



Wooler, Peter (2014) *Weaponisation and UK newspapers: Do jihadist-Salafist terrorists get the coverage they desire?* [MRes.]

Copyright © 2014 The Author

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author(s)

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study,
without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining
permission in writing from the author(s)

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or
medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title,
institution and date must be given.

<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/85/>

Deposited: 13 December 2016

Enlighten Dissertations
<http://endeavour.gla.ac.uk/>
deposit@lib.gla.ac.uk

Student Number: 2098524

University of Glasgow

Dissertation Title: Weaponisation and UK newspapers: Do jihadist-Salafist terrorists get the coverage they desire?

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of: MRes Political Communication

Month and year of presentation: August/September 2014

Word count: 14 982

Table of contents

Abstract:.....	3
Introduction:	3
Literature review:.....	4
Jihadist-Salafists and what they want.....	4
Terrorism, propaganda of the deed and weaponisation	6
Framing and scripts.....	8
Framing of attacks dependent on location and geopolitics?.....	10
Are certain journalistic norms and values suspended in coverage of terror events?.....	12
Purpose and hypotheses.....	14
Case studies and methodology	15
Background to case studies and justification for choosing them.....	15
Data	16
Syntactic content analysis.....	19
Potential drawbacks and limitations to method.....	23
Results and analysis	24
Are news outlets weaponised in the case of a domestic attack? Testing H_1	24
Does the degree of weaponisation vary according to the location of the attack? Testing hypotheses H_2 , H_3 and H_4	28
Discussion and concluding thoughts.....	31
Bibliography:	34
Appendix.....	38
Extracts from Shehzad Tanweer’s videotape statement (London bombing).....	39
Transcript of Mohammad Sidique Khan’s videotape statement (London bombing).....	41
Extracts from Amir Dokka’s declaration of the Caucasus Emirate (Volgograd bombing).....	42
Extracts from Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s note (Boston bombing).....	43

Weaponisation and UK newspapers: Do jihadist-Salafist terrorists get the coverage they desire?

Abstract:

This dissertation examines the degree to which UK news outlets are ‘weaponised’, in the sense that they are uncritical ‘instruments of warfare’ in coverage of terrorism, or delegitimised, in the sense that terrorists get coverage opposed to the kind they desire. This is achieved by using a syntactic content analysis to explore how four UK newspapers present jihadist-Salafists with reference to their religion, political motivations, rationality and claim to act on behalf of Muslims. Research first assesses claims of weaponisation with reference to coverage of a domestic terror attack. Further analysis is added by comparing coverage of this domestic terror event with that of an attack against a geopolitical ally (the USA) and a geopolitical rival (Russia) to shed light on how weaponisation may vary with physical proximity and/or geopolitical circumstances. This dissertation finds that UK news outlets appear not to be weaponised in coverage of the domestic attack, weaponised to a limited extent in coverage of the attack against a geopolitical ally and to a greater extent in coverage of the attack against a geopolitical rival.

Introduction:

‘The media serve as a worldwide stage on which a small group can perform with the guarantee that their ideas, causes and ideologies will attain international awareness...recognition and even sympathy’ (Weimann, 1985: 434, 443)

In the post-September 11th geopolitical environment, jihadist-Salafist terrorism of al-Qaeda and related groups has been an appreciable security threat to countries worldwide. Political communication scholars, media professionals and commentators often worry that by reporting on the spectacular violence of terrorists, news outlets provide them with the kind of exposure they crave. This has been referred to as media ‘weaponisation’ (Gillespie *et al*, 2010a: 247, 2010b: 271; Powers, 2010). Such concerns are understandable given that it is difficult, if not impossible, for news outlets to ignore terror events (Paracharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 55). Yet, despite how often such anxieties are voiced, there appears to be little empirical research into the portrayals of terrorists in the aftermath of their violence and their success in getting the coverage they desire.

Scholars have also discussed ideas regarding the interplay of media professionals’ norms and values and how this may affect the portrayals of terrorists. Some have posited that news outlets treat domestic and foreign terror events and their perpetrators quite differently but appear to disagree or are unsure of which factors are likely to affect the portrayal of terrorists. In particular, it has been suggested

that attacks against geopolitical rivals may be more likely to provoke the sort of coverage terrorists desire than those against countries in close alliance with the government of the news outlets (Schaefer, 2003: 110-111). Conversely, it has also been suggested that terrorists who execute their attack on foreign soil regardless of geopolitical circumstances are attributed coverage more in line with that which they desire (Weimann, 1985:435; Schaefer, 2003: 96; see also Hoskins 2006: 456-7). Without empirical research, it is difficult to assess which of these claims is more likely to be accurate.

This dissertation addresses these gaps in academic research. Firstly, it gives a brief overview of jihadist-Salafism and puts the concept of news outlet weaponisation into its theoretical context. Secondly, ideas and research are discussed relating to scripts, framing, media professionals' norms and values and why one may expect coverage to vary depending on the location of a terror event. Thirdly, it explains the system of syntactic content analysis designed to measure the degree and mechanism of weaponisation or delegitimisation. Fourthly, results examine whether UK news outlets are weaponised in their coverage of a domestic terror event and how the degree of weaponisation may vary in accordance with the location of the attack by comparing coverage of terror events against a domestic target, a geopolitical ally (the USA) and a geopolitical rival (Russia). The dissertation ends with a brief discussion of the results' implications and suggestions for further research.

Literature review:

To properly devise a method for assessing the extent and mode of weaponisation in jihadist-Salafist terror attacks and how this may vary with contextual factors, it is necessary to draw on a body of research and discussion from various academic disciplines relating to radical Islamism, propaganda, framing and the impact journalists' norms and values may have on news output.

Jihadist-Salafists and what they want

Political scientist Gilles Kepel (2003) refers to the predominant form of violent radicalism associated with the Sunni sect of Islam as 'jihadist-Salafism'. To Kepel, jihadist-Salafism has its modern origins in the teachings of a number of theorists and scholars, most notably Sayyid Qutb who fronted the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. The Muslim Brotherhood and other groups competed for pre-eminence among Sunni radicals for a number of decades and oscillated between being more and less open to violence with varying interpretations of Qutb's work (Kepel, 2003: 31-32).

Jihadist-Salafism grew out of one of these interpretations, and al-Qaeda took leadership of this tendency from the 1990s onwards, partially a result of its leader, Osama Bin Laden, having a reputation for his fearlessness and organisational capabilities (Kepel, 2003: 299-322). Despite al-Qaeda's origins being as much practical as ideological – it began simply as a list of jihadist-Salafist insurgents in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, hence its English translation being 'the (data)base' (Kepel, 2003: 243) – it

was until 2014, and the rise of the self-declared Islamic State, the principal and virtually unrivalled international jihadist-Salafist organisation.

Al-Qaeda and linked groups became known for their ability to strike military and political targets worldwide, such as the USS Cole in October 2000 in Yemen, killing thirteen American sailors (Kepel, 2003: 320) and spectacular high-casualty strikes against civilians, particularly the 11th September 2001 attacks in the USA, killing nearly three thousand (Kepel, 2003: 1). With al-Qaeda's command came a consolidation of the jihadist-Salafist movement, with previously independent entities coalescing around al-Qaeda in ideology with many even becoming 'franchises', officially linked to the leadership (Kepel, 2003: 299-322; Hoffman, 2004). Recent years, however, have also seen the growth of ideologically-aligned but independent cells acting under al-Qaeda's banner - the 2005 London and 2013 Boston bombings are examples of strikes by such cells.

Although there is some variation between groups linked to al-Qaida, particularly in terms of the emphasis they put on various shared goals, the establishment of a new caliphate is typically the ultimate primary objective. A number of caliphates have existed from the mid-first century to the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 (Kepel, 2003: 167, 43). The new caliphate would be a sovereign state-like entity governed by sharia (Islamic law and moral code) and unite Muslims across all parts of the world where they form a significant proportion of the population, superseding current nation-states (Kepel 2003: 24-26, 220-224). The (re-)establishment of a caliphate is not the only political motivation, however. Al-Qaeda groups also focus on more immediate political grievances, often involving perceptions of Muslim persecution and the 'occupation' of 'Muslim land' such as in Palestine and Iraq (Kepel, 2003: 33, 295, 323-341; Richardson, 2006: 41, 100).

As well as having broadly similar and compatible political motivations, al-Qaeda-linked jihadist-Salafists tend to justify their attacks with closely-related conceptions of religious duty and motivation. Often this involves the religious requirement to protect and act on behalf of the global community of Muslims ('Ummah') and a belief in the martyr's heavenly reward for doing so (Richardson, 2006, 38-48, 106-107). Jihadist-Salafists often justify attacks on civilians through arguing that supporting a government via taxes and voting makes citizens fair targets (Richardson, 2006: 6; see also Mohammad Sidique Khan's statement in appendix). Other, typically more moderate voices, counter by claiming such acts are against Islam (Jackson, 2001) allowing jihadist-Salafists to be portrayed as aberrations to their religion.

While recognising the ideological harmony of al-Qaeda-linked jihadist-Salafists, it is also important to consider that terrorists tend to promote a particular causal understanding of an attack by referring to grievances specific to their target and the time the attack occurs (Richardson, 2006: 83-103). For this reason, stated motivations may vary from one attack to another. Al-Qaeda affiliates in Russia,

for example, may focus on Russian policy in areas with large Muslim populations whereas those attacking the UK may discuss its foreign policy in 'Muslim lands' and support for Israel. However, because of their supranationalist tendencies, jihadist-Salafists also often talk of a global struggle and tie together various grievances (Richardson, 2006: 83-103).

Terrorism, propaganda of the deed and weaponisation

As has been pointed out (Richardson, 2006: 3-11, 27), 'terrorism' as a term has evolved in meaning and been applied to a range of groups with varying tactics with some described in such terms rejecting the label and others only accepting it with qualification. To Richardson (2006: 4-6), for an act to be considered terrorist, it must a) have a political motivation, b) use or threaten violence, c) send a message to an audience beyond the immediate victims, d) target civilians and e) be perpetrated by a non-state entity. This is broadly in line with other conceptions, for example the United Nations Security Council (2004). This theoretical framework is useful because it highlights the intention to enact political change. If propaganda is understood to be the intentional attempt to affect people's understanding of an issue and change their behaviour in order to aid oneself or a cause (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2006: 7), then Richardson's definition makes terrorism inherently a form of propaganda. For this reason, terrorism is sometimes referred to as 'propaganda of the deed' (Richardson, 2006: 77). In this perspective, terrorists are propagandists relaying messages through media outlets to advance their cause and bring attention to their political and religious motivations and the group they seek to represent (Richardson, 2006: 13-20).

Propaganda, of course, needs a medium to be relayed to an audience. News outlets provide the most obvious means for this to happen, given the newsworthiness of terrorist violence generally (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 55). To Gillespie *et al.* (2010a: 247, 2010b: 271) and Powers (2010), this causes news outlets to be 'weaponised' by terrorists. As Powers (2010) points out, the concept of weaponisation strikes in harmony with much academic discussion of terrorism and propaganda. To some, terrorism can change the nature of conflict; Bolt (2012: 82), for example, regards news narratives as being akin to a domain of war, like land, sea and air. If we *are* to consider media narratives a domain of war, the war against terrorism would be a total war with civilians directly affected. Weimann (1985: 434) explores this point, arguing the actual victims of violence are only targets in the physical sense, considering the wider public exposed to the message also victims – for this reason, terrorism has been called an 'information crime' (Gaunter, 1980). Similarly, it has been said that terrorism is made real, or 'reified' (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 55) by media outlets, who provide a 'theatre of terror' (Weimann, 1985: 433, 435) to bring attention to terrorists' causes.

Terrorists, for their part, often seem to view themselves as propagandists. For example, Bin Laden spoke of how the 11th September attacks in 2001 made inaudible 'speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else', able to be understood by people regardless of language (cited in

Richardson, 2006: 77). However, one must understand the political objectives of al-Qaeda to fathom what change this ‘speech’ actually is and the change it is intended to bring about. Media professionals also appear to often view terrorism as a form of propaganda. Schmid (1992) conducted a series of interviews with news outlet editors to identify how they view terror stories. When 20 editors were asked if ‘terrorists manufacture violent events to gain access and thereby status’, 18 agreed (Schmid, 1992: 116), suggesting that they are at least aware of terror groups to manipulate the news.

The importance of media in the eyes of terrorists and their desire to ‘weaponise’ it are demonstrated by terrorists being motivated by a belief that they will achieve the coverage they desire and designing attacks in order to achieve this (Paletz and Tawney 1992: 105; Cohen-Almagor, 2005). For example, German former left-wing terrorist and author Michael Baumann explains that he and his group ‘always looked how the newspapers... reacted to our actions, and how they explained them, and thereupon we defined our strategy’ (cited in Cohen-Almagor, 2005). Jihadist-Salafist terrorists have a similar propensity to design attacks to try to maximise the kind of coverage they desire, particularly to emphasise their ethical and religious justification for the attack and be presented as heroic martyrs acting on behalf of oppressed Muslims (Richardson, 2006: 106-107). Suicide attacks, in particular, are believed to be used by jihadist-Salafists because they serve the dual purpose of drawing attention to political grievances but also make a statement to Muslims about the bombers’ religious devotion and political commitment (Richardson, 2006: 104-135). This potentially augments their claim to act on behalf of Muslims and to represent the sole legitimate form of Islam, a key goal of jihadist-Salafists (Richardson, 2006: 99-101; Kepel, 2003: 2-10).

Terrorists’ belief that attacks stimulate interest is well founded. As Mogensen (2008) notes, terrorists often choose methods of attack which are as spectacular as possible and make as many people as possible feel unsafe. This allows attacks to be framed as threats to the whole of society and culture, further enhancing newsworthiness (Mogensen 2008: 32). In this way, terrorism coverage can be viewed as a prime example of news ‘amplify[ing]’ threats (Gillespie *et al*, 2010a: 247) as, generally speaking, the number of people affected by the terror event is many orders of magnitude higher than the actual casualty count, which can even be zero given that some terrorists tip-off authorities before the attack.

Augmenting this, Gitlin (2009: 12) refers to media ‘supersaturation’, the increasing intrusion of media outlets into the public’s daily life allowed by the increasing propensity of people to have near-constant access to news. This is enabled by technological changes, such as internet-enabled smartphones. This ‘media torrent’ (Gitlin, 2009: 12) may give terror groups an even more powerful ability to get exposure to as many people as possible. This coverage, however, does not necessarily equate to weaponisation – for this to occur, terrorists need to obtain the coverage they desire. It is entirely plausible that an attack can be a highly salient, but not stimulate the coverage they desire.

So what are the defining traits of a news outlet which has been truly weaponised by a jihadist-Salafist terror group? Gillespie *et al* (2010a, 2010b) and Powers (2010) discuss the ability of violent groups to get coverage they desire but a literal weapon, such as a gun, acts as the user intends it to. For this reason, for news outlets to be weaponised, they must be *uncritical* instruments of warfare, relaying propaganda of the deed and providing the coverage the user of the news outlet ‘weapon’ desires. The weaponised news outlet must not simply report on violence, but explore the rationality and motivations of the attackers and present them as acting on behalf of the group they seek to represent, which, in the case of jihadist-Salafists, would be Muslims. However, one must also consider how news outlets may prevent themselves being weaponised by giving terrorists delegitimising coverage, opposed to that which they desire. It is plausible that terrorists have their legitimacy diminished far more often than they get the coverage they desire and there are a number of ways this delegitimation may occur in news outlets. Crucially, weaponisation and/or delegitimation can occur and be detected through the use of framing.

Framing and scripts

‘Framing’ is considered by Entman (2005: 26) to be ‘the process of selecting or highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality’. It can be regarded as operating on a micro-level, with sentences incorporating frames which represent particular causal interpretations, implications of guilt, ethical judgements and imply solutions (Entman, 2005: 26). Individuals and entities can be framed as well as events, potentially encouraging particular labelling or classification of them (Goffman, 1974; Kitzinger, 2000). In coverage of terrorism, this is particularly important because frames may represent weaponised news or delegitimise terrorists and their motivations. Terrorists can be presented as ‘freedom fighters’, combating injustices on behalf of an oppressed group, or, mad, stupid and acting on the behalf of no-one other than themselves or a negligibly small group of sympathisers (Richardson, 2006: 19, 47, 117; Weimann 1985; Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008). Frames may also be subtle, however, as there is also scope for media professionals to use framing somewhere between these two extremes (Schaefer, 2003).

Scripts, on the other hand, are a macro-level pattern and can be produced by the repeated use of certain frames and other elements (such as comparisons). Entman (2005: 26) describes scripts as ‘standardized information processing rules that journalists use in covering certain categories of events, actors, or issues’. Identifiable scripts include the ‘human interest’ and ‘conflict’ scripts, (Entman, 2005: 26) and, perhaps, a ‘terrorism’ script. So, if a script develops in coverage of terrorism, one should be able to identify certain frames common to stories covering terror events. According to Entman (2005: 6-7, 26), psychological phenomena and the culturally-determined framework media practitioners operate within encourage media outlets to adhere to scripts and use particular frames when reporting on and analysing events.

Other authors posit that economic pressures and the drive for media professionals to advance in their career encourages reality to be framed in such a way that benefits the creators of news (Weimann, 1985). This would potentially move the primary cause of scripts and framing from individual journalists towards editors and other professionals at higher levels of news production, as their economic interests come into play. Because it is challenging to provide empirical evidence for the motivation of journalists, there appears to be little evidence allowing one to discern whether cultural or economic interpretations for the use of frames and scripts may be more explanatory. Whatever the reason for their use, however, they allow news to create a particular representation of events without telling direct untruths, creating what Lippmann calls a 'pseudoenvironment' (quoted in Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 52).

It is pertinent to consider framing because it can have a significant effect on an audience's evaluation of available solutions, the attractiveness of those solutions and who should be held to account through encouraging interpretations of the cause of an event (Reese 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Entman, 2005: 26). Conversely, they can also draw attention away from possible causal interpretations of events (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 54). Given the importance of frames in affecting perceptions and the need for a news outlet to uncritically relay the messages of terror groups in order to be truly 'weaponised', these frames have the capacity to dramatically reduce the degree of weaponisation. 'Weaponised' framing, for example, may draw attention towards a causal interpretation and solution which is in harmony with the objectives of terrorists. Opposing frames, however, can be used to delegitimise terrorists and aid a causal interpretation and view of available solutions which are less in tune with their aims. Of course, highlighting the importance of framing does not detract from other factors (volume of coverage, for example) in determining the impact an event has on the public, or the effectiveness of a propaganda deed in affecting policy; rather, framing is one variable among many. Indeed, the role of the media generally in affecting policy and public opinion on a macro level is unclear; as Weimann (1985: 442) remarks, it 'function[s] among and through the nexus of mediating forces of selectivity and interpersonal influence'.

Like frames, scripts can also come with associated implications of guilt, innocence and culpability. In terrorism, for example, an article may use the 'human interest' script rather than the 'technical details' script, the former of which is likely to put a greater moral judgement on one party whereas the latter potentially more value-neutral. Similarly, Iyengar (1990) distinguishes between episodic frames, which cover issues using a specific case, and thematic frames, which discuss an issue in its wider background. For example, an episodic frame might discuss the practical details of a particular terror event (perhaps within a 'technical details' script) whereas a thematic frames examines terrorism as a phenomenon generally (perhaps within a 'human interest' script). If episodic frames, which are often emotive (Iyengar, 1990), dominate framing of a particular event, there is likely to be a greater moral judgement of people involved, which, in coverage of terror events, would presumably lead to greater

condemnation of the terrorists. Therefore, thematic frames are perhaps more likely to discuss terrorism with reference to the motivations of terrorists groups which could lead to more 'weaponised' coverage. The next section discusses why the relative dominance of thematic versus episodic and weaponised versus delegitimising frames may vary with the location and geopolitical context of an attack.

Framing of attacks dependent on location and geopolitics?

Physical proximity has been noted as a factor augmenting an event's salience (Hoskins, 2006: 456-7; Weimann, 1985: 435). However, it has also been suggested by scholars such as Schaefer (2003: 110-111) that the *framing* of events may vary according to other factors such as the government of the news outlet's relations with the victim state. Schaefer (2003: 96) also suggests briefly that cultural proximity may be a factor. Therefore, there is reason to suspect that there may be no clear-cut, uniform script for terrorism coverage but framing is dependent on factors of cultural or physical proximity and/or geopolitics.

Comparing the popularity of various frames in coverage of one event between different news outlets can shed light on how framing varies across news outlets. Similarly, one may be enlightened by comparing the prominence of various frames of comparable events in the same news outlets - as Schaefer (2003:93) remarks, 'frames are likely to come into sharpest focus when we compare similar news stories through contrasting media contexts'. Empirical studies guided by these logics have found that the popularity of particular frames in terror events appears to be affected by the location, victim and perpetrator of the attack. Similar findings have been found in the coverage of accidents. One such study, (Entman, 2005: 29-49) compares coverage in American newspapers, news magazines and television of (South) Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007, shot down in 1983 by the Soviet Air Force, and Iran Air Flight 655, shot down in 1988 by the US Navy. Despite these shootdowns occurring in broadly comparable circumstances, Entman finds that US news outlets represented the perpetrators in very different ways and framing was in line with 'cues' from the US government. In coverage of the Korean airliner shootdown, the Soviet military was portrayed as 'evil' and arguably implied as having intentionally shot down the aircraft (Entman, 2005: 33). Conversely, in the case of the Iran Air shootdown, US military personnel were represented as having made a terrible but understandable mistake due to the technical difficulties in differentiating between military and civilian aircraft with some even attributing responsibility to the Iranian crew (Entman, 2005: 32-36).

Differences in coverage of these two shootdowns suggests that similar events may be framed in very different ways and Entman (2005: 48) suggests that the rivalry between the USA and USSR was a major factor in framing differences, with the US press being more critical of the geopolitical rival. This is referred to (Entman, 2005: 29) as journalists adhering to 'habitual' 'schemas' based on international relations. Similarly, geopolitics is also claimed to be an important factor in the framing of terror events

and terrorist groups. For example, Schaefer (2003: 110-111) believes that journalists add a 'local tint' to foreign news and are biased according to geopolitics to such an extent that 'differences in terrorism coverage... may be simply a reflection of mindsets rooted in the larger international system'. Similarly, Cohen-Almagor (2005) and Weimann (1985) point out that the framing of violent groups as 'terrorists' or 'freedom fighters' appears to vary according to international relations, with, for example, Israel being portrayed as a terrorist entity by many Arab nations. This would come as no surprise to indexing or cascading activation theorists (e.g. Katchanovski and Morley, 2012; Entman, 2005, respectively) who believe political elites have the power to be the primary definers of an event or group and generally affect news outlets' framing. If this is true, one can expect framing to be in line with the perspectives and recent positions of governments and political elites – this is broadly the explanation Entman (2005) gives.

Differences in coverage of terror events with varying geopolitical contexts may be more subtle than media outlets simply singing a militant group's praises or condemning them, however. Schaefer (2003) analyses framing following the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 11th September attacks in Kenyan, Tanzanian and American newspapers. The study finds that the Kenyan and Tanzanian newspapers tended to explore the grievances of the attackers to a much greater extent than their American counterparts. Crucially, this did not extend to expressing support for terrorists, but may be more nuanced; the Kenyan and Tanzanian outlets did urge 'Americans to understand why US middle East policy makes them targets', while 'reject[ing] an Iranian assertion that the United States brought in on itself', arguing that it was undeserved and offering condemnation (Schaefer, 2003: 106). While recognising that this may, at least in part, be due to cultural differences which affect how Tanzanian, Kenyan and American journalists cover events, Schaefer (2003: 96) argues that physical distance allows 'a more detached perspective' so 'when the attack occurs on foreign soil... there should be greater focus on the causes of the attacks'. This is in line with Weimann's (1985: 435) suggestion that the motivations of terrorists are more likely to be explored in the case of foreign attacks generally – that *physical distance is the key factor*.

However, here lies a conflict in academic literature. Schaefer (2003: 110-111) also posits an alternative explanation, that the *differences in framing reflect the system of international relations*. The implication of this is that journalists should more thoroughly explore terrorists' motivations in attacks against geopolitical rivals than allies. This idea strikes in tune with Entman's (2005: 29-49) argument that framing of geopolitical rivals tends to be more negative generally.

Russia can be considered one such a geopolitical rival to the UK. Its relations with Russia can reach peaks which some describe as reminiscent of the Cold War-era (Goldfarb, 2007). In addition to this, although systematic research into UK news outlets' framing of Russia is difficult to come by, a

number of studies have found that US outlets tend to frame Russia as a geopolitical rival and play down prospects for cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism and instead focus on conflicts of interests (Katchanovski and Morley, 2012). Interestingly, and supporting the idea that geopolitical rivals are treated more critically, Katchanovski and Morley (2012) also find that states which clash with Russia tend to be treated comparatively favourably in US news outlets. Thus, at least in some circumstances, journalists do appear to be influenced by geopolitics and in some way the adage ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ influences framing. There appears to be little research, however, into whether this inclination applies to coverage of jihadist-Salafists, a common enemy of Russia and the West. In contrast to Russia, the UK and USA enjoy generally very warm relations and close cooperation on political, economic and military affairs (Dumbrell, 2009). Thus, framing of attacks in Russia and the USA should contrast if geopolitical factors do affect framing in the way Schaefer (2003: 111) suggests.

It is also important to note that while framing may vary with structural factors such as geopolitics and physical proximity, the attributes of an individual reader can also have a dramatic impact on how they view an event. Seeger *et al* (2003) find that sex, age, psychological factors and the degree of personal relationship media consumers have to an attack appears to affect their reactions. Particularly relevant to coverage of jihadist-Salafist terror events, Gillespie *et al* (2010a) and Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2011), find that in the coverage of Islamic terrorism and UK foreign policy in Muslim-majority countries, British Muslims are more likely to view mainstream news critically and seek out non-mainstream sources.

Are certain journalistic norms and values suspended in coverage of terror events?

Just as terrorists and academics often view terrorist violence as a form of propaganda, so do media professionals (Blaisse, 1992; Schmid, 1992) and some appear to feel a responsibility to prevent their outlets aiding terror groups and encouraging violence. A major means to this end is believed to be careful, sometimes intentional, use of delegitimising frames. Authors suggests these frames imply terrorists do not have or understand their political motivations, are irrational, or do not act on behalf of those they seek to represent (Schmid 1992; Paletz and Tawney 1992; Blaisse 1992; Schaefer, 2003; Richardson, 2006: 19, 47, 117). Note that this is broadly the opposite of the coverage jihadist-Salafists desire - for this reason, delegitimation can be considered the opposite of weaponisation

As Entman (2005: 29-49) and Schaefer (2003) note, unconscious factors are likely to play a significant role here and frames may be unconsciously selected by media professionals due to cultural, historical and geopolitical influence. In at least some circumstances, however, media practitioners do seem to consciously seek to diminish the legitimacy of terrorists due to a sense of normative duty. For example, Schmid’s (1992) interviews asked if media outlets have a responsibility to ‘combat terrorism’ and 15 of 20 answered in the affirmative. In a statement relating conceptually to weaponisation, one

editor explained that media professionals should ‘not willingly make themselves instruments of terrorists’ (Schmid, 1992: 117). Research and discussion also suggests that media professionals are concerned about the ability of terrorist violence to worsen sectarian tensions and feel a sense of duty to prevent this happening (Mogensen 2008: 38; Howard, 2003; Paletz and Tawney, 1992: 110). It is not clear how this would occur, but would potentially involve differentiating between terrorists and the wider Muslim population – countering their claim to represent Muslims.

Empirical studies concerned primarily with how the norms and values of media professionals may affect framing appear difficult to come by. However, qualitative research by Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2011) finds that news outlets selectively relay al-Qaeda messages, with political and religious justifications for attacks often being omitted. The authors suggest intermediary groups acting as sources for translations of terrorists’ messages act as gatekeepers, preventing journalists, and in turn, the public from getting an unadulterated picture of terrorist motivations.

Schmid’s (1992) interviews with editors give some detail about how norms and values may practically affect framing. One editor explained that news outlets should not act as a ‘spokesman’ for terrorists (Schmid, 1992: 126), implying terrorists’ political motivations should not be explored. Lastly, one noted that terrorists’ ‘blindness’ should also be portrayed (Schmid, 1992: 126), suggesting framing of them as politically ignorant. This is not conducive to a value-neutral ‘just the facts’ approach but encourages media practitioners to rely on their subjective, biased evaluation of terrorists as illegitimate, nasty and ignorant. To some academics, this bias is normatively desirable, Cohen-Almagor (2005: 385), for example, claims ‘journalists...*should not only transmit a truthful account of “what’s out there”... It is an objective matter that terrorism in democracies is wrong*’ (emphasis added). For this reason, it has been said (Schaefer, 2003) that the position of ‘neutral adversary’ is abandoned in coverage of (at least some) terror events. These informal conventions, sometimes called ‘voluntary restraint’ (Hocking, 1992: 95ff), to delegitimise terrorists may be described as a system of self-censorship. Those who traverse this system can find their reputation and career suffering - Irvin (1992: 66), for example, discusses the example of Jo Thomas, a journalist who was allegedly discharged from her position for attempting to explore political grievances of the IRA.

There is reason to believe early use of phraseology may be influential in later coverage, for example, through governments’ power to offer ‘primary definitions’ of an entity or event (Miller, 1993). Presumably this would be in line with the influence of journalists’ norms and values as well as a desire not to traverse ‘voluntary restraint’ as long as the government is not trying to exacerbate tensions nor has goals in common with the terror group. However, as Miller (1993) and Bennett *et al* (2007: 105) point out, in times of crisis and breaking news stories, this ability of the government to push a preferred ‘primary definition’ is limited because journalists often produce news with less information and guidance

from official sources than usual. This further highlights the importance of considering the influence of media practitioners' norms and values; as Paletz and Tawney (1992: 107) point out, without government guidance, these are likely to play a more important role.

Restraint can extend to journalists using careful, sometimes government-approved, phraseology to diminish the platform they give to terrorists (Paletz and Tawney 1992). To some, this is normatively desirable. Cohen-Almagor (2005: 395), for example, claims that journalists are 'morally required' to do this in order to prevent giving the impression that terrorism is justifiable or legitimate. Thus, there is reason to suspect that, in their role as an intermediary between terrorists and the public, media professionals themselves may act in a similar way to the translators mentioned previously (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2011). The effect of this would likely be to distort or not mention the motivations of terrorists and put distance between them and the group they claim to be acting on behalf of.

However, not all media professionals are equally guided by, or possess the same set of, norms and values. To some, impartiality and informing the public as comprehensively as possible are more important than preventing violence. Lawrence Grossman, president of American news network NBC, summarised this position, saying 'the job of the press is not to worry about the consequences of its coverage, but to tell the truth' (quoted in Cohen-Almagor, 2005: 383). Career pressure may also be a factor here, with some believing that their career is best served by gaining 'scoops' and exposing information uncovered elsewhere (a point explored by Schmid, 1992). Because of their different places in the market and management, the strength of these norms and values may also vary from one news outlet to another.

Purpose and hypotheses

This research aims to make a contribution to the literature on news outlet coverage of terrorism by empirically testing the concept of weaponisation put forward by Gillespie *et al* (2010a) with reference to three terror attacks in four UK newspapers. One attack occurred in the UK, another in the USA and the third in Russia, coverage of which will test news outlet weaponisation against a domestic target, a friendly state and a geopolitical rival, respectively. The first hypothesis tests whether or not newspapers are weaponised in coverage of a domestic terror event.

- H_1 : *Jihadist-Salafist terrorists will **not** be presented as having acting rationally with legitimate religious and political motivations and/or widespread support of Muslims in coverage of a domestic (UK) attack.*

However, the literature review suggested that, in the case of any terrorist attack on foreign soil, terrorists may be more likely to get the coverage they desire, so news outlets should be more weaponised, as Weimann's (1985) suggests. It also discussed ideas (e.g. Schaefer, 2003: 110-111) suggesting that when the attack occurs against a geopolitical rival, this weaponisation may go further than in the attack against

a geopolitical ally. Thus, it is not clear whether one should view this difference in coverage, and therefore the extent of weaponisation, as a dichotomy between domestic and foreign coverage or whether it also depends on how friendly relations are between the victim and the news outlets' country, i.e. geopolitics. The second, third and fourth hypotheses explore how the degree of weaponsation may be different depending on the location of the attack and if this is dependent on geopolitics. Note that H_1 is compatible the remaining three hypotheses. However, H_2 , H_3 and H_4 are mutually exclusive.

- H_2 : *Jihadist-Salafist terrorists will have their rationality, religious motivations, political grievances and the support of the community they seek to represent more thoroughly explored in coverage of attacks on foreign soil than the domestic attack. The rationality, grievances, motivations and representativeness of terrorists will be explored to a similar degree in coverage of both attacks against foreign states.*
- H_3 : *Jihadist-Salafist terrorists have their rationality, religious motivations, political grievances and the support of the community they seek to represent more thoroughly explored in coverage of attacks on foreign soil than the domestic attack. The rationality, grievances, motivations and representativeness of terrorists executing their attack against a geopolitical rival will be explored to a greater extent than against a geopolitical ally.*
- H_4 : *Jihadist-Salafist terrorists have their rationality, religious motivations, political grievances and the support of the community they seek to represent explored to the same extent in the case of a domestic attack, an attack against a geopolitical ally and an attack against a geopolitical rival.*

Case studies and methodology

This paper will assess the degree to which UK newspapers were 'weaponised' in their coverage of the 7th July 2005 bombing in London, UK, the April 15th 2013 Boston bombings and the Volgograd¹ bombings on the 29th and 30th December 2013 in Russia. These three bombings were chosen for being as comparable as possible aside from their location (the influence of which is being investigated) but there are some significant differences to note.

Background and rationale for choosing case studies

All three attacks were perpetrated by jihadist-Salafist terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. The London and Boston bombers were members of autonomous cells inspired by and linked to al-Qaeda and its affiliates (The Guardian Online, 2006; New York Times Online, 2013). The Volgograd attack was executed by Vilayat Dagestan, affiliated with the Caucasus Emirate, an al-Qaeda-lined 'virtual state' which aims to establish itself as the government in the Russian-controlled Caucasus (Reuters, 2014). The Volgograd and London bombers used suicide tactics but the Boston attackers used planted bombs.

¹ Formerly known as Stalingrad

Although authors such as Schaefer (2003) and Weimann (1985) believe that the number of casualties and fatalities affects the volume of coverage, that is not the key variable being investigated, rather, it is the degree of weaponisation which this research attempts to establish. These three cases were chosen for being as similar as possible in this respect but numbers do vary significantly. 42 died and 121 were injured in the Volgograd bombings, 56 died and around 700 were injured in the London bombings and the Boston attack caused approximately 280 injuries and 5 deaths (CNN, 2014; Reuters, 2014; The Guardian Online, 2006). All these figures include the bombers themselves. As Entman (2004: 30) notes, however, comparisons do not 'require an assumption that the underlying facts...[are] analogous to a fine degree'. Rather, like in his comparison of coverage of airliner shootdowns, 'complicated events open to varying interpretations' and it is not possible to say objectively that one act was more or less immoral (Entman, 2004: 30). Media practitioners cannot establish objectively that the rationality, motivations and representativeness of the terrorists in the three cases being compared in this study are greater or lesser in any of the attacks compared to the others. Thus, differences in framing should largely be a result of external factors, such as geopolitical circumstances or physical proximity.

Data

It was decided to analyse four UK-wide newspapers (*The Sun*, *The Mirror*, *The Times* and *The Guardian*) over a time scale of one week for a number of practical and theoretical reasons. Sources were selected to be as representative of the UK newspaper market as possible in terms of circulation and political persuasion. Left- and right-wing newspapers are believed to frame events differently (Edwards and Cromwell, 2006) so it was decided to include two left-of-centre and two right-of-centre newspapers, with the party the newspaper tends to support being used as a crude proxy of its general political position. Tabloids *The Sun* and *The Mirror* have the largest circulations of UK newspapers with readerships of around 2.2 and 1 million readers, respectively and tend to support opposing parties during general elections, with *The Sun* generally right-of-centre (favouring the Conservatives) and *The Mirror* left-of-centre (favouring Labour). *The Times* is a right-of-centre broadsheet and often regarded as the UK's newspaper of record with readership averaging around 400,000. *The Guardian* enjoys significantly fewer readers than the other three sources (approximately 190 000) but, as the largest left-of-centre broadsheet (Edwards and Cromwell, 2006) was included to contrast *The Times*. All figures all from *The Guardian Online* (2013).

Using newspapers as sources for framing research is advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, text is available in electronic form, allowing a coder to search by keywords relating to frames, necessary in the content analysis system described later. Secondly, newspapers (particularly broadsheets) tend to include in-depth discussion (Stempel and Hargrove, 2002) so may be expected to include a large number of thematic frames, heightening the likelihood of exploration or delegitimation of terrorist

motivations. Additionally, although television appears to be the major source of information for news about crises, newspapers remain a major secondary source (Stempel and Hargrove, 2002).

A timeframe of one week was chosen to produce a sufficiently large sample to provide meaningful results and allow enough time for newspapers to report on the identity of the attackers, which in all three cases wasn't entirely clear in the first day of reporting. However, practical limitations prevented much longer periods due to the time taken to code paragraphs using the semi-manual system.

Paragraphs were chosen as the units of text for a number of reasons. The use of paragraphs fulfils Krippendorff's (2004: 97) criteria for the unit of text fragment being distinct and countable. Perhaps more difficult to ensure, however, is that the size of the text unit being analysed contains enough contextual information to give the manual coder enough information to classify it. For this reason, Krippendorff (2004: 101) suggests using paragraphs or even units rather than sentences as, for example, sentences may refer to entities as 'they' or 'them', not making it clear who or what is being referred to. The unit should, however, be small enough for individual ideas to not be merged together because as has been noted (Krippendorff, 2004: 101-102), larger units, such as whole articles, tend to give more neutral evaluations. This can occur, for example, because a coder summarising an entire article containing conflicting frames may simply state they both appear, even when one would be recorded as occurring more frequently within that article if smaller units were being analysed.

To isolate stories about the London, Boston and Volgograd attacks, the *NewsBank* archive of newspapers was searched for keywords within the four publications one week after the three bombings. An exception was made in the case of the Russian attack, where one extra day was included because two bombs exploded one day apart. Keywords were selected to find all stories covering the events, in this case, the names of the respective cities, i.e. 'London', 'Boston' or 'Volgograd' for each attack as well as 'bombing', 'bomb', 'terrorist', 'terror', 'attack' 'al-Qaeda', 'al-Qaida' and 'al-Qa'ida'. The Sunday counterparts of the daily newspapers were searched by the same method and results integrated into their daily sister publications' results. Articles from national editions, for example *The Guardian's* Scottish edition, were included only when the body text was different from the UK-wide edition. To ensure that all information is included in the text units being analysed (as Krippendorff, 2004: 99 regards as desirable), headlines were coded as if they were ordinary paragraphs.

With 1750 and 1873 paragraphs returned, it was decided that search terms for the London and Boston attacks returned too many paragraphs to code using the semi-manual system. For this reason, the number of articles relating to the London and Boston attacks was reduced by randomly selecting two thirds of the articles for each newspaper on each day and removing them. This stratified sampling technique (Krippendorff, 2004: 115-116) allowed the creation of a sample of around one third while preserving the variation in salience between days. This prevents running the risk of some days being

overrepresented or underrepresented (Krippendorff, 2004: 115-116), desirable because the kind of coverage is likely to change over time (Kitzinger, 2000; Miller, 1993). Thus, it prevents distorting results while still giving a representative sample.

Note that, because the number of *stories* was reduced by the sampling method, the number of paragraphs was not reduced by exactly the same proportion, as not all stories include the same number of paragraphs. Also note that the number of articles to be removed was determined by counting the total number of articles for that day and newspaper, multiplying this value by 0.66 and rounding to the nearest integer, so the overall sample of articles was reduced by approximately, but not exactly, two thirds. For example, before the sampling method was applied, there were a total of 93 articles relating to the Boston attack, but after the sampling method was applied, there were 32 articles, not 31. Because many fewer articles were returned by the Volgograd search, it was not necessary to sample coverage of the Russian attack and all stories returned by the search term had the relevant paragraphs coded.

Table 1 summarises the number of paragraphs and stories returned. Note that not all the paragraphs identified here, even after sampling, will be coded. Rather they will be the text which a second set of keywords, relating to coding frames, will be searched for within, summarised in Table 2.

Table 1 (Number of stories and paragraphs returned):

Case	Newspaper	Articles before sample	Paragraphs before sample	Articles after sample	Paragraphs after sample
London	<i>The Times</i>	132	798	44	262
	<i>The Guardian</i>	136	811	34	196
	<i>The Sun</i>	31	191	19	135
	<i>The Mirror</i>	31	417	22	148
	Total	330	1750	119	741
Boston	<i>The Times</i>	93	601	32	210
	<i>The Guardian</i>	60	350	19	116
	<i>The Sun</i>	85	568	32	213
	<i>The Mirror</i>	52	354	20	140
	Total	290	2217	103	679
Volgograd	<i>The Times</i>	12	68		
	<i>The Guardian</i>	6	34		
	<i>The Sun</i>	10	42		
	<i>The Mirror</i>	5	30		
	Total	33	174		

For results to be valid, in the sense that they measure what the hypotheses are testing (Krippendorff, 2004: 313), all newspapers should cover all the events. If this were not the case, comparisons in the degree of weaponisation between attacks and between newspapers may simply reflect differences in the degree of weaponisation from one attack or newspaper to another. Although there is definite variation, the relative dominance of newspapers (in terms of paragraphs) is similar between attacks, meaning that this should not be a problem.

Syntactic content analysis

The system of content analysis selected is a form of what Matthes and Kohring's (2008: 261-262) refer to as a *computer-assisted syntactical approach* and is a three stage process. Firstly, potential frames are identified with the aid of existing literature, in this case by both empirical research and academic discussion, for example the 'attackers are insane' frame from Ricardson's (2006, 19, 47, 117) belief that this is a common portrayal of terrorists. Secondly, text fragments (paragraphs) associated with that frame from particular search terms (e.g. all thesaurus results for 'insane') are identified. Thirdly, identified paragraphs are classified according rules which describe frames (e.g. if attackers are referred to as a synonym for insane without grammatical negation, the 'attackers are insane' frame is selected).

A semi-manual approach was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the literature review highlighted the use of nuance and it would be difficult to create a fully automated system which wouldn't overlook this (see Krippendorff, 2004: 100-103 for a fuller discussion of this point). Also, using a human coder makes taking negatives into account easier, so, for example, paragraphs stating the attackers were *not* insane are not coded into the same category as stating that they were. Furthermore, Matthes and Kohring (2008: 261-262) critique fully automated syntactic systems by arguing that a human coder is often better able to detect the meaning of words and phrases depending on context, a point revisited later. For this reason, a semi-manual system using a human coder was chosen.

Using this system, paragraphs identified in Table 1 were coded according to categories relating to whether they represent weaponisation – '*Positive*' (weaponised, i.e. coverage terrorists desire), '*Negative*' (delegitimised, i.e. opposed to what terrorists desire) or '*Neutral*' (neither). To give further information about the nature of weaponisation or delegitimation, paragraphs were also coded as fitting specific frames within these broader categories. These frames relate to the various ways in which terrorists seek to be seen and are actually represented, discussed in the literature review. *POSreligion-nocaveat*, *POSreligion-withcaveat*, *POSrepresent*, *POSpolitics* and *POSinsane* are frames within the *Positive* category. *NEGreligion*, *NEGrepresent*, *NEGpolitics* and *NEGinsane* are frames of the *Negative* category. The *Neutral* category has no frames but paragraphs classified under it are also referred to as *NEU*.

The first of the frames relates to how terrorists are portrayed in relation to their religion. *POSreligion-withcaveat* refers to the attackers religious motivation while implying they are not

representative of the wider Muslim population, as the literature review suggested may be common. This can occur for example, by calling the terrorists ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ Muslims rather than simply ‘Muslims’ or attributing their actions to ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ Islam or ‘Islamism’ rather than simply ‘Islam’. *POSreligion-nocaveat* paragraphs refer to attackers’ religious motivation without such caveats. *NEGreligion* refers to the attackers not understanding Islam or not being Muslim. Searching within the London and Boston samples and the Volgograd text for all paragraphs using the root words ‘Muslim’, ‘Islam’ and ‘Religion’ isolated paragraphs relating to these frames.

Frames *POSrepresent* and *NEGrepresent* relate to whether or not terrorists are presented as having the support of, or represent, the group they seek to act on behalf of, i.e. Muslims. In the case of any group or individual described as following Islam, being a Muslim, representing Muslims (e.g. the Muslim Council of Britain) or having the same religion as the attackers, the paragraph would be categorised as *POSrepresent*. When anyone described in these terms condemned the attack or offered condolences to the victims or their families, or called victims ‘innocent’, the paragraph was coded as *NEGrepresent*.

The next frames, *POSpolitics* and *NEGpolitics*, relate to the political motivations of jihadist-Salafists and are guided particularly by Kepel’s (2003) and Richardson’s (2006) work. Paragraphs which discuss political motivations are categorised as fitting the *POSpolitics* frame and those which present the attackers as not having legitimate political motivations or not understanding the political situation are coded as *NEGpolitics*. As noted, the stated political grievances of terrorists are likely to vary from one attack to another depending on the target and context. For this reason, the released statements and material from each terrorist group also guided the search terms. However, because al-Qaeda is truly an international entity, including in the eyes of those who act under its banner, the terms used to search for political grievances specific one attack have been used to find paragraphs to code for all attacks. So, for example, the search term ‘Dagestan’ has been used in coverage of the London and Boston attacks in case articles discuss global al-Qaeda operations, despite being a political grievance most associated with the Volgograd attack. Note that a selection of released statements which guided these search terms have been included in the appendix with political grievances emboldened.

The last frames relate to insanity. Recall that Richardson (2006, 19, 47, 117) claims this is a common way in which terrorists are portrayed. Search terms to identify paragraphs relating to this frame were found with the *thesaurus.com* (2014) result for ‘insane’, as well as the word itself. In the case of attackers being referred to ‘insane’ or a synonym, the paragraph was coded as *NEGinsane*, representing delegitimation, but if a grammatical negative was used, the paragraph would be coded as *POSinsane*, representing weaponisation.

Table 2 summarises the coding system. To avoid the problem which Matthes and Kohring (2008: 262) call falling into a ‘methodological black box’ whereby systems of classifications are unclear, a full

explanation of the coding system is included in Table 5 in the appendix, including search terms to find paragraphs relating to the frames and coding rules.

Table 2 (Coding system):

Category	Frame	Details
<i>Positive</i>	<i>POSreligion-nocaveat</i>	Attributing attackers' actions to their religion and did not imply not representative of Muslims
	<i>POSreligion-withcaveat</i>	Attributing attackers' actions to their religion and implied not representative of Muslims
	<i>POSrepresent</i>	Mentions Muslims or Muslim groups supporting attackers and/or terrorism
	<i>POSpolitics</i>	Mentions attackers political motivation / grievances
	<i>POSinsane</i>	Attackers were not insane
<i>Negative</i>	<i>NEGreligion</i>	Suggests attackers do not understand Islam, are not Muslim and/or rejected that the attackers had a religious motivation
	<i>NEGrepresent</i>	Suggests attackers did not have support of Muslims or Muslim groups and/or mentioned Muslims condemning terrorism
	<i>NEGpolitics</i>	Suggests attackers did not understand the political situation or did not have political grievances
	<i>NEGinsane</i>	Suggests attackers were insane
<i>Neutral</i>	<i>NEU</i>	Fits none of the above but includes one or more of their search terms

Note that neural (*NEU*) paragraphs are also being counted. It was decided to include these for comparison because they represent a third way which neither augments nor diminishes the attackers' legitimacy. In this way, they could, along with the *POSreligion-nocaveat*, *POSrepresent* and *POSpolitics*, perhaps be regarded as a sign of a more objective, value-neutral style of reporting. So, for example, if it is true that reporting is more value-neutral in the case of attacks against foreign countries, the proportion of paragraphs coded as *NEU* should be higher in coverage of these attacks than in coverage of the domestic terror event.

There is no explicit mutual exclusivity between frames, except the *Neutral* classification because it contains no information relevant to the frames. It was decided to not make even diametrically opposed frames mutually exclusive with each other because paragraphs in newspapers are often longer than one sentence and may contain opposing views. For example, one person may argue that the attack represents a legitimate understanding of Islam (thus the categorising the paragraph as either *POSreligion-nocaveat* or *POSreligion-withcaveat*) but then be immediately rebutted by someone claiming the opposite (so the paragraph would also be categorised as *NEGreligion*). Practically, this system involved allocating each paragraph a value for each of the 10 binary variables corresponding to each frame (5 in the *Positive* category, 4 in the *Negative* category and 1 *Neutral*).

So, for example, Example Paragraph 1, below, was categorised as fitting both *POSrepresent* and *NEGrepresent* because it contained two opposing ideas relating to the search terms for those frames but no search terms relating to other frames. For this reason, the *POSrepresent* and *NEGrepresent* variables

were set to '1' and all other variables set to '0'. Note that although it contains a search term for the frames relating to the religious motivation of jihadist-Salafists (e.g. *NEGreligion*), it does not fit any of these frame coding rules so is not categorised as fitting them. Example Paragraph 1 also highlights the usefulness of coding paragraphs rather than sentences because without the first sentence, the second and third would not have enough contextual information to be coded properly, with the coder not knowing who was being referred to in that sentence.

Plainly, not all went on to become active Islamic terrorists back in the UK. But some have. And others have passed on their training to the next generation. (Example Paragraph 1, coded as *POSrepresent*: '1', *NEGrepresent*: '1', all other variables: '0').

Paragraphs do not need to contain opposing information to be coded as fitting more than one frame, however. Example Paragraph 2, below, was coded as both *NEGpolitics* (attackers did not have the support of Muslims) and *NEGinsane* (attackers were insane).

Mr Blair also insisted that most Muslims wanted nothing to do with the maniacs who wreaked havoc in London yesterday. (Example Paragraph 2, coded as *NEGpolitics*: '1', *NEGinsane*: '1', all other variables: '0').

Of course, a paragraph can be coded as fitting only one frame. Example Paragraph 3, below, shows a paragraph which was coded as *Neutral* (*NEU*) only because it contains a search term relating to one or more frames (in this case 'Muslim') but no information allowing it to be categorised as any of the *Positive* or *Negative* frames.

Anti-terrorist police seized the men - all young British Muslims - after they were sent back from America. (Example Paragraph 3, coded as *NEU*: '1', all other variables: '0').

Recall that hypothesis H_1 relates to the rationality, political grievances, religious motivations and representativeness of jihadist-Salafists and whether or not this is uncritically relayed to the reading public. For the hypothesis to be rejected (suggesting weaponisation), newspapers should have more paragraphs coded as *Positive* than *Negative*. Setting this threshold is somewhat arbitrary, as, for example, it could be argued that a lower proportion of *Negative* paragraphs could still demonstrate non-weaponised news (as these outlets are not *uncritically* portraying terrorists). However, the threshold has been set at 50% because it would be difficult to choose any other significant value.

Hypotheses H_2 , H_3 and H_4 , regarding the degree of weaponisation in coverage of different attacks, will be accepted or rejected with reference to the relative dominance of *Positive* and *Negative* paragraphs, ignoring *Neutral* paragraphs. This will be calculated by the proportion of paragraphs coded as *Positive* minus the *Negative* proportion and called the *Positive to Negative thrust*. Crucially, coverage with a

greater *Positive* to *Negative thrust* will be regarded as being more weaponised because this represents a greater proportion of *Positive* to *Negative* paragraphs. Mathematically, the *Positive* to *Negative thrust* value always falls in a range between -100 (complete weaponisation) to 100 (complete delegitimisation).

Potential drawbacks and limitations to method

The content analysis attempts to take into account nuance and subtlety but, in some cases, there are conflicting opinions about the implications and influence of terminology. Howard (2003) and Richardson (2003: 3-10) for instance, believe the term 'terrorist' diminishes a group's legitimacy. Others believe the term can actually augment perceptions of their legitimacy because terrorism is inherently political by most conceptions (e.g. Fogarty, 2013: 17-19 minutes). Also, because one of the key political objectives for jihadist-Salafists is the establishment of a caliphate to unify all Muslims, rejecting nationality, terms like 'British Muslim' may be inherently biased and this will not be reflected in the content analysis.

In addition to this, because British Muslims are more likely to view mainstream news critically and seek out non-mainstream sources (Gillespie *et al*, 2010a; Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2011), the results of this research may not well inform the effect coverage is likely to have on Muslims in the UK. It may be, for example, that only paragraphs in the *Positive* category have an effect on these individuals given their more critical reading of news, meaning that the absolute number of *Positive* paragraphs British Muslims are exposed to could be a better measure in this regard.

There are also questions of reliability to be considered. If reliability of data is understood to be the degree of constancy of measurements throughout the data collection process (Krippendorff, 2004: 211), then having only one manual coder brings advantages and disadvantages in this regard. On the one hand, tests to diagnose problems with reliability like those which compare the results of two manual coders (Krippendorff, 2004: 212) are not possible with only a single coder. For this reason it is difficult to test how well results can be replicated and how reliable data is. On the other hand, because frames should 'mean the same thing for everyone who uses them' (Krippendorff, 2004: 211), using only a single coder ensures unanimity in understanding of the frames' meaning. Of course, there will likely be problems associated with the accuracy of manual coding. For example, although frames *POSinsane* and *NEGinsane* rely on fairly objective coding rules, a manual coder's accuracy in following these rules can be expected to vary; some coders' tiredness lowers accuracy, yet other improve over time (Krippendorff, 2004: 214-218).

Lastly, as with any study based on specific cases, this research should not be seen as necessarily generalisable, given that a range of contextual factors cannot be taken into account. For example, government mishaps and unpopularity may create circumstances more fertile for the exploration of the

political grievances of terrorists and help bring about policy change, as is believed to have occurred in the aftermath of the 2004 train bombings in Madrid (Rigo, 2004).

Results and analysis

Results relating to hypothesis H_1 will be examined first with an in-depth analysis of coverage of the domestic attack. After this, comparisons will be made between coverage of the domestic attacks with those against a geopolitical ally and geopolitical rival, testing hypotheses H_2 , H_3 and H_4 .

Are news outlets weaponised in the case of a domestic attack? Testing H_1

Table 3 shows the popularity of categories and frames by attack. Percentages are rounded to one decimal place in all tables. Also note that results for the *POSinsane* frame have not been included, as in all cases, the count was zero.

Table 3 (Coding categories and frames summary – London attack)

	Category name:	Positive				Negative				Neutral
	Frame name:	<i>POS religion-nocaveat</i>	<i>POS religion-withcaveat</i>	<i>POS represent</i>	<i>POS politics</i>	<i>NEG religion</i>	<i>NEG represent</i>	<i>NEG politics</i>	<i>NEG insane</i>	<i>NEU</i>
<i>The Times</i>	Frame count	3	6	4	5	8	17	5	1	35
	Category count	18				31				35
	Category percentage	21.4				36.9				41.7
<i>The Guardian</i>	Frame count	5	6	1	11	15	12	2	1	66
	Category count	23				30				66
	Category percentage	19.3				25.2				55.5
<i>The Sun</i>	Frame count	0	8	2	4	4	21	1	2	36
	Category count	14				28				36
	Category percentage	17.9				35.9				46.2
<i>The Mirror</i>	Frame count	1	0	1	6	7	13	4	3	21
	Category count	8				27				21
	Category percentage	14.3				48.2				37.5
Combined newspapers	Frame count	9	20	8	26	34	63	12	7	158
	Category count	63				116				158
	Category percentage	18.7				34.4				46.9

Of the *Positive* frames, *POSreligion-withcaveat* and *POSpolitics* were most popular. Over twice as many paragraphs were coded as fitting the *POSreligion-withcaveat* frame than *POSreligion-nocaveat*, suggesting newspapers do tend to differentiate between jihadist-Salafist terrorists and the broader Muslim population. This supports claims that media professionals tend to choose their wording carefully to not exacerbate sectarian tensions (Mogensen, 2008: 38; Howard, 2003). *POSreligion-withcaveat* and *POSreligion-*

nocaveat have a combined count of 29, demonstrating that the attackers did have some success in having their religious motivations aired. However, their opposing frame, *NEGreligion*'s count was slightly higher, at 34, meaning that more paragraphs treated the terrorists as having illegitimate than legitimate religious motivations, and even those which did mention their religious motivations often implied the terrorists were unlike other Muslims.

The literature review pointed to contrasting ideas in terms of the norms and values of media professionals and how their economic self-interest and desire for career advancement may pull in different directions in terms of framing. The approximate equivalence in popularity between *NEGreligion* versus *POSreligion-nocaveat* and *POSreligion-withcaveat* combined suggests that in a domestic attack, 'voluntary restraint' is about as powerful an influence on framing as the desire to go against the grain and gain a 'scoop' (Schmid, 1992) and to remain objective. This supports Cohen-Almagor (2005: 383) suggestion that this career pressure is still a factor for some journalists in their coverage of terror events.

However, a much larger difference exists between *POSpolitics* and *NEGpolitics*, with the latter being over twice as popular, indicating strong delegitimisation on political grounds. Interestingly, this suggests that 'voluntary restraint' may be a more powerful influence in discussion of political rather than religious motivations.

The difference between opposing frames was even wider, however, in the case of paragraphs discussing Muslim support or condemnation of the attackers (*POSrepresent* and *NEGrepresent*). Over combined newspapers, *NEGrepresent* was by far the most common frame generally, and almost eight times as many paragraphs were classified as *NEGrepresent* (suggesting Muslims oppose the terrorists) than *POSrepresent* (that Muslims support the terrorists). The popularity of frame *NEGrepresent* is also in line with academic work suggesting that media professionals are aware of the ability of terror attacks to cause division between social groups and feel duty-bound not to exacerbate sectarian tensions.

Only 7 paragraphs were coded as fitting the *NEGinsane* frame, suggesting claims or implications of insanity are not a popular mode of delegitimisation. This unpopularity of *NEGinsane* is perhaps surprising given that some academic discussion seems to suggest it would more common – recall that Richardson (2006: 41, see also 19, 117) calls this the 'most obvious and common explanation'. One cannot reject the idea that insanity is a common means of diminishing the legitimacy of terrorist groups based on a single case, but results do call the idea into question.

Figure A (Coding categories and frames summary – London attack)





Figure A allows a visual comparison between the popularity of frames between the four source newspapers. Perhaps the most striking observation one makes on inspection of the figure above would be the large differences between the proportions for various categories. This is particularly the case in terms of the proportion of paragraphs coded as *Negative* (delegitimising) and *Neutral* (not fitting into either *Positive* or *Negative* categories). However, it is important to note that in no newspapers did *Positive* paragraphs represent a larger proportion than *Negative* paragraphs – in this way it can be said that none of these four newspapers was coverage weaponised. Interestingly, there is less variation in the proportion of paragraphs coded as *Positive* (augmenting weaponisation). It is difficult to say definitely what the cause of this relative consistency is but it may be due to these paragraphs being necessary in order to explain the attack's context or relay newsworthy quotes from the attackers and their (in)famous sympathisers.

The 'Combined newspapers' rows on Table 3 and the corresponding bars on Figure A present an overall picture of UK newspapers. In this combined category, *Negative* paragraphs were around 1.8 times as numerous as *Positive* paragraphs. A one tailed *t*-test confirms this difference is statistically significant at the conventional alpha of 0.05 ($P < 0.01$) (test based on Pryce, 2005: chapter 6). This strongly challenges the idea that UK newspapers are weaponised in the way Gillespie *et al* (2010a, 2010b) describe, as their use demonstrates news outlets were not uncritically relaying the messages of terrorists and giving them the coverage they desire in the aftermath of this domestic terror attack. This is not to say that the news outlets in this study may not have in some way aided the perpetrators of these bombings - these newspaper do contain some paragraphs which give terrorists the coverage they desire, but almost twice as often, they did the very opposite. If news narratives are to be considered a domain of war in the way Bolt (2012: 82) describes, the perpetrators of this domestic attack appear to be losing the struggle to have one's narrative dominate opposing interpretations.

Interestingly, results also suggest the degree of weaponisation varies substantially over the course of the week, shedding further light on the way in how delegitimisation occurs. Recall that *thrust* is calculated as the percentage of *Positive* paragraphs minus the percentage of *Negative* paragraphs. Figure B shows the change in *thrust* over time for combined newspapers. Only the first day, with a *thrust* value of approximately 13, suggests weaponised news. All other days suggest delegitimised representations of the attackers. This can be seen as supporting claims that framing is likely to change over time (Kitzinger: 2000; Miller: 1993). There are a number of plausible explanations to this, for example that journalists adhere more to a ‘just-the-facts’ approach in the immediate aftermath of a terror attack but as time goes on, stories tend to involve more comment and reaction than details.

To better understand this relationship, a regression was performed with days and *thrust* values from the four newspapers but not the combined category, to avoid using repeated data and giving false accuracy. A slope coefficient of approximately -7 was yielded, suggesting news is indeed weaponised to a lesser extent as time goes on and the *thrust* can be expected to decrease by around 7 points per day over this period (Pryce, 2005: 7-13). However, the significance of the slope coefficient is above the conventional alpha of 0.05 ($P=0.16$), so one cannot be sure this relationship is statistically significant. Note that the trend for the combined category is slightly different to regression line because the combined category gives equal weight to all paragraphs whereas the regression gives equal weight to each newspaper on a given day and some newspapers have more paragraphs than others.

Figure B (Change in combined newspaper thrust over time):



Returning to Weimann's (1985) quote opening this dissertation, that a terrorist attack gives a guarantee that the 'ideas, causes and ideologies' of the terrorists will gain exposure, this research does *not* refute that. Rather, what Weimann says may be true, but to understand the degree of success a terrorist group has in using media outlets to present themselves in the way they want, one must also consider the counterfactuals; in this case that terrorists appear to be much more likely delegitimised. Indeed, one of the London bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, seemed quite aware that this would happen, speaking of a 'predictable propaganda machine' which would 'naturally try to put a spin on things' (see statement in appendix).


Results from the content analysis also suggest that this delegitimation does not need to rely on translators. Recall that Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2011) found that when jihadist-Salafist terror groups released statements in a foreign language, translators appeared to act as gatekeepers, adulterating terrorists' messages and drawing attention away from their motivations. Rather, results suggest that this delegitimation may be part of a more general trend for media outlets to prevent weaponisation, at least in coverage of a domestic attack.

In summary, although there is variation over time and between newspapers, a general picture can be identified. Because *Negative* paragraphs outnumbered *Positive* paragraphs by a factor of approximately 1.8 and this difference is statistically significant, the first hypothesis, H_1 , can be tentatively accepted and the idea of news outlet weaponisation, as this dissertation sees it, tentatively rejected for coverage of a domestic attack.

Does the degree of weaponisation vary according to the location of the attack? Testing hypotheses H_2 , H_3 and H_4

Hypotheses H_2 , H_3 and H_4 regard how the degree of weaponisation in UK newspapers coverage may vary depending on the location of the attack, reflected in the relative dominance of *Positive* versus *Negative* paragraphs. Recall that for H_2 to be accepted, the degree of weaponisation must be roughly equal in coverage of both foreign attacks but greater than the domestic attack. For H_3 to be accepted, the degree of weaponisation in coverage of the attack against the geopolitical rival must be greater than in coverage of an attack against the geopolitical ally, in turn greater than the degree of weaponisation in coverage of the domestic attack. For H_4 to be accepted, the degree of weaponisation in coverage of these three attacks should not vary significantly. Figure C allows comparisons in the popularity of paragraphs coded as fitting the *Positive*, *Negative* and *Neutral* categories (exact figures are given in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, later)

Figure C (Comparison of the proportion of paragraphs coded as Positive, Negative and Neutral)



The proportion of paragraphs coded as *Positive* (augmenting weaponisation) is lowest in the case of the domestic attack (London) at approximately 19%, with the proportion for the geopolitical ally (Boston) higher at approximately 27% and the geopolitical rival (Volgograd) a little higher still at approximately 28%. Conversely, the proportion of paragraphs coded as *Negative* (diminishing weaponisation) was highest in the domestic attack at around 34%, with the proportion of the geopolitical ally lower at around 18% and the geopolitical rival lower still at only around 6%. Under this dissertation's conception, for news outlets to be weaponised they should have a greater proportion of *Positive* than *Negative* paragraphs, i.e. a greater (positive) *thrust* value. London coverage's *thrust* was calculated to be -15.7, suggesting fairly high delegitimisation, Boston coverage's *thrust* was 9.3, suggesting fair weaponisation and Volgograd coverage's *thrust* was 21.8, suggesting high weaponisation. A 3 by 3 chi-squared test was performed to consider the relationship between the location of the attack and the counts of *Positive*, *Negative* and *Neutral* paragraphs. A chi-squared value of 31 and a $P < 0.01$ were calculated, so results are statistically significant beyond the conventional 0.05 level (test based on Pryce, 2005: chapter 7).

Thus, results are in line with the idea (implied by Schaefer, 2003: 110-111) that weaponisation should be lowest in coverage of domestic attacks and highest in coverage of attacks against geopolitical rivals, with coverage of attacks against geopolitical allies being somewhere between. Because of this, hypotheses H_2 and H_4 can be rejected and hypothesis H_3 can be cautiously accepted on the basis of these cases. Thus, this research provides empirical support for Schaefer's (2003: 111) idea that 'differences in terrorism coverage... may simply be a reflection of mindsets rooted in the larger international system'.

To shed further light on the nature of weaponisation and delegitimisation, Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 and allow comparisons in terms of the popularity of various frames. As before, percentages are to one decimal place and the *POSinsane* frame is not shown, as no paragraphs were found to fit it.

Table 4.1 (London coding summary)

	Positive				Negative				Neutral
	<i>POS religion-nocaveat</i>	<i>POS religion-withcaveat</i>	<i>POS represent</i>	<i>POS politics</i>	<i>NEG religion</i>	<i>NEG represent</i>	<i>NEG politics</i>	<i>NEG insane</i>	<i>NEU</i>
Count	9	20	8	26	34	63	12	7	158
Percentage	2.7	5.9	2.4	7.7	10.1	18.7	3.6	2.1	46.9
Count	63				116				158
Percentage	18.7				34.4				46.9

Table 4.2 (Boston coding summary)

	Positive				Negative				Neutral
	<i>POS religion-nocaveat</i>	<i>POS religion-withcaveat</i>	<i>POS represent</i>	<i>POS politics</i>	<i>NEG religion</i>	<i>NEG represent</i>	<i>NEG politics</i>	<i>NEG insane</i>	<i>NEU</i>
Count	13	8	0	23	5	1	19	4	89
Percentage	8	4.9	0	14.2	3.1	0.6	11.7	2.5	54.9
Count	44				29				89
Percentage	27.2				17.9				54.9

Table 4.3 (Volgograd coding summary)

	Positive				Negative				Neutral
	<i>POS religion-nocaveat</i>	<i>POS religion-withcaveat</i>	<i>POS represent</i>	<i>POS politics</i>	<i>NEG religion</i>	<i>NEG represent</i>	<i>NEG politics</i>	<i>NEG insane</i>	<i>NEU</i>
Count	2	1	0	15	0	1	3	0	42
Percentage	3.1	1.6	0	23.4	0	1.6	4.7	0	65.6
Count	18				4				42
Percentage	28.1				6.3				65.6

There are fairly large differences in frames' popularity from one attack to another. For example, in the case of the London bombing, *NEGrepresent* (attackers did not have Muslim support) was by a long way the most popular frame. However, in the Boston and Volgograd bombings, *NEGpolitics* (attackers did not understand the political situation or did not have political motivations) was far more popular. Having said that, *POSpolitics* (exploring the political motivations of terrorists) was the most popular *Positive* frame in coverage of all three attacks, and so the most popular mode of weaponisation generally. *NEGinsanity*, signifying delegitimisation through implying the attackers were insane, is unpopular in coverage of all three attacks, further challenging Richardson's (2006: 19, 41, 117) idea that this is a common mode of diminishing terrorists' appearance of legitimacy. *NEGrepresent* varies greatly in popularity, being most popular in the London attack and least popular in the Volgograd attack – this may be at least in part due to the ease of getting quotes from moderate organisation and individuals commenting and condemning the attack. The finding that *POSreligion-withcaveat* is over twice as

numerous than *POSreligion-nocaveat* in the domestic attack, but slightly less numerous in coverage of the attack against a geopolitical rival possibly may suggest that journalists' desire to prevent sectarian tension is greater when the attack is on domestic soil.

Recall that to Entman (2005: 26), a script occurs when journalists habitually call upon the same 'information processing rules' and repeat the use of particular frames and other elements. The different dominance of delegitimising frames, coupled with the statistically significant differences in the relative dominance of wider *Positive* and *Negative* categories suggests that there is likely no terrorism script common to coverage of all terror attacks.

It is perhaps also noteworthy that the proportion of paragraphs coded as *Neutral* was lowest in coverage of the domestic attack and highest in the bombing against a geopolitical rival, with the attack against the ally lying between, similar to the pattern of *Negative* paragraphs. This could be seen as further evidence of a more distanced, value-neutral approach to journalism in attacks against geopolitical rivals and to a lesser extent in attacks against geopolitical allies compared to domestic attacks.

Caution is necessary in interpreting these results, however. Differences in the degree of weaponisation are in line with geopolitical explanations but could also be regarded as evidence that proximity (at least in terms of culture) is a factor. If the USA is considered more culturally proximate than Russia for UK media professionals, this value-neutral approach could be made easier as Shaefer (2003: 96) also suggests, discussed in the next section.

Discussion and concluding thoughts

This research, despite its limitations, has yielded results that suggest particular modes of delegitimation and weaponisation in coverage of jihadist-Salafist terror events. It also suggests how the degree of weaponisation may vary depending on the location of the attack. There are several plausible explanations for these results which relate, and may lend support, to theoretical perspectives.

Persons and organisations interested in preventing sectarianism may be reassured by the finding that journalists tend to differentiate between jihadist-Salafist terrorists and the broader Muslim population, at least in coverage of a domestic attack. Further research, however, would be needed to give insight into the impact that actually has on the reading public and, for example, whether or not the average reader differentiates between 'Islamism' and 'Islam'. Knowing the likely impact of this may help guide better media relations strategies in the event of a terror attack. This point is particularly pertinent given that some anecdotal evidence suggests a rise in violent Islamophobia following jihadist-Salafist terror attacks (Islamophobia Watch, 2013).

The finding that news outlets appear to represent terrorists in the way they would like to be portrayed to a greater extent in foreign attacks, particularly when the victim is a geopolitical rival, may

lend support to indexing and cascading activation models (supported by scholars such as Katchanovski and Morley, 2012; Entman, 2005, respectively), albeit with some important caveats. Presumably UK political elites are less likely to explore the grievances and religious motivations of potential terrorists who would attack their own state than those who hold grievances against geopolitical rivals as the nature of geopolitics may encourage elites to be critical of rival states. If elites do tend to dominate framing in the way that indexing and cascading activation models suggest, then one would expect this effect could help explain why weaponisation was greater in the attack against a geopolitical rival. To be sure, it may be that some UK political elites in some way encouraged media professionals to explore the motivations and support of the Volgograd bombers privately, but, at least publically UK and Western leaders harshly condemned the attacks. UK Prime Minister David Cameron, for example said that he was 'shocked and saddened' and offered to help Russia in whatever way the UK can (BBC, 2013). What is true, however, is that the UK and its NATO allies have harshly criticised Russian actions in the Caucasus previously (e.g. BBC, 1999) and historical events may influence later framing (Kitzinger, 2000).

The notional influence of historical frames is complicated, however. On the one hand it is given some support by this content analysis in that the vast majority of paragraphs coded as *Positive* in coverage of the Volgograd attack explored political grievances of the terrorists. On the other, many historical frames exploring the political grievances of the 2005 London bombers were available to UK journalists given the significant elite opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and their focusing on this conflict as a grievance. Thus, an interaction effect between the availability of historical frames and journalistic norms and values not to be weaponised (at least in coverage of some attacks) and/or other factors such as geopolitics or proximity may be observed. For example, it may be that historically available frames are influential as long as they don't clash with journalistic values and cultural pressures. Further research into this field, possibly utilising qualitative approaches exploring the ethics of media professionals in foreign and domestic terror events may be fruitful in shedding light on some of these questions.

An alternative explanation could be that the negative reporting of a country leads to a more negative framing generally, even where no relevant historical frames are available to draw on. Further research into the degree of weaponisation in coverage of attacks against geopolitical rivals where the terrorist group's grievances have not been previously explored by elites may be enlightening. Of course, finding a case where these historical frames are unavailable against a geopolitical rival may prove difficult, because, as a result of the nature of geopolitical rivalries, these grievances are presumably likely to already have been discussed by domestic elites.

It is also plausible that differences in the degree of weaponisation in coverage of the three attacks are related to factors of cultural proximity, as is briefly mentioned by Shaefer (2003: 96). Results

are in line with what one would expect if cultural (but not physical) proximity were the major factor behind the degree of weaponisation, if Russia is considered less culturally proximate than the USA and comparably far in physical proximity. To better understand how proximity may affect framing, further research should take a greater number of cases into account, for example by including a non-proximate state in close alliance to the government of the news sources. Unfortunately, this presents problems in that a limited number of cases are available - presently no obvious example of an al-Qaeda-linked bombing against a non-proximate close ally of the UK comparable to those used in this study exists. Thus, without a bombing of this sort occurring, it may never be possible to resolve this question of whether it is cultural proximity, geopolitics or another factor which is the major cause of differences in the degree of weaponisation. However, as mentioned, this dissertation does at least suggest that *physical* proximity is likely not the major factor as the degree of weaponisation was higher in the attack against Russia than the USA, despite their comparable physical proximity.

Thus, it can be said that, while this dissertation does not reject the concept of news outlets being weaponised outright, the terminology of such outlets being 'weapons' is somewhat misleading. A literal weapon, such as a gun, can generally not be expected to be sentient or critical in the way UK newspapers have been in their coverage of the bombings explored in this dissertation's research. Nor do literal weapons act differently according to geopolitical circumstances or factors of cultural proximity. Rather, it may be more enlightening to think of news outlets as lenses. It is through these lenses which events, movements and entities and their messages can be reflected, in the sense that some parts of their communication are blocked before reaching the audience, and refracted, in the sense that what does get through may be to some degree adulterated before it reaches that audience.

Bibliography:

- BBC (1999), *UK condemns Chechnya ultimatum*, www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/554075.stm, (Accessed on 11 Aug. 2014).
- BBC (2005), *London bomber: Text in full*, www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm, (Accessed on 11 Aug. 2014).
- BBC (2013), *Volgograd Blasts: IOC 'confident' Games Will Be Safe*, *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25551835> (Accessed on 28 July 2014).
- Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G., Livingston, S. (2007), *When The Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*, (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press).
- Blaisse, M. (1992), 'Reporters' Perspectives', in Paletz, D. L and Schmid, A. P. (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage), pp. 137-169.
- Bolt, N. (2012), *The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries*, (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Chong, D. and Druckman, J. N. (2011), 'Identifying Frames in Political News' in Erik P. Bucy and R. Lance Holbert (eds.), *Sourcebook for Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques*, (Routledge: New York).
- CNN (2014) [Central News Network], *Russia Bombings Raise Questions about Sochi Olympics Security*, www.edition.cnn.com/2013/12/30/world/europe/russia-volgograd-explosion/, (Accessed on 04 Jan. 2014).
- Cohen-Almagor, R. (2005), 'Media Coverage of Acts of Terrorism: Troubling Episodes and Suggested Guidelines', *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 30 (3), 383-409.
- Dumbrell, J. (1999), 'The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st Century Temperature', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11 (1), 64-78.
- Edwards, D. and Cromwell, D., (2006) *Guardians of power: the myth of the liberal media*, (London: Pluto Books).
- Entman, R., M. (2004), *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Fogarty S. (2013) Shelagh Fogarty, Radio Programme, BBC Radio 5 Live, 23 May 2013.
- Gaunter, D. J. M. (1980), *Relationship between freedom of press and information and publicity given by the mass media*, paper presented at the Conference on Defence of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
- Gillespie, M., Gow, J., Hoskins, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Žveržhanovski, I. (2010a) 'Shifting Securities: News Cultures, Multicultural Society and Legitimacy', *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 9 (2) 239-253.

- Gillespie, M., Gow, J., Hoskins, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Žveržhanovski, I. (2010b) 'Shifting Securities: Theory, Practice and Methodology: A response to Powers, Croft and Noble', *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 9 (2) 269-274.
- Gitlin, T. (2002), *Media Unlimited: The Torrent of Sounds and Images in Modern Life*, (New York: Metropolitan).
- Goffman, E. (1974), *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, (New York: Harper & Row).
- Goldfarb, A. (2007), *Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB*, (New York: Free).
- Hocking, J. J. (1992) 'Governments' Perspectives', in Paletz, D. L and Schmid, A. P. (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage) pp. 86-104.
- Hoffman, B. (2004), 'The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27 (6): 549-560.
- Hoskins, A. (2006), 'Temporality, Proximity and Security: Terror in a Media-Drenched Age', *International Relations*, 20 (4): 453-466.
- Hoskins, A., and O'Loughlin, B. (2011), 'Remediating jihad for western news audiences: The renewal of gatekeeping?', *Journalism*, 12 (2) 199–216.
- Howard, R. (2003), *Conflict Sensitive Journalism Handbook*, (Copenhagen: International Media Support and Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society).
- Irvin, C., L. (1992), 'Terrorists' Perspectives: Interviews', in Paletz, D. L and Schmid, A. P. (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage) pp. 62-85.
- Islamophobia Watch (2013), Anti-Muslim Backlash after Woolwich (updated), www.islamophobiawatch.co.uk/the-anti-muslim-backlash-that-followed-the-murder-of-lee-rigby/, (Accessed on 11 Aug. 2014).
- Iyengar, S. (1990), 'Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty', *Political Behavior*, 12 (1): 19-40.
- Jackson, S. A. (2001), 'Jihad and the Modern World', http://www.lamppostproductions.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/JIHAD_MOD_WLD.pdf, (Accessed on 18 Aug. 2014).
- Jowett, G. and O'Donnell, V. (2006), *Propaganda and Persuasion*, (London: Sage).
- Katchanovsky, I. and Morley, A. R. (2012), 'The Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 59 (1): 15-30.

- Kavkazcenter (2007), 'The official version of Amir Dokka's statement of declaration of the Caucasian Emirate', www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml, (Accessed on 11 Aug. 2014).
- Kepel, G. (2002), *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Kitzinger, J. (2000), 'Media templates: patterns of association and the (re)construction of meaning over time', *Media Culture Society*, 22 (1): 61-84.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004), *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology, Second Edition*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
- Matthes, J. and Kohring, M. (2008), 'The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity', *Journal of Communication*, 58 (2): 258–279.
- Miller, D. (1993), 'Official sources and 'primary definition': the case of Northern Ireland', *Media, Culture and Society*, 15 (3): 385-406.
- Mogensen, K. (2008), 'Television journalism during terror attacks', *Media, War and Conflict*, 1(1): 31–49.
- New York Times Online (2013), *Boston Suspects Are Seen as Self-Taught and Fueled by Web*, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/us/boston-marathon-bombing-developments.html, (Accessed on 23 Aug. 2014).
- Paletz, D. L. and Tawney L. L. (1992), 'Broadcasting Organisations' Perspectives', in Paletz, D. L. and Schmid, A. P. (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage), pp. 105-110.
- Papacharissi, Z. and Oliveira, M. D. F. (2008), 'News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers', *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13 (1): 52-74.
- Poole, E. (2002), *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*, (London: I.B. Tauris).
- Powers, S. (2010), 'Weaponized Media, Legitimacy and the Fourth Estate: A Comment', *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 9 (2): 255-258.
- Pryce, Gwilym B. J. (2005), *Inference and Statistics in SPSS: A Course for Business and Social Science*, (Glasgow: GeeBeeJey).
- Reese, S. (2001), 'Framing Public Life', in S. Reese, A. Grant and O. Gandy (eds.), *Framing Terrorism*, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), pp. 7-31.
- Reuters (2014), *Militant Islamist video threatens Winter Olympics*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/20/us-russia-olympics-militants-idUSBREA0J0CX20140120>, (Accessed on 20 Aug 2014).
- Richardson, L. (2006), *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*, (New York: Random House).

- Rigo, E., O., I. (2004), 'Aznar's Political Failure or Punishment for Supporting the Iraq War? Hypotheses About the Causes of the 2004 Spanish Election Results', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49 (4): 610-15.
- Schaefer, T. M. (2003), 'Framing the US Embassy Bombings and September 11 Attacks in African and US Newspapers', in Norris, P., Kern, M. and Just, M. R. (eds.), *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, The Government, and the Public*, (New York: Routledge), pp. 93-112.
- Schmid, A. P. (1992), 'Editors' Perspectives', in Paletz, D. L and Schmid, A. P. (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage), pp. 111-136.
- Seeger, M. W., S. Venenette, R. R. Ulmer, and T. L. Sellnow (2002), 'Media Use, Information Seeking, and Reported Needs in Post Crisis Contexts', in Greenberg, B. S. (ed.) *Communication and Terrorism: Public and Media Responses to 9/11*, (Creesskill, NJ: Hampton Press), pp. 53-63.
- Stempel, G. and Hargrove, T. (2002), 'Media Sources of Information and Attitudes About Terrorism', in Greenberg, B. S. (ed.) *Communication and Terrorism: Public and Media Responses to 9/11*, (Creesskill, NJ: Hampton Press), pp. 17-26.
- The Guardian Online (2006), *Leak reveals official story of London bombings*, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/apr/09/july7.uksecurity>, (Accessed on 14 Aug. 2014).
- The Guardian Online (2013), *ABCs: National daily newspaper circulation June 2013*, www.theguardian.com/media/table/2013/jul/15/abcs-national-newspapers, (Accessed on 01 Sep. 2013).
- Thesaurus.com (2014), *Insane Synonyms, Insane Antonyms*, www.thesaurus.com/browse/insane, (Accessed on 10 Aug. 2014).
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981), 'The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice', *Science*, 211 (4481): 453-458.
- United Nations Security Council (2004), *Resolution 1566* www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/N0454282.pdf?OpenElement, (Accessed on 08 Oct. 2014).
- US District Court, District Of Massachusetts (2014) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV, <http://c.o0bg.com/rw/Boston/2011-2020/2014/05/22/BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/tsarnaev1.pdf>, (Accessed on 19 Aug. 2014).
- Weimann, G. (1985), 'Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Labelling Terrorism in the Israeli Press', *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 2 (4): 433-445.
- White, D. M. (1950), 'The 'gate keeper': A case study in the selection of news', *Journalism Quarterly*, 27 (3): 383-391.

- Youtube (2012), 7/7 - *Bomber's Will - Shehzad Tanveer (RARE VIDEO)*,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FG6a26uX1eA, (Accessed on 11 Aug. 2014).

Appendix

Table 5 (Coding System):

Category	Frame	Details	Coding requirement
Positive	<i>POSreligion-nocaveat</i>	Mentioned attackers' religious motivation and did not imply not representative of Muslims	From root words: 'Islam', 'Muslim', 'Religion', 'Koran', 'Hadith' 'Quran', 'Qur'an', 'Sunnah', 'Muhammad', 'Prophet', 'Allah', 'God' referring to the attackers and attributing their actions to religion beyond simply mentioning it. Does not include caveats outlined in <i>POSreligion-withcaveat</i> coding requirement
	<i>POSreligion-withcaveat</i>	Mentioned attackers' religious motivation and implied not representative of Muslims	From root words: 'Islam', 'Muslim', 'Religion', 'Koran', 'Hadith' 'Quran', 'Qur'an', 'Sunnah', 'Muhammad', 'Prophet', 'Allah', 'God', referring to the attackers and attributing their actions to religion beyond simply mentioning it. Includes caveats suggesting not representative of Muslims generally though referring to attackers, their religion or their politics as a root word of 'extreme' or a synonym of 'extreme'
	<i>POSrepresent</i>	Referred to Muslim or Muslim groups supporting attackers	From root words: 'Islam', 'Muslim', 'Religion', 'Mosque', 'Allah', 'God' referring to organisations or individuals other than the attackers supporting attackers or terrorism generally
	<i>POSpolitics</i>	Referred to attackers political motivation / grievances	Mentioned any of the following as grievances: 'Iraq', 'Afghanistan', 'Ummah', 'Palestine', 'Innocent', 'Justify', 'al-Qaeda', 'al-Qa'ida', 'Chechnya', 'Dagestan', 'Ichkeria', 'Ingush', 'Independent', 'Insurgent', 'Muslim lands', 'Muslim world', 'Kuffar' but did <i>not</i> state the attackers do not understand the political situation or have political grievances
	<i>POSinsane</i>	Attackers were not insane	From root words: 'Insane', 'crazy', 'paranoid', 'nuts', 'lunatic', 'Batty', 'Bizarre', 'Deranged', 'Idiotic', 'Irrational', 'Irresponsible', 'Mad', 'Preposterous', 'Psychotic', 'Senseless', 'Cracked', 'Cuckoo', 'Daft', 'Demented', 'Derailed', 'Fatuous', 'Frenzy', 'Impractical', 'Loon', 'Maniac', 'Mental', 'Moonstruck', 'Nutty', 'Psychopathic', 'Rabid', 'Raging', 'Raving', 'Schizophrenia', 'Screwy', 'Touched', 'Unhinged', 'Unsettled', 'Wild' referring to the attackers with a grammatical negative or negation, e.g. 'the attackers were not insane'
Negative	<i>NEGreligion</i>	Attackers do not understand Islam or are not Muslim	From root words 'Islam', 'Muslim', 'Religion', 'Koran', 'Hadith' 'Quran', 'Qur'an', 'Sunnah', 'Muhammad', 'Prophet', 'Allah', 'God' referring to the attackers. Suggests attackers do not understand Islam, are not Muslim and/or rejects that their actions relate to their religion

	<i>NEGrepresent</i>	Attackers did not have support of Muslims or Muslim groups	From root words: 'Islam', 'Muslim', 'Religion', 'Mosque', referring to organisations or individuals other than the attackers condemning attackers or terrorism generally and/or expressing sympathy for victims, victims' families and/or calling victims 'innocent' or a synonym
	<i>NEGpolitics</i>	Attackers did not understand the political situation or did not have political grievances	Mentioned any of the following as grievances: 'Iraq', 'Afghanistan', 'Ummah', 'Palestine', 'Innocent', 'Justify', 'al-Qaeda', 'al-Qa'ida', 'Chechnya', 'Dagestan', 'Ichkeria', 'Ingush', 'Independent', 'Insurgent', 'Muslim lands', 'Muslim world', 'Kuffar' and stated attackers did not understand the political situation or did not have political grievances
	<i>NEGinsane</i>	Attackers were insane	From root words: 'Insane', 'crazy', 'paranoid', 'nuts', 'lunatic', 'Batty', 'Bizarre', 'Deranged', 'Idiotic', 'Irrational', 'Irresponsible', 'Mad', 'Preposterous', 'Psychotic', 'Senseless', 'Cracked', 'Cuckoo', 'Daft', 'Demented', 'Derailed', 'Fatuous', 'Frenzy', 'Impractical', 'Loon', 'Maniac', 'Mental', 'Moonstruck', 'Nutty', 'Psychopathic', 'Rabid', 'Raging', 'Raving', 'Schizophrenia', 'Screw', 'Touched', 'Unhinged', 'Unsettled', 'Wild' referring to the attackers unless a grammatical negative or negation is used
Neutral	<i>NEU</i>		Included no search terms from other categories

Extracts from Shehzad Tanweer's videotape statement (London bombing)

'To the non-Muslims of Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this. **You are those who have voted in your government**, who in turn have, and still continue to this day, **continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters from the East to the West, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. Your government has supported the genocide of 150 000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah.**

You have offered financial and military support to the US and Israel in the massacre of our children in Palestine. You are directly responsible for the problems in Palestine and Afghanistan and Iraq to this day. You have openly declared war on Islam and [inaudible] in the crusade against the Muslims.

We are 100 percent committed to the cause of Islam, we love death the way you love life. I tell you British citizens to **stop your support for your lying British government.** And to the so-called War on Terror, and ask yourselves, why would thousands of [inaudible] give their lives for the cause of Muslims [inaudible]. And what is wrong with you, that you fight not in the cause of Allah, and for those

weak [inaudible] oppression of men, women and children who cries our Lord rescues from this town whose people are oppressors and raise us from among you one who will protect and raise from us from among you one who will help.

All Muslims of Britain, you turn on your TV sets, watch and hear about the **oppression of the Muslims from the East to the West**, and yet you turn a blind eye in your lives as if you never heard anything as if it does not concern you. What is the matter with you that you turn back to the religion of Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala. If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your kindred, the wealth you've gained, the commerce in which you feel decline, and the dwellings in which you delight [inaudible] wait until Allah brings upon you his decision and Allah guides those people who are [inaudible].

Your duty is to Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala and to those who are weak and oppressed, all you who believe, what is the matter with you, that when you ask too much [inaudible] for his cause [inaudible] heaven to the Earth, and you believe in the world of this life rather than the one after, but little is the enjoyment of this world as compared to the hereafter. All Muslims of Britain, stand up and be counted. You are those [inaudible Arabic], if you turn back from your religion, Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala says you will believe, whoever amongst you turns back from his religion, Allah will bring people who he will love and they will love him [inaudible]. Fight against the disbelievers, for it is but an obligation in Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala says. Fighting was ordained for you, though you dislike it and it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and you like the thing which is bad for you. Allah knows that you do not know

What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks that *inshallah* will intensify and continue until you pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until you stop **all financial and military support to the US and Israel**, and until you **release all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh and your other concentration camps**. And know that if you fail to comply with this then know that this war will never stop and know that we are ready to give our lives 100 times over for the cause of Islam. **You will never experience peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.**

All Muslims of Britain and the world the [inaudible] is just a fleeting enjoyment and [inaudible] Allah will return. Obey Allah and his messenger, if you are in need, believe us. **Fight against the oppressors, the oppressive British regime and you the other oppressive Kuffar forces** [inaudible]....they are forcing us Muslims [inaudible]. As Allah *Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala* says: "Those who believe fighting the cause of Allah and those who disbelieve fighting the cause of *Shaitan*". So **fight, you against the cause of Shaitan**. Ever feeble is the blood of *Shaitan*. So fight for the cause of Allah. Our

blood flows across the earth, **Muslim blood has become cheap Better** those who will **avenge the blood of our children in Palestine and the rapes and massacres of our sisters in Kashmir.**

As for those of you who have been affected by this reminder, give your lives for Allah's *Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala* cause. For in truth this is the best transaction as Allah *Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala* says, 'Verily Allah has chosen to deliver their lives and their properties for the price that they should be the paradise. They fight Allah's cause so they kill and are killed. It is the promising truth that is binding [inaudible]

And who is truer to his promise than Allah? Then rejoice in the life in which you have concluded that is the supreme success. We ask Allah... to protect Sheikh Osama and those who are close to him; and those who are fighting Allah's cause across the earth. We ask Allah to **lift the oppression of Muslims** and to **hasten the release of the Muslim prisoners and scholars** across the Earth. We ask Allah... to protect Sheikh [inaudible] Zaraqawi and those who are with him and **grant a victory in Iraq**. Oh Allah [inaudible] accept us in righteousness in the day we shall return to you.' (Youtube, 2012)

Transcript of Mohammad Sidique Khan's videotape statement (London bombing)

'I'm going to keep this short and to the point because it's all been said before by far more eloquent people than me.

And our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going to talk to you in a language that you understand.

Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood. I'm sure by now the media's painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas.

I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer.

Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... **This is how our ethical stances are dictated.**

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.

We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation...

[inaudible]

... I myself, I myself, I make dua to Allah... to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the... of this cause.

With this I leave you to make up your own minds and I ask you to make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into gardens of paradise.' (BBC, 2005)

Extracts from Amir Dokka's declaration of the Caucasus Emirate (Volgograd bombing)

'In The Name Of Allah The Most Gracious The Most Merciful. Assalamu Aleykum Wa Rahmatulahi Wa Barakatu. Praise be to Allah, whom we praise and pray for help and forgiveness. We seek refuge in Allah from the evil of ourselves and the wickedness of our own deeds...

...My message is addressed to the Mujahideen who are fighting in the Caucasus, as well as oppressed Muslims of Idel-Ural, Siberia and other regions, occupied by Rusnya.

I want to remind you the fact that many Muslims are prone to forget. **Our lands are occupied by Russian kuffar and the swinish way of life has been thrust upon us for a long time.** It is the punishment of Allah for going astray from his Path, because nothing in the world can happen without the will of Allah, may He, the Most High, be praised...

...I am not talking about **native kuffar, they are exposed falsehood and filth with a human appearance. They are dogs, dogs of the Hell,** whom Allah send down upon Muslims when Muslims move away from their Religion.

We, the Mujahideen, went out to fight against the infidels not for the sake of fighting, but to restore the Sharia of Allah in our land. Allah says that He does not change condition of people until they change it themselves.

Today, as during all times, the condition can be changed only with a weapon in our hand. **If Allah's Religion could be established on Earth using another method, then our Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) would not participate in 27 battles.**

There is no power and no might except with Allah, and at the same time **Allah says us to make a cause and prepare forces for waging the war,** as much as we can.

As much as we can does not mean equaling in amount to what kuffar have. It is impossible at this stage, don't be mistaken and remember: **the victory of Muslims will come,** Inshaallah, not

because of number of warriors or abundance of weapons, but it will come because of our fear of Allah. And fear of Allah is such state of a soul and such behavior of a Muslim, when he is afraid of violating limits of permitted and forbidden, which were established by Allah...

...Muslims must be afraid of it always, throughout their entire life. Therefore **we, Mujahideen, reject any laws, rules and establishments that do not come from Allah...**

...I reject all laws and systems established by infidels in the land of Caucasus. **I reject and declare outlawed all names used by infidels to divide Muslims. I declare outlawed ethnic, territorial and colonial zones carrying names of "North-Caucasian republics", "Trans-Caucasian republics" and such like. I am officially declaring of creation of the Caucasus Emirate.**

All lands in Caucasus, where Mujahideen who gave bay'ah (oath) to me wage Jihad, **I declare wilayahs of the Caucasus Emirate: wilayah Dagestan, wilayah Nokhchiycho, wilayah Ghalghaycho, wilayah Iriston, wilayah of the Nogay Steppe, the combined wilayah of Kabarda, Balkar and Karachay.**

I don't think that it is necessary to draw the borders of the Caucasus Emirate. Firstly, because **Caucasus is occupied by kuffar and apostates and is Dar al-Harb, the territory of war, and our nearest task is to make Caucasus Dar as-Salam, establishing the Sharia in its land and expelling the kuffar.**

Secondly, **after expelling the kuffar we must reconquer all historical lands of Muslims, and these borders are beyond the boundaries of Caucasus...**

...I said it earlier and I repeat it again. **We are an inseparable part of the Islamic Ummah.** I am saddened by the position of those Muslims who declare as their enemies only those kuffar who attacked them directly. And at the same time they seek support and sympathy from other kuffar, forgetting that all infidels are one nation.

Today in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine our brothers are fighting. Everyone who attacked Muslims wherever they are are our enemies, common enemies. Our enemy is not Rusnya only, but everyone who wages war against Islam and Muslims. And they are our enemies mainly because they are the enemies of Allah.' (Kavkazcenter, 2007)

Extracts from Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's note (Boston bombing)

'I'm jealous of my brother who ha[s] [re]ceived the reward of jannatul Firdaus (inshallah) before me. I do not mourn because his soul is very much alive. God has a plan for each person. Mine was to hide in this boat and shed some light on our actions. I ask Allah to make me a shahied (iA) to allow me to

return to him and be among all the righteous people in the highest levels of heaven. He who Allah guides no one can misguide. A[llah Ak]bar!

The US Government is killing our innocent civilians but most of you already know that. As a [UI] I can't stand to see such evil go unpunished, we **Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all.** Well at least that's how muhammad (pbuh) wanted it to be [for]ever, the ummah is beginning to rise/[UI] has awoken the mujahideen, know you are fighting men who look into the barrel of your gun and see heaven, now how can you compete with that. We are promised victory and we will surely get it. Now I don't like killing innocent people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said [UI] it is allowed. All credit goes [UI].

Stop killing our innocent people and we will stop. (US District Court, District Of Massachusetts, 2014)