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University  
of Glasgow

**School of Social and Political Science**

Qualitative comparative manifesto analysis of three Western  
European Populist Radical Right Parties.

FPÖ, UKIP and FN and immigration related policies

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## Abstract

*The European Elections in 2014, national elections and recent opinion show consolidated high popularity of Populist Radical Right Parties all over Europe. In particular in Austria, the UK and France domestic populist radical right parties seem to successively gain more influence and salience. Since this party family stresses national values and questions immigration in general, this work explicitly scrutinizes these parties' stances on immigration and immigration related issues. The following issue areas are examined: immigration in general, the proposed immigration system and access to labour market, protecting national values/ the nation state and law and order policies. The author uses a qualitative manifesto analysis to study the party positions of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Front National (FN). By doing so, the analysis is based on the most recent party manifestos published by each party. In addition, this work compares the party positions and uncovers distinct differences. The comparison makes clear that party positions of the FPÖ are the most strict and extreme, whereas the UKIP takes the most moderate stances. The FN does not claim to have similar strict policies as the FPÖ however; the FN stance is clearly very close to FPÖ's positions. Even if there are marginal differences between the three parties in law and policies, the other policy areas confirm the aforementioned pattern.*

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## ***1. Introduction***

In the latest European Elections of 2014, European Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) had remarkable success. In countries such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Greece far-right parties could increase their share of votes. In particular in France, in the United Kingdom (UK) and in Austria, PRRPs could demonstrate their consolidated strong support. The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) ranked third with a share of 19.72%. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as well as the Front National (FN) elevated to the first position in their countries (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014: 285). One year later, the UK General Elections 2015 has not confirmed UKIP's first place but it could manifest UKIP's position as the third most popular party in the UK with a share of votes of 12.6% (BBC, 2015). The latest French departmental elections in March 2015 have shown that between the first and second round of these elections 25.19% and 22.23% of the French voters have preferred the Front National (election-departementale, 2015). Recent opinion polls from May 2015 demonstrate that around 30% of French voters would prefer FN's leader Marine le Pen as a presidential candidate in their first round of the French presidential election (Odaxa, 2015). Opinion polls from 10th May 2015 in Austria substantiate the FPÖ's strong performance. The popularity raised to 26%, hence second party in Austria (Gallup, 2015).

With that in mind, the salience of PRRP<sup>1</sup>s in those countries is evident and their influence on specific policy areas is increasing<sup>2</sup>. Thus, there is academic research on different kinds of issues related to PRRPs. As so, their influence on their domestic competitors and on distinct policies<sup>3</sup> is scrutinized as well as the reason for their popularity<sup>4</sup>. Also, recent research examines PRRPs voters' attitudes toward, for example, authoritarianism, scepticism or xenophobia<sup>5</sup>. In addition, academic work discusses the different approaches competing domestic parties undertake in order to counter PRRPs' success and influence<sup>6</sup>. With regard to cross-country comparisons, the literature rather focusses on common reasons for their rising popularity or academic literature conducts quantitative manifesto analysis<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> This work will exclusively focus on radical populist parties of the right party spectrum.

<sup>2</sup> See chapter: 2.5.

<sup>3</sup> See for instance: Akkerman, 2012; Rydgren, 2003; Lynch and Whitaker, 2013

<sup>4</sup> See for instance: Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006

<sup>5</sup> See for instance: Rydgren, 2008

<sup>6</sup> See for instance: Gruber and Bale, 2014

<sup>7</sup> See for instance: Alonso and Fonseca, 2012



My dissertation will answer different questions. It will contribute to the recent academic discussion about PRRPs since it will analyse and compare three PRRPs manifestos with regard to immigration policies. This policy area is chosen since PRRPs do not only strongly criticise current immigration policies but also regard questions about immigration as one of their core policy areas and advocate for radical steps in immigration policy<sup>8</sup>. Furthermore, this work will aim to classify the parties' positions according to their degree of rigour and toughness. More precisely, it will help to understand and explain the differences and similarities in specific policy positions. I will focus on Austria, the UK and France since the PRRPs of these countries were among the strongest parties in the latest European Elections and I am able to understand the original sources.

Regarding the importance of my study, I am firstly convinced that a comparison of the parties' policy positions can contribute to the study of PRRPs in Europe. Secondly, this work will narrow the gap of the recent academic work as it will apply a qualitative content analysis on the latest party manifestos of three salient PRRPs in Western Europe.

This work is structured as follows. At the beginning, a general overview about the definition of populism will be revealed. In addition, the academic discussion about PRRPs' characteristics and their challenges will be outlined. Furthermore, the electoral base of the three chosen PRRPs and their impacts on representative politics will be portrayed. The subsequent section will portray the methodical concept and the research design of that work. The following analysis will describe the parties' positions and eventually identify similar and different positions. With regard to coherence, all parts of this work and analyses will follow a distinct order that starts with Austria, followed by the UK and France.

## ***2. A Party family: Radical right populist parties***

### ***2.1. Defining the term Populism***

Up to the present, populism has been a driving force in favour of diverse and contrasting goals. Dependant on the context, populism can be for change but it can also be for the preservation of the status quo. Dependant on the forces behind populism, it can be associated with both extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing groups. The concept of populism itself is a rather multifaceted concept that is difficult to generalize since it is usually specific to the context where it is active and has emerged out of (Taggart, 2000). However, one can agree on

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<sup>8</sup> See chapter 3. and Dunn, 2015; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006

the following characteristics: Populism stands for a “rather vague understanding of democracy“ and strongly prefers direct democratic ideas over the system of a representative democracy (Pelinka, 2013a: 3). “Ordinary people should govern themselves” and therefore populism considers institutionalised governing structures as hurdle for direct democracy (Pelinka, 2013a: 3). Shils (1956: 100) tries to outline specific attributes which characterise populism. In general, populists deny well-educated citizens their respect by saying they lack the “simple wisdom and virtue of the people”. In addition, populists show their aversion towards more sophisticated people because those purportedly consider themselves as something superior than ordinary people (Shils: 1956). The institutional political framework supposedly interferes into the expression of the people’s will and therefore populist democracy should be installed. This concept of populist democracy involves “direct action of a large number of people” that could eventually circumvent the institutions of a political system (Kornhauser, 1960: 131). In that vein, populists’ democracy model does not favour checks and balances of political processes and advocate “no separation of powers” or “division of responsibility” (Shils, 1956: 104). Populists however regard the will of the people as the unique force that has both the legitimacy and is able to set moral standards and is able to rule over justice (Shils, 1956). In populists’ mind, indirect democracy neither works nor represents them. In fact, this triggers frustration and disappointment among populists (Pelinka 2013a).

With regard to economic affairs, populism prefers highly interventionist states and is likely to pledge for nationalisation of banks (Taggart, 2000, Wiles, 1969). This position shows contradictory populists’ views since populists usually oppose the “autonomy of the legislative branch of government” and “deny autonomy to any institution” (Shils, 196: 101).

These contradicting viewpoints are in line with Wiles observations as he argues that populists’ views lack “ideological stability”. If some way of ideological stability is present, the “ideology is loose” and “logic and effectiveness are less valued” than moral and “correct attitudes” among populists (Wiles, 1969: 167-168).

When looking explicitly at the distinction populists make when claiming to speak on behalf of the people, one can state that the differentiation between those who are the people and those who do not belong to the people can be traced along lines of wealth. Di Tella (1965) explains that the people who consider themselves as *the people* are poorer than the elite. Wiles (1969) argues similarly and explains that wealth is usually held by those who are under

attack by the populists. However, this generalisation could be based on wrong assumptions and should be treated with caution since populism can also be associated with various social bases. For instance, populism can occur either when there is a middle/upper middle class or a mass of citizens that expresses their discontent with the current status-quo (Di Tella, 1965). Wiles (1969) argues that populists oppose the establishment as well as the counter-elite. Also, populism mistrusts centres of powers and the alienation towards their opponents can become violent. In its most extreme forms populism can become authoritarian and reject democracy. Therefore Taggart (2000: 114) argues that populism can be regarded as a societal force that tests the “tolerance of representative politics”. Inversely, when populist movements occur one can state that the democratic system is permeable for populist sentiments. Upcoming populism can indicate the “health of the representative political system” and signal problems in the political system (Taggart, 2000: 114-115).

One of the origins of populism could be associated with the people’s reactions to modernity or to particular factors of the modern world. Increased scope and complexity of the representative democracy with regard to state-like institution such as the European Union (EU) has enhanced both the discontent of *the people* and increased the target of criticism (Taggart, 2000: 13, 116). Likewise, Wiles (1969: 170) argues as he points out that populism is “fundamentally nostalgic” and explains that populists are discontent with the present and the short-term future. They seek for a future in conformity with their values and morale of the past. However, one should not assume that there is a simple link and an easy explanation with regard to modernity and increasing populism. Nonetheless, one could say that modernity “allows the condition for populism to become systematized and therefore to become manifest in populism movements” (Taggart, 2000: 111).

## **2.2. *Populist radical-right parties***

Following section explores the party family of populist radical right parties in Europe (PRRPs). After a research about core characteristics of PRRPs in Europe, I have found out that many scholars refer to Mudde’s (2007) work when discussing the nature of PRRPs<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, I have decided to mainly ground my discussion about PRRPs on his work.

The core concept of PRRPs is the nation. Other features of the populist radical right- wing (PRR) party family are rooted in this core characteristic. The concept of the nation itself and nationalism are closely linked. Nationalism advocates for a “congruence of the cultural and

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<sup>9</sup> See for instance: Rooduijn, 2014, Niels Spierings & Andrej Zaslove, 2015

political unit” of a state or nation and nationalism always contains ethnic and civic elements (Mudde, 2007: 16; Wimmer, 2002). The core aim of nationalists is to realise a “monocultural state” (Mudde, 2007: 16). In the mind of a nationalist, a nation purely of homogeneous people can be achieved through a spectrum of ways such as assimilation and expulsion. More extreme ways are expulsion and genocide (Koch, 1991).

Due to conceptual stretching and to the sheer fact that state nationalism was a founding ideology for many countries, this term is problematic for a definition of PRRPs (Mudde, 2007 and Gellner, 1997). According to Mudde (2007) in order to describe precisely the nature PRRPs, one should not regard nationalism as the adequate term to define their core characteristic. One should rather consider the term *nativism* as appropriate. Although PRRPs are doubtlessly characterised by nationalist attributes, referring to the term nationalism would be unsuitable when distinguishing moderate nationalists from radical nationalists. Therefore, I consider the term *nativism* more appropriate when examining the core concept of PRRPs: the nation.

*Nativism* can be broadly defined as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. The ideology of *nativism* states “that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group” (Mudde, 2007: 19). As consequence, non-native populations menace the homogeneous nation-state. In order to delineate natives from non-natives, this distinction can be drawn alongside ethnic, racial, cultural and religious aspects (Benett 1990). The aforementioned definition leads to a conclusion that *nativism* excludes moderate nationalism and states that *nativism* can be racist as well as non-racist since it can distinguish natives from non-natives according to their culture or religion.

Rydgren (2007) however uses the term *ethno-nationalism* when defining PRRPs but comes to similar conclusions. He states that PRRPs strive for a homogenous nation. Xenophobia and the priority of preserving the national identity are emphasized in their manifestos. Furthermore, they consider cultural diversity as a cause for the extinction of the nation’s culture (Griffin, 2000). The term *ethno-nationalist* expresses a rejection of other ethnicities. More precisely, other ethnicities are considered to be “incompatible and incommensurable” (Rydgren, 2007: 244).

A second major characteristic of PRRPs is *authoritarianism* that emphasises on law and order in the society (Rydgren, 2007). PRRPs share the belief that a “strictly ordered society” should be envisaged. Any deviation from rules and morals should be strictly avenged and punished

(Mudde, 2007:23). Their belief in authority is not “blind obedience”. Rather, the authority should reflect the will of the people (Rooduijn, 2014).

The third major feature of PRRPs is *populism*. According to my earlier description of populists and their differentiation of the *people*, it is important to extend my description with regard to right-wing populism in particular. When claiming to speak on behalf of *the people*, populists show their aversion against intellectual and economic elites and existing democratic systems. In populist mind, those people who do not belong to their group are *the others*. Right-wing populism does exclude further people from their group of *the people*. Those people are considered to be “alien, [...] foreign due to birth, citizenship, religion, culture or race”. Any populism traced alongside one’s nationality, race and religion can be identified as right-wing populism (Pelinka, 2013a: 7). In addition, Pelinka (2013a) underlines that in general contemporary right-wing populism is even more directed against those from abroad than against the elite from above. But when anti-elitism occurs, it accuses those who are purportedly responsible for the immigration of *the others* into their land. Also, anti-elitism today opposes the elites who supports further European integration and globalization. In a nutshell, right-wing populism is based on the aversion of those who are considered to be foreign and those who seem to be responsible for it.

Scholars such as Mammone (2009: 183) are rather critical and do not consider populism as a core characteristic of the parties that I label PRR. Instead, she names PRRPs as neo-fascist parties and argues that populism is not “the key feature” of these extreme right-wing parties since populist elements can also be observed along the entire party spectrum. Furthermore, she opposes the fact that one has “stretched this container concept too far” and it has created the new party category of PRRPs (Mammone, 2009: 183). In similar vein, Husbands (2002: 51) points out that “it is not merely that the populist attribution gives to these movements a homogeneity that they do not have but rather it may give them the wrong sort of homogeneity”. Also, Collovald (2003: 279-280) makes clear that by labelling these parties national-populist instead of fascist, one “also provide a sort of political and democratic legitimization of right-wing extremism”. In order to precisely describe these parties, it would be more appropriate to refer to xenophobic, anti-system and ethno-nationalist attributes. With regard to the preferred notion of neo-fascism by Mammone and Collovald, Mudde (2000) takes a different stance. In his understanding, parties that are labelled neo-fascist stand nowadays exclusively for parties that want to “restore the Third Reich [...] or quote historical National Socialism (fascism) as their ideological influence” Mudde (2000: 12). Furthermore,

the ideology of fascism bases on the belief that the nation is “at a turning-point in the historical process” (Griffin, 1991:33, 35). This belief is uncommon in the new radical right parties’ ideology as they do not want to set up a new order and replace the current system (Griffin, 2000). Further core values of fascism such as populist ultranationalism and decadence are partly addressed by PRRPs (Rydgren, 2007). The PRRPs’ *ethno-nationalism* is “less aggressive and expansive” as the fascist populist nationalism (Rydgren, 2007: 246). However pledging for “ethnic purity, homogeneity, and organic order places them in the same tradition as fascism”. Concerning decadence, only some parties include that ideological theme. This leads to the conclusion that PRRPs are not fascists but “there are affinities to fascism” (Rydgren, 2007: 246).

Even though few scholars reject the term PRR to describe a distinct party family, I am convinced that the term populism is appropriate with regard to that party family I look at. In fact, populists’ attitudes encapsulate anti-system stances what should be considered as more liable according to critics such as Mammone. In addition, I put xenophobic and ethno-nationalist attitudes under the banner of nativism. By doing so, I also reconcile Mammone’s critique. Lastly, I consider authoritarianism as the third major pillar of PRRPs.

As a conceptual delineation from right-wing extremism, Mudde (2000: 13) points out that PRRPs and extreme right-wing parties “do not differ that much in content”. Core features of extreme right-wing parties are “national pride [...], dissatisfaction with democratic institutions [...], militarism or patriotism [...], law and order [...], anti- Americanism [...] and attitude towards political change” (Falter and Schumann 1988: 101). Concerning differences towards PRRPs, extreme right-wing parties typically stand for “anti-democratic features” (Mudde, 2000: 13). In contrast, PRRPs do not intend to eliminate partially or fully the free democratic order (Frisch, 1990). According to Zaslove (2004: 66), extreme right-wing parties “oppose the constitutional order (Verfassungswidrig)” whereas PRRPs are less extreme, accept “the general constitutional parameters” but challenge strongly the “limits of liberal democracies“. Furthermore, Eatwell (2000: 411) suggests to stress that parties of the extreme right-wing spectrum can be characterised as “anti-parliamentarian” whereas PRRPs take part in parliamentary elections attempt to win seats (Dunn, 2015).

The following brief paragraph addresses the question whether the three chosen parties from Austria, the UK and France can be put under the banner of PRRPs. Recent academic work

classifies them as PRRPs<sup>10</sup> and to add, the analysis of the party manifestos has given further evidence to prove that each party is a PRRP. This section will confirm them as populist parties on the basis of the rhetoric in their manifestos. Elements that complement the aforementioned term PRRP will be later highlighted during the analysis and comparison. In other words, radical right-wing positions, authoritarian elements and their stress on the nation will become more apparent later.

Every single party regards itself as the alternative of all other established parties and all three parties resent the establishment of their mainstream competitors. Identically in line with the aforementioned characteristics of populism, these parties criticise the power of the country in the hands of only a few and they advocate more direct democratic participation such as referenda. In their mind, current political governments and parties do not represent the will of the people anymore. Instead, the political elites represent only the interests of a marginal part of the society. For instance the FPÖ (2013: 22) states “[...] dass die Macht zurück an jene ergeht, die sie haben sollen: Die Bevölkerung”<sup>11</sup>, UKIP (2015: 3) says: “[...] UKIP came from: a feeling that successive governments were no longer representing the will of the British people” and “[...] we will allow a national referendum on the issues of greatest importance to the British public” (UKIP, 2015: 57). Likewise, the FN expresses its aversion: “[...] les élites de gauche et droite<sup>12</sup>” (FN, 2012: 105) and “Le référendum d’initiative populaire serait inscrit dans la Constitution et les conditions de son organisation seraient allégées afin de permettre un réel exercice de la démocratie directe<sup>13</sup>” (FN, 2012: 103). Moreover, data in their manifestos demonstrate their mistrust in globalisation, liberalists’ ideas, power of corporations and the increasing scope of the EU. According to their manifestos, the FPÖ (2013: 20) voices “Traditionelle Fixpunkte lösen sich im Sog der Globalisierung immer mehr auf. Politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammenhänge werden immer komplizierter und für den berühmten „kleinen Mann“ letztendlich nicht mehr nachvollziehbar.<sup>14</sup>” In the same vein, UKIP (2015: 3) demands to “[...] rebalance power from large corporations and big government institutions and put it back into the hands of the

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<sup>10</sup> See for instance: Afonso, 2015; Gruber and Bale, 2014; Pelinka, 2013b; Mudde, 2013; Rooduijn, 2014

<sup>11</sup> Translations all mine unless other stated: Power should return in the hands of citizens

<sup>12</sup> Translation: the elites of the centre-left and centre-right parties

<sup>13</sup> Translation: Access to petitions for referenda will be written in the constitution and conditions of their application will be simplified. This will enable direct democracy.

<sup>14</sup> Translation: The globalisation dissolves traditional values and customs. The political and economic background becomes more complex and complicated. Hence, the ordinary citizen cannot cope with it anymore.

people of this country [...]”. Similarly, the FN (2012 :5) argues that “L’Union européenne ensuite, cheval de Troie de la mondialisation ultralibérale [...]”<sup>15</sup>.

### **2.3. Dilemmas and challenges for PRRPs**

At the very beginning it seems noteworthy to highlight a dilemma populist parties face in general. Even though populism mistrusts institutions and the system of representative politics, populist parties are forced to challenge established parties in that very system they constantly criticize (Taggart, 2000).

A popular strategy that was implemented in France and Belgium against the FN and the Vlaams Belang was the “cordon sanitaire”. This is a systematic exclusion of PRRPs in any cooperation with other parties (Pelinka, 2013b: 11 and Mudde, 2007: 289). On the one hand, potential cooperation cannot be achieved by the PRRPs, on the other hand one could argue that these parties are taken “incentives to moderate” and helps them “to focus themselves fully on a vote-maximizing strategy” (Mudde, 2007: 289). The opposite strategy is cooperation and even an invitation to join a government. Pelinka (2013b) refers to Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark. Regarding the two former countries, the Austrian FPÖ and the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn could not reconcile their populist promises and governmental responsibility and experienced big defeats during the following elections (Pelinka, 2013b). In addition, PRRPs’ role in government is “usually fairly limited” and weaker ministries are allocated to PRRPs’ members (Mudde, 2007: 280). The Dansk Folkeparti however could consolidate its position in Denmark through contributing to additional seats for a governing majority between 2001 and 2011 despite not occupying any ministries. By doing so, the Danish party could introduce some of their policies while not taking risks through bad performances of potential ministers (Pelinka, 2013b).

### **2.4. Electorate Base of PRRPs**

When analysing the electoral base of PRRPs in Europe, Webb and Bale (2014) claim that both centre-right and centre-left parties in countries such as the UK, France and Austria have to worry about voter defection towards the PRRPs. Election studies have shown that especially “culturally anxious blue-collar workers” support PRRPs (Webb and Bale, 2014: 968). Moreover, one general characteristic is the gender gap which describes a discrepancy between male and female PRRPs’ voters. At all levels of these parties (leadership, membership and electorate) there is a lower female participation. However, one should not

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<sup>15</sup> Translation: The EU is a Trojan horse that incorporates the ideas of ultraliberal globalisation.



overvalue that fact as such a discrepancy between men and women occurs likewise in centre-right and conservative parties of the present. Current literature tries to explain the gender gap in PRRPs voters' behaviour. Immerzeel et al (2015) assume that male blue-collar workers especially are more likely to experience direct competition from immigrants for their employments. In opposition to that, women do not experience direct competition from immigrants to that extent since they are likely to work in the public sector or remain at home. In light of these two instances, Immerzeel et al (2015) argue that men tend to be more anti-immigration as it is more likely for them to face direct competition. Other potential explanation for the gender gap could be that men prefer authoritarian attitudes of PRRPs since they are more likely to prefer strict law and order attitudes (Gidengil, 2005).

Regardless of the explanations for the gender gap, previous studies about authoritarianism and nationalism seem to have proved that individuals who prefer PRRPs have an authoritarian predisposition and are very likely to share exclusive-nationalist values (Altemeyer, 1996, Verdery, 1993). These viewpoints are recently challenged by Dunn (2015: 376). He argues differently and discovered that voters' authoritarian attitudes do not "inconsistently predicts preference for [P]RRP parties". In Austria for instance, Dunn (2015: 376) could observe that "the probability of preferring a RRP party actually declines as authoritarianism increases". However, exclusive-nationalist attitudes (nativism) of PRRPs' voters can clearly be regarded as a liable core characteristic of PRRPs' voters (Dunn, 2015).

With regard to economic attitudes, welfare-chauvinism<sup>16</sup> is a strong concern among PRRPs' voters, in particular in combination with EU-migration (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005). Apart from typical Eurosceptic attitudes that are in line with the aforementioned populist attitude against the power of elites and institutions (Vasilopoulou, 2011), environmental issues seem to be equally important for PRRPs' supporters. More precisely, PRRPs' partisans oppose post material and cosmopolitan attitudes (Inglehart, 1997). In addition, it is noteworthy that one cannot talk about a homogeneous group of voters. Instead, the electorate is diverse and varies between parties and countries (Mudde, 2007 and Spierings & Zaslove, 2015).

In order to give a general overview about the data which has been analysed I want to point out some significant findings before scrutinizing all three parties' voters in detail.

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<sup>16</sup> See chapter methodical concept and research design for explanation

My analysis has shown that it is more likely that men vote for the three parties. There is a more significant gap among UKIP and FPÖ voters than among FN voters. Moreover, young voters are especially attracted to the FN and the FPÖ. However, UKIP's voters are likely to be 45 years or older. Voters under 35 years are not likely to vote for UKIP. In addition, one can point out that people with low education, low-skilled workers and blue-collar employees tend to vote for the FPÖ, FN and UKIP.

The Austrian institutes SORA/ISA (2014a) launched a survey just days before the European Elections in 2014. This data indicates a gender gap as the FPÖ is more popular among male voters (24%) whereas only 17% of female voters support the FPÖ<sup>17</sup>. For young voters until the age of 29, the FPÖ (23%) is the second most popular party behind the Austrian Greens (26%). The older the voters are, the less support the FPÖ has. However, the FPÖ stays the second or third most popular party with regard to other age categories. Voters between 30 and 59 years prefer to vote for the centre-right party Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) (29%), but they support the centre-left Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) and the FPÖ equally with 21 %. Among older voters, the FPÖ stays in third place but with a large difference of more than 17% towards both ÖVP and SPÖ<sup>18</sup>. Voters who have left only compulsory education (32%) or completed an apprenticeship (25%) are likely to vote for the FPÖ. FPÖ's appeal is marginal amongst high-school graduates (9%) and academics (7%)<sup>19</sup>. Furthermore, the FPÖ is very popular among workers and leads with a large gap. The lower the professional advancement, the more popular the FPÖ is among these voters<sup>20</sup>.

With regards to voter migration<sup>21</sup> compared to the European Elections in 2009, the data shows that the ÖVP lost 26,000 voters whereas the SPÖ lost 28,000 voters to the FPÖ. The moderate PRRP BZÖ, a party that was founded after a split from the FPÖ in 2005, lost 33,000 voters to the FPÖ (Gruber and Bale, 2014). Moreover, there has been a migration of 130,000 voters from a Eurosceptic List named Liste Martin towards the FPÖ.

Populus Polls have identified UKIP voters' characteristics in January 2015 (Stellings, 2015). The data indicates that UKIP voters are very likely to be male, 45 years or older. It is striking that UKIP is especially popular among the retired over 65, lower educated men. The support

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<sup>17</sup> See figure 1

<sup>18</sup> See figure 2

<sup>19</sup> See figure 3

<sup>20</sup> See figure 4

<sup>21</sup> See figure 5

for UKIP decreases the higher the educational level and the younger the voter<sup>22</sup>. UKIP voter is likely to have a secondary education, but no further studies. In addition, there is a higher UKIP support amongst tenants of social housing, in particular in rural areas. Furthermore, UKIP's support is significantly weaker amongst non-white citizens, those who are still in education or those who work for the public sector. These findings are in line with Ford and Goodwin (2014) who state that UKIP voters are likely to be less qualified and belong to the older white male working class. These people show their strong discontent with the British politics, oppose the EU and regard immigration as threat to the British economy. In addition, UKIP voters share values on social and cultural issues such as same-sex couples and ethnic diversity that opposes views of young, liberal and cosmopolitan Britons. Ford and Goodwin (2014: 279) call UKIP voters "the left behinds" in a way as such they have not adapted to post-industrial change and profound cultural changes of British society. According to post-election voter migration<sup>23</sup> compared to the previous General elections in 2010, one can point out that UKIP could gain most of its support from former Conservative voters (Baxter/Electoral Calculus 2015). Around 30% of UKIP's total votes in May 2015 could have been gained from the Conservatives, closely followed by 23% from other minor parties such as the British National Party. Another 23% of UKIP's support came from former UKIP voters. 15% of UKIP's support came from former Liberal Democrats voters and only about 7% of UKIP's overall 12.9% total came from former Labour voters. This analysis however does not include former non-voters.

Different voter-migration analysis<sup>24</sup> published in January 2015 (Stellings, 2015) indicates that that 46% of UKIP's support could come from former Conservative voters, 15% from former Liberal Democrats and 10% by former Labour voters. Compared to the aforementioned voter migration analysis, one can identify huge differences. However both voter migration analysis point out that former Labour voters seem to have the weakest impact on UKIP's support. The January 2015 voter migration analysis does not highlight the salience of other minor parties. While the aforementioned analysis states that minor parties contribute to 23% of UKIP's support, the January's analysis predicted that only 3% of UKIP's support would be generated through former *other party* voters. I argue that the more recent post-election voter migration should be considered as more updated and hence more valuable.

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<sup>22</sup> See figures 6 & 7

<sup>23</sup> See figure 8

<sup>24</sup> See figure 9

Since there is detailed data regarding the French voting behaviour at the 2014's European elections, I will base partly my short outline about the electorate base of the FN on this recent data. One should however bear in mind that this election had a low turnout of 42% (l'Institut CSA, 2014) and could also be regarded as a protest vote especially with regard to the notion of a *second-order vote*<sup>25</sup>.

Ipsos/Steria (2014a) carried out a survey<sup>26</sup> for a wide range of French media just before the European Elections in 2014. Women and men vote almost similarly for the FN, with a slight difference of 1%. In addition, FN's electorate could win 30% of all young voters under 35 years. Among the 35-59 years, 27% of them voted for the FN. Among older voters, the FN is behind the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)<sup>27</sup> with 21%. According to the FN's voters' education, one can highlight that people without high school diploma support the FN to a significant extent. Among voters who have a Bachelor degree, the FN is the third most popular party behind the domestic centre-left and centre-right party. With regard to the profession, one can state that the higher professional advancement, the lower the support is for the FN. Amongst blue-collar workers 42% and amongst employees 38% preferred the FN. Moreover, voters with low household income for instance less than €20,000 and between €20,000 and €30,000 vote for the FN. With regard to household income, the FN leads largely before its centre-right and centre-left competitors. Data by Ifop-Fiducialon (2014) on voter migration<sup>28</sup> shows that 14% of the electorate that had supported the centre-right Sarkozy during the presidential elections in 2012, voted for the FN during the European elections in 2014. This is the highest voter migration among all other parties in favour of the FN. For instance 7% of the centrist presidential candidate's voters Bayrou defected towards the FN during the European Elections 2014. Only 6% of former Holland's voters supported the FN in 2014.

A second data set will help to deepen the likely profile of FN's voters. Looking back to the latest presidential elections in 2012, Jean-Marie le Pen as presidential candidate of the FN could win 17.90% of the overall votes during the first round. 79.48% of all registered French voters took part in that first round which led to a second round between two candidates who could win the most and second most overall votes during the first round (Kuhn, 2013).

Analysis on these voters with regard to the FN might be more liable since the 2014's

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<sup>25</sup> See Bernhagen, P. & Schmitt, H. 2014

<sup>26</sup> See figures 10, 12, 14, 16, 18

<sup>27</sup> Recently renamed „Les Républicains“

<sup>28</sup> See figure 20

European elections turnout was very low (42%) and the voters' behaviour could have been motivated by a protest vote against the incumbent government. Berruyer's (2012) data<sup>29</sup> indicate a slightly larger gender gap, an increase of 5% of men. With regard to the voters' age, 2012's data substantiate FN's strong support among voters under the age of 35 and confirms a declining appeal for the older voters. Likewise, one can confirm that French people who have no school diploma at all and those who have a left school after secondary education represent a large part of FN's electorate (56%). The higher the voter's education the more FN's appeal tends to decrease. The same pattern can be seen with regard to the voters' occupation. Blue-collar worker (31%), office worker (25%) and craftsmen (21%) represent more than three-fourths of FN's voters' occupation. With respect to FN's voters' financial situation, one can point out that 56% of FN's supporters consider their financial situation as very difficult or difficult.

### ***2.5. Impact of populism and PRRPs on representative politics and on Conservative Parties***

Populism is able to structure the political debate through three different ways. Firstly, populism tries to construct a political debate that is characterised by simplicity. Since populism regards itself as the force that speaks on behalf of the ordinary people, politics should remain simple and direct. It delegitimises "complex or technical policy initiatives" (Taggart, 2000: 112). Secondly, populism determines the vocabulary of the political debate since it considers itself as a voice of *the people*. It can therefore justify its positions with legitimacy of its supporters. Thirdly, populism tends towards political dualism and polarization. There is either a good or bad and right or wrong in their positions towards issues (Taggart: 2000: 113).

Other parties or political movements are affected by the aforementioned typical characteristics of populism and populists' impact on the system of representative politics. Opposing political forces are pushed to reconstitute their positions, notably in opposition of populist claims. Moreover, other parties imitate "the simple style of populism" (Taggart, 2000: 112). Since centre-right parties are generally successful in winning voters through "cross-class, traditional, authoritarian and nationalist appeal", this renders them vulnerable in competition with PRRPs due to their small ideological gap (Webb and Bale 2014). However, Mudde (2013: 5) suggests that one should be critical when claiming that PRRPs' impact on

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<sup>29</sup> See figures 11, 13, 15, 17, 19

political party is strong since there is less academic work that has analysed and proved that claim.

Apart from that, centre-right parties across Western Europe can face the situation where not only voters but also party members change their party membership towards the PRRP. Webb and Bale (2014) pose the question whether a centre-right party that loses its members towards their PRR competitor can still manage to save its electorate that is even more volatile than party members. This party member defection has happened in the UK and is likely to happen in France and Austria with party members of the UMP and ÖVP leaving their parties in favour of joining the FN or FPÖ (Webb and Bale, 2014).

Following paragraph discusses briefly the impact of PRRPs in Austria, the UK and France.

When referring to the Austrian case, one easily can state that the history of the FPÖ and its impact and influence on Austrian politics is much stronger than UKIP in the UK and the FN in France. The case of the Austrian PRRP is among the “longest and enduring” in the world (Gruber and Bale, 2014: 239) Since the FPÖ used to be in the Austrian government from 1983 until 1986 and again from 2000 until 2006, FPÖ’s influence on Austrian politics was more dominant than in the other two countries. Moreover, the first coalition was with the centre-left party whereas the second coalition was signed with the centre-right ÖVP (Pelinka, 2013b). One can say that the constant presence had an impact on the Austrian party system as a whole. In particular the ÖVP is constantly challenged by the FPÖ since its shift towards a PRRP under its leader Joseph Haider in 1986. Since then, the centre-right party has to make much effort to counter FPÖ’s populist appeals to their own voters. Due to voter defection, the ÖVP attempted a couple of strategies in order to successfully compete with its PRR competitor (Gruber and Bale, 2014). After having tried to insulate the FPÖ for about ten years between 1986 and 1995 (cordon sanitaire<sup>30</sup>), the FPÖ always called for further and more extreme policy stances. The FPÖ could take advantage of the established parties who did not cooperate at all. Thus, the FPÖ could construct their populist communication (Gruber and Bale, 2014). In 1995, the ÖVP changed its strategy and adopted some stricter policies on issues that were originally dominated by the FPÖ such as immigration (Gruber, 2014). Here, one can see that ÖVP’s strategy was largely influenced by the question about how to deal with the FPÖ. Neither by playing the FPÖ down, nor adopting some of the FPÖ’s policies could bring the success (Gruber and Bale, 2014). Quite the contrary happened; during the

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<sup>30</sup> See chapter 2.3.

election in 1999 the FPÖ won slightly more votes than its centre-right competitor even after the ÖVP had shifted towards stricter stances on FPÖ's core policies. As a consequence, FPÖ and ÖVP formed their first coalition until the snap elections two years later (Gruber and Bale, 2014). However, during the following elections in 2002, the ÖVP could take advantage from FPÖ's internal party conflicts and won 42.3% whereas the FPÖ dropped to 10% of the total votes (Picker et al, 2004). Here one can see that the strategy of including the FPÖ in the government led to a success for the ÖVP with regard to the electoral record in 2002. During the following elections however, the ÖVP was consecutively losing its voters. In terms of policies, the two coalitions with the FPÖ from 2002 until 2006 triggered a change inside the ÖVP on migrant integration (Götzelmann, 2010). A detailed system to improve integration was established which would finally undermine the FPÖ's positions on these issues. ÖVP's new positions on asylum, immigration and integration took stricter stances and demanded a greater contribution from migrants. Moreover, a point-based system was redesigned to limit labour migration. Despite all of these harder stances, the ÖVP scored its lowest share of the votes (24%) whereas the FPÖ rose up to 20.5% during the latest elections in 2013 (Gruber and Bale, 2014).

With regard to the UK, Lynch (2015: 195) argues that the rise of UKIP is a "symptom" of long-term Conservatives' problems. In addition, he claims that a stronger UKIP is not the cause of problems for the Conservatives, it is rather a "contributory factor" to them. However, UKIP's strength means to become a challenge for the Conservatives (Lynch: 2015). As Lynch (1999) further states, identity politics such as immigration and European integration have never been the strength of the Conservatives. As a consequence, UKIP builds on its strength in identity politics and connects its Euroscepticism with immigration and identity. This strategy poses problems to the Conservatives who cannot lower the salience of certain issues anymore. As a result, their weak profile in identity issues exacerbates and UKIP attacks the Conservatives on their vulnerable issues (Lynch, 2015, Lynch and Whitaker, 2013). With regard to a position towards the EU, UKIP is not regarded as the key challenger of the Conservatives. Intra-party competition and competition with the Labour party is considered to be more significant (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013). However, Lynch and Whitaker (2013) point out that policies created by the Conservatives have become more Eurosceptic over the last 20 years. Taking a withdrawalist position due to the rising popularity of UKIP has never been an option for the Conservatives (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013). Nevertheless, the latest Conservative manifesto (2015) pledges for an in-out

referendum about the question whether the UK should stay in the EU. This referendum after a renegotiation of the relationship of the UK with the EU is in accordance with public opinion polls stating that the UK should stay in the EU after a successful renegotiation (Lynch, 2015). Thus, it seems that the Conservatives' stricter stance in the EU question is driven by public opinion as a soft Euroscepticism during a renegotiation of the EU relationship is popular with public opinion. Voters' decision in favour of the EU could eventually weaken hard Eurosceptics such as UKIP in the case when voters value the Conservatives' engagement with the EU question. Gruber and Bale (2014) have a different view when stating that the introduction of additional legislation in terms of immigration, Go-Home vans, and the announcement to exclude foreigners from social security and child benefit could be seen as an answer of the growing popularity of UKIP voters. With regard to these policy areas the Conservatives need to tackle the rising UKIP. Taking a harder stance can nonetheless contribute to bad reputation and a loss of credibility to the Conservatives (Gruber and Bale, 2014). As a consequence, one could say that the Conservative approach is driven by both party management and tactical party competition with UKIP and Labour (Lynch, 2015)

The FN has been stronger in France and has a longer successful history than UKIP in Britain. Therefore, I will focus on the FN's impact on the French centre-right party Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) since Sarkozy's presidency who was, and is again, the party leader. During Sarkozy's first presidential campaign, he adopted FN themes such as national identity in order to counter FN's campaign and appeal to FN voters (Beauzamy, 2013; Mondon, 2014). During Sarkozy's presidency when he had restructured his government in late 2010, his rhetoric became continuously more right-wing populist until the end of the French presidential election in 2012 where he was defeated by his socialist counterpart (Andrew Knapp, 2014). His rhetorical strategy was interpreted as a way to convince FN voters to support him in the second round of the French presidential election of 2012. In a nutshell, the UMP's strategy was to appeal voters of the PRRP (Chiche and Dupoirier, 2013). In that vein, the UMP reinforced the stigmatisation of Muslim immigrants and Islam (Huet and Guéant, 2012). During the election campaign, Sarkozy himself and other high-rank UMP politicians advocated for policy proposals that were identical to those presented by the FN. One of Sarkozy's close colleagues stated that Islam should obey the French "republican secular ideals" (Mondon, 2014: 309). The Muslim migrants were explicitly portrayed as being incapable to assimilate and both their rising population and their behaviour were pointed out as problematic (Pouchard, 2012). In addition, Sarkozy expressed his favour for



national preference, a theme that was originally strongly advocated by the FN (Mondon, 2014). That strategy did not lead to a victory for the UMP, nor did it contribute to good reputation. Mondon (2014: 312) argues that by “echoing the most radical voices within le Pen’s party” the UMP damaged its reputation. In a new strategic alignment contest after the defeat in the elections, party members had preferred to continue under the banner of “la Droite forte<sup>31</sup>”. UMP’s new leader Copé continued in a populist right-wing manner and the party’s new positions were characterised at least to a degree by an alignment to the right-wing voters (Haegel 2012). The UMP, lately renamed les Republicains in Mai 2015 (Goar, 2015), seemed to have felt worried about losing its voters towards the FN and therefore adapted a right-wing populist rhetoric.

### ***3. Methodical Concept and Research Design***

The following analysis and comparison will focus on four distinct policy areas of the FPÖ, UKIP and FN. As Dunn (2015: 370) states, PRRPs frequently stress “the loss of national culture and identity as a result of mass immigration“. To add, PRRPs stand for radical steps in immigration policy in order to preserve the nation state and openly oppose multiculturalism and insist on assimilation (Dunn, 2015). Arzheimer and Carter (2006: 427) argue similarly as they point out that “policies on the issues of multiculturalism, internationalism, the ‘national way of life’ and law and order” can be regarded as the core policy issues of PRRPs.

Due to that reason, the scrutinized policy areas will be: positions towards immigration in general, the proposed immigration system and access to labour market, protecting national values/ the nation state and lastly law and order policies.

In order to understand parties’ positions upon policies, it is useful to analyse “the texts they generate” (Laver et al 2003: 311). Besides the strategic activities of a party, party manifestos indicate policy positions. In the same vein, Protsyk and Garaz (2013) argue as the study of party manifestos has been useful to understand party standpoints in several policy fields.

In regards to an appropriate method, Klingemann et al (2006) advocate the use of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), a quantitative method that is based on already coded manifestos. Klingemann et al (2006) describe the CMP as the most appropriate framework to analyse party positions. In relation to my conducted analysis, the most recent manifestos of

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<sup>31</sup> Translation: Strong Right-wing

the selected parties have neither been coded nor published yet. Therefore, I am not able to work with quantitative data of the CMP analysis (manifestoproject, no date).

In addition, Protsyk and Garaz (2013: 297) claim that the theoretical framework of a CMP analysis is driven by the motivation of “capturing party positions on all dimensions of party competition”. Therefore, Budge (2001) argues that a CMP analysis is not suitable when looking at specific policy areas. De Lange and Mudde (2005: 484) prefer qualitative manifesto analysis since it provides a “more profound understanding”.

Since the motivation of this work will be the analysis of specific policy areas, I will neglect a CMP analysis. A qualitative content analysis seems more appropriate to answer my research question. This in comparison to a quantitative content analysis where one counts the frequency of specific words or content, my applied analysis will go beyond a mere count of words (Kondracki and Wellman, 2002).

My analysis will be based the FPÖ’s Handbuch der Freiheitlichen Politik (HdfP) that was published in 2013. This HdfP is a very detailed source that portrays the FPÖ’s recent party positions (FPÖ, 2013). Concerning UKIP, I have chosen the recent manifesto for the General Elections 2015 (UKIP, 2015). Regarding the FN, the manifesto for the Presidential Elections in 2012 which was still valid for the European Elections in 2014 (FN, 2012).

The three chosen party manifestos are the most recent ones available online. In order to contribute to the latest academic literature, I find it crucial to work on the most updated sources published by these three parties.

PRRPs use two different frames when discussing the problems linked to immigration. These two frames will be briefly outlined here since they will be used as analytical frame when analysing the immigration policies of the selected parties.

As Rydgren (2008: 746) explains, these frames are important as they “dominate the ideological programme and discourse” of PRRPs. The first frame is the ethno-pluralist frame that states that “in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated; mixing different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction” (Rydgren, 2008: 745). PRRPs are extremely concerned with the increasing number of Muslims migrating to their countries and “threatening European values” (Rydgren: 2008:745). Moreover, people with ethno-pluralist views accuse immigrants for the reason of

increased criminality and deny Muslims the will and capability to assimilate (Rydgren, 2008). The second analytical frame I will use when analysing immigration policies will be the welfare-chauvinist frame. This frame states that immigrants and natives are “competing for limited economic resources” (Rydgren, 2008: 746). As a consequence, immigrants are the cause for unemployment and abuse the generosity of the welfare state. According to the welfare-chauvinist attitudes, there should be given priorities to national citizen in various kinds of ways such as housing and jobs. Rydgren (2008: 746) names this attitude a “reversed affirmative action”.

Regarding the research design, the selected manifestos have been coded and positions towards the four selected policy areas have been ordered in coherent common categories<sup>32</sup>. As a next step, the parties’ positions referring to the chosen topics have been described and compared. As last step, I have drawn a line between the results of the comparison and the aforementioned analytical frames.

#### ***4. Qualitative Data: The parties’ positions***

Following section will reveal the parties’ programmatic stances towards the chosen four issue areas that are closely linked to immigration.

##### ***4.1. Positions towards immigration in general***

###### ***4.1.1. FPÖ***

The Austrian party declares frankly that the country cannot cope anymore with immigration. Since 2000, the manifesto asserts that one million immigrants have arrived in Austria. According to the FPÖ, a successful integration of these migrants is not possible anymore. The current situation was triggered by a wrong immigration policy in the past which enabled mass immigration of poorly skilled workers (FPÖ, 2013: 16, 31, 39, 210). In that vein, the FPÖ pledges for expulsions of immigrants from Austria and prefers a “Minuszuwanderung<sup>33</sup>” (FPÖ, 2013: 31) and the FPÖ rejects any kind of immigration at the moment. The FPÖ argues that any particular immigration that was motivated by a gain of social benefits and intra-European immigration from the eastern European countries was harmful. For instance, due to the high degree of low-skilled immigrants in Austria, criminality and unemployment as well as the abuse of social benefits has risen (FPÖ, 2013: 31, 33, 36, 37). Likewise the FPÖ

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<sup>32</sup> See chosen four categories: immigration in general, the proposed immigration system and access to labour market, protecting national values and the nation state and law and order policies.

<sup>33</sup> Translation: Reversed immigration

affirms that Austria is not an immigration country (FPÖ, 2013: 31). In order to substantiate its positions, the FPÖ has integrated various external sources in its HdFP. There is a quote of a newspaper article that fits into their positions and indicates illustrations of the negative impacts of low skilled immigration (FPÖ, 2013: 35) Furthermore, the FPÖ quotes an Austrian migration report and points out that Austria is among those European states with highest immigration rates (FPÖ, 2013: 33).

#### **4.1.2. UKIP**

UKIP denounces the “uncontrolled, politically-driven migration” that has taken place in the last decades. This policy has led to a record in net migration by 298,000 people and has negative consequences on the British economy, the public sector, the British culture and the environment (UKIP, 2015: 10, 11). In particular, the free movement of people and labour within the EU has “driven down wages in recent years” and impedes Britain in preventing foreign criminals entering the UK (UKIP, 2015: 7, 53). Therefore UKIP advocates for a five-year immigration stoppage for unskilled workers, regardless whether European citizen or non-European migrant. Skilled workers should be limited to 50,000 per annum<sup>34</sup>. UKIP underlines in some sections that it is not against immigrants in general. UKIP describes the UK as a country that accepts migrants and as one of “the most welcoming and tolerant people in the world” (UKIP, 2015: 10, 11, 13). Migrants should not be blamed for the problems; rather the immigration system should be questioned and changed (UKIP, 2015: 10).

#### **4.1.3. FN**

The FN strongly criticises the current and previous immigration policy that has led to an increase in legal immigration by 78 % between 2000 and 2009 (numbers of residence permits). Also, between 2007 and 2010, labour migration increase by 61 % according to FN’s manifesto (2012: 11). Uncontrolled mass migration brought the French society out of equilibrium and the party believes that successful immigration cannot occur anymore. Instead, both political and religious tensions increase and inter-ethnic conflicts in French ghettos occur (FN, 2012: 12). The FN advocates for an immigration stop and links mass migration to the decrease of French wages (FN, 2012: 11). An annual net migration cap of 10,000 highly skilled immigrants should be installed<sup>35</sup> (FN, 2012: 11, 12). With regard to

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<sup>34</sup> Concrete immigration system will be further discussed in 4.2.

<sup>35</sup> Concrete immigration system will be further discussed in 4.2.

illegal immigrants, the FN claims to introduce a thorough expulsion of illegal immigrants. These should not even have the right to demonstrate (FN, 2012: 12, 45, 59).

## ***4.2. Immigration System and access to Labour market***

### ***4.2.1. FPÖ***

Austria should stop further mass-migration; in particular the number of low-skilled workers should be decreased. However, the FPÖ does not state any explicit number in its HdfP. To monitor the concrete numbers of Austria's immigration, a population census should be carried out. FPÖ's favoured immigration system foresees a stop for non-European citizens and national competence over intra-EU migration to Austria (FPÖ, 2013: 37, 39, 101, 284). Furthermore, unemployment is regarded as a reason for strict expulsion (FPÖ, 2013: 31, 37, 39). Current immigrants' permit of residence and the right to work should be phased out and not be renewed (FPÖ, 2013: 211).

Regarding the immigration system the FPÖ advocates for a strict process where the immigrant has to apply for a permit of residence before entering the country, however details to the criteria are not given. The temporary right to work permit relates to the sector the immigrant wants to work in and only in the case of a lack of domestic workforce, immigrants are allowed to start working. When in employment for at least one year, including unemployment of less than two months, the immigrant will have access to the full labour market in its federal region for a further two years. The latter permission can be withdrawn when the immigrant is unemployed for a longer period of time. In the case of illicit employment, immigrants should lose their temporary right to work (FPÖ, 2013: 114, 115). Also, the FPÖ wants to introduce a temporary guest worker residence permission that excludes family regrouping unless the non-native person is a highly-skilled specialist or manager. The HdfP explicitly opposes privileges to Turkish immigrants on the Austrian labour market. In addition, the party wants to prioritise Austrians in sectors such as nursing and tourism. Long-term unemployed Austrians should receive training for these jobs. Moreover, the FPÖ pledges for a quota that states that for five foreign skilled-workers one Austrian citizen must be employed (FPÖ, 2013: 39, 115, 117, 118, 201, 208).

In relation to labour and immigrants, the FPÖ asserts that immigrants in Austria disproportionately seek for jobs compared to Austrians (FPÖ, 2013: 112). The unemployment of immigrants causes a yearly expense of about one billion Euro according to their HdfP (2013: 113). Furthermore, the FPÖ is strictly against the employment of migrants in the

public sector and criticises the early labour market liberalisation for the 2004 enlargement's member states. Those states have not converged sufficiently to Austrian standards (FPÖ, 2013: 110, 112). With regard to social benefits, the FPÖ supports an abolishment for non-EU citizens. Moreover, non-Austrian workers should contribute to their own social security system that should be immediately set up. This system should work independently from the Austrian state and will not be eligible for any state subventions (FPÖ, 2012: 112, 113, 118, 211).

#### **4.2.2. UKIP**

UKIP's manifesto heavily criticises the current migration system as Britain is not able to identify clearly how many people have entered and left Britain (2015: 11, 40). As a consequence, UKIP wants to set up a new immigration system that firstly controls the number of people coming into the UK. Secondly, the system should treat every single immigrant equally. UKIP finds that the current immigration policy prefers EU citizens and discriminates Commonwealth countries (2015: 11, 12, 34). According to UKIP, one should introduce an "Australian style points-based system" that refers to the economic need of the British economy and to the immigrants' skills. A Migrant Control Commission should be given the authority to oversee the number of immigrants and ensures that immigration benefits the UK. In that vein, visas will be issued to those applicants that are considered to be demanded in the British economy. Those high-skilled in-demand immigrants should be limited to 50,000 per year. Family reunion visas shall be strictly controlled and should prevent sham marriages. When it comes to employment of foreign nationals, UKIP pledges for a priority of British nationals (UKIP, 2015: 11- 13, 41, 45). Any right to buy or help to buy for social housing property will be exclusively reserved for British nationals, unless the non-British national has served in Her Majesty's Armed Forces (HMAF). Access to social housing will only be given to non-British people who have paid for least five years National Insurance and UK taxes (UKIP, 2015: 34).

#### **4.2.3. FN**

As stated in their manifesto, the FN wants to decrease legal immigration from 200,000 to 10,000 per annum and family regrouping should be cancelled. Moreover, the party estimates a yearly cost of € 70 billion caused by migration which could be economised. Only high-skilled people should have access to work in France in order to benefit innovations and France's international standing. That access should be reduced from ten to three years. If

unemployed for more than one year, immigrants should leave France and their pension contributions will be transferred to the immigrants' bank account. Also, the FN advocates a priority for French citizens in a job selection process (FN, 2012: 11-13). Besides that, the FN focusses explicitly on immigration from African countries. Immigration flows should be stopped and subjected to distinctive treaties between France and African states. In return, France would establish economic partnerships and investments under this conditionality. Social benefits should only be allocated to those families where at least one family member is French or citizen of the EU and not to illegal immigrants at all (FN, 2012: 12, 13, 31, 51).

### ***4.3. "Protecting national values" and "End of Nation State"***

#### ***4.3.1. FPÖ***

FPÖ's HdfP explains in detail how to prevent Austrian's culture from multicultural influences. It argues that the current Austrian society has been disrupted with people from foreign cultures. As a result, the Austrian society does not stand for its traditional values anymore. Further, the FPÖ opposes foreign *parallel* cultures and multiculturalism (FPÖ, 2013: 31, 167). More precisely, FPÖ's acceptance of other cultures living in Austria can only occur when foreign cultures absolutely identify with the Austrian culture.

Additionally, the FPÖ accuses immigrants of not having the ability or intention to assimilate into the Austrian society. According to the party's positions, Austria should not be regarded as a "multikulturelles Idyll"<sup>36</sup>. Instead foreigners should proactively integrate irrespectively of their cultural background and education (FPÖ, 2013: 38, 39). The FPÖ explicitly identifies Turkish immigrants as problematic when referring to a newspaper article (FPÖ, 2013: 39). More than half of Turkish immigrants create their own subcultures whereas migrants from other countries ease better in the Austrian society. Furthermore, a graphic shows Austrian citizens' and migrants' birth rates and indicates those of Turkish and former Yugoslavian nationality separately, whereas immigrants from other countries are summed up into a single group (FPÖ, 2013: 114).

Protecting the Austrian identity from foreign influences is regarded as *the* crucial task for the present moment (FPÖ, 2013: 31, 258). Apart from these stances, the FPÖ stresses the importance of the German language when living in Austria. The HdfP unequivocally states

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<sup>36</sup> Translation: multicultural idyll

that German is the language of Austria. Any language interpreters in public administrations have to be paid by the person who does not speak German. The German language should be protected against words from a foreign language and should be exclusively spoken in school yards and inside schools. In addition, the HdfP stresses the proportion of migrant children in Austrian schools and finds that the school class should not have more than 30 % of non-native German speaking pupils. In that vein, the FPÖ worries about the decrease of teaching quality and questions successful integration due to many non-German native speakers in Austrian schools and denounces unteachable students in Austrian schools. The German speaking level has to be assessed before the start of primary school. In addition, speaking German is a precondition for the permit or residence or later the naturalisation (FPÖ, 2013: 35, 37- 39 259, 260).

In regards to religion, the FPÖ advocates German speaking imams. It is also noteworthy to mention that the FPÖ only focusses on the Islam; other religions are not present in its manifesto. The HdfP describes in detail how Islamic people successively gain in influence in Austria. For instance, the FPÖ portrays immigration from the Islamic world as a security threat to the Austrian society. Even more precisely, the FPÖ compares Islamic immigrants with the Trojan horse that could eventually import Islamic extremists and terrorists. Furthermore, the description of the Islam in the HdfP promotes fear. The HdfP states that Islam regards the world as a battleground until the entire world will be Islamic. To substantiate this viewpoint, the FPÖ quotes several suras which express violence against non-Muslims. In addition, the HdfP concludes that Islamic parallel societies are increasing vastly and already 200 mosques have been constructed in Austria. Then it refers to the UK and highlights that already half of all British mosques have been infiltrated by Islamic preachers. The FPÖ further illustrates Islam as an evil religion when it states that Austria should set up a distinctive special commission that assesses the actual Islamisation in Austria which includes inter alia the practice of the sharia, potential parallel societies, the potential for violence, forced marriage, honour killings, human rights and emancipation (FPÖ, 2013: 51, 53, 54 284). Here, one clearly observes the lack of a clear distinction between ordinary Muslims and Islamic extremists. Moreover, the FPÖ points out the actual number of Muslims in Austria and asserts that the dark figure seems to be much higher in reality. To add, the FPÖ voices that in 2050 half of the pupils in domestic school classes will be of Muslim religion. With regard to current education policy, all pupils should take part in sports and swimming lessons regardless of their religious attitudes (FPÖ, 2013: 50, 52, 168). Aside from these points, the



party pronounces the secularism and equal rights in Austria. With regard to Islam, the FPÖ highlights forced circumcisions, genital mutilation and violence against women. In that vein, the FPÖ takes a stand against wearing headscarves and burkas in public places and opposes any mosques with minarets. According to the HdFP, minarets symbolise the Muslim claim to power and can be seen as triumphal columns. However what opposed the voiced secularism is the appreciated installation of crucifixes in public buildings (FPÖ, 2013: 50, 53, 54, 138). In a sharp contrast to the aforementioned heavy criticism and rejection of Islam, is one a statement where the party condemns any discrimination with regards to someone's religion (FPÖ, 2013: 28).

#### **4.3.2. UKIP**

UKIP's manifesto voices opposition to multiculturalism which has led to "alarming fragmentation of British society. Instead, it pledges for integration into the British culture and wants to "review funding for public bodies which promote divisiveness through multiculturalism" (UKIP, 2015: 61). That integration should be open to everyone who wishes to identify with Britain. Furthermore, the English language is regarded as a crucial element of national identity. Hence, multi-lingual official documents should be abolished. The increased numbers of migrants coupled with the high birth rates of migrants will cause problems according to UKIP manifesto (2015: 11). Apart from that, UKIP wants to revive British patriotism and create a minister of state for heritage and tourism (UKIP, 2015: 51, 61). In addition, Britons should take pride in their country since it is a "remarkable country with "remarkable people" (UKIP, 2015: 60). Schools should further teach British achievements and emphasis British values. Also with relation to schools, UKIP criticises over-sized classes due to the increasing amount of people living in Britain (UKIP, 2015: 11, 31, 61). Furthermore, UKIP pronounces zero tolerance to societies and faith positions that oppose equality under the law or refuses to respect human rights. Thus, UKIP makes clear that it will not tolerate and prosecute any perpetrator of female genital mutilation, forced marriages and honour killings (UKIP, 2015: 55, 61).

#### **4.3.3. FN**

The French party is against multiculturalism and pillories the promotion of multiculturalism in general. Instead, integration is the key. Even further, the FN labels the promotion of multiculturalism *positive* discrimination. According to their manifesto this notion describes the preference of immigrants whereas French citizens are disadvantaged. More precisely, the

manifesto heavily criticises a negative discrimination of the majority of French people and asserts that minorities have disproportionately too many rights (FN, 2012: 13, 105). As a consequence, privileges for immigrants shall be abolished and anti-French racism should be prosecuted by the law (FN, 2012: 12, 106). Aside from that, the FN states that immigration has had a direct negative impact on the French identity. For instance, the Islamisation steadily increases and parallel societies are regarded as poison for French cohesion. These religious parallel societies tend to subordinate the French law and install the supremacy of religious right. Their influence increases and it becomes more difficult to be not affected by Islamic influences and more difficult to preserve laicism as well as French values. To underline the viewpoints, the FN refers to the school canteen and how there is a ban of pork and the introduction of halal meat choice. The FN also refers to distinct opening hours in public pools for men and women and the increasing number of Moslems praying in public areas (FN, 2012: 12, 105, 106). Moreover, the FN denounces the construction of mosques on Muslim communities' own accord and any foreign money transfer that supports religious aims and public subsidies for Islamic societies. In addition, the FN wants to assess if they can tighten the current ban of headscarves for instance in public transport. Concerning national values, the FN wants an obligation for foreign parents to take compulsory French lessons, whose children are in school to take French lessons. Also, the party wants a French flag to be displayed on all public buildings and foresees to buy uniquely French products for canteens of French administrations (FN, 2012: 28, 106).

#### ***4.4. Law and Order***

##### ***4.4.1. FPÖ***

The Austrian party wants to temporarily reintroduce national borders to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia since the criminality has increased through open European borders due to the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the HdfP quotes an article that points out Turkey as a hotspot for illegal immigration and criticises the nature of Turkey as a transit country that does not prevent migration flows (FPÖ, 2012: 16, 237, 238). In order to restore security in Austria, the FPÖ advocates special task forces which are familiar with the ethnic groups that pose problems in Austria. Furthermore, these forces should speak the multiples languages of the various immigrants. The Austrian state should not decrease their spending in security measures and staff. Instead, the federal security staff shall increase by 3000 people as the criminality equally increases. In addition, FPÖ favours closer cooperation with other countries in regard to foreign DNA databases (FPÖ, 2012: 37,109, 240, 241).

In order to counter increasing criminality tourism in particular from Eastern Europe and crimes among asylum seekers, the FPÖ provides tougher penalties, zero tolerance and many more controls of asylum camps. The FPÖ even refers to certain nationalities for instance Afghan, Algerian and Georgian and blames them for their high criminality rate when enjoying asylum in Austria. Furthermore, the Austrian party highlights the dominant involvement of African immigrant in particular from Morocco and Gambia in the domestic drug traffic scene according to a drug report by the home secretary (FPÖ, 2012: 237- 240). According to their HdfP, the FPÖ favours stricter regulations for criminal foreigners. The FPÖ wants immediately to deport immigrants in the case of social benefits fraud, unwillingness to integrate, homelessness, lack of asylum and other capital crime. Concerning the latter, foreigners should be imprisoned in their home country and any imprisonment will impose a life-long Austrian entry ban (FPÖ, 2012: 31, 37-39, 106, 117, 118).

#### **4.4.2. UKIP**

UKIP advocates in its manifesto for full control of British borders and links current border control policy with foreign criminality such as “tragic crimes”, “gangs of thieves”, “petty criminality” and “scammers” (UKIP, 2015: 53). New technology solutions should be created to track all passport and visa holders in order to detect “over stayers”. Security staff for the border agency should be increased by 2,500 people as well as the police and prison services by 3,500 people. Furthermore, department of staff dedicated to illegal immigration compliance and enforcement should be expanded (UKIP, 2015: 5, 12, 13, 52, 53). UKIP further criticises cuts in criminal justice services and wants to “provide them with adequate resources” (UKIP, 2015: 53). UKIP cannot fears influence on sentences or hearings due to lack of resources. In addition, it favours stricter regulations and procedures when foreign criminals are involved. These should be deported to their country of origin and fulfil their sentences in their own country. In addition, their visa will be revoked. When launching an appeal from abroad, the costs should be paid by themselves or by their country of origin. According to UKIP’s manifesto, these policies will “free up prison places and relieve some stress on the prison service”, UKIP explicitly stresses that 10,000 prison places could be saved (UKIP, 2015: 53, 55).

#### **4.4.3. FN**

The French party draws a line between immigration and insecurity in France. It regards immigration as a major cause for violence and criminality in French banlieues<sup>37</sup> and in French night crimes. The French border should be controlled by French border control. Immigrants become criminal due to a lack of assimilation and wrong policies presented by previous governments. FN's response to these events is a larger budget for justice and better police inquiries in order to restore the public order and laicism (FN, 2012: 5, 14, 15, 17, 18). Minor crimes should also lead to enforcement and compliance instead of impunity due to overpopulation in French prisons (FN, 2012: 14, 15). This overpopulation should be tackled by a strict expulsion of sentenced immigrants to their home country. Bilateral agreements with those states should enable this procedure. More precisely, the party points at high delinquency of Northern African, Turkish and Eastern-European nationals (FN, 2012: 12, 16). Moreover, the FN wants to institute a ministry of internal affairs, immigration and laicism that publishes statistics about the issue of permit of residences, neutralisations and expulsion. In the opinion of the FN, this published data will lead to more national cohesion (FN, 2012: 13).

## **5. Comparisons**

### **5.1. Immigration in general**

Concerning the three parties' viewpoints towards immigration in general, one clearly identifies a common condemnation of the previous and current immigration policy of each individual country. Every single party denounces the mass migration, and the FPÖ and FN argue that integration of such a mass of immigrants is not possible anymore. UKIP however does not mention any points referring to that latter opinion. Apart from that, all parties point out that their countries have experienced an unprecedented immigration record. According to the FPÖ, Austria is amongst the EU states with the highest immigration rate. Likewise, UKIP states that Britain has had a record net migration, and the FN refers to their steep rise in legal migration and labour migration numbers. However, only one of these parties, the FPÖ, frankly states that their country is not an immigration country. One could say that this comment shows FPÖ's plain aversion towards immigrants, whereas both the other parties do not express their aversion that openly. However, the FN's will to strictly expel all illegal immigrants, and withdraw their right to demonstrate, is a sign of FN's rigorous stance. On a

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<sup>37</sup> Translation: Suburbs with high density of immigrants and variety of ethnic groups

spectrum, the FN is located closer to the FPÖ than to UKIP. Another instance shows FPÖ's firm stance towards immigration. Whereas UKIP and the FN want to drastically reduce immigration in general, the FPÖ wants an immediate stop and opposes any further people coming to Austria. In that vein, it is important to highlight that UKIP even expresses that Britain is a very welcoming country and that UKIP believes that not the immigrants are the problem but the immigration problem itself. This underlines UKIP's less aggressive stance towards immigrants especially in comparison to the FPÖ.

With regard to negative influences of immigration on the society, one can see that the FPÖ and the FN blame immigrants for the rise in criminality. UKIP does not follow their rhetoric, however, they point out the potential danger of foreign criminals entering the UK. Moreover, the FN identifies foreigner dominated suburbs as hotspots for political and ethnic tensions.

In relation to the domestic economy, one can point out that every single party regards mass immigration as harmful for the economy. Whereas the FPÖ accuses immigrants of social benefit abuse and a cause of unemployment, UKIP and the FN blame mass immigration as the trigger for fallen wages.

## ***5.2. Immigration System and access to labour market***

Every single party pledges to reduce the numbers of immigrants coming to their countries. As aforementioned, the FPÖ currently opposes all immigration. UKIP states a clear annual number not exceeding 50,000 people, as does the FN with 10,000. Here one can already identify a gradation in strict measures. The Austrian party takes the hardest stance on this point followed by the FN and UKIP. In order to reduce the current number of immigrants in Austria, the FPÖ wants to phase out their residency permits. Once that is achieved, the FPÖ follows the other two parties by wanting to allow immigration only in relation to the needs of their economy. UKIP and the FN point out that only highly-skilled immigrants should have access to their country. By doing so, UKIP favours an Australian point-based system under supervision of a Migrant Control Commission. The FPÖ in comparison wants to base the need for immigrants on local authorities that decide whether they need additions to the workforce or not. More precisely, the FPÖ does not refer to highly-skilled people. In addition, FPÖ's system is rather complicated and restricts the immigrants' access to the entire labour market for the first few years. After having met many criteria, an immigrant can enjoy up to a 10 years access to the Austrian labour market. The FN is here stricter and allows highly-skilled immigrants a three years stay in France. UKIP does not state any limits what

underlines UKIP's more moderate position. One can once again state that UKIP's position is the most moderate while the FN exceeds the FPÖ concerning the access to the domestic labour market.

Further analysis of the manifestos shows that the FPÖ and the FN favour the expulsion of immigrants who are unemployed for a certain period. One can identify here more rigorous measures in the HdFP, whereas the FN proposes expulsion for unemployment embracing more than one year. Concerning family regrouping, the FPÖ claims a firm stop except for managers and highly-skilled experts. UKIP voices better verification of family regrouping but basically does not show any sign of opposition. The FN however opposes any kind of family regrouping. Further similarities can be detected between the FPÖ and the FN as both parties denounce the costs of immigration and the impact on the state's budget. In relation to the employment of immigrants, UKIP and the FN take a harder stance since they pledge giving a priority to British or French citizens. The FPÖ is more moderate and demands Austrian nationals' priority for professions in the nursing and tourism sector but opposes any employment of foreigners in public services. Also, the Austrian party claims that for every five employed immigrants, one Austrian has to be employed in domestic businesses.

With regard to social benefits, one can see a firm stance from all three parties. There is agreement in excluding social benefits from non-EU immigrants according to the FPÖ and the FN. As a consequence, EU citizens will have access to social benefits. In contrast, UKIP favours social housing help schemes exclusively for Britons unless the immigrants have served in HMAFs. Access to social housing will only be eligible for immigrants who have paid their taxes and social insurance for at least five years. One finds here different conditionality regarding access to social benefits. It is obvious that the Eurosceptic UKIP does not refer to EU citizenship, but relates to the Commonwealth countries and serving in HMAFs. Another point concerns the FPÖ and the FN: both parties single out distinct groups of immigrants. While the FPÖ opposes current privileges for Turkish migrants regarding labour market access, the FN singles out immigrants coming from African states.

### ***5.3. "Protecting national values" and "End of Nation State"***

All three parties demonstrate their clear opposition towards multiculturalism and denounce how their countries have been disrupted by foreign cultures. Every party similarly condemns immigrants' impact on the nations' values and society. Their emphasis differs slightly as the FPÖ states that the Austrian society does not stand anymore for its values, UKIP points at the

alarming fragmentation of British society, and the FN highlights the negative effects on the French identity. While strongly rejecting multiculturalism, all three parties regard integration as the better alternative than multiculturalism. Whereas the British party endorses integration for everyone who wants to identify with Britain, the other two parties are sceptical towards the immigrants' behaviour. For instance, the FPÖ blames immigrants who show neither the will nor the ability to integrate into the society, and wants to cap foreign pupils in domestic school classes. In FPÖ's mind, immigrants should proactively make the effort to improve their integration. The FN has a different emphasis but heavily criticises the minority rights foreigners have in France. Moreover, multiculturalism is racism against French people, and anti-French racism should be prosecuted under the law. One can see here FPÖ's and the FN's direct biased views towards the immigrants. The FPÖ consider immigrants as solely responsible for integration, and when referring to positive racism, the FN tries to discredit integration efforts in France. Yet again, one observes UKIP's moderate stance and FPÖ's and FN's more extreme positions. More precisely, any similar positions with the FPÖ and the FN on that topic are not present in UKIP's manifesto. The following positions underline that finding. Although all three parties condemn any parallel societies and faith positions that contradict western values, UKIP expresses its zero tolerance and solely underlines the danger of honour killings, forced marriages and genital mutilation with regard to faith positions. Both other parties explicitly denounce Islam for its influence on parallel societies. For instance, the FN describes parallel societies and the rising Islamisation as poison for the French cohesion. It further warns against religious law that subordinates French law, and condemns the increasing influence of Islamic rules on French society. As a consequence, the FN wants to tighten the rule for wearing headscarves. Likewise, the FPÖ argues in a similar fashion, but seems to be more extreme. It solely points at the Islam and does not distinguish between moderate Muslims and Islamists. By doing so, the party promotes fear and highlights Islam as a security threat. It points at the numbers of Muslims living in Austria and states that by 2050 half of Austrian school classes will be Muslim. In addition, the FPÖ advocates a ban for burkas and headscarves, denounces the current number of mosques in Austria, and opposes any minarets. Even if the FPÖ states that it opposes any discrimination due to someone's religion, and the FN highlights laicism that contradicts parallel Islamic societies, it seems obvious that both the FPÖ and the FN have major antipathy for Moslems and dislike Islam. However, FPÖ's positions are again more extreme than those of the FN.

Concerning preserving the national identity, all regard their languages as a national core value. However, the FPÖ takes the strictest stances as it demands only German in schools and on schoolyards. FPÖ and UKIP think similarly because the FPÖ does not automatically foresee interpreters for foreigners, and UKIP oppose official multi-lingual documents. The French party wants to oblige foreign parents to learn French. In addition, the FPÖ and UKIP equally condemn immigrants' high birth rates. In another point, UKIP and the FN show similar viewpoints because they want to revive national pride. While UKIP wants to educate British students better on British history and achievements, the FN's emphasis is on raising French flags on public buildings and showing loyalty with French food producers. The FPÖ however wants to express its open loyalty to Christianity, what is a core element of Austrian culture, by displaying crucifixes in public buildings.

#### **5.4. Law and Order**

All three parties associate immigration with rising criminality and advocate the closure and control of their borders. Whereas the FPÖ explicitly wants to close its border with its eastern neighbouring countries, UKIP points out that it wants to have full control over British borders. The Austrian party describes the most detailed rising criminality of Eastern Europeans, criminal asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Georgia and Algeria as well as drug traffic delinquency by immigrants from Gabon and Morocco. Even further, the Austrian party singles out distinct immigrants when accusing Eastern European, North African and Turkish immigrants for their high criminality rate in France. The British party does not single out specific nationalities. However, one can find a similar positions in the claim to increase security staff, stop budget cuts in security issues and tighten custodial sentences. In addition, one can see some similar opinions in enhancing the numbers of people working on security tasks with regard to immigrants. For instance, the FPÖ wants to establish taskforces dedicated to foreign criminality, UKIP voices better enforcement and compliance teams tasked with illegal immigration. Lastly, the FN pledges more efficient police inquiries and a ministry that publishes statistics regarding immigration, naturalisation and expulsion. Concerning the latter point, the three parties' manifestos show rather congruent stances. All three parties want to expel foreign criminals to their country of origin. In their minds, this policy could free up prison space. The FN denounces impunity due to overpopulation in



domestic prisons, and UKIP estimates the number of free prison places that could be created<sup>38</sup>.

### **5.5. *Overview of comparison***

On balance<sup>39</sup>, one can state that all three parties have set their own emphasis in their manifestos. Both electoral machinations and domestic particularities could be possible explanations for that. However, it was possible to compare the parties' viewpoints on four different policy areas. Concerning their positions towards immigration in general, on a spectrum of rigor and toughness, one can locate the FPÖ on the extreme side, whereas UKIP is placed on the less extreme side. The French party is similar to the FPÖ but does not represent the same extreme positions. Likewise, one can position these parties identically on the spectrum with regard to the immigration system and access to labour market even if there are two less crucial points where the FPÖ does not dominate with its strict positions. Concerning the access to the labour market, the FN takes a harder stance. Also, regarding national priority, the FN and UKIP are tougher than the FPÖ. The parties' positions towards the end of the nation state once again show the rigor of the FPÖ's stances, although the FN approaches very close to the FPÖ's positions. UKIP substantiates its moderate positions compared to both other parties. Regarding law and order policies, all three parties stand for similar strict positions. There is one exception as the FPÖ and FN accuse specific nationalities whereas UKIP seems to stay rather neutral.

While analysing and comparing the viewpoints, one can refer to the aforementioned analytical frameworks that are used by PRRPs when portraying negative influences of immigrants on domestic societies and economies. Every single party stresses the negative impact of mass migration on their domestic economy, and links unemployment, social benefit fraud, declining wages and a drain on public budgets arising from immigration. These viewpoints are clearly in line with welfare-chauvinist beliefs. One could also refer to the welfare-chauvinist doctrine when advocating a strict reduction in the number of immigrants with regard to competition between immigrants and nationals on the domestic labour market. National priority for employment is among the parties' pledges as well as strict rules for labour seeking migrants.

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<sup>38</sup> Above analysis is based on findings in the manifestos of the FPÖ (2013), UKIP (2015) and FN (2012) which have been already referenced in the previous section 4. "Qualitative Data: The parties' positions".

<sup>39</sup> See figure 22

Similarly, one could also refer to the ethno-pluralist framework since these parties regard the high influx of immigrants as a threat to both their national culture and identity. The causal association of immigrants with higher criminality, as well as negative impacts on society, is equally a clear element of ethno-pluralist beliefs. In addition, especially the FPÖ and the FN mistrust Moslem's ability to integrate in their societies and portray them as a threat. As the ethno-pluralist frame states, these parties want to preserve the character of their nation by highlighting the importance of the domestic language and reinforcing the national pride.

The results of the analysis and comparison evoke potential matching links with the electoral base. Since typical voters of PRRPs seem to be less educated, and work in jobs that do not require high qualifications, these voters could regard immigration as harmful and hence find PRRP's positions appealing<sup>40</sup>.

## **6. Conclusion**

This work has demonstrated the salience of PRRPs in general. Their characteristics and dilemmas when dealing with representative politics and their electoral base were discussed. Moreover, the impact of PRRPs in the three chosen countries was briefly outlined. In particular, the latter point and the enduring opinion poll results highlight their increasing importance. As a consequence, a thorough analysis of their party positions has been identified as a seemingly fruitful area of study. Even more precisely, a qualitative comparison of PRRPs' positions seems to be rare. The academic literature focusses to a large extent on quantitative analysis based on the CMP, and evaluates already coded manifestos<sup>41</sup>. However, no kind of comparative quantitative analysis of the chosen parties' most recent party manifestos has been carried out to date. With these reasons in mind, I decided to conduct a qualitative manifesto analysis. Hence, I am convinced that my work can be regarded as a valuable contribution to the academic field of PRRPs in Western Europe.

The study of recent party manifestos of PRRPs in Austria, the UK and in France has identified similar and different positions on distinct policy areas that have been scrutinized. The parties' positions *on immigration in general*, the proposed *immigration system* and *access to labour market*, *protection of national values and the nation state* and *law and order policies* have been the subject of the analysis.

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<sup>40</sup> There will be no analysis of the reasons behind PRRP's appeal since this is not the goal of this work.

<sup>41</sup> See for instance: Souto-Otero, 2011; Gibbons, 2011, Ruedin, 2013

As a result, my comparison has shown overall that the FPÖ dominates in terms of strictness and rigor. At the same time, the FN approaches the FPÖ but does not pledge similar strict positions. Concerning UKIP, one can clearly regard this party as the most moderate party among all three parties. On a spectrum of the rigor and toughness of their analysed positions, the Austrian party occupies the most extreme position whereas UKIP is located on the opposing less extreme side. With regard to the FN, the gap between the FN and UKIP is rather wide compared to the gap between the FN and the FPÖ. These findings are especially valid for the analysed policy topics that involved stances on *immigration in general, the proposed immigration system and access to labour market* and opinions on protecting *national values and the nation state*.

However, positions on *law and order policies* are very similar and only marginal differences were identified. Concerning the analytical frameworks, every single party has welfare-chauvinist and ethno-pluralist elements in their manifestos and follow their rhetoric.

My findings can be considered as a starting point for further qualitative party manifesto comparisons of PRRPs. On the one hand, this work can be updated by further qualitative manifesto studies of either more policy areas or by looking at additional parties. Due to the enduring popularity of European PRRPs, one could extend a qualitative manifesto comparison to other parties of this party family. Equally, one could address questions on how PRRPs' positions differ from their centre-right competitors.

On the other hand, my findings could be analysed and confirmed through a different approach. The quantitative CMP could be a means to verify the results of this work as soon as applicable quantitative data has been analysed and officially published on CMP's website.

That method could assess the accuracy of my work and uncover potential shortcomings.

## 7. Annexes

Figure 1 FPÖ Gender

Source: SORA/ISA, 2014a




Figure 2 FPÖ Age

Source: SORA/ISA, 2014a




Figure 3 Voters' Education

Source: SORA/ISA, 2014a




Figure 4 Voters' Occupation

Source: SORA/ISA, 2014a




Figure 5 Voter Migration Austria, between 2009 and 2014

Source: SORA/ISA, 2014b




Figure 6 The UKIP Index: Demographics (1)

Source: Stelling, 2015




Figure 7 The UKIP Index: Demographics (2)

Source: Stelling,gs 2015




Figure 8 Voter Migration British General Elections 2015, Post-Election Analysis

Source: Baxter/Electoral Calculus, 2015




Figure 9 Voter Migration, British General Elections 2015, January Polls

Source: Stellings, 2015




Figure 10 FN's voters' gender, European Elections 2014 France

Source: Ipsos/Steria, 2014






Figure 11 FN's voters' gender, first round 2012, Presidential Elections

Source: Berruyer, 2012




Figure 12 Voters' age, European Elections 2014 France

Source: Ipsos/Steria, 2014






Figure 13 Voters' age, first round 2012, Presidential Elections

Source: Berruyer, 2012




**Figure 14 Voters' Education European Elections 2014 France**

Source: Ipsos/Steria, 2014




**Figure 15 Voters' education, first round 2012, Presidential Elections**

Source: Berruyer, 2012




**Figure 16 Voters' Occupation European Elections 2014 France**

Source: Ipsos/Steria, 2014



**Figure 17 Voters' occupation, first round 2012, Presidential Elections**

Source: Berruyer, 2012



**Figure 18 Voters' Financial Situation, European Elections 2014 France**

Source: Ipsos/Steria, 2014




Figure 19 Voters' Financial Situation, first round 2012, Presidential Elections

Source: Berruyer, 2012




Figure 20 Voter Migration between 2012 and 2014 in France

Sources: Ifop-Fiducialon, 2014





Figure 21 Result of the Analysis, own graphic according to findings



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