An unlikely interim fix: the urgent case for a UN Security Council reform

Abstract

Many scholars, authors and politicians have stated that the UN Security Council, in the contemporary world, is ‘not fit for purpose.’ Two decades of discussions and deliberations over why and how to reform the Council has not resulted in a consensus in the international community. However, there is an urgent need to reform the Council to improve its efficiency and save itself from irrelevance. This paper intends to deliver a comprehensive analysis of the UNSC reform issue and provide an ‘interim fix’ as an alternative solution to break the reform impasse.
The paper analyses the foundational design of the UNSC using the Institutional Design Theory and reiterates the inherent need for a reform of the Council. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the reform process. A comprehensive examination of the reform proposals show that the two reasons that equally contribute to the reform stalemate are the lack of consensus among the reform groups and the firm opposition of the P5 to any reform agenda that encroaches on their special status or veto right. Using the Veto Player Theory and the Path Dependency Theory, the paper arrives at a finding that a reform implementation through formal amendment of the UN Charter, is unlikely to be foreseen in the near future. Upon such circumstances and taking into account the urgent need for a Council reform, the final part of this paper provides a strategic ‘interim fix.’ This involves introducing various reform strategies that curb the veto right of the P5, as it is the veto right contribute the most to the inefficiency of the Council. The paper suggests the implementation of such a reform strategy through a loose phased agreement, which does not involve a formal amendment to the Charter – to move past the reform impasse and advocate for an immediate fix.