Instead, he is a deliverer of truth to the incomprehensible event (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 316). Blaney has created a political space, positioning himself as the informed speaker on the attack.

Legitimization and Delegitimization

After the scene had been set, Blaney legitimized his role as the authoritative speaker by casting himself and other Canadians in a positive light (van Dijk, 1997b: 28-29). His use of possessive pronouns “our,” “we,” and “us” creates a solidarity narrative (CBC News, 2014c). The referent pronouns overlap, combining Blaney, as a government

official, with the public, regardless of ideological allegiance, as “we” means all Canadians (CBC News, 2014c).

(1:00 – 1:33)

“Our government remains committed to ensure the safety and security of all Canadian [*sic*] and will continue to support the brave men and women who protect our lives everyday and a special thanks to the people of the police St Jean here. I want to extend my gratitude to them for what they did yesterday to keep us safe. Canada’s law enforcement officer [*sic*] put their lives on the line everyday so that we can live in peace and security and go on with our lives. This is exactly what they have done yesterday and for that, those men and women deserve our gratitude. I commend them for their courage and their bravery” (CBC News, 2014c).

Blaney also uses positive promotion to legitimize Canadian armed forces through the use of adjectives such as, “brave” and “courage,” to extend their actions to the wider context (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 316; CBC News, 2014c). He uses these adjectives numerous times, drawing attention to the importance of these values as Canadian ideological principles (van Dijk, 1997b: 16). He insinuates that an external threat has come onto Canadian soil, as these “brave men and women” have had to protect Canadians in order to live in “peace and security” (CBC News, 2014c). Blaney has constructed an “internal consensus” as he characterizes that Canadians must work together to protect the nation as a whole (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 316). This legitimization strategy is important because he has positioned himself as the informed speaker on behalf of all Canadians in the understanding of an external threat.

Representation and Misrepresentation

Blaney’s explanation of the attack was exposed during the question and answer period, when he constructed Couture-Rouleau’s actions bluntly as an act of terrorism.

Blaney presents the situation by giving information to the press that directs the narrative surrounding the event into contextualizing Couture-Rouleau as a terrorist.

(1:56- 2:07)

“What took place yesterday is clearly linked to terrorist ideology and that’s why we are offering the support of the RCMP in the ongoing investigation” (CBC News, 2014c).

However, Blaney kept other crucial information surrounding the event secretive as part of the “ongoing investigation” (2014c). Misrepresentation of the event was relayed when a reporter asked if Couture-Rouleau’s passport had been revoked.

(2:07-2:34)

Theriault “Well I would say that you are asking a question that deals directly with the investigation so obviously we cannot really comment, but I do want to specify this afternoon the QPP and the RCMP will hold a news conference where they can answer more of your technical questions. But obviously, we don’t want to draw any hasty conclusions, we want to let police officers do their work ” (CBC News, 2014c).

By saying that Couture-Rouleau’s actions were linked to a terrorist ideology and then stating that the investigation does not want to make “hasty conclusions,” the flow of information is controlled as the press will continue to speculate about the terrorist angle (2014c). Moreover, by mentioning the other press conference, attention is diverted from elaborating on more details behind the attack (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 312). The situation has been misrepresented through this verbal denial and omission of referencing Couture-Rouleau directly.

The three PDA techniques employed show how Canadian political officials attempted to persuade the general public to accept their diagnosis of Couture-Rouleau’s actions. The argument was constructed by imposing an inclusive narrative that positioned the government officials as the best sources for accurate information and the audience as

the subordinate listeners (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 316). The use of positive self-promotion of the Canadian state and misrepresentation of technical details surrounding the event helped to create an environment where terrorism was quickly the dominant narrative.

Couture-Rouleau's Conceptualization

Couture-Rouleau did not make a statement prior to his attack. However, he called 9-1-1, when he was being pursued by police and claimed responsibility, saying that he had conducted the attack "In the name of Allah" (Deland, 2014). One is left to speculate how Couture-Rouleau constructed his argument, as it appears that he only appeared to position himself as acting on the behalf of a higher power. Due to the fact that he did not articulate an explicit explanation, the contextual variables are an important addition to understanding his actions.

Discussion

In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the government is expected to bring comprehension to an incomprehensible situation in order to explain why the attack happened (Sederberg, 2003: 270). The discourse and context analyzed in this section illustrate that the political response oversimplified the event on October 20th because it did not consider the pre-conditional factors at the individual level before Blaney made his statement. Clearly, from the press conference, Couture-Rouleau was an individual taking action because of his terrorist ideology. Couture-Rouleau's 9-1-1 call is the only direct clue of his articulated explanation for his attack, yet without taking into account the

numerous pre-conditional factors and triggers at the individual, domestic, and international levels, the understanding of Couture-Rouleau's actions is incomplete.

Applying the Multilevel Variable

Couture-Rouleau's life appeared to be going downhill as he faced an increasing amount of stress stimuli (Hobman, 2014). Farrington's stress model becomes applicable to this case because there appeared to be a relationship between the level of stress, frustration, and violence (1983: 135-137). Couture-Rouleau's psychological state was in decline as he became increasingly frustrated by the numerous demands put on him financially and emotionally. Moreover, he became increasingly alienated from his peers as these stress stimuli took a toll on his wellbeing, instead turning to the online community on social media outlets. He may have used violence as an expressive way to cope with the frustration and stress of his personal life. The individual level should have been included, as a pre-condition that impacted Couture-Rouleau's decision to act, as it allowed for domestic and environmental variables to have more of an enabling effect on an already vulnerable individual.

Increased attention by law enforcement agencies at the domestic level, through the visits they paid him when they deemed him to be an "at risk" individual, may have only added to the frustration that Couture-Rouleau felt (Woods, 2014). However, the anger directed towards his passport being confiscated may have been the catalyst to his violence, which the RCMP in the days that followed named as the principle reasoning (The National Post, 2015). Yet, the domestic level triggers were not the only environmental triggers.

At the international level, the most obvious trigger emerged through Couture-Rouleau's use of social media. He appeared to hold political grievances against Western states, particularly of Canada's support against ISIL in the Middle East (Peritz, Ha, and Perreux, 2014). Blaney utilized the international level of the multi-level variable to explain Couture-Rouleau's actions, but without the other two levels, his analysis of Couture-Rouleau's terrorist ideology was too simplistic.

Policy Implications

The level of analysis that is selected as the principle reasoning behind a terror attack is important because it determines how the state formulates its response (Sederberg, 2003: 271). Blaney's response for the attack relied on the variables at the international level and emulated Sederberg's war metaphor. The underlying problems of the individual were excluded, categorizing his actions as part of the broader war against terrorism. Blaney chose to characterize the problem into an "us" versus "them" narrative, even before details about Couture-Rouleau's background emerged, maintaining the Conservative government's stance that, "terrorism knows no boundaries" (The Toronto Sun, 2015). War implies that Canada has entered an unknown state of affairs, as an attack on home soil requires that sacrifices must be made to ensure victory. This political solution became more about winning, rather than finding the root causes behind an individual's motivations (Spencer, 2012: 399-400). Unfamiliar with terror attacks against on home soil because of their infrequency; Canadian officials struggled to come up with an appropriate response to address Couture-Rouleau's actions.

A tension emerges from the discourse, as it is easier to formulate a response, under the war metaphor, as an external problem against the state rather than a problem

influenced by domestic forces. Yet, if the attack was portrayed as a symptom of a disease, Blaney would have had to admit that defeating radicalization is impossible as the threat posed by radicalized individuals can only be managed. He would have had to admit that it was less about ideology and more about circumstance (Speri, 2015). The construction of who is a terrorist is difficult as there is an array of pre-conditions and external triggers that must be placed into consideration. However, categorizing an act under the war metaphor's framework legitimizes the state's ability to use coercive and repressive techniques, as all necessary sacrifices must be made for victory (Sederberg, 2003: 272-273). Each level in the multilevel variable model has its merits, but in this case, the Couture-Rouleau's personal troubles should have been included in the initial conception of the attack. Conceptualizing a response under the disease framework would have been the more appropriate response. Yet, war was chosen as the framework for the state to adhere to because of its "convenient label" (Spencer, 2012: 4). The next section will analyze the second terror attack that occurred in October 2014 to determine if this tension between the explanations is a reoccurring them.

Chapter Five: Parliament Hill Shooting

Introduction

The second attack on Canadian soil occurred two days later in Ottawa, when Michael Zehaf-Bibeau attacked Parliament Hill. Like the first investigation, this analysis will take a two step approach by first looking the context prior to the event at the individual, domestic, and international level before examining the discourse of the government and the perpetrator. The interpretation of the discourse allows for an explanation of why the attack was deemed a terrorist attack and if the perpetrator's actions were motivated by terrorism (Spencer, 2012: 394). Like his predecessor, Zehaf-Bibeau gave little prior warning for his upcoming attack, leaving Canadian officials with the task of piecing together an explanation for his actions (CBC News, 2014b).

The Incident

On October 22, 2014 Zehaf-Bibeau gunned down Reservist Corporal Nathan Cirillo, who had begun his shift on sentry duty at the National War Memorial that morning (Gander, 2014). Immediately after firing the fatal shot, Zehaf-Bibeau ran into the Centre Block of the Parliament Building and engaged in a struggle with security guard, Samearn Son (Borger and Glenza, 2014). Zehaf-Bibeau was able to shoot Son in the foot before proceeding to run along the Hall of Honour, headed towards the Library of Parliament. Passing a committee room where the members of the Conservative Party had gathered, including Prime Minister Harper, Zehaf-Bibeau hid from RCMP officers in pursuit. Thirty-one shots were fired during the final shoot out as RCMP officers enclosed

on Zehaf-Bibeau just outside the Library. Finally, Sergeant-at-Arms officer Kevin Vickers fired the fatal shot to bring down Zehaf-Bibeau (Solomon, 2015).

Individual Pre-Conditions

Individual Level

Prior to his attack, Zehaf-Bibeau led a relatively uneventful childhood as he grew up in Laval, Quebec with his mother. Neighbors interviewed by news outlets depicted him as a child with a “good upbringing” (Wiebe, 2014). However, Zehaf-Bibeau’s life entered a period of decline, which was documented by his many interactions with law enforcement and nomadic lifestyle (Sherwell, 2014). By 2011, Zehaf-Bibeau had a string of convictions that included assault, theft, robbery, and fraud (Friscolanti, 2014). Court documents from his trial in December of 2011, showed that Zehaf-Bibeau was looking to use jail time to overcome his crack cocaine addiction (Coppin, 2014). Zehaf-Bibeau was unable to stay in one place for a long period of time as he drifted around British Columbia staying in various places such as Vancouver, Surrey, and Burnaby (Friscolanti, 2014). In between his interactions with the law, he was reported to have slept inside his local mosque in Burnaby, citing that he no other place to go, as he was not on speaking terms with his divorced parents. He had no income according to his December 2011 court documents, which showed him unable to pay the \$100 victim impact surcharge (Coppin, 2014). Two weeks prior to his attack, he was residing in a homeless shelter in Ottawa (Friscolanti, 2014).

Zehaf-Bibeau’s life was also increasingly defined by his declining psychological state. During his 2011 hearing, court liaison officer Jack Bibby examined Zehaf-Bibeau

and believed that he suffered some from a mood disorder characteristic of bipolar disorder (Lampert and Gordon, 2014). At the mosque, acquaintances of Zehaf-Bibeau stated that he appeared paranoid and at one point stating that he thought the devil was coming after him. By late 2014, his behavior became increasingly “erratic” and elders at the Burnaby mosque eventually asked Zehaf-Bibeau to leave (Sherwell, 2014). It is important to include the individual level, as its downhill effects may have been a contributing variable to Zehaf-Bibeau’s actions on October 22nd.

Potential Domestic Trigger

The potential domestic trigger may have stemmed from Zehaf-Bibeau’s failure to acquire a passport because of the monitoring efforts carried out by law enforcement agencies. On October 2nd, after arriving in Ottawa, Zehaf-Bibeau went to the Libyan embassy to quickly renew his Libyan passport to visit family overseas, according to what he told embassy officials. However, he was denied because of the discrepancies in his identification documents, as his B.C. driver’s license listed his first name as Michael and his expired Libyan passport listed his name as Abdul. Embassy officials told Zehaf-Bibeau that a background check was needed, which would delay the process up to a month. Zehaf-Bibeau did not proceed with the application (McGregor *et al.*, 2014). Residents at the Ottawa Shelter reported that Zehaf-Bibeau expressed frustration over the incident (Alfaro- Gonzalez *et. al.*, 2015: 32). At the domestic level, the passport issue may have impacted an already vulnerable individual.

Potential International Trigger

At the international level, Zehaf-Bibeau appeared to hold political grievances against the military actions of Western countries, which he expressed at the shelters he stayed at. Residents reported that Zehaf-Bibeau appeared to be a vocal supporter of ISIL (Alfaro- Gonzalez *et. al.*, 2015: 32). Paul Jarjapka, a counselor at the Vancouver Salvation Army Shelter, reported that while watching the news, Zehaf-Bibeau started an argument with him over ISIL's actions (Wines and Yardley, 2014). Zehaf-Bibeau claimed that Americans were the terrorists because ISIL's actions were sent by God to overcome the arrogance and corruption put forth by the West (Friscolanti, 2014). Moreover, he equated the bombing of a school bus in the United States with the U.S. bombing Syria (Wine and Yardley, 2014). It appears at the international level, Zehaf-Bibeau took issue with the current state of foreign affairs.

Speeches under Examination

Given the context, it is important to see how the actors involved with the shooting explained the event using the three PDA techniques. The government discourse that is of focus is Prime Minister Stephen Harper's address to the nation. Furthermore, Zehaf-Bibeau's cell phone video filmed in his car prior to his assault will be examined to assess his motive in striking Parliament Hill.

Stephen Harper Conceptualization

Hours after the shooting, Harper in a televised address to the nation presented a hardline stance against Zehaf-Bibeau's attack, conceptualizing the violent actions as part of the larger War on Terror against Islamic extremists in the Middle East (Fairclough,

Mulderrig, and Wodak, 2011: 360). Harper's speech presented a view that Canadians are in a fight against an abstract evil that requires an any means necessary policy approach by the Conservative Party (Horvath, 2012: 51).

Coercion

Beginning with the opening lines of the speech, it became evident that Harper was creating an all-inclusive narrative in order to build toward his diagnosis of Zehaf-Bibeau's actions later on. He begins his speech by setting the agenda on what happened earlier that day, coercing the audience by controlling the information under discussion.

Time: 0:01-0:08

"My fellow Canadians, for the second time this week there has been a brutal and violent attack on our soil" (CBC News, 2014b).

Harper has positioned himself as the leader of *all* citizens, making his rhetoric as inclusive as possible and appearing not to take an ideological stance. He later reiterates the phrase, "my fellow Canadians" two more times in the speech to emphasize the ideals of Canadian citizenry (2014b). The use of the pronoun "our" in phrases such as "our soil" also invokes a sense of unity in a time where Canadians are uncertain for the security of the nation (Horvath, 2012: 50; CBC News, 2014b). This allows for Harper to create a political space where he is the authoritative speaker on information surrounding the Parliament Hill shooting.

(0:17-0:33)

"Corporal Cirillo was killed today-murdered in cold blood- as he provided a ceremonial Honour Guard at Canada's National War Memorial. That sacred place that pays tribute to those who gave their lives so that we can live in a free, democratic and safe society" (CBC News, 2014b).

Harper creates a sense national unity over a shared understanding of Canadian history (Maimona, 2014: 5). The use of coercion is not explicit because Harper is not issuing any commands or instituting any specific legislation (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 311). Instead, Harper uses logical assumptions by emphasizing the importance of upholding democratic ideals. The agenda for the speech has been set into a broader topic of what the attack means for all Canadians, regardless of their political affiliations.

Legitimization and Delegitimization

Once the Prime Minister has positioned himself as the leader of *all* Canadians, he then delegitimizes Zehaf-Bibeau's actions by labeling his actions as acts of terrorism (1:21-1:28)

"Fellow Canadians, in the days to come, we will learn more about the terrorist and any accomplices he may have had" (CBC News, 2014b).

Zehaf-Bibeau's name is not mentioned throughout the speech, only acknowledged as "the terrorist," dehumanizing Zehaf-Bibeau into an abstract entity (2014b). The label of terrorist comes with negative connotations as it alludes to the War on Terror against organizations, such as al-Qaeda, even if they are not explicitly mentioned (Horvath, 2012: 50). More so, the use of "we" encompasses the attack on a more individual level as Harper emphasizes that Canadians must work together to protect "our" soil as "we" learn more (CBC News, 2014b).

Representation and Misrepresentation

Finally, Harper controls the representation of information surrounding the event through his concluding remarks. The goal of Harper's speech was to mold the discourse

into a narrative that calls for hardline measures as the common sense solution (Maimona, 2014: 3).

(2:05-2:19)

“In fact, this will lead us to strengthen our resolve and redouble our efforts and those of our national security agencies to take all necessary steps to identify and counter threats, and keep Canada safe here at home” (CBC News, 2014b).

It is hard to disagree with this reasoning, as obviously the security of the nation after an attack should be the upmost concern. Harper’s reasoning represents the state’s response as a rational solution.

(2:20-2:33)

“Just as it will lead us to strengthen our resolve and redouble our efforts to work with our allies around the world and fight against the terrorist organizations who brutalize those in other countries with the hope of bring savagery to our shores” (CBC News, 2014b).

Harper has conceptualized Zehaf-Bibeau’s actions as the acts of a foreign enemy who has declared war against the Canada as a nation. His actions are categorized under the understanding that terrorists are irrational actors who will go to any length to destroy the West (Horvath, 2012: 50-52). The attack is presented as part of the broader political initiative that going to war against these actors is needed for the self-defense of the state. As in all wars, Canadians must be prepared to make sacrifices and put their trust in Harper’s efforts.

Zehaf-Bibeau Conceptualization

Prior to his attack, Zehaf-Bibeau recorded a cell phone video in his car, where he outlined his reasoning for his imminent actions. The RCMP allowed for the full release of the video at the end of May 2015 (The Toronto Star, 2015). In his monologue, it becomes

evident that Zehaf-Bibeau conceptualizes his actions as part of the larger war against the West.

Coercion

Zehaf-Bibeau begins his monologue by positioning himself as the authoritative speaker of the subject at hand by aligning himself with “Allah” (The Toronto Star, 2015).

Time: 0:02-0:12

“In the name of Allah, the most gracious and the most merciful. All praises to Allah, the lord of the universe. We seek his help and ask for his forgiveness. Lord, open for me my chest, ease my task for me and remove the impediment from my speech” (The Toronto Star, 2015).

Zehaf-Bibeau has situated himself as speaking on behalf of others, as he blends his reference to “my” and “me” and interchanges it with the pronoun “we” (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 311; The Toronto Star, 2015). He is creating a political space as he coerces his listeners to accept that he has accepted a “task” from Allah on the behalf of his audience because he is working to improve the current environment to earn Allah’s mercy (2015). Thus, in order to persuade others, he has positioned himself as carrying out a higher power’s wishes.

Legitimization and Delegitimization

A few seconds later, Zehaf-Bibeau legitimizes his position through the use of self-promotion using his extremist credentials. Zehaf-Bibeau identifies himself as part of a larger cause, the Mujahideen, referring to the army of holy fighters engaged in jihad (Payton, 2015). He uses the pronouns “we,” “our,” and, “us” as a way to position himself

as the spokesperson for the Mujahideen (The Toronto Star, 2015). He has legitimized himself through this reference, as he is part of a historical movement that has gone on for centuries, fighting against the West (Arbabzadah, 2011).

(0:23- 0:32)

“So we are retaliating, the Mujahideen of this world. Canada’s officially become one of our enemies by fighting and bombing us, and creating a lot of terror in our countries and killing us and killing our innocents” (The Toronto Star, 2015).

Zehaf-Bibeau persuades the listener of the importance of his cause by adopting an “us” versus “them” dialogue that polarizes the political space (van Dijk, 1997b: 32). Canada becomes delegitimized, as it is described as one of the Mujahideen’s “enemies” that creates “terror” as well as “killing” civilians (Chilton and Schaffner, 2011: 312; The Toronto Star, 2015). These words invoke negative connotations of violence, which implies that the violence conducted by Canada is illegitimate.

He then legitimizes the Mujahideen by highlighting how they are different from the Canadian state, by highlighting traits that invoke positive connotations through the use of inclusive pronouns.

(0:50-0:54)

“We are good people, righteous people, believing his laws, and his prophets peace be upon them all” (The Toronto Star, 2015).

“We” positions Zehaf-Bibeau as part of a group that represents individuals who are fighting for peace to end the oppression that is conducted by Canada (The Toronto Star, 2015). Zehaf-Bibeau is legitimizing himself and his actions through the use the personal pronoun “we” as he boasts about the characteristics of the Mujahideen (2015).

He highlighted the differences between himself and the state as he is “righteous,” while his opponent is an enemy that “kills innocents” (The Toronto Star, 2015). His grievance is that the state is illegitimately conducting war against Allah.

Representation and Misrepresentation

Once Zehaf-Bibeau has delegitimized Canada’s actions, he ends his speech using the third PDA technique to appear rational in order to carry out his attack against the state.

(0:57-1:07)

“Inshallah, we’ll not cease until you guys decide to be a peaceful country and stay to your own and I, and stop going to other countries and stop occupying and killing the righteous of us who are trying to bring back religious law in our countries” (Toronto Star, 2015).

Inshallah, translated as “if Allah wills,” is defined as a phrase that is said before future events and can be interpreted as an individual’s desire to do “God’s will” on what is good for humanity and the world as a whole (AHYA, 2015). By invoking “God’s will,” Zehaf-Bibeau has acknowledged that his future task will be difficult to complete and “God’s blessing” is necessary as that will be the driving force behind Zehaf-Bibeau’s task (AHYA, 2015). Thus, Zehaf-Bibeau used the representation technique to control the amount of information he provides to his audience regarding the problem that he views he must take action against. However, he has also misrepresented the situation through his oversimplification of the problem being entirely Canada’s fault. Zehaf-Bibeau ends his speech, depicting his actions as part of the greater battle against the West.

Discussion

The purpose of this case was to demonstrate that the discourse surrounding the aftermath of a terror attack painted an incomplete picture because Harper did not acknowledge Zehaf-Bibeau's personal troubles. The explanation of the motive by both Harper's and Zehaf-Bibeau's discourse appeared to be in line with one another. However, once the context is applied, a tension still emerges between the government's explanation and an explanation that includes all three levels of analysis. The analysis is split into two sections to best answer the research questions presented. First, Zehaf-Bibeau's motivations behind his attack are investigated and second, the metaphorical conceptualization is examined.

Applying the Multilevel Variable

In the days that followed, Harper's narrative that Zehaf-Bibeau's actions were driven by an extremist-inspired agenda motivated by foreign policy grievances were confirmed by Canadian law enforcement (Hobman, 2014). Bob Paulson, the Commissioner of the RCMP, stated that Zehaf-Bibeau's actions were "purposeful, deliberate, considered premeditated actions" that were driven by a "distorted world view" (Stone, 2014). Zehaf-Bibeau's motivations, Paulson added, "were in respect, broadly, to Canada's foreign policy, and also in respect of his religious beliefs" (Stone, 2014). The cellphone video cited as the primary evidence used to give little doubt that Zehaf-Bibeau was an ISIL-inspired terrorist (Leblanc, 2015). The RCMP would later add context to Paulson's remarks and Harper's speech, citing that the trigger for the violent radicalization stemmed from Zehaf-Bibeau becoming frustrated over his inability to

renew his passport to travel abroad (Glassford, 2015). The individual level was ignored as Commissioner Paulson reiterated, “I’m not persuaded at all that mental illness is what’s driving these things” (Stone, 2014). The analysis by government officials highlighted the international factors as the principle reason with domestic undertones.

Zehaf-Bibeau explicitly defined his actions as driven by grievances at the international level, as he explained that he was acting in retaliation for Canada’s actions in Iraq (The Toronto Star, 2015). However, an investigation into the individual level adds complexity to the incident as the pre-conditional factors displayed a mentally unstable man who clung onto religion as a way to make sense of his life that was in a rapid decline (Wines and Yardley, 2014). Susan Bibeau, in a letter to the press, attempted to provide context to her son’s attack, writing that, “I believe he acted in desperation” and that “for me mental illness, is at the centre of this tragedy” (2014: 2). And in regards to his inability to get a passport, “he was mad and felt trapped so the only way out was death” (Bibeau, 2014: 2). Zehaf-Bibeau was alienated from his parents, ostracized from his mosque, and his psychological state altered with his fear of being chased by the devil (Lampert and Gordon, 2014). From this analysis, it appears that Zehaf-Bibeau was a vulnerable individual who did not handle stressful events well as the passport issue frustrated him enough to express himself violently.

Policy Implications

The labeling given to radicalized individuals in the aftermath of a terror attack has vast implications for the political responses to the event, whether it is characterized as a disease, crime, or war (DeAngelis, 2009). Harper’s emulation to the war metaphor set a tone that the state would develop a defensive strategy that would employ all necessary

means against the enemy from reaching Canadian shores. Zehaf-Bibeau's actions were depicted as reminders to the public that terrorists were targeting the Canadian state for the freedom that it represented. The Harper government demanded that the response must be militaristic, as Canada has to defend itself against the "evil" and "savagery" that is promoted by violent extremism (CBC News, 2014b). Negotiation and bargaining with these irrational terrorists were deemed unnecessary solutions that would not deter future attacks (Sederberg, 2003: 275). This position was reaffirmed on October 23, when Former Defense Minister Rob Nicholson stated that Canada's international counterterror operations in Iraq "will continue unimpeded" (Puzic, 2014). Harper oversimplified Zehaf-Bibeau's actions because he depicted as him as in individual who acted against the freedom that Canada exemplifies, not as a mentally ill individual angry at the direction that his life had taken (Greenwald, 2014).

The conceptualization of Zehaf-Bibeau's actions under the war metaphor ignores the root causes that may have helped to motivate his attack. Under the war metaphor, ultimate victory is the final expectation (Seberberg, 2003: 271). But the problem with the use of this metaphor in political rhetoric is that a terrorist's ideology simply cannot be defeated as it becomes hard to figure out what the ultimate objective would be (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2008: 103). Harper's counter-terror measures have not stated what the end point is, only that violent extremism must be eliminated (Greenwald, 2010). However, Canada has been at war against terrorism for almost a decade and a half, yet violent extremism continues to exist around the globe (Greenwald, 2014). An extended state of war puts Canada into an indefinite state of emergency, increasing public fears against a threat that is bound to happen when the counter-terror measures do not address

the grievances of its aggrieved citizens (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2008: 103-106). Defeating extremist ideologies cannot be accomplished through violent action, instead Canada must win a battle of ideas (Sederberg, 2003: 272).

Sederberg in addressing his own metaphor states, “the context within which terrorism occurs, while it may not mean everything, certainly means something” (2003: 268). The disease metaphor should have been incorporated into the state response as it includes the pre-conditions of the individual and the stress stimuli that helped to shape a “distorted view” of global events (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2008: 97). However, the disease metaphor may have been deemed politically inappropriate by Harper’s party because it would have admitted that terrorism can not be defeated, only managed, like a chronic health condition (Sederberg, 2003: 275). The incomprehension that Canadians felt in the aftermath of Zehaf-Bibeau’s attack should have been followed by an examination into prevention programs to assist vulnerable individuals, rather than the Conservative response that terrorists hate Canadian ideals (Greenwald, 2014). This reasoning appears illogical and oversimplified to explain why a terror happened if the perpetrator was in fact Canadian. Other variables were clearly at play. The war metaphor has proven to be an inadequate framework as the state’s response should have been multidimensional to address the conditions from which extremist views, like Zehaf-Bibeau’s, arise (Sederberg, 2003: 282).

Chapter Six: Conclusion

Developing effective counter-terror policies has become an increasingly difficult affair, as the threat posed by new terror's homegrown agenda is difficult to detect. Brian Jenkins characterized the complexity of these terror attacks as, "catching people like Zehaf-Bibeau or Couture-Rouleau before they carry out attacks can be a special kind of hell...its not like there's an x-ray machine to see what a man is thinking" (Patriquin and Friscolanti, 2014). Were these attacks preventable? Probably not, as Zehaf-Bibeau's cell phone video was taken the same day as his attack and Couture-Rouleau left no warning whatsoever (Patriquin and Friscolanti, 2014). Security agencies are also caught in a difficult situation, as it is not illegal to hold radical views in Canada, making it increasingly hard to identify possible security threats (Geddes, 2014). Political rhetoric has illustrated that officials are having difficulty conceptualizing this kind of terror, relying on the war metaphor, which that does not completely fit with these violent Canadians. Consequently, the cure to preventing violent radicalization is currently unknown as these extremist beliefs continue to permeate state borders across the globe, influencing vulnerable individuals to action (Sederberg, 2003: 272).

Findings

From the data examined in this analysis, it appears that Canadian officials are overvaluing the explanation that the motives behind the October 2014 terror attacks were caused by grievances at the international level and not the pre-conditions that existed at the individual level. The multilevel variable proved to be important as it highlighted the degree of influence that a level had on the actor's actions. These case studies confirmed

earlier findings that violently radicalized individuals who act alone are more likely to be mentally ill and more likely to be influenced by stressful external situations in their vulnerable state (Corner and Gill, 2015). The grievances between Zehaf-Bibeau and Couture-Rouleau were slightly different, but a trend emerged as both of the actors were undergoing periods of decline with their personal troubles (Patriquin and Friscolanti, 2014). That is not to underestimate the violence conducted by Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau. Their actions were acts of terrorism because their targets were symbolically chosen, fitting the Criminal Code of Canada's definition of terror as a tactic that is employed for a religious, political, or ideological objective to coerce the government to change its policy or actions (Government of Canada Justice Laws, 2015). The case studies demonstrated the complexity surrounding the process to violent radicalization that has largely baffled the Canadian public and government officials.

Metaphorical Analysis

The purpose of the metaphorical analysis was to investigate if Canadian political rhetoric matched the reasoning that the perpetrators of the October 2014 attacks gave for their actions. Given the push by Canadian political officials to categorize Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau's actions as part of the larger battle against terrorism, a modification of this conceptualization is needed. The Conservative Party's stance that extremist ideology pushes an individual to violence is incorrect as more variables are at play (Kundnani, 2015: 10). The war metaphor as a framework for policymaking lacks the attention needed to curtail the conditions from which vulnerable individuals develop their extremist views (Hartmann-Mahmud, 2002: 431). War, as conceptualized by Canadian officials, appears to have undefined goals and fails to comprehend why individuals turn

against their home country. Like policies of the past including the “War on Drugs,” declaring war on a concept may work in the short term to attract attention to the problem, but it does little to address the numerous variables or pathways that contribute to the crisis in a meaningful way (Hartmann-Mahmud, 2002: 427- 431). War may be a political instrument to add simplicity to a complex problem, but to explain violent radicalization in Canada, another conceptualization is needed to better understand the recent terror plots.

Recommendations

From this analysis, it is clear that the individual level has been undervalued, therefore the best way to manage the radicalization process is to treat it like a chronic health problem under the disease framework and apply methods to reduce its intensity. This may entail further research to examine the pre-conditions and stresses at the individual level, in order to develop more effective security procedures. Social reform programs may be part of the solution to prevent vulnerable individuals from catching the “infectious” ideas (Sederberg, 2003: 275-276). However, the state must be wary of pursuing policies that employ aggressive means to detect violent radicals, as these policies may be unacceptable to its citizens (272). Counter-terror policies must ensure that civil liberties are not infringed upon, especially in a democratic state like Canada, which prides itself on these credentials (Sageman, 2008: 269). Yet, figuring out what happens “before the bomb goes off” is a complex task and Canadians must prepare themselves for an era where not every attack can be prevented (Sedgwick, 2010: 479).

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