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'From Desecuritisation to Re-securitisation:  
Colombian Refugees in Ecuador'

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*Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of  
MSc. International Relations*



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## **ABSTRACT**

While securitisation theory proposed by the Copenhagen School has been widely discussed, theoretical and methodological issues remain. Using Ecuador and Colombian refugees as a case study, this work presents an analysis of the dynamics of (de)securitisation and assesses the most common (de)securitising discourses and practices carried out by the elites. After determining the frames used to construct and deconstruct refugees as a threat through discourse analysis, it continues to evaluate the attitude of the Ecuadorian audience, gathered via surveys. Findings demonstrate that the audience accepted some security frames more than others and had different perceptions towards different categories of migrants. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods can help to identify the speech acts and measure the approval of the audience of securitising moves. The analysis of this case suggests that adopting a mixed-methods approach is a viable tool in securitisation theory, despite its limitations.

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## INTRODUCTION

Migration as a threat to society has been the core of contemporary security debates. This interest is inspired by the complexity of the issue due to the wide range of causes, actors and implications at play. Therefore, migration constitutes a challenge faced by many countries manifested in different ways. As an omnipresent topic, it is discussed at all levels: in conversations, the media and elites. More importantly, migration is constantly present in the political, economic, social and security agenda. In this sense, securitisation theory developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998), explains the process by which migration becomes a security issue. According to this theory, population movements can represent a threat to the receiving society, demanding the employment of extraordinary measures (accepted by the audience). While this conceptualisation of migration has been criticised by scholars, its desecuritisation remains under theorised. Likewise, the existing studies on this matter are limited to European and American cases. This not only confines the use of the theory, but ignores the dynamics of other contexts and political systems. Therefore, the objectives of this dissertation are: to expand the empirical scope of (de)securitisation to non-western societies, drawing from the case of Colombian refugees in Ecuador. Additionally, this work aims to examine more in depth desecuritisation and its unintended consequences. Finally, it seeks to assess the audience's acceptance of (de)securitising discourses.

### ***A. Background Context***

Since the start of the millennium, South America has witnessed an unprecedented population movement within the region. The root of the issue goes back to the

internal conflict in Colombia. Although it is difficult to precisely identify the causes of the conflict, there are two main factors that pushed Colombians to migrate. One of the reasons is the clashes among the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia<sup>1</sup>, paramilitary groups and the army. The former emerged in the 1950s during the Violence Age (La Violencia),<sup>2</sup> in response to the terror and lack of status quo at the time (Jaramillo 2008: p. 42). In a different manner, the paramilitary groups appeared to protect plantations, cattle, oil reservoirs, factories and drug dealers. However, their job eventually turned into fighting the FARC, destroying entire towns that presumably had links with them (Romero in Schussler 2009: 33). As a consequence of continuous confrontations, the citizens are still left to suffer paramilitary occupations of their land, intimidation, forced recruitment, kidnappings, rapes and torture from both sides (Rivera et al 2007: 28).

The second factor is the repercussions of Plan Colombia. This initiative was developed amid all the chaos that the conflict brought, sponsored by the US. This strategy was adopted by the former President Alvaro Uribe in order to receive support in terms of political, economic and military matters to weaken illegal armed groups (Plan Colombia n.d). The main intentions were to provide training and weapons for the police and the army, fumigation of coke plantations, human rights protection and to strengthen Colombia's justice system (Plan Colombia and Beyond 2008 in Schussler 2009: 34). However, two implications unfold from this initiative: the dominant military scope of PC and the control gained by the Colombian army. On one hand, the social aspect was almost completely overlooked as the priority was strengthening the

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<sup>1</sup> Herein after FARC

<sup>2</sup> This was a period of extreme violence due to insurrection and criminality in Colombia during 1950.

military. Likewise, certain measures taken caused collateral damage. That is the case of farmers, whose plantations are often destroyed as a consequence of fumigations. Lastly, this strong military presence pushed the FARC to the jungle, near the border with Ecuador (Walsh 2009: 140). Thus, it is estimated that around 4 million Colombians are displaced<sup>3</sup> either internally or to bordering countries including Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.

### ***B. Delimiting the Problem***

According to the United Nations Higher Commissioner of Refugees, Ecuador is the number one country receiving refugees in the region (2011: 310). Colombia is the top refugee producer in Latin America and the 8<sup>th</sup> worldwide, following Myanmar (UNHCR 2012: 13). Although the total amount of refugees<sup>4</sup> is uncertain, the UNHCR's Global Appeal 2014-2015 Ecuador, stated that there are 123,133 refugees residing in Ecuador, from which 12,454 are asylum seekers. To date, the government of Ecuador has recognised 54,800 refugees. Furthermore, it is expected that an average of 1,000 people per month will continue to arrive (UNHCR 2014). These are only rough estimations as most refugees struggle to apply or prefer not for fear of rejection or deportation. As figures show, this has become a big challenge for Ecuador. Therefore, different policy approaches have been adopted by governments in order to manage the issue. It is in this scenario that multiple and different (de) securitising discourses and practices took place.

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<sup>3</sup> These figures make Colombia the country with the highest amount of International Displaced People worldwide, followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (UNHCR 2012: 21-22).

<sup>4</sup> Although there is a clear distinction between a refugee and an asylum seeker, this dissertation will refer to all people that come from Colombia that fit the definition of refugee – regardless of circumstances pertaining to recognition or application.

### *i. Importance*

The case of Colombian refugees in Ecuador is relevant to current securitisation debates for three reasons. First, it has the potential to be theoretically productive as it can illustrate the dynamics of the securitisation and desecuritisation of migration. Secondly, by analysing these dynamics in Ecuador, the desecuritisation of migration could be further empirically studied. Third, with this case, it will be possible to determine whether the implications of desecuritising migration could be counterproductive.

### *ii. Research Questions*

The government has adopted different approaches towards this migratory issue. Ecuadorian policies have varied across the years, treating migration as a threat, desecuritising it and probably going back to securitisation. Therefore, the research questions that this dissertation intends to answer are:

- What are the discourses and practices that constructed Colombian refugees as a threat?
- What are the foundations and implications of the desecuritisation of Colombian migration in Ecuador?
- Does the audience accept the (de) securitising discourses promoted by Ecuadorian elites and media?

### ***C. Structure***

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 will present a literature review of the existing scholarship on securitisation, desecuritisation and the (de) securitisation of migration. The most important theoretical debates in the matter will be analysed in this section. Additionally, an outline of the methodology will be included in this chapter. Chapter 2 will cover a brief account of the first securitisation of Colombian migration followed by its desecuritisation. Since re-securitisation is the third unit of analysis in this work, Chapter 3 will present the discourses and practices involved in this stage. In order to show the audience's acceptance or rejection of re-securitisation, Chapter 4 will present a snapshot of public opinion reflected in surveys. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarise the most relevant points in this dissertation and their theoretical and empirical implications.

## CHAPTER 1

### “Literature Review and Methodology”

In the 1990s, the Copenhagen School contributed to security studies with a different approach from the dominant and traditional perspective of the field. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) endeavoured to propose a reconceptualization of security, expanding the scope to other sectors than the military. However, as section one will present, several debates had taken place regarding the role of the audience, context and practices other than the speech act. In section two, desecuritisation contributes with other theoretical discussions in terms of effectiveness, the political nature of the concept and ethics. The (de) securitisation of migration will complement this account and be briefly outlined. This chapter seeks to present an overview of both phenomena and their most debated aspects according to the existing literature. Additionally, with the purpose of setting the scene for the case study in Chapters 3-4, the last section will discuss the methodology used in this work and its limitations.

#### **1.1 Securitisation Theory: Explaining the process**

Securitisation consists in preserving the survival of the referent object of the military, economic, societal, political and environmental sectors by taking extraordinary measures to face an existential threat. Therefore, this issue requires urgent action and will be framed in a special type of politics (or above) by shifting between non-

politicised/politicised to securitised using speech acts. It should be noted that the ultimate requirement for the success of the speech act is the approval of the audience since otherwise it would only remain a securitising move (1998: 21-25, 27).

### *1.1.1 Units and Conditions*

Referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors are the units of securitisation. The former is *what* must survive, e.g. the society, the biosphere, to which their existence is jeopardised by an existential threat. The securitising actor (person or group) declares an issue as a threat, while the functional actor need not participate directly but might affect the issue's (de) securitisation. So, a polluting oil company will not securitise the issue but might exert influence in the process (Buzan et al 1998 pp. 36-42).

According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation entails internal, external and facilitating conditions. The former covers the linguistic and grammatical aspects of the speech act. Hence, this theory sees the grammar of security as crucial; focusing mainly on linguistics (discourses). The second condition is about the context around the securitising move. The position of the actor should enable securitisation, not necessarily in an official way but to hold the social capital to do so. Finally, there are certain features that can contribute to the process, facilitating the identification of the issue as a threat. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the latter condition may or may not be present as it does not determine the course of securitisation (Buzan et al 1998: p. 33).

### *1.1.2 Theoretical Debates: Audience, Context and Practices*

Given its constructivist approach, there is an inter-subjective relationship between the audience and the securitising actor. In this point, Mark Salter (2008) argues that under this framework it becomes more difficult to establish if securitisation was successful. Further development on how the acceptance of the audience occurs should be considered. However, the Copenhagen School overlooks the possibility of several different audiences (Salter 2008: p.328-329). Holger Stritzel (2007) agrees in this point and adds that along with the acceptance of the audience, this process and the power-dynamics between actors should also be included.

Scholars concurred that securitisation theory would be more productive if it broadened its horizons and included a wider set of contexts, institutions, practices and symbolic resources (Huysmans 2000; Williams 2003; Karyotis 2007; Karyotis 2012). For instance, Salter (2010) argues that the setting determines the language, mode, figures and even structure of an act. Thus, the same actors may behave differently and use a different language in different settings, in accordance to the norms and expectations of those audiences (Salter 2010: 119). In a similar way, Thierry Balzacq (2008) proposes that securitisation should not be seen as a speech act but a pragmatic act, where agents, context, and audience are merged. He remarks that an effective securitisation is very context-dependent, audience centred and with power laden dynamics (2005: pp. 178-179).



On the other hand, institutional changes, policy initiatives, bureaucratic procedures and even technology can also determine who or what the threats are (Bigo 2000; Bigo 2002). In terms of institutions, Huysmans (2006) considered that the government, the police, NGOs and media can also be part of this process (2006: 31-35). Similarly, Michael Williams (2003) presented an interesting approach to the theory and includes images as a way to securitise (2003: pp. 525-528). Vultee (2010) also discussed the role of media and concluded that there is a similarity between framing and securitisation since both raise an existential issue that requires emergency action (Balzacq 2005 in Vultee 2010: pp. 28, 81).

### **1.1 Desecuritisation:**

As a response to securitisation, desecuritisation was proposed by Ole Waever (1995) in the context of the Cold War and the dynamics of East-West. In that environment, it was imperative to remove threats in order to ameliorate state relations. As a consequence, the transformation of threats into challenges helped to avoid security issues and open political debate. Desecuritisation was the product of bargaining and negotiations, limiting security speech acts. After Germany's unification, the fear of going back to chaos and losing control made it necessary to care for other's concerns (Waever 1995: 59-62). Desecuritisation then, is the removal of security from the securitised threat. Although innovative, desecuritisation is a concept that needs further exploration. Since there is not a universal guideline on what can be considered a threat, scholars have proposed several ways to desecuritize. Therefore, this section assesses theoretical debates about effectiveness, the political nature of desecuritisation and its ethical aspect. Additionally, the process, namely the different

ways to desecuritize an issue will also be considered.

### *1.2.1 Theoretical Debates: Effectiveness, the Political and Ethics*

Desecuritisation consists of moving the securitised (ergo existential) threats out of the security realm, in other words shifting them from emergency mode into normal. It can be inferred that if something is securitised, it can also be desecuritised (Roe 2004; Arandau 2004; Hansen 2012; Huysmans 2006). Buzan et al (1998: 4, 29) and Waeber (1995: 57) argue that desecuritisation would preferably be a long-range option and more effective than securitisation. For instance, Daniel Deudney (1990: 467-469) claims that in matters of environment, security has a short-term extent thus it may imply that desecuritisation could be more appropriate. Moreover, the us-versus-them perspective in security policies would not suit environmental degradation. Following the same line, Huysmans (2006: 126) questions security policies regarding migration. Therefore, dilemmas would rise in terms of the effectiveness of introducing border patrols/ tougher entry requirements and the desired outcome since these aggressive changes can also trigger more 'illegals'.

The character of desecuritisation like securitisation is political. In this point, Michael Williams (2003: 520) suggests that because securitising a threat is a choice, it will always be political. Hence, security is a speech act with political implications. In this aspect, Huysmans (1995; 1998; 2006) suggested that there is a Schmittian influence in the Copenhagen School concepts. For Huysmans, Carl Schmitt posed the friend-enemy relationship at the core of the political, turning securitisation theory into a strategy of the elites (Huysmans 1998: 571). This division creates the political

authority, who gains the capacity to legitimise its government and unify the individuals in a community (Schmitt 1996: 25-26). The enemy becomes an existential threat that leads to the famous passage of the limit i.e. politics of horror<sup>5</sup>, pushing extraordinary measures and breaking away from the usual course of affairs. This exceptionality is the foundation of securitisation (Buzan et al 1998; Waever 2000).

Olav Knudsen (2001) suggests that the existential threat is constructed (or deconstructed) around the (de) securitising actor's fears and views, thus lacking objectivity and limiting their identification to politicians (2001: 359-361). Roe (2004: 281) agrees in this point and adds that the process is constrained because the actor can influence the claims and thus the acceptance of the audience. Likewise, Buzan (1998: 208) believes that these dangerous implications could lead to paranoia. In this decisionism, the government could also over-emphasise security in order to gather more funding given the urgency of the threat (MacKenzie 2009: 259). In short, most scholars evidenced their concerns on the implications of (de) securitisation, suggesting that some ethical standards should be set.

In terms of ethics and morality inherited in both securitisation and desecuritisation, Rita Floyd (2014) suggested a normative theory to deal with those concerns. The author drew from Just War Theory and presented the conditions for morally acceptable securitisations. According to her, desecuritisation would be an ethical exit strategy. For this purpose it must: be timely (when the threat is neutralised), terminate security discourses and practices, and avoid renewing its previous status

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<sup>5</sup> The passage of the limit results in such fear of the possibility of death because of the threat.

(by building a stable state of affairs). Furthermore, desecuritisation would demand more than the unmaking of security e.g. including the application of restorative measures, such as compensation (2014: 5-7, 22, 27).

### *1.2.2 The Process of Desecuritisation*

Scholars debate the existence of 'a desecuriting' speech act. This will depend on the theoretical perspective one stands from. For instance from Floyd's (2014: 20) normative framework, language is only a warning or promise, whereas for Thierry Balzacq (2005), speech acts can lead to desecuritisation. Nevertheless, for this author there is not 'a' specific speech act (cited in Hansen 2012: 530). On the other hand, in certain cases like the Falungong desecuritisation in China presented by Juha Vuori (2010), an explicit speech act had the potential to desecuritize. The author evidenced how Li Hongzi as the leader of FLG, sent open letters denying being a threat to the Chinese government. In contrast, Andreas Behnke (2006: 65) sees desecuritisation possible only through the absence of speech acts, because any debates on an issue not being a threat anymore, might retain its security logic.

The context is very important to determine ways to desecuritize. Since every political situation is specific, there are not general principles to determine what issue should be (de)securitized (Wæver 2000: 282-285). As a consequence, there are several ways of empirically applying desecuritisation. Some authors applied Wæver's (2000: 253) strategy of avoidance (no security language is involved); management (handles the issue carefully without spiralling security dilemmas) or transformation (from emergency mode to normal). The Murmansk initiative works as an example of the

last variation. As a result of calling for cooperation with the West in non-security challenges and stating their removal from the national security agenda, these issues went back to normal politics (Atland 2008: 305).

Other ways to desecuritize have been proposed, for instance Huysmans (1995) suggests a more theoretical standpoint with objectivist, constructivist and de-constructivist strategies. In the first case threats are not real; they are instead informed by the people's perceptions. Therefore, it is important to convince the audience using statistics and information that demonstrates that there is no danger. The constructivist strategy seeks to first understand the issue and then handle it. However, this strategy ignores that the world is constantly changing hence by the time the issue is handled; it might not be the same. The de-constructivist alternative (or the everydayness), intends to look from the inside rather than the outside as there are multiple identities within an individual. According to the author, this is the most appropriate form, at least in the case of migration (Huysmans 1995: 65-68). From the literature reviewed in the present work, although promising, this proposal has only been applied in the societal sector<sup>6</sup>.

In the same way, Hansen (2012) presented four types of desecuritisation. The author proposed the stabilisation strategy, through which conflicts are pushed to the background. A threat can be supplanted by another one in desecuritisation by replacement. In a different manner, rearticulation intends to resolve the issue and eliminate the friend-enemy distinction through dialogue and cooperation. This mode

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<sup>6</sup> Roe rejects the de-constructivist approach arguing that by turning minorities into normal and everydayness, in some sense would kill their (needed) distinctiveness.

proposes finality, which is not possible as the world is in constant change (2012: 539-544). Gorbachev and the Murmansk speech (Atland 2008) also serve as an example of this strategy. However, it can be more difficult to achieve and bring complicated power dynamics. Finally, the silencing technique ignores an issue, disappearing as a consequence. Hansen (2012: 545) adds that this mode should be further developed; it is also problematic since it does not explain how un-securitised issues would enter to this group. MacKenzie's (2009: 243, 256-258) work on female soldiers in Sierra Leone is a suitable case that fits this strategy. It shows that securitising male soldiers and ignoring women, caused a return to normal for the latter. Therefore, they were removed from security discourses (desecuritised) and put at a disadvantage to men.

Assuming that desecuritisation was not unsuccessful, the chances are that the issue may shift to the realm of non-politicised (not dealt with in any way), politicised or even re-securitised (Atland 2008: 292). The latter scenario is not denied by the Copenhagen School; in fact Waever (2000: 285) commented that this phenomenon can take place in worrisome scenarios. In addition, for this scholar an optimal result would be asecuritisation, without feeling insecure or attempting to be safe (Waever 1995: 56; 1998). However, this assumption is contested by Floyd (2014: 11-14), who argues that the outcome of this process is a desecuritised state of affairs where either human security or insecurity is achieved - not asecuritisation.

### **1.3 Migration and (De) Securitisation**

As part of the societal sector of securitisation, migration can be seen as threat to the identity of a collectivity, namely the host society (Buzan et al 1998: 22-23). In this

point, Williams (2003) and McSweeney (1999) argue that presenting societal security in this manner can be dangerous, foster intolerance and exclusion. Setting identity at the core of a society overlooks two factors: identities change constantly and there can be numerous identities within one society (1999: 72). In this matter, Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre (1993: 189) suggest that the long-term goal is not to achieve a full societal security but to remove the issue from the security agenda. They further, if the language of security continues, the issue then is not resolved. However, most scholarship focuses on the securitisation of migration, not its desecuritisation.

In this sense, literature usually portrays the securitisation of migration as an issue exclusively of Western concern. Waever et al (1993: 186-187) justify this focus, with the idea that the international system is dominated mostly by Western states. For instance, Roxanne Lynn (2007: 71-74) agreed that there is a general consensus in academia and policy-making that population movements are security issues. She made special reference to how undocumented immigration and refugees are being securitised nowadays. The author presented the case of Haitian immigration to the US in order to illustrate three different securitisation logics. Similarly, Jef Huysmans (2000; 2006) has also limited his work to this region, more specifically towards the securitisation of migration in the EU. He showed how the Union through its generally restrictive regulations in migration matters, delegitimised immigrants (2000: 752-753). Moreover, the cultural and political homogeneity that the EU promotes may reinforce this type of policy (2006: 120-122). Alexandra Buonfino (2006) joined this consensus and added that immigration had become one of the biggest security

concerns of the century. Her work emphasised the dominance of this EU discourse in the policies of the UK and Italy. Bigo (2000) also contributed to this topic and pointed out the mechanisms that enhance these exclusionary policies in Europe. Furthermore, events like 9/11 worsened the perception of migration, linking it to criminality and terrorism. Thus, EU policy-makers interpreted migration as a threat to national security, merging this security continuum in treaties like Maastricht and Amsterdam (Karyotis 2007: 1-6). In the same way, Georgios Karyotis (2010) presented Greece's securitisation of immigration, influenced by religious elites.

## **1.4 Methodology**

### *1.4.1 Approach*

Since this dissertation draws from securitisation theory, the analysis of speech acts and the acceptance of the audience need to be considered. Therefore, the methodology used was a mixed-methods approach. This combination of qualitative and quantitative methods allowed the study of the sources that contained anti/pro securitisation discourses and online surveys that reflected the perceptions of the audience. A multi-strategy research provides a more compatible understanding of both. As Hammersley (1996) states, the two strategies can be used in different aspects of the investigation and can be joined together. In this work, qualitative facilitated the identification of the information that was used to design the questions in the survey (Bryman 2004: 454-455).

### *1.4.2 Strategy and Research Design*

This research has a case study base. According to Bryman (2004: 49) a case is



associated with a location be it a community or organisation. Therefore, the case of desecuritisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador, limits the research to a geographical location and a determined group of people. The period covered in this study ranges from 2000 to 2013. Choosing this design helped the investigation by identifying the unique features of this case so data could be gathered. In addition, this approach allowed an extensive assessment of the context, setting and actors involved. The purpose is to structure and determine the themes of the research and the reasons of its importance (Stake 2001: 447-450).

The nature of this case study is explanatory since it seeks to point out a cause-effect relationship from desecuritisation and re-securitisation (De Vaus 2005: 220-222). From the data analysed it is expected to conclude that desecuritisation of migration is neither always effective nor desirable, hence it is deductive. Although a case study design is suitable for the purpose of this dissertation, it also has some limitations. For instance, in spite of the argument that generalisation is difficult to represent in one single case, the reader is the one who should draw conclusions from the information presented. There are also some issues of validity and reliability. However, the researcher is responsible for the entire process beginning with selecting the case, the data collected, the methods used and the interpretation of the findings (Burns 2000: 474-475).

#### *1.4.3 Data Collection and Analysis Methods*

The data needed for this study were secondary sources including journal and newspaper articles, books and official websites. Primary sources were also used, such

as policy documents, the constitution of Ecuador, law bills and online surveys. Discourse analysis was applied to study the speech acts contained in the newspaper articles. The samples for speeches were collected from El Universo, El Comercio, La Hora and Diario Hoy. The criteria for selecting these outlets were circulation per region (coast and Andean), reliability (most years of functioning) and access (online database availability). For this purpose, 147 newspaper articles were collected from which 85 were codified into categories and 27 in subcategories corresponding to securitisation (4), desecuritisation (10) and re-securitisation (13). Discourse analysis was suitable as it focuses on the language in texts and its relationship with social and cultural contexts. It also examines the influence of the relationship of the participant, the effects on the audience and the construction of views and identities through discourse (Paltridge 2012: 2-3). This method analyses the power relations i.e. the subject positions, interpretative repertoires and ideological dilemmas that may arise in the text (Bryman 2008: 501-503). Although the context of the speeches was not first-hand, one could draw from the overall external situation to interpret the elites' statements. Another constraint in this work was the translation of the quotes and texts from Spanish into English. However, since the researcher is a Spanish native speaker and speaks English fluently, this did not represent any inconvenience.

This research was supported by the use of online surveys because of its advantages, especially its practical aspect. Primarily, surveys are more appealing for participants, represent lower costs, have better response rates and the results can be downloaded to a database. Since the study required participants from Ecuador, this option helped to eliminate geographical constraints. Nonetheless, there were some issues to take

into account. Although technology has recently spread very fast, not everyone owns a computer or has access to internet, especially in a developing country as Ecuador. Therefore the sample tended to be biased as the population was more educated, wealthier and younger. Moreover, since there are not enough studies about online behaviour, online surveys are more difficult to assess (Couper 2000 in Bryman 2004: 481; Bryman 2004: 483-485). In spite of these limitations, the benefits are worthy to consider.

The participants for this online survey were selected through a snowball sample. Surveys were circulated via social media and reached 264 responses. The criteria for the respondents' selection were to be an Ecuadorian adult (18+). There were 26 questions, divided in three sections, as seen in Appendix 1. The first part was about the attitude of Ecuadorians towards identity, migration and Colombian refugees. The second part was about political values, the population's level of political involvement, the parties they felt closer to and their participation in other organisations. The last section focused on demographic controls in order to see if age, education, gender, occupation or religion had any incidence in their attitudes towards migration. The survey's circulation period was two weeks.

#### *1.4.4 Ethics in Research*

This research acknowledges the following ethical aspects: confidentiality, privacy, consent and avoidance of any possible harm. The surveys maintained the privacy of the respondents as stated in the Plain Language Statement. Moreover, since no personal information was asked, consent was not needed. The information gathered

was digitally saved with a password known to the investigator and the supervisor in order to protect it. This survey did not imply any risks for the researcher or participants as shown in the ethical approval form attached in Annexe 1.

### **1.5 Conclusion**

As stated in this chapter, the literature reviewed reflected the elements of securitisation theory, its appraisal and the criticisms of desecuritisation. The main purpose of this section was to identify the main points to consider in the development of this dissertation. Therefore, the audience acceptance, the expansion of practices and the evaluation of desecuritisation's effectiveness are the cues to follow in the course of this work. In order to achieve this, a mixed-methods approach was taken. Regarding the research design, Ecuador's desecuritisation of migration was selected as explanatory case study and the methods for data collection/ analysis were discourse analysis and online surveys.

## CHAPTER 2

### **“The Empirical Process of Desecuritisation”**

In the previous chapter securitisation, desecuritisation and their most debated aspects were discussed. Therefore, this chapter draws from both concepts and intends to present an account of how these phenomena took place in Ecuador. Thus, in accordance to the Copenhagen School, speech acts were evaluated in order to illustrate the anti and pro-migration arguments in Ecuador’s society via discourse analysis. Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 1 most scholars agree that securitisation needs to include other aspects than language – hence, an assessment on the practices carried out by institutions such as the police and the government will be done. The following section focuses on explaining the transition from securitisation to desecuritisation and the possible reasons why this change occurred. Lastly, Hansen’s (2012) desecuritisation through re-articulation strategy will be used to explain how the ‘threatening’ status of Colombian refugees was removed and set back to normal politics.

#### **2.1 The First Securitisation: An Overview**

The first securitisation was a gradual process that began in the early 2000s. This period was characterised by the elites’ active involvement. It reached its highest points in 2003 and 2005 being pushed by several factors: the Plan Colombia; constant changes in Colombia and Ecuador’s bilateral relations; and the lack of resources in

the host country. The reaction of the elites, media and the population was severe. For instance, one parish in Esmeraldas declared a state of emergency in response to the arrival of Colombians, intensifying border patrols. Although PLANEX 2020, proposed by Alfredo Palacios (former President of Ecuador), dealt with migration among other foreign policy matters, the securitisation of Colombian migration took place. Following what securitisation theory states, the conjunction of discourses and practices in Ecuador turned refugees into an existential threat that endangered the referent object (Ecuador's society). This phenomenon will be one of the three units of analysis in the present work.

### *2.1.1 Constructing the threat: Crime, Economy, Labour and Security*

In this case, Colombian refugees were seen as a threat to public order, a menace to local economy and competition in the labour market. Since securitisation theory (as stated in chapter 2) draws from speech acts, four newspaper articles that featured different securitising statements will be analysed<sup>7</sup>. The association of criminality to migration was expressed in the first place by the ex-President of Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez and reinforced by the national commander of the police, Jorge Poveda. Economic discourses of budget concerns were also reproduced by the chancellor. The Ministry of Labour also claimed that immigration caused job competition and displacement. Finally, institutions such as the Chancellery and the Government also discussed the struggle for jobs between Colombians and Ecuadorians. In addition to the securitising discourses, practices will also be analysed.

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<sup>7</sup> It should be noted however, that the purpose of this analysis is not to pose media as a securitising actor but as a channel used by elites to either securitise or desecuritize Colombian migration in Ecuador.

In 2003, Gutierrez referred to Colombians as representing 'the majority of the criminals arrested in Ecuador', basing these accusations on police reports. However, it was not clear which reports he referred to, making this claim very vague. He also remarked the fact that Colombian migrants were numerous, as he repeated the word 'majority' twice (Gutierrez in Diario la Hora 2003b). The message he intended to project was that of danger and caution while also suggesting that the public force had 'done their job' by arresting those criminals. The role that Gutierrez played put him as the voice of the country. Thus, as the President of the nation, if he declares certain issue as threatening, the impact of his message on the citizens will be considerable. In addition, the national commander of the police, Jorge Poveda highlighted the urgency of the situation by saying: 'every day many Colombians arrive to Ecuador'. He also categorised migrants: 'some as refugees, others to start businesses and also to do criminal activities (sic)'. Although it is quite positive that refugees, investors and criminals were set separately, he reiterates the 'matter of *much concern* that should be dealt [my emphasis]', generalising this concern among all (Poveda in Diario la Hora 2003b). Poveda as the chief of the police force represented a high rank of authority hence reinforcing what the President previously had said. As a consequence, a migrant-crime relation resulted from this discourse.

The economic impact of the issue on the country was also discussed by the elites. In this aspect, the securitising discourse transitioned from a purely criminal perspective to a matter of economy and labour. The chancellor of Ecuador, Jose Betancourt, explicitly said 'Ecuador does not have a budget to afford all the expenses of receiving

refugees from our Colombian neighbours'(Betancourt in Diario la Hora 2003b). Even though he referred to refugees in a less derogatory way by using the word neighbours, he pointed out the fact that we (Ecuador) *cannot* receive them. In matters of competition between locals and migrants, the minister of labour, Luis Mantilla, expressed – in relation to Peruvians and Colombians – that 'those immigrants accept to work for the 50% of the minimum wage'. In this statement the depiction of immigrants is limited to the two nationalities, he furthers his argument with 'they are displacing local labour' which (according to the minister) partially explained according to him 'the increase of Ecuadorian emigration to Europe (...) [There are areas] where there is no Ecuadorian labour because almost everyone migrated' (Mantilla in Diario La Hora 2003a). Using words like 'those immigrants' that 'displace' Ecuadorian labour establishes clear power relations where 'the other' is seen as negative competition. In this antagonist relationship, locals are the victims and foreigners the enemies whom take opportunities away from Ecuadorians.

The degree of existentiality begins to increase and the actions taken by institutions complemented the speeches. Galo Chiriboga, the Minister of Government stated that 'if it is necessary we [the government] will declare state of emergency' (Chiriboga in El Universo 2005). This reaction was in response to the 1,000 Colombians that suddenly arrived to San Lorenzo, Esmeraldas and the presumed invasion of Ecuadorian air space by Colombian helicopters (Diario la Hora 2005). As a response to this discourse, the mayor of the parish Vuelta Larga, Gustavo Samaniego, declared a state of emergency in the area. Additionally, three shelters were established and patrols employed by 50 were implemented (Diario La Hora 2005).



It is very difficult to isolate the responses towards the Colombian conflict and those directed towards migration, since often both are interrelated. However, the declaration (speech act) by the major (securitising actor) of an existential threat (Colombian refugees) to the referent objects (the society of San Lorenzo) led to a securitising move that was generally accepted by the population. This acceptance can be illustrated in CEDATOS-Gallup (2006) survey where 74% of Ecuadorians were against Colombian migration and 35% were in favour of deportation. Moreover, 52% of them agreed that 'illegal' Colombians must be scrutinised (cited in la Hora 2006). As a consequence of these events, Colombian refugees became securitised.

## **2.2 Towards a New Perspective: Desecuritisation**

Drawing from Hansen's (2012) re-articulation strategy to desecuritize an issue, this section intends to explain how Colombian refugees were moved (from the securitised realm) to the normal course of politics. Firstly, changes in Ecuador's political environment took place during 2007-2009, which led to a harmonisation in the attitude towards migration and Colombian refugees. In this point, the attention regarding xenophobia was drawn not in favour of Colombians but as a reaction to the attacks on Ecuadorians in Europe and the USA. Four cases were most discussed by the elites in those host countries and Ecuador. These events could be seen as a cause for this abrupt change in migration policy. As a result, Rafael Correa<sup>8</sup> came along with new ideologies and pro-migration policies. In 2008, Ecuador's constitution was

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<sup>8</sup> Rafael Correa, the 56<sup>th</sup> president of Ecuador, elected on the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 2006, re-elected for a second term in April 2009 and in February 2013.

amended including the principle of world citizenship, condemning racism and discrimination in any form and recognising refuge as a right to promote equal rights and obligations for foreigners. Furthermore, campaigns like “We are all migrants” were launched in other countries in order to raise awareness in this matter. In relation to the influx of Colombian refugees, the Ecuadorian government began its Enhanced Registration Programme (ERP) from 2009 to 2010 as a tool to regularise displaced people in the northern border. However, the results of this endeavour were not the expected as will be further discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

### *2.2.1 Transition to desecuritisation*

The xenophobic attack against an Ecuadorian girl in October 2007 on a train in Barcelona went viral. Not only the media and Ecuadorian authorities reacted in shock but also the international community responded. It reached such an impact that the Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish government, Parliament and courts of justice and NGOs got involved. The Ecuadorian minister, Maria Fernanda Espinosa, expressed ‘there is no possible exaggeration when a racist and xenophobic act is committed (...) we will apply all the weight of the law in unity (...) we will do what it takes for these acts never happen again and that the culprit is punished’. This statement portrays attitudes of revenge. The power relations in this case are the same as in the first securitisation, the victim is an Ecuadorian who is abused by the other (a Spanish man). However, when saying the words ‘we’ and ‘unity’, Espinosa also sends the message that both nationals (Ecuadorians and Spaniards) are not distinct (Espinosa in Diario HOY 2007).

Another three xenophobic episodes took place in 2008. One of those tells the story

of an Ecuadorian man living in NYC, who was attacked by five African-Americans. The magnitude of the assault was such that the victim died as a consequence. The second case was similar in that an Ecuadorian man was stabbed to death by a group of American teenagers (La Hora 2008). Likewise, a girl from Ecuador living in Spain was battered by a 14-year old local. In this case, Lorena Escudero, representative of the National Secretariat for Migration said that she 'strongly reject[s] this new act of violence against an Ecuadorian minor'. From this statement, it can be interpreted the emphasis on the nationality and the age of the victim, by using 'strongly' it may imply that the government is angered by this event. As these cases show, discrimination against Ecuadorians reached a high point in this period and as expected intolerance, racism and violence were rejected.

### *2.2.2 Changes: New Constitution, campaigns and Enhanced Registration Programme*

Contrary to securitisation, it is not clear whether there is a desecuritisation speech act as explained in chapter 1. However, this case will follow Balzacq (2010) and Hansen's (2012) argument that speech acts can lead to desecuritisation without being 'a desecuritisng speech act'. In addition, practices like changes in Ecuadorian policies that contributed to this process will be assessed.

#### *2.2.2.1 A 'Revolutionary'<sup>9</sup> Law*

Plan Ecuador was adopted as a state policy in March 2007 by incumbent President Rafael Correa, being especially directed towards the situation in the northern border.

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<sup>9</sup> Often called revolutionary since it was a product of what Correa named the 'Citizen's Revolution'.

This plan conceived security and solidarity to maintain peace and development. These premises contributed to the inclusion of refuge and asylum in the National Development Plan 2007-2010 which later led to changes in institutions and other regulations (Dirección General de Refugiados 2008: 25, 27). However, since the highest rank of Ecuadorian law is the constitution, the main referent of desecuritising migration was its amendment in November 2007 (officialised in September 2008).

Amid the consequences of Colombia's conflict, other incidents took place that could have incited this desecuritisation. Simultaneously, a wave of violence hit Ecuadorians living abroad provoking different reactions and leading to new amendments in matters of migration<sup>10</sup>. For instance, the Ecuadorian constitution considers the right to migrate without identifying anyone as illegal because of their migratory status. Furthermore, this constitution recognises the right of asylum and refuge according to international instruments. It is also determined that the principle of non-refoulement should be respected and guarantees humanitarian assistance to all displaced persons. Although these improvements are significant, the best example of a desecuritising move was the promotion of the principle of universal citizenship and free movement, the demand for enforcing human rights of the migrant's and the rejection of racism, xenophobia and all forms of discrimination (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2008: 33, 183). As a product of this open border initiative, all foreigners that want to visit Ecuador do not need a visa unless their period of stay exceeds 90 days (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2013).

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<sup>10</sup> See: Articles 40, 41, 42, and 416 No. 5-6 of the Constitution.

Consequently, because of the principles pursued by the Constitution, the new Policy of Refuge was implemented in September 2008 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, five axes of action in migration policy were proposed. The elements of this policy were created towards the promotion of a mixed model of protection for massive influx of refugees and individual applications. Additionally, it sought to provide immediate protection to those 'invisible persons' through the ERP. The Policy on Refuge also included long-term integration strategies and programmes in coordination with the respective city halls in order to include refugees in the Ecuadorian society (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integracion 2008 in FLACSO ANDES 2010).

#### *2.2.2.2 We Are All Migrants' Campaign*

'We are all migrants' was promoted by the SENAMI whose purpose was to spread 'the word' of universal citizenship abroad (National Secretariat of Migration). In a symbolic ceremony, President Correa gave a famous Ecuadorian singer who was supposed to go on tour in Europe, the 'World Citizen' passport. In this sense, the Secretariat released a statement where they emphasised that the campaign was created to 'raise awareness about the importance of migration (...) as an inexhaustible source of richness and progress to the states'. There is a positive connotation in this message, since the relevance of migration is highlighted by the benefits that it represents. It is interesting that *inexhaustible* is used to describe migration, this appears to be a reminder that this phenomenon will perpetuate. SENAMI furthered that 'the initiative (...) [was] developed around the ideals of world citizenship, solidarity and fraternity, and in rejection of all forms of discrimination,

racism and xenophobia' (SENAMI in El Universo 2009a). This phrase reinforces the values proposed by the Constitution, and gives an idea of unity and brotherhood among states. However, the power relations in this text lean towards optimal vs. condemning situations, positioning first what the relationship between migrants-states should be and what it cannot be.

### *2.2.2.3 Enhanced Registration Programme: Appraisal and Consequences*

The intention of the 'Enhanced Registration Programme' was at first to regularise 50.000 refugees in the northern border (Schussler 2009: 39). This project began in March 2009 (only to finish 15 months later) and was seen as a pioneer in Latin America because of its unprecedented reach. It consisted in transporting mobile offices that would register refugees living in the provinces on the border such as Esmeraldas, Sucumbíos, Orellana, Carchi and Imbabura (UNHCR 2010). For this purpose, a database was created with the personal information of applicants who were then interviewed in order to determine the cause of the displacement. The duration of the process was one day, and given its efficiency 32.390 visas were granted. These results represented an increase of 62% in the number of refugees recognised in comparison to the previous -securitised- stage (FLACSO ANDES 2010: 2-3; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2012).

The Sub-secretariat of Multilateral Relations and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs got involved and claimed their views in the matter. Carlos Jativa, spokesman of the Chancellery said that the ERP was a '(...) peace strategy to ameliorate the living conditions of the population in the borders threatened by the

Colombian conflict'. From his statement, it is interesting to see that he did not use the language of dividing friend-enemy. Therefore, his intentions were to avoid the conflict and assist the ones in need regardless of nationality. This was emphasised when the ambassador used general terms like 'the population' to give the idea of unity, putting together both Colombians and Ecuadorians. This speech does not say 'they are not a threat' but, certainly sends the message that they are not enemies that come to the country to commit crimes. Jativa continued remarking the need for inclusion 'in the national life (...) it is not nice to be a refugee, not even in paradise' (Jativa in El Universo 2009b). The aim of the desecuritising actor is evident: he calls the people to welcome refugees and help with their integration. Moreover, describing the condition of refugee as not pleasant in any case, 'not even in paradise' intends to convince the audience that they indeed need Ecuador's help. Alfonso Morales, representative of the General Directorate of Refuge, also contributed to this de-construction of threat. He stated that the government 'trust [s] the good faith of the person applying' (Morales in El Universo 2009c). There is some kind of reassurance for the audience in the sense that the government trusts refugees. Hence, it can be implied that because of the government's power position over the citizens, if they trust, so should they. These discourses of solidarity, unity and trust constructed the refugees in a more humane way. The statements expressed by the authorities in this case, illustrate that the arguments promoted in the securitisation of Colombian refugees were replaced by intentions of peace and brotherhood.


It is possible to see that the ERP was a remarkable improvement in matters of refuge in the region. Deborah Elizondo, representative of the UNHCR, praised the endeavour

of the Ecuadorian government ‘*thanks* to [their] political will, the protection (...) has been extended’. She added that this project ‘turned out to be an *impressive* tool of protection’ [my emphasis]. Elizondo sends a message of gratitude to the government and exalts the success of the registry. In spite of the fact that they did not reach the goal of 50,000 visas, tripling the visas issued from previous figures of 10,713 cases approved, represented a considerable progress for their lives.

### **2.3 Conclusion**

The unfortunate cases of Ecuadorians being abused with xenophobic attacks contributed to the changes presented in this section. There appeared to be a domino effect in desecuritising practices. First, changing the law of highest hierarchy in the country led to a reconsideration of migration policy which in turn was complemented by campaigns. Recognising world citizenship opened the door to all foreigners and influenced in the treatment of refugees. The ERP represented the apex of desecuritising practices in this case as it was accompanied by speeches of equal treatment and solidarity. Although neither authority explicitly said that Colombian refugees no longer posed a threat, it can be inferred from the actions and the speeches analysed, that the intention was to move the notion of security away from the concept of refugees. Figure 1 presents a summary of the factors that led to the desecuritisation of migration in Ecuador.





**Figure 1. The Desecuritisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador**

## CHAPTER 3

### **“Re-securitisation, a Response to Desecuritisation”**

As presented in the previous chapter, the number of recognised refugees reached the highest peak in 2009-2010 as a result of desecuritisation. In spite of intentions for ameliorating the conditions of asylum seekers, a mix of exaggeration met reality (initially promoted by media and elites) led to a re-securitisation of Colombian migration. Unfortunately, the expected outcomes from past desecuritisation did not occur. In the following years, however, some discourses from the first securitisation were reinforced. A general rejection was spread towards refugees, asylum seekers, migrants that did not apply for refuge and the ones whose application was not approved. Different discourses were used to justify this phenomenon. The most prominent argument was in security and public order matters reproduced by authorities and endorsed by negative media coverage. The period that encompassed these events ranged from mid-2010 up to 2013.

#### **3.1 Re-securitisation: Refugees, Delinquency Debates and Policy**

##### *3.1.1 Extreme (in) security*

The situation of Colombian refugees after the Enhanced Registration Programme (ERP) was unexpected. The perceptions of this population reverted to a state of rejection, stigmatisation and fear, where institutions played an important part. For instance, the police, the District's Attorney office and the Chancellery championed

discourses that proclaimed a security nexus of immigration, criminality and drugs. The statement released by the anti-delinquency intelligence unit of Quito's Police, referred to the problem of gangs competing for the drug market in the city and attributed the cause of this issue to '(...) the current policies of open borders and free mobility, [which] make easy their entrance. Looking for refuge blurs the line with transnational criminality' (Anti-delinquency Unit agent in El Universo 2010). It is highlighted how that specific policy is the genesis of the problem, directly linking drug trafficking and its consequences to migration. It can be inferred that the dilemma relies in either granting refuge or living in the middle of criminality. The self and other are expressed when using 'their entrance'. This relationship of victims and perpetrators is reinforced later on by describing how both issues are merged. Unsurprisingly, the refugees that do need this recognition are non-existent, they are relegated and categorised as delinquents nonetheless. For instance, the District's Attorney cites the case of the province of Carchi where '80% of the foreigners arrested has a refugee ID or is in the application process. (...) in Tulcan [the capital of the province] 95% of arrested people are Colombians' (La Fiscalia in El Universo 2010). Introducing figures that represent a high amount of people from this nationality involved in criminal activities reinforces the assumption of 'Colombians are criminals'. The power position of these institutions sets Ecuador as the victim of these apparently dangerous foreigners.

Similar attitudes from authorities continued throughout 2011. A distinctive securitising speech was promoted by Rafael Correa. The President mentioned that the applications had been reduced and will be 'strictly revised, (...) before the process

was very *lax* and this has to be corrected (...) sometimes, criminals applied for refuge and got it, this is coming to an end' [my emphasis] (Correa in El Universo 2011a). The President selected the word *lax* to describe the ERP. Hence, there was a lack of severity and because of this; criminals are 'now' refugees. Even the government and the UN had previously praised this programme; the words of the President are straightforward in that it requires correction. This statement only emphasises the negative results of the registry, thus, it is possible to see a change in its perception. The overall image that the government portrayed is of reflectivity and strictness. Through the construction of this discourse it can be noted that criminals are set apart from refugees, the latter are not generalised as the former. In this aspect, Leonardo Carrion, Sub secretary of Migration of the Chancellery, suggested reconsidering the registration plan. The reason given highlighted what Correa suggested before, therefore the plan ought to change since 'there were Colombians that requested asylum and committed crimes'. Although Carrion does recognise that 'the delinquency index of Colombians in the country is low', he furthers that 'the infiltration of criminals thanks to this programme is evident' (Carrion in El Universo 2011b). With the ERP finished, this statement opens the possibility of changing the strategy of regularising refugees. In accordance to these speeches, the Sub-secretary of Migration decided to filter refugee visas that had been granted up to then. As a result, the government and the UNHCR jointly set up a process of data systematization. From this endeavour, only 1% of the cases represented irregularities. In addition, Ecuador pursued an agreement with Colombia in order to share the Colombian Secret Services database to verify the applicants' criminal records (El Comercio 2011). Not only did the institutions committed to proclaim arguments of

criminality but also they took actions that concurred with those discourses. By encouraging a re-assessment of the applications given and asking for a joint criminal records revision, migration was no longer desecuritized. It can be concluded that for these elites, the programme was used as a way to bring criminals in and thus required modifications.

### *3.1.2 Strengthening the law*

Perhaps the most controversial change in Ecuador's migration policies occurred in May 2012 with the enactment of the Presidential Decree No. 1182. This regulation had been harshly criticised mainly by NGOs and INGOs<sup>11</sup>. The debates rely on the modifications to the previous Decree No. 3301 which recognised both the 1951 Convention and the Cartagena Declaration. Therefore, the criteria<sup>12</sup> of refugee set by the former international instrument is stated to be: founded fear of being persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a group or political opinion; and being unable or unwilling to be protected in their home country (UNHCR 1951: 16). On the other hand, the 1984 Cartagena declaration includes among refugees those who have fled their home countries because of generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive human rights violations or other disturbing circumstances that threatened their lives, freedom or safety (OAS 1984). It can be inferred that the case of Colombian refugees, as discussed throughout this work, fits more the definition of the Declaration. Nonetheless, Decree 1182 in its Article 8

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<sup>11</sup> In this matter, Asylum Access Ecuador in joint efforts with the Public Interest Law Clinic of the San Francisco de Quito University and Human Rights Watch have filed amicus curiae brief in 2012 and 2014 before the Constitutional Court of Ecuador contending that the decree violates the obligation of the state to protect refugees (HRW 2014). For further insight see: [http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/16/amicus-brief-refugee-rights-ecuador#\\_ftn42](http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/16/amicus-brief-refugee-rights-ecuador#_ftn42)

<sup>12</sup> For more information see the Convention, Article 1, para 2.

encompasses only the definition of refugee established in the Convention.

However, Article 12 provides that no sanctions will be applied for those who are in need of international protection because their lives, integrity, freedom or security were threatened, provided that three conditions are verified. Regarding this latter point lays another concern. The issue with this Decree is not limited to the definition of refugees, but also extends to procedural restrictions. For instance, the first condition is to present themselves to the competent authority within 15 days since arrival (Correa 2012). It is this requirement that becomes problematic in the sense that many asylum seekers do not know the laws or procedures to follow in order to apply. Additionally, the Decree regulates the cases of unfounded, abusive and illegitimate applications. This means that those who apply without coinciding with the definition of a refugee recognised by Ecuadorian law, or use illegal elements to support the application, will not be granted refuge on the grounds of inadmissibility. Similarly, if there are founded reasons to consider that the applicant had committed crimes in Ecuadorian territory, the application will not be processed. In the former scenarios, the applicant has three days to appeal or leave the country. In the last case, the person should immediately leave.


In addition, a clear securitisation intention is included in Article 55 of the Decree, which allows authorities to revoke refuge if the person has been involved in crimes or situations that disrupt Ecuador's security (Correa 2012). From these structural changes, it can be concluded that the limitation in the definition of a refugee represents the main problem, followed by extremely short periods to apply and

appeal. Moreover, the motives for dismissal or rejection of the applications are not entirely clear. From this brief analysis it can be deduced that there is a disregard for the asylum seekers' reality, where there is a lack resources, means and knowledge of the bureaucratic procedures that take place. Furthermore, in the case of illegitimate applications, the founded reasons are not explicit enough. It represents an issue of interpretation that remains unclear. Likewise, when revoking the person's refugee status it is not explicit enough under what point is classified as being involved in a criminal activity e.g. accomplice, aider, conspirator, principal etc. As a consequence of these restrictions, the number of refugees recognised dropped to 1,625, representing a decrease of 94.95%. These issues represent a regression in the country's migratory approach, and more specifically these changes securitise migration once again.

### **3.2 Conclusion**

In this second securitisation of migration in Ecuador, the discourses changed from an economic and labour perspective to mostly security and public order. Creating a drug, crime and migration continuum brought back previous perceptions of Colombian refugees. Consequently, the changes in laws to restrict refugee materialised what elites had proclaimed ever since the ERP finalised. From the assessment of this third aspect of the case, it can be concluded that the desecuritisation by re-articulation led - as feared by scholars - to a re-securitisation of migration. In order to illustrate these three units of analysis, Chart 1 explains how the number of approved applications coincides with the stages of securitisation, desecuritisation and re-securitisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador. The last element of securitisation, the acceptance of the audience should be determined in

order to label this phenomenon as a successful re-securitisation. Since the response of the audience is crucial to this work, the following chapter will examine this aspect along with an evaluation of the implications.



**Chart 1. The Desecuritisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador according to the number of applications approved from 2000-2013 (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2013).**



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **“Re-securitisation: Acceptance or Rejection of the Ecuadorian Audience?”**

In the last chapter, re-securitisation discourses and practices were discussed. In sum, this second securitisation was more focused on the criminal, drugs and migration continuum and less like its first manifestation where refugees allegedly caused economic and labour issues. The 1182 Decree helped to bring these discourses to reality by restricting the refugee’s application process. Consequently, this chapter attempts to consider the perceptions of the host society. Following one of the theoretical debates considered in Chapter 1, securitisation theory presented by Buzan et al (1998) requires further development, especially when assessing the acceptance or rejection of the audience (Salter 2008; Stritzel 2007; Balzacq 2005; Karyotis 2012). Thus this dissertation proposes that carrying out surveys can contribute to this gap in the theory. In order to attain this purpose, a survey was conducted to determine if the audience accepted the re-securitising discourses as shown in section one, or rejected them.

#### **4.1 Findings: The Acceptance of the Ecuadorian Audience**

As stated by the Copenhagen School, the acceptance of the audience consolidates securitising moves. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to present a snapshot of public opinion and verify whether they coincide with the main discourses and

practices against Colombians. To achieve this endeavour, 264 Ecuadorians were considered to answer 26 questions in an online survey circulated specifically for this objective as shown in Appendix 1.

#### 4.1.1 Profile of the Population

The people sampled were Ecuadorians living in the country and abroad. The slight majority of the surveyed population were men, single with University education and employed. Married people and students (as an occupation) had the second highest percentage. Almost all the participants (86.89%) were not members of any organisation: political parties, trade unions or voluntary organisations. However, most of the people showed an interest in politics; although it varied in intensity. There was a uniform division of opinion when they were asked where in the spectrum of left and right their political interest lie. Regarding this question, there was a very slight inclination towards the left with 7.24% more than the right and ideological centred (neither left nor right). Similarly, in the case of religion, a slim majority of the population was religious with 44.07% versus 35.17% non-religious and those who were in the middle with a 20.76%. The main religion chosen was Catholicism with 62.50%. These figures are shown in Table 1.

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<b>Profile of the Sample</b>	
Ecuadorians	100%
Living in Ecuador	50%
Living Abroad	50%
Female	44.91%

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Male	55.09%
Single	64.40%
Married	28.40%
University (Undergraduate and Postgraduate)	86.20%
Employed	51.70%
Students	44.90%
Not members of any Organisation	86.89%
Interest in politics	74.31%
Left-Wing (0-4)	37.24%
Ideologically centred (5)	31.80%
Right-Wing (6-10)	30.96%
Religious (6-10)	44.07%
Less religious (0-4)	35.17%
Neither (5)	20.76%
Catholic	62.50%

**Table 1. Profile of the Sample**

#### *4.1.2 Attitude towards migration: Successful Securitisation?*

As presented in Chapter 3, the re-securitising arguments leaned more towards public order rather than budgetary problems or job competition. This was reflected in their answers as shown in Chart 2, where 50.8% of the people thought immigrants were somewhat good for the economy of the country. At first, it would appear that the Ecuadorians surveyed had a slightly positive attitude towards migrants, as the majority of participants believed that Ecuador's cultural life would not be undermined by their presence. In the same way, they chose that it could actually be a

better country if people from abroad came to live in Ecuador. In both cases, the response rates were high with 63% and 65% respectively. See charts 3 and 4.




Chart 2. Economic Implications




Chart 3. Cultural Implications






Chart 4. Impact on Living Conditions



**Chart 5. Perceptions on the number of immigrants in Ecuador**

Although the negativity towards immigration was not as apparent, the subsequent set of questions reflected a change in their perceptions. Firstly, 95% of the people agreed that the number of immigrants in Ecuador had increased. In the next question, they were asked to classify different types of immigrants as either positive or negative. In this section, it is possible to see that although there was not a straightforward negative connotation of refugees and asylum seekers in general, there was certain rejection towards Colombian migrants. This was revealed in the next category where the majority indicated that irregular and Colombian migrants were negative with 72.27% and 41.45% respectively. This is contrary to the perceptions of tourists who were considered positive by the vast majority, which represented the 93.36% as presented in Chart 5.




**Chart 6. Perceptions on different types of Immigrants**

In order to delve deeper into this point, pro and anti-immigration statements were included in the survey. These statements represented the arguments from the re-securitisation stage, where the general discourse was based on two axes: increase of criminality and Ecuador’s lax legal framework. In the first set of speeches, there was not a distinction between being a Colombian refugee or a Colombian criminal. On this subject, the participants’ opinion divided as 35.3% did not agree that Colombians represented the majority of foreign criminals. However, a very close portion of the population (33.73%) thought that Colombians did represent the majority of foreign criminals. In addition to the negativity perceived by the population in terms of irregular and Colombian immigrants, the audience manifested their opinion on criminality linked to immigration. In this topic, 44.32% of the respondents agreed


with this re-securitising argument versus the 25.49% who did not think so. It can be inferred that the 'public order' re-securitising discourse was accepted by the audience.

There was a similar trend in the responses that corresponded with the re-securitising discourse and practices carried out by President Correa and the Sub-secretary of Migration (discussed in chapter 3). As shown in Chart 10, two options were themed as 'regulations'. For instance, when the audience was asked if the laws of Ecuador are *too flexible*, 65.1% of them agreed. Likewise, when the visa as a requirement for Colombians that intend to enter the country was presented as an option, the surveyed population responded that it should be that way (50.78%). In this section of the question, 32.03% disagreed. It can be argued that the audience also accepted the changes in the Ecuadorian law proposed by the President via Decree 1182. Furthermore, these results suggest that even with those modifications in migration policy, law should be stricter in this matter.

As the population is divided into Ecuadorians living abroad and in the country, the exposure to the issue may have influenced their perception. However, the overall evaluation suggests that there is only a very slim difference between one group and the other. For instance, taking negative re-securitising arguments in terms of regulations and criminality, more people living in Ecuador agreed than those living abroad. Conversely, when there were less negative statements towards migration such as equality, discrimination and poverty, people abroad tended to agree more as explained in Chart 8.




**Chart 7. Perception on Pro and Anti-Immigration Statements**



**Chart 8. Pro and Anti-Immigration Statements: Ecuadorians Living Abroad and in Ecuador**



In this context, where criminality and migration are practically one, it is understandable that fear in the host society manifests. In this point, Chart 9 represents the concerns of the citizens surveyed. As expected, their biggest concern is to become victims of delinquency as expressed by 73.25%.



**Chart 9. Concerns of the People**

## 4.2 Discussion

This survey was conducted in order to determine if the re-securitising discourses were accepted by the audience. There are several points to consider in this analysis. Firstly, for Ecuadorians, different migrants are perceived differently. Therefore for the audience, migrants from Latin America, refugees and asylum seekers are seen slightly more positively in comparison to irregular and Colombian migrants. Secondly, when specific securitising statements were asked, the audience reflected that immigrants increase criminality, that some foreign delinquents are Colombian and that overall, Ecuador should strengthen its policies on immigration (especially in terms of Colombians entering the country).

This negativity (manifested towards irregular and -mostly Colombian migration) could have been influenced by the constant security language used by elites and media. For instance, from 157 newspaper articles analysed for this work, 46.49% of them linked Colombians to drugs, crime and guerrilla. Furthermore, specific activities such as prostitution among women and crimes like usury and contract killings in men were the usual images promoted. Attention was also paid to hate crimes against refugees but the social conditions they lived in were rarely covered. It can be presumed that this scenario of public order concerns, fostered fear among the audience. Thus the vast majority of Ecuadorians in this survey were afraid of becoming victims of delinquency.

It is interesting to see, how in this re-securitisation stage, the prominent security frame used was only towards public order issues. This may suggest that some security discourses were stronger than others. In this sense the pattern in this re-securitisation differs from that of the first one. Thus, in this survey, the audience responded that in matters of economy, culture and the quality of life in Ecuador, immigrants are not perceived as threatening. In this point, it is worth noting that in the first securitisation, job competition and budgetary concerns were the main anti-refugee arguments expressed by the Chancellor and Minister of Labour.

Even though the population mostly showed an anti-immigration attitude, they also acknowledged some social connotations of the issue. The great majority (70.31%) thought that nationals and migrants should be treated equally and 44.71% of them also recognised that Colombian immigrants are constantly discriminated against.

Thus from these figures, two important points arise: the rights of the refugees and discrimination. These results can be complemented with Ospina, Santacruz and Vallejo's (2012) study, which revealed that 52% of the Colombian refugee population surveyed felt discriminated in Ecuador. The main reasons were due to nationality, refugee status and gender (58%, 18% and 10% respectively).

In terms of access to basic rights like labour, housing and education, refugees constantly struggle. They are paid minimum wages (if paid at all), leading to exploitation. Colombians that look for housing are usually welcomed with phrases like 'you come here to smuggle drugs and turn the house into a brothel' (Focus Group with Colombian women conducted by Ospina et al 2012: 96-101). This negative attitude is also present in education, where in spite of being legally prohibited<sup>13</sup>, schools deny the enrolment of Colombian children. Rejection because of their nationality was mostly expressed from teachers and classmates (Ortega et al 2012: 158-159). Without access to a fairly paid job, housing or education, refugees have to struggle even more than a regular poor Ecuadorian to survive. In words of Schussler (2009: 58) refugees become '*the poorest among the poor*'.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

In conclusion, two main observations resulted from this survey. First, Ecuadorians see Colombians as a threat in comparison to the rest of the migrants and second, public order securitising arguments were stronger than the economic and labour ones. As

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<sup>13</sup> Ministerial Agreement No. 337 enacted in 2008 provides equal treatment for foreigners.

figures previously showed, the audience agreed that: migration has increased in the country; irregular and Colombian refugees are perceived negatively; migration increases criminality; regulations should be stricter; and the population fear for their safety (due to delinquency). Thus, it can be inferred that the Ecuadorian participants accepted the security discourses and practices disseminated by elites. As a consequence, those re-securitising moves turned into a successful re-securitisation.

In spite of these contributions, it is important to acknowledge some limitations of this survey. Even though the sample is not representative enough, it is indicative of the perceptions of some Ecuadorians on this issue and reflects how they interpreted different securitising frames. Therefore, it can be suggested that it is worth conducting this type of survey and combining it with discourse analysis. In this way, securitising speech acts and the acceptance or rejection of the audience can be assessed jointly. Thus a mixed-methods approach could help to improve the methodological constrains of securitisation theory. However, due to the scope of this survey, the relations between the variables that may have impacted the attitudes towards migration should be considered for further research.

## CHAPTER 5

### “CONCLUSION”

A vast array of scholarly work on the (de)securitisation of migration is particularly concentrated on European and American societies. Therefore, this dissertation presented the case of Colombian refugees' securitisation, desecuritisation and re-securitisation in Ecuador. For this purpose, the main debates on (de) securitisation and migration were included in the literature review. Afterwards, the speech acts and other mechanisms were then identified in the first securitisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador. The transition period towards desecuritisation was also considered, explaining the possible causes that led to this remarkable change in the Ecuadorian migratory policy. Unfortunately, the outcomes from desecuritising this issue were different to those expected, as re-securitisation moves were manifested right after. This interesting and rich case explained the various actors, practices and arguments that played a part in the securitisations and desecuritisation of Colombian migration in Ecuador. Furthermore, it contributed to current security debates in two ways: theoretically and empirically.

#### **5.1 Summary**


There were three units of analysis in this research: the securitisation, desecuritisation and re-securitisation stages of migration in Ecuador. The first securitisation started in 2003 and reached its highest point in 2005. The securitising discourses were based on public order, economy and labour concerns. Important figures participated in the

process such as former President Lucio Gutierrez and the commander in chief of the police. Their arguments openly declared Colombians as criminals. Likewise, the Chancellery saw refugees as a problem in terms of budget and the Minister of Labour strongly affirmed that immigrants displaced locals from jobs. Securitisation was consolidated when a state of emergency was declared in Esmeraldas, intensifying border patrols. These securitising moves were accepted by the audience as surveys revealed that Ecuadorians rejected Colombian migration and favoured deportation schemes.

In the second stage, the attitudes towards migration changed. Desecuritisation was progressive, influenced by the treatment that Ecuadorian emigrants received abroad. The fact that some of the victims were children and two died as a consequence of xenophobic attacks, were determinant factors that pushed desecuritisation. This perception of migration also affected the image of Colombian refugees in Ecuador. Hence, Plan Ecuador emerged to handle the situation at the border and modifications in migratory regulations, institutions and the Constitution took place. However, the best example of desecuritisation practices was the adoption of the ERP, which regularised 32.390 refugees in a year as shown in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 explained the last phase, where re-securitising arguments were based on the association of immigration-criminality-drugs. The police, the DA and Chancellery were the institutions that spread these ideas. Using statistical information, the former enhanced fear towards Colombians, highlighting the high number of

Colombians arrested in certain parts of the country. Consequently, the pro-immigration discourses of governmental elites changed. Thus, the most prominent re-securitising practise was the enactment of decree 1182, restricting the definition of refugee and reducing the amount of days for appeals and application. The number of recognised refugees then dropped dramatically with only 48 cases approved in 2013. Figure 2 presents a summary of the whole process.



**Figure 2. The Re-securitisation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador**

The acceptance of the audience is the determining factor in securitisation. Thus, surveys were conducted in order to establish whether re-securitisation of migration in Ecuador was successful. As explained in chapter 4, there were three points to remark from this survey. First, Ecuadorians perceived irregular and Colombian

migrants more negatively than other migrants. Second, the majority of the responses suggested that the public order re-securitising arguments were accepted. For instance, the audience recognised the immigrant-criminal relation as they agreed that immigration increases criminality. Moreover, they admitted that Ecuadorian laws are too flexible in matters of migration, agreeing with the proposition that Colombian should require visas. Third, participants did not see immigrants as a threat to the economy, culture or living conditions of the country.

## **5.2 Theoretical Implications**

This case study illustrated the dynamics of securitisation, desecuritisation and re-securitisation. Drawing from the scholarship reviewed, a few gaps in the theory were identified. First, it is important to understand the dynamics of securitisation and desecuritisation. The second unit of analysis in this dissertation drew from Hansen's (2012: 543-544) re-articulation desecuritisation, changing the perceptions of the self-other i.e. Ecuadorians-Colombians. This modality, as inherently positive, would not face new securitisations. However, the author did recognise that there is uncertainty as re-articulation claims a finality that cannot be guaranteed. This might explain why re-securitisation took place.

It is possible to see that after the Ecuadorian government desecuritised migration, issues of public order brought securitising arguments back to the scene. The latter responds to Waeber's (1995) suggestion that desecuritisation would be more effective than securitisation, showing that this might not necessarily occur. Declaring that Colombian refugees are not a threat, and regularising their status was not



sufficient. Attention needed to be paid to the Ecuadorian society, in order to cushion the effects of those policy changes. Perhaps more work on the social aspect of this complex issue could have prepared the host society better. This however, should have begun with the authorities' own public statements as their position could have significant impact on the citizens. Sometimes desecuritisation fails in a sense that if it does not effectively manage an issue it can pave the way for re-securitisation. Thus, this case illustrated that desecuritising without actually addressing the basic factors that built the issue as such, would not be successful or desirable and at some point counterproductive.

Second, securitisation theory as a dynamic process that involves different securitising actors and mechanisms needs the approval of the audience (Buzan et al 1998: 27). The interplay between securitisation, desecuritisation and re-securitisation goes up and down drawing from discourses that coincided with declaring the state of emergency, implementation of programmes, campaigns and changes in Ecuadorian regulations. The surveys conducted reflected that the audience agreed with the public order statements, implying that the re-securitisation was successful. Methodologically, the elites' speeches were assessed through discourse analysis. However, this qualitative approach could be complemented with a quantitative perspective. Thus, this dissertation demonstrated that surveys are a viable way to identify if the audience agrees or not with securitising moves.

### **5.3 Empirical Implications**

As the three stages showed throughout Chapters 2 and 3, there are several implications for Ecuador and the refugees. It can be said that there is an inconsistent management of the issue. There was a lack of coherent migration policy which appeared to be due to different goals and views from the elites such as Gutierrez and Correa. For instance, the results of the surveys portrayed some securitising arguments were stronger than others. It can be inferred that for Ecuadorians, Colombian refugees are only a threat in terms of criminality, disregarding economy or cultural arguments.

For the Ecuadorian government remains a difficult task to build a bridge between complying with the refugees' rights and fighting against prejudices, stereotypes and xenophobia. Adopting this approach could minimise the impact on the host population and help the refugees with access to basic services. As stated in Chapter 4, there is an environment of constant discrimination towards Colombian refugees, which prevents them from working and getting paid fairly, enrolling in schools and finding housing. On the other hand, providing assistance for the refugees becomes a big responsibility for the country.

Ecuador had manifested in several occasions that Colombia should also collaborate more, as they have only provided USD 500,000 since the beginning of the displacement. A report presented by the Refugee Directorate stated that the yearly budget for refugees is 60 million dollars. Moreover, international organisations like the UNHCR have been actively collaborating with the government donating USD 15 million per year - 25% of the total expenses (La Hora 2013). In spite of these efforts,

there is still a long way to go.

In terms of managing Colombian refugees at a regional level, there had been different initiatives. The Colombian government enacted the Colombian Victims and Land Restitution Law in 2011 and rearranged peace talks in 2012. The 'Victim's Law' consists on giving reparations to the displaced people for human rights violations and returning the land they lost or was abandoned as a product of the conflict (Human Rights Watch 2011). Although this regulation could be an incentive for displaced people to return, it might be very unlikely that they do until the conflict is really over.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Even though this dissertation had intended to contribute filling some of the gaps in securitisation scholarship, there are a few aspects that were not included in this study. Therefore, the attitudes of the host society towards migration could be observed including a bigger and more representative sample, so generalisation works better. Likewise, the factors that may have influenced Ecuadorians in rejecting or accepting anti and pro-migration discourses should also be considered in the future. Finally, given the complexity and magnitude of the issue, it would be ideal to research how the dynamics of securitisation and possibly desecuritisation worked in the remaining receiving countries such as Venezuela and Panama.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: Surveys

#### First Part: Attitudes towards Migration

<b>Q1. In reference to Ecuadorian identity, how important would you say the following options are?</b>					
	<b>Very Important</b>	<b>Quite Important</b>	<b>Not Important</b>	<b>Not Important at all</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
a) Having Ecuadorian citizenship	1	2	3	4	5
b) Being born in Ecuador	1	2	3	4	5
c) Living in Ecuador for most of one's life	1	2	3	4	5
d) Having at least one Ecuadorian parent	1	2	3	4	5
e) Having Ecuadorian ancestry	1	2	3	4	5
f) Shared cultural heritage	1	2	3	4	5
g) Accepting Ecuadorian values	1	2	3	4	5
h) Feeling Ecuadorian	1	2	3	4	5

<b>Q2. To what extent do you think the following factors impact on migrants' decision to move to Ecuador?</b>					
	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>Not very</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Very</b>	<b>DK/NR</b>
a) Fear of persecution in home country	1	2	3	4	5
b) Violent conflict	1	2	3	4	5
c) Presence of family/ migrant community	1	2	3	4	5

d) Better living conditions	1	2	3	4	5
e) Ease of access	1	2	3	4	5
f) As a transit country to another Latin American destination	1	2	3	4	5
g) Finding a job	1	2	3	4	5
i) Other _____					

*There is a lot of discussion these days about the impact of immigration (from Colombia?) to Ecuador. What is your view of immigration to Ecuador?*

<b>Q3. Would you say it is generally bad or good for Ecuador's economy that people come to live here from other countries?</b>												
Bad for the economy										Good for the economy	Don't Know	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	

<b>Q4. And would you say that Ecuador's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?</b>												
Cultural life undermined										Cultural life enriched	Don't Know	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	

<b>Q5. Is Ecuador made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?</b>												
Worse place										Better place	Don't Know	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	

<b>Q6. Do you think the number of immigrants to Ecuador nowadays should be (please tick one of the following options):</b>	
increased a lot	<input type="checkbox"/>
increased a little	<input type="checkbox"/>
remain the same as it is	<input type="checkbox"/>
reduced a little	<input type="checkbox"/>
reduced a lot	<input type="checkbox"/>

**Q7. How positive or negative would you say the following types of migrants are perceived?**

	Very negative	Mostly negative	Neither positive nor negative	Mostly positive	Very positive	DK/NR
a. Asylum seekers	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. Refugees	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. Irregular migrants	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. Migrants from Colombia	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. Migrants from other parts of Latin America	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. Tourists	1	2	3	4	5	6

**Q8. The following are some statements people have said about immigration. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of them?**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	DK/NR
a) Colombians should be asked for visas to enter the country	1	2	3	4	5	6
b) Migrants and nationals should be treated equally	1	2	3	4	5	6
c) The majority of foreign delinquents in Ecuador are Colombians	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) Immigrants increase crime rates	1	2	3	4	5	6
e) Immigrants are generally good for the Ecuadorian economy	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) Colombian immigrants in Ecuador live in poor conditions	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) Ecuador's laws are too flexible towards immigrants	1	2	3	4	5	6
h) Colombian immigrants are constantly discriminated	1	2	3	4	5	6

## Second Part: Political Values

**Q9. How interested are you in politics?**

<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Not very</i>	<i>Somewhat interested</i>	<i>Very interested</i>	DK/NR
1	2	3	4	5

**Q10. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this 0-10 scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?**

Left												Right
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	DK/NR

**Q11. Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?**

No 1 →[GO TO Q14]      Yes 2 →[GO TO Q12]      DK/NR 3

**Q12. IF YES: Which one?**

1. PAIS
2. PSP
3. PSC
4. MPD
5. CREO
6. SUMA
7. PRE
8. PACHAKUTIK
9. PRIAN
10. DK/NR

**Q13. How close do you feel to this party?**

**Do you feel you are:**

1. Very close
2. Quite close
3. Not very close
4. DK/NR

<b>Q14. To what extent are you concerned about the following?</b>						
	<b>Not at all concerned</b>	<b>Slightly concerned</b>	<b>Somewhat concerned</b>	<b>Moderately concerned</b>	<b>Extremely concerned</b>	<b>DK/NR</b>
a. Losing your job (or unable to find employment)	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. Being unable to pay your bills	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. Becoming a victim of delinquency	1	2	3	4	5	6

<b>Q15. How satisfied or dissatisfied would you say you are nowadays...</b>						
	<b>Very Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Neither Dissatisfied not satisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Very satisfied</b>	<b>DK/NR</b>
a. with the way democracy works in Ecuador	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. with your income	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. with your life as a whole	1	2	3	4	5	6

<b>Q16. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful dealing with people?</b>												
<b>Please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate your view, where 0 means 'can't be too careful' and 10 means 'most people can be trusted'.</b>												
<b>Can't be too careful</b>						<b>Most people can be trusted</b>						<b>DK/NR</b>
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	

### **Third Part: Demographics**

*Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about your background.*

#### **Q17. What is your gender?**

1. Male
2. Female

#### **Q18. In which age group to you belong?**

1. 18-24
2. 25-39
3. 40-54
4. 55+

#### **Q19. What level of education have you completed?**

1. Primary
2. Secondary
3. University, undergraduate
4. University, postgraduate
5. Nothing

#### **Q20. What is your marital status?**

1. Married
2. Living with a partner (but not married)
3. Widowed
4. Divorced/Separated
5. Single (never married)
6. Primary school



**Q21. What is your current employment status?**

Full time employment	(1)	Part-time employment	(2)
Self-employed	(3)	Homemaker	(4)
Student	(5)	Retired	(6)
Unable to work	(7)	Unemployed	(8)

**Q22. What is the industry of your occupation?**

Student	(1)	Tourism	(9)
Education	(2)	Architecture/ Design/ Decoration	(10)
Medicine	(3)	Office work/ Administrative Area	(11)
Legal/Politics	(4)	Cleaning	(12)
Sports	(5)	Banking/ Economy	(13)
Commerce	(6)	Other	(14)
Maintenance	(7)		

**Q23. Are you Ecuadorian?**

Yes (1)
No (2)

**Q24. Are you a member of any of the following organisations in Ecuador?**

	Yes	No	DK/NR
a) A political party	1	2	3
b) Trade Union or Labour Organisation	1	2	3
c) Voluntary organisation (e.g. neighbourhood groups, churches, cultural groups, non-governmental organisations, etc)	1	2	3

Q25. How religious do you consider yourself on this 0-10 scale?												
Not at All										Very much		DK/NR
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	
Q.26. What is your religion?												
Catholic				(1)	Orthodox				(5)			
Evangelic				(2)	None				(6)			
Mormon				(3)	Other				(7)			
Jehovah's Witness				(4)								

**Thank you very much for your time and support!**

**Contact Details of Principal Investigator**

Gabriela Garcia G.  
[2103774G@student.gla.ac.uk](mailto:2103774G@student.gla.ac.uk)

**Supervisor**

Dr. Georgios Karyotis  
[Georgios.Karyotis@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:Georgios.Karyotis@glasgow.ac.uk)

## APPENDIX B: Informative Charts




Chart 10. Survey Question No. 3




Chart 11. Survey Question No. 4




Chart 12. Survey Question No. 5






Chart 13. Anti/ Pro-Securitisation Statements: Comparison between Ecuadorians in EC and Abroad



**Chart 14. Anti/ Pro-Securitisation Statements: Ecuadorians in EC**



**Chart 15. Anti/ Pro-Securitisation Statements: Ecuadorians Abroad**