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Any Room at the Inn? Migration and the Securitising Moves of Political and Religious Elites in the UK

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Abstract

This research aims to make a theoretical contribution to the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory by addressing its untenable focus on political actors. Using the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study, it explores how messages are framed by both political elites *and* religious elites in relation to migration. After an initial discussion underlining the limitations imposed by an overreliance on political actors, the selection of religious actors is validated. This percolates around three factors: the Bourdieuan cultural capital that religious elites are endowed with; the unjustifiable lack of scholarly attention that religion and religious actors have received in the migration and in/tolerance literature; and the potential to contribute to the so far intractable question of whether religion promotes tolerance or intolerance. Employing critical discourse analysis, an intricate study of the rhetoric of both sets of elites is undertaken. Findings demonstrate that the hegemonic discourses of political elites are indeed based upon notions of threat and security. Contrastingly, the messages of religious elites are on the whole aimed at desecuritising migration. Throughout the analysis, the normative dilemma which exists at the core of securitisation theory, namely, how to desecuritise an issue, is exposed and discussed. To conclude, two points are addressed. Initially, the impact these findings have for future policy that is designed to challenge the securitisation of migration. And secondly, scholars are encouraged to expand upon the research by incorporating quantitative methods to enable a precise measuring of the influence which religious elites and religiosity have upon attitudes towards immigration.

Introduction

Beginning in the 1980's and intensified by the events of 9/11, migration has been securitised (Doty, 2007). In the United Kingdom (UK) the intolerance of immigrants has been steadily rising, with a recent NatCen Social Research British Social Attitudes survey finding that a quarter of respondents cited that the main reason migrants come to Britain is to claim benefits (*The Guardian*, 2014). Moreover in the May 2014 European Elections the anti-immigrant UK Independence Party (Ukip) topped the poll with 27.49% of the vote - the first time since the general election of 1906 that a party other than Labour or the Conservatives have won a national election (*BBC News*, 2014). Evidently immigration is entrenched at the apex of the political agenda.

As Wæver (1995:70) pontificates, it is a truism that, “‘society’ never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for”. The Copenhagen School's¹ (CS) securitisation theory posits that the construction of security threats “is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites” (Wæver, 1995: 57). Thus if a nuanced understanding of the security-migration nexus is to be achieved an analysis of the de/securitising moves of UK elites is essential. This begs the question, however: which set of elites?

The CS has been criticised for its untenable focus on political elites (Case Collective, 2006). Following Bourdieu's (1992) concept of 'cultural capital', it has been argued that political elites are in a unique position to 'speak' security and

¹ As demonstrated in the c.a.s.e collective (2006), 'schools' are rarely as rigid and monolithic as those who, usually from the outside, impart upon them via labelling. Whilst using the term CS is beneficial for simplicity, I acknowledge the diversity which exists within the 'CS' as I do not seek to over simplify or essentialise a group – a consideration which unfortunately escapes the hegemonic discourses of 'The migrant'.

therefore are the natural subject of analysis. Whilst true to a point, this has been shown to be inadequate. The analytical net has been successfully expanded to cover elites in the realms of professional security (customs officers, border control, police etc.) (Bigo, 2008) whilst some innovative scholarship has shown the capacity for securitisations to come 'from below' (Doty, 2007). Here is this first contribution this research seeks to make. Attention will expand the focus of the migration-related speech-acts to the religious elite in the UK². The rationale behind the selection of religious elites is bound in two interconnected points. Initially, religion is acknowledged as being central to notions of identity (Lausten and Weaver, 2000: 709). Identity is postulated to be foundational to the construction and perception of migrants as a security threat (Buzan *et al*, 1998). Such strong identitarian feelings infer a strong possibility of religiosity impacting upon attitudes towards migrants. Secondly this contributes to a theoretical advancement of securitisation theory. As will be shown, religion has been widely ignored in the security literature, and other than sole attempts to explore this relationship (Karyotis and Partikios, 2010) it remains under-theorised.

The second contribution this research aims to make is infused with the first. In the literature which explores immigration attitudes and in/tolerance, religion is given insufficient attention (for example see: Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004; Weldon, 2006; Schlueter, Mueleman, and Davidov, 2013). When previously exploring this relationship the controlling factors have remained largely fixed, spanning socio-economic facets, psychological characteristics and ideology. Through an outline of the significance of religion to identity and the very public interventions

² Although focussing on the UK, for coherence, the political parties selected for analysis are UK-wide parties only. Thus state-specific parties, for example national parties in Scotland and Wales are not included. Unfortunately for this study there is not a UK-wide Church and there exists vastly different religious politics with separate Churches in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Therefore the religious elites will be selected from the Churches representing England as this state constitutes the vast majority of the population. Whilst not a perfect model, this offers the most reasonable and coherent choice for a unit of analysis.

of the religious elite in the UK, the untenable exclusion of religion and religiosity from the immigration-tolerance scholarship will be underlined.

The third and fourth contributions are empirical. A detailed Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be conducted on the interventions into the immigration debate by both the political and religious elite. On the political front this will illuminate the dominant messages and frames being espoused regarding immigration. The same will be true of the religious cohort, but with an additional insight being unveiled. Whether religion fosters tolerance or intolerance has been a perennial debate with evidence being presented to back both sides, if not in equal measure (Appleby, 1999; Brewer *et al*, 2010; Fox and Sandler, 2004; Schober, 2007). The prevailing conclusion therefore is that a case-by-case approach is essential. Thus whether tolerant messages of ‘Love Thy Neighbour’, or intolerant messages of there being ‘No Room at the Inn’ dominate, will unveil the attitudes of the UK’s contemporary religious elites. In addition, space will open to outline some of the normative dilemmas securitisation theory is confronted with after becoming a recurrent feature of the analysis.

In light of these intentions this study will follow a rigid framework. To contextualise the analysis a review and critique of securitisation theory will be conducted in Chapter 1. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of religion in terms of identity and its absence in immigration-tolerance scholarship. Next, in Chapter 2, there will be an outline of the security-migration nexus. This will explore the four axes that support the securitisation of migration: societal; criminological; economic; and political (Karyotis, 2007). These four axes will provide the analytical framework to deconstruct the empirical data. The CDA will begin in Chapter 3 starting with the political elites, with an individual section for the leader of each of the four main political parties: Conservative; Labour; Liberal Democrat; and Ukip.

Chapter 4 is reserved for a CDA of the religious elites, with a focus on the contemporary leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches in England and their predecessors. Overall the analysis contributes to our understanding of two significant strands of enquiry: the impact of religion on immigration attitudes; and to a refinement of how securitisation theory works in practice where there are contributions from a variety of actors.

Chapter 1 - Theory and Methodology

Theory

As a prerequisite to exploring securitisation theory it is first necessary to briefly discuss its theoretical roots, specifically ‘Framing Theory’. For Chong and Druckman (2007), “[t]he major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations”. In other words, the way in which a message is conveyed, points the audience to the “essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987: 143). The oft cited example to capture this effect is the case of the right for a hate group to rally. Stress the issue using the frame of free speech and the public have been shown to support the right to rally. Stress the issue using the frame of the potential for violence and the public have been shown to reject the right to rally. The capacity for contradictory frames to alter public opinion has had repeated empirical vindication (Lecheler and de Vreese, 2011; Slothus, and de Vreese, 2010). Furthermore, evidence has demonstrated the dominant role played by the sources of a frame. Not surprisingly, frames espoused from a non-credible source have minimal effect (Hartman and Weber, 2009; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2006). In the critique of securitisation theory below, the infusion of the basic premise of framing theory will become apparent.

Securitisation theory has been one of the most innovative and influential additions to the field of security studies (Karyotis, 2012: 391). The theory germinated

via the work of scholars imperfectly labelled as belonging to the ‘Copenhagen School’ (CS). Securitisation embodies the linguistic turn in security studies. For the CS, security is a “*speech act*” where “the utterance *itself* is the act” (Wæver, 1995: 55). “By saying the words something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship” (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 26). To clarify, the use of the word ‘security’ is not essential. Rather it is the “designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action” that is the decisive factor in determining what *is* ‘security’ (Buzan *et al*, 1998). Even so, “the defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse”, meaning that the linguistic is paramount and that discourse analysis is designated as the “obvious method” to adopt when studying it (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 176).

The process of securitisation is intersubjective, conducted between securitising actors and audiences, in specific places, contexts and times. Theoretically there is not any specific criteria one must meet in order to become a securitising actor. For Wæver (1995: 57) however, “[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.” This elite-centricism borrows from the Bourdieuan concept of ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1992). It is postulated that elites possess greater quantities of cultural capital which is endowed via status, authority, or ‘expertise’ that acts to ‘legitimise’ security moves. This is supported by the framing literature. Naturally therefore studies of securitisation have focussed upon political elites and more recently on elites within the realms of professional security (Bigo, 2008). Despite examples of pioneering works which have demonstrated the capacity for securitisation ‘from below’ (Doty, 2007), cultural capital results in elites having a substantial influence over the securitisation and desecuritisation processes.

Thus, central to defining security for the CS is the rhetorical moves of, most likely political, elites. This “canonical view of security as a speech act” (Balzacq, 2005: 176), however, has been exposed as insufficient by a theoretical and methodological widening from a plethora of scholars, and particularly by those who have adopted a political sociology approach to securitisation (Case Collective, 2006). It is beyond the scope of this study to address all of the limitations which exist in the CS’s theory of security. But it is necessary to briefly acknowledge several of the most significant critiques. Forming the base of the vast majority of criticism is the need to erase the CS’s artificial distinction between the linguistic and behavioural social practices (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 107). Rather than a purely linguistic practice, Balzacq *et al* (2010: 2) insist that security consists of a “kaleidoscope of practices”. Numerous empirical studies substantiate this conjecture. Möller (2007) unveiled the importance of visual images to the U.S governments securitising moves in the aftermath of 9/11. Balzacq (2008) demonstrated the role “policy tools” can play, whilst in a similar vein Basaran (2008) showed how specific security practices can reinforce securitisations. As a final example, although in no way exhaustive of the scholarship available, studies have made it clear that various forms of governmentality can also have a substantive impact on de/securitising processes (Bigo, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008).

More specifically, Balzacq (2005) provides an erudite critique of the CS’s ‘internalist’ position. The CS adopt speech act theory from Austin (1962) who purports that a speech act consists of three facets: locutionary (the utterance); illocutionary (the act performed in articulating a locution); and perlocutionary (the consequential effects designed to impact upon the target audience in terms of feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions). Balzacq effectively argues that the CS’s focus on

rhetoric belies the three parts of the speech act. It is posited that the CS have conflated the illocutionary act with the perlocutionary act. The result is a “failure to properly incorporate audience and context” (Balzacq, 2005: 178). By introducing a focus on the perlocutionary tangent, Balzacq (2005: 178) proposes relabeling the process a “pragmatic act”. The pragmatic act consists of two intertwined levels: the agent and the act. Within the level of the agent, factors such as the power position or the identity of who is attempting to ‘do’ security, becomes crucial. In short, their cultural capital. In terms of the level of the act, included is both the traditional rules governing speech acts stressed by the CS, namely grammatical and syntactical, *and* context. It is in this level of context that analysis can explore which heuristic tools are used to mobilise the audience, including analogies, metaphors, emotions or stereotypes (Balzacq, 2005). Thus the pragmatic act inserts into securitisation theory both context and non-linguistic features.

In an attempt to advance Balzacq’s theoretical propositions, the level of the agent will be explored at greater depth. Balzacq (2005: 184) stresses the importance of the specific actor noting that often to persuade an audience, the actor must try to appear to identify with the audience. This concept is captured by Burke (1955: 55), who states that to effectively convince an audience the speaker must employ devices which resonate with the recipient by “speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying [her/his] ways with [her/his]”. This identification can again be linked to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’. The political or cultural capital which an actor wields will contribute to whether the ‘devices’ used to identify are viewed as legitimate and therefore whether they will have any kind of perlocutionary effect.

With the centrality of capital in mind, it is widely acknowledged that religion is one of most significant influences on identity (Lausten and Weaver, 2000: 709).

Crucially for this study, as the focus is migration, religion is often particularly intertwined with ethnic (Shafer, 2004) or national (Bruce, 2003) identity. Scholarship unearthing this religio-identity relationship is plentiful. Transcending the majority of studies, several key themes emerge. Initially, it is postulated that religions by their very nature create 'out groups' (Wellman and Tokuno, 2004). This is captured eloquently by Brewer *et al* (2010) who note that religions tend to have high-binding capital but weak-bridging capital. In short, a natural 'us' and 'them' is generated between those who proscribe to a certain religion and those who do not - even if this is binary relationship is unintentional. The second theme relates to the power of religious elites. Religion is recognised as a great source of legitimacy in the political realm (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Little, 2007). The extent to which religion is important to identity provides elites with a powerful tool if they can operationalise it effectively (Haynes, 2007). Moreover Wald, Owen, and Hill's (1988) study demonstrates that religious teachings tend to illicit "attitudinal conformity". Finally Lausten and Weaver's (2000) pioneering study of securitisation and religion, advocated that the authority of religious elites is transcendental, as their utterances are viewed as direct interpretations of God's wisdom and desires. Overall then, the 'capital' which religious elites can exploit as de/securitising actors is significant.

This influence is to be welcomed if the mantra of 'Love Thy Neighbour', which Coward (1986) notes is a cornerstone of most religions, is adhered to. However, 37 out of 47 studies completed between 1940 and 1990 revealed a positive relationship between religion and prejudice, whilst a mere 2 studies produced polarised results (Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005). More encouragingly, Appleby's (1999) research on the role of religious actors and fostering peace carries an abundance of examples where individuals have used their religious legitimacy to create unity as opposed to

conflict. Appleby's anecdotal examples however are just that – examples – and for each of these a similar case can be used to show elites using religion to reinforce a conflict (Johnston and Eastvold, 2004; Schober, 2007). But, although the empirical evidence points towards religion fostering intolerance, the relationship is far more complex. Thus generalisations should be avoided and a nuanced approach taken. What these studies do show as a whole is that religion, and therefore religious elites, can play a critical role in shaping the views of adherents. Naturally then it is necessary to examine the rhetoric of religious elites regarding migration to gain a fuller understanding of whether the message of Love Thy Neighbour is dominant, competing with conflicting messages, or absent. Or in the language of framing theory, what do they put forward as the “essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987: 143). Illumination of what message is produced will provide the basis for further studies to unpack the precise relationships between the religious actors 'moves' and the effects these have on their audience. The evidence given above indicates that, theoretically, it should be substantial. Moreover the one unique study that analysed religious elite rhetoric regarding migration provided empirical support for this thesis. Using Greece as a case study and using quantitative regression models, Karyotis and Partikios (2010) uncovered that the messages of religious elites had a profound impact in shaping the attitudes (negative in this case) towards migrants.

Despite this potential power that religion and religious elites can employ, a brief review of the scholarship which addresses the relationship between immigration and in/tolerance reveals a significant shortcoming. When analysing this relationship there exists a group of controlling factors which scholars rarely deviate from. The factors that have historically been shown to impact upon individuals' attitudes include: socio-economic characteristics, incorporating age, gender, education, occupation, and

un/employment; psychological characteristics, namely self-esteem and authoritarianism; and left-right political placement (for example see: Prior, 2004; Weldon, 2006; McLaren, 2012; Schlueter, Mueleman, and Davidov, 2013). The 'usual suspects' is how Sniderman, Hagendoon and Prior (2004) describe this cohort of controlling factors.

As outlined above, the centrality of religion to identity and the cultural capital that religious figures possess makes the absence of religiosity as a controlling factor seem peculiar. One explanation for this omission may lie in the secular bias and exclusionary attitude which has permeated International Relations (IR) as a discipline since its inception. Fox and Sandler (2004) provide an excellent summary of the underlying reasons which have led to an unreasonable ignoring of religion in IR. In short, four intertwined factors have combined, including: the 'Western' roots of the social sciences and IR which coalesce around science, rationalism, and a rejection of religion; the 'Western' bias apportioned to secularisation theory following on from the hegemonic theory of modernisation; the central ideological pillars of IR, especially Realism, which have rejected the role of religion and other factors of this nature in favour of a statist paradigm; and finally a preference for quantitative data combined with religion being notoriously difficult to measure has led to a lack of attention which in turn evoked a *de facto* lack of importance. With this historical framework the absence of religion from many subject areas in IR is understandable. But in an era where secularisation and modernisation theory are being vociferously challenged (Casanova, 1994), religious fundamentalism is rapidly proliferating, and anti-Muslim feeling following 9/11 has been perpetuated (Doty, 2007), the entrance of religion and religiously into IR is essential.

Two specific examples highlight the intellectual incoherence surrounding the absence of religion in studies relating to attitudes towards immigration. McLaren (2007: 727) writes that,

Britons are clearly worried about the symbolic threats of immigrants – the threat of religions that are perceived to emphasise non-British values and a terminal community other than that of Britain, and the threat to shared customs and way of life.

And (McLaren, 2012: 203),

For some, immigrants pose a strong threat to these identities by bringing with them seemingly different values and ways of life; ... Newcomers who may be perceived as holding extremely different values from those of natives—Muslim migrants vis-à-vis a predominantly secular Britain or France, for instance - may be particularly difficult to reconcile with national identities.

Thus it is acknowledged that religion is both a clear identity marker in determining who is 'in' and who is 'out', and a cause for perceiving 'threat'. Why then is the religiosity of Britons not controlled for when measuring attitudes towards immigrants? The secular label that Britain carries may be offered as an explanation. Acknowledging recent statistics, however, reveals an oversimplification. In the 2011 Census 59% of UK inhabitants still described themselves as Christian with a further 5% declaring themselves to be Muslim (*Office for National Statistics*, 2013). Those

identifying as non-religious grew from 15% in 2001 to 25%. Although this figure is rising, those describing themselves as 'religious' maintain to be a substantial majority. Moreover inclusion of the religious factor would shed light upon whether, in the case of the UK, religiosity fosters tolerance or intolerance towards immigrants. An illumination of some significance, as to repeat, in order to tackle this perennial question a case-by-case approach is essential. Overall therefore, it is clear that the exclusion of religion needs to be addressed.

Methodology

To reiterate, discourse analysis is proscribed by the CS as the "obvious method" to study security (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 176). As noted above, discourse analysis has limitations. But this essay will not attempt to repeat a demonstration of said limitations exposed by scholars who have effectively used non-linguistic methods (Balzacq, 2008; Basaran, 2008; Möller, 2007). Instead this essay aims to enhance the rhetorical aspect of securitisation theory through a discourse analysis of a more critical nature. To do so the analytical net will be widened to include societal actors outside of the political and professional security elite.

To contextualise, the basic rationale of discourse analysis is to know "*who* uses language, *how*, *why*, and *when*" (Van Dijk, 1997: 2). Discourse analysis as a method suffers itself from the same inadequacy as securitisation theory in general: an internal focus on text. Focussing solely on text oversimplifies the constructive power of language by ignoring the role of structures and power relations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Thus this study will employ critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA incorporates Bourdieu's (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) notion of

‘constructivist structuralism’. This position recognises the social is both constrained by, and actively shapes and alters, social structures. In short, the relationship is dialectic and life, contrary to the most extreme branches of postmodernism, cannot be reduced to discourse alone (Bryman, 2008). In the words of Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 125) “the contingency of the social depends upon how persons and practices are positioned within social structures... [C]lass, gender, race, and age relations affect the contingency of the semiotic in particular”.

In this study, the aim of the analysis is to widen securitisation theory to incorporate the rhetoric of political *and* religious elites. If the analysis is to be holistic, therefore, selecting CDA as opposed to discourse analysis is essential. CDA enables analysis to look beyond the ‘text’ which is vital for unearthing the impact of de/securitising moves by both sets of elites. On the political side, the wider politics of the European financial recessions, growth in euroscepticism, and ever increasing securitisation of migration across Europe in the last 20 years has to be acknowledged as the milieu in which the analysis is being conducted. On the religious side, the purpose is again to provide context. As outlined above, the social position of religious elites endows them with a specific moral authority and legitimacy to those who proscribe to a particular faith. Thus the interventions of religious elites, and the persuasive devices and rhetorical structures they employ to convince an audience have to be viewed through this prism of religion, authority and legitimacy. Drawing on Foucault (1980), simply analysing the text without this external context would fail to capture the significance of certain rhetoric, by being blind to wider power relations that govern the social.

The theoretical case for expanding securitisation theory to consider the role of religious elites is clear. CDA is equipped to enable this expansion due its

acknowledgement of context, therefore justifying its methodological selection. It is necessary to ensure that the CDA is conducted logically and coherently. Thus a clear analytical framework is essential. Establishing this framework and explaining its requirement will be outlined in the following chapter.

Chapter 2 – The Four Axes for Securitising Migration

The analytical paradigm selected in this study to conduct a CDA is a reflection of the established framework that is exploited to securitise the issue of migration. The ‘threat’ posed by migration is articulated around four main axes: societal, criminological, economic, and political (Karyotis, 2007). A concise outline of each axis will provide a solid basis to critically examine the rhetorical interventions of the political and religious elites below.

For the security-migration nexus, societal security is recognised as the central monolith (Wæver, 1993), as this axis transcends, and is foundational for each of the other three. In the case of societal security, identity is ascribed as the referent object (Buzan *et al*, 1998). By altering the demographic equilibrium and challenging traditional ‘identities’ migration is deemed to deunify and destabilise the host society (Ibrahim, 2005: 164). This conjecture relies upon the adoption of fixed, essentialist identities of both the migrant and the indigenous population (Huysmans, 1995). In short, a culturally harmonious and homogenous ‘us’ is contrasted with a culturally homogenous and foreign ‘them’. Framing security in the Shmittian sense of defining one’s self in relation to the other, as Buofino (2004: 26) suggests, is not only detrimental to society but is based on questionable foundations. This Orientalism, or fear of the other, is argued to have a plethora of roots, largely linked to the

Europeanisation and globalisation which have undermined the concept of societal homogeneity (Statham, 2003: 165). The result in the UK and across Europe has been a rise in exclusion, xenophobia and racism, as the “deadly vagueness” (Hough, 2013: 117) of societal identity has enabled scapegoating of the migrant ‘other’. Draconian and illiberal legislative practices have been established across Europe, such as Greece and France, where restrictions have been introduced for migrants in the realms of marriage and schooling respectively (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 35).

The social construction of the migrant as a threat however is clear. Society, as composed of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991) is far from homogenous, whilst the societies of UK and Europe are a product of continuous migrations, crossbreeding and cultural syncretism (Lohrmann, 2000: 8). Irrespective of this actuality, the perception of a harmonious ‘us’ and threatening ‘them’ is exemplified by Weiner’s (1992: 105) acknowledgement that it is often not the case of how many migrants are at the door, but is instead a case of whom is knocking. Two prevalent examples underline this relationship: Israel’s unlimited acceptance of Jewish migrants returning ‘home’ contrasted with their opposition to non-Jewish migrants; and higher degrees of prejudice shown by European Union (EU) states towards non-EU, as opposed to EU migrants.

The second axis where security fuses with migration is criminological. Mirroring societal security, the binary identitarian notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are paramount. The ‘threat’ on this occasion is physical security, as migrants are cemented into the hegemonic criminal-migrant thesis (Karyotis, 2007: 9-10). The thesis posits that migrants are substantially more prone to engage in criminal activities than the indigenous persons of the host population. The basis for this assertion is argued by Huysmans (2000) to lie in the progressive ‘Europeanisation’ of security following

waves of integrative measures including the Schengen Treaties, Europol, and most significantly the Single European Act. Blossoming from these integrative measures is the so called “security problematique” (Huysmans, 2000: 760). The prevailing discourse of this 'problematique' is that the free movement of goods, capital, services and people, enhances the capacity for the free movement of undesirables, specifically, criminals, organised criminals, illegal immigrants, and terrorists. By amalgamating migration with illegal activities and terrorism, a security continuum exists where migration and crime become fused together (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). It has become vogue to refer to this phenomenon as ‘(in)securitisation’ (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Bigo and Tsoukala; 2008). Simply, security in effect does the opposite of what it is traditionally associated with: creates fear as opposed to safety. Individual freedoms give way to 'security' (Karyotis, 2012) whilst migrants again face stigmatisation and maltreatment (Buonfino, 2004). To give one of the more egregious examples, 'national origin' is being used as a synonym for danger, where the professionals of security (customs officers, border control, police etc.) are using 'profiling' to look for criminals as opposed to evidence based methods (Buonfino, 2004). Adopting profiling induces an image of an Orwellian dystopia fused with Phillip K. Dick’s *Minority Report*³. Taken as a whole the criminal-migrant thesis fosters “suspicion, stigmatisation, and fear of resident ethnic minorities and migrants among the population” (Buonfino, 2004: 47-8). This fear and exclusion has been exacerbated by the dramatic proliferation of (in)security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Karyotis, 2007: 6-8).

³ 'Minority Report' is a science fiction short story written by Phillip K. Dick in 1956. A disturbing prediction of contemporary policing in which 'precogs', who can see into the future, use this to punish crimes that have not yet happened. It is a short step to see the parallels with 'profiling'. In 2002 Stephen Spielberg produced a film adaptation of the story starring Tom Cruise. I am indebted to Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (2005: 259) for drawing my attention to this comparison.

Empirically the thesis is not wholly inaccurate at surface level. Admittedly there is a higher percentage of migrants in prison populations than their share of the population should merit. This correlation, however, is anomalous. Being denied many non-custodial sentences, migrants are often imprisoned for migratory related offences, but are not more likely to commit non-migratory related offences (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). Moreover, racism and prejudice are argued to add to this unfairly high prison representation (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). Overall, as Lohrmann (2000: 8) argues, the evidence suggests the criminal-migrant thesis is “misjudged and overestimated.”

Thirdly, migration is securitised on an economic basis. In keeping with the analysis above, notions of 'them' and 'us' are ingrained in economic discourses. Grievances raised against the migrant ‘other’ relating to competition for jobs, lowering wages and causing urban deterioration are well established, whilst the issue of welfare remains particularly controversial (Karyotis, 2007). In terms of welfare, the securitising discourses are framed around the image of an indigenous deserving 'we' being exploited by a foreign undeserving 'them'. This exclusion is not trivial. Huysmans (2000a: 767) argues that “access to social and economic rights are central to ‘belonging’ to the (welfare) state.” In times of economic hardship, widespread in Europe since the 2007 economic crash, scarcity of jobs and resources can raise competition and understandably raises tension. Combined with the wider securitisation of migrants as a 'problem', economically, migrants are viewed through the dominant frame of ‘threat’ and there is subsequently a proliferation of what Huysmans (2000b) labels “welfare chauvinism”. This chauvinism is a product of two prevailing discourses. Initially, welfare is posited as a 'magnet' that sucks migrants into the host state. As a consequence therefore, secondly migrants are viewed as

illegitimate recipients of welfare. This can manifest in the moderate sense of migrants being viewed as a barrier to the state providing for its 'own' people first, to a more extreme position where migrants are depicted as freeloading fraudsters (Geddes, 2000).

Evidently migrants are not framed as an economic asset, despite repeated examples of migrants benefiting host economies (Borjas, 1995, 1999). Moreover with the Population Division of the United Nations concluding in a report that EU states would have to import 700 million migrants by 2050 to sustain current levels of welfare spending, pulling up the metaphorical draw bridge may have detrimental effects in the long term (United Nations, 2000). And again, in terms of societal cohesion, a hegemonic discourse of competition between binary groups does nothing to placate intolerance and xenophobia.

Lastly, migration is securitised on a political axis. Weiner's (1992) influential article demonstrated how a politically based securitisation can be founded upon issues of state stability where migrations may not only be a product of conflict but can induce conflict. In the context of securitising moves in the UK, however, domestic political securitisations are of greater significance.

The crux of the issue is delicately captured by Buofino (2004: 38) who poses an intriguing question: in the presence of strong macro-economic arguments favouring migration, why does securitisation trump economisation? Helpfully, Buofino (2004: 38) has prepared an answer. "In a society governed by insecurity, public opinion needs to be reassured by governments." In short, there is a far greater quantity of political capital to be accrued from the securitisation discourse. Thus political elites are using their cultural capital, which provides media exposure and

'authority', to exploit societal concerns relating to identity, crime, and economics, for political gains (Ibrahim, 2005). As a consequence, the securitisation of migration is entrenched even further. With the security discourse becoming hegemonic, mainstream political parties compete to appear 'tougher' than one another on the issue of migration. Failure to appear 'tough', it is theorised, will provide ammunition for the Right and far-Right to attack the mainstream parties and gain popular support (Karyotis, 2007: 11-12). This line of thinking is reminiscent to Joseph Heller's notion of 'Catch 22'. A simple statement captures the circularity of this logic: to stop the political Right, we must move our policies to the Right. Despite this contradictory manoeuvring, there is an even greater irony. Rather than an amelioration of the threat of extreme politics, moving the centre ground of politics to the Right in response to the securitisation of migration has fostered a *growth* in Right and far-Right politics across the UK and Europe (Dannreuther, 2007). This is exemplified by the general proliferation of hostile and aggressive rhetoric being employed in political discourses of migration and most recently by the results of the 2014 European elections where populist anti-EU, anti-immigration parties had unprecedented success.

In sum, the securitisation of migration percolates around the societal, criminological, economic, and political axes. These axes will provide a clear and coherent framework to explore the rhetoric of the political and religious elites in the forthcoming chapters. Borrowing from framing theory, it will demonstrate which axis or axes, if any, are selected to represent the “essence of the issue”.

Chapter 3 - Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Elites in the UK

In this chapter, a CDA will be conducted on a number of the crucial interventions made by political elites in the UK into the debate over migration. In turn analysis will focus on ‘moves’ by the leaders of the four main UK-wide political parties: David Cameron of the Conservatives; Ed Miliband of Labour; Nick Clegg of the Liberal Democrats; and Nigel Farage of Ukip. To conclude, a brief summary will bring together the prevailing themes that emerge. Focussing on political elites is a natural first-step in any securitisation theory study due to the cultural capital that they benefit from. The resulting analysis will illuminate the prevailing frames which are operationalised at the apex of UK politics. This CDA will also provide something more original. It will provide a template for which to compare other elite actors, in this instance religious figures, which if divergent, will underline the intellectual poverty of a purely political elite focus.

*David Cameron*⁴

⁴ All quotations in this section, unless referenced otherwise, are extracted from David Cameron’s (2013) speech in March, 2013, accessed online at gov.uk.

In March of 2013, the Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, gave a speech which directly addressed immigration (Cameron, 2013). Whilst careful to note how “immigration has brought significant benefits to Britain”, the central mantra espoused in the speech is one of “control”. This message focuses on the economic axis, percolating around welfare and public services.

Beginning with welfare, for Cameron, in recent years, “Britain was a soft touch”. He posits that it is necessary to ensure that “they [the migrant] want to contribute to our country not because they are drawn by the attractiveness of our benefits system or by the opportunity to use our public services.” The aim therefore is “stopping our benefits system from being a soft touch”. Currently, in terms of benefits, Cameron suggests that the message reads: “if you can't find a job or drop out of work early, the British taxpayer owes you a living for as long as you like.” Thus one of the flagship policy alterations announced involves stricter rules for migrants as opposed to non-migrants claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA), where the former “will be cut off” after six months regardless of circumstance.

These extracts fit neatly into Huysmans (2000) notion of welfare chauvinism. By repeatedly inserting the word “our” Cameron reinforces division. References to “our country” and “our benefits system” invokes the idea of a deserving 'us' and undeserving 'them'. This is cemented by framing this division through the concept of so called 'welfare tourism' where migrants are portrayed as “freeloading fraudsters” (Huysmans, 2000: 767-9) exploiting the indigenous population.

Turning to public services, the extract dedicated to housing mirrors the sentiments above. Cameron states that,

We cannot have a culture of something for nothing. New migrants should not expect to be given a home on arrival. And yet at present almost one in ten social lettings go to foreign nationals. So I am going to introduce new statutory housing allocations guidance this spring to create a local residence test. This should mean that local people rightly get priority in the social housing system. And migrants will need to have lived here and contributed to this country for at least two years before they can qualify.

Regardless of whether one agrees or not with the idea that residents who have lived in an area longer should take top priority is inconsequential to the effect of such an argument. Prioritising “local people” ingrains notions of separateness between the indigenous 'us' and the migrant 'them'. Moreover insinuating all migrants “expect” to be given a home on arrival further strengthens the idea that migrants are 'scroungers' whose fundamental aim when coming to a new state is to exploit it.

Overall this is a clear securitising move. Founded on identity politics, Cameron selects the economic axis to outline the ‘problems’ caused by migrants. By framing the “essence of the issue” as negative economic impacts the effect is to create division and chauvinism. Whilst on this occasion the economic axis was exploited, crime and identity have also been selected in other interventions (Cameron, 2014), highlighting the typical nature of Cameron’s threat-security rhetoric.

Ed Miliband⁵

In the current parliament, Labour Party leader Ed Miliband has made two speeches of significance to this research. The first, given in December 2012, directly discusses immigration. The second, coming in March 2014 in the lead up to the European elections, is based upon Europe, with immigration forming a substantial role in the prose.

Beginning with the former, Miliband takes a largely pro-immigration position. Acknowledging that he himself is the child of an immigrant, Miliband makes certain to emphasise how he feels that “[s]ocial, cultural and ethnic diversity has made us [the UK] stronger.” Miliband openly disagrees with those who call for “assimilation”, noting that “One Nation⁶ does not mean one identity. People can be proudly, patriotically British without abandoning their cultural roots.” Overall Miliband posits that “the real story of Britain today...[is] our multiple identities.” To support the idea of positivity, Miliband notes that, “[a] quarter of Britain's Nobel prize winners were born overseas” and that “[o]ur NHS is staffed by nurses from all over the world.”

This is a clear attempt to desecuritize the societal axis. Clearly avoiding exclusive rhetoric, Miliband is proactive in his attempt to remove the invisible barrier between 'us' and 'them'. Contrary to Cameron above, Miliband's use of 'our' infers an all-encompassing multiple identity of 'we'.

Miliband also addresses what he refers to as the “challenges”, noting that “there is profound anxiety about immigration.” Whilst admitting there is anxiety about

⁵ All quotations in this section, unless referenced otherwise, are selected from a transcript of 'Ed Miliband's immigration speech' which appeared in the *New Statesman* (2012).

⁶ 'One Nation' is a political slogan of the Labour Party.

various economic issues “including benefits”, Miliband vows to be “tougher on unscrupulous employers, who exploit those coming here and undercut those already here.” As outlined above, welfare within the economic axis due to notions of entitlement and meritocracy can be particularly divisive. But crucially, Miliband attempts to place the public’s anxiety and concern upon the “unscrupulous employers” who are exploiting everyone, including migrants, as opposed to blaming the migrant for causing economic perversions by their very presence.

Reflecting the trend in British politics, however, Miliband’s 2014 (*The Spectator*, 2014) intervention was less positive. It is necessary to note that many features of the 2012 speech remained in place, including: the onus placed on the cultural benefits migrants bring; a rejection of a universal identity; and an economic attack aimed at businesses. But in relation to welfare, and the benefits system in particular, the tone was slightly altered. Miliband (*The Spectator*, 2014) stated,

We must take action to protect the integrity of the benefits system.

British people recognise that Britain gains when people come here and contribute. But they don't believe that people newly arrived should have exactly the same rights as people who have contributed throughout their entire lives.

Reflecting Cameron’s restrictive stance, Miliband then purports his desire to increase the length of time before a newly arrived migrant can claim JSA from three to six months. Following this there is a slightly arbitrary sentence which declares that “[t]here is also an issue of people who commit crimes here having recently arrived from other European countries” (*The Spectator*, 2014).

This 2014 speech, whilst perhaps not a holistic securitising move, contains discourse that supports securitisations. Contrary to the speech of 2012, Miliband expands upon and subsequently reinforces the discourses of an 'undeserving them' facilitating welfare chauvinism. Moreover the rather throw away reference to crimes committed by migrants without sufficient context supplements the criminal-migrant thesis outlined by Karyotis (2007). This ignores the rather anomalous nature of supposed migrant criminality (Lohrmann, 2000), whilst stressing this particular frame creates a fear of the migrant as a 'threat' to personal security and law and order.

Overall then, Miliband's position is not homogenous. Whilst putting across pro-immigration rhetoric in 2012, anti-immigration, security-threat rhetoric has encroached into his issue-framing.

Nick Clegg⁷

Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Democrat Party, Nick Clegg, is a self-declared europhile. In a live televised debate with Nigel Farage, leader of Ukip, preceding the European elections, immigration took a central role in discussions. Using the societal and economic axis, Clegg attempts to desecuritize immigration. But, these desecuritisation moves are problematised by the rigidity of the securitisation discourses, and in turn can be seen as reifying migrants as a threat.

Starting with the societal axis, in relation to migrants having transformational effects on the dominant culture, Clegg declares that he "love[s] the diversity" of

⁷ All quotations in this section, unless referenced otherwise, are transcribed from the second round of the televised debate 'Europe: In or Out' which aired on the BBC on the 3rd of April 2014. It has been accessed via ukipmedia's (2014) channel on Youtube.

“modern Britain” and believes we should be “celebrating that not denigrating it”. Continuing, he warns we should not pretend “that we can turn the clock back to some nineteenth century by gone age which simply doesn't exist anymore.” By stressing that diversity is a cause for celebration and ridiculing the concept of a unitary identity Clegg looks to deconstruct the supposed threat that migrants pose to societal identity. Contrastingly, this is followed by repetitions of the phrase “British people” when referring to the governments record of providing jobs and apprenticeships. Although moving into the economic axis, this undermines the idea of equality regardless of diversity. Stressing jobs and apprenticeships for “British people” as an achievement is an attempt to allay fears that those born in Britain are losing out to migrants. But the effect is not to desecuritize the economic axis but to securitize identity. It creates a two-tier system which separates the 'deserving' indigenous from the 'sort-of deserving' migrant. Perhaps Huysmans' (2000) concept of welfare chauvinism can be expanded to include employment chauvinism?

Turning specifically to the economic axis, Clegg again attempts a desecuritising move. Initially he outlines how roughly, “1.5 million people from elsewhere in the European Union have come to our country since 2004, about half of those have gone back home” and that “there are about 1.5 million Brits elsewhere in the European Union.” This extract appears designed to undermine discourses of immigrant 'invasions' by highlighting the fact that European migration is serendipitous. Invoking the idea that many Brits are in fact immigrants in other countries highlights the notion that migrants are not always the 'other'. In short, members belonging to the perceived 'us' can themselves be migrants. But Clegg then adopts the language of threat and security. Directly following the above statements Clegg underlines changes introduced under the current coalition government to the

“benefit rules, so people can't just turn up and claim benefits no questions asked no strings attached on the first day that they arrive.” The aim is to make sure migrants “play by the rules and don't exploit our generosity through benefits”. This is in direct contrast to his preceding statements accrediting migrants with vital work in the NHS and other public services. Moreover, as former Home Secretary David Blunkett has declared, migrants generate a net benefit to the state through taxes despite use of services. For the 2001 financial year the surplus stood at £2.5 billion (*Migration News*, 2002). This rhetoric from Clegg therefore appears to be rooted in the Catch 22 political axis. Clegg seeks to appear tougher on benefit tourists as not to accede ground to the Right, of which Nigel Farage represents. But by choosing to highlight this point it acts to confirm there is a 'problem' and reifies notions that if given the chance migrants are in fact scroungers. Thus the debate on immigration takes place in the language of security and Clegg's liberal politics move to the Right.

Principally, Nick Clegg makes clear desecuritising moves regarding identity and economics. These moves are undermined, however, by the normative dilemma ingrained in securitisation theory. By framing his desecuritising moves using the language of security, for example trying to allay fears that migrants can't abuse the system, this contributes to an entrenchment of this negative security frame.

*Nigel Farage*⁸

Situated on the Right of the political spectrum, Farage and Ukip are openly eurosceptic. Analysis of Farage's immigration 'moves' will be taken from the same

⁸ All quotations in this section, unless referenced otherwise, are transcribed from the second round of the televised debate 'Europe: In or Out' which aired on the BBC on the 3rd of April 2014. It has been accessed via ukipmedia's (2014) channel on Youtube.

BBC debate with Nick Clegg discussed above. In clear securitising moves, Farage speaks in the framework of identity, economics, and crime.

Beginning with the economic axis, Farage outlines the threat to public services following the recent 'migration wave' to enter the UK. Farage notes that there is “a chronic problem in schools”, citing the National Audit Office report that stated there was a need to immediately create “a quarter of a million new primary places”. On the issue of housing Farage exclaims, “housing, goodness me, we need to a build a house every seven minutes just to cope with immigration into this country.” These extracts are a clear example of ‘quantification rhetoric’. Quantification rhetoric acknowledges the importance of numerical and non-numerical statements which are given to support or refute arguments. The significance of this rhetorical strategy is highlighted by Bryman (2008: 503) who underlines the “importance of quantification of everyday life”. Thus, with this degree of importance, quantitative data is included due to its capacity to impart authority on an argument. By including large figures, Farage is attempting to elicit authority for his conjectures and stimulate concern over the issue of immigration. Finally in terms of the economic axis, on the broader question of the labour market, it is necessary to quote from Farage at length:

It is bad news for ordinary British workers and families that we’ve had over the course of the last decade, because of an excess in the labour market... we've had wage compression, where wages have gone down by 14% in real terms since 2007, we've had a doubling of youth unemployment. It’s good for the rich, because it’s cheaper nannies and cheaper chauffeurs and cheaper gardeners, but it’s bad news for ordinary Britons. We need to have control over

immigration and the numbers that come here. I don't want us to discriminate against India and New Zealand because we have an open door to Bulgaria and Romania. Let's have an immigration policy based on quality.

This is a very interesting and delicately constructed statement. Inferring that the wage compression is due to a saturated labour market which is bad news for “ordinary British workers” is typical of securitisation on the economic axis which draws on notions of identity (Karyotis, 2007). What is less typical is Farage's rejection not of immigration per se, but of migrants who are not subject to quality control. Arguably, this may be viewed as a more cosmopolitan immigration policy, where discrimination is based upon meritocracy as opposed to nationality. Of course within the framework of the EU this is unattainable as the free movement of persons is a defining characteristic of the organisation. The effect therefore is to insinuate, whether correct or not, that migrants who come to the UK are of low quality and are of lesser value or worth than the indigenous population.

Secondly, Farage addresses the societal axis directly:

The real impact and the real upset up and down this country, the shock if you like, is that immigration on this scale has changed fundamentally the communities not just of London but actually of every city and every market town in this country and it's happened rapidly over the course of the last few years. It's led to increasing

segregation in our towns and cities which for a country that has always had a great record of racial harmony and integration is bad news. But worst of all what it's done socially is it has left, I'm afraid, a white working class...a white working class as effectively an underclass and that I think is a disaster for society.

Polar to the more standardised securitisation of identity where 'us' is being threatened by 'them', Farage takes a different tact. He blames immigration, as opposed to immigrants, for causing segregation, which is depicted as naturally bad for *both* groups. The message purports that a drive for tolerance, inclusivity and to reduce the stress of segregation for indigenous persons and migrants means to reduce immigration itself. This again, of course, is not possible in the context of EU immigration law as this lever to control immigration does not exist. The consequence of this divisive frame is the perpetuation of the idea that migrants automatically create disharmony.

Finally, Farage makes use of the criminological axis. He states his desire for an immigration policy that is based upon “speaking English, having skills, and being law abiding citizens. We do not have that power as members of the European Union.” As always, what is said rests upon assumptions of what is not said (Fairclough, 2003: 11). Inserting that an immigration policy should be based upon individuals “being law abiding citizens” is another attack on the lack of national control regarding freedom of movement. The insinuation is that criminals compose a statistically significant proportion of the total sum of migrant numbers. To reiterate, this criminal-migrant thesis has been shown to be severely exaggerated (Lohrmann, 2008).

On the whole, predictably from a politician of the Right, Farage frames the “essence of the issue” of migration as one of threat and security.

Conclusion

It is evident from the analysis above that the attitude of the elite political class in the UK towards migration is in line with much of Europe. All four forms of the securitising axis have been operationalised to support the securitisation of migration. Cemented in notions of a binary and essentialist ‘us’ and ‘them’, moves have been framed to render migrants a threat to societal identity, the economy, law and order, and political stability. The normative dilemma in securitisation theory has also been exposed. Nick Clegg can be argued to have contributed to the reinforcement of security frames despite his aim being to desecuritize the issue. This leaves a rather difficult oxymoron to untangle: how to desecuritize desecuritisation? In other words, how to engage in the debate about migration with the intention of alleviating fears and dispelling myths, but without entrenching those same fears and myths by paying them lip service. Thus overall, the central hegemonic discourse of political elites is comprised of threat and security. Attention will now turn to religious elites to identify whether this framing is consistent or whether there is divergence.

Chapter 4 - Critical Discourse Analysis of Religious Elites in the UK

A CDA will be carried out on several of the interventions made by religious elites in the UK into the debate over migration. Analysis will focus on former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, his successor Rowan Williams, and the previous and current heads of the Catholic Church in England, Cardinal Murphy-O’Conner and Cardinal Nichols respectively. This will uncover the prevailing messages of the religious elites and whether they diverge from their political counterparts. Once again the purpose is to expand securitisation theory’s analytical net to gain insight into the messages of a significant and influential group of actors who have, untenably, been largely ignored. Finally, the lack of public involvement from the current Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby will be critiqued and an attempt will be made to explain the effects of this peculiar silence on such a hot political, and arguably moral, issue. This will try and draw together the issue of the normative dilemma that transcends the CS’s securitisation theory, which arises as an analytical theme.

Lord Carey⁹

Lord Carey held the position of Archbishop of Canterbury, the most senior role in the Church of England, between 1991 and 2002. Currently a prominent Member of the Cross Party Group on Balanced Migration in the House of Lords, in October 2012 he made a very public intervention in the debate about immigration in the UK. In an open letter to Prime Minister David Cameron, the former Archbishop makes an impassioned plea to deal with “the most divisive issue in our national political debate”. Lord Carey professes that “[t]he challenge now is for the Conservative Conference to bring this urgent issue to the forefront.” In an attempt to persuade the Prime Minister and wider public why the issue of migration constitutes an existential threat, Lord Carey employs three of the four axes outlined above: societal; economic; and political.

Beginning with the societal axis, Lord Carey posits that,

...there comes a point when we have to reconsider policy and, without backing away from a commitment to those who need asylum, find ways to limit the scale of immigration, which is disturbing *our* way of life. (Emphasis added).

Dotted throughout the text are repeated uses of “our” carrying similar connotations. Typical examples include Lord Carey's references to “our proud heritage” and immigrants capacity to “change our society forever”. Lord Carey acknowledges the conceivable contradiction in his position as a former Church leader where “the Christian faith emphasises the need to welcome the stranger” and that “Jesus and his family were themselves refugees fleeing to Egypt to escape the wrath of King Herod.”

⁹ Unless referenced otherwise, all quotations in the section are extracted from Lord Carey's (2012) open letter to Prime Minister David Cameron ahead of the Conservative Party Conference.

To counter these potential criticisms, he outlines the crucial strand of his argument, noting,

[t]he Church has rightly and repeatedly given sanctuary to *genuine* asylum seekers over the years. This compassionate Christian tradition has contributed to the British reputation for tolerance and a very proud history of welcoming successive waves of immigrants.

(Emphasis added).

Here Lord Carey is adopting a form of intertextuality, which simply means the incorporation of other discourses or knowledge into a text (Fairclough, 2003). A clear attempt is made to justify notions of Christian compassion for “genuine asylum seekers” whilst not offering the same consideration for, say, economic migrants from the EU. Notice also the use of “asylum seekers” and “immigrants” as if they were synonyms of one another. The issue of asylum which is rooted in international law is conflated with immigration which is a product of voluntarily agreed upon principles and policy within the EU.

On the economic axis Lord Carey chooses to highlight the strain that increasing numbers of migrants place upon critical services such as “[o]ur maternity units” and “our primary schools”. Whilst the inclusion of “our” again conjures feelings of Huysmans’ (2000) “welfare chauvinism” the examples given by Lord Carey are also highly selective. Maternity units are of course a vital artery of any health service. However this is one small artery in the astronomical body that is the National Health Service (NHS). The very same NHS that is widely cited to be dependent on immigrants working as doctors, nurses, cleaners and administrators, without whom the NHS would face collapse (*Sky News*, 2013; *The Guardian*, 2014).

Coupled with this “chauvinism” is the inclusion of figures relating to estimated population growth. Firstly, Lord Carey states that if current immigration levels are maintained “our population will reach 70?million¹⁰ in 15 years time.” Subsequently, we will “need to build a house every seven minutes over the next 15 years to accommodate new arrivals.” Citing a report by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility, Lord Carey points out how their plan for economic growth and debt reduction would result in the UK population rising to “88?million in 2060 - 25?million more than today.” These extracts are another clear example of ‘quantification rhetoric’. As outlined above, the degree of importance quantitative data carries in everyday discourse invokes a substantial capacity to impart authority on an argument. Thus by including large figures, Lord Carey is attempting to provide authority to his statements and generate concern over the issue of immigration.

Lastly, in terms of the political axis, Lord Carey attempts to justify his position as a means to quell Right-wing political parties. “There has been an alarming rise in support for far-Right policies”, it is noted, as a frustrated public is angered by their “political masters” and “elite opinion-formers” who are “brushing the issue [of immigration] under the carpet.” Lord Carey imparts a veiled hypothesis as to how the UK has arrived in this political milieu. It is suggested that in recent years anyone who attempted to raise the issue of immigration faced accusations of intolerance and racism. But he argues that a “concern about rapid population growth is not an issue of race, and neither should it be exploited by racists.” Perhaps not, but viewing the UK’s “way of life” as fixed, Lord Carey’s position does appear to have xenophobic undertones. Of course cultures vary widely. The social norms of Canada, Venezuela, China, Tanzania, and Sweden are about as diverse as they are geographically

¹⁰ The ‘?’ which follows this figure and the figures below was present in the original text. I mention this to avoid any confusion.

dispersed. Crucially however, culture is not a trait equivalent to skin colour. It can be learned. Carrying on with this biological imagery, culture is evolutionary in that it constantly adapts. Lord Carey falls into the trap of the circulatory logic already highlighted. He adopts a fixed and essentialist view of culture and attempts to preserve this culture to stop the capacity for “far-Right parties to capture the agenda.” But a preservation of a unitary, essentialist culture is a central goal of the far-Right. So in effect Lord Carey is advocating and embodying at least one of the principles of far-Right policy. Here we have an explicit incarnation of ‘Catch 22’ politics.

Following the CS security criteria, Lord Carey’s intervention is a clear securitising move: in the realms of identity, economics and politics, migrants are framed as posing an imminent *threat*.

Rowan Williams¹¹

From December 2002 until December 2012, Rowan Williams served as the Archbishop of Canterbury. Williams’ most significant involvement into the migration debate has not directly referred to ‘formal’ immigration but has concentrated on refugees and asylum seekers. Throughout his career Williams has been a long supporter of rights for refugees and asylum seekers in the UK where he has advocated tolerance and understanding (rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org, 2010). As Karyotis (2007) has made clear, especially in a post-9/11 context, asylum and immigration are often infused together in the hegemonic security discourses of migration. A conflation made by Lord Carey above. Therefore this intervention is significant. One particular example will be explored at length.

¹¹ Unless referenced otherwise, all quotations in this section are taken from Rowan Williams’ (2010) lecture for the Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA).

The example is taken from a lecture given by Williams to CARA in 2010. One extract is particularly relevant and especially striking:

...this is perhaps the moment to note that the vocal anxieties we hear from some quarters about the survival of 'British identity' in the face of migrants and refugees betrays the lack of proper confidence in the capacity and commitment of our society to learn and to teach; it suggests a confusion about what matters to us and why. In fact it illustrates dramatically why we must always be alert to argument, because we need to learn how to articulate why we are as we are, and why this or that element of our culture can and should be defended. The presence of the 'stranger' is a gift rather than a threat in this context because the stranger helps us to see who we are - hopefully, not as an 'us' over against a 'them', but as an 'us' always in the process of formation.

This passage focuses solely on the societal axis in an attempt to dispel the myths of essentialism which are central to securitising identity. By placing "British identity" in quotation marks Williams is challenging the actuality of this phenomenon. Even more explicit is the concluding remark which directly invokes the notion that images of "us" and "them" should be replaced with the idea of a constantly adapting overarching "us" which includes those currently bracketed under "them". An articulation that is polar to that of Lord Carey.

In terms of deploying religious language to maximise the authority and impact of his intervention, Williams has one implicit and one explicit reference. Beginning with the former, referring to the "stranger" as a "gift", is significant. The word "gift" is

particularly emotive due to its centrality in the story of the birth of Jesus where it is said that Three Kings travelled to present their gifts of gold, myrrh and frankincense. Equating migrants to offerings given to Jesus infers upon migrants much esteem and suggests they should be treated with the greatest respect. Turning to the latter, Williams draws a parallel between the believers in the formative years of the Christian Church who were themselves “strangers” and the contemporary migrant as 'other'. He notes, “the believer was essentially a ‘migrant’”. Again the purpose of this language is clear: to inspire tolerance and empathy in the Christian community toward the 'other'.

In sum, contrary to his predecessor Lord Carey, Williams attempts a desecuritising move. Concentrating on the societal axis, a clear effort is made to inspire a less fixed and cosmopolitan notion of identity and to encourage tolerance and care for the migrant ‘other’.

Murphy-O'Conner

From 2000 until 2009, The Archbishop of Westminster, who acts as the leader of the Catholic Church in England and Wales was Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O'Conner. Murphy-O'Conner has intervened into the debate over immigration on several occasions, two of which will be addressed.

Initially in May of 2007, the Cardinal addressed a rally in Trafalgar Square, London, during the Strangers into Citizens campaign which sought amnesty and a path into citizenship for illegal migrants resident in the UK. Murphy-O'Conner (*BBC News*, 2008) said that there was a responsibility to welcome immigrants and “to appreciate the gifts they bring and also make sure that in some way they are

supported.” Notice again the use of the word “gift” and its association with migrants – the connotations of which were outlined in the section analysing Williams. Moreover, referring to migrants as “vulnerable” “threatened” and easily “exploited” (*BBC News*, 2008), Murphy-O’Conner abstains from using securitisation rhetoric and makes his appeal based on humanitarian and cosmopolitan grounds. Migrants are portrayed as victims as opposed to perpetrators of crime.

The second intervention occurred during Murphy-O’Conner’s¹² 2007 Christmas Homily, where immigration took centre stage. The canvass used to paint the picture of immigration was the story of the birth of Jesus. Central to this tale, the Cardinal stresses, is that the “news of great joy” was to be “shared by the whole people”. “Nobody was excluded. Everyone ought to benefit from this news”. Referring to Mary and Joseph’s ordeal where there was “no room for them at the inn” the Cardinal invites his audience to imagine how they felt. Murphy-O’Conner then goes on to make a plea for a less alarmist attitude towards migrants. “Do we perceive them as a threat to our well-being or to our way of life, or are we able to welcome people who need that welcome.” In short, he asks, “Is there any room at our inn?”

This message is a clear example of an elite attempting to employ specific rhetorical devices, in this case metaphor, to maximise the power of their interjection. As a religious figure, drawing a comparison between the immigrants and the parents of Jesus, with Mary being one of the most revered figures in Catholicism is a powerful image. By framing migration in this way, mirroring Williams, Murphy-O’Conner has performed a clear desecuritising move. And once again, the deconstruction of the binary categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is central.

¹² All quotations in the remainder of this section, unless referenced otherwise, are extracted from Cardinal Murphy-O’Conner’s (2007) Christmas Homily.

*Vincent Nichols*¹³

Succeeding Murphy-O'Connor was Cardinal Vincent Nichols who remains Archbishop of Westminster at present. Nichols most significant involvement in the debate on immigration occurred when he voiced a scathing critique on the tone in which discussions were being carried out. This intervention came in an Interview with *The Telegraph* (2014) in response to the controversial anti-immigration posters Ukip launched (*ukip.org*, 2014) during their European election campaign¹⁴. Cardinal Nichols begins by acknowledging that immigration “is a very difficult issue” and that there are “no easy solutions”. However the rationale behind his intervention lies in an attempt to stress the need to desecuritize the language employed. Cardinal Nichols argues that “it is very important that into our political debate goes a good dose of reality.” With this in mind he appeals for the debate to be carried out with a “sense of realism”, a “sense of respect” and to be devoid of “expressions which are alarmist and evocative of anger or dismay and distress at all these people coming to this country.”

Accompanying this appeal are attempts to persuade the audience to accept his call for desecuritisation using the economic, societal, and perhaps criminological axes. Beginning with the economic base, Nichols points to the “life of hospitals” and the “life of many public sector areas” which are “dependent on people who come to this country”. This is in stark contrast with the attempts made by Lord Carey who sought to use pressure on particular services within the NHS as a securitising tool. In terms of

¹³ All quotations in this section, unless referenced otherwise, are taken from Cardinal Vincent Nichols interview with *The Telegraph* in 2014.

¹⁴ For example, one poster read, “26 million people in Europe are looking for work. And whose job are they after?”. This was accompanied by a large white hand pointing aggressively at the audience.

identity, appeals centre on the notions that immigrants “add to our wellbeing” and add “richness” to the UK. Here it is poignant to notice that the word 'our' is used on this occasion in a positive sense. Wellbeing is being added to by as opposed to taking away from “our way of life”, as Lord Carey (2012) professes. This is very much in line with the holistic notion of an ‘us’ espoused by Williams. When talking of migrants coming to the UK in the quote above, Nichols refers to “this country” as opposed to 'our' country. Thus care is taken to evoke the idea that the UK is a country simply inhabited by people who happen to be on the island, as opposed to a country which belongs to a specific group of 'indigenous' persons. Finally in terms of the criminological axis, Nichols notes that “the reality is that people who are waiting to have due process are treated in a way that leaves them very often crippled.” Whist not explicit this may be interpreted as a veiled reference to the aforementioned decreasingly humanitarian treatment of migrants resulting from new approaches to border controls and customs practices.

Here again we have a desecuritising move. Using the economic, societal and arguably criminological axes, Nichols attempts to diffuse some of the alarmist rhetoric being employed by attacking the dichotomous categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Justin Welby

Succeeding Williams as Archbishop of Canterbury in 2012 was Justin Welby, who retains the position at present. Despite the debate on immigration taking centre stage in UK politics in recent months, especially during the European election campaigns, Welby has yet to make any public statements on the situation. His silence on the issue

is of course directly contrasted with the very vocal and very deliberate interventions made by both his predecessors and contemporary religious elites heading the Catholic Church in England. On the surface this lack of involvement may indicate a lack of interest in the specific issue, as he has been outspoken on several other issues, such as the broader issues of welfare and poverty. A more nuanced analysis of this silence, however, even if speculative, may be useful.

We have seen how desecuritising actors struggle to move an issue such as immigration out of the security nexus for two intertwined reasons. Firstly, the very nature of an elite making a public statement on any issue infers importance to the issue and superiority over issues said elite chose not to address. This may be viewed as a very blunt example of where the significance of what is said has a dialectical relationship with what is unsaid (Fairclough, 2003: 40). Secondly, there exists the normative dilemma of securitisation theory. Often the language of security is so ingrained that security frames are reinforced even though the aim is to desecuritize. The four axes of the security-migration nexus act as case in point. The “objectivist strategy”, as Huysmans (1995: 65) calls it, is where objective evidence based claims are made to show migrants do not threaten 'our' identity, that migrants are not all criminals, that they are not scroungers and economic burdens, or they are not the spark to ignite a far-Right political explosion. But ironically these acts reinforce the securitising discourses. In short, discussing the securitising discourses in public, even if to criticise them, ensures that security and the notions of 'threat' remain inseparable from the mainstream discourses regarding migration.

To be clear, the rationale behind Welby's failure to speak on matters of migration is unattainable. But the impact of his rhetorical silence may be speculated upon. For Wæver (2000), the best, and perhaps the only way to avoid the emergency

politics of security is to not talk about issues in terms of security in the first place. Despite Roe (2004) more accurately labelling this ‘non-securitisation’, as by its nature desecuritisation requires an issue to be one of security before it can begin the process of moving it back into the political realm, theoretically Welby’s silence can be interpreted in this sense. Welby’s lack of involvement should therefore be a positive for those seeking desecuritisation or less reactionary politics.

But here is where context and an externalist analysis of securitisation is essential. To reiterate, it is true that securitising moves have and continue to dominate the discourses of the political elite. Contrastingly desecuritising moves are and have been largely hegemonic in the elite religious discourses. Thus despite the normative dilemma of attempting to desecuritize using security frames, the pro-immigration religious elite may have dampened down the security rhetoric simply by offering an alternative position. In conclusion, despite Wæver’s theoretically internalist stance viewing Welby’s silence as a benefit to desecuritisation, by not challenging the hegemonic political discourses that frame migration as a threat, the securitisation of migration may be entrenched even deeper.

Conclusion

In sum, with the exception of Lord Carey’s atypical intervention, the religious elite of the UK have largely made attempts to desecuritize migration. As outlined in Chapter 1, scholarship has underlined the influence religion and religious elites can have upon adherents. A concoction of legitimacy, high binding capital and attitudinal conformity combine to provide a platform for significant influence. To date, the majority of

empirical as well as case study-based research has shown a correlation between religion and intolerance. This is despite numerous examples of religious elites using their influence to inspire the opposite. Thus the idea of religion as having a Janus-face is well ingrained. On the issue of migration, analysis of the interventions by the religious elite in UK can be seen to depart from the religion-intolerance correlation. At least at the level of the elite, framing the issue of migration around notions of 'Love Thy Neighbour', with the exception of Lord Carey, is dominant.

Conclusion/Further research

Immigration is dominating much of the political agenda in the UK and the rest of Europe. Thus understanding the nuances surrounding the framing of de/securitising messages relating to migrants is one of the most pertinent tasks to assist with future immigration policy.

Spawning from ideas pivotal to framing theory, securitisation theory has provided an innovative and influential framework to begin to unravel the relationship between migration and perception of threat. Whilst beneficial, securitisation theory has several critical limitations. This research has aimed to expand securitisation theory by adopting a context-enabling externalist stance and focussing on a set of previously ignored societal actors: religious elites.

The justification for this expansion was threefold. Initially, identity is posited by the CS to be fundamental to the security-migration nexus. Identity is foundational for the four axes used to securitise migration: societal, economic, criminological and political. It has been recognised by scholars that one of the most significant influences on identity is religion. Despite this significance, religion has remained absent from the vast majority of studies conducted which focus upon immigration attitudes and levels

of in/tolerance. It was speculated that this may be a product of entrenched disciplinary biases. Regardless of the cause, the influence played by religion on identity and the centrality of identity to the security-migration nexus makes its introduction to future studies essential. Finally, the unrivalled influence that elites, or in the language of framing theory, “credible sources”, have in shaping public attitudes, is widely recognised. The perception of moral authority and legitimacy that religious elites possess endows them with a significant quantity of cultural capital to establish themselves as influential actors.

On an empirical level the case of the UK was illuminating. Unsurprisingly in the contemporary political context, the dominant messages from political elites framed the “essence of the issue” as one of security. Although there were some attempts made to desecuritize migration this exposed the so far intractable normative dilemma which exists at the root of securitisation theory: how to desecuritize desecuritisation? Contrastingly the analysis of religious elites, with the exception of Lord Carey, found that the most prolific messages framed “the essence of the issue” as one of non-security. These desecuriting moves demonstrate that in the case of the UK, at least at the level of the elite, religion is being operationalised to promote tolerance. Again, however, the normative dilemma presented itself, particularly due to the silence of the current Archbishop, Justin Welby. Whilst theoretically silence or non-security toward an issue is argued to be a positive for desecuritisation, this may be overly simplistic. Even though the attempt to desecuritize an issue such as immigration may in fact cement security frames, failure to speak may have an even greater detrimental effect by leaving the security-stressing discourses unchallenged.

With these findings in mind, several policy challenges emerge. Despite the negative framing of immigration, the political elite largely conform to the message

that Britain is and should be a multicultural society. Their inconsistency in this realm must be challenged. The case of the religious elites in the UK espousing desecuritisising frames underlines the potential for non-governmental organisations with divergent messages to confront the hegemonic discourses of the political elite. This said, political elites maintain the dominant share of framing ‘capital’. What is needed therefore is for groups with divergent messages to be more forceful and innovative in getting their message across. This may include cross-organisation cooperation that can in effect pull together the ‘capital’ of various organisations to have sufficient weight to challenge the political hegemony. Overall it outlines that far greater effort is required to engage in the debate and frame the “essence of the issue” of migration in positive, or at least non-threat-security terms.

Finally, whilst this research has made a significant contribution for understanding UK immigration politics, there is vast room for fruitful expansion. Incorporating quantitative methods such as survey data to measure the tolerance of religious individuals towards migrants would be highly revealing. It is clear that religious actors have the potential capital to have a significant impact in shaping attitudes through their rhetoric. Moreover Karyotis and Patrikios’ (2010) study of Greece proved this empirically. The inhabitants of Greece, however, are of far greater religiosity than that of the largely ‘secular’ UK. Thus an adoption of quantitative methods would illuminate the extent to which religious elites still wield influence in ‘secular’ states. More specifically it may unveil the nuances of in/tolerance between religious denominations. For example, are Catholics more tolerant than Protestants due to the consistent desecuritisising messages from their religious elites? Have the tolerance levels of Protestants of the Anglican Church risen and decreased in line with Williams and Lord Carey’s interventions respectively? How have these levels of

tolerance changed, if at all, during Welby's silence or what could be referred to as a period of non-security? Finally, how does this correspond with the growing non-religious and atheist group? These are important research questions which will enhance the understanding of the impact of elite moves on specific groups and scholars are encouraged to engage with them. This is not a purely intellectual exercise. The prevalence of migration in a time of ever-increasing globalisation and the detrimental effects of intolerance to societal cohesion make the future of immigration policy dependent on innovative scholarship which increases knowledge.

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